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The 111th Congress may consider extending funding for the Global Peace Operations Initiative
(GPOI), the centerpiece of the Bush Administrations efforts to prepare foreign security forces to
participate in international peacekeeping operations. GPOI was established in mid-2004 as a five-
year program with intended annual funding to total $660 million from FY2005 through FY2009.
The primary purpose of the five-year program was to train and equip 75,000 military troops, a
majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations by 2010. In October 2008, the National
Security Council’s Deputies Committee approved a five-year renewal of GPOI’s mandate, which
the Obama Administration affirmed once it took office, according to the State Department.
GPOI also provides support for the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), an
Italian “train-the-trainer” training center for gendarme (constabulary police) forces in Vicenza,
Italy. In addition, GPOI promotes the development of an international transportation and logistics
support system for peacekeepers, and encourages information exchanges to improve international
coordination of peace operations training and exercises. Through GPOI, the United States
supports and participates in a G* Africa Clearinghouse and a G8++ Global Clearinghouse, both to
coordinate international peacekeeping capacity building efforts.
GPOI incorporates previous capabilities-building programs for Africa. From FY1997 to FY2005,
the United States spent just over $121 million on GPOI’s predecessor program that was funded
through the State Department Peacekeeping (PKO) account: the Clinton Administration’s African
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor, the Bush Administration’s African
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. (ACOTA is now GPOI’s
principal training program in Africa.) Some 16,000 troops from ten African nations were trained
under the early ACRI/ACOTA programs. Some $33 million was provided from FY1998 to
FY2005 to support classroom training of 31 foreign militaries through the Foreign Military
Financing account’s Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC).
Within a year after GPOI was initiated in late 2004, the Administration began expanding the
geographical scope of GPOI to selected countries in Central America, Europe, and Asia. In 2006
and 2007, the program was further expanded to countries in Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific.
GPOI now includes 53 “partner” countries and two partner organizations throughout the world,
although the emphasis is still on Africa. According to figures provided by the State Department,
almost 57,600 peacekeeper trainees and peacekeeper trainers were trained as of January 31, 2009.
Funds allocated to the GPOI program from FY2005 through FY2009 totaled, as of April 2009,
some $480.4 million.
Congress has tended to view the concept of the GPOI program favorably, albeit sometimes with
reservations. Over the years, the State Department has addressed various congressional concerns.
A June 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report (GAO-08-754) responded to a
congressional request to investigate several points. Among them were (1) the extent to which
contributing and participating countries maintain records and databases; (2) the quality and
sustainability of the training of individuals and units; (3) the extent to which those trained are
equipped and remain equipped to deploy in peace operations; (4) participating countries capacity
to mobilize those trained; (5) the extent to which trained individuals are deployed; and (6) the
extent to which contractors are used and the quality of their results. The committee also requested
an assessment of whether GPOI was achieving its goals.
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Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Purposes and Goal..................................................................................................................... 1
Achievements to Date ............................................................................................................... 1
Funding to Date......................................................................................................................... 2
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
GPOI Purposes and Activities ......................................................................................................... 3
GPOI Goals and Needs ............................................................................................................. 3
Demand for Peacekeepers................................................................................................... 4
Need for Gendarme/Constabulary Forces........................................................................... 5
U.S. Peacekeeping Training and Assistance, Pre-GPOI, in Sub-Saharan Africa ...................... 5
The Transition to GPOI Training and Assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa ................................. 6
Development of a “Beyond Africa” Program............................................................................ 7
Western Hemisphere ........................................................................................................... 7
Asia/South Asia/Pacific Islands .......................................................................................... 8
Greater Europe (Europe and Eurasia) ................................................................................. 8
Middle East ......................................................................................................................... 9
Foreign Contributions to Peacekeeping Capacity Building ...................................................... 9
Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) ................................... 10
Administration Funding Requests and Congressional Action ........................................................11
FY2005-FY2009 GPOI Funding..............................................................................................11
Issues for the 111th Congress ................................................................................................... 13
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Table 1. GPOI Obligations, FY2005-FY2009............................................................................... 13
Table 2. GPOI Training Summary, FY2005-First Third, FY2009................................................. 16
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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 18
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As the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) completes the last of its five planned years, the
111th Congress may begin considering whether to continue funding training for foreign military
and police forces through this program. The State Department is expected to request funding in its
FY2010 appropriations request, following the executive branch’s decision to continue the
program. In October 2008, the National Security Council’s Deputies Committee approved a five-
year renewal of GPOI’s mandate, which the Obama Administration affirmed once it took office,
according to the Sate Department. Previous Congresses have generally endorsed the concept of
this program, but also have questioned whether the program is as well-managed as possible and
whether it will achieve its goals. The 111th Congress may wish to consider whether its concerns,
stated in past legislation, have been met.
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Established to train 75,000 international peacekeepers by 2010, GPOI was the George W. Bush
Administration’s signature initiative to build international peacekeeping capacity. (State
Department officials express confidence that the goal of 75,000 peacekeepers-trained will be
achieved by early 2010.) The Administration launched the five-year $660 million (in FY2005-
FY2009 funds) initiative in mid-2004 as a means to alleviate the perceived shortage worldwide of
trained peacekeepers and “gendarmes,” as well as to increase available resources to transport and
sustain them (“Gendarmes,” also known as constabulary police or stability police, are police with
a combination o f policing and military skills considered vital to the semi-stable environments of
peace operations, where the potential for outbreaks of rioting and other violence creates a need
for specially-trained police forces.). While the United States has provided considerable support to
implement several peace processes and to support peacekeepers in the field from a variety of
budget accounts for well over a decade, until GPOI it had provided relatively little funding to
build up foreign military capabilities to perform peacekeeping operations.1
In plans for GPOI after 2010, State Department officials state that the program’s emphasis would
shift from direct training to building the capacity of foreign nations to develop their own
peacekeeping infrastructure and capabilities.
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As of the end of January 2009, GPOI funds have supported the training of 54,245 military troops
as peacekeepers and of 3,350 military personnel to train others in peacekeeping skills. Of those
trained, GPOI reports that as of January 30, 2009, some 46,115 troops from 21 countries were
deployed to 18 peacekeeping operations and 1 election observer mission, and another 4,860
troops were in the process of being deployed.2 In addition, GPOI has supported the training of
1 The term “peacekeeping” is used generically here. It covers the range of activities referred to elsewhere as peace
operations, stability operations, or stabilization and reconstruction (S&R)operations.
2 These missions include the U.S.-run mission of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), two NATO-run operations, two
African missions, 10 United Nations operations, a joint African Union-United Nations mission, and two other
operations. The NATO missions are the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) within Operation Enduring
Freedom, in Afghanistan, and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The African Union-run operations are AMIS in Sudan and
AMISOM in Somalia. The 10 U.N. operations are MINURSO in Western Sahara,, MINUSTAH in Haiti, MONUC in
(continued...)
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1,932 police trainers from 29 countries at the Italian-run Center of Excellence for Stability Police
Units (CoESPU) in Vicenza, Italy.
In addition to training peacekeepers, GPOI supports a variety of institutions specializing in or
contributing to peacekeeping operations. These include 22 peace operations training centers
around the world, as well as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS).
GPOI also provides funds for the Transportation Logistics Support Arrangement (TLSA), which
has supported troops deploying to several peacekeeping missions,3 and other GPOI deployment
equipment funding has supported troops deploying to some of these and other missions.4 In total,
as of January 30, 2009, GPOI had contributed $65.4 million to provide equipment to and
transport troops deployed to seven missions, according to GPOI officials.
In total, all GPOI-funded activities helped deploy 46,115 troops from 21 countries to 18
peacekeeping operations and 1 election observer mission, as of January 30, 2009, with an
additional 4,860 troops about to deploy at that time.
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Through FY2008, GPOI funding totaled $374.46 million. GPOI funding for FY2009 totals
$105.95 million, plus $3.0 million in State Department International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) funding. (The Bush Administration’s FY2009 request called for $106.2
million in peacekeeping operations funds.)
With these funds, GPOI has provided for the training of 57,595 peacekeepers and peacekeeping
trainers as of January 31, 2009.5 (For a breakdown of this number by country, see Table 2,
below.)
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Before mid-2004, the United States provided peacekeeping capacity-building assistance to
foreign militaries primarily under two programs, the African Contingency Operations Training
and Assistance program (ACOTA) and its predecessor program, and the Enhanced International
Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC). Both ACOTA and EPIC have been subsumed under
the GPOI budget line. ACOTA is still the term used to refer to the Africa component of GPOI,
however, and is implemented by the State Department’s Africa Bureau.
(...continued)
the Democratic Republic of Congo, ONUB in Burundi, UNFIL in Lebanon, UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNMIL
in Liberia, UNMIS in Sudan, UNOCI in the Ivory Coast, and UNOSIL in Sierra Leone. GPOI trained troops have also
contributed to UNAMID, the joint African Union-United Nations operation in Darfur. The other two missions are the
Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC) and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI).
3These are AMISOM, AMIS, UNAMID, and UNIFIL.
4 These are AMIS, AMISOM, MINUSTAH, UNMIS, and OEF/ISAF.
5 Information provided by Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, e-mail of February 23, 2009.
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Overall responsibility for GPOI rests with the State Department Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs’ Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis (PM/PPA). (Information about GPOI is available at
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi.) PM/PPA works closely with DOD offices to plan and carry
out the program.
Impetus for GPOI came from the Department of Defense (DOD), where officials in the Office of
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) worked with the State Department for
over a year and a half to develop the proposal. Officials in SO/LIC’s section on peacekeeping
developed the plan as a means to expand and improve the ACOTA program—with more and
better exercises and more equipment—as well as to extend the program beyond Africa to other
parts of the world. Policymakers hoped that the availability of peacekeeping training would
encourage more countries to participate in peacekeeping operations, enable current donors to
provide a greater number of troops, and increase the number of countries which potentially could
serve as lead nations, according to some analysts.
The GPOI budget is part of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Peacekeeping (PKO) account,
also known as the “voluntary” Peacekeeping account, under the Military Assistance rubric. The
PKO account funds activities carried out under Section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended (FAA).6 Section 551 authorizes the President to provide assistance for
peacekeeping operations and other programs to further U.S. national security interests “on such
terms and conditions as he may determine.” (This provides some flexibility to the President, but
is not tantamount to the discretion that he can exercise when funding is provided
“notwithstanding any other provision of law.”)
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In his September 21, 2004 address to the opening meeting of the 59th session of the U.N. General
Assembly, President Bush asserted that the world “must create permanent capabilities to respond
to future crises.” In particular, he pointed to a need for “more effective means to stabilize regions
in turmoil, and to halt religious violence and ethnic cleansing.” A similar rationale prompted the
Clinton Administration to formulate the ACRI training program in 1996 and underlies the current
search for new strategies and mechanisms to prevent and control conflicts.7
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To accomplish these ends, the Bush Administration set three major GPOI goals:
• Train some 75,000 troops worldwide, with an emphasis on Africa, in
peacekeeping skills by 2010.
6 The State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations account (i.e., PKO, also known as the “voluntary” peacekeeping
account) funds U.S. contributions to peacekeeping efforts other than assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping
operations. U.N. assessed contributions are funded through the State Department’s Contributions to International
Peacekeeping Account (CIPA).
7 For more information on this topic, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions:
Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and
Reconstruction Capabilities, by Nina M. Serafino.
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• Support Italy in establishing a center to train international gendarme
(constabulary) forces to participate in peacekeeping operations (see section
below); and
• Foster an international deployment and logistics support system to transport
peacekeepers to the field and maintain them there.
Through GPOI, the State Department also promotes the exchange of information among G-88
donors on peace operations training and exercises in Africa. This is accomplished through donors
meetings which serve as a “clearinghouse” to facilitate coordination. The first of these State
Department meetings was held in Washington, D.C. on October 7-8, 2004.9 The United Kingdom
hosted a second meeting in February 2006, the Russian Federation hosted a third in June 2006,
Germany hosted a fourth in March 2007, Japan hosted the fifth in April 2008, and Italy is hosting
the sixth in April 2009.
Through GPOI, the State Department also supports a G8++ Global Clearinghouse information
exchange to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide. The first Global Clearinghouse meetings
was held in Washington, D.C., in October 2007,10 and the second in the United Kingdom in
December 2008.
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For many analysts, a continued effort to improve the peacekeeping skills of African and other
military forces is an important step towards controlling devastating conflicts, particularly in
Africa. In the mid-1990s, several developed nations provided most of the peacekeepers. The
perception that developed nations would not be able to sustain the burden indefinitely, as well as
the perception that the interests of those nations in Africa were not sufficient to ensure needed
troop commitments there, led international capacity-building efforts to focus on Africa.
As of the end of December 2004, shortly after GPOI first started up, almost 25,000 of the nearly
58,000 military personnel who were participating in the current 17 U.N. peacekeeping operations
were from the 22 African troop-contributing nations. (African nations provided over half of the
military personnel—roughly 24,000 of 47,000—in the seven U.N. peacekeeping operations in
Africa.) Africa’s military contribution to U.N. peacekeeping at the end of 2004 was over double
that at the end of 2000; five of the top ten African contributors, who provided some 98% of the
military contribution, received training under the ACRI/ACOTA program. African contributions
to the U.N. international civilian police pool (CIVPOL) remained just about the same over those
four years: 1,213 in December 2004 (of a total of 6,765 from all nations) compared to 1,088 in
December 2000.
African militaries also participate in regional peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the
Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU). (The
first ECOWAS peacekeeping mission was deployed to Liberia in 1990. Subsequent missions were
8 G8 refers to the “Group of 8” major industrialized democracies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. G8 heads of state, plus representatives from the European Union, meet at
annual summits.
9 The United States European Command (EUCOM) held two previous “clearinghouse” meetings in May and December
2004.
10 This included 46 countries and organizations, according to the State Department.
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deployed to Liberia once again, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, the Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, and
Somalia. The AU deployed its first peacekeepers to Burundi in 2003 and Sudan in 2004. All
missions eventually became U.N. operations. Both organizations are trying to develop an African
stand-by peacekeeping force, comprised of contributions from five regional organizations, by
2010. Under GPOI, the United States will work to enhance and support the command structures
and multilateral staff of ECOWAS and the AU.
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A second capability in short supply is the specialized units of police with military skills to handle
temporary hostile situations such as unruly crowds.11 Several countries have such forces (e.g., the
Italian carabinieri, the French gendarmerie, and the Spanish Guardia Civil, among others). In the
United States these forces generally have been referred to in the past as constabulary forces; in
the context of peacekeeping and stabilization operations they are currently referred to as “stability
police” or gendarme forces. The United Nation refers to such forces as “formed police units” or
FPUs.
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From 1996 through 2004, the United States provided field and staff training to develop military
capabilities for peacekeeping through the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its
successor program, ACOTA. Early in FY2005, ACOTA was subsumed under GPOI. Under
ACRI/ACOTA, the United States trained some 16,000 troops from 10 African nations:12 Benin,
Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, and
Uganda.13 (It also trained a small number of gendarmes who received the same training as the
others.)
11 Gendarme/constabulary forces are trained in both military and policing skills, but are less heavily armed than
soldiers. According to the Clinton Administration’s Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD-71), constabulary tasks
include the regulation of peoples’ movements when necessary to ensure safety; interventions “to stop civil violence,
such as vigilante lynchings or other violent public crimes” and to “stop and deter widespread or organized looting,
vandalism, riots or other mob-type action;” and the dispersal of “unruly or violent public demonstrations and civil
disturbances.” (Text: The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations, February 24, 2000, pp 9-10.)
Constabulary forces often can deploy more rapidly than other international civilian police because they usually deploy
as “formed units” (i.e., in previously formed working groups) instead of as individuals. They also are often equipped
with their own communication and logistical support. See CRS Report RL32321, Policing in Peacekeeping and
Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions, by Nina M. Serafino.
12 ACRI provided training in traditional peacekeeping skills where there is an existing cease-fire or peace accord. The
more muscular ACOTA, initiated in 2002, has also provided training in the skills needed for African troops to perform
peacekeeping tasks in more hostile environments, including force protection, light-infantry operations and small-unit
tactics. Information from a State Department official and Col. Russell J. Handy, USAF, Africa Contingency Operations
Training Assistance: Developing Training Partnerships for the Future of Africa. Air and Space Power Journal, Fall
2003, as posted online at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/fal03/handy.html. ACOTA also
put greater emphasis on the “train the trainer” aspect. As of 2005, training packages included Command and Staff
Operations Skills, Command Post Exercises (i.e., exercises, often computer-based, of headquarters commanders and
staff) and Peace Support Operations Soldier Skills field training, according to a State Department fact sheet.
13 Military personnel from two of these nations were trained only briefly under ACRI. Training for the Côte d’Ivoire
was halted because of a military coup, and for Uganda, because of that country’s involvement in the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of Congo.
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The United States also provided non-lethal equipment to the militaries that it trained. This
included communications packages, uniforms, boots, generators, mine detectors, Global
Positioning Systems (GPS), and medical and water purification equipment.
Initially, under ACRI, U.S. soldiers provided field training and oversaw classroom training
provided by private contractors. Because of the demand for U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan,
private contractors also began to conduct field training. By the time GPOI was initiated, private
contractors, many of whom reportedly were retired military personnel and reservists, conducted
most of the training, while U.S. active duty military officers and non-commissioned officers were
much less involved overall, but did provide mentoring. This remains true today.
Funding for ACRI, which like ACOTA was provided under the State Department’s Peacekeeping
Operations (PKO) account, totaled $83.6 million during its six fiscal years (FY1997-FY2002).
(Additional support for ACRI was provided through the Foreign Military Financing program.)
ACOTA was funded at $8 million in FY2003 and $15 million in FY2004.
Other support for classroom training of foreign militaries was provided through the EIPC, a “train
the trainer” program which began in FY1998 and was subsumed under the GPOI rubric. EIPC
provided assistance to selected countries—some 31 as of early 2005—by designing and
implementing a comprehensive, country-specific peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance
training and education program to enhance a nation’s institutional structure to train and deploy
peacekeepers. EIPC funding, provided under the Foreign Military Financing Program, totaled
about $31.5 million through FY2004.
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GPOI was designed as a program with worldwide reach, but its emphasis was always intended to
remain on Africa. In FY2005, only a few hundred peacekeeper trainees were from outside Africa,
and thus far the great majority of trainees are Africans. (For a detailed account of the number of
trainees from each country, see Table 2 at the end of this report. This table provides the number
of trainees trained using the funds from each fiscal year, not the number of trainees actually
trained in that fiscal year. Because training is still being conducted with previous fiscal year
funds, these numbers will change.) Training in Africa continues to be conducted under the
ACOTA program, which is implemented by the State Department’s Africa Bureau.
In GPOI’s first funding year, during FY2005, some 12,080 African troops from 13 partners were
trained using funds initially appropriated for ACOTA under the regular budget and additional
funds appropriated for GPOI. This number included pre-deployment training for five battalions
from Senegal that were then deployed to specific peacekeeping missions.14 The 12 other ACOTA
partners whose troops were trained using FY2005 funds were Benin, Botswana, ECOWAS,
Gabon, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, and Zambia.
GPOI’s Africa ACOTA component now consists of 24 partners: 22 partner countries and two
partner organizations. The states are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
14 The Senegalese were trained to participate in missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Côte
d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Darfur.
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Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. (However, as the State
Department has suspended military assistance to Mauritania and Niger, no GPOI assistance is
being provided to those countries at this time.) In addition, GPOI provides assistance to the
African Union and ECOWAS, which are also partners. This assistance includes sponsoring retired
U.S. Army officers contracted as advisors to these institutions.
As of February 23, 2009, GPOI funds have provided training under the ACOTA program for
55,263 peacekeepers, according to the State Department GPOI office. Of these, some 45,606 have
been deployed or where in the process of deploying to a UN or other peace operation as of that
date. In addition, since FY2005, ACOTA has trained 12,627 more peacekeepers from GPOI
partner countries using other PKO funds and funds from the Netherlands. Of those, 12,127 have
been deployed or were in the process of deploying as of February 23, 2009.15
In addition, GPOI supports five peace operations training centers in Sub-Saharan Africa. These
are located in Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, and South Africa.
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In July 2005, the State Department initiated a training and equipping program for countries
outside of Africa (informally referred to at the time as the “Beyond Africa” program)16 in order to
extend GPOI training to three new regions: Latin America, Europe, and Asia. (As in Africa, some
equipment is provided during training, but only that needed for the training itself. Trained troops
are not provided with equipment needed for operations until they deploy.) The number of partner
countries outside of Africa has grown to 31.
The largest number of partners outside Africa are in Asia/South Asia and the Pacific Islands,
where there are 14 partner states. Eleven partner countries are in the Western Hemisphere, six in
Europe and Eurasia, and one in the Middle East.
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The Latin American program began in Central America, where GPOI funds were initially used to
train and equip soldiers from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, as well as to
upgrade an existing facility in order to establish a peacekeeping training center in Guatemala.
Through this support, Central American countries were able to stand up a battalion of about 600
Central American troops, as part of the Conferencia de Fuerzas Armadas Centroamericanas
(CFAC).
There are now 11 Western Hemisphere partner countries: Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Some
1,867 peacekeepers and trainers from Western Hemisphere partner countries and 5 from Canada
15 Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, e-mail of February 23, 2009.
16 The Department of Defense transferred the $80 million in P.L. 108-447 (Division J Section 117) supplemental
appropriations to be used for GPOI programs in June 2005. Funds became available for obligation in mid-July, 15 days
after the State Department notified Congress of its spending plans.
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(which is not a partner) received GPOI training, as of January 31, 2009. Although Bolivia is a
partner country, it has not yet participated in GPOI activities.
GPOI supports eight peace operations training centers in the Western Hemisphere. These are
located in Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and
Uruguay.
The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) runs major peacekeeping exercises under GPOI
auspices. In 2009, the PKO of the Americas will be held in multiple phases geared to the needs of
each participant. Events are to be held in March and May at six locations, with additional events
in June or July.
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In Asia, the first countries to be extended train-and-equip assistance and provided some logistical
support were Bangladesh, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Thailand (which was subsequently suspended
because of a military coup and reinstated in February 2008). GPOI funds were also used establish
and install a communications network among partner countries in the region, called the Peace
Support Operations Collaboration Center (PSOCC) in Mongolia.17
Currently, there are 14 partner countries in good standing in these regions: Bangladesh,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka,
Tajikistan, Thailand, Tonga, and Vietnam. In addition, Fiji is a partner country, but it is currently
under sanctions and not eligible for GPOI assistance. India chose not to join GPOI as a partner,
but Indian personnel have participated in some GPOI training events through the use of non-
GPOI funds. Personnel from Australia, Brunei, Japan, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Republic of
Korea, New Zealand, and Singapore have also participated in GPOI training events, although
GPOI did not fund the travel and accommodations for personnel from these countries. In all,
some 3,287 peacekeepers and peacekeeping trainers from those regions have been trained using
GPOI funds.
GPOI supports peacekeeping operations training centers in five countries in these regions:
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, and Thailand.
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In Europe, the first countries whose troops were offered training and other support under GPOI
were Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the Ukraine. Bosnia was provided information
technology support for its training center and a U.S. instructor with FY2005 funds.
Currently, GPOI has six partner countries in greater Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Romania, Macedonia, and the Ukraine. Some 323 peacekeepers and peacekeeping
trainers from this area have participated in GPOI training events, including 13 from France,
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, which are not partner countries.18
17 This project was part of plans for what was formerly referred to as the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN).
18 However, GPOI did not pay the individual costs of each of these participants, including travel, per diem, and any
other expenses.
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GPOI funds supports peace operations training centers in three countries in Greater Europe:
Albania, Bosnia and Ukraine. GPOI also has provided deployment equipment to SEEBRIG, the
seven-member multinational South East Europe Brigade, composed of personnel from Albania,
Bulgaria, Italy, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey.19
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GPOI’s first and currently only Middle Eastern partner country is Jordan, which was added in
FY2006. Two peacekeepers from Jordan have participated in GPOI training. (One person from
Lebanon also participated in GPOI training, but his participation was not funded by GPOI.).
GPOI funds support a peacekeeping operation center in Jordan.
Morocco is to be added as a GPOI partner country in FY2009.
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When the Bush Administration launched GPOI in 2004, it intended it as a stimulus for increased
multilateral efforts to build worldwide peacekeeping capacity, with a focus on Africa. At the time,
several countries had their own significant programs supporting peacekeeping in Africa. In
addition, through the G8, the major industrialized democracies had indicated increasing support
for peace efforts in Africa. In June 2002, the G8 Summit at Kananaskis, Canada, adopted a broad
Africa Action Plan that contained sections on conflict resolution and peace-building efforts. The
more specific Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support
Operations was developed over the next year and presented at the June 2003 Summit at Evian-
les-baines, France.20 At their June 2004 summit meeting at Sea Island, GA, G8 leaders adopted a
third Africa peacekeeping action plan: Action Plan on Expanding Global Capability for Peace
Support Operations.21
European and other countries continue their assistance to African peacekeeping. In addition to the
United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) conduct bilateral training programs with
African militaries. Germany and the UK provided the assistance necessary to launch the regional
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana, which opened in 2004, and
Germany is providing continuing assistance. The European Union and other countries, most
prominently Canada, Italy, France and the Netherlands, have also assisted the Center.
19 SEEBRIG as an entity does not hold the presidential determination necessary to receive direct GPOI support, but
GPOI provides support to SEEBRIG through direct assistance to Romania, which hosted the SEEBRIG headquarters.
Original plans were to provide pre-deployment training for troops participating in the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), the NATO peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan, but were changed when it was determined there was
no need for it.
20 Texts available at http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/kananaskis/afraction-en.pdf and http://www.g8.gc.ca/
AFRIQUE-01june-en.asp.
21 Text available at http://www.g8usa.gov/d_061004c.htm. In his September 2004 speech to the United Nations,
President Bush referred to Italy as a “joint sponsor” of GPOI, because it co-sponsored with the United States the Sea
Island G8 peacekeeping action plan.
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Italy supports international peacekeeping capacity building efforts with its Center of Excellence
for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), an international “train the trainer” school for police to learn
and transfer peacekeeping policing skills. Italian carabinieri, who are widely viewed as a leading
model and have played a prominent role in providing gendarme forces to peacekeeping and
stabilization operations22 established CoESPU at Vicenza in March 2005. Italy is providing not
only the facility, but also most of the staff . As of mid-2006, some 145 carabinieri were attached
to CoESPU, of which about 25 were instructors and training staff. (At the same point, two U.S.
military service members were attached to the center, one serving as Deputy Director.23)
CoESPU’s goal, by 2010, is to train 3,000 mid-to-high ranking personnel at Vicenza and an
additional 4,000 in formed units in their home countries.
The United States is CoEPSU’s primary foreign supporter. Currently, there is one U.S. service
member at CoESPU, serving as the Deputy Director, and the United Sates is considering staffing
additional positions through U.S. military personnel, civilian personnel, or contractors. A U.S.
contribution of $10 million for the school’s operation and training programs was transferred to
Italy in late September 2005; its contributions through FY2009 total $15 million. (According to
CoESPU officials in 2006, the U.S. contribution covers about one-third the cost of running the
school.)24
Several other countries have contributed. Canada, France, and Russia have provided instructors
for certain courses.
CoESPU offers high-level courses (for staff officers ranking from Lt. Colonels to Colonels and
their civilian equivalents) consisting of four-and-a-half weeks of classes (approximately 150
classroom hours) in international organizations, international law (including international
humanitarian law), military arts in peace support operations, tactical doctrine, operating in mixed
international environments with hybrid chains of command, and the selection, training, and
organization of police units for international peace support operations.
The Center also offers a course for junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers (sergeant
majors to captains) and their civilian equivalents. This course covers the materials taught in the
high-level course with an emphasis on training in the more practical aspects, including checkpoint
procedures, VIP security and escorts, high-risk arrests, border control, riot control, election
security, and police self-defense techniques.
(The first high-level class graduated 29 officers on December 7, 2005. The first class consisted of
officers from Cameroon, India, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, and Senegal. A pilot course for the
middle-management level began on January 13, 2006, and seven weeks later graduated about 100
officers. Students for this course were drawn from the same six countries as those at the first-high
level course.)
22 According to Carabinieri officials interviewed by the author, as of mid-November 2004, some 1,300 carabinieri
were deployed in missions to Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Albania, and Palestine.
23 (In 2006, CoESPU officials stated they would like a commitment of five U.S. military service members, one as
Deputy Director and others to assist with information, training, and studies and research efforts, including the
development of doctrine. Author’s interviews at CoESPU, June 2006.
24 Author’s interviews at CoESPU, June 2006.
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CoESPU also has worked on developing a lessons-learned and doctrine writing capability in
order to serve as an interactive resource for Stability Police Units (SPUs). An early intention was
to develop a coherent and comprehensive SPU doctrine to promote interoperability in the field, to
ensure that doctrine is the basis of training standards and methods, and to respond to questions
from SPU commanders in the field, as well as to support pre-mission and in-theater training
exercises. Recently, the United Nations has taken on the task of spearheading the development of
SPU (or in U.N. terms, Formed Police Unit/FPU) doctrine; CoESPU is supporting this initiative.
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Funding for GPOI totaled $374.46 million from FY2005 through FY2008. Initial dedicated
funding of $96.7 million in FY2005 was contained in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for
FY2005 (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447), split between the Department of State (almost 20%) and the
DOD (80% as funds to be transferred to State) budgets.25 For FY2006, the State Department
allocated $100.4 million to GPOI, which was slightly more than half of the total PKO account,
but some $14 million below the President’s request.26 For FY2007, the Administration requested
$102.6 million for GPOI funding. House and Senate action signaled some discontent with the
program.27 The final continuing resolution28 that funded most government operations and
25 Although the initiative had long been in the works, President Bush approved GPOI in April 2004, two months after
the FY2005 budget request was submitted to Congress. To fund the initiative at approximately $100 million in
FY2005, the Administration proposed that 80% be DOD funds and the remaining 20% be ACOTA State Department
funds. The Armed Services committees did not back GPOI because of concerns that its inclusion in the DOD budget
would divert funds from U.S. troops. GPOI’s strongest support seemed to come from Senate foreign affairs authorizers
and appropriators. Nevertheless, in the end, Congress divided the FY2005 GPOI funding in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447) as follows. Section 117 of Division J (“Other Matters”)
provided that “$80 million may be transferred with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense” to the Department of
State Peacekeeping Operations account, where it was allocated to GPOI. Division D of H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447
contained $20 million in State Department PKO funding for the ACOTA account and nearly $1.8 million in EPIC
Foreign Military Financing funding. Both accounts which are now subsumed under GPOI.
26 The Bush Administration requested $114.4 million for FY2006 GPOI funding. The House FY2006 Foreign
Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 3057 (as reported by the House Appropriations Committee (HAC), H.Rept. 109-
152, on June 24 and passed on June 28), contained $96.4 million for GPOI. In its report, the HAC expressed its support
for GPOI as a means for the United States to “reduce the emphasis on the use of military troops for these operations.” It
explained that it had provided $18 million less than the request because it did not expect that all $63 million indicated
for equipment and transportation outside of Africa could be obligated and spent in 2006. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee version of the State Department authorization bill for FY2006 and FY2007 (S. 600, S.Rept. 109-35,
reported on March 10, 2005, and returned to the calendar on April 26) would have authorized $114.4 million for
FY2006 and such sums as may be necessary for FY2007 for GPOI. The House version (H.R. 2601, H.Rept. 109-168, as
reported by the House International Relations Committee on July 13, 2005 and passed on July 20) The Senate version
of the bill (as reported June 30 and passed July 20), contained $114.0 million for GPOI. does not mention GPOI and
does not detail accounts in such a way as to indicate whether GPOI is funded. There was no further action on the bill.
In the end, Congress did not dedicate any funds specifically for GPOI (or for any other program in the PKO account) in
the conference version of the FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriation bill (H.Rept. 109-265, P.L. 109-102, signed
into law November 14, 2005), which funded the PKO account at $175 million—$20.8 million below the
Administration’s request of $195.8 million. The State Department eventually allocated an estimated $100.4 million for
27 The House was disinclined to provide full funding.27 Senate appropriators expressed discontent with State
Department management of the program. They proposed that GPOI funding be transferred to a new FMF program and
(continued...)
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programs through FY2007, including GPOI, left the decision on the amount of GPOI funding for
FY2007 largely to the State Department, albeit in the context of a reduced availability of funds.29
The State Department’s FY2007 GPOI obligations totaled $81 million (i.e., $1 million less than
provided for in the House-passed FY2007 Foreign Operations bill, H.R. 5522). (An earlier
version of the Continuing Resolution had set the House-passed amount as the level for FY2007
GPOI funding.) For FY2008, Congress fully funded the Bush Administration’s budget request for
$92.5 million in GPOI funding. (This funding was contained in the omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008 [H.R. 2764, Division J; P.L. 110-161, signed into law December 26,
2007]).30 The State Department allocated almost $4 million more.
State Department allocations for GPOI for FY2009 total $105.95 million from PKO funds and an
expected additional amount of some $3 million from INCLE funding (see Table 1 and notes,
below). The State Department allocated these funds from appropriations in the Omnibus
Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8, signed into law March 11, 2009). The Bush
Administration’s FY2009 budget request called for $106.2 million in PKO funds for GOPI.
(...continued)
recommended that the COESPU program be either fully funded by other countries or be transferred to the State
Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) In the Senate Appropriations
Committee (SAC) version of H.R. 5522, the State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Bill for
FY2007 (S.Rept. 109-277), approved by SAC on June 29, 2006, funding for GPOI would be transferred from the PKO
account to a new program under the Foreign Military Financing Program. S.Rept. 109-277 stated that the State
Department “has failed to demonstrate a requisite level of commitment to the program, instead viewing funds provided
for GPOI as a funding source for other activities.” [The State Department transferred $57 million in GPOI funds to
support urgent needs of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur, Sudan, according to a State Department
official.] The report also scored the State Department for ignoring committee guidance on GPOI and for its inability “to
articulate any plan for the use of fiscal year 2005 funding until calendar year 2006.” S.Rept. 109-277, p. 92.
The SAC recommended that a Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund be created under FMF, the purpose of which
would be “identical to GPOI, namely, to identify the critical shortfalls in the training, equipment, and capabilities of our
allies to serve in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.” To decide on the allocation of funds, the Assistant
Secretary of State for Political-Military [Pol-Mil] Affairs would consult with commanders of the U.S. regional military
commands (U.S., Pacific, Central, European, and Southern) to identify “the most critical training and equipment
shortfalls of our peacekeeping partners and regional allies” in order to develop a three year plan and program to address
those needs. S.Rept. 109-277, p. 92.
28 Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007 (H.J.Res. 20, P.L. 110-5, signed into law February 15, 2007.
Amends P.L. 109-289, division B, as amended by P.L. 109-369 and P.L. 109-383.)
29 Congress, in effect, reduced the amount of funding available for the GPOI program by funding the overall PKO
budget at $223.25 million, while earmarking $50 million for peacekeeping operations in Sudan. Congress thus provided
$173.25 million for other (than Sudan peacekeeping) PKO programs in FY2007, i.e., $27.25 million less than the
Administration’s $200.5 million PKO budget request and the same as the FY2006 PKO budget. State Department plans
for FY2007 included spending for two new programs totaling some $31 million, the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism
Initiative (TSCTI) and Liberia, that were not included in the FY2006 budget.
30 Although the Act does not specify funding for GPOI, the Joint Explanatory Statement on the final version of the
omnibus appropriations bill specifies that the executive branch is to take into account House and Senate Committee
report language on bills incorporated into the omnibus when implementing the legislation. The House Report (H.Rept.
110-197) accompanying the original State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill
recommends full funding.
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Table 1. GPOI Obligations, FY2005-FY2009
(in $ millions)
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008
Category
Actualsa Actualsb Acutals Actuals FY2009
Totals
African Contingency Operations
Training and Assistance
(ACOTA) 28.92
35.00
40.39
44.00
49.00
197.28
Africa Regional HQ Support:
African Union (AU) and the
Economic Community of West
43.21
African States (ECOWAS)
10.01
9.71
7.15
7.16
9.18
East Asia and the Pacific
7.74
11.00
6.55
9.42
15.13
49.84
Europe and Eurasia
5.05
6.00
4.00
5.80
4.10
24.95
Near East (i.e., Jordan)
0
0.65
1.30
1.00
1.60
4.55
South & Central Asia
0.93
5.00
7.36
10.33
6.60
30.22
Western
Hemisphere
6.49
11.70
8.45
11.65 12.06 50.35
Center of Excellence for
Stability Police Units (CoESPU)
15.00 0 0 0
0
15.00
Transportation and Logistics
Support Arrangement (TLSA)
and Deployment Equipment
21.99
19.77
5.79
5.69
4.81
58.05
Program
Management
0.55
1.51
0
1.39 3.48 6.93
Total
96.66
100.36
81.00
96.44 105.95 480.38
Source: Department of State, as of April 2, 2009.
Notes: Some totals do not add due to rounding. For FY2009, GPOI also includes approximately $3 million in
State Department International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds that are not included in
this table as a final amount has not been decided.
a. As GPOI was not created until late 2004, FY2005 actuals include funds originally appropriated elsewhere:
$14.88 million in Peacekeeping Account (PKO) funds for ACOTA; $1.79 million in Foreign Military Financing
for Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC), and an $80 million transfer from DOD.
b. FY2006 funding includes $57 million from FY2006 supplemental appropriations.
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Over the past few years, the State Department responded to concerns of the 109th and the 110th
Congresses to strengthen GPOI. Its steps included producing a strategic plan (the executive
summary of which is publically available),31 facilitating procedures to speed planning and
implementation, and implementing an evaluation program. As of 2008, Congress requested32 that
31 U.S. Department of State. Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Global Peace
Operations Initiative (GPOI): Summary of GPOI Strategy for Fiscal Years 2005-2006. September 4, 2006.
32 In action on the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), in
(continued...)
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the Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigate a number of remaining issues: the GAO
expressed several concerns about GPOI performance and management in a June 2008 report.33
Among the points the Congress requested the GAO to address were (1) the extent to which
contributing and participating countries maintain records and databases; (2) the quality and
sustainability of the training of individuals and units; (3) the extent to which those trained are
equipped and remain equipped to deploy in peace operations; (4) participating countries capacity
to mobilize those trained; (5) the extent to which trained individuals are deployed; and (6) the
extent to which contractors are used and the quality of their results. The committee also requested
an assessment of whether GPOI is achieving its goals and recommendations as to whether a
country’s participation in GPOI “should require reciprocal participation.”
In its June 2008 report, the GAO doubted, based on information available to it in its investigation,
that GPOI would be able to reach its goal of training 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010. The GAO
stated, however, that it could not evaluate information that the State Department subsequently
provided to demonstrate that GPOI would reach its goal. As of February 2008, GPOI officials are
stating that 75,000 will be trained by early 2010. GPOI officials also state that the program will,
as recommended by the GAO, ensure that plans for extending GPOI activities beyond 2010
identify the necessary resources for developing long-term peacekeeping skills and infrastructure
in Africa.34 They point to plans to concentrate on building infrastructure in any post-2010
program.
The GAO made several recommendations to improve human rights vetting, program
management, and training content. The following bullets note the recommendations and the steps
that GPOI is taking to meet them. Congress may wish monitor progress on the GAO
recommendations.
• Noting that a number of foreign military troops who received GPOI training had
not been properly vetted, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of State
develop a system for monitoring all GPOI vetting activities and for ensuring that
all individuals are vetted. According to GPOI officials, the recommendation
applies not only to GPOI, but to State Department vetting in general. To improve
the vetting system, according to those officials, the Department has secured
funding to establish a database that will facilitate record-keeping and access to
past vetting cases. GPOI program implementers will use the system when it is
available.
(...continued)
Section 1204 of its version of the bill (S. 1547, reported June 5, 2007), called for a GAO study describing and assessing
the activities and implementation of the GPOI program. This requirement was retained in the final bill (H.R. 4986, P.L.
110-181, signed into law January 28, 2008). In the SASC report accompanying the Senate version of the bill (S.Rept.
110-77), SASC stated that it wanted to “strengthen the likelihood that GPOI will be administered in such a fashion, and
that there will be an expectation, if not a requirement, that GPOI training recipient countries contribute troops to U.N.
missions in the near-term, and that GPOI will increase the number of peacekeepers who can remain ready via sustained
training and equipping programs.” SASC expressed concern as to whether the readiness of GPOI-trained troops “is
being monitored or maintained” and noted that program objectives calling for the establishment of an equipment depot
for and of a multilateral transportation logistics support arrangement (TLSA) have not been fulfilled.32 SASC also
expressed concern that participation by other G-8 members has not met expectations.
33 Government Accountability Office. Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but United States is Unlikely to Complete All
Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements are Needed. GAO-08-754, June 2008.
34 Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained. op. cit., p. 35.
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• Judging that GPOI was unable to account for the delivery and transfer of
nonlethal training equipment to partner countries, the GAO recommended that
the Secretary of State monitor implementation, on an ongoing basis, of new
procedures to account for delivery and transfer of nonlethal training equipment to
partner countries. According to GPOI officials, the State Department GPOI
Evaluation Team had identified this accountability problem before the GAO
investigation. The ACOTA program has instituted a sole-source logistics contract
to improve the entire logistics process from acquisition to delivery, and is
establishing a mechanism with its African partners to manage joint inventories.
The State Department is developing procedures with other stakeholders to better
account for equipment that is commercially acquired through the State
Department’s Office of Acquisition Management’s regional procurement support
offices. Similarly, new procedures have been developed by the State Department
and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to account for training equipment
provided through the Foreign Military Sales system, with the U.S. government
retaining title to and custody of defense articles until a designated U.S.
government agent confirms and documents delivery of GPOI material to a
recipient country’s authorized representative or agent.
• In order to improve training, GAO recommended that the Secretary of State
develop, in consultation with DOD a training program for GPOI that uses
standard military task lists and related training standards in order to establish
program-wide criteria for evaluating the quality of training and measuring trainee
proficiency. According to GPOI officials, a GPOI contractor, Detica, is working
in close collaboration with key stakeholders and others, including the U.N.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to develop a set of essential tasks for
peace operations35 and corresponding training standards to improve training
programs.
• In regard to U.S. support to CoESPU, GAO recommended that the State
Department work with DOD in order to help Italy staff key unfilled positions in
order to better evaluate progress and monitor results. GAO also suggested that
GPOI provide additional guidance to U.S. missions to help the United States and
Italy collect data on the training and deployment of CoESPU graduates. The State
Department is looking into the possibility of using GPOI funds to provide
additional staff at CoESPU who would help with evaluation and monitoring,
including the development of an alumni database, outreach materials, and
tracking mechanisms. Also, according to GPOI officials, U.S. Embassy staff and
others have been asked to help administer a survey regarding the training
activities and deployments of CoESPU graduates. The results may be available
by mid-2009.
35 “Mission essential task lists” or METLs in military terminology.
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Table 2. GPOI Training Summary, FY2005-First Third, FY2009
(#s trained to standard as of January 31, 2009)
Total #
Total #
Region/Country/
Peacekeepers
Peacekeeper
Organization
Trained
Trainers Trained
Total #
Sub-Saharan Africa
Benin 4,260
195
4,455
Botswana 118
47
165
Burkina Faso
2,535
161
2,696
Burundi 1,291
0
1,291
Cameroon 692
101
793
ECOWAS 287
2
289
Gabon 1,212
161
1,393
Ghana 5,965
169
6,134
Kenya 189
5
194
Malawi 1,063
25
1,088
Mali 880
130
1,010
Mauritania - Suspended
284
20
304
Mozambique 868
161
1,029
Namibia 817
71
888
Niger – Suspended
1,041
107
1,121
Nigeria 9,463
586
10,049
Rwanda 4,789
92
4,881
Senegal 7,829
435
8,264
South Africa
211
114
325
Tanzania 775
24
799
Uganda 4,149
137
4,286
Zambia 563
113
676
Sub-Total Africa
49,254
2,856
52,110
Asia/South Asia/Pacific Islands/Middle East
Australia 20
0
20
Brunei 47
5
52
Bangladesh 190
50
240
Cambodia 187
29
216
Fiji – Suspended
45
2
47
India 83
2
85
Indonesia 361
72
433
Japan 3
0
3
Jordan 2
0
2
Korea, Republic of
46
6
52
Laos 3
0
3
Lebanon 1
0
1
Malaysia 322
75
397
Mongolia 640
77
717
Nepal
372
35
407
New Zealand
5
0
5
Papua New Guinea
2
0
2
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Total #
Total #
Region/Country/
Peacekeepers
Peacekeeper
Organization
Trained
Trainers Trained
Total #
Philippines
16
0
16
Singapore 12
0
12
Sri Lanka
60
7
67
Thailand 356
35
391
Tonga 113
7
120
Subtotal Asia/Central Asia/South
Asia/the pacific
2,888
402
3,290
Greater Europe (Europe and Eurasia)
Albania 254
0
254
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3
0
3
France 3
0
3
Germany 4
0
4
Italy 1
0
1
United Kingdom
5
0
5
Ukraine 27
26
53
Subtotal Greater Europe
297
26
323
Western Hemisphere
Belize 55
10
65
Canada 5
0
5
Dominican Republic
13
2
15
El Salvador
215
7
222
Guatemala 751
16
767
Honduras 255
26
281
Nicaragua 445
5
450
Paraguay 36
0
36
Peru 18
0
18
Uruguay 13
0
13
Subtotal Western Hemisphere
1,806
66
1,872
Total 54,245
3,350
57,595
Sources: Compiled from information provided by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs, February 18, 2009.
Notes: This table does not include soldiers trained by GPOI-trained trainers. The standard used by evaluators
for inclusion was mastery of at least 80% of the coursework and an 80% or better attendance record. NA = Not
Available.
This table includes countries that are not GPOI partners but participated in multilateral peacekeeping exercises
or received training at GPOI-supported regional training facilities at the request of the host government. These
countries include Australia, Brunei, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy Japan, Laos, New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, and Singapore. It also includes Cameroon, which is not a GPOI partner
(i.e., eligible to receive bilateral assistance). It is listed here as receiving training because it sends students to the
Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU).
# Peacekeepers = # soldiers (and occasionally gendarmes) trained in peacekeeping skills in GPOI courses in
order to deploy to peacekeeping operations.
# Peacekeeper Trainers = # soldiers trained to train other military personnel in peacekeeping skills for
deployment to peacekeeping operations (i.e., soldiers trained under the “train-the-trainer” program).
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Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
nserafino@crs.loc.gov, 7-7667
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