Piracy off the Horn of Africa
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
R. Chuck Mason
Legislative Attorney
Rawle O. King
Analyst in Financial Economics and Risk Assessment
April 24, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40528
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Piracy off the Horn of Africa
Summary
Recent attacks, including those on U.S.-flagged vessels, in the waters off the Horn of Africa have
brought new U.S. and international attention to the long-standing problem of piracy in the region.
The International Maritime Bureau recorded 111 attacks in the waters off the Horn of Africa in
2008, almost double the number in 2007. As of April 20, 2009, The International Maritime
Bureau had counted 84 attacks since January: approximately 300 non-U.S. crew members on 18
hijacked vessels remain in Somali captivity. Previously concentrated in the Gulf of Aden between
Yemen and the northern coast of Somalia and along the country’s eastern coastline, attacks on
merchant ships are now taking place over an area of more than 1 million sq. miles in the Gulf and
the west Indian Ocean, posing a significant threat to commercial shipping. Pirate attacks also
have threatened relief shipments bound for East Africa and the countries of the Horn, amid a
humanitarian crisis in the region that experts are calling the worst since 1984.
The increase in pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa is directly linked to continuing insecurity and
the absence of the rule of law in war-torn Somalia. The absence of a functioning government in
Somalia remains the single greatest challenge to regional security and provides freedom of action
for those engaged in piracy along the Somali coast. Some observers also have alleged that the
absence of coastal security authorities in Somalia has allowed illegal international fishing and
maritime dumping to occur in Somali waters, which in turn has undermined the economic
prospects of some Somalis and may be providing economic or political motivation to some
groups engaged in piracy. The apparent motive of many active Somali pirate groups is profit, and
piracy has proven to be a lucrative activity for many thus far. Ransoms paid to Somali pirates and
their supporters, estimated at over $30 million in 2008, may exacerbate ongoing fighting and
further undermine security in the region.
The U.N. Security Council issued four resolutions (1816, 1838, 1846, and 1851) in 2008 to
facilitate an international response to piracy off the Horn of Africa. At present, Resolution 1851
has authorized international naval forces to carry out anti-piracy operations in Somali territorial
waters and ashore, with the consent of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG). In
January 2009, a multilateral Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was
established to coordinate antipiracy efforts. U.S., NATO, European Union, regional, and other
naval forces are currently patrolling waters near Somalia in coordination with a U.S.-led Task
Force. On April 23, international donors pledged over $250 million to support African Union
peacekeepers and planned efforts to strengthen nascent TFG security forces.
Some members of the 111th Congress have expressed concern about the threat posed by piracy,
and President Obama has stated that his Administration is resolved to halt the rise of piracy in the
Horn of Africa region. On April 15, the Obama Administration outlined preliminary plans for a
more robust policy response to the threat of piracy and pledged to continue working through
multilateral coordination and enforcement mechanisms established during the Bush
Administration. Most experts believe that the reestablishment of government authority in Somalia
is the only guarantee that piracy will not persist or reemerge as a threat. Congress may seek to
influence U.S. policy through oversight of U.S. military operations and diplomacy and through
foreign assistance appropriations and authorizations. Also see CRS Report RL33911, Somalia:
Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, by Ted Dagne and CRS Report R40081,
Ocean Piracy and Its Impact on Insurance, by Rawle O. King.
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Contents
Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 3
Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Profile..................................................................................... 5
The Pirates...................................................................................................................... 5
Motives........................................................................................................................... 6
Tactics and Demands....................................................................................................... 7
Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Impact .................................................................................. 10
Threats to Commercial Shipping and Global Trade........................................................ 10
Threats to Humanitarian Aid Deliveries......................................................................... 12
Potential Financing of Regional Conflict and Terrorism Concerns ................................. 12
U.S. and International Policy Responses.................................................................................... 13
U.S. Policy.......................................................................................................................... 13
United Nations Security Council ......................................................................................... 15
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia ............................................................... 15
Combined Task Force 151 and Other Naval Forces.............................................................. 16
NATO: Operation Allied Provider and Operation Allied Protector ....................................... 17
European Union: Operation ATALANTA ............................................................................ 17
International Maritime Organization and the Djibouti Code of Conduct ............................... 18
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: “Shipriders” and Capacity Building................. 19
Private Sector and Shipping Industry Responses.................................................................. 19
Issues for Congress and Policy Options ..................................................................................... 20
Oversight of U.S. Military Forces and U.S. Foreign Assistance ........................................... 21
Piracy, Law Enforcement, and International Cooperation..................................................... 22
Options for Improving the Immediate Security of Merchant Ships....................................... 25
Risk Reduction and Best Practices................................................................................. 25
Arming Merchant Ships ................................................................................................ 25
Convoys........................................................................................................................ 26
Maritime War Risk Insurance ........................................................................................ 26
Toward a Long-Term Solution: "Piracy is a Problem that Starts Ashore".............................. 27
Figures
Figure 1. The Horn of Africa, Surrounding Waters, and Key Locations ....................................... 4
Figure 2. Somalia Map................................................................................................................ 5
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 28
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Recent Developments
On April 8, 2009, Somali pirates seized the U.S.-flagged commercial shipping vessel MV Maersk
Alabama approximately 250 nautical miles south east of the Somali town of Eyl. Press reports
suggest that the 20-member crew of U.S. citizens overtook their Somali captors some time after
the ship was seized and attempted unsuccessfully to free the ship’s captain, Vermont resident
Richard Phillips. In response, the United States Navy dispatched the U.S.S. Bainbridge,1 an
Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, and reconnaissance aircraft to the area in order to monitor the
small craft where Captain Phillips was being held. Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel
worked with naval personnel to conduct hostage negotiations for the captain’s release. On April
11, after officials determined that Phillips’ life was in immediate danger, U.S. Special Forces
mounted a successful rescue operation with the authorization of President Barack Obama.
According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), as of April 15, approximately 300 non-
U.S. crew members on 18 hijacked vessels remained in Somali captivity.
Three pirates were killed by snipers in the U.S. rescue operation; a fourth, a young Somali named
Abdiwali Abdiqadir Muse, now faces piracy, conspiracy, and weapons charges before the United
States District Court in the Southern District of New York.2 Since the beginning of 2009, over 130
pirates have been delivered to Kenyan judicial authorities for trial. Some analysts have expressed
concern that the rescue operation could trigger the use of increasingly violent tactics in future
pirate attacks.
A leader of the pirate group based in the town of Eyl who held Phillips reportedly vowed revenge,
telling reporters that, “this matter will lead to retaliation and we will hunt down particularly
American citizens travelling our waters. Next time we get American citizens... they [should]
expect no mercy from us.” An attack on a second U.S.-flagged vessel, the MV Liberty Sun, on
April 14 appeared to be an attempt by pirates to make good on that threat. A pirate leader told
reporters after the Liberty Sun attack that, “We were not after a ransom. We also assigned a team
with special equipment to chase and destroy any ship flying the American flag in retaliation for
the brutal killing of our friends.”3
The attack on the Alabama was one of several to occur during a recent resurgence in pirate
activity in the west Indian Ocean, where Somali pirates have relocated some of their operations to
avoid more robust international naval patrols to the north in the Gulf of Aden. Experts suggested
that the higher volume of foreign patrols, bad seasonal weather, and a series of sizeable ransom
payments in recent months contributed to a downward trend in pirate attacks in the region from
December 2008 through early March 2009. However, a number of recent pirate attacks, including
operations conducted hundreds of nautical miles from the Somali coast in the Indian Ocean, have
underscored the persistent threat of piracy to international ships transiting the region’s waters.
1 The U.S.S. Bainbridge is named for Captain William Bainbridge, the commander of the U.S.S. Philadelphia who was
held in captivity in the Barbary state of Tripoli from 1803 to 1805 after the Philadelphia ran aground in Tripoli harbor
during anti-piracy operations. The captivity of Bainbridge and his crew significantly escalated the military
confrontation between the United States and the Barbary pirates, whose threats to U.S. vessels in the Mediterranean
were a key factor in the early development of the United States Navy. For more information, see
http://www.bainbridge.navy.mil/sitepages/history.aspx.
2 See complaint U.S. v. Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse, 09-MG-1012, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York,
April 21, 2009; and Alexandra Marks, “Teen Somali to be Tried as Adult, Christian Science Monitor, April 21, 2009.
3 Agence France Presse, “Pirates stage rocket attack on US freighter,” April 14, 2009.
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In response, on April 15, 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlined the
Administration’s preliminary plans for developing a more robust anti-piracy policy. According to
Secretary Clinton, U.S. diplomats will engage with Somali Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) officials and leaders from the semi-autonomous region of Puntland in the Eyl district to
“press these leaders to take action against pirates operating from bases within their territories.”
The Administration sent an envoy to attend an April 23 policy and donors conference on Somalia
in Brussels and called for the next meeting of the international Contact Group on Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia to be held in early May 2009 (see “Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia” below). Lastly, U.S. officials plan to redouble efforts to work with the shipping and
insurance industries “to address gaps in their self-defense measures.” U.S. naval personnel have
suggested that international security efforts will not be able to guarantee safe passage across the
entire vast area of ocean in which the pirates are now operating and have emphasized the
importance of finding a solution to the problem ashore.
To that end, the African Union voted in March 2009 to extend the mandate of their peacekeeping
force in the country, known as the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), for three
months while the United Nations Security Council continues to review a proposal to send a U.N.
peacekeeping force to Somalia to replace AMISOM. AMISOM forces have come under attack in
recent months from Islamist groups opposed to the presence of foreign troops in Somalia,
including the Al Qaeda influenced group known as Al Shabaab. Meanwhile, a nascent unity
government formed between the TFG and the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS) has
returned to Mogadishu, and has elected ARS leader Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as its president.
Negotiations continue among the unity government participants and with opposition groups to
determine the makeup of an expanded parliament. Elements of the ARS based abroad, as well as
groups and factions in Somalia, have vowed to continue fighting against the new government, and
violence has surged. The international Contact Group on Somalia continues to work on a
multilateral basis to support Somali efforts to reach reconciliation agreements and implement the
country’s Transitional Federal Charter. The April 23 donors conference netted over $250 million
in pledges of support for AMISOM and TFG plans to establish police and security forces. The
Obama Administration has requested $40 million in 2009 supplemental Peacekeeping Operations
(PKO) funding to provide “non-lethal equipment, logistical support, and basing facilities for the
African Union Mission to Somalia and to support Somali security sector reform.” The
Administration also is seeking authority to transfer up to $50 million in supplemental
Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) funding to the PKO account for
Somalia, if necessary. For more information about political developments in Somalia and U.S.
policy, see CRS Report RL33911, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting
Peace, by Ted Dagne.
On March 16, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon released his report to the Security
Council required by Resolution 1846 on the security of international navigation off the coast of
Somalia (S/2009/146). In January, the International Maritime Organization convened a meeting of
17 regional States, which adopted the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (see
“International Maritime Organization and the Djibouti Code of Conduct” below).
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Background
Piracy has reemerged as a global security threat, most recently in the waters off the Horn of
Africa, but also in West Africa, the waters off India, the South China Sea and the Strait of
Malacca, and the Caribbean. Pirates tend to operate in regions with large coastal areas, high levels
of commercial activity, small national naval forces, and weak regional security cooperation
mechanisms. These characteristics facilitate other maritime security threats, including maritime
terrorism, weapons and narcotics trafficking, illegal fishing and dumping, and human smuggling
operations.
Worldwide rates of piracy began to increase in the early 1990s, peaked at roughly 350 to 450
reported attacks per year during the period 2000-2004, and then declined by almost half by 2005.
In 2007, almost half of the world’s reported pirate attacks took place in African waters, mainly
near Nigeria and Somalia. The number of attacks in Somali waters doubled in 2008, accounting
for an estimated 40 percent of the 293 pirate attacks reported worldwide.4 The recent increase in
pirate attacks off Somalia will cause the total number of worldwide pirate attacks to increase, but
not necessarily back to the levels of 2000-2004. Nevertheless, recent high profile attacks in the
Gulf of Aden and the west Indian Ocean have brought renewed international attention to the
problem of piracy in waters off the Horn of Africa.
The U.S. National Maritime Security Strategy, issued in 2005, stated that the “safety and
economic security of the United States depends upon the secure use of the world’s oceans,” and
identified “well organized and well equipped” pirates and criminals as threats to international
maritime security. The bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 in the Yemeni harbor of Aden and the
bombing of the French oil tanker MV Limburg in 2002 illustrated the threat of potential maritime
terrorism in the region, and the United States, working with its international partners, established
a combined naval task force (Combined Task Force 150)5 in addition to increasing bilateral
military and security assistance to regional navies. However, until the establishment of Combined
Task Force 151 (see “Combined Task Force 151”) in 2008, the United States did not assign any
naval forces the sole task of performing anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa region.
Similarly, until 2008, the international community did not respond to the threat of piracy in the
waters off of Somalia in a coordinated, dedicated manner. In December 2008, the European
Union launched EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, representing the first naval operation
under the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The development of
a collaborative regional response in East Africa in recent months has mirrored regional reactions
to the threat of piracy in the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, which
are credited with having drastically reduced the instance of piracy in Southeast Asia since 2005
(see “International Maritime Organization and the Djibouti Code of Conduct” below). Eradicating
piracy in the Horn of Africa region may prove to be a more daunting task. The vast areas of the
western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden where the pirates operate are remote, Somalia
remains largely ungoverned, and regional states have relatively weak naval capabilities.
4 Much of the statistical information on pirate attacks found in this report has been provided by the International
Maritime Bureau, a division of the International Chamber of Commerce.
5 See the U.S. Navy’s website for CTF 150, available at: http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/command/ctf150.html.
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Figure 1. The Horn of Africa, Surrounding Waters, and Key Locations
Source: Congressional Cartography Program, Library of Congress, adapted by CRS Graphics.
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Figure 2. Somalia Map
Source: Congressional Cartography Program, Library of Congress, adapted by CRS Graphics.
Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Profile
The Pirates
Several groups of pirates currently operate in Somali waters, according to reports from the United
Nations Secretary General and the experts group convened by the Secretary General’s Special
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Representative for Somalia.6 Organized predominantly along clan lines and based in distinct,
remote port towns, the groups have varying capabilities and patterns of operation, making
generalized responses more difficult. The two primary groups identified by the Secretary General
in his March 2009 report were a pirate network based in the Puntland region district of Eyl and a
pirate network based in the Mudug region district of Harardera (Xarardheere). The Secretary
General and the Special Representative’s experts group also report that smaller pirate groups also
operate from the Somali ports of Bosaso, Qandala, Caluula, Bargaal, Hobyo, Mogadishu, and
Garad .7 The Secretary General has warned that some of the pirate groups “now rival established
Somali authorities in terms of their military capabilities and resource bases.”
The northern semi-autonomous region of Puntland appears to be home to the most active and
capable pirate networks, and some regional and local government officials there are alleged to
have facilitated and profited from piracy prior to recent efforts by regional leaders to crack down
on piracy-related corruption. Puntland’s regional authorities have developed a basic coast guard,
but accounts suggest that the equipment and capabilities of this small force remain very limited.
Several of the pirate groups have adopted names to suggest that they are acting in a maritime
security capacity. Piracy also appears to have become an attractive pursuit for young men,
creating potential legal complexities for regional and international governments seeking to try
young pirate suspects for alleged crimes.
Motives
According to the final report of the experts group convened in November 2008 by U.N. Special
Representative to Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, “poverty, lack of employment,
environmental hardship, pitifully low incomes, reduction of pastoralist and maritime resources
due to drought and illegal fishing and a volatile security and political situation all contribute to
the rise and continuance of piracy in Somalia.” While the profitability of piracy appears to be the
primary motivating factor for most pirates, other observers argue that since conditions in Somalia
make survival difficult for many and prosperity elusive for most, the relative risk of engagement
in piracy appears to have been lowered in many areas. 8
Somali pirates interviewed by international media sources frequently link their piracy activities to
trends such as illegal fishing and dumping in Somali waters that have emerged as the country has
lost its ability to patrol its waters over time.9 While these explanations may mask the
6Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1846 (2008), S/2009/146, March 16, 2009;
and, International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, Final Report: Workshop commissioned by the Special
Representative of the Secretary General of the UN to Somalia Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, November 10-12,
2008, Nairobi, Kenya.
7 The Special Representative’s experts group report identified the following specific pirate group leaders (clan, location
in parentheses): Isse Mahmuud and Leelkase (Darood, Eyl), Omar Mahmuud (Darood, Garad), and the Habargedir
(Hawiye, Hobiya, Harardera, and Mogadishu).
8 The dire economic and security situation in Somalia is illustrated by the continuing outflow of refugees and migrants
to neighboring countries. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that as many as 50,000 people,
predominantly Somalis, crossed the Gulf of Aden to Yemen in 2008. The deaths of hundreds of migrants in a boat
accident off the northern Somali coast in April 2009 were the latest instances in a pattern of similar accidents. “More
Somali Migrants Drown off Yemeni Coast,” UN IRIN, March 1, 2009.
9 The U.N. experts group noted the tendency of pirates to characterize their actions as an alternative livelihood or as
retribution for illegal international activities in Somali waters: “The pirates also firmly believe that they have every
right and entitlement to attack illegal fishing vessels operating in their territorial waters as their fishing resources are
being pillaged daily by international shipping vessels from Asia and Europe.” International Expert Group on Piracy off
(continued...)
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opportunistic piracy of some, reports suggest that illegal fishing and dumping have disrupted
Somalia’s coastal economy. For example, a July 2005 report from the United Kingdom
Department for International Development (DFID) estimated that Somalis lost $100 million to
illegal tuna and shrimp fishing in the country’s exclusive economic zone in 2003-2004.10
The international Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) (see “Contact
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia”) stated at its inaugural meeting that “piracy is
symptomatic of the overall situation in Somalia including the prevalence of illegal fishing and
toxic waste dumping off the coast of Somalia, which adversely affects the Somali economy and
marine environment.”11 The CGPCS also reaffirmed “its respect for Somalia’s sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and sovereign rights over natural resources” and underscored that the group’s
participants “ensure that their flagged vessels respect these rights.”
Paradoxically, the regional fishing industry reportedly has been damaged significantly by the
threat of piracy. According to some reports, tuna catches in the Indian Ocean fell 30 percent in
2008, in part because of fishing vessels’ fears of piracy. This has had a major impact on countries
like the Seychelles, who rely on the fishing industry for up to 40 percent of their earnings.12
The use of force by international naval patrols to apprehend or kill pirate suspects has raised the
prospect that revenge may become a motivating factor for pirates whose associates are killed or
captured. The April 14 attack on the U.S.-flagged MV Liberty Sun allegedly was carried out with
the intention of damaging or sinking the ship and injuring or killing its crew in retaliation for the
deaths of three Somali pirates during U.S. military efforts to secure the release of the detained
captain of the MV Maersk Alabama days earlier.13
Tactics and Demands14
As noted above, some Somali pirate groups have developed sophisticated operational capabilities
and have acquired weaponry, equipment, and funds that place them on par with or more effective
than the local forces arrayed against them. The typical Somali pirate team is equipped with a
variety of small arms, including AK-47 rifles and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers.
Many pirate teams use fishing skiffs powered with large outboard motors to give chase to larger,
but slower moving tankers, cargo ships, yachts, cruise ships, barges, and tug boats. Local Somali
fisherman reportedly are forced to support pirate activities in some cases, while in other cases,
(...continued)
the Somali Coast, Final Report, p.15
10 DFID, “Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries,” July 2005.
11 Statement of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, New York, January 14, 2009.
12 “Somali Piracy ‘Reduces Tuna Haul,’” BBC, January 22, 2009.
13 An alleged pirate commander named Abdi Garad told reporters, “This attack was the first against our prime target.
We intended to destroy this American-flagged ship and the crew on board but unfortunately they narrowly escaped us.
The aim of this attack was totally different. We were not after a ransom. We also assigned a team with special
equipment to chase and destroy any ship flying the American flag in retaliation for the brutal killing of our friends.”
Agence France Presse, “Pirates stage rocket attack on US freighter,” April 14, 2009.
14 The U.S. government has provided mariners with descriptions of common pirate tactics and instructions for response.
See, for example, U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, “Somali Pirate Tactics,” December
2008. Available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/HOA_Somali%20Pirate%20Tactics_15DEC2008.pdf
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coastal Somalis lend their fishing boats, equipment, and navigational expertise to teams of would-
be pirates from inland communities.
Somali pirates initially focused on attacking ships in the western Indian Ocean, off Somalia’s
eastern coast. When ships operating on that route shifted further out to sea, Somali pirates shifted
their focus to the Gulf of Aden, where there is a concentration of merchant ships (about 20,000
per year) operating in a more constrained waterway that is relatively close to Somalia’s northern
shore. Most recently, now that international naval forces are patrolling the Gulf of Aden with
some effectiveness, Somali pirates have shifted some of their focus back to the Indian Ocean, and
are now able to operate hundreds of nautical miles from the Somali coastline, often with the
support of so-called ‘mother ships.’ These ‘mother ships’ are larger fishing vessels often acquired
or commandeered by acts of piracy, and tend to operate out of the Somali ports of Bosaso and
Mogadishu and the Yemeni ports of Al Mukalla and Ash Shihr.
U.S. and international officials suspect that in some cases, Somali businessmen and international
support networks provide pirate groups with financing, supplies, and intelligence on the
movements of ships in regional ports in return for shares of ransom payments. The pirates refuel
and purchase logistical supplies like fuel and engine parts in Yemen, according to U.S. naval
officials.15 According to the NATO Shipping Center, Somali pirates returning from raids in the
Gulf of Aden often stop at the port of Caluula on the northeast tip of Somalia before proceeding
to their safe havens on the Indian Ocean coast.16
One of the unique characteristics of Somali piracy has been the taking of hostages for ransom. In
this sense, piracy off Somalia can be viewed as a form of maritime kidnapping. Unlike pirate
attacks in Strait of Malacca or Nigeria, where ships are boarded either to take the vessel or its
contents, pirates off the Horn of Africa routinely take the target vessel’s crew hostage in return for
ransom payments. This approach to piracy is possible because the pirates have a sanctuary on
land in Somalia and in its territorial waters from which they can launch pirate attacks and conduct
ransom negotiations. Pirates in other parts of the world are less likely to have such sanctuaries.
This has presented maritime security forces with significant challenges to traditional engagement
strategies and tactics.
According to reports, most vessels under attack have less than 15 to 30 minutes between the first
sighting of the pirates and their boarding of the ship and taking of hostages. If a naval ship cannot
arrive on scene within those 15 to 30 minutes, it will likely arrive too late to prevent the ship’s
capture. Naval combatant ships generally can steam at speeds of up to 30 knots (speeds of 20+
knots might be more likely), so unless a naval ship happens to be a few miles away when a
commercial ship comes under attack, it won’t arrive until after (perhaps long after) the 15- to 30-
minute window has come and gone. The large area of water to be patrolled and the relatively
small number of naval ships available means that the closest naval ship is often far too distant to
arrive within that timeframe.
While pirate attacks may involve violence and the use of weaponry, most Somali pirate groups
have not shown a willingness to wantonly harm captives taken in the course of their raids. Pirates
in other parts of the world who engage in these types of attacks might be more likely to kill or
15 Comments by Admiral Mark Fitzgerald in “Work with Yemen Government on Somali Piracy: U.S. Admiral,”
Reuters, March 9, 2009.
16 Report of the UN Secretary General, S/2009/146, paragraph 6, page 2.
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seriously wound merchant ship crew members, since extracting ransom payments is not their
objective. Negotiations for ransom involve the use of satellite telephones, third-party
intermediaries in Somalia and abroad, and public relations efforts to influence interaction with
property owners and foreign officials. Most navies have avoided rescue operations that could
endanger the lives of hostages, preferring instead to engage in hostage negotiations or wait for
shipping companies to negotiate ransom. According to reports, a recent rescue operation by
French naval forces, designed to free a family held hostage onboard a small sailboat off the
Somali coast, resulted in the death of the vessel’s owner, a French citizen, during an exchange of
fire between the pirates and naval personnel.17
Prior to the U.S. military resolution of the MV Maersk Alabama seizure and other French military
operations, the most sensational cases of piracy to date had been resolved through the payment of
large sums of money to different pirate syndicates.18 The Ukrainian ship MV Faina was released
for a reported $3.2 million ransom in February 2009 after being held for nearly 6 months by
pirates based in Harardera (Xarardheere). The seizure of the ship, carrying T-72 tanks and a
significant amount of ammunition and small arms, led several governments, including the United
States, to dispatch naval forces to the region to monitor the ship and its cargo. The Saudi oil
supertanker MV Sirius Star was released for a reported $3 million ransom to Eyl-based pirates in
January 2009 following its seizure in November 2008. The hijacking of the Sirius Star illustrated
the threat piracy may pose to international energy supplies as well as the capabilities of some
Somali pirates to operate far out to sea against large vessels. Ransom payments are considered to
be problematic by some observers because they encourage pirates to continue their attacks with
the expectation that insurance and shipping companies will decide that ransoms are cost effective
relative to the insured values of personnel and cargo (see “Threats to Commercial Shipping and
Global Trade” below).
The use of force by international naval forces to apprehend pirates and to free hostages in recent
months has raised the prospect of an escalation in the pirates’ use of force. As noted above, pirate
leaders have vowed to retaliate for the recent deaths of some of their operatives at the hands of
U.S. and other international naval forces. The use of force against suspected pirate vessels also
may be problematic because of the difficulty inherent in distinguishing a pirate mother ship from
a legitimate commercial ship. According to reports, in November 2008, a ship from the Indian
navy attacked what it thought was a pirate mother ship, only to discover, after the attack was
conducted, that the targeted ship was an innocent Thai commercial trawler. The effective use of
force against pirate strongholds in coastal towns would likely require significant military planning
and the investment of considerable resources in order to avoid or minimize civilian casualties.
The number of naval ships that would be needed to completely halt piracy in the Gulf of Aden
and the waters of Somalia’s Eastern Coast is probably much larger than the 12 to 20 that have
been operating there in recent months. As many as 60, for example, might be required to
suppress piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The adjoining area of concern in the Indian Ocean off
Somalia’s eastern coast, which has been measured at more than 1 million square miles, is much
larger than the Gulf of Aden, so completely halting piracy in that area would likely also require a
large number of ships.
17 Others onboard were rescued safely.
18 The French military also has reportedly undertaken a number of raid and rescue operations since April 2008 to free
its citizens held aboard seized ships.
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Reports suggest that some pirates have invested ransom earnings in sophisticated weaponry and
have fortified their operating bases against local authorities and potential international
intervention. Some observers warn that international military operations to combat pirates ashore
with force could undermine political reconciliation efforts aimed at reestablishing national
governance in Somalia. (See “Oversight of U.S. Military Forces and U.S. Foreign Assistance”
below.)
Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Impact
The strategic location of the Horn of Africa increases its importance for international security and
commerce. The northern coastline of Somalia lies to the south of the Gulf of Aden, a key transit
zone for ships passing to and from the Red Sea and the increasingly active port of Djibouti. The
U.S Department of Energy estimated that, as of 2006, as many as 3.3 million barrels of oil per
day were transiting the Bab el Mandeb strait between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. The
Indian Ocean waters off the southeast coast of Somalia are home to busy shipping lanes for trade
between Asia and East Africa, as well as for ships making longer voyages around South Africa’s
Cape of Good Hope. Ship traffic to and from the Kenyan port of Mombasa is particularly
vulnerable to security disruptions in the west Indian Ocean.
Threats to Commercial Shipping and Global Trade19
Somali piracy incurs economic costs in a number of ways, including ransom payments, damage to
ships and cargoes, delays in delivering cargoes, increased maritime insurance rates, the costs of
steps to harden merchant ships against attack, and costs for using naval forces for anti-piracy
operations. The total economic costs of piracy, though significant in an absolute sense, are
thought to be equivalent to only a very small fraction of the total value of worldwide shipborne
commerce. In testimony on February 4, 2009, before the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Peter Chalk, senior
policy analyst at the Rand Corporation, stated that the overall annual cost of piracy to the
maritime industry is estimated to be between $1 billion and $16 billion. Some of these costs are
ultimately paid by the consumer.
In May 2008, insurance underwriters at Lloyds of London designated the Gulf of Aden a “war-
risk” zone subject to a special insurance premium. London-based ocean marine insurers have
raised rates for ships making the voyage through the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal. These
levels of increase can only be estimated because of the competitive nature of the ocean marine
insurance business. One group of London insurance brokers and underwriters estimates extra
premiums at $10,000 to $20,000 per trip through the Gulf.20 U.S. rates, however, apparently have
not changed. According to representatives of the American Institute of Marine Underwriters
(AIMU), U.S. ocean marine insurers have not had to pay ransom for any act of piracy; therefore,
they say, hull and cargo insurance rates for vessels leaving the United States remain the same.
19 For more information about the commercial impact of piracy, see CRS Report R40081, Ocean Piracy and Its Impact
on Insurance, by Rawle O. King.
20 Piracy Threat Hikes Insurance Premiums: Insurers to Raise Rates in High-Risk Areas After Piracy Heists Off Somali
Coast, November 20, 2008, located at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/278262.
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London-based shipping firms are usually prepared to pay ransom when the demanded sums are
considered low, ranging from $500,000 to $2 million, compared with the value of the ships and
cargo. Such payments are reimbursed because the hull insurance policies issued in London
explicitly cover the peril of piracy.21 (Hull insurance forms used by American insurers generally
exclude coverage for the peril of piracy.) However, when the ransom demanded exceeds the value
of the cargo, the shippers typically do not pay the ransom.
Ship operators (and their governments) might judge that the costs of paying occasional ransoms
are less than the costs of taking steps to prevent occasional hijackings such as rerouting or arming
merchant ships. Some assert that payment of ransoms has tended to keep the level of violence
associated with piracy off Somalia relatively low, and while individual ransom payments can be
significant, the small percentage of ships operating in the area successfully attacked and captured
lowers the overall risk in the eyes of some commercial entities. As such, the payment of
occasional ransoms might be viewed by ship operators (and their governments) as a regrettable
but tolerable cost of doing business, even if it encourages more piracy.
The increase in pirate attacks is occurring at a time when the shipping industry is expressing
concerns about its financial health. One development is that the frequency of hiring dry bulk
carriers, a key industry component, has decreased; the “hire” rates have dropped over 90% in the
last six months.22 (In some cases, the hire rate has dropped because the financial industry has
stopped financing trade due to the global economic crisis.)23 In addition, many ship owners and
other key industry participants apparently face severe losses from the global financial market
crisis. Some major dry bulk shippers lost money speculating on the market in shipping derivatives
that offered potential for strong investment returns.24 Shipping derivatives were developed to
manage risk stemming from fluctuations in freight rates, vessel prices, interest rates, and foreign
exchange rates, more effectively, in a cheaper and more flexible manner. Many shippers made
derivative bets mistakenly on the direction of dry bulk rates during 2008.
In addition to the generalized threat that piracy poses to the security of the shipping lanes
described above, the incidence of piracy has important second order effects on the costs, patterns,
and benefits of regional and international shipping and trade. Egypt’s Suez Canal serves as a vital
shipping link between the Mediterranean Sea and Red Sea, and the revenue derived from ships
transiting the Canal is an important source of funding for Egypt’s government. Canal authorities
report that shipping traffic and resulting revenue have declined in recent months, due both to
decreased economic activity and the piracy threat to the Canal’s approaches in the Gulf of Aden.
Rerouting vessels to avoid the Gulf of Aden and other waters near the Horn of Africa adds
additional transit days and fuel costs to shipping companies. The costs vary by type of ship and
frequency of voyage, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation.25
21 Robert F. Worth, “Pirates Seize Saudi Tanker off Kenya: Ship Called the Largest Ever Hijacked,” New York Times,
November 18, 2008, p. A. 6.
22 Robert Wright, “Shipping in Crisis: Sector Must Navigate Rates Challenge,” Financial Times, November 19, 2008,
p. 18.
23 Ibid.
24 A derivative is a financial instrument whose price is dependent upon or derived from one or more underlying assets.
The derivative itself is a contract between two or more parties. Its value is determined by fluctuations in the underlying
asset. The most common underlying assets include stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies, interest rates, and market
indexes.
25 For example, circumnavigation rather than transiting the Gulf of Aden/Suez Canal increases the annual operating
cost of an oil tanker “by reducing the delivery capacity for the ship from about six round-trip voyages to five voyages,
(continued...)
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Threats to Humanitarian Aid Deliveries
Piracy threatens the delivery of vital humanitarian assistance to the Horn of Africa, much of
which arrives by sea.26 In addition to the 7.2 million Ethiopians currently receiving emergency
humanitarian assistance, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) estimates that
an additional 4.9 million will require food aid in the first half or 2009. As of April 2009, The
United States provided over $600 million in humanitarian assistance to the country in FY2008,
and has provided over $111 million to date in FY2009.27 In neighboring Somalia, an estimated
3.2 million Somalians, approximately 43 percent of the population, required food aid in the latter
half of 2008. U.S. humanitarian assistance to Somalia totaled $270 million in 2008 and over $157
million to date in FY2009.28 The Obama Administration has requested $200 million in FY2009
supplemental International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funding and $300 million in FY2009
supplemental P.L. 480, Title II humanitarian assistance, in part to address food and water
shortages in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan.
Food insecurity in the region, caused by drought and instability, has been heightened by high food
and fuel prices in the region. Officials from the World Food Program (WFP), which ships tens of
thousands of metric tons of food monthly to the Horn of Africa region, reports that it has become
more expensive to ship assistance to Mogadishu, and that their ability to deliver relief is
significantly hampered. Canada, NATO, and European Union forces have assumed WFP escort
responsibilities since late 2008 (see “NATO: Operation Allied Provider and Operation Allied
Protector” and “European Union: Operation ATALANTA” below).29
The continuing threat of piracy to ongoing relief efforts was illustrated clearly in April 2009,
when pirates hijacked the MV Maersk Alabama and attacked the MV Liberty Sun, both U.S.-
flagged and crewed cargo vessels contracted by the WFP to deliver USAID food assistance off
the southeast coast of Somalia. The Maersk had delivered food aid to the port of Djibouti and was
en route to the port of Mombasa, Kenya when it was seized by Somali pirates.
Potential Financing of Regional Conflict and Terrorism Concerns
The volatile Horn of Africa is home to several ongoing armed conflicts, and armed banditry is a
common threat in much of the region. The small arms trade in the Horn and its potential to fuel
instability remains a major concern to the international community. In spite of the longstanding
United Nations arms embargo on Somalia established by Security Council Resolution 733 (1992),
U.N. observers have reported “persistent violations” in recent years amid calls from the African
Union and others for the lifting of the embargo to allow the armament of transitional government
forces battling Islamist insurgents (see “United Nations Security Council” below). According to
the Security Council Resolution 1851, “the lack of enforcement of the arms embargo... has
(...continued)
or a drop of about 26 percent. The additional fuel cost of traveling via the Cape of Good Hope is about $3.5 million
annually.” U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, Economic Impact of Piracy in the Gulf of
Aden on Global Trade, December 2008.
26 Food insecurity in the region is also exacerbated by banditry, roadblocks, inter-clan fighting, and attacks on aid
workers.
27 USAID, Complex Emergency – Ethiopia, Situation Report #6, April 9, 2009.
28 USAID, Complex Emergency – Somalia, Situation Report #4, January 15, 2009.
29 Christian Fraser, “On Patrol with the Pirate Hunters,” BBC, November 21, 2008.
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permitted ready access to the arms and ammunition used by the pirates and driven in part the
phenomenal growth in piracy.”
Observers have expressed apprehension that some of the revenue from ransoms paid for the
release of ships and hostages may be used to finance an influx of more weapons to the area for
pirates or others. U.S. Navy officials have not found that fighters associated with Al Shabaab
have financial ties to piracy at present, but the potential for personnel linkages may remain.30 To
the extent that ransom payments and new arms further empower criminal pirate groups, the
challenge that such groups pose to local authorities at present and to potentially reconstituted
national authorities in the future could grow.
U.S. and International Policy Responses
Piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa is a symptom of the wider instability that has plagued
Somalia and the region since the early 1990s. At present, the internationally recognized
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is working with the Alliance for the Reliberation of
Somalia (ARS) on efforts to form a unity government and reconstitute national security and law
enforcement entities. The Bush and Obama Administrations have supported reconciliation efforts
in Somalia and have taken a leadership role in coordinating diplomatic and military responses to
the threat of piracy in the region, in coordination with the United Nations Security Council. Funds
pledged at the April 23 donors conference for Somalia in Brussels are intended in part to support
the development of security forces by the TFG, and such forces, once developed, may improve
local authorities’ ability to act against pirates ashore.
To date, U.S. and international efforts to respond to the threat of piracy have taken on a multi-
faceted approach. In order to provide a short term response to the immediate threat to
international navigation in the region’s waters, the United Nations Security Council has
authorized third party governments to conduct anti-piracy operations in Somali territorial waters
and ashore, but only with authorization from and in coordination with the TFG. Regional bodies
such as the African Union, the Arab League, and ad hoc groupings such as the participants in the
December 2008 International Conference on Piracy in Nairobi, Kenya, have held consultative
meetings and issued policy statements condemning piracy in the region and providing guidance
for the development of coordinated, collaborative regional responses. Recent pirate attacks such
as the seizure of the MV Maersk Alabama also may precipitate changes in U.S. policy and
priorities among Administration officials and Members of Congress.
U.S. Policy
The U.S. National Maritime Security Strategy, issued in 2005, stated that the “safety and
economic security of the United States depends upon the secure use of the world’s oceans,” and
identified “well organized and well equipped” pirates and criminals as threats to international
maritime security. In June 2007, the Bush Administration adopted a Policy for the Repression of
Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea that stated that it is the policy of the United
30 Vice Admiral William Gortney, the commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command told the House Armed
Services Committee on March 5, 2009, that “We look very, very carefully for a linkage between piracy and terrorism or
any kind of ideology and we do not see it. It would be a significant game changer should that linkage occur. But we
have not seen it. We watch very carefully for it.”
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States to “[c]ontinue to lead and support international efforts to repress piracy and other acts of
violence against maritime navigation and urge other states to take decisive action both
individually and through international efforts.” In December 2008, the Bush Administration
issued an implementation plan based on that policy to address piracy threats in the Horn of Africa
region. The U.S. National Security Council (NSC) “Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa:
Partnership and Action Plan” set out the objective “to repress this piracy as effectively as
possible in the interests of the global economy, freedom of navigation, Somalia, and the regional
states.”31 In pursuit of that objective, the plan outlined three “lines of action” for U.S. policy:
“1) prevent pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain to piracy; 2)
disrupt acts of piracy consistent with international law and the rights and responsibilities of
coastal and flag States; and 3) ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held
accountable for their actions by facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates by flag,
victim and coastal States, and, in appropriate cases, the United States.”
In support of the 2007 policy and 2008 plan, the Bush Administration formed an interagency
counter-piracy task force that “addresses the full spectrum of anti- and counter-piracy efforts,
from piracy prevention to interruption and termination of acts of piracy, to ensure the
accountability of pirates.” The State Department and Defense Department are the principal
members of the task force and work with other U.S. government agencies to coordinate U.S.
policies and engagement in the multilateral initiatives that have been developed since mid-2008.
To date, the task force has overseen efforts to implement elements of the December 2008 NSC
Action Plan, which pledges U.S. support for the establishment of an international Contact Group
on piracy (established January 2009, see “Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia”)
and a regional counter-piracy coordination center (under development, see “International
Maritime Organization and the Djibouti Code of Conduct”).
The Obama Administration has not announced new overarching strategic priorities with regard to
the piracy threat, although Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has outlined preliminary plans for a
more robust policy response. According to Secretary Clinton, U.S. diplomats will engage with
Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) officials and leaders from the semi-autonomous
region of Puntland in the Eyl district to “press these leaders to take action against pirates
operating from bases within their territories.” The Administration sent Acting Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs Phillip Carter to the April 23 policy and donors conference on
Somalia in Brussels and has called for a meeting of the international Contact Group on Piracy off
the Coast of Somalia in early May. Lastly, U.S. officials plan to redouble efforts to work with the
shipping and insurance industries “to address gaps in their self-defense measures.”
The Obama Administration’s FY2009 supplemental request appears to anticipate the delivery of
some security assistance to the region, contingent upon continued progress in Somali
reconciliation negotiations. The December 2008 Plan called for U.S. “bilateral assistance
programs for judicial capacity building efforts” for regional states. Comments from Obama
Administration officials suggest that their Administration shares the view expressed in the Bush
Administration Action Plan that U.S. anti-piracy efforts are intended “to be mutually supportive
of longer-term initiatives aimed at establishing governance, rule of law, security, and economic
development in Somalia.”
31 U.S. National Security Council, “Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan,” December
2008. Available at: http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Countering_Piracy_Off_The_Horn_of_Africa_-
_Partnership__Action_Plan.pdf.
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United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1816 (June 2008) authorized states acting in cooperation with and with prior
notification of the TFG to “enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing
acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea” and to “use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a
manner consistent with action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant
international law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery.” The initial
authorization lasted for six months from June 2008. Resolution 1838, adopted in October 2008,
called on states with military capabilities in the region to contribute to anti-piracy efforts and
clarified the standing of the authorization contained in Resolution 1816 with respect to
international law.
At the request of the TFG, the mandate established in Resolution 1816 was extended for 12
months in December 2008 in Resolution 1846. In December 2008, Resolution 1851 expanded the
mandate by authorizing states and regional organizations that are acting at the TFG’s request to
“undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia [italics added] for the purpose
of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.” Both resolutions require any authorized
international measures to be undertaken in accordance with humanitarian and human rights laws.
Other provisions of Resolution 1851 have guided developments since December 2008 and may
inform future U.S or international initiatives (see “Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia”, “United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime”, and “Oversight of U.S. Military Forces
and U.S. Foreign Assistance” below).
Resolution 1846 authorized the provision of technical assistance to TFG personnel and forces “to
enhance the capacity of these States to ensure coastal and maritime security” in accordance with
procedures outlined in Resolution 1722. Under paragraphs 11 and 12 of Resolution 1722, the
supply of technical assistance to Somali “security sector institutions” is authorized provided that
prior case-by-case notification is made to the U.N. arms embargo Committee for Somalia.32
Resolution 1851 provides similar authorization to weapons and military equipment destined for
the sole use of Member States and regional organizations undertaking authorized anti-piracy
operations in Somali waters. The transfer of weaponry to Somali maritime security forces would
require separate authorization from the Security Council. The African Union’s Peace and Security
Council and the TFG have requested that the broader U.N. arms embargo be amended or lifted in
order to improve the capabilities of forces fighting Islamist insurgents.
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
Based on Resolution 1851, the Bush Administration led the formation of a multilateral Contact
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) made up of 24 member governments and 5
regional and international organizations.33 The Contact group held its first meeting in January
2009 and identified six tasks for itself: 1) improving operational and information support to
counter-piracy operations, 2) establishing a counter-piracy coordination mechanism, 3)
strengthening judicial frameworks for arrest, prosecution and detention of pirates, 4)
32 For more information, see the Committee web page at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/.
33 Resolution 1851 “encourages all States and regional organizations fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
coast of Somalia to establish an international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact between and
among states, regional and international organizations on all aspects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off
Somalia’s coast.”
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strengthening commercial shipping self-awareness and other capabilities, 5) pursuing improved
diplomatic and public information efforts, and 6) tracking financial flows related to piracy.34 In
support of these goals, four working groups are to make recommendations to the Contact Group
secretariat on relevant military/operational, judicial, diplomatic, and public information aspects of
regional and international anti-piracy efforts. The goals of the working groups’ efforts are to
improve operational coordination, information sharing, and the effectiveness of legal enforcement
activities among all regional and international actors combating piracy in the region. The latest
meeting of the CGPCS was held in Cairo in March 2009 and the next meeting reportedly will be
held in early May 2009.
Combined Task Force 151 and Other Naval Forces
United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) commands the Combined Maritime
Forces operating in the Arabian/Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Arabian Sea,
and Indian Ocean. In January 2009, the command established Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-
151), with the sole mission of conducting anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the
waters off the Somali coast in the Indian Ocean. That role had previously been filled by CTF-150,
which continues to perform counterterrorism and other maritime security operations as it has
since 2001-2002. In August 2008, CTF 150 and partner forces agreed to the establishment of a
Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) in the Gulf of Aden to serve as a dedicated, more secure
transit zone for merchant vessels. The MSPA has been credited in part with lowering the success
rate of Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden transit zone.
As of April 2009, CTF-151 consisted of personnel and nearly two dozen ships from the United
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Malaysia,
Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey and Yemen.35 U.S. naval commanders expect that
Bahrain, Jordan, Japan, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, Belgium and Poland also will
participate in CTF-151 operations in the near future. Task force operations are coordinated from
the NAVCENT command center in Bahrain. NAVCENT commanders told Congress in early
March that CTF-151 and other cooperating naval forces had disarmed and released 121 pirates,
disarmed and turned over for prosecution 117 pirates, and were holding nine pirates pending final
disposition.36
Other countries, most notably Russia, China, and India have deployed naval forces to the region
to participate in monitoring and anti-piracy escort operations. From an operational perspective,
while these countries do not formally and fully coordinate their policies with CTF-151, there are
ongoing communication efforts. Naval observers and officials in the United States have noted the
engagement of China with particular interest, as Chinese naval operations in the Horn of Africa
region demonstrate the Chinese government’s desire and ability to protect international shipping
lanes far from China’s shores. As of April 2009, a Chinese destroyer and frigate were departing to
replace two Chinese navy destroyers that have been deployed for anti-piracy operations since late
December 2008.37 A supply ship that is currently deployed is reportedly scheduled to stay on
34 Statement of Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, New York, January 14, 2009.
35 Vice Admiral William Gortney, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, Testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee, March 5, 2009.
36 Ibid.
37 Cui Xiaohuo, “New fleet sails to fight Somali pirates,” China Daily, April 2, 2009.
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scene with the new task force, which will have the same helicopter and naval special forces team
capabilities as its predecessor.
NATO: Operation Allied Provider and Operation Allied Protector
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has deployed two Standing NATO Maritime
Groups to conduct anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa region since October 2008. The
first deployment, named Operation Allied Provider, served as a temporary protection force for
World Food Program assistance shipments in the region. In December 2008, NATO ended
Operation Allied Provider and transitioned WFP protection responsibilities to the European
Union’s new naval operation (see “European Union: Operation ATALANTA” below).
In March 2009, NATO launched its second anti-piracy mission, Operation Allied Protector, which
is being carried out by Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1). According to NATO, the
forces participating in Operation Allied Protector will “deter, defend against and disrupt pirate
activities” as they transit the region. The Maritime Group was originally scheduled to perform
temporary anti-piracy missions as it transited the Horn region en route to South East Asia and as
it returned in June 2009.38 In April 2009, NATO officials cancelled the planned SNMG1 visits to
Singapore and Australia and extended the Operation Allied Protector mission until June 20, 2009.
A scheduled visit to Karachi reportedly will go ahead as planned. As of late March 2009, the
following ships were participating in SNMG1 and Operation Allied Protector: NRP Corte Real
(flagship, Portugal), HMCS Winnipeg (Canada), HNLMS de Zeven Provinciën (The Netherlands),
SPS Blas de Lezo (Spain), and the USS Halyburton (United States). NATO officials reportedly
were seeking to extend the authority of participating ships to detain captured pirates as of late
April 2009.
European Union: Operation ATALANTA
In December 2008, the European Union launched EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, its first
naval operation under the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
Forces participating in Operation ATALANTA have been tasked with provide protection for WFP
vessels and merchant vessels and are authorized to “employ the necessary measures, including the
use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed
robbery which may be committed in the areas where they are present.”39 According to the
European Union, the force consists of twenty ships and over 1,500 personnel. Greece, France,
Spain, Germany and Italy have contributed forces and personnel to the operation for its full term
of twelve months. Other EU member states and third party countries are expected to contribute
over time. In coordination with the deployment, EU NAVFOR also has established an online
center known as Maritime Security Center-Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA) for transiting ships to
record their ships’ movements voluntarily and to receive updated threat information.40 Similar
voluntary tracking and reporting services are provided by the United Kingdom Maritime Trade
38 The task force is scheduled to visit Karachi, Pakistan, Singapore, and Perth, Australia, before returning to the Horn of
Africa Region.
39 European Union Council Secretariat, “Fact Sheet: EU naval operation against piracy (EU NAVFOR Somalia -
Operation ATALANTA),” EU NAVFOR/04, March 2009.
40 Information on the Maritime Security Center-Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA) is available at:
http://www.mschoa.eu/Default.aspx.
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Operations office in Dubai and the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Liaison Office in Bahrain. Between
CTF-151, Operation ATALANTA and Operation Allied Protector, almost 50 combatant ships are
currently patrolling in the region.
International Maritime Organization and the Djibouti Code of
Conduct
The International Maritime Organization (IMO)41 has had an international anti-piracy program
since the late 1990s and has successfully engaged on a multilateral basis in other regions to
improve anti-piracy cooperation. At present, cooperative mechanisms for managing the security
of the waters near the Horn of Africa are being developed as called for by the IMO42 and as
encouraged by Resolution 1851.43 The IMO began sponsoring consultation meetings on piracy for
the Horn of Africa region in 2005, which led to the development of a draft cooperative framework
agreement in early 2008.
In January 2009, representatives of 17 regional governments met at an IMO-sponsored meeting in
Djibouti and adopted a Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.44 As of late January
2009, nine regional governments45 had signed the Code of Conduct, which remains open for
signature by other parties. Three regional facilities---the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in
Mombasa, Kenya, the Sub-Regional Coordination Centre in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and a
regional maritime information center that is to be established in Sana’a, Yemen---are to support
the information sharing components of the agreement. The parties also agreed to resolutions on
technical cooperation and the establishment of a regional training center in Djibouti. The Contact
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) intends to adopt interim measures to facilitate
regional coordination until a dedicated coordination center to support the Djibouti Code of
Conduct is established.
A similar cooperative framework developed by the IMO, the littoral states of the Strait of
Malacca, and other Asian governments has been in force since 2006. Known as the Regional Co-
operation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia
(ReCAAP),46 the agreement established procedures for coordinating responses to piracy and
41 The International Maritime Organization is a United Nations agency with over 168 member governments. Based in
the United Kingdom, its members develop regulations for international shipping related to safety, the environment, and
maritime security. It also serves as a global coordinating body for legal issues, technical co-operation, and maritime
security including anti-piracy efforts. For more information, see: http://www.imo.org/.
42 IMO Resolution A.1002(25) “calls Upon Governments in the region to conclude, in co-operation with the
Organization, and implement, as soon as possible, a regional agreement to prevent, deter and suppress piracy and
armed robbery against ships.”
43 Resolution 1851 “encourages all states and regional organizations fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
coast of Somalia to consider creating a center in the region to coordinate information relevant to piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.”
44 International Maritime Organization, “High-level meeting in Djibouti adopts a Code of Conduct to repress acts of
piracy and armed robbery against ships,”
45 Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Yemen
signed the code of conduct in January.
46 Text available at: http://www.recaap.org/about/pdf/ReCAAP%20Agreement.pdf. Sixteen signatories include the
People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, the
Republic of India, the Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
(continued...)
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sharing best practices among law enforcement and security personnel. The ReCAAP Information
Sharing Center (ISC) in Singapore now serves as the principal clearinghouse for piracy reporting
and response coordination.47 These steps, taken in conjunction with other regional agreements
between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore to coordinate anti-piracy patrols in the Straits of
Malacca and surrounding waters have been successful in reducing piracy in that region. The
negotiation of the bilateral and multilateral initiatives in the Straits of Malacca region highlighted
several issues that may be of interest to parties seeking to establish similar programs in the Horn
of Africa region, namely the importance of addressing local concerns over sovereignty, territorial
water rights, and the presence of foreign military forces in regional waters.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: “Shipriders” and
Capacity Building
Under the auspices of Resolution 1851 and in conjunction with the judicial working group of the
(CGPCS), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has launched a project to facilitate
regional law enforcement participation in anti-piracy enforcement efforts off the coast of
Somalia.48 The program was encouraged in language included in Resolution 1851 and focuses on
providing judicial capacity building assistance to regional states and facilitating so-called
“shiprider” arrangements in which regional law enforcement personnel are seconded to
international vessels to perform anti-piracy arrest and investigation functions. The United States
has shiprider agreements with a number of Western Hemisphere governments to facilitate
maritime security operations in waters of shared concern.
In general, shiprider arrangements are designed to address the logistical and legal challenges
inherent in multilateral naval enforcement efforts in remote areas or where the capacity of
regional governments does not allow for the provision of sufficient security. With regard to
current operations in the Horn of Africa region, long transport times, limited military resources,
legal limitations on the operations of military personnel, and complex differences in jurisdictional
standards and requirements would complicate the arrest and prosecution by the varied non-
regional forces operating under Resolution 1851. In order to help regional governments meet the
added resource requirements that the arrest, detention, and prosecution of Somali pirate suspects
would create, the UNODC plans to provide judicial capacity building assistance, in coordination
with other donors.
Private Sector and Shipping Industry Responses
Private sector and shipping industry responses to the threat of piracy in the waters off the Horn of
Africa have varied. In addition to altering financial decisions based on higher insurance costs,
(...continued)
Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.
47 A diagram of ReCAAP-ISC reporting and response procedures is available at:
http://www.recaap.org/about/pdf/Information_Flow_Response_chart.pdf.
48 Resolution 1851 “invites” states and regional organizations “to conclude special agreements or arrangements with
countries willing to take custody of pirates in order to embark law enforcement officials (“shipriders”) from the latter
countries, in particular countries in the region, to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of persons detained as a
result of operations conducted under [the] resolution.”
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some accounts suggest that shipment navigation patterns have changed in response to the threat of
piracy, with some vessels preferring to circumnavigate the southern Cape of Good Hope rather
than risk attack in the Gulf of Aden. Crews also have developed a number of unique
countermeasures and best practices in their attempts to ward off and resist pirate attacks. The use
of water cannons, fire hoses, and passive sonic defenses has become more widespread, and
industry surveys suggest that ships that operate at speeds above 15 knots49 and that have higher
freeboards50 have proven less susceptible to pirate attack, thus far. Debates about the use of armed
guards continue among shipping industry representatives, government officials, and observers
worldwide (see “Options for Improving the Immediate Security of Merchant Ships”).
The IMO and other bodies such as the International Chamber of Commerce International
Maritime Bureau (ICC-IMB) have developed detailed guidance and recommendations for
governments and commercial vessels seeking to prevent, deter, and respond to pirate attacks. The
IMB also has established a 24-hour piracy reporting center in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, which
seeks to serve as the global, one-stop shop for piracy reporting and piracy threat information
distribution for commercial vessels. The IMB also works with other regional information centers
to collect and disseminate threat and situation reporting. For the Horn of Africa region, the IMB
and European Union Maritime Security Center-Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA) issue periodic
‘Industry Updates’ detailing recent trends in pirate attacks and making recommendations to
vessels transiting regional waters.51
Issues for Congress and Policy Options
The risk of pirate attacks in the waters off the Horn of Africa is unlikely to disappear in the near
term, and the United States government has identified piracy as a direct threat to U.S. national
security concerns. U.S. policies developed by the Bush Administration to address Somali piracy
are now being revisited and enhanced by the Obama Administration in light of high profile
attacks on U.S.-flagged vessels and crew members in April 2009.
Most defense analysts acknowledge that while the unprecedented level of naval patrols in the area
-- conducted by more than fifteen nations -- has deterred some attacks, the area is simply too vast
to prevent all incidents. When the MV Maersk Alabama was attacked on April 8, 2009, the closest
naval vessel, the U.S.S. Bainbridge, was approximately 300 nautical miles away. Similarly, the
U.S.S. Bainbridge was only able to arrive on the scene of an aborted April 14 attack on the MV
Liberty Sun a reported 6 hours after the attack ended. The continuing anti-piracy operations of
international navies also comes at significant cost, as governments around the world weigh the
budgetary impact of the current economic downturn and military requirements in other theaters of
operation.
Like terrorism, acts of piracy in African waters pose a transnational security threat that emanates
from areas plagued by conflict, weak governance, and economic insecurity. Regional security
forces currently have limited maritime capability, and many governments have prioritized the
development of their armies at the expense of navies or coast guards. That has changed to some
extent in recent years, as international studies have highlighted the threat to local economies
49 One knot is unit of measurement equivalent to one nautical mile per hour or 1.15 miles per hour.
50 The term ‘freeboard’ refers to the distance between the waterline and the main deck of the ship.
51 Available at: http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=344&Itemid=233.
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posed by illegal fishing, in addition to more traditional maritime security threats. Regional
coordination and intelligence sharing also is weak.
The United States and its international partners have policy tools that have been used to address
similarly complex security circumstances in other regions. However, ongoing U.S. and
international security operations in environments such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and
Colombia suggest that military intervention and foreign assistance require political consensus,
political will, and significant coordination in order to be successful. Maritime security efforts in
the Persian Gulf, the Caribbean, the waters of West Africa, and the Strait of Malacca have had the
same requirements. While short term results in containing other transnational threats have proven
to be achievable, the long-term ability of international intervention to eliminate these threats is
less certain in the absence of committed and capable regional and local actors.
Oversight of U.S. Military Forces and U.S. Foreign Assistance
U.S. military engagement in the region is divided among two geographic combatant Commands.
U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility (AOR) includes the waters of the Gulf of Aden
and those off the eastern Somali coast, while the AOR of the new U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM), which became fully operational in October 2008, encompasses the African
continent.52 To date, much of the U.S. military’s anti-piracy response has been conducted at sea,
by Central Command (CENTCOM). On land, AFRICOM provides security assistance to several
regional maritime security forces, few of which have “blue water capacity.” CENTCOM
provides similar assistance to the Yemeni coast guard.
Oversight of U.S. Navy anti-piracy operations focuses on forces associated with CTF-151 and
with NATO’s Operation Allied Protector. Several U.S.-homeported Navy ships support the
deployment of U.S. Navy ships operating on a continuous basis in the areas where Somali pirates
are active. As such, the commitment of a single additional U.S. Navy ship to the area can have a
notable effect on the Navy’s ability to perform missions in other parts of the world.
U.S. military operations in the region are not limited to anti-piracy efforts. The United States has
conducted anti-terrorism activities in the Horn of Africa and in Yemen for over a decade,
including the naval Combined Task Forces established as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Djibouti has hosted a semi-permanent Forward Operating Site, known as the Combined Joint
Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) since 2003, with over 1,500 U.S. military personnel in
residence. The command authority for CJTF-HOA, formerly under CENTCOM, was recently
transferred to AFRICOM. Its efforts initially focused primarily on countering violent extremism
in the region, but the Task Force’s activities have expanded in recent years to include a wide
variety of activities aimed at building the capacity of regional militaries to respond to more
general threats, such as natural disasters and armed conflict. CJTF-HOA personnel provide
training to the region’s security forces on counter-terrorism, maritime security, and peacekeeping.
As mentioned above, the United States conducts an array of maritime security assistance
programs in East Africa and Yemen. In Kenya, for example, the United States provides maritime
52 AFRICOM’s AOR includes all African countries except Egypt, which remained in the AOR of CENTCOM after that
command transferred responsibilities for the Horn of Africa countries to AFRICOM in 2008. For more information see
CRS Report RL 34003, U.S. Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by
Lauren Ploch.
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security assistance to both the Kenyan Navy and an array of agencies, including the Kenya
Wildlife Service, revenue authority, and police, to address an array of threats, from smuggling and
illegal fishing to terrorism. The U.S. also began support for a regional Maritime Center of
Excellence in Mombasa in early 2009; courses at the Center are attended by participants from
throughout East Africa. Several African countries, including Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and
Yemen, have received U.S. support for the installation of radar systems that provide enhanced
maritime domain awareness. Congress expanded the Department of Defense’s Section 1206
“train and equip” authority in FY2009 to include assistance for maritime security forces.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1851 “calls on Member States to assist the TFG, at its request
and with notification to the Secretary-General, to strengthen its operational capacity to bring to
justice those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilitate or undertake criminal acts of piracy
and armed robbery at sea.” The Obama Administration may seek to expand current assistance
programs for regional and Somali actors subject to congressional appropriations and authorization
and in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions. As noted above, the Obama
Administration has requested $40 million in 2009 supplemental Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
funding to provide “non-lethal equipment, logistical support, and basing facilities for the African
Union Mission to Somalia and to support Somali security sector reform.”53 While those funds are
likely to be directed toward improving Somali capacity to counter threats from insurgents and
terrorists, to the extent that assistance improves the overall ability of government forces to
operate effectively and assert security control, it may have positive implications for anti-piracy
operations in the future.
Although some press reports in April 2009 quoted unnamed U.S. officials as stating that the U.S.
military may consider launching military attacks against pirate strongholds, in testimony before
the House Armed Services Committee in March 2009, Stephen Mull, Acting Undersecretary of
State for International Security and Arms Control stated that although the United States supported
the inclusion in Security Council Resolution 1851 of authorization for anti-piracy operations on
land, there were, at that time “no plans to conduct counter-piracy operations on land.” In April,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appeared to imply that the United States would encourage
Somali figures in the Transitional Federal Government or in the region of Puntland to take action
against pirate safe havens ashore. The December 2008 National Security Council Partnership and
Action Plan stated that the United States “will work with concerned governments and
international organizations to disrupt and dismantle pirate bases to the fullest extent permitted by
national law.”
Piracy, Law Enforcement, and International Cooperation
Several United Nations instruments address the problem of piracy, including the Convention on
the High Seas,54 the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),55 and the Convention for the
53 According to the Administration justification for the supplemental request, “funding may also be directed towards
Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts. Some funding will pay for equipment and logistical support for training efforts
for Somali troops by Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and other nations in the region that will implement the training
activities.” The Administration also is seeking authority to transfer up to $50 million in supplemental Contributions for
International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) funding to the PKO account for Somalia, if necessary.
54 Convention on the High Seas, 13 U.S.T. 2312; T.I.A.S. 5200; 450 U.N.T.S. 82. Signed at Geneva, April 29, 1958.
Entered into force September 30, 1962.
55 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), 21 I.L.M. 1261. Convention adopted December 10,
1982. Entered into force November 16, 1994 (the United States is not a party to the Agreement).
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Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention).56
The United States is a signatory to the Convention on the High Seas and the SUA Convention, but
not to UNCLOS. A “global diplomatic effort to regulate and write rules for all ocean areas, all
uses of the seas and all of its resources” resulted in the convening of The Third United Nations
Conference on the Sea in 1973 and the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982.57 UNCLOS generally
incorporates the rules of international law codified in the Convention on the High Seas, but also
comprehensively addresses the use of other areas of the sea including, for example, the territorial
seas, natural resources, and the seabed.
The Convention on the High Seas, to which the United States is a party, and UNCLOS both
address piracy by stating that “[a]ll states shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the
repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”58
The term “piracy” is defined in UNCLOS (Article 101) as:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private
ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed-
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board
such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or
(b).59
Article 110 of UNCLOS authorizes warships to visit and/or inspect ships on the high seas that are
suspected of engagement in piracy. Although the United States is not party to UNCLOS, the
Convention on the High Seas also authorizes the right of visitation/inspection of vessels
suspected of being engaged in piracy.60 States, under both the Convention on the High Seas and
UNCLOS, are authorized to seize a pirate ship, or a ship taken by piracy and under the control of
the pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board.61 The courts of the State whose
forces carry out a seizure may decide the penalties to be imposed on the pirates.62
The SUA Convention further expands on the judicial treatment of pirates. Its main purpose is “to
ensure that appropriate action is taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships.”63
56 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, T.I.A.S. Signed at
Rome, March 10, 1988. Entered into force March 1, 1992 (for the United States March 6, 1995).
57 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm.
58 Convention on the High Seas at Article 14; UNCLOS at Article 100.
59 UNCLOS at Article 101. (The definition is, with a minor grammatical change, the same definition found in the
Convention on the High Seas (Article 14).
60 Convention on the High Seas at Article 22.
61 Convention on the High Seas at Article 19; UNCLOS at Article 105.
62 Id.
63 International Maritime Organization statement on aims for the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. Available at http://www.imo.org/.
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Unlawful acts include, but are not limited to, the seizure of ships; acts of violence against persons
on board ships; and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or damage
it.64 The SUA Convention calls on parties to the agreement to make its enumerated offenses
“punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those
offenses.”65 The United States criminalizes acts of piracy66 and foreigners or U.S. citizens that
commit acts of piracy are subject to imprisonment for life.67 While it appears that U.S. law is
sufficient to address the criminality of piracy, this may not be the case in other countries.
Additionally, even with comprehensive criminal laws, the logistics related to the enforcement of
the laws may be an impediment to their utilization.
Questions regarding legal jurisdiction, due process for detained pirate suspects, and the role of
foreign military forces in anti-piracy law enforcement activities may complicate current U.S. and
international operations against pirates in the Horn of Africa region. The most immediate legal
concern associated with anti-piracy operations are jurisdictional questions that arise based on the
location of pirate attacks and/or international naval interventions, the nationalities of crew
members, and the countries of registry and/or ownership of any seized vessels.68 Multiple
governments may be able to assert legal jurisdiction depending on the specifics of the incident.
But many governments lack sufficient laws and judicial capacity to effectively prosecute
suspected pirates. The disposition of property and insurance claims for vessels involved in piracy
also raises complex legal questions. A developing legal issue concerns the prosecution of
juveniles participating in acts of piracy. Recent reports suggest that some of the Somali pirates are
teenage minors,69 and therefore could have a defense of infancy in certain jurisdictions that may
assert jurisdiction over the offense.70
To date, some of these legal and law enforcement challenges have been addressed through the
establishment of bilateral agreements by the United States, the United Kingdom, the European
Union and others with governments in the Horn of Africa region, and particularly with Kenya.
Some agreements concluded to date define procedures for the detention, transfer, and prosecution
of captured pirate suspects. For example, suspected pirates captured by U.S. military forces now
may be transferred to Kenyan custody for prosecution according to the terms of a bilateral
memorandum of understanding signed in January 2009. As noted above (see “United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime: “Shipriders” and Capacity Building”), efforts also are underway to
establish mechanisms for regional law enforcement personnel to serve as shipriders on coalition
vessels and to expand the anti-piracy law enforcement and judicial capacities of neighboring
states.
64 Id.
65 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation at Article 5.
66 18 U.S.C. § 1651 et seq.
67 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651 and 1652.
68 For one review and discussion of these legal questions from a U.S. military point of view, see Cmdr. James Kraska
and Capt. Brian Wilson, “Fighting Piracy,” Armed Forces Journal, February 1, 2009 (expressing view that
international and regional cooperation, not armed force, is the long-term solution to piracy).
69 See http://www.smh.com.au/world/fate-of-teen-pirate-uncertain-20090414-a5ih.html.
70 For example, under common law, children under the age of seven are conclusively presumed to be without criminal
capacity, those who have reached the age of fourteen are treated as fully responsible, while as to those between the ages
of seven and fourteen there is a rebuttable presumption of criminal incapacity. In addition jurisdictions have adopted
juvenile court legislation providing that some or all criminal conduct by those persons under a certain age (usually
eighteen) must or may be adjudicated in the juvenile court rather than in a criminal proceeding. LaFave & Scott,
Criminal Law §4.11 (2d ed. 1986).
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Options for Improving the Immediate Security of Merchant Ships
Risk Reduction and Best Practices
The U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration issues detailed guidance to U.S.
mariners transiting the waters off the Horn of Africa region to help ensure their safety and
security.71 Its latest guidance, issued April 20, 2009, includes instructions for U.S. flagged vessels
seeking escort support from the U.S. Navy and Combined Maritime Forces participating in
coalition naval security operations in the region.72 As noted above, international bodies such as
the International Maritime Organization73 and the International Maritime Bureau74 also have
outlined several actions that merchant ships and their crews can take to reduce their risk of being
attacked and captured.
These include measures that can be taken before and during pirate attacks. For example, rerouting
ships, if possible, allows ships to avoid waters where Somali pirates are known to operate. This
option can lengthen operating routes and increase shipping costs, but perhaps not as much as
paying an occasional ransom. Recommendations suggest that transit of high-risk areas is not
recommended at times of day when Somali pirates historically have been more likely to stage
attacks, namely in early morning or dusk hours. In transit, effective watch procedures are
recommended, since early detection of impending attacks increases the likelihood that avoidance
and suppression measures will succeed. Higher ship operating speeds and evasive maneuvers
have proven effective in many cases, as have denial systems such as barbed and razor wire and
specialized electrical fences for ships. Crew preparation, training, and responses also are credited
with reducing risks of successful pirate attacks.75
Arming Merchant Ships76
Arming merchant ships can be done by either giving arms to the ship’s crew, or by hiring armed
security teams to ride on the ships. U.S. government officials traditionally have expressed
concern that merchant ships with armed crew members could pose security or terrorism risks
visiting U.S. ports. Many merchant ship owners and operators are strongly averse to arming
merchant ships, for practical and financial reasons.
71 U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration Advisories are available at:
http://www.marad.dot.gov/news_room_landing_page/maritime_advisories/advisory_summary.htm.
72 Advisory #: 2009-05, East Coast Of Somalia And Gulf Of Aden Transits, April 20, 2009.
73 International Maritime Organization, “Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on
preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships,” MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3, May 29, 2002.
Available at: http://www.imo.org/includes/blast_bindoc.asp?doc_id=941&format=PDF.
74 International Maritime Bureau-Piracy Reporting Center, Advice to Masters, April 2009. Available at:
http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=309&Itemid=97.
75 International Maritime Organization, “Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on
preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships,” MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3, May 29, 2002.
Available at: http://www.imo.org/includes/blast_bindoc.asp?doc_id=941&format=PDF. See also: International
Maritime Bureau-Piracy Reporting Center, Advice to Masters, April 2009. Available at: http://www.icc-
ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=309&Itemid=97.
76 Most of the concerns listed here are discussed in John W. Miller and Paulo Prada, “Attack Raises Debate On Guns
For Sailors,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2009; and Keith Bradsher, “Rescue Fuels Debate Over Arming Crews,”
New York Times, April 13, 2009.
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As noted above, private or military gun battles with pirates can raise the overall level of violence
associated with piracy off Somalia, which may increase risks to all merchant mariners on ships
operating in that area. Since merchant ship crews are often not trained in the use of weapons, they
might not be able to use them very effectively in fighting pirates. If ship crews try to defend
themselves with firearms and fail, the pirates might be more likely to kill some of the crew
members.
Even if used properly, lighter firearms might not be effective in countering pirates armed with
heavier weapons, such as rocket-propelled grenades. Pirates with access to large amounts of
money from prior ransom payments can acquire heavier weapons, so as to out-gun the merchant
ships. In all cases, fire is a major safety concern, particularly on tanker ships, and gunfire could
ignite vapors from the ship’s cargo, or the cargo itself.
Financial concerns may also mitigate against arming merchant ships. Hiring armed security teams
might be more expensive than paying occasional ransoms. Liability for fatal shootings aboard a
ship can be a complex legal matter that can lead to expensive lawsuits. Since many ports restrict
vessels from having weapons on board, commercial ships that often make calls at multiple ports
along their operating routes could find it difficult to operate along certain routes.
Convoys
Convoys escorted by naval ships are an option, though merchant ship operators may be reluctant
to use them because it can require merchant ships to wait in a certain location for the next
scheduled convoy to begin. The delays associated with this waiting can impose costs on ship
operators that could be greater than the cost of paying an occasional ransom. The establishment
and maintenance of a convoy system over the long term, in the absence of broader efforts to
address the root causes of the piracy problem, could pose unacceptable costs for international
navies.
Maritime War Risk Insurance
Federal law (Title XII of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended) authorizes the federal
government to administer a maritime war risk insurance program that insures or reinsures, as a
last resort, ocean-going commerce should private ocean marine insurance markets prove
insufficient. Available statistics suggest that industry resources are adequate, given the property
and casualty insurance industry surplus and the relatively low cost of insurance premiums.77 As a
result, despite the increased activity of pirates, some may contend that Congress does not need to
amend the existing federal insurance statutory construct. Others, however, may urge increased
levels of oversight and investigation into the situation in an effort to ensure that international
commerce remains stabilized, particularly at a time of global economic crisis.
77 According to the A.M. Best Company, the U.S. property/casualty insurance industry’s reported surplus, a measure of
claims-paying capacity or capital, declined by about $62.3 billion or 12%, at year-end in 2008 to $455.6 billion from
$517.9 billion at year-end 2007. While not all of the $455.6 billion is allocated to ocean marine insurance, the level of
industry-wide surplus suggests U.S. private insurers have the overall financial resources to cover potential losses from
incidences of ocean piracy.
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Toward a Long-Term Solution: "Piracy is a Problem that Starts
Ashore"78
In the short term, the international community
has responded to the threat of piracy in the waters
“Ultimately, piracy is a problem that starts
off the Horn of Africa with multinational naval
ashore and requires an international solution
ashore. We made this clear at the offset of
patrols, nascent diplomatic coordination efforts,
our efforts. We cannot guarantee safety in this
and enhanced private security efforts by members
vast region.”
of the commercial shipping industry. In the
Vice Admiral William Gortney
longer term, U.S. officials and international
experts believe that addressing the threat of
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
piracy will require the strengthening of regional
Testimony before the House Armed Services
security capabilities, improved intelligence
Committee, March 5, 2009
gathering and sharing, more effective and capable
law enforcement, and enhanced multilateral coordination, both at sea and on land. By all
accounts, pirates will likely continue to find sanctuary in Somalia until basic governance and
security conditions there change.
Some Members of Congress have called on the Administration to develop a “comprehensive
approach” to Somalia that responds to the threat of piracy in the context of a broader initiative to
stabilize the country and support transitional government institutions. Some U.S. officials
recently have supported a similar approach. In January 2009, Dr. Jun Bando, Maritime Security
Coordinator and U.S. AFRICOM Liaison for the U.S. Department of State Bureau of African
Affairs argued that “a durable solution for ending piracy in the Horn of Africa will require
improving security, stability, rule of law, and economic opportunity in Somalia, as well as
solidifying political progress by forming a unity government and advancing the peace process.”79
Beginning in January, the Obama Administration signaled its intention to continue working with
U.S. partners in the Contact Group on Somalia80 and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia toward those goals. In response to recent attacks on U.S.-flagged and -crewed vessels,
U.S. Secretary of State Clinton indicated on April 15, 2009 that a more robust anti-piracy policy
is now being developed. The Administration’s interagency steering group on piracy was
scheduled to convene on April 17 to discuss changes to U.S. strategy. Enhanced diplomatic
engagement with Somali Transitional Federal Government officials and leaders from the semi-
autonomous region of Puntland also will be launched with the aim of encouraging local Somalis
to take steps to secure regions where pirates currently enjoy safe havens.
78 United States Navy, Commander, Combined Maritime Forces Public Affairs, “Combined Maritime Forces Issues
New Alert to Mariners,” April 7, 2009.
79 Dr. Jun Bando, Maritime Security Coordinator/U.S. Africa Command Liaison, U.S. Department of State Bureau of
African Affairs, “International Response to Piracy Expanded, Unified,” DipNote, January 30, 2009.
80 The Contact Group participants are as follows: Italy, Kenya, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and representatives of the African Union, the European Union Council President and Commission, the
Inter-governmental Authority on Development, the Arab League, and the United Nations.
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Author Contact Information
Lauren Ploch
R. Chuck Mason
Analyst in African Affairs
Legislative Attorney
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
rcmason@crs.loc.gov, 7-9294
Christopher M. Blanchard
Rawle O. King
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Analyst in Financial Economics and Risk
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
Assessment
rking@crs.loc.gov, 7-5975
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
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