Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
April 22, 2009
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
RS21968
CRS Report for Congress
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks

Summary
Iraq’s political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, is increasingly
characterized by peaceful competition rather than violence, but sectarianism and ethnic and
factional infighting continue to simmer. As 2009 began, there was renewed maneuvering by
opponents of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki who view him as authoritarian and were perceived as
conspiring to try to replace him, had his party fared poorly in the January 31, 2009 provincial
elections. However, the elections appeared to strengthen Maliki and other Iraqis who believe that
power should remain centralized in Baghdad, and Maliki is considered well positioned to
compete in the parliamentary elections (to be held by the end of January 2010) that will select the
next four-year government. The provincial elections, held in all provinces except Kirkuk and the
Kurdish-controlled provinces, were relatively peaceful and there was a more diverse array of
party slates than those that characterized the January 2005 provincial elections.
Internal dissension within Iraq aside, the Bush Administration was optimistic that the passage of
key laws in 2008, coupled with the provincial elections, would sustain recent reductions in
violence. President Obama praised the orderliness and relative absence of violence of the
provincial elections—an outcome that reaffirmed the Obama Administration’s belief that it can
proceed with the planned reduction of the U.S. troop presence without inordinate risk to Iraqi
stability. Yet, violence has since increased in some areas of Iraq, particularly those where different
ethnicities and sects live in close proximity. The elections also reduced U.S. concerns about Iran’s
influence in Iraq, in part because pro-Iranian parties—particularly those that maintain militias
armed by Iran—fared poorly in the elections. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam
Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.

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Contents
Overview of the Political Transition ............................................................................................ 1
January 2005 National Assembly and Provincial Elections .................................................... 1
Permanent Constitution ......................................................................................................... 1
December 15, 2005 Elections ................................................................................................ 2
Benchmarks, Reconciliation, and Provincial and Future Elections ............................................... 3
The Strengthening of the Iraqi Government 2008-9 ......................................................... 3
January 31, 2009 Provincial Elections ................................................................................... 4
Outcomes and Implications ................................................................................................... 5
Elections Going Forward................................................................................................. 7

Tables
Table 1. January 31, 2009 Provincial Election Results (Major Slates) .......................................... 8
Table 2. Election Results (January and December 2005) .............................................................. 9
Table 3. Assessments of the Benchmarks................................................................................... 10

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 12

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Overview of the Political Transition
After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, the United States set up an occupation
structure, reportedly based on concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions
and not produce democracy. In May 2003, President Bush, reportedly seeking strong leadership in
Iraq, named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to head a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA),
which was recognized by the United Nations as an occupation authority. Bremer discontinued a
tentative political transition process and instead appointed (July 13, 2003) a non-sovereign Iraqi
advisory body: the 25-member “Iraq Governing Council” (IGC). After about one year of
occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to an appointed Iraqi interim government on
June 28, 2004. It was headed by a Prime Minister, Iyad al-Allawi, leader of the Iraq National
Accord, a secular, non-sectarian faction. Allawi himself is a Shiite but many INA leaders were
Sunnis, and some of them were formerly members of the Baath Party. The president of this
interim government was Ghazi al-Yawar, a Sunni tribal figure who spent many years in Saudi
Arabia.
January 2005 National Assembly and Provincial Elections
A series of elections in 2005 produced the full-term government that is in power today. In line
with a March 8, 2004, “Transitional Administrative Law” (TAL, interim constitution), the first
post-Saddam election was held on January 30, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National
Assembly (which formed an executive), four-year term provincial councils in all 18 provinces
and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). According to the “proportional
representation/closed list” election system, voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a
coalition of parties, or persons); 111 entities were on the national ballot, of which nine were
multi-party coalitions. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population) boycotted, winning only 17
Assembly seats, and only one seat on the 51 seat Baghdad provincial council. That council was
dominated (28 seats) by representatives of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), led by
Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim. Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, then at odds with U.S. forces, also
boycotted, leaving his faction relatively under-represented on provincial councils in the Shiite
south and in Baghdad. The resulting transitional government placed Shiites and Kurds in the
highest positions—Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani was President and
Da’wa (Shiite party) leader Ibrahim al-Jafari was Prime Minister. Sunnis were Assembly speaker,
deputy president, a deputy prime minister, and six ministers, including defense.
Permanent Constitution
The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum
by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On
May 10, 2005, a 55-member drafting committee was appointed, but with only two Sunni Arabs
(15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 as advisors). In August 2005, the talks
produced a draft, providing for: a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether
Kirkuk (Tamim province) will join the Kurdish region (Article 140); designation of Islam “a main
source” of legislation;1 a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47); families choosing which
courts to use for family issues (Article 41); making only primary education mandatory (Article

1 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html.
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34); and having Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the federal supreme court (Article
89). Many women opposed the two latter provisions as giving too much discretion to male family
members. It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation authority (Coalition Provisional Authority,
CPA) applicable until amended (Article 126), and established a “Federation Council” (Article
62), a second chamber with size and powers to be determined in future law (not adopted to date).
The major disputes—still unresolved—centered on regional versus centralized power. The draft
permitted two or more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions”— reaffirmed in
passage of an October 2006 law on formation of regions. Article 117 allows “regions” to organize
internal security forces, legitimizing the fielding the Kurds’ peshmerga militia (allowed by the
TAL). Article 109 requires the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current
fields” in proportion to population, and gave regions a role in allocating revenues from new
energy discoveries. Disputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage of national
hydrocarbons legislation — Sunnis dominate areas of Iraq have few proven oil or gas deposits,
and favor centralized control of oil revenues. The Kurds want to maintain maximum control of
their own burgeoning oil sector.
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85%) to try to
defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11, 2005) providing for a
panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election government
took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another two months (under the same rules as the
October 15 referendum.) The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no”
vote, respectively, but the constitution was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55%
“no,” missing the threshold for a “no” vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.
December 15, 2005 Elections
In the December 15, 2005 elections for a four-year national government (in line with the schedule
laid out in the TAL), each province contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of
Representatives” (COR)— a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. Of the 275-seat body,
230 seats were allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that would have won
additional seats had the constituency been the whole nation. There were 361 political “entities,”
including 19 multi-party coalitions, competing. As shown in the table, voters chose lists
representing their sects and regions, and the Shiites and Kurds again emerged dominant. The
COR was inaugurated on March 16, 2006, but political infighting caused the Shiite bloc “United
Iraqi Alliance” to replace Jafari with another Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime
Minister.
On April 22, the COR approved Talabani to continue as president. His two deputies are Adel Abd
al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq al-Hashimi, leader
of the broad Sunni-based coalition called the Accord Front (“Tawafuq”—within which Hashimi
leads the Iraqi Islamic Party). Another Accord figure, the hardline Mahmoud Mashhadani
(National Dialogue Council party), became COR speaker. Maliki won a COR vote for a 37-
member cabinet (including himself and two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key
slots (Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently until June 2006, due
to infighting. Of the 37 posts, there were 19 Shiites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; and 1 Christian. Four
were women.
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Benchmarks, Reconciliation, and Provincial and
Future Elections
The 2005 elections were considered successful by the Bush Administration but—possibly
because they took place in the context of ongoing insurgency and sectarian conflict—the
elections did not resolve the Sunni Arab grievances over their diminished positions in the post-
Saddam power structure. In August 2006, the Administration and Iraq agreed on a series of
“benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, might achieve political reconciliation. Under
Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress” on eighteen
political and security benchmarks — as assessed in Administration reports due by July 15, 2007
and then September 15, 2007 — were required for the United States to provide $1.5 billion in
Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq. The President used the waiver provision. The law also
mandated an assessment by the GAO, by September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the
benchmarks have been met, as well as an outside assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).
As 2008 progressed, citing the achievement of almost all of the major legislative benchmarks—
and the dramatic drop in sectarian-motivate violence attributed to the U.S. “troop surge”—the
Bush Administration asserted that political reconciliation was well under way. However, U.S.
officials maintain that the extent and durability of reconciliation will largely depend on the degree
of implementation of the adopted laws and on further compromises on inter-communal
differences and disputes, as well as on continued attenuated levels of inter-communal violence.
Iraq’s performance on the “benchmarks” is in the table below.
The Strengthening of the Iraqi Government 2008-9
The passage of key legislation and the continued calming of the security situation enhanced
Maliki’s political position throughout 2008. A March 2008 offensive ordered by Maliki against
the Sadr faction and other militants in Basra and environs ultimately pacified the city, weakened
Sadr politically, and caused some Sunnis and Kurds to see Maliki as more even-handed and non-
sectarian than previously thought. This contributed to a decision by the Accord Front to return to
the cabinet in July 2008. Other cabinet vacancies were filled subsequently, mostly by
independents. This represented a reversal from 2007, when Maliki appeared weakened
substantially by the pullout of the Accord Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime
Minister Iyad al-Allawi from the cabinet, leaving it with 13 vacant seats out of a 37 seat cabinet.
Maliki’s growing strength caused concern even among Maliki’s erstwhile political allies. The
Kurds, who had been a key source of support for him, began to criticize his leadership because of
his formation of government-run “tribal support councils” in northern Iraq, which the Kurds see
as an effort to prevent them from gaining control of disputed territories that they want to integrate
into their Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). ISCI, the longstanding main ally of Maliki’s
Da’wa Party, competed with the Da’wa for provincial council seats, as discussed below, and
accused him of surrounding himself with Da’wa veterans to the exclusion of other decision-
makers. The competition prompted reports in late 2008 that several major factions were
considering attempting to bring about a “no-confidence” vote against Maliki. The late December
2008 resignation, under pressure, of Sunni COR Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, who was
perceived as blocking a no confidence motion, was one outward indicator of the dissension.
Several attempts to replace him, including on February 19, 2009, failed to achieve the 138 vote
majority needed to confirm a successor. However, the COR was able achieve a majority to
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approve Ayad al-Samarrai, a Sunni Arab critic of Maliki, on April 20, 2009. He had been the
leading candidate in the several previous attempts to select the new Speaker.
Throughout 2008, U.S. officials grew concerned that Maliki’s increasing political strength could
lead to reversals, for example by creating restiveness among the Sunni “Sons of Iraq” fighters
who Maliki has refused to fully integrate wholesale into the Iraqi Security Forces. The 100,000
fighters nationwide cooperate with U.S. forces against Al Qaeda in Iraq and other militants.
Those fears proved relatively unfounded because the Iraqi government’s assumption of the
payments to the Sons of Iraq—a process completed by April 2009—went relatively without
incident. However, some of the Sons are increasingly resentful that only 5,000 have been
integrated into the ISF, and that the remainder have not yet been given the civilian government
jobs they were promised. Others complain that their payments have been delayed, which the
government claims is due to cash shortfalls resulting from the sharp fall in oil prices in late 2008.
Emboldened by his political strength but also attentive to pressure by Iran, Maliki insisted on
substantial U.S. concessions in the U.S.-Iraq “status of forces agreement” (SOFA) that passed the
COR on November 27, 2008 over Sadrist opposition, and notwithstanding Sunni efforts to obtain
assurances of their future security. The pact took effect January 1, 2009, limiting the prerogatives
of U.S. troops to operate in Iraq and setting a timetable of December 31, 2011 for a U.S.
withdrawal. President Obama, on February 27, 2009, outlined a U.S. troop draw-down plan that
comports with the major provisions of the SOFA.
January 31, 2009 Provincial Elections
The Obama Administration, as did the Bush Administration, looked to the January 31, 2009
provincial elections to consolidate the reconciliation process. Under a 2008 law, provincial
councils in Iraq choose the governor and provincial governing administrations in each province,
making them powerful bodies that provide ample opportunity to distribute patronage and guide
provincial politics.
The elections had been planned for October 1, 2008, but were delayed when Kurdish restiveness
over integrating Kirkuk and other disputed territories into the KRG caused a presidential veto of
the July 22, 2008 election law needed to hold these elections. The draft law provided for equal
division of power in Kirkuk (between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans) until its status is finally
resolved, prompting Kurdish opposition to any weakening of their dominance in Kirkuk.
Following the summer COR recess, the major political blocs agreed to put aside the Kirkuk
dispute and passed a revised provincial election law on September 24, 2008, providing for the
elections by January 31, 2009. The revised law put off provincial elections in Kirkuk and the
three KRG provinces, and stripped out provisions in the vetoed version to allot 13 total reserved
seats (spanning six provinces) to minorities. However, in October 2008, the COR adopted a new
law restoring six reserved seats for minorities: Christian seats in Baghdad, Nineveh, and Basra;
one seat for Yazidis in Nineveh; one seat for Shabaks in Nineveh; and one seat for the Sabean sect
in Baghdad.
In the elections, in which there was virtually no violence on election day, about 14,500 candidates
vied for the 440 provincial council seats in the 14 Arab-dominated provinces of Iraq. About 4,000
of the candidates were women. The average number of council seats per province is about 30,2

2 Each provincial council has 25 seats plus one seat per each 200,000 residents over 500,000.
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down from a set number of 41 seats per province (except Baghdad) in the 2005-2009 councils.
The new Baghdad provincial council has 57 seats. This yielded an average of more than 30
candidates per council seat, which some see as enthusiasm for democracy in Iraq. However, the
reduction in number of seats also meant that many incumbents were not re-elected.
Voters were able to vote only for a party slate, or for an individual candidate (although they also
had to vote for that candidate’s slate as well). This procedure encourages voting for slates, and
strengthened the ability of political parties to choose who on their slate will occupy seats allotted
for that party. This election system was widely assessed to favor larger, well organized parties,
because smaller parties might not meet the vote threshold to obtain any seats on the council in
their province.3 This was seen as likely to set back the hopes of some Iraqis that the elections
would weaken the Islamist parties, both Sunni and Shiite, that have dominated post-Saddam
politics.
About 17 million Iraqis (any Iraqi 18 years of age or older) were eligible to vote, which was run
by the Iraqi Higher Election Commission (IHEC). Pre-election-related violence was minimal,
although five candidates and several election/political workers were killed. There were virtually
no major violent incidents on election day. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) took the lead in
defending polling places, with U.S. forces as back-up. Turnout was about 51%, somewhat lower
than some expected, and some voters complained of being turned away at polling places because
their names were not on file. Other voters had been displaced by sectarian violence in prior years
and were unable to vote in their new areas of habitation.
The vote totals were finalized on February 19, 2009, but were not certified until March 29, 2009.
Within fifteen days of that (by April 13, 2009) the provincial councils were to convene under the
auspices of the incumbent provincial governor, and to elect a provincial council chairperson and
deputy chairperson. Within another 30 days after that (by May 12, 2009) the provincial councils
are to elect (by absolute majority) a provincial governor and deputy governors. The term of the
provincial councils is four years from the date of first convention.
Outcomes and Implications
Some of the primary outcomes of the elections appear to be evident based on the results for the
the two main Shiite parties, whose fates differed dramatically. In the mostly Shiite southern
provinces, ISCI (Shahid Mihrab list) and Maliki’s Da’wa “State of Law Coalition” offered
competing lists. Maliki’s post-election political position apparently has been enhanced by the
strong showing of his list. Any discussions of a possible vote of no confidence against Maliki are
likely derailed, based on the election results, although some Sunni deputies did introduce such a
motion in the COR in late February 2009. With 28 out of the 57 total seats, the Maliki slate is in
effective control, by itself, of the Baghdad provincial council (displacing ISCI). Da’wa also
emerged very strong in most of the Shiite provinces of the south, including Basra, where it won
an outright majority (20 out of 35 seats). Fadhila previously dominated the Basra provincial
council and administration, a platform from which it launched a move by file a petition, under the
2006 regions law, to form a new region consisting only of Basra province. This effort did not
attract the needed 10% of provincial residents’ signatures to trigger a referendum by the time of

3 The threshhold for winning a seat is: the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats up for election.
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the provincial elections. It is likely that Fadhila’s relatively poor showing and the broader trend of
support for strong central government will derail the Basra region movement for the near future.
The apparent big loser in the elections was ISCI, which had been favored because it is well
organized and well funded. ISCI favors more power for the provinces and less for the central
government; centralization is Maliki’s preferred power structure. ISCI did not win in Najaf
province, which it previously dominated and which, because of Najaf’s revered status in Shiism,
is considered a center of political gravity in southern Iraq. It won seven seats there, the same
number that was won by the Maliki slate. ISCI won only 3 seats on the Baghdad province
council, down from the 28 it held previously, and only five in Basra. Some observers believe that
the poor showing for ISCI was a product not only of its call for devolving power out of Baghdad,
but also because of its perceived close ties to Iran, which some Iraqis believe is exercising undue
influence on Iraqi politics.
The unexpected strength of secular parties such as that of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi,
appeared to show that voters favored slates committed to strong central government and “rule of
law,” as well as to the concept of Iraqi nationalism. This trend was also reflected in the strong
showing of a single candidate in Karbala province. The figure, Yusuf al-Habbubi, is well thought
of in the province for even-handedness. His boasts of close ties to Saddam’s elder son Uday
(killed in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003) did not hurt him politically, even though most
Karbala residents are Shiites repressed by Saddam’s government. Still, because al-Habbubi is a
single candidate, he only won his own seat on the Karbala provincial council.
Although Maliki’s coalition was the clear winner in the elections, the subsequent efforts to form
provincial administrations demonstrated that he still needed to strike bargains with rival factions,
including Sadr, ISCI, and even the Sunni list of Saleh al-Mutlaq (National Dialogue Front) that
contains many ex-Baathists. The provincial administrations that are taking shape, mostly in line
with set deadlines above, are in the table below.
Maliki remains well positioned in the run-up to the next parliamentary elections, to be held by
late January 2010. On the other hand, some view Maliki as somewhat weaker than expected
because he was unable to block the selection of Samarrai as new Assembly speaker, discussed
above. Some Sunni Arabs to try to become Iraq’s President in the next government, sensing that
the Kurds are now a weakening part of the central government. President Talabani has said in
March 2009 that he will not be available to continue as President at that time, in part because of
widely publicized health problems that have required occasional treatment outside Iraq.
Sunni Participation and Integration
The elections did, to a large extent, further U.S. goals to bring Sunni Muslims ever further into
the political structure. Sunnis boycotted the January 2005 provincial elections and had been
poorly represented in some mixed provinces, such as Diyala and Nineveh. It was also hoped that
the elections would help incorporate into the political structure the tribal leaders (“Awakening
Councils”) who recruited the Sons of Iraq fighters. These Sunni tribalists offered election slates
and showed strength at the expense of the established Sunni parties, particularly the Iraqi Islamic
Party (IIP). The main “Iraq Awakening” tribal slate came in first in Anbar Province, according to
the final results. The established, mostly urban Sunni parties, led by the IIP, had been struggling
in 2008 as the broader Accord Front (Tawafuq) fragmented. In the provincial elections, one of its
component parties—the National Dialogue Council—ran on slates that competed with the IIP in
several provinces.
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Another expected outcome of the election was that Sunni Arabs have wrested control of the
Nineveh provincial council from the Kurds, who won control of that council in the 2005 election
because of the broad Sunni Arab boycott of that election. That appears to have occurred, with a
Sunni list (al-Hadba’a) winning a clear plurality of the Nineveh vote and subsequently taking
control of the provincial administration there. That faction is composed of Sunnis who openly
oppose Kurdish encroachment in the province and who are committed to the “Arab and Islamic
identity” of the province. Nineveh contains numerous territories inhabited by Kurds and which
have been a source of growing tension between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and
the central government in Baghdad.
Another mixed province, Diyala, was hotly contested between Shiite and Sunni Arab and Kurdish
slates, reflecting the character of the province as another front line between the Kurds and the
central government. As noted in the elections results chart below, the provincial version of the
Accord Front narrowly beat out the Kurds for first place. There continues to be substantial
friction between Sunni and Shiite Arabs in that province, in part because Sunni militants drove
out many Shiites from the province at the height of the civil conflict during 2005-2007.
Other U.S. officials saw the elections as key opportunity to move Moqtada al-Sadr’s faction
firmly away from armed conflict against the mainstream Shiite parties. That conflict surged in the
March 2008 Basra offensive discussed above. Sadr announced in October 2008 that he would not
field a separate list in the provincial elections but support Sadrists on other lists. Sadr’s faction,
represented mainly in the “Independent Liberals Trend” list, filed candidate slates in several
provinces mostly in the south. The slate fared well enough in several southern provinces to be a
potential coalition partner, and, through deal making, has gained senior positions in a few
southern provinces. The failure of Sadrists to win control of any councils could reflect voter
disillusionment with parties that continue to field militias—which many Iraqis blame for much of
the violence that has plagued Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein.
Elections Going Forward
Some observers maintain that the success of the provincial elections could be determined by
subsequent contests. By the end of July 2009, there are to be elections for the Kurdistan National
Assembly, which will elect a president of the KRG. There is also a planned referendum by June
30, 2009 on the U.S.-Iraq status of forces agreement, although some believe this referendum
might not be held at all if there is no popular agitation to hold it. By July 31, 2009, district and
sub-district elections are to take place. Moreover, as noted, Iraq is supposed to hold new national
elections by early 2010.
Several other possible elections in Iraq are as yet unscheduled. For example, there are to be
provincial elections in the three Kurdish controlled provinces and the disputed province of
Kirkuk, subsequent to a settlement of the Kirkuk dispute. Under the election law that set the
provincial elections, a parliamentary committee was to make recommendations on resolving this
dispute, to be issued by March 31, 2009. That deadline was not met. The U.N. Assistance
Mission—Iraq (UNAMI) also is continuing its efforts to forge a grand settlement of Kirkuk and
other disputed territories, and a UNAMI report on that is anticipated some time in April 2009.
Depending on political outcomes, there could be further elections. Among them would be a
referendum on whether Basra province could form a new “region;” a referendum on any agreed
settlement on Kirkuk; and a vote on amendments to Iraq’s 2005 constitution.

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Table 1. January 31, 2009 Provincial Election Results (Major Slates)
Baghdad - 55 regular seats, plus
State of Law (Maliki) – 38% (28 seats); Independent Liberals Trend (pro-Sadr) –
one Sabean and one Christian set-
9% (5 seats); Accord Front (Sunni mainstream) – 9% (9 seats); Iraq National
aside seat
(Al awi) – 8.6%; Shahid Mihrab and Independent Forces (ISCI) – 5.4% (3 seats) ;
National Reform list (of former P.M. Ibrahim al-Jafari) – 4.3% (3 seats)
Basra – 34 regular seats,
State of Law – 37% (20); ISCI – 11.6% (5); Sadr – 5% (2); Fadhila (previously
plus one Christian seat
dominant in Basra) – 3.2% (0); Al awi – 3.2% (0); Jafari list – 2.5% (0). New
Governor : Shiltagh Abbud (Maliki list); Council chair: Jabbar Amin (Maliki list)
Nineveh – 34 regular seats, plus
Hadbaa – 48.4%; Fraternal Nineveh – 25.5%; IIP – 6.7%; Hadbaa has taken
one set aside for
control of provincial council and administration, excluding the Kurds.
each of: Shabaks, Yazidis, and
Christians
Najaf – 28 seats
State of Law – 16.2% (7); ISCI – 14.8% (7); Sadr – 12.2% (6); Jafari – 7% (2);
Allawi – 1.8% (0); Fadhila – 1.6% (0). No governor selected. Council chairman:
Maliki list
Babil – 30 seats
State of Law – 12.5% (8); ISCI- 8.2% (5); Sadr – 6.2% (3); Jafari – 4.4% (3); Al awi
– 3.4%; Accord Front – 2.3% (3); Fadhila – 1.3%. New Council chair: Kadim
Majid Tuman (Sadrist)
Diyala – 29 seats
Accord Front list – 21.1%; Kurdistan Alliance – 17.2%; Allawi – 9.5%; State of
Law – 6 %. New council leans heavily Accord
Muthanna – 26 seats
State of Law – 10.9% (5); ISCI – 9.3% (5); Jafari – 6.3% (3); Sadr – 5.5% (2);
Fadhila – 3.7%.
Anbar – 29 seats
Iraq Awakening (Sahawa – Sunni tribals) – 18%; National Iraqi Project Gathering
(established Sunni parties, excluding IIP) – 17.6%; Allawi – 6.6%; Tribes of Iraq –
4.5%.
Maysan – 27 seats
State of Law – 17.7% (8); ISCI – 14.6% (8); Sadr – 7; Jafari – 8.7% (4); Fadhila –
3.2%; Allawi – 2.3%. New Governor: Mohammad al-Sudani (Maliki); Council
chair: Hezbollah Iraq
Dhi Qar – 31 seats
State of Law – 23.1% (13); pro-Sadr – 14.1% (7); ISCI – 11.1% (5); Jafari – 7.6%
(4); Fadhila – 6.1%; Allawi – 2.8%. New governor – Maliki list; Council chair:
Sadrist
Karbala – 27 seats
List of Maj. Gen. Yusuf al-Habbubi (Saddam era local official) – 13.3% (1 seat);
State of Law – 8.5% (9); Sadr – 6.8% (4); ISCI – 6.4% (4); Jafari – 2.5% ; Fadhila –
2.5%.
Salah Ad Din – 28 seats
IIP-led list – 14.5%; Al awi - 13.9%; Sunni list without IIP – 8.7%; State of Law –
3.5%; ISCI – 2.9%. New council leans Accord/IIP
Qadissiyah – 28 seats
State of Law – 23.1% (11); ISCI – 11.7% (5); Jafari – 8.2% (3); Al awi – 8%; Sadr –
6.7% (2); Fadhila – 4.1%. New governor: Salim Husayn (Maliki list)
Wasit – 28 seats
State of Law – 15.3% (13); ISCI – 10% (6); Sadr – 6% (3); Al awi – 4.6%; Fadhila –
2.7%. New governor: Shi te independent; Council chair: ISCI
Source: UNAMI translation of results issued February 2, 2009 by the Independent Higher Election Commission
of Iraq; Vissar, Reidar. The Provincial Elections: The Seat Allocation Is Official and the Coalition-Forming Process
Begins. February 19, 2009.


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Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks

Table 2. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Bloc/Party
Seats
Seats
(Jan. 05)
(Dec. 05)
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). Now 85 seats after departure of Fadilah (15
seats) and Sadr faction (28 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz
al-Hakim has 30; Da’wa Party (25 total: Maliki faction, 12, and Anizi faction, 13);
140 128
independents (30).
Kurdistan Alliance - KDP (24); PUK (22); independents (7)
75
53
Iraqis List (secular, Al awi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni parties for Dec.
40 25
vote.
Iraq Accord Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP,
— 44
Tariq al-Hashimi, 26 seats); National Dialogue Council of Khalaf Ulayyan (7); General
People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi (7); independents (4).
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan.
— 11
2005 vote.
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
2
5
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
—
0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Al awi list in Dec. vote
5
—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2
—
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Umar al-Jabburi, Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (smal Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1
Notes: Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10
million)/ December: 75% (12 million).
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Table 3. Assessments of the Benchmarks
July 12,
Subsequent Actions and Assessments - May 2008 Administration
Benchmark
2007
GAO
Sept. 14, 2007
report, June 2008 GAO report, International Compact with Iraq
Admin.
(Sept. 07) Admin. Report
Review in June 2008, and U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Reports
Report
(and various press sources)
1. Forming Constitutional Review
(S)
unmet
S
CRC filed final report in August 2008 but major issues remain unresolved and
Committee (CRC) and completing review
satisfactory
require achievement of consensus among major faction leaders.
2. Enacting and implementing laws on De-
(U)
unmet
S
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12, 2008. Allows about 30,000
Baathification
unsatisfact.
fourth ranking Baathists to regain their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists in top three
party ranks would receive pensions. But, could al ow for judicial prosecution of

al ex-Baathists and to firing of about 7,000 ex-Baathists in post-Saddam security
services, and bars ex-Saddam security personnel from regaining jobs. Some
reports suggest some De-Baathification officials using the new law to purge
political enemies or settle scores.
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that
U
unmet
U
Framework and three implementing laws stalled over KRG-central government
ensure equitable distribution of resources
disputes; only framework law has reached COR to date. Revenue being
distributed equitably, and 2008 budget adopted February 13, 2008 maintains
17% revenue for KRG. Some U.S. assessments say factions unlikely to reach
agreement on these laws in the near term.
4. Enacting and implementing laws to form
S
partly met
S
Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low threshold (petition by
semi-autonomous regions
33% of provincial council members) to start process to form new regions, but
main blocs agreed that law would take effect April 2008. November 2008:
petition by 2% of Basra residents submitted to IHEC (another way to start
forming a region) to convert Basra province into a single province “region.
Signatures of 8% more were required by mid-January 2009; not achieved.
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to
S on (a)
overall
S on (a) and (c)
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments adopted February 13,
establish a higher electoral commission, (b)
and U on
unmet; (a)
2008, took effect April 2008. Implementing election law adopted September 24,
provincial elections law; (c) a law to specify
the others
met
2008, provided for provincial elections by January 31, 2009. Other provisions
authorities of provincial bodies, and (d) set
above. The law provided open list/proportional representation voting, which
a date for provincial elections
al ows voting for individual candidates; 25% quota for women (although vaguely
worded); and banned religious symbols on ballots.
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
no rating
unmet
Same as July
Law to amnesty “non-terrorists” among 25,000 Iraq-held detainees passed
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
February 13, 2008. Of 23,000 granted amnesty, about 6,300 released to date.
19,000 detainees held by U.S. being transferred to Iraqi control under SOFA.
7. Enacting and implementing laws on
no rating
unmet
Same as July
Basra operation, discussed above, viewed by Bush Administration as move
militia disarmament
against militias. On April 9, 2008, Maliki demanded all militias disband as
condition for their parties to participate in provincial elections. Law on militia
demobilization stalled.
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July 12,
Subsequent Actions and Assessments - May 2008 Administration
Benchmark
2007
GAO
Sept. 14, 2007
report, June 2008 GAO report, International Compact with Iraq
Admin.
(Sept. 07) Admin. Report
Review in June 2008, and U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Reports
Report
(and various press sources)
8. Establishing political, media, economic,
S
met
met
No change. “Executive Steering Committee” works with U.S.-led forces.
and services committee to support U.S.
“surge”
9. Providing three trained and ready
S
partly met
S
No change. Eight brigades assigned to assist the surge. Surge now ended.
brigades to support U.S. surge
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with
U
unmet
S to pursue
No significant change. Still some U.S. concern over the Office of the
authorities to make decisions, without
extremists U on
Commander in Chief (part of Maliki’s office) control over appointments to the
political intervention, to pursue all
political
ISF - favoring Shiites. Still, some politically-motivated leaders remain in ISF. But,
extremists, including Sunni insurgents and
interference
National Police said to include more Sunnis in command jobs and rank and file
Shiite militias
than one year ago.
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
U
unmet
S on military, U
Bush Administration interpreted Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce
providing even-handed enforcement of law
on police
law even-handedly.
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad
S
partly met
S
No change. Ethno-sectarian violence has fallen sharply in Baghdad.
will not provide a safe haven for any
outlaw, no matter the sect
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b)
Mixed. S
unmet
same as July 12
Sectarian violence continues to drop; Shiite militias weaker.
eliminating militia control of local security
on (a); U
on (b)
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security
S
met
S
Over 50 joint security stations operated in Baghdad at the height of U.S. troop
stations
surge, expected to close by June 30, 2009 when, under the SOFA, U.S. troops
are to cease patrolling Iraqi cities.
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating U
unmet
U
Continuing but slow progress training ISF, which is expected to secure Iraq by
independently
the end of 2011 under the SOFA, which requires U.S. troops to be out by then.
Obama Administration draw down plan envisions meeting that timetable.
16. Ensuring protection of minority parties
S
met
S
No change. Rights of minority parties protected by Article 37 of constitution.
in COR
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in
S
partly met
S
About 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for capital projects was spent.
2007 capital budget for reconstruction.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not
U
unmet
U
Some governmental recriminations against some ISF officers still observed.
making false accusations against ISF
members
Source: Compiled by CRS
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Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks


Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612




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