Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP)
Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
April 27, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22707
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles
Summary
In late 2007, the Department of Defense (DOD) launched a major procurement initiative to
replace most uparmored High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) in Iraq with Mine-
Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles by FY2009. MRAPs have been described as
providing significantly more protection against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) than
uparmored HMMWVs. DOD’s decision to acquire a new, smaller MRAP variant for use in
Afghanistan; MRAP mechanical, logistical, and readiness concerns could be potential policy
issues for congressional consideration. This report will be updated.
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Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
DOD’s MRAP Requirement ................................................................................................. 1
MRAP Survivability ............................................................................................................. 1
MRAPs Deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan ............................................................................ 1
Disposition of MRAPs in Iraq ............................................................................................... 2
Growing Need for MRAPs in Afghanistan............................................................................. 2
A New MRAP Version for Afghanistan ....................................................................................... 2
Status of M-ATV Effort......................................................................................................... 3
MRAP Operational Concerns ...................................................................................................... 3
MRAP Mechanical, Logistical, and Readiness Issues ............................................................ 3
Potential Issues for Congress....................................................................................................... 4
MRAP Disposition................................................................................................................ 4
M-ATV Program ................................................................................................................... 5
MRAP Maintenance, Logistics, and Readiness ...................................................................... 5
Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 6
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Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles
Background
MRAPs are a family of vehicles produced by a variety of domestic and international companies
that generally incorporate a “V”-shaped hull and armor plating designed to provide protection
against mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). DOD originally intended to procure
three types of MRAPs.1 These included Category I vehicles, capable of carrying up to 7 personnel
and intended for urban operations; Category II vehicles, capable of carrying up to 11 personnel
and intended for a variety of missions such as supporting security, convoy escort, troop or cargo
transport, medical, explosive ordnance disposal, or combat engineer operations; and Category III
vehicles, intended to be used primarily to clear mines and IEDs, which are capable of carrying up
to 13 personnel. The Army and Marines first employed MRAPs in limited numbers in Iraq and
Afghanistan in 2003, primarily for route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
operations. These route clearance MRAPs quickly gained a reputation for providing superior
protection for their crews, and some suggested that MRAPs might be a better alternative for
transporting troops in combat than uparmored HMMWVs.
DOD’s MRAP Requirement 2
In 2008, DOD approved the following MRAP acquisitions quantities by service and for other
uses: Army, 12,000; Marine Corps, 2,225; Navy, 544; Air Force, 558; U.S. Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM), 378; and ballistic testing, 133, for a total of 15,858 vehicles of all
categories.
MRAP Survivability 3
DOD officials have stated that the casualty rate for MRAPs is 6%, making it “the most survivable
vehicle we have in our arsenal by a multitude.” By comparison, the M-1 Abrams main battle tank
was said to have a casualty rate of 15%, and the uparmored HMMWV, a 22% casualty rate.
MRAPs Deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan4
On February 20, 2009, DOD announced that it had fielded its 10,000th MRAP in Iraq. Since the
first MRAP was fielded in April 2007, more than 11,700 MRAPs have been fielded across
CENTCOM which suggests that about 1,700 of those 11,700 MRAPs had been sent to
Afghanistan as of February 2009. DOD also noted that they had trained more than 22,000
personnel to operate MRAPs since April 2007. Because ground convoys into Afghanistan have
1 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report, Subject: Rapid Acquisition of Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected Vehicles, July 15, 2008.
2 Ibid.
3 Information in this section is taken from DOD Press Transcripts, “DOD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell,” May 15,
2008.
4 Information in this section is taken from an American Forces Press Service News Article, “Military Fields 10,000th
Mine-Resistant Vehicle to Troops in Iraq,” February 20, 2009.
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been frequently attacked, MRAPs are being airlifted in Afghanistan along with other sensitive
vehicles and equipment.5
Disposition of MRAPs in Iraq6
As U.S. forces begin drawing down in Iraq, the Army and Marines plan to put the majority of
MRAPs into prepositioned stocks at various overseas locations, ship a number back to the United
States for training, and place a number into logistics and route clearance units. Out of the Army’s
eventual 12,000 Iraq-based MRAPs, the Army plans to use only 2,675 in operational units. The
Army plans on allocating 702 MRAPs for training in addition to the 50 MRAPs already
designated for training drivers. Another 1,400 MRAPs will be incorporated into route clearance
units and some MRAPs will likely be given to or sold to Iraqi forces. The rest (possibly as many
as 7,000) will be placed in world-wide prepositioned stocks. The Marines plan to keep only about
800 of their 2,225 MRAPs with operating forces, with the rest being sent to prepositioned stocks.
Growing Need for MRAPs in Afghanistan7
Roadside IEDs are estimated to be causing about 75 percent of coalition forces casualties in
Afghanistan, which is an increase of 25 percent from 2007, when it was estimated that IEDs were
responsible for 50 percent of all casualties. This IED rate of casualties for January and February
of 2009 was reported to be higher than the rate in Iraq when fighting was at its worst. NATO
officials in Afghanistan have noted that IEDs are becoming more powerful and U.S. commanders
in Afghanistan are asking for 3,300 MRAPs but it is suggested that the Pentagon could end up
buying up to 10,000 lighter-weight MRAPs for Afghanistan if the U.S. increases its force level to
60,000 personnel over the next couple of years.
A New MRAP Version for Afghanistan
In the summer of 2008, DOD began to examine the possibility of developing and procuring a
lighter-weight, all-terrain capable MRAP variant to address the poor roads and extreme terrain of
Afghanistan. This new vehicle - designated the MRAP-All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) - is intended
to weigh between 7 to 10 tons (as opposed to the 14 to 24 tons of the current MRAP variants) and
have better off-road mobility.8 In early December 2008, a Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued
with DOD officials suggesting that as many as 10,000 M-ATVs could be procured, but a more
likely estimate was 2,080 vehicles.9 This requirement for M-ATVs is in addition to the original
15,858 MRAPs approved by DOD in 2008. The Pentagon planned to award up to five contracts
5 Jason Sherman, “Strykers, MRAPs Airlifted into Afghanistan to Avoid In-Transit Ground Attacks,”
InsideDefense.com, February 27, 2009.
6 Information in this section is taken from Emelie Rutherford, “Some Mine-Resistant Vehicles in Iraq Destined for
Prepositioned Stocks, CONUS Training,” Defense Daily, March 17, 2009 and Marjorie Censer, “Army to Move
MRAPs Into Training, Route Clearance, Logistics Units, InsideDefense.com, March 23, 2009.
7 Information in this section is taken from Tom Vanden Brook’s, “Push for MRAPs in Afghanistan,” USA Today, April
3, 2009 and “Need Rises for Lighter MRAPs,” USA Today, February 4, 2009.
8 Kris Osborn, “DOD Doubles Potential Buy of Lighter MRAPs,” Defense News, November 17, 2008.
9 Emelie Rutherford, “Pentagon Eyeing $1.5 Billion Request to Hill for New All-Terrain MRAP Effort,” Defense
Daily, December 3, 2008.
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for test vehicles in the spring of 2009 and a final production contract to a single firm in May
2009, although DOD has not ruled out awarding a final contract to more than one firm.10 DOD
would like to make a final award to a single firm to avoid the logistical problems encountered in
the MRAP program where MRAPs came from a variety of firms.11 DOD also hopes to do a better
job of pricing M-ATVs, as the Pentagon Inspector General determined that DOD had likely
overpaid $45.7 million on some 2,900 MRAPs because they failed to properly determine if
contract prices were “fair and reasonable” for the first nine MRAP contracts awarded.12 The total
cost for the M-ATV program is estimated by some to be approximately $ 3 billion, with $1.5
billion coming from the FY2009 War Supplemental and the other $1.5 billion from an expected
request to Congress.13 If DOD receives requested funding and production proceeds as intended,
the first M-ATVs could be deployed to Afghanistan in the fall of 2009.
Status of M-ATV Effort
In January 2009, Navistar, a Force Protection and Michigan-based General Dynamics Land
Systems (GDLS) team, Oskkosh, General Dynamics Land Systems- Canada (GDLS-C), and BAE
Systems were said to have submitted written bids and armor samples.14 In late February 2009,
prototypes were delivered to Aberdeen Proving Grounds for evaluation with a contract award
scheduled for June 2009. On March 30, 2009, Navistar reportedly filed a protest citing an
“unspecified technicality in the government’s evaluation of its proposal” and GDLS-C announced
that they were dropping out of the M-ATV competition.15 Navistar withdrew its protest in early
April after the contract was amended by program officials and the award of a single production
contract is still expected in June 2009.16
MRAP Operational Concerns
MRAP Mechanical, Logistical, and Readiness Issues
At the program level, GAO has noted that “operating, maintaining, and sustaining a fleet of
15,000 fielded vehicles by at least five different vendors could present significant challenges.”17
Secretary of Defense Gates acknowledged that there are a number of mechanical problems
associated with the MRAPs, attributing some of these difficulties to the rapid acquisition of the
10 Ibid.
11 Rebekah Gordon, “Brogan: Step-Ladder Pricing, Cumulative Volume Pricing in M-ATV Contract,”
InsideDefense.com, February 5, 2009.
12 Ibid.
13 Emelie Rutherford, “Pentagon Eyeing $1.5 Billion Request to Hill for New All-Terrain MRAP Effort,” Defense
Daily, December 3, 2008.
14 Rebekah Gordon.
15 Marjorie Censer, “Navistar Files Protest in MRAP ATV Competition; GDLS-C Out,” InsideDefense.com, April 2,
2009.
16 Marjorie Censer, “Navistar Withdraws M-ATV Protest After Corrective Action Taken in RFP,” InsideDefense.com,
April 9, 2009.
17 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report, Subject: Rapid Acquisition of Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected Vehicles, July 15, 2008.
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vehicle.18 Secretary Gates noted that DOD did not ensure “that the supply line was full before we
deployed them,” and also made reference to problems with the MRAP’s fire extinguisher system,
problems with suspension, and the vulnerability of its axles.19 Another concern is that, at present,
much of the MRAP maintenance is being performed by contractors as DOD adjusts its long-term
maintenance strategy so that maintenance will be performed by military personnel. It was
reported in the summer of 2008 that one in five MRAPs in Iraq were out of service (which
correlates to an 80% readiness rate) primarily due to a lack of repair parts.20 The Pentagon
disputed this claim and maintained that its operational readiness rate for MRAPs in Iraq is almost
92%.21 Sufficient repair parts may also be a readiness concern in Iraq and Afghanistan, as DOD
admits it is trying to “catch up” in terms of MRAP repair parts.22 In the past, shortages of heavy
duty transmissions, engines, axles, and tires have been cited as MRAP readiness issues. These
parts shortages may be exacerbated in the case of Afghanistan, where vulnerable ground supply
lines have necessitated a greater reliance on resupply by air transport. While plans to place a
significant portion of the MRAP fleet into prepositioned stocks might seem to alleviate
operational readiness concerns, MRAPs that are placed into prepositioned stocks will be required
to be kept at a high state of readiness.
Potential Issues for Congress
MRAP Disposition
Recent testimony by Army and Marine Corps leadership suggests that almost 8,000 of the almost
16,000 MRAPs are destined for an inactive status in the prepositioned stocks of those Services.
As MRAP fielding began in 2007, many of these vehicles destined for prepositioning are likely
less than two years old, and it can be argued that this is an inadequate return on investment. On
April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates announced that he intended to significantly restructure
the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) program.23 As part of his justification to restructure
FCS, Secretary Gates was concerned that the FCS program did not include a role for MRAPs and
implied that there needed to be a greater role for MRAPs in the Army’s vehicle modernization
plan. It is not known if current Army and Marine Corps plans to inactivate upwards of 8,000
MRAPs constitutes the role that Secretary of Defense Gates envisions for these vehicles, but it
might prove beneficial to clarify both DOD’s and the Service’s positions on this potential point of
contention.
18 Marjorie Censer, “Gates: Military Fixing MRAP Problems As Fast As We Can,” InsideDefense.com, December 19,
2008.
19 Ibid.
20 Suzanne Malveaux, “One Out of Five MRAPs in Iraq is Out of Commission,” CNN, July 8, 2008.
21 Jason Sherman, “MRAP Operational Readiness Rates Exceed 90 Percent Goal; Nine Trucks Destroyed,”
InsideDefense.com, July 11, 2008.
22 Ibid.
23 Information in this section is taken from a transcript of Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates Budget Press Briefing,
Arlington, VA April 6, 2009. For detailed information on the Future Combat System see CRS Report RL32888, The
Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
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M-ATV Program
DOD leadership has suggested that they have learned a number of lessons from the MRAP
program that will play a role in how they structure and execute the M-ATV program.24 These
lessons include contractual, order quantity, and pricing lessons as well as safety lessons—
including design features to address frequent MRAP rollovers. Before DOD awards M-ATV
production contracts, perhaps as early as June 2009, a detailed discussion between DOD and
Congress regarding these lessons learned and how their incorporation will improve M-ATV
effectiveness, readiness, and safety, as well as how these lessons could result in potential overall
program cost savings might be beneficial.
MRAP Maintenance, Logistics, and Readiness
GAO has expressed concern that “operating, maintaining, and sustaining a fleet of 15,000 fielded
vehicles by at least five different vendors could present significant challenges.”25 These
challenges will likely be exacerbated by the possible procurement of thousands of M-ATVs.
While DOD contends that there is a degree of commonality between MRAPs from various
vendors, there are likely considerable logistics and maintenance issues resulting from the mixed
MRAP fleet. The rugged and extreme Afghan terrain might also put a greater strain on MRAPs
than Iraq did, further increasing readiness issues. These issues could have significant readiness
and cost ramifications that Congress might wish to review with DOD. While DOD’s long-term
goal is to transition from contractor to military maintenance for MRAPs, contractors are
responsible for a great deal of MRAP maintenance activities. Are there sufficient contractors in
Iraq and Afghanistan to support the ever-growing MRAP fleets? Is the quality and availability of
contractor MRAP maintenance comparable to military maintenance and is this a significant factor
in MRAP readiness? DOD is currently “catching up” in terms of acquiring and stockpiling MRAP
repair parts. Is this shortage a function of funding, the ability of the respective MRAP
manufacturers to produce sufficient stocks of repair parts, of programmatic priorities, or a
combination of factors? How do the resupply problems associated with transiting Pakistan affect
MRAP maintenance, logistics, and readiness in Afghanistan—particularly if thousands of
additional vehicles will be deployed in theater over the next few years? Will repair parts and
MRAP and M-ATV components need to be airlifted into theater due to enemy interdiction of
ground resupply routes ?
24 Kris Osborn, “MRAP Breakthrough,” Defense News, October 6, 2008 and “Implementing Lessons from MRAP,”
Defense Update, March 2009.
25 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report, Subject: Rapid Acquisition of Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected Vehicles, July 15, 2008.
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Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
Congressional Research Service
6