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Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 provides
the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime
security forces. DOD values this authority as an important tool to train and equip military
partners. Funds may be obligated only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Thus far,
the Department of Defense (DOD) has used Section 1206 authority primarily to provide
counterterrorism support. This authority expires in FY2011.
Section 1206 obligations totaled some $100 million in FY2006, $279 million in FY2007, and
$293 million in FY2008. As of mid-April 2009, FY2009 project approvals are being finalized.
As of the date of this report, of FY2009 funds, only $49.3 million has been approved and
obligated for two programs in Lebanon.
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Origins and Evolution of Section 1206 Authority .......................................................................... 1
Congressional Action in 2005 ................................................................................................... 2
Subsequent Congressional Action and Concerns ...................................................................... 3
Funding Provisions and Annual Obligations................................................................................... 5
Conditions ....................................................................................................................................... 6
Joint DOD-State Department Approval Process.............................................................................. 6
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Table 1. Section 1206 Funding: FY2006-2008 Obligations............................................................ 7
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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 10
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ection 1206 of the FY2006 NDAA (P.L. 109-163), as amended, provides the Secretary of
Defense with a new authority to train and equip foreign military forces and foreign
S maritime security forces. This is the first major DOD authority to be used expressly for the
purpose of training the national military forces of foreign countries. Generally, DOD has trained
and equipped foreign military forces through State Department programs. The Bush
Administration requested this “Global Train and Equip” authority because DOD viewed the
planning and implementation processes under which similar State Department security assistance
is provided as too slow and cumbersome.1
Section 1206 provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military
forces for two purposes. One is to enable foreign military forces, as well as foreign maritime
security forces, to perform counterterrorism (CT) operations. Nearly all Section 1206 assistance
to date has been CT training and equipment (T&E). Most T&E has been provided by contractors,
according to DOD officials. The other purpose is to enable foreign military forces to participate in
or to support military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are participating. (DOD
does not use Section 1206 authority for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, according to
DOD officials.)
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In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, some DOD officials
sought a means to increase U.S. support to foreign military and security forces in order to disrupt
terrorist networks. Although “train and equip” authority had resided with the State Department
since 1961, DOD submitted proposed legislation to Congress in early 2005 for authority and
appropriations to train and equip foreign forces. As submitted to Congress, the DOD-proposed
legislation differed in several important respects from the legislation that was eventually passed.
DOD’s proposed authorization bill would have vested new authority with the President to
“authorize building the capacity of partner nations’ military or security forces to disrupt or
destroy terrorist networks, close safe havens, or participate in or support United States, coalition,
or international military or stability operations.” The proposed legislation provided the Secretary
of Defense the lead on implementation, but gave a veto power to the Secretary of State: “The
Secretary of Defense may, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, implement partnership
security capacity building.... “ DOD could implement capacity building projects on its own, or by
transferring DOD funds to the Department of State or to any other federal agency. The
presidential and agency roles changed in subsequent versions.
The original authorization language would have allowed assistance to build up foreign military
and security forces for purposes similar to but more specific than those ultimately enacted into
law (Section 1206, P.L. 109-163). The types of forces that could be assisted were much broader,
and included “armies, guard, border security, civil defense, infrastructure protection, and police
1 State Department programs under which foreign military forces are trained are the International Military Education
and Training (IMET) and the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) programs. Equipment is provided to foreign governments
through the State Department Foreign Military Sales/Foreign Military Financing (FMS/FMF) programs. According to
DOD, this “traditional security assistance takes three to four years from concept to execution,” while “Global Train and
Equip authority allows a response to emergent threats or opportunities in six months or less.” U.S. Department of
Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, February 4, 2008, p. 103. Hereafter referred to as
FY2009 DOD Summary Justification.
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forces.” The proposed annual cap on such assistance was $750 million, much greater than that
eventually approved.
DOD’s proposed appropriations language would have provided for the appropriation of up to
$750 million of funds from operations and maintenance accounts to provide assistance to military
or security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and provide assistance to other military forces in
friendly nations in the nearby region to enhance their capability to combat terrorism and to
support U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Secretary of Defense could use
those funds only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.
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Neither DOD proposal for a global train and equip authority or appropriation was included in
legislation reported that year by the Armed Services committees or the Appropriations
committees. A modified version of the DOD authorization proposal was introduced by Senator
Inhofe as a floor amendment (S.Amdt. 2432) to the Senate version of the FY2006 NDAA. (S.
1042) On November 8, 2005. the Senate approved an amended version of that amendment,
supported by Senator Lugar. Both would provide authority for the purposes requested by DOD.
Each version of the Inhofe amendment, progressively strengthened the State Department role
compared to the DOD proposal. Conference committee negotiators made further changes,
however, strengthening the DOD role, diminishing the State Department role, restricting the types
of forces that could be supported, and lowering the funding cap.
The Inhofe amendment introduced on November 4, 2005, was similar to the DOD authorization
request in that it would have conferred authority on the President to build partnership security
capacity of foreign military and security forces on the President and authorized the use of up to
$750 million a year in DOD funds for the same purposes as the original DOD authorization
request. A major difference was the role of the State Department. The Inhofe amendment made a
request by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense the trigger to initiate DOD support, a
seemingly stronger role than that of the DOD proposed legislation which required the Secretary
of Defense to seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State for any support. Like the DOD
proposal, however, the Inhofe amendment left DOD free to implement programs itself, or to
transfer funds to the Department of State or any other federal agency for implementation. (These
funds would remain available until expended.) In introducing the amendment, Senator Inhofe
indicated that the purpose of the new authority was to expedite train and equip assistance, and
expressed displeasure with then-current arrangements for train and equip programs conducted
through the State Department. For instance, he noted that assistance to train and equip Georgia
forces for counterterrorism required that “Seven different authorities for funding and sources...be
stitched together” in a process that took eight months. (Congressional Record, November 4, 2005,
p S12395.)
The revised Inhofe amendment further strengthened the Secretary of State’s role by making three
changes. One change eliminated DOD’s ability to implement proposals on its own. Another
eliminated DOD’s ability to transfer funds to any civilian agency other than the State Department.
In short, the Secretary of Defense could provide partnership support only by transferring DOD
funds to the Department of State. A third change made such support subject to the authorities and
limitations in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and the FY2006 Foreign Operations bill. In a
floor statement on November 8, 2006, Senator Lugar said that “the amendment as now written
leaves the authority for deciding which countries, and when, how, and why foreign assistance
should be provided, in the hands of the Secretary of State. The amendment does not provide
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statutory authority to the Secretary of Defense to establish a new foreign aid program outside the
purview of the Secretary of State. It does authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide funding
to the State Department for a new train and equip foreign assistance program....”2 At the same
time, Senator Lugar acknowledged DOD concerns that the “State Department oversight of these
kinds of programs [is] cumbersome and slow.” He stated: “These obstacles need to be
overcome. State Department procedures should be streamlined and the two Departments should
develop plans to push these important programs forward efficiently and quickly.” (Congressional
Record, Senate, S12495.)
A final version, as discussed elsewhere, emerged from the conference committee. There were
four important changes from the Senate version. First, the conference committee version (Section
1206 of P.L. 109-163) stripped the leadership role from the Secretary of State and bestowed it on
the Secretary of Defense. Section 1206 broadened DOD’s role by providing authority for the
President to direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support a program to build the capacity
of a foreign military forces. It reduced the Secretary of State’s role by providing that the
Secretaries of Defense and State were to “jointly formulate any program directed by the
President” and the Secretary of Defense was to “coordinate with the Secretary of State in the
implementation of any program directed by the President....” Second, the conference committee
version did not provide authority to assist security forces of any type. Third, it lowered the annual
funding cap considerably, to $200 million. And fourth, it broadened the purpose of the
counterterrorism element of the assistance from enabling foreign forces to disrupt or destroy
terrorist networks and to close safe to enabling them to conduct counter-terrorist operations.
In their explanatory statement (H.Rept. 109-360, accompanying H.R. 1815), the conferees
described Section 1206 as a two-year pilot program, which would be reviewed at the end of that
period. They noted that “under current law, foreign military training programs are conducted
exclusively under the authority of the Secretary of State. The conferees believe it is important
that any changes in statutory authorities for foreign military assistance do not have unintended
consequences for the effective coordination of U.S. foreign policy writ large, nor should they
detract from the Department of Defense’s focus on its core responsibilities, particularly the
warfighting tasks for which it is uniquely suited.”
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Congress made further changes to Section 1206 authority through amendments in subsequent
NDAAs, among them changes elevating the State Department’s role but at the same time vesting
authority for the program in the Secretary of Defense (with the concurrence of the Secretary of
State), raising the funding cap, and extending the duration of the authority. Section 1206 of the
John Warner NDAA for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364) eliminated the President’s role in directing the
Secretary of Defense to conduct or support such programs, and instead authorized “the Secretary
2 Senator Lugar further stated that “The Secretary of State should retain full authority over decisions as to which
countries should receive assistance, the timing of its provision, and the way in which it should be provided. The
Department of Defense should continue implementing train and equip programs under the purview of the Secretary of
State.” He concluded: “All foreign assistance programs need to take place within a foreign policy context, with
consideration of the traditional concerns---the recipient country’s treatment of its own people, potential reactions from
neighboring sates in the region, and the overall bilateral relationship with the recipient country, including the assistance
in the war against terrorism. It is the Secretary of State’s job to weigh such foreign policy issues and make
recommendations to the President that strke the right balance for American interests. The amendment as now written
meets the concerns I had and I would request that I be listed as a co-sponsor.” (Congressional Record, Senate, S12495.)
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of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State” to conduct or support those programs.
It raised the authorized amount to $300 million, and it extended the authority through FY2008.3
This amendment was the result of a conference committee compromise over a proposed Senate
amendment that would have extended Section 1206 authority to combatant commanders. In their
explanatory statement, the conferees stated that “the authorities provided in this section are
provided in the spirit of a pilot program... . The conferees believe it will be important to
demonstrate through experience that these expanded authorities can and will be exercised
consistent with the effective coordination of U.S. foreign policy writ large. Furthermore, the
conferees strongly believe that foreign assistance programs are more appropriately funded
through the foreign assistance accounts, as administered by the Department of State, and urge the
administration to request sufficient funding for foreign military assistance in those accounts in
future years budget requests.”4
Through the enactment of the Duncan Hunter NDAA for FY2009 (P.L. 110-417), Congress
rejected the Administration’s 2008 request to make Section 1206 authority permanent law under
Title 10 (Armed Services) of the United States Code. Instead, it extended the temporary authority
for three years (i.e., through FY2011). P.L. 110-417 also expanded Section 1206 authority to
include the provision of assistance to maritime security forces,5 and raised the spending cap to
$350 million.
3 The DOD proposal for FY2007 NDAA authorization language had requested that authority to direct Section 1206
programs be vested in the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, rather than the
President, in order to “increase responsiveness by relieving the President of having to approve each Section 1206
program personally, while preserving important roles of both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State in
authorizing capacity-building programs under this provision. This would enable the Department of Defense, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State, to pursue time-sensitive opportunities to build capacity of partner nations.” DOD
also requested the expansion of the types of forces that could be assisted to include security forces (“specifically
gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, border protection, and
counterterrorism forces...”), and an increase in the spending cap to $750 million.
4 These changes were the result of a conference committee compromise on a Senate amendment to Section 1206 in S.
2766, its version of the FY2007 NDAA. See H.Rept. 109-702, the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007,
Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 5152.
The Senate amendment would have permitted the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State,
to authorize commanders of the geographic combatant commands “to respond to unanticipated changes in a security
environment” within their area of responsibility (AOR) to spend up to $50 million per year per commander for Section
1206 purposes, with total spending limited to $200 million. In addition, the Senate Amendment would have permitted
the Secretary of Defense to authorize geographic combatant commanders “to respond to urgent and unanticipated
humanitarian relief or reconstruction requirements in a foreign country within the commander’s AOR” if the
commander determined that such assistance would promote the security interest of the United States and the recipient
country, up to a total of $200 million “in any country in a fiscal year.” In response, the House, which had no similar
provision, offered the amendment which was adopted. Although the proposed section to provide combatant
commanders with funding for existing Section 1206 purposes was deleted, elsewhere in the bill the conferees included
a provision to expand authority under the Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund to provide urgent and unanticipated
humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance.
5 As passed by the Senate, S. 3001would have extended Section 1206 authority to security forces, specifically “a
foreign country’s coast guard, border protection, and other security forces engaged primarily in counterterrorism
missions in order for that country to conduct counterterrorism operations.” The Administration had requested authority
to train and equip a wide spectrum of security forces, including gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense,
infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland defense, coast guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces.
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In their respective conference reports on the FY2009 NDAA, both the House and the Senate
armed services committees expressed concern about whether Section 1206 funds were being
appropriately used.
• The Senate Armed Services Committee report reiterated the committee’s earlier position
that Section 1206 was intended as a pilot program, “not intended to duplicate or
substitute for other foreign assistance authorities, nor...intended to sustain train and equip
programs over multiple years.” It expressed the committee’s concerns that Section 1206
funds were “being used for programs, particularly in countries where the terrorist threat is
currently low, that primarily serve to build counter-narcotics capabilities.”6
• The House Armed Services Committee report stated DOD had “pushed beyond the
clearly articulated limits of this authority” in the case of Panama, raising concern “about
the responsible execution of this authority in the future.” In the report, the committee
expressed its belief “that capable foreign partners play a vital role in the international
security environment but remain unconvinced that this authority should reside
permanently with the Department of Defense. The committee expects that, over the long-
term, these ‘train and equip’-type authorities, which appear to be migrating to the
Department of Defense, might better remain within the Department of State’s
jurisdiction.”7
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Section 1206 programs are funded from the DOD operations and maintenance account. During
the first two years of the program, DOD transferred funds from lower-priority missions to fund
activities under Section 1206, according to the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Policy
[OSD/P]. For FY2008, Congress appropriated $300 million for Section 1206 in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2008 [P.L. 110-161].) In its 2008 request for permanent Section 1206
authority, the Administration requested that spending authority be increased to $750 million, but
in its FY2009 budget request asked for $500 million in spending authority for that year. Instead,
in the FY2009 Duncan Hunter NDAA, Congress increased the authorized amount to $350
million. In the same bill, Congress also provided authority for funds to be used in consecutive
fiscal years (i.e., funds made available for a program begun in one fiscal year may also be used
for that program in the next fiscal year). The table below provides data on Section 1206 FY2006-
FY2008 programs. Total program obligations for FY2006 through FY 2008 were $673.0 million:
$100.1 million in FY2006, $279.5 million in FY2007, and $293.4 million in FY2008.
FY2009 project approvals are pending. (See paragraph on the approval process, below.) As of the
date of this report, of FY2009 funds, only $49.3 million has been approved and obligated for two
programs in Lebanon.
6 S.Rept. 110-335 continued: “While recognizing a degree of overlap between counterterrorism and counternarcotics
capabilities, the committee urges the Department of Defense to fund programs to build counter-narcotics capabilities
using funds and authorities intended to support counter-narcotics activities, and if appropriate, seek any necessary
modifications to existing counter-narcotics authorities to support these activities. The committee also indicated that it
viewed U.S. Africa Command AOR counterterrorism needs as a priority for Section 1206 assistance.
7 H.Rept. 110-652 also encouraged DOD “to use members of the United States military to conduct the training
provided under this authority whenever possible.”
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Section 1206 of the FY2006 NDAA requires that programs conducted under its authority observe
and respect human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the “legitimate civilian authority within that
country.” The authority may not be used to provide any type of assistance that is otherwise
prohibited by any provision of law. It also may not be used to provide assistance to any country
that is otherwise prohibited from receiving such assistance under any other provision of law. The
legislation also requires a 15-day advance notification to the congressional defense, foreign
affairs, and appropriations committees before initiating each program. This notification must
specify, among other things, the program country, budget, and completion date, as well as the
source and planned expenditure of funds.
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As modified by the FY2007 John Warner NDAA, Section 1206 authority permits the Secretary of
Defense to provide such support with the “concurrence” of the Secretary of State. According to
DOD and State Department officials, that term has been interpreted to mean the Secretary of
State’s approval. Section 1206 requires both secretaries to jointly formulate any program and
coordinate in its implementation. Their respective agencies have developed an extensive joint
review process that some officials see as a potential model for other assistance programs. Section
1206 programs are developed under a “dual-key” authority (i.e., with the approval of both DOD
and Department of State officials). U.S. embassies and the military combatant commands are
encouraged to jointly formulate programs. Both parties “must approve each program explicitly in
writing”8 before the proposal is submitted to DOD and State Department staff in Washington,
D.C., for their concurrence and, ultimately, the approval of the Secretaries of Defense and State.9
8 FY2009 DOD Summary Justification, p. 103.
9 E-mail from the OSD/P, May 20, 2007.
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Table 1. Section 1206 Funding: FY2006-2008 Obligations
($ U.S. millions)
Recipient Program
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
Totals
General
Defense Institute of International
Human Rights/ Respect for
Legal Studies
Civilian Authority Training
—
—
0.6
0.6
AFRICA
Chad
Light Infantry Rapid Reaction
Force Establishment
— 6.0 —
Tactical Airlift Capacity
Training
— 1.7 — 8.0
Tactical Communications
Interoperability Aid
— 0.3 —
Djibouti
Maritime Domain Awareness
(MDA), Response, Interdiction,
and Coastal Security
— 8.0 —
Enhancement
13.1
CT Communications Package
—
—
5.1
Ethiopia
CT Communications and
Combat Engineering Capability
— — 13.3
17.7
Night Vision Capability Package
—
—
4.4
Kenya
Border Security Initiative
—
—
4.1
Border and Coastal Security
11.1
Enhancement
— — 7.0
Mauritania
Light Infantry Rapid Reaction
Force Establishment
4.5 — 4.5
Tunisia Suppressing
Trans-Border
Terrorist Activity
— — 10.0
10.0
Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria and Senegal Civil-Military Operations
Training in Support of the
— 3.4 — 3.4
TransSahara CT Program
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania
East Africa Regional Security
Initiative
— 14.2 — 14.2
Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe
Gulf of Guinea Regional
Maritime Awareness Capability
6.8 — —
6.8
Aid
Chad and Nigeria
Multinational Information-
sharing Network Aid
6.2 — —
6.2
Algeria, Niger, Chad, Morocco,
Partner Nation Intelligence
Senegal, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Mali Capability Aid
— 1.1 — 1.1
Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Cape
MDA and Territorial Water
Verde, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Threat Response Capability
Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia,
Establishment —
5.7
—
5.7
Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, and Sao Tome and Principe
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Recipient Program
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
Totals
Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde,
West and Central Africa
Gabon, Ghana, Sao Tome & Principe, Maritime Equipment Package
—
—
11.5
11.5
Senegal, Togo
Cameroon, Gabon, Guinea, Senegal,
Maritime Security Capability
Sierra Leone
Enhancement
— — 12.5
12.5
Total Africa
13.0
44.9
67.9
125.8
GREATER EUROPE
Albania
CT Capability Aid
—
6.7
—
Maritime Coastal Patrol CT
12.2
Capability Enhancement
— — 5.5
Georgia
CT Capability Aid
—
6.5
—
17.9
Special Forces T&E
11.4
Macedonia
CT Capability Aid
—
3.0
—
3.0
Ukraine
CT Capability Aid
—
12.0
—
12.0
Total Greater Europe
—
28.2 26.9 45.1
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (Including Central Asia)
Indonesia
Integrated Maritime
Surveillance System
18.4 — —
Eastern Fleet Regional
Command Center (FY07)/
— 3.8 7.3
MDA (FY08)
Celebes Sea and Malacca Strait
Network
— 6.1
57.4
Coastal Surveillance Stations
—
11.5
4.3
Western Fleet Command and
Control (C2) Center and HQ
— — 2.0
Command, Control,
Communications and
Computers (C4) Surveillance
— — 4.0
and Reconnaissance
Kazakhstan
Coalition CT and Stability
Operations Capacity Aid
— 19.3 — 31.8
Caspian Security
—
—
12.5
Kyrgyzstan
Increasing Armed Forces CT
Capabilities
— — 12.0
12.0
Malaysia
Eastern Sabah MDARadars
—
13.6
—
Strait of Malacca MDA Support
—
2.2
—
MDA Package
—
—
11.5
CENTRIX Stations
—
0.5
43.9
C2 Center for Joint Forces
Sabah HQ
— — 7.1
Maritime Interdiction Package
—
—
9.0
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Recipient Program
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
Totals
Philippines
Maritime T&E for Interdiction
Purposes
— 2.9
Coast Watch South High
Frequency Radios (FY07)/
— 1.8 11.1
Radars for Sulu Archipelago
(FY08)
32.4
Maritime Interdiction
Capability
— 6.4 —
Interdiction and Offensive
Capabilities Improvement (of
— 4.4 —
UH-1 Huey helicopters)
Border Control Interdiction
—
—
5.8
Sri Lanka
Maritime Security T&E for
Interdiction Purposes
10.9 — —
Aircraft C2 Integration
—
6.0
—
18.3
Maritime Security and Navy
Interdiction Capability
— 1.4 —
Total Asia and the Pacific
29.3
79.9
86.6
195.8
MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH/SOUTHWESTERN ASIA
Azerbaijan
Naval Commando CT Training
—
—
1.7
1.7
Bahrain
Patrol Boats
5.3
—
—
Coastal Patrol Capability
Development
— 24.5 — 34.1
Defense Force
Counterintelligence Analysis
— 0.04 —
Center Development
Defense Force Special
Operations T&E
— — 4.3
Bangladesh
Maritime Patrol and
Interdiction Initiative
— — 7.2
7.2
Lebanon
Military Assistance to Lebanese
Armed Forces
10.5 30.6 —
Special Operations Forces T&E
—
—
7.2
61.7
Secure Communications for
Special Operations Forces
— — 9.2
Logistics Support System
—
—
4.2
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Recipient Program
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
Totals
Pakistan
Border Area T&E/ Marines
T&E
23.3 5.7 —
Enhance Shared MDAand
Cooperative Maritime Security
— 8.1 —
Aid
92.9
Helicopter CT Capability
—
—
20.9
Special Services Group COIN
Kick Start Initiative
— — 17.9
Mi-17 Support to 21st QRS (?)
—
—
17.0
Yemen
Cross Border Security and CT
Aid
4.3 — —
Yemeni Special Operations
30.3
Capacity Development to
— 26.0 —
enhance border security
Total Middle East and South Asia
43.4
94.9
89.6
227.9
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Mexico
CT Capabilities (FY07)/ CT
Capability Package (FY08)
— 1.0 12.9
13.9
Dominican Republic and Panama
Joint Maritime CT Capability
Aid
14.4 — —
14.4
Bahamas, Dominican Republic,
Caribbean Basin Maritime
Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua
Security Aid (radios and boats)
— 23.3 — 23.3
Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic, Carribean Basin Capability
Honduras, Jamaica, and Panama
Enhancements
— — 12.0
12.0
Belize, Guyana, Honduras, and
CT Unit T&E for participation
Suriname
in Operation Enduring
— — 13.8
13.8
Freedom
Total Western Hemisphere
14.4
24.3
38.7 77.4
Totals 100.1
279.5
293.4
673.0
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense. FY2006-FY2007 figures verified May 2008. FY2008 figures made
available November 24, 2008.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
ȱȱ ȱ
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
nserafino@crs.loc.gov, 7-7667
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