Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
April 14, 2009
Congressional Research Service
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Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy

Summary
Although a small country, Moldova has been of interest to U.S. policymakers due to its position
between NATO and EU member Romania and strategic Ukraine. In addition, some experts have
expressed concern about alleged Russian efforts to extend its hegemony over Moldova through
various methods, including a troop presence, manipulation of Moldova’s relationship with its
breakaway Transnistria region, and energy supplies and other trading links. Moldova’s political
and economic weakness has made it a source of organized criminal activity of concern to U.S.
policymakers, including trafficking in persons and weapons.
On April 5, 2009, Moldova held parliamentary elections. The Communist Party of the Republic
of Moldova (PCRM) won just under 50% of the vote and 60 seats in the 101-seat parliament.
International election observers said that the election “met many international standards and
commitments,” but noted significant problems in some areas. The Communist victory sparked
demonstrations. Some demonstrators sacked and looted the parliament building and the offices of
the president. Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin denounced the protests as an attempted coup
d’etat and vowed to put down any further riots with force, if necessary. He claimed that Romania
instigated the riots, pointing to the Romanian flags some protestors displayed at the
demonstrations.
Moldova is Europe’s poorest country. Living standards are low for the great majority of
Moldovans, particularly in rural areas. Remittances from Moldovans working abroad amounted to
38.3% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product in 2008. The global financial crisis has had a
negative impact on Moldova. Remittances have dropped, as Moldovan emigrants have lost jobs in
other hard-hit countries.
As a self-declared neutral country, Moldova does not seek NATO membership, but participates in
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. Moldova currently has a Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement with the European Union (EU), which provides for cooperation in a wide
variety of spheres and holds out the possibility of an eventual free trade agreement. Moldova
hopes to become a candidate for EU membership, although the EU is unlikely to accept Moldova
as a candidate in the foreseeable future, due to Moldova’s poverty and the EU’s own internal
challenges.
The United States and Moldova have enjoyed good relations since the country’s independence in
1991. The United States has supported democracy and free market reform in Moldova. The
United States reacted cautiously to the outcome of the April 2009 Moldovan election, saying its
view of the vote was “generally positive,” but noting some problems. The United States has tried
to support the country’s fragile sovereignty and territorial integrity by advocating the withdrawal
of Russian forces from Moldova and for negotiating a settlement of the Transnistria issue
consistent with Moldova’s territorial integrity.

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Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy

Contents
Political Situation........................................................................................................................ 1
Transnistria ........................................................................................................................... 3
Economy .................................................................................................................................... 4
Foreign Policy............................................................................................................................. 5
U.S. Policy.................................................................................................................................. 7

Figures
Figure 1. Transnistria and Gagauz Regions.................................................................................. 3

Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 9

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Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy

Political Situation
Although a small country, Moldova has been of interest to U.S. policymakers due to its position
between NATO and EU member Romania and strategic Ukraine. In addition, some experts have
expressed concern about alleged Russian efforts to extend its hegemony over Moldova through
various methods, including a troop presence, manipulation of Moldova’s relationship with its
breakaway Transnistria region, and energy supplies and other trading links. Moldova’s political
and economic weakness has made it a source of organized criminal activity of concern to U.S.
policymakers, including trafficking in persons and weapons.
On April 5, 2009, Moldova held parliamentary elections. The Communist Party of the Republic
of Moldova (PCRM) won just under 50% of the vote and 60 seats in the 101-seat parliament. The
Communists support closer ties with the European Union, while also having good relations with
Russia. Their main base of support has been among elderly people and rural voters. Many young
people have left poverty-stricken Moldova to find work abroad.
Three other parties managed to surpass the 6% threshold for representation. The center-right
Liberal Party of Moldova won 12.78% of the vote and 15 seats. The deputy chairman of the party
is Dorin Chirtoaca, who was elected as mayor of the capital Chisinau in 2007 on an populist, anti-
Communist, anti-corruption platform. The Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova won 12.26% of
the vote and 15 seats. It has a pro-business, pro-European integration orientation. The centrist Our
Moldova Alliance, led by ideologically-flexible former Communist leaders, won 9.81% of the
vote and 11 seats. Turnout for the election was just under 60%.
The International Election Observers Mission (which included observers representing the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and the European
Parliament), said that the election “met many international standards and commitments, but
further improvements are required to ensure an electoral process free from undue administrative
interference and to increase public confidence.” The observers generally praised the conduct of
the vote on election day and the ballot count, although some irregularities were reported. They
cited concerns such as biased reporting by the state broadcaster, misuse of government resources
to assist the PCRM, and frequent allegations of intimidation of voters and candidates, some of
which were verified by the observers.1
The Communist victory sparked demonstrations on April 6 and 7. As many as 10,000 persons
demonstrated in Chisinau, Moldova’s capital, on April 7. Many demonstrators were peaceful, but
some sacked and looted the parliament building and the offices of the president. Over 200 people
were injured in clashes between the police and the rioters, and one person died. The authorities
later arrested over 300 persons, allegedly for engaging in violence. Observers noted that young
people predominated among the protestors, many of whom reportedly found out about the
demonstrations through messaging tools such as Twitter and SMS.
Some observers have asserted that the demonstrators acted out of frustration with the Moldova’s
limited economic opportunities and stagnation, which they associate with the Communists, as

1 For a text of the observers preliminary report, see the OSCE website at
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2009/04/37142_en.pdf
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well as suspicions of electoral fraud. According to press accounts, in addition to anti-Communist
slogans, some demonstrators chanted “we want to join Europe,” and “we are Romanians,”
pointing to at least some support among the demonstrators for union with neighboring EU
member-state Romania.
The three opposition parties that won seats in the assembly seemed to be caught off guard at first
by the protests. Nevertheless, they have tried to recover the initiative, charging that the election
was fraudulent. They conducted a check of voting rolls, and claim that the government cast
fraudulent ballots for dead persons and those living abroad. Exit polling by the respected
Moldovan Institute for Public Policy estimated the PCRM would receive about 45% of the vote,
close to, but a bit less than, the nearly 50% it did receive. On the other hand, supporters of the
opposition note that the Communists received under 400,000 votes in the 2007 local election, yet
allegedly received over 700,000 in this election, a remarkable increase for a party that has not had
a discernable upsurge in popularity since then.
President Voronin denounced the protests as an attempted coup d’etat and vowed to put down any
further riots with force, if necessary. On the other hand, he agreed to a recount of the vote, to be
held on April 15. However, opposition leaders rejected participation in the recount, saying it too
could be tainted with fraud, and are demanding new parliamentary elections. The opposition’s
call for new elections could signal extended political conflict in Moldova, particularly if it is
accompanied by continued demonstrations. Opposition leaders charge that journalists and
students were arrested and in some cases beaten by authorities in the days after the violence.
When it convenes, the new legislature will try to elect the new President of Moldova. A three-
fifths majority, or 61 votes, is required. The incumbent, Communist leader Vladimir Voronin, is
constitutionally barred from seeking a third five-year term. The Communists will be able to select
the next President if they can secure the support of one member of the opposition parties, which
may prove difficult, given the current confrontation. If no president is elected within 60 days, a
new parliamentary election must be held. Whoever is elected as President will likely play a less
prominent role than Voronin has done. Voronin has made clear that he intends to remain
Moldova’s leading political figure, either in some other post such as parliament speaker or
Communist parliamentary faction leader, or behind the scenes.
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Transnistria
Figure 1. Transnistria and Gagauz Regions
Conflict between Moldovan forces and
those of the breakaway “Dniestr Republic”
(a separatist entity proclaimed in 1990 by
ethnic Russian local officials in the
Transnistria region of Moldova) erupted in
March 1992. Over 300 people died in the
violence. A cease-fire was declared in July
1992 that provided for Russian, “Dniestr
Republic,” and Moldovan peacekeepers to
patrol a “security zone” between the two
regions. Each of the peacekeeping
contingents have roughly 400 personnel.
They are overseen by a Joint Control
Commission, which includes the three
sides, as well as the OSCE as an observer.
The causes of the conflict are complex,
involving ethnic factors and, above all,
maneuvering for power and wealth among
elite groups. Ethnic Russians and
Ukrainians together make up 51% of
Transnistria’s population of about 650,000,
while Moldovans are the single largest
ethnic group, at 40%.
Many analysts are convinced that a key

factor obstructing a settlement is the
personal interests of the leaders of the “Dniestr Republic” and associates in Moldova, Russia and
Ukraine, who control the region’s economy. They also allegedly profit from illegal activities that
take place in Transnistria, such as smuggling and human trafficking. The 2008 State Department
human rights report sharply criticized the poor human rights record of the “Dniestr Republic,”
noting its record of rigged elections, harassment of political opponents, independent media, many
religious groups, and Romanian-speakers.
Negotiations over the degree of autonomy to be accorded the Transnistria region within Moldova
have been stalled for many years.2 The two sides have negotiated over Transnistria’s status with
the mediation of Russia, Ukraine and OSCE. In 2005, at the urging of Ukraine and Moldova, the
United States and the European Union joined the talks as observers. In 2006, Moldova offered a
“package” of proposals, in which Transnistria would have broad autonomy, but would remain part
of Moldova. Moldova would reaffirm its neutral status and all foreign (i.e. Russian) troops would
be withdrawn. Russian property rights in Transnistria would be recognized. Nevertheless,
Transnistrian and Russian leaders, apparently satisfied with the present state of affairs, have

2 Another potential secession issue was defused in 1994, when the Moldovan parliament adopted a law establishing a
“national-territorial autonomous unit” for the Gagauz minority. The region has its own elected legislative and executive
authorities and would be entitled to secession from Moldova in the case of Moldova’s reunification with Romania.
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blocked any agreement. In September 2006, Transnistria held a referendum on independence and
union with Russia, which passed with 97% of the vote.
Since March 2006, the peace process in Transnistria had been stalled until a series of bilateral
meetings between President Voronin and the “President” of Transnistria Igor Smirnov in 2008. In
December, they discussed restarting talks on Transnistria’s status, as well as implementing
confidence-building measures and ensuring the free flow of goods and persons. However, the
talks made little progress, with Smirnov calling on Moldova to recognize Transnistria’s
independence and refusing to restart the “5+2” talks.
On March 18, 2009, Voronin, perhaps hoping to secure political advantage before Moldova’s
April parliamentary elections, met with Smirnov and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev in
Moscow. The three men issued a declaration that called for a resumption of direct talks between
Transnistria and the Moldovan government under Moscow’s aegis. They expressed support for
incorporating Russian military contingent in Moldova into a peacekeeping force under the
supervision of the OSCE. Critics charged that the statement undermined Moldova’s previous
demand for Russia to withdraw its forces from Transnistria and appeared to put Transnistria’s
leaders and the Moldovan government on equal footing, also in contradiction to Chisinau’s past
policy. However, Voronin pulled out of the subsequent direct talks scheduled for March 25, after
Transnistria issued a travel ban against U.S. and EU diplomats attempting to visit the region.
Economy
According to the World Bank, Moldova’s per capita Gross National Income of $1,100 in 2006
makes it the poorest country in Europe. Living standards are poor for the great majority of
Moldovans, particularly in rural areas. In 2008, the average monthly wage was $270. More than a
quarter of Moldova’s economically active population work abroad. Remittances from those
working abroad amounted to 38.3% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product in 2008, according
to the World Bank. Moldova’s main natural resource is its rich soil. Agriculture, especially fruit,
wine and tobacco, plays a vital role in Moldova’s economy. Most of Moldova’s industry is
located in Transnistria.
Moldova has had mixed success in economic reform. It has succeeded in achieving a measure of
macroeconomic stability, including the stabilization of Moldova’s national currency, the leu.
However, Moldova’s small economy is highly vulnerable to external shocks. Moldova has
privatized its small and medium-sized business sector, and it has had success in privatizing
agricultural land. The sale of large firms has stalled under Communist rule and foreign direct
investment FDI) in Moldova is very low. Cumulative FDI was $1.8 billion at the end of 2007,
$540 per capita. In comparison, neighboring Romania’s FDI per capita was $2,829. Key problems
include poor governance, a weak judiciary, and corruption.
The global financial crisis has had a negative impact on Moldova. The leu has weakened and
remains under pressure. Remittances have dropped, as Moldovan emigrants have lost jobs in
other hard-hit countries. The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts that Moldova’s GDP will drop
1% in 2009, after growing more than 7% in 2008.3

3 Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report: Moldova, March 2009; EIU Country Profile: Moldova, 2008.
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Foreign Policy
Perhaps Moldova’s most important foreign policy relationship is with Russia. Most of Moldova’s
exports go to Russia, and over 90% of its energy imports come from Russia. In the past, Moldova
has accumulated large debts to Russian energy firms, which has provided Russia with leverage
over Moldova. Some analysts charge that Russia has used negotiations over Transnistria to
expand its political leverage over the country and to block any Moldovan moves toward Euro-
Atlantic integration. The Transnistria issue is complicated by the continued presence of about
1,500 Russian troops in the breakaway region (including the approximately 400-person
peacekeeping contingent in the security zone), as well as huge stockpiles of weapons and
ammunition. Russia has flatly refused to honor commitments it made at the 1999 OSCE summit
in Istanbul to withdraw its forces from Moldova. Russian leaders have also attempted to condition
the withdrawal of Russian troops on the resolution of Transnistria’s status. Russia has provided
financial support to Transnistria, including grants and loans as well as subsidized energy. In
return, Russian firms have assumed control over most of Transnistria’s industry.4
On January 1, 2006, Gazprom cut off natural gas supplies to Moldova, after Moldova rejected
Gazprom’s demand for a doubling of the price Moldova pays for natural gas. Gazprom restored
supplies on January 17, in exchange for a slightly smaller price increase. Moldova also agreed to
give Gazprom, already the majority shareholder, a higher equity stake in Moldovagaz, which
controls Moldova’s natural gas pipelines and other infrastructure. Gazprom is also seeking to
complete the purchase of Transnistria’s stake in Moldovagaz. Some analysts charge that Russia is
using energy supplies and other trade as weapons to pressure Moldova to drop its pro-Western
orientation and to turn its energy infrastructure over to Moscow. In 2005, Russia restricted wine
and other agricultural imports from Moldova, allegedly over health concerns, dealing a very
heavy blow to the country’s economy. Russia finally permitted Moldovan wine imports again in
November 2007, but Moldova’s wine exports to Russia remain reduced from former levels.
The Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008 may have an impact on Moldova. Transnistrian
authorities may become even more intransigent in talks over a settlement. They could press
Russia to grant them diplomatic recognition as independent states, as Moscow has done for
Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions, possibly as a prelude to incorporating Transnistria
into Russia. Indeed, Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov has called for Transnistria to be
incorporated into Russia. On the other hand, observers note that the case of Transnistria is
different from that in Georgia in that Moldova is very unlikely to try to retake Transnistria by
military force. Moreover, they point out that Russia does not have a common border with
Transnistria, as it does with Georgia.
Russia could push for a Transnistria settlement that would give the pro-Russian enclave effective
veto power over the country’s foreign and domestic policies, which could stymie any Moldovan
efforts toward European integration. However, even without recognizing Transnistria’s
independence or exerting heavier pressure for a settlement favorable to Transnistria, Russia may
still succeed in dissuading Moldova from pursuing a pro-Western course. Even before the
Georgia war, Russia successfully pressed Moldova to reduce its role in the GUAM regional group
(named after the initial letters of the names of its members – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and

4 “Moldova’s Uncertain Future,” International Crisis Group, August 17, 2006, from the ICG website
http://www.crisisweb.org.
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Moldova), which aims to coordinate the policies of these countries in many areas, including
energy. Russia has seen GUAM as a U.S.-inspired, anti-Russian project in what it views as its
sphere of influence. In May 2008, Moldova approved a national security strategy that reaffirmed
the country’s long-standing neutrality, winning praise from Russian officials. Russia
congratulated the Moldovan Communists for their April 2009 election victory and echoed their
criticisms of alleged Romanian meddling in Moldova’s internal affairs.
As a self-declared neutral country, Moldova does not seek NATO membership, but participates in
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. Moldova currently has a Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement with the European Union (EU), which provides for cooperation in a wide
variety of spheres and holds out the possibility of an eventual free trade agreement. Moldova
signed an Action Plan with the EU in 2005 in the context of the EU’s European Neighborhood
policy. The EU plans to provide 209.7 Euro ($310 million) in aid to Moldova between 2007 and
2010, a substantial sum for a small country. The EU has granted Moldova trade preferences that
permits it to sell more of its wine and agricultural goods to the EU, enabling it to reduce its
dependence on the Russian market. In addition, many Transnistrian companies have registered in
Moldova in order to benefit from EU trade preferences, a move that could counter pro-
independence forces in Transnistria.
Since 2005, an EU mission has helped to monitor Moldova’s Transnistria border with Ukraine, in
an effort to deter smuggling. Moldova hopes to become a candidate for EU membership, although
the EU is unlikely to accept Moldova as a candidate in the foreseeable future, due to Moldova’s
poverty and the EU’s own internal challenges.
In March 2009, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership Initiative, part of the EU’s European
Neighborhood program. The Partnership is aimed at developing a regional approach to the EU’s
relations with the countries lying between the EU and Russia, rather than the bilateral ties that the
EU has at present with these states. The program could lead to greater aid and advice from the EU
to Moldova. Long-term goals of the Partnership include a free trade zone and visa-free travel to
the EU.
Moldova’s ties with Romania are a sensitive issue in both countries. Many Romanians consider
Moldovans in fact to be Romanians, and support the eventual unification of the two countries.
Although most independent experts consider the “Moldovan language” to be Romanian, the issue
is a matter of political controversy in Moldova. After the incorporation of Moldova into the
Soviet Union during World War II, Soviet authorities promoted the idea of a separate Moldovan
language (using the Cyrillic rather than the Latin script), as a means of countering possible
secessionist ideas. Those favoring the term “Moldovan” tend to favor Moldova’s independence or
close ties with Russia. Many persons favoring the term “Romanian” support union with Romania.
In a 1994 referendum, over 90% of Moldovans rejected unification with Romania. However, it is
possible that more inhabitants of this impoverished country may begin to favor union with
Romania now that Bucharest is a member of the EU. Romania’s entry into the EU led to hundreds
of thousands of Moldovan applications to Romania for dual Romanian-Moldovan citizenship.
The riots in the wake of the April 2009 Moldovan parliamentary elections sharply increased
tensions between the Moldovan government and Romania. President Voronin claimed that
Romania instigated the riots, pointing to the Romanian flags some protestors displayed at the
demonstrations. Moldova expelled Romania’s ambassador from Chisinau, instituted a visa regime
for Romanians visiting Moldova, and closed several border crossings with Romania.
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The EU has taken a low profile in the controversy over the April 2009 Moldovan election. The
Czech EU Presidency called on all sides to engage in peaceful dialogue, and to respect the rule of
law, freedom of expression, and media freedoms. Some observers have suggested that the EU
could play a mediating role between the government and opposition, particularly if the current
political conflict in Moldova is extended.
U.S. Policy
The United States and Moldova have enjoyed good relations since the country’s independence in
1991. The United States has supported democracy and free market reform in Moldova. In a
speech in Bratislava, Slovakia on February 24, 2005, President Bush noted that Moldova’s March
2005 parliamentary elections gave the country a chance to “place its democratic credentials
beyond doubt.”5 After the elections, U.S. officials said that the United States agreed with the
OSCE assessment that the election was generally in line with international standards, but with
shortcomings in several areas, including media access for opposition candidates. U.S. and other
Western officials continue to be critical of some aspects of Moldova’s democratic development,
particularly its uneven record on media freedoms and its weak judiciary. They have also said
Moldova needs to make more progress in fighting corruption and establishing an attractive
business climate for investors.
The United States reacted cautiously to the outcome of the April 2009 Moldovan election. On
April 7, State Department spokesman Robert Wood said that the U.S. view of the election was
“generally positive,” but said that the United States has not completed its assessment of the vote.
He added that the United States urges Moldovans to “desist from any type of violent activity.”
Similarly, U.S. Ambassador in Moldova Asif Chaudhry urged demonstrators not to engage in
violence, and praised the government for its initial restraint as well as its decision to allow a
recount and permitting the opposition to see voting lists. However, he expressed concern about
government arrests of students and journalists after the violence.
The United States has tried to support the country’s fragile sovereignty and territorial integrity by
advocating the withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova and for negotiating a settlement of
the Transnistria issue consistent with Moldova’s territorial integrity. The United States has
worked with the European Union to put pressure on the Transnistria leadership to end its
obstructionist tactics in negotiations on the region’s future. On February 22, 2003, the United
States and the European Union announced a visa ban against 17 top Transnistrian leaders. Other
Transnistrian officials involved with the harassment of Latin-script schools were added to this list
in 2004. The United States has refused to ratify the adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
treaty until several conditions are met, including the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova.
In November 2007, Russia suspended its observance of the CFE Treaty, attributing the move to
he failure of the United States and other countries to ratify the adapted treaty.
The United States has called for continued cooperation on weapons proliferation and trafficking
in persons. In May 2003, the United States imposed missile proliferation sanctions on two
Moldovan firms for transferring equipment and technology to Iran. Transnistria has been a center
for the trafficking of small arms to world trouble spots. The 2008 State Department Trafficking in
Persons report is sharply critical of Moldova’s record in this area. It noted that Moldova is a

5 Agence France Presse wire service dispatch, February 24, 2005.
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major source of women and girls trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation. It is a Tier 3
country, meaning that it “does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination
of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so.” Although noting that Moldova had
made modest progress in some areas, the report stressed these gains were overshadowed by
Moldova’s failure to investigate alleged cases of involvement of government officials in
trafficking.
The United States has provided aid to Moldova to help meet political and economic reform
objectives. The Bush Administration estimated that the United States provided $15.3 million in
aid for Moldova in FY2008, and requested $16.95 million in FY2009. U.S. aid is aimed at
supporting independent media and non-governmental organizations in Moldova, as well as
fostering cultural and civic exchanges. U.S. economic aid is improving the business climate in
Moldova, and help the country diversify its exports. The United States donates humanitarian aid
in the form of food and medicine to particularly vulnerable parts of Moldova’s impoverished
population.
U.S. security assistance is used to help Moldova participate in Partnership for Peace exercises,
and to develop its peacekeeping capacity and interoperability with NATO. The United States
provides funding to help Moldova strengthen its border and fight trafficking. In addition,
Moldova is in the second year of a $24.7 million program under the Millennium Challenge
Corporation to fight corruption, strengthen the judiciary, and achieve other reform objectives.
The 109th Congress approved legislation concerning Moldova. In February 2005, the Senate
passed S.Res. 60, which expressed support for democracy in Moldova and called for the
authorities to hold free and fair elections in March 2005. In March 2005, the Senate passed S.Res.
69, which called on Russia to honor its commitments to withdraw its troops from Moldova.
S.Res. 530, passed in July 2006, called on President Bush during the Moscow G-8 summit to
discuss frankly with President Putin a series of policies deemed to be inconsistent with G-8
objectives, including the January 2006 energy cut-off to Moldova.
The 110th Congress has also passed legislation concerning Moldova. S.Res. 278, passed on July
31, 2007, strongly urged Russia to reconsider its suspension of CFE implementation, and called
on Moscow to “move speedily” to withdraw its troops and military equipment from Moldova. A
House companion resolution, S.Res. 603, was introduced on August 1, 2007. H.Res. 457,
introduced on June 5, 2007, calls on Russia to withdraw its forces and armaments from Moldova.
Its says the current Russian-Moldovan peacekeeping force in the security zone should be replaced
by a multinational one under an OSCE mandate.
In the 111th Congress, the Senate passed S.Res. 56 on April 1, 2009. The resolution called on
Moldova to hold free and democratic parliamentary elections on April 5. It notes that a genuinely
democratic political system is a precondition for “full integration of Moldova into the Western
community of nations.” The resolution says that the Senate “in light of the steps taken by the
Government of Moldova, pledges the continued support of the United States Government for the
establishment in Moldova of a fully free and democratic system, the creation of a prosperous
market economy, and the assumption by Moldova of its rightful place as a full and equal member
of the Western community of democracies.”

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Author Contact Information

Steven Woehrel

Specialist in European Affairs
swoehrel@crs.loc.gov, 7-2291




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