Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Developments and
Policy Implications
Kerry Dumbaugh
Specialist in Asian Affairs
April 14, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40493
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Developments and Policy Implications
Summary
Policy toward and support for Taiwan are a key element in U.S.- relations with the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and an important component of U.S. policy in Asia. Official U.S.
relations with the Republic of China (ROC) government on Taiwan became a casualty of the U.S.
decision to recognize the PRC government as China’s sole legitimate government. Since then,
unofficial U.S. relations with Taiwan have been built on the framework of the 1979 Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA – P.L. 96-8) and shaped by three U.S.-PRC communiques. Under these, the
United States maintains official relations with the PRC, but continues to have unique and critical
interests in Taiwan, including significant commercial ties, objections to PRC threats to use force
against Taiwan, arms sales and security assurances, and support for Taiwan’s democratic
development. U.S. policy today remains rooted in a general notion of maintaining the “status
quo” between Taiwan and the PRC. But other factors have changed dramatically since 1979,
including growing PRC power and importance, Taiwan’s democratization, and the deepening of
Taiwan-PRC economic and social linkages. These changes have led to periodic discussions about
the efficacy of current U.S. policy and whether or not it should be reviewed or changed.
Taiwan’s current president, Ma Ying-jeou, elected in March 2008, moved quickly to jump start
Taiwan-PRC talks that had been stalled since 1998. The talks to date have yielded a number of
agreements, including agreements to establish regular direct weekend charter flights, direct sea
and air transportation, postal links, and food safety mechanisms. Taiwan also has lifted long-
standing caps on Taiwan investment in the PRC and lowered the profile of its bids for
participation in U.N. agencies. These and other initiatives are welcomed by many as having
contributed to greater regional stability. More pessimistic observers see growing PRC-Taiwan ties
eroding U.S. influence, strengthening PRC leverage and, particularly in the face of expanding
economic links, jeopardizing Taiwan autonomy and economic security.
The changing dynamic between Taiwan and the PRC poses increasingly difficult, competing
policy challenges for the United States. Along with new policy challenges – such as what U.S.
policy should be if Taiwan should continue to move closer to or even align with the PRC – the
Obama Administration will be faced with other challenges familiar from past years, including
decisions on new arms sales to Taiwan, which are anathema to the PRC; how to accommodate
requests for visits to the United States by President Ma and other senior Taiwan officials; the
overall nature of U.S. relations with the Ma government; whether to pursue closer economic ties
with Taiwan; what role, if any, Washington should play in cross-strait relations; and more broadly,
what form of defense assurances to offer Taiwan. In addition, the Taiwan government also is
seeking to raise its international profile in other ways involving the United States. Taiwan is
seeking to be removed from the U.S. Special 301 “Watch List” for intellectual property rights
violations, and is seeking to qualify for the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which eliminates
some visa requirements for qualified countries. The Taiwan government also continues to ask for
a U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which would broaden the current avenue for U.S.-
Taiwan trade discussions, the 1994 Trade and Investment Framework (TIFA).
Legislation in the 111th Congress concerning Taiwan includes H.Con.Res. 18, urging that the
United States resume diplomatic relations with Taiwan; and H.Con.Res. 55, expressing U.S.
support for and commitment to Taiwan. This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Developments and Policy Implications
Contents
Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1
Key U.S. Policy Questions .......................................................................................................... 1
Brief Background to Taiwan’s Political Landscape ...................................................................... 2
Fundamentals of U.S. Policy ................................................................................................. 3
The Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8) .............................................................................. 4
Changing Political Dynamics in Taiwan ................................................................................ 5
Key Current Issues ...................................................................................................................... 6
Current Political Situation in Taiwan ..................................................................................... 6
Resumption of Cross-Strait Talks .......................................................................................... 7
Bid for U.N. Membership/Participation ................................................................................. 8
Corruption Investigations: Former Chen Administration...................................................... 10
Special Expense Accounts............................................................................................. 10
Economic and Trade Relations ............................................................................................ 11
Taiwan-U.S. Trade and Investment ................................................................................ 11
Cross-Strait Trade and Investment ................................................................................. 12
Other Key Bilateral Issues................................................................................................... 13
U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan and Taiwan’s Defense Budget.............................................. 13
Visa Waiver Program (VWP) ........................................................................................ 14
U.S. Policy Trends .............................................................................................................. 15
Policy Options for Congress...................................................................................................... 16
Maintain and Reaffirm the Current AOne-China@ Policy....................................................... 16
Change the AOne China@ Policy ........................................................................................... 16
Make U.S. Policy More Assertive and Transparent .............................................................. 17
Another ATaiwan Policy Review@ .................................................................................. 17
More Active U.S. Role on Cross-Strait Relations........................................................... 18
Exert More Pressure on the PRC ................................................................................... 19
More Overt U.S. Support for Taiwan Democracy .......................................................... 20
Implications ........................................................................................................................ 20
For Cross-Strait Relations ............................................................................................. 21
For U.S. Arms Sales...................................................................................................... 21
For PRC Policy and Credibility ..................................................................................... 22
For Taiwan Democracy ................................................................................................. 23
Legislation in the 111th Congress ............................................................................................... 23
Chronology............................................................................................................................... 24
For Additional Reading ............................................................................................................. 26
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 26
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Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Developments and Policy Implications
Recent Developments
March 27, 2009 – Taiwan’s Council for Economic Planning and Development issued a report,
Taiwan’s Economic Situation and Outlook, that cited a 28.6% drop in exports from February 2008
to February 2009 and a serious slowdown for the economy beginning in the 4th quarter of 2008.
March 18, 2009 – U.S. American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) chairman Ray Burghardt said that the
United States was “comfortable with what’s happening” in Taiwan-PRC engagement. The same
day, former Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian appeared at his final pre-trial hearing before going
on trial for corruption, scheduled to begin March 26, 2009.
March 17, 2009 – The first luxury cruise ship (Ocean Mystery) to sail directly to Taiwan from the
PRC (Shanghai) arrived at Keelung, reportedly carrying 1,600 PRC tourists.
March 16, 2009 – In its first quadrennial report (QDR), Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense said that
Taiwan would cut its military personnel from 275,000 to 215,000 over the next five years – part
of a plan to create an all-volunteer force by December 2014.
March 14, 2009 – The Taiwan government urged the PRC to jettison its “anti-secession” law. The
law, passed in March 2005, justifies the use of force to prevent Taiwan independence.
March 11, 2009 – The second session of the 11th National People’s Congress began in Beijing. At
the close of the three-day meeting, Premier Wen Jiabao said that the PRC would be “willing to
have consultations” for Taiwan to participate in international organizations.
Key U.S. Policy Questions
U.S. policy on Taiwan, which is enshrined in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (the TRA, P.L. 96-8),
remains rooted in a general notion of maintaining the “status quo” as it existed when the TRA
was enacted. The United States has interpreted the “status quo” as the preservation of peace and
stability in the Taiwan Strait until such time as the undecided issue of Taiwan’s political status can
be resolved peacefully by agreement between Taiwan and the PRC. Some in the United
States also see the “status quo” as the maintenance of a relative military, economic, and
diplomatic balance between the two sides.1 Everything that has followed since then in U.S. policy
toward Taiwan has been bound up within this delicate balance.
But while U.S. policy has remained static, the circumstances it was designed to address have
changed dramatically. Complex political changes have occurred in both Taiwan and the PRC. The
military balance is shifting inexorably in the PRC’s favor, there have been dramatic
improvements in the PRC’s economic fortunes, and the two sides have increasingly connected
1 Definitions of the “status quo” for Taiwan vary among the parties involved. Some in the United States, such as
Georgetown University Professor Robert Sutter, see the “status quo” as the maintenance of balance between the two
sides. The former government of Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian interpreted “status quo” to mean that Taiwan was
already a fully independent, sovereign state. The current Taiwan government of President Ma Ying-jeou has described
the “status quo” more as de facto independence. The PRC definition of the “status quo” counts Taiwan as an
unalienable part of China.
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economic interests. These changes have resulted in periodic speculation about whether the current
U.S. policy framework remains appropriate or should be revised. Issues involving Taiwan’s
unresolved political status remain key features in other U.S. interactions with both Taiwan and the
PRC. They include complex policy trade-offs and questions such as:
• how far the United States should go in trying to accommodate PRC sensitivities about
Taiwan without compromising U.S. principles supporting Taiwan’s democratic
development;
• how much the United States should try to pressure either China or Taiwan or both to
avoid provocative actions;
• whether the United States should change its policy of not arbitrating or facilitating
negotiations between Taiwan and the PRC in favor of a more direct, interventionist
approach; and
• whether the United States should conduct a reassessment of its Taiwan policy in light of
changing circumstances, and what the extent of such a possible reassessment should be.
Brief Background to Taiwan’s Political Landscape
Once a U.S. World War II ally, China’s situation changed dramatically after the civil war victory
of Mao Tse-tung in 1949. The reigning Chinese government, led by Chiang Kai-shek and his
Kuomintang (KMT) party, fled mainland China and moved to Taiwan, an island off the southern
Chinese coast. For the next thirty years, the United States continued officially to recognize the
government on Taiwan while both regimes—the KMT government on Taiwan and the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) government on the mainland—claimed legitimacy as the sole legal
government of the Chinese people.
With these competing claims of sovereignty, official U.S. relations with the government on
Taiwan became a casualty of the 1979 decision to establish U.S. diplomatic relations with the
PRC government as the sole government of all China. U.S. unofficial relations with Taiwan,
meanwhile, have been shaped since then by three U.S.-China communiques and built on the
framework of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8). Under these agreements, the United
States maintains its official relations with the PRC while selling Taiwan military weapons and
having extensive economic, political, and security interests there. Since then, absent formal
diplomatic relations, the United States still has maintained substantial economic and security
relationships with Taiwan, including the sale of defensive military weapons and services.2 But
continuing political and economic transformations in both the PRC and Taiwan since 1979 mean
that U.S. policymakers are facing a different set of complex policy choices with each passing
year.
This report focuses on current developments in Taiwan, analyzing how those developments are
affecting choices the United States makes about its policy toward Taiwan specifically and toward
the PRC more broadly. Other CRS reports provide more details about the myriad historical
2 U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan are governed by Section 2 and Section 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act, P.L. 96-8: 22
U.S.C., Chapter 48, Sections 3301-3316.
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Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Developments and Policy Implications
complexities of Taiwan’s current situation in U.S. policy, such as: historical background about
how the ROC on Taiwan went from a U.S. ally to a government with no diplomatic U.S.
relations, including the fundamentals governing U.S. policy toward Taiwan today (CRS Report
RS22388, Taiwan’s Political Status: Historical Background and Ongoing Implications); the
increase in U.S.-Taiwan tensions under the former administration of President Chen Shui-bian
(CRS Report RL33684, Underlying Strains in Taiwan-U.S. Political Relations); the 2008
elections in Taiwan (CRS Report RS22853, Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential Election, all by Kerry
Dumbaugh; as well as the subtle permutations of the “one-China” policy over three decades and
its role in U.S. policy (CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China”
Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei) and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan
(CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990), both by Shirley A. Kan.
Fundamentals of U.S. Policy
The fundamental framework of U.S. policy toward Taiwan was laid down decades ago, beginning
with the Nixon opening to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1971 that resulted in the
severing of official relations with the government on Taiwan in 1979. U.S. policy toward Taiwan
since then has been defined by four primary documents: the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8,
enacted in 1979); and three U.S. communiques with the PRC:
• the Shanghai Communique (1972), in which the United States "acknowledge[d]" that
both China and Taiwan maintain there is but one China, declared it did "not challenge
that position," and reaffirmed its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question.
• the Communique on Normalization of Relations with the PRC (1979), in which the
United States recognized the PRC government as the sole legitimate government of all
China and "acknowledge[d] the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan
is part of China", and
• the August 17 Communique on Arms Sales to Taiwan (1982), in which the United
States stated it had no intention of pursuing a "two-China" policy; that it appreciated
China's pledges to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question; and that it did not
plan on a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan.
In addition, U.S. policy has been shaped during these decades by a combination of other factors.
Among these are a set of six policy assurances the United States gave Taiwan in the 1980s;3 the
precedents set by a collection of sensitive “guidelines on Taiwan” that the executive branch has
adopted to define and constrain its actions; a variety of statements by successive U.S.
Administrations about the nature of U.S. policy toward Taiwan and the PRC; and periodic
initiatives by Members of Congress intended to affect U.S. policy in some way.
3 Various participants in crafting U.S. Taiwan policy report differing versions of the “six assurances.” Basically, the
assurances are that the United States will not change the TRA and will not pressure Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC;
or become involved as mediator in negotiations between Taiwan and the PRC. For a more thorough discussion, see
CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington,
Beijing, and Taipei, by Shirley A. Kan.
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The Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8)
In 1979, the Carter Administration announced the United States would sever official relations
with Taiwan and recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of China. While Members of
the 96th Congress clearly concurred with the strategic imperative of such a move, many Members
were unhappy with what they saw as the Carter Administration’s minimal proposals for continued
dealings with the government on Taiwan. In particular, some were concerned that the package of
legislation the White House submitted to Congress to govern future unofficial relations with
Taiwan – the “Taiwan Enabling Act” – did not go far enough in protecting either Taiwan or U.S.
interests. Congressional debate on the legislation in 1979 was extensive and complicated. The end
result was passage of a much amended version of the Administration’s proposal — the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA – P.L. 96-8) — which remains the domestic legal authority for conducting
unofficial U.S. relations with Taiwan today.4 Much of the TRA deals with the logistics of U.S.-
Taiwan relations: the establishment of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) as the unofficial
U.S. representative for diplomatic interactions with Taiwan, including details about its staffing,
functions, and funding; and the continued application of existing U.S. laws and treaties affecting
Taiwan after the severing of ties.5
Although it is a common American misperception that the TRA mandates the United States to
defend Taiwan in case of attack, nothing in the TRA specifically obligates the United States to do
so or to resort to military conflict on Taiwan’s behalf. In 1995-1996, precedent was set for
potential U.S. involvement when the United States sent two carrier battle groups to the area after
China conducted an unprecedented series of live-fire missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait. In
light of the lack of a mandate in the TRA but the apparent U.S. willingness to act in the Taiwan
Strait missile crisis, there remain questions about how the United States may react in a
comparable situation now.
Of particular relevance for long-term U.S. policy are Section 2 (b) and Section 3 of the TRA,
dealing with U.S. strategic interests in and arms sales commitments to Taiwan.6 Section 2 of the
TRA speaks in broad terms about U.S. interests for peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question,
saying that any forceful resolution would be of “grave concern to the United States.” It further
states that U.S. policy is to “maintain the capacity of the United States to resist ... coercion” in
addressing the Taiwan issue. Section 3 provides for the sale of U.S. defense articles and services
to Taiwan, but is non-specific about the nature of these articles. It merely calls for “such defense
articles and services ... as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability.” It also gives Congress a role in determining what needs Taiwan may have. Much of
the U.S. debate on Taiwan arms sales since the TRA was enacted has involved differing
judgments — often between Congress and the White House — about what should be the
capabilities and quantities of the “necessary” articles and services the United States provide to
Taiwan under Section 3.
4 For more detailed discussions of congressional actions at the time, see “Congress and U.S. policy in Asia: New
relationships with China and Taiwan,” in Congress and Foreign Policy – 1979, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1980, pp. 54-71; Wolff, Lester L. And Simon, David L., eds.,
Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act, American Association for Chinese Studies, Jamaica, New York, 1982;
Jones, DuPre, ed., China: U.S. Policy Since 1945, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1980.
5 See the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) website at [ http://www.ait.org.tw/en/]
6 See CRS Report 96-246, Taiwan: Texts of the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. - China Communiques, and the "Six
Assurances", by Kerry Dumbaugh.
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Changing Political Dynamics in Taiwan
Until the mid-1980s, Taiwan had a one-party system in which Chiang Kai-shek’s authoritarian
Nationalist Party (KMT) ruled under martial law.7 The KMT permitted no political opposition and
held no democratic elections. In 1986, the party began to liberalize, allowing the formation of
opposition parties, including the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a party whose platform
advocated Taiwan independence from China. The KMT government also ended martial law (in
1987), and for the first time opened government positions to native “Taiwanese”—the 85% of the
island’s population who predated the influx of the two million “mainlanders” fleeing civil war in
China. In the ensuing years, members of the ROC legislature on Taiwan, elected on mainland
China over 40 years earlier, were asked to retire, and a new, streamlined legislature was elected in
1992.
In 1996, Taiwan held its first direct presidential election, which was won by KMT leader Lee
Teng-hui, himself a native Taiwanese. During his presidency, Lee increasingly distanced himself
from his party’s long-standing position that there was only “one China” and that Taiwan was part
of it. Instead he began emphasizing Taiwan’s distinct culture and identity apart from the PRC’s.
This posed complications for one of the fundamental tenets on which U.S. relations with the PRC
were based—the statement that “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side
of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.”8
The uninterrupted KMT dynasty on Taiwan finally was broken on March 18, 2000, when DPP
candidate Chen Shui-bian won the presidency with only 39% of the popular vote in a three-way
race. The victory was a stunning defeat for the KMT and its unbroken 50-year tenure in power on
Taiwan. By the narrowest of margins, President Chen was elected to a second (and final) term in
March 2004, winning by only 29,518 votes out of a reported 13.25 million votes cast.9 The
KMT’s fall from political dominance was compounded in two subsequent legislative elections in
December 2001 and December 2004. By 2004, the KMT saw its majority of 115 seats in the 225-
member Legislative Yuan (LY) cut to just 79.
With neither the DPP nor the KMT having a working majority, each formed coalitions with
smaller parties to gain strength. President Chen Shui-bian presided over a “Pan-Green” coalition
composed of his DPP party and the Taiwan Solidarity Union; it was opposed by the “pan-Blue”
coalition of the KMT and the People First Party (PFP), which together retained the barest control
of Taiwan’s 225-member legislature. Since the two opposing coalitions had very different
political ideologies and roughly equal political strength, this split government created significant
gridlock in Taiwan’s political arena, and thus difficult political realities for U.S. policymakers
throughout Chen’s tenure.
7 In Chinese, the Nationalist Party is “Kuomintang” (or KMT) in Taiwan and Guomindang (or GMD) in the PRC.
8 This particular quote is from the 1972 Shanghai Communique issued at the conclusion of President Richard Nixon’s
landmark trip to China. A somewhat vaguer formulation—“The [United States] acknowledges the Chinese position that
there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.”—was part of the 1979 communique normalizing U.S. relations
with the PRC.
9 In this campaign, President Chen and his Vice-president, Annette Lu, were both shot and slightly wounded just before
the election. KMT opponents, who believed they were on the verge of victory, called this the “shooting incident,”
believing it helped the DPP attain victory.
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Key Current Issues
Current Political Situation in Taiwan
Between the two contending political parties described above, politics in Taiwan play out against
a backdrop that blends strongly held views on divisive domestic issues with a running debate over
Taiwan’s political status and its relations with the PRC. While much of the American press
focuses on the latter issues, Taiwan’s domestic political fights often are bare-knuckled affairs
fraught with charges and countercharges over official corruption, nepotism, misuse of public
funds, and various failures in management of the economy.
The political situation in Taiwan changed substantially in 2008 when momentum swung back
behind the KMT while the DPP, struggling with growing political scandal and low voter
confidence, lost power in both presidential and legislative elections. While many had expected a
victory on March 22, 2008, for KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou and his running mate,
Vincent Siew, the size of the party’s winning margin (2.2 million votes) was a surprise to most
outside observers and even to some in the party itself.10 Emphasizing a platform of economic
improvement and better relations with the PRC and the United States, Ma did respectably even in
southern and rural districts heavily dominated by the DPP in the past. His ticket’s wide margin of
victory echoed a similarly dramatic KMT victory in the January 2008 legislative elections, where
the party gained a majority of 81 seats in a newly constituted and smaller 113-seat body
compared to the DPP’s 27 seats.11 When Ma assumed office on May 20, 2008, the KMT had
regained solid control of the government.
The DPP’s electoral fortunes in 2008 were burdened by a number of factors. These included what
was widely regarded as the poor performance of the DPP incumbent President Chen Shui-bian;
economic difficulties during his tenure; corruption scandals in the DPP; and Chen’s increasing
emphasis on a controversial pro-independence agenda. Some observers felt that the DPP missed
the opportunity to make critical adjustments in its policies after public dissatisfaction with its
performance became clear in 2005. Instead of becoming more moderate and moving to where the
voters were, according to this view, the DPP had tried to move the voters to it, a strategy that did
not serve it well in the 2008 elections.12
Taiwan’s new President, Ma Ying-jeou, of the KMT, has pursued a more conciliatory approach
toward the PRC and has vowed to improve relations with the United States. Since his landslide
election, however, Ma’s popularity has fallen, plagued among other things by a faltering
economy, tumbling stock markets, and rising energy prices as well as by concerns over his cross-
strait policies and by residual domestic political tensions in Taiwan. Under Taiwan’s new KMT
government, then, the United States faces new challenges involving the implications of closer and
10 Based on the author’s conversations in Taiwan on March 23-24, 2008, with both KMT party officials and with
foreign observers.
11 DPP candidates received 37% of the votes in the 2008 legislative elections, which were held under new rules that
favored the KMT. See CRS Report RS22791, Taiwan's Legislative Elections, January 2008: Implications for U.S.
Policy, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
12Shelley Rigger, Brown Associate Professor of East Asian Politics, Davidson College, in a discussion roundtable on
Taiwan, March 23, 2008.
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more cordial ties between Taiwan and the PRC for U.S. interests, and what role, if any,
Washington should play in cross-strait relations.
Resumption of Cross-Strait Talks
Many observers believe that the election of President Ma presented an opportunity to lay a new
framework in Taiwan-PRC relations—one that moves toward cross-strait improvements and new
understandings, and away from the more confrontational policies of the past. In the two months
between his election and his inauguration on May 20, 2008, Ma spoke of his intentions to begin
normalizing cross-strait ties in a “cross-strait common market,” to establish direct air links with
the PRC, and to ease other restrictions on cross-strait contacts. He sought to ease tensions with
China by pledging adherence to what he called a “three no’s” approach: no unification, no
independence, and no use of force—a pledge he repeated in his inaugural address. He called for a
“diplomatic truce” with China and pledged to stop using “dollar diplomacy” to win foreign
country recognition.13 These were departures from the policies of former President Chen, who
while seeking to reach out to the PRC also had antagonized Beijing by emphasizing Taiwan’s
separate identity and independent political status.
After his inauguration, Ma moved quickly to implement improvements in cross-strait relations,
expanding on the foundations that had been laid by the previous Chen administration. In a
symbolic move, Taiwan in mid-May 2008 worked jointly with the PRC in providing disaster
relief after the Sichuan earthquake. After its prickly relationship with the former Chen
Administration, Beijing appeared equally receptive to the idea of cross-strait improvements under
the Ma Administration. By late May, the PRC had issued – and Taiwan had accepted – a PRC
invitation to resume quasi-official talks for the first time since October 1998. The Taiwan and
PRC governments still do not negotiate directly. In Taiwan, cross-strait talks are handled on the
Taiwan side by the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), a nominally non-governmental
organization authorized to handle such exchanges. The corresponding body in the PRC is the
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), under the Taiwan Affairs Office of
the State Council. The two rounds of cross-strait talks held to date have been conducted by these
two semi-official bodies. They include:
• A first round in Beijing on June 12-13, 2008, resulting in agreements to allow weekend
direct charter flights and boost PRC tourism to Taiwan.
• A second round in Taiwan on November 4-7, 2008, resulting in four agreements on direct
sea transportation, air transportation, food safety, and direct postal links.
In addition to cross-strait talks, there have been other senior level encounters. The chairman of
the KMT, Wu Poh-hsiung, met with PRC President Hu Jintao on May 28, 2008, the highest-level
encounter between the two sides to that point since 1949.14 On November 21, 2008, Taiwan’s
Lien Chan, who in the past has served as both Taiwan’s Vice-President and as Premier, met with
PRC President Hu Jintao during the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in
13 “Dollar diplomacy” (or “checkbook diplomacy”) refers to the situation in which both Taiwan and the PRC have
competed for official diplomatic relations by promising to and investing huge sums in countries that may be wavering
in their diplomatic allegiances.
14 On April 29, 2005, when the KMT was out of power, KMT Chairman Lien Chan met with PRC President Hu Jintao,
the first time the leaders of the CCP and KMT had met since World War II.
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Peru. Although Lien currently holds no formal government positions, his stature is sufficient that
this meeting was said to be the highest-level meeting between the two sides in an international
forum since 1949. Taiwan’s cross-strait negotiator, P.K. Chiang, began a trip to China on January
7, 2009, visiting a number of PRC cities to discuss issues facing investors from Taiwan on the
mainland. Taiwan also has undertaken a number of unilateral initiatives, including lifting caps on
Taiwan investment in the PRC.
Other cross-strait initiatives are still in the discussion stage. President Ma signaled that his
administration would be more flexible on the names Taiwan uses in its international engagement
efforts—suggesting, for instance, that Taiwan’s negotiation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
would be less divisive if Taiwan used the same name it used when applying to the WTO—
“separate customs territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu.” DPP members and others in
Taiwan have criticized the Ma government’s new policy approach, saying that by not “properly
analyzing the consequences” of easing cross-strait economic restrictions, the KMT government
has jeopardized Taiwan’s interests. The opposition party also has criticized Ma’s diplomatic
overtures toward China as being “over-dependent on China’s goodwill.”15 While President Ma
himself reportedly has said that cross-strait talks should be accelerated, opponents of his new
policies have criticized them as proceeding too rapidly.16 In March 2009, the Chairman of the
U.S. American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), Ray Burghardt, said that the United States was
“comfortable with what’s happening” in Taiwan-PRC engagement.
Bid for U.N. Membership/Participation
The Ma Administration also has been more moderate and flexible than its predecessor concerning
Taiwan’s annual United Nations (U.N.) bid. In its first such bid on August 14, 2008, the Ma
Administration submitted a proposal to the U.N. Secretariat asking to be allowed to have
“meaningful participation” in U.N. special organizations such as the World Health Organization
(WHO).17 Because of PRC objections, a U.N. subcommittee decided on September 18, 2008 not
to include Taiwan’s request for “meaningful participation” in U.N. activities on the agenda for the
63rd General Assembly.
In 2009, however, there appears to be progress on Taiwan’s bid to participate in the WHO. On
January 13, 2009, WHO officials sent a letter to the Taiwan government stating that the island
henceforth would be included in the International Health Regulations (IHR), a set of legally
binding rules governing international commitment to disease surveillance, alert, and response.18
As an IHR participant, Taiwan will be included in the Global Outbreak and Alert Response
Network, receiving the latest updates on global epidemics. While welcoming the news as a
positive development, a Taiwan spokesperson said that Taiwan would continue to seek observer
15 “Ma’s cross-strait economic and trade policies are not ready,” DPP News link, July 22, 2008,
http://www.dpp.org.tw/.
16 Wu, Sofia, “Cross-strait talks should be accelerated: president,” Central News Agency English, June 15, 2008.
17 According to The China Post of August 16, 2008, the resolution was titled “The Need to Examine the Fundamental
Rights of the 23 Million People of the Republic of China (Taiwan) to Participate Meaningfully in the Activities of the
U.N. Specialized Agencies.”
18 Some have suggested that there may be relevance for Taiwan’s current U.N. bid in the fact that Hong Kong’s
Margaret Chan, a Chinese national, is currently the head of WHO. Chan, was elected to the WHO post in 2006, and
presided over several previous rejections of Taiwan’s U.N. application.
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status at the annual World Health Assembly meeting.19 Other Taiwan observers have bristled at
the suggestion that PRC officials essentially had given “permission” for Taiwan to participate by
negotiating directly with the WHO to include Taiwan in the IHR.20 Taiwan’s Foreign Minister,
Francisco H.L. Ou, said that Taiwan will only accept an invitation extended directly by the WHO
Secretariat to participate in the WHA, not one routed through Beijing.21
Taiwan has been unsuccessful in 15 previous attempts to gain either membership or non-member
status in the U.N. and its affiliates such as the WHO. Taiwan’s efforts under the DPP
Administration of President Chen included an application both for full U.N. membership as well
as for use of either the name “Republic of China” or “Taiwan.” These applications had been of
particular concern to both China and the United States.
In keeping with long-standing U.S. policy, U.S. officials said that the United States would play no
mediating role in Taiwan-PRC talks on the WHO issue.22 While there is support in the U.S.
Congress for Taiwan’s U.N. membership,23 U.S. government officials, on record as supporting
Taiwan’s membership in organizations “where statehood is not an issue,”24 have been unusually
blunt and outspoken in opposition to some of Taiwan’s past U.N. application efforts under
President Chen. In August 2007, for instance, a senior U.S. officials said:
We are very supportive of Taiwan on many many fronts.... However, membership in the
United Nations requires statehood. Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is not at this point a
state in the international community. The position of the United States government is that the
ROC ... is an issue undecided, and it has been left undecided ... for many, many years.25
Taipei also points out that it is a full member in other international organizations to which the
PRC also belongs, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Trade Organization
(WTO), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).26 In 2004, the 108th Congress
enacted legislation (P.L. 108-235) requiring the Secretary of State to seek Taiwan’s observer
status in WHO each year at its annual meeting, the World Health Assembly (WHA). Taiwan has
maintained that its “observer status” in U.N. bodies such as WHO would be an apolitical solution
since other non-sovereign entities, like the Holy See and the Palestine Liberation Organization,
have been given such status. The PRC has opposed Taiwan’s bid for U.N. participation in the past
because it suggests that Taiwan is a sovereign state. Beijing argues that since Taiwan is not a state
but a part of China, it cannot separately be admitted to U.N. entities for which sovereign status is
a pre-requisite for membership.
19 Hsu, Jenny, “’Taipei’ gets direct link to WHO unit,” Taipei Times, January 23, 2009, p. 1.
20 Xie Yu, “Taiwan put under WHO health rules,” China Daily, February 12, 2009.
21 Chen, Jian, “WHA arrangements directed by China unacceptable: foreign minister,” Central News Agency, March
19, 2009.
22 Chan, Rachel, “U.S. will not mediate on WHA issue: AIT chair,” Central News Agency English, March 18, 2009.
23 Resolutions introduced in the 110th Congress in support of Taiwan’s U.N. bid include H.Con.Res. 73 and H.Con.Res.
250.
24 A State Department spokesman, in response to a press question at the State Department press briefing of March 20,
2002.
25 Dennis Wilder, National Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs, at a White House press briefing on the
President’s September APEC trip, August 30, 2007.
26 Hong Kong also enjoys separate membership in these organizations from its sovereign, the PRC.
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Corruption Investigations: Former Chen Administration
On December 12, 2008, former President Chen Shui-bian was indicted on charges of corruption
while he served as Taiwan’s president. He was arrested on those charges on November 12, 2008;
his trial began on March 26, 2009.
The Taiwan government conducted broadening investigations into allegations of corruption made
since 2006 against then-President Chen, his family members, and officials in his administration.
New allegations of money-laundering arose in August 2008 against Chen and his family, plunging
the DPP further into crisis, according to current DPP chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen.27 The August
2008 allegations, which involve foreign government investigations and not just those of Taiwan’s
KMT-dominated government, also are the first in which Chen publicly admitted even partial
culpability, saying that the funds were from campaign contributions, legally acquired, that he
failed to report. On August 15, 2008, Chen apologized to the DPP for causing “humiliation” and
“irreparable damage” to the party for his failure to declare the campaign funds. He announced his
and his wife’s immediate resignations from DPP party membership.28
Shortly after Chen stepped down as president on May 20, 2008 (thereby losing his presidential
immunity), Taiwan prosecutors announced they were starting an official investigation on his
potential role in the 2006 corruption and malfeasance charges. In pursuit of these allegations,
President Ma on August 6, 2008 announced that he was declassifying documents, classified by
Chen while he was president, that allegedly implicated Chen in the case of the special expenses
fund. Chen has maintained that the funds wired to overseas accounts are undeclared campaign
funds legally acquired, not government funds embezzled from the “special affairs” account while
he was president or bribes associated with the 2004 financial reforms he initiated.29 He has called
the corruption investigations a “political vendetta” by the KMT against him and his family. One
Taiwan press editorial has criticized recurring corruption allegations in recent years—which have
involved a number of senior Taiwan politicians—suggesting they are fueled more by political
partisanship than by interest in real reform.30
Special Expense Accounts
Investigations and indictments for corruption have been a recurring feature of political life in
Taiwan, particularly over the issue of how senior officials use and account for expenditures from
so-called “special expense accounts.” Such accounts are to be used for official expenses only, but
give the controlling officials broad discretion on how the funds are spent. They operate generally
with poor government oversight and are subject to vague rules that many Taiwan officials have
said are confusing. Among those investigated and cleared of such charges in the past are: current
President Ma Ying-jeou, former foreign minister James Huang, former economics minister Steve
Chen, and current DPP chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen (investigated when she was head of the
Mainland Affairs Council). Other investigations for “special expense account” infractions include
27 DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen, quoted in “DPP chief ‘shocked’ by former President Chen’s graft scandal,” The
China Post in English, August 17, 2008.
28 “ Former president quits DPP in disgrace,” Central News Agency in English, August 15, 2008.
29 After questioning by prosecutors on August 12, 2008, former President Chen was quoted as saying “I have never put
any illegal income in my own or in my family’s pockets. I believe the judiciary will prove me innocent.” “Former
President Chen professes his innocence after questioning,” Taiwan News Online, August 13, 2008.
30 “Does corruption stop here?” Taipei Times, August 22, 2008, p. 8.
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former Vice President Annette Lu, former justice minister Shi Mao-lin, former education minister
Tu Cheng-sheng, former interior minister Lee Yi-yang, and former civil service minister Chu Wu-
hsien, among others.
Economic and Trade Relations
Taiwan’s economy grew rapidly (around 10% a year) in the 1970s and 1980s. Growth declined to
around 5-6% a year in the 1990s as the economy matured. But Taiwan’s economy has faltered in
the global financial crisis, experiencing a serious slowdown beginning in the 4th quarter of 2008.
According to a March 2009 report by Taiwan’s Council for Economic Planning and Development
Taiwan’s export-heavy economy suffered a 28.6% drop in exports from February 2008 to
February 2009.31
Taiwan-U.S. Trade and Investment
Taiwan is the United States’ ninth-largest overall trading partner, with two-way trade in 2008
valued at $61.6 billion, a slight decrease from 2007. Taiwan also is the sixth-largest destination
for U.S. agricultural exports, about $2.5 billion annually. In addition to agricultural goods,
Taiwan’s U.S. imports include industrial raw materials and machinery and equipment; its exports
to the United States are largely electronics and consumer goods. Once Taiwan’s largest trading
partner, the United States has been surpassed by China and Japan and is now Taiwan’s third-
largest trading partner, supplying 11% of Taiwan’s imports and absorbing 14% of its exports. The
U.S. trade deficit with Taiwan in 2008 was $11 billion.
Special 301 Watch List
Taiwan has been on the U.S. Special 301 Watch List for years because of strong U.S. concerns
that it maintained insufficient protections for intellectual property rights (IPR). This changed in
2009, after Taiwan initiated a series of new laws and established institutional frameworks to
assure IPR protections. On January 16, 2009, the USTR announced that Taiwan had made
sufficient improvements to be removed from the list.32
To address U.S. concerns, the Taiwan government passed more robust copyright legislation,
enacted new laws targeting illegal Internet file sharing, and improved prosecution of IPR offenses
through the establishment (July 1, 2008) of a specialized Intellectual Property Court.33 The U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) had removed Taiwan from the more stringent “Priority Watch List”
in 2004. But pursuant to provisions the Trade Act of 1974, Taiwan remained on the U.S. Special
301 “Watch List”—a designation of a less serious risk of IPR violations than indicated by the
“Priority Watch List.”
31The report, issued on March 27, 2009, (Taiwan’s Economic Situation and Outlook), can be found at the website:
http://www.cepd.gov.tw/encontent/m1.aspx?sNo=0011655.
32 USTR News, “USTR announces conclusion of the Special 301 Out-of-Cycle review for Taiwan,” January 16, 2009,
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2009/January/asset_upload_file824_15293.pdf?ht=.
33 “2008 Special 301 Report,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, text at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2008/2008_Special_301_Report/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf.
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The U.S. business community was divided on whether Taiwan had made sufficient IPR
improvements to merit removal from the “Watch List.” For instance, in separate letters to USTR
dated September 8, 2008, the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council said it “strongly supports” Taiwan’s
removal from the Watch List, while the U.S.-based International Intellectual Property Alliance
recommended that “Taiwan remain on the Watch List” pending further IPR improvements.
Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
Taiwan for years has been seeking the economic and political benefits of a U.S.-Taiwan Free
Trade Agreement (FTA), so far without success. President Ma reportedly mentioned the subject
again during his August 2008 transit visit through the United States on his way to Latin
America.34 To date, U.S.-Taiwan trade discussions have been held under a 1994 Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), a non-binding consultative mechanism the United
States employs for resolving trade and investment difficulties with countries still opening their
economies.35 In some instances, a TIFA may lead to economic liberalization that is significant
enough to result in a U.S. FTA with the TIFA country. Taiwan has argued that its status as a major
trading partner of the United States justifies an FTA on economic grounds.
U.S. officials cite a number of obstacles to an FTA with Taiwan over the near term—not only
trade matters, such as Taiwan’s record on intellectual property rights (IPR), but more
fundamentally, the complicated political issues involving both Taiwan’s and U.S. relations with
the PRC. The PRC strongly opposes a U.S.-Taiwan FTA. In the past, Taiwan’s bid has had its
supporters in the U.S. Congress, several of whom have introduced measures regarding an FTA for
Taiwan.36
Cross-Strait Trade and Investment
Since 1949, both Taiwan and the PRC have maintained restrictions on trade and economic
investment relations across the Taiwan Strait. These have included requirements that goods and
articles be transshipped via third parties and not directly; restrictions on the kinds of goods and
articles that can be traded; and caps on investment levels, among others. Even with these
restrictions on official trade and contacts, Taiwan businesses have invested increasingly across the
strait into the mainland, although the exact figures remain unclear. Taiwan-China trade has also
increased dramatically, so that China (along with Hong Kong) has surpassed the United States as
Taiwan’s most important trading partner. According to Taiwan’s Central News Agency, Taiwan’s
total bilateral trade with the PRC for 2008 was $105.4 billion.
Taiwan’s growing economic interconnectedness with the PRC has created increasing pressures on
a succession of Taiwan governments to ease its restrictions on direct travel and investment. Since
1987, Taiwan incrementally eased long-standing restrictions on contacts with the PRC. Initiatives
under President Chen and the DPP, included the start in January 2005 of the first non-stop direct
34 Lin Yi-feng and Wu, Lilian, “President Ma arrives in San Francisco,” Central News Agency in English, August 18,
2008.
35 Negotiations for the TIFA were conducted through the respective U.S. and Taiwan unofficial representative bodies at
the time: the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA).
36 S.Con.Res. 60 (Sen. Baucus), introduced on December 18, 2007; and H.Con.Res. 137 (Rep. Berkley), introduced on
May 1, 2007, both express congressional support for the opening of FTA negotiations with Taiwan.
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charter flights flown in 55 years between the two adversaries (limited to the Lunar New Year
holiday that year).
The resumption of cross-strait talks in June 2008 and the subsequent agreements signed
(discussed elsewhere in this report) have already increased the potential for cross-strait trade and
investment. Ma Administration officials also have talked about creating a comprehensive
agreement to expand economic cooperation between Taiwan and China – with names suggested
such as the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) or the Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). The idea is controversial to some in Taiwan because
of the economic inter-dependence they fear such an agreement could help create.37 President Ma’s
willingness to significantly expand such cross-strait exchanges has concerned many DPP
members and pro-independence advocates in Taiwan, who see the Ma initiatives as having overly
ambitious expectations and as moving far too rapidly. These DPP observers say that cross-strait
overtures need to be calibrated carefully to avoid compromising Taiwan’s economic security and
political autonomy.
Other Key Bilateral Issues
U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan and Taiwan’s Defense Budget
Under the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8), the United States is obligated to provide Taiwan with
defense articles and services for its self-defense—a commitment to which the PRC objects. In
spite of the apparent warming ties with Taiwan after the March 2008 presidential election, many
thought the Bush Administration delayed sending forward notifications to Congress concerning a
number of long-pending U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.38 In June 2008, some Members of the U.S.
Senate wrote to President Bush expressing concern about the reports and urging the White House
to act swiftly on Taiwan’s arms sales requests.39 Some speculated that the delay in arms sales
notifications was related to Beijing’s hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games from August
8-24, 2008. One Pentagon official hinted in a public forum that the United States may have
imposed a freeze on weapons sales to Taiwan.40 A State Department spokesman at the time
maintained that the pending arms sales still were being discussed in “an internal interagency
process.”41
Since then, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have resumed. On August 25, 2008, the Pentagon
announced that it was awarding the McDonnell-Douglas Corp. (owned by Boeing) a contract to
provide Taiwan with 60 Harpoon missiles and associated hardware, worth $89.8 million, that
Taiwan requested in 2007.42 On October 3, 2008, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
37 The Chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, for instance, expressed opposition to the idea: “No CEPA to
be signed with China: MAC,” The China Post, October 17, 2008.
38 For details on Taiwan’s arms purchases, see CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, by
Shirley A. Kan.
39 “Inhofe urges support of Taiwan,” June 30, 2008 press release. For a full text, see http://inhofe.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=DAB422E7-802A-23AD-4101-
32FFB910FFE4.
40 Admiral Timothy Keating hinted at a freeze during a briefing at the Heritage Foundation on July 16, 2008.
41 State Department spokesman Sean McCormack, in response to a question at the Daily Briefing on July 17, 2008.
42 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), No. 717-08, August 25,
2008. http://www.defenselink.mil/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=3848
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(DSCA) notified Congress of the possible Foreign Military Sale of six different types of defense
articles and equipment, consistent with the policies of P.L. 96-8, which could total a maximum of
approximately $6.4 billion. These included:
• upgrades of four E-2T Aircraft to the HAWKEYE 2000 configuration (est.
maximum of $250 million)
• 30 AH-64D Block III APACHE Longbow Attack helicopters (est. maximum of
$2.532 billion)
• 330 PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missiles (est. maximum of $3.1
billion)
• 32 UGM-84L Sub-Launched HARPOON Block II missiles and 2 UTM-84L
HARPOON Block II Exercise missiles (est. maximum of $200 million)
• follow-on spare parts in support of F-5E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B, and Indigenous
Defense Fighter IDF aircraft (est. maximum of $334 million)
• 182 JAVELIN guided missile rounds and 20 JAVELIN command launch units
(est. maximum of $47 million)43
Visa Waiver Program (VWP)
Taiwan also has sought to qualify for coverage under the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP),
which eliminates some visa requirements for qualified countries, allowing their citizens to make
temporary U.S. visits without first obtaining a valid visa. VWP countries must meet certain
criteria—such as offering reciprocal privileges to U.S. citizens, having machine-readable
passports, and having a low nonimmigrant refusal rate (defined as the formal denial of a
nonimmigrant visa application by a U.S. consular official). The latter criteria appears to have
been a particularly difficult one for Taiwan.44 In 2007, Congress enacted amendments to the VWP
which may provide for a waiver of the non-immigrant refusal rate.45 With a waiver, Taiwan may
meet the requirements of the program.
Although Taiwan citizens would benefit from the facilitated travel that the U.S. Visa Waiver
Program affords, another key Taiwan government motive is thought to be the international stature
that Taiwan would gain from being among the VWP’s group of participants. In addition,
participation in the program is often seen as evidence of close ties with the United States. In
addition to its current failure to meet all of the program’s qualifications (absent a non-immigrant
refusal rate waiver), Taiwan’s chances of participation in the VWP also are subject to the
anticipated kinds of political difficulties involving the PRC that are aspects of other U.S.-Taiwan
relations. The PRC does not qualify for the VWP.
43 The notifications can be found on the DSCA website under “36(b) Arms Sales Notifications.” http://www.dsca.mil/
PressReleases/36-b/36b_index.htm
44 For additional information on the Visa Waiver Program, see CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program, by Alison
Siskin.
45 The measure was enacted in 2007 in P.L. 110-53, although the visa waiver did not become available until October
2008.
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U.S. Policy Trends
It is unclear at this point what the Taiwan policy of the Obama Administration will be. Trends
since 1979 strongly suggest that the White House will maintain policy continuity, with U.S.
policy remaining rooted firmly in the fundamentals of the Taiwan Relations Act and the three
communiques. In a press conference in Taiwan on March 18, 2009, for example, AIT Chairman
Ray Burghardt stressed that U.S. commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act will remain
unchanged, and also emphasized that U.S. officials “truly are enthusiastic” about improvements
in cross-strait ties.46
Recent history on U.S. Taiwan policy indicates, however, that even within the framework of
policy continuity there can be nuance. Many observers concluded in 2001 that the newly elected
George W. Bush then had abandoned the long-standing U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” in
favor of “strategic clarity” that placed a clearer emphasis on Taiwan’s interests and showed less
concern for PRC views. In addition to approving a major arms sales package for Taiwan in 2001,
subsequent statements and actions by Bush Administration officials continued to appear more
supportive of Taiwan than those of previous U.S. Administrations. This support was in keeping
with growing concern in Congress in the late 1990s that the U.S. policy framework toward
Taiwan had become outdated and that Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities had eroded while those
of the PRC had grown. A series of congressionally mandated annual reports issued by the
Pentagon supported these conclusions, assessing that the military balance in the Taiwan Strait was
increasingly tilting in the PRC’s favor.
During its tenure, however, the Bush Administration began reshaping its own policy articulations
concerning both Taiwan and the PRC. Administration officials came to see that smooth U.S.-PRC
relations may be an important tool in cooperating against terrorism, maintaining stability on the
Korean peninsula, and many other key U.S. strategic goals. As articulated by Vice President
Cheney during his visit to Shanghai in April 2004, the White House judged that “the areas of
agreement [between the United States and the PRC] are far greater than those areas where we
disagree ... ”47 Also, such problems of trust developed between Taiwan’s President Chen and U.S.
officials that the bilateral atmosphere eroded significantly during the Bush Administration.48 The
Bush White House came to balance criticisms of China’s military buildup opposite Taiwan with
periodic warnings to the Taiwan government that U.S. support was not unconditional.49 Whether
such nuance will continue in the Obama Administration remains to be seen.
46 Chairman Raymond Burghardt, AIT Press Conference, Taipei, Taiwan, March 18, 2009, http://www.ait.org.tw/en/
news/officialtext/viewer.aspx?id=2009031901.
47 From the Q & A session with Vice President Cheney following his speech at Fudan University in Shanghai,
broadcast by Beijing CCTV in English, found in FBIS, April 15, 2004.
48 See CRS Report RL33684, Underlying Strains in Taiwan-U.S. Political Relations, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
49 “There are limitations with respect to what the United States will support as Taiwan considers possible changes to its
constitution.” Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly before the House International Relations
Committee, April 21, 2004.
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Policy Options for Congress
Given developments in U.S. relations with Taiwan since 2001, lawmakers who are concerned
about current trends and the U.S. ability to meet future challenges may consider a number of
various options for U.S. policy.
Maintain and Reaffirm the Current AOne-China@ Policy
The official U.S. policy view is that the Aone-China@ policy and the fundamental framework
surrounding it is an important constant in an otherwise dangerously fluid and evolving U.S.-
Taiwan-PRC relationship. In this view, any alteration or apparent flexibility in that policy would
lead to a Adisintegrating policy@ damaging to U.S. interests.50 In addition, according to this view,
the current policy framework helps protect the United States and U.S. policies from becoming
greater factors in the domestic Taiwan and PRC political environments. The slightest deviation
from U.S. policy formulations and actions C an off-the-cuff comment, the use of different
wording beyond that already approved, a visit by a more senior U.S. official C can be and has in
the past been seized upon by actors from either side to further domestic political agendas,
inevitably creating nettlesome diplomatic problems for U.S. policy.
Moreover, these proponents say, those who advocate scrapping the Aone-China@ policy and other
aspects of the U.S. policy framework are recklessly discounting PRC resolve on unifying Taiwan
with the mainland and irresponsibly advocating actions that well could lead to the use of U.S.
military forces in a U.S.-PRC conflict. The Taiwan Relations Act and the current policy approach,
according to these proponents, should be maintained and regularly reaffirmed. As the PRC itself
is firmly committed to the “one-China” policy, maintaining and reaffirming the current policy
would be the last disruptive to U.S.-PRC relations.
Change the AOne China@ Policy
A strongly held but minority view places greater emphasis on the political aspirations and
democratic rights to self-determination of the people on Taiwan. According to proponents of this
view, the current U.S. policy framework on Taiwan is completely out of step with the American
emphasis on global democratization. They hold that as the PRC and Taiwan have evolved, the
original U.S. policy framework on Taiwan has grown stultified and increasingly irrelevant. The
Aone-China@ policy itself, they argue, originally was based on the U.S. acknowledgment that both
Taiwan and the PRC held there was only one China and that Taiwan was part of it.51 They
contend that this U.S. policy has become untenable; it no longer reflects the reality in Taiwan.
They say it is based on a faulty premise that perpetuates more-or-less continual deferral of a
resolution to Taiwan=s political status and ignores Taiwan’s peaceful transition to democracy.
50 Interview with former U.S. government official, June 22, 2006.
51 This was the formulation in the U.S.-PRC AShanghai Communique@ of 1972, which held that AThe United States
acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a
part of China. The [U.S.] Government does not challenge that position.@ In repeating this assertion, the Joint
Communique of 1979 establishing official relations with the PRC eliminated specific mention of either government:
AThe Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and
Taiwan is part of China.@ See CRS Report 96-246, for full texts of the Taiwan Relations Act and the three U.S.-China
communiques.
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Therefore, they say, the Aone-China@ policy needs to be abandoned and replaced with a Aone-
China, one-Taiwan@ policy in which the United States would work toward gradual normalization
of relations with Taiwan.
Some who advocate this viewpoint believe that the costs of such a policy change for the United
States would be minimal. They believe that PRC actions and statements on Taiwan are just
Asaber-rattling,@ and they doubt that the PRC will attack Taiwan should Taipei declare
independence.52 Even if the PRC should attack Taiwan, these proponents appear confident that for
political and strategic reasons, the United States would come to Taiwan=s aid.53 To do nothing,
they say, would seriously damage U.S. credibility and influence in Asia.
Others in the U.S. policy community and elsewhere stress that changing the “one-China” policy
would be an about-face in the long-standing U.S. position and would involve the greatest risk to
U.S.-PRC relations. Given the high priority the PRC places on the Taiwan issue, Beijing likely
would view such a policy change uncompromisingly and could react strongly, to the detriment of
U.S. interests. Potential PRC reactions could include a break or suspension in U.S.-China talks at
many or all levels; abandonment of PRC support for important U.S. global policy initiatives;
rupture of economic and perhaps even political relations; and military operations against Taiwan
that could involve U.S. military forces. Some suggest also that such a move would be damaging
to Taiwan’s ultimate economic and political security.
Make U.S. Policy More Assertive and Transparent
Bracketed within the above two policy options is a steady but quiet flow of alternative policy
suggestions. These tend to advocate various substantive changes in day-to-day U.S. relations with
Taiwan that their proponents believe would remain within the boundaries of the current policy
framework and within U.S. understandings with the PRC.
Another ATaiwan Policy Review@
At the very least, some say, the United States needs to consider doing another comprehensive
review of its Taiwan policy in order to revisit once again the 1979-1980 ATaiwan Guidelines@ that
govern U.S. government interactions with Taiwan and with Taiwan officials. Reportedly, only one
such review to update the guidelines has been conducted since 1979 C the 1993-1994 Taiwan
Policy Review undertaken in the Clinton Administration C and that review resulted in a new
approval for exchanges of high-level official visits in the economic arena.54 But even the high-
52 Coen Blaauw, of FAPA, and John Tkacik, of The Heritage Foundation, are two proponents of this view.
53 Tkacik, John, ed. Rethinking One China, The Heritage Foundation, December 1, 2004.
54 Apart from the Taiwan Policy Review, several other Clinton Administration decisions led to debates over whether
the United States had changed its policy on Taiwan. In 1997-1998, the White House made statements that became
known as the Athree noes@ C that the United States did not support a Aone China, One Taiwan@ policy, Taiwan
independence, or Taiwan membership in international organizations requiring statehood. In 2000, the Clinton
Administration made further incremental changes to U.S. rhetoric by adding the U.S. expectation that any resolution to
the Taiwan issue would not only be peaceful, but decided Awith the assent of the Taiwan people.@ For these and other
U.S. policy statements, see CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key
Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, by Shirley A. Kan.
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level economic visits resulting from the 1993-94 policy review were not pursued with vigor by
the Bush Administration, according to these proponents.55
Furthermore, since the 1993-94 policy review, there have been dramatic developments in
Taiwan=s political development. From an authoritarian, one-party government some saw as only
marginally more democratic than that of the PRC, Taiwan has become a fully functioning
democracy, with multiple political parties, competitive elections, and two complete, peaceful
shifts in government – the DPP’s victory under Chen in 2000 and the KMT’s return to power
under Ma in 2008.
In addition, since 1995 the PRC has undertaken a substantial military buildup along the coast
opposite Taiwan, and in 2005 Beijing adopted the anti-secession law suggesting hostile intent
against Taiwan. These significant developments since 1993-94, according to this view, justify
another Taiwan Policy Review to make selected changes in U.S. policy. Proponents of a review
believe that the importance of Taiwan for U.S. interests, and of peace and stability in the Taiwan
strait, warrant such renewed policy attention. Limited changes, they argue, could result in a more
rational policy process and could improve communications. Among the policy changes that have
been discussed are:
• More transparent and open interactions with Taiwan at the working level,
including visits between U.S. and Taiwan officials in official U.S. government
buildings and invitations to Taiwan officials to attend special events such as
swearing-in ceremonies;
• Higher level U.S. government visits and exchanges with Taiwan counterparts;
• Greater coordination within the U.S. government C including regular inter-
departmental meetings involving the Departments of Commerce, Defense, State,
and Treasury, among others C on policy and substantive issues involving Taiwan;
and
• More open and active support for Taiwan=s participation in international
organizations for which statehood is not a requirement, and greater support for
observer status for Taiwan in organizations for which statehood is a requirement
(such as the United Nations and World Health Organization).
The implications of a Taiwan policy review for U.S.-PRC relations likely would depend on the
nature of the policy review itself. A substantial or comprehensive public review undoubtedly
would raise concerns both in the PRC and likely in Taiwan. As stated before, however, such a
review is not without precedent, and could be seen by both U.S. and PRC officials as a pragmatic
adjustment to current circumstances.
More Active U.S. Role on Cross-Strait Relations
Among those suggesting alternative approaches, there appears to be greater sentiment that a more
active U.S. role in cross-strait matters is both justifiable within the current policy framework and
warranted by changing sentiments within the PRC and Taiwan. They suggest, for instance, that
there is room for U.S. involvement in trying to moderate, re-shape, or otherwise influence those
55 The only such contact in recent years was the Taiwan visit of Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Karan Bhatia in
May-June 2006.
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contending positions of the two sides that remain major obstacles to greater stability in the
Taiwan Strait. Such greater involvement would require changes in long-standing U.S. assurances
to Taiwan that the United States would not become involved in a mediating role between the two
sides, and long-standing objections from the PRC that the United States not “interfere” in China’s
internal affairs. U.S. officials maintain, however, both governments in recent years have changed
the way they talk to Washington about Taiwan. U.S. officials now are under subtle and perhaps
increasing pressure from both governments to become directly involved in some aspects of cross-
strait issues.
According to U.S. officials, the PRC during Taiwan’s Chen Administration suggested that Beijing
and Washington cooperate to manage controversial Taiwan issues. This included suggestions and
pressure from PRC officials that the United States pressure Chen into shelving plans for an
island-wide referendum and that U.S. officials avoid sending the “wrong signals” to
Taiwancouraging independence aspirations.56 For their part, members of the Taiwan government
suggested that the Taiwan Relations Act needed to be strengthened or reevaluated. They sought
U.S. support for Chen’s constitutional reform plans and more visible and routine U.S.-Taiwan
official interaction. As a result, some observers in both Taiwan and the United States suggest that
the time may be ripe for the United States to step up its rhetoric and activities to promote cross-
strait dialogue.
Nevertheless, this receptivity to U.S. involvement has significant limitations—the chief of which
is that each side wants U.S. involvement only on behalf of its own interests. Taiwan urges the
United States to press the PRC to renounce the use of force and to agree to no pre-conditions for
cross-strait talks. The PRC urges the United States to oppose Taiwan independence and to be
more forceful in opposing unilateral changes in the status quo. According to many, U.S.
involvement in such a one-sided way could help foster rather than ease cross-strait tensions.
Former U.S. officials report that the United States is willing to help in a cross-strait dialogue if
both sides can reach consensus on the kind of U.S. help they can accept.57
Exert More Pressure on the PRC
Another alternate view is that the United States has become too responsive to PRC sensitivities
on Taiwan, and therefore unwilling to exert more pressure on the PRC government to reduce its
hostile military posture toward Taiwan. According to this view, the U.S. stake in maintaining a
democratic Taiwan, along with the potential cost of a non-peaceful resolution to Taiwan=s political
status, is too high for the U.S. government to remain on the sidelines. The United States should
use more of its considerable leverage with Beijing in an effort to bring about more conciliatory
behavior and promote more cross-strait concessions. Proponents suggest that U.S. officials could
pressure the PRC to reduce its missile and military buildup opposite Taiwan and to revisit China’s
2005 Anti-Secession Law which specifically provides for use of force against Taiwan.
56 Some critics of U.S. policy suggest that the PRC’s search for U.S. involvement is a “united front” tactic designed
primarily to isolate Taiwan from some of its U.S. support.
57 Former U.S. government official interviewed on July 5, 2006.
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More Overt U.S. Support for Taiwan Democracy
Another set of policy suggestions supports greater U.S. support for and involvement in Taiwan=s
democratic institutions. According to this view, Taiwan has already transformed itself by adopting
a democratic system of governance; it is in the interests of all parties to have Taiwan=s
government be as effective and stable as possible. In particular, Taiwan’s democratic system
serves as a principle barrier to a Taiwan leadership’s “preemptive capitulation” to PRC
initiatives.58 But proponents of this view say that the very immaturity of Taiwan=s democracy and
the infrastructural weaknesses of its political institutions are hampering Taiwan governance,
contributing to cross-strait tensions, and posing problems for U.S. policy. Proponents suggest that
the U.S. might pursue initiatives to improve the effectiveness of Taiwan=s governance, such as:
• U.S. support for limited constitutional reforms in Taiwan (such as movement to a
parliamentary system or reduction in the multiple levels of government) that
could contribute directly to more effective government institutions and a more
workable balance of power;
• Greater dialogue and more direct contact between the U.S. Congress and
Taiwan=s Legislative Yuan (LY), particularly to assist the LY=s current structural
reform and committee structure and processes; and
• Encouragement for Taiwan to use its political strengths and resources in a non-
isolating way C by de-emphasizing divisive sovereignty issues, for instance, and
instead emphasizing the global role Taiwan can play in democratic capacity
building C such as in vote-counting and monitoring.
In addition, say these proponents, the United States can and should be more open in offering
rhetorical support for the statements and actions of Taiwan leaders, defending them as natural
components of Taiwan=s democratic processes.59 The United States might feel obliged publicly to
disagree with those espousing Taiwan independence aspirations, according to this view, but U.S.
officials should openly support the rights of Taiwan officials to say such things as an essential
part of the open debate that characterizes a democratic government.
Implications
Many consider the continued success in 2008 of the democratic process in Taiwan to be a
validation of U.S. goals for the spread of democratic values. It also further emphasizes the unique
and delicate challenge for U.S. policy that Taiwan continues to pose: Taiwan is our ninth largest
trading partner with a vibrant and free democratic government on an island claimed by the PRC,
with which the United States has no diplomatic relations but does have defense commitments,
and whose independence from China U.S. officials say they do not support. With Taiwan under
the KMT government, the United States will be faced with some challenges familiar from past
years, including decisions on: new arms sales; how to accommodate requests for visits to the
United States by President Ma and other senior Taiwan officials; the level of U.S. relations with
the Ma government; and whether to pursue closer economic ties, such as through a Free Trade
Agreement. In addition, Taiwan-U.S. relations under the KMT government face new
58 Bush, Richard and Romberg, Alan, “Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States,” the Brookings Institution,
March 30, 2009.
59 John Tkacik, from The Heritage Foundation, is one of the proponents of this view.
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challenges—notably the implications that President Ma’s initiatives toward the PRC have for U.S.
interests; and what role, if any, Washington should play in Taiwan-PRC relations.
For Cross-Strait Relations
President Ma’s emphasis on improving relations with the PRC presents a potentially new policy
environment for the United States. U.S. policy had been stressed after President Chen abandoned
his early, unsuccessful olive branches to Beijing in favor of a more pro-independence approach,
with U.S. officials subjected to increasing pressure from both sides to become directly involved in
some aspects of cross-strait ties. PRC officials began quietly urging the United States to pressure
Chen into shelving plans for an island-wide referendum, and they pressed U.S. officials to avoid
sending the “wrong signals” to Taiwan. Members of the Taiwan government urged U.S. officials
to give more overt support for Taiwan’s democracy and to put more pressure on Beijing to lessen
its hostility – efforts that some see as setting a precedent for overriding the “six assurances” to
Taiwan. U.S. officials were put in the position of continually seeking to re-balance the cross-strait
relationship to achieve some sort of stasis in keeping with stated U.S. policy goals.
The cross-strait policy of President Ma’s government presents the United States with a different
set of challenges. Ma’s new approach toward the PRC would seem to be in keeping with U.S.
wishes, as U.S. officials in the past have urged both sides to move toward greater conciliation and
less confrontation. In 2008, a U.S. State Department spokesman spoke favorably (if somewhat
tepidly, in keeping with most U.S. policy pronouncements on Taiwan issues) of the resumption of
cross-strait talks under the Ma Administration, responding to a reporter’s question with “ ... we
believe it’s important for the two to work towards a peaceful resolution of the ... Cross-Strait
issues.”60
While U.S. policy favors improvements in Taiwan-PRC relations, it has been silent on what
should be the speed, depth, and degree of cross-strait conciliation. Some observers worry that the
KMT government may be overly responsive to economic imperatives and to pressures from
influential Taiwan business interests that have substantial economic investments in China. They
worry that the Ma government could reach a swift accommodation with Beijing that may
complicate U.S. regional interests.
The implication for U.S. interests is only one factor President Ma will have to continue to
consider in pursuing his PRC policy. Ma faces multiple balancing acts. These include efforts to
improve cross-strait relations—and Taiwan’s economic opportunities on the mainland—while not
appearing overly eager to voters who worry that he will sell out Taiwan’s political interests in
pursuit of closer mainland economic ties. He also will have to strike a balance between those in
the electorate who favor unification with China; those who argue for a strong defense for Taiwan
and the continuation of U.S. weapons purchases; and those who urge significant improvements in
Taiwan’s relations with Beijing.
For U.S. Arms Sales
Relatedly, the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan takes on new shades of delicacy in an
environment of improving Taiwan-PRC ties. While U.S. law mandating arms sales to Taiwan
60 Acting Deputy Spokesman Gonzalo R. Gallegos, State Department Daily Press Briefing, June 12, 2008.
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Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Developments and Policy Implications
states that these sales shall be “based solely upon ... the needs of Taiwan,” such decisions can be
and have been a useful U.S. policy lever in U.S.-Taiwan-PRC relations.61 Either the approval of a
major weapons package to Taiwan or an apparent “freeze” in weapons sales can have symbolic
significance for either side of the strait. U.S. policymakers will be faced with decisions on what
kind of signal a specific U.S. arms sale will send under current circumstances. The PRC objects
to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and has reacted punitively in some cases, so that future U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan may have significant implications for cross-strait ties. A recent news story from a
Taiwan newspaper alleged that U.S. military officials are concerned that potential Taiwan-PRC
military exchanges could provide Beijing with an opportunity to learn details about sensitive U.S.
military technology sold to Taiwan and, therefore, could jeopardize future U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan.62
For PRC Policy and Credibility
Despite the challenges that Ma faces, many believe that his policy approach will be an important
test of the PRC’s stated intentions of approaching cross-strait problems by “putting aside
differences and seeking a win-win result.”63 Having railed against President Chen’s
independence-aspirations for eight years while wooing the KMT, the PRC now is faced with the
question of whether it wishes to follow through with creative initiatives if it is to capitalize on the
opportunity that a KMT government presents. Rebuffing a new and, at least initially, a more
conciliatory Taiwan government could damage the PRC’s credibility that it wishes to pursue a
peaceful and constructive solution for cross-strait ties. Any perceived PRC reluctance also could
serve to revitalize U.S. and congressional opposition to the PRC’s Taiwan policy—opposition
which remained relatively muted for years in part because of mutual U.S.-PRC problems with
former President Chen.
Observers suggest there are a number of options now for Beijing to make meaningful gestures
toward Taiwan that would not impinge on PRC sovereignty claims. Beijing has appeared willing
to take some guarded steps. These include willingness to restart cross-strait talks on a mutually
acceptable basis; a new willingness to entertain Taiwan’s aspirations to be a “meaningful
participant” in the WHO; and, with the November 2008 meeting between Taiwan’s Lien Chan
and PRC President Hu Jintao during the APEC meeting, at least the suggestion of a halt to
inflexible posturing against Taiwan in APEC and other multilateral organizations. Other such
steps could include a suspension of Taiwan-focused military exercises and other military
maneuvers in the strait and a meaningful drawing-down of missiles deployed opposite the Taiwan
coast.
61 Arms sales to Taiwan are mandated in P.L. 96-8, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Section 3302(b) of U.S.C. 22, Ch.
48, Sect. 3301-3316, enacted April 10, 1979.
62
Lowther, William, “Pentagon wary of PRC-Taiwan ties,” Taipei Times, January 7, 2009, p. 1.
63 Reportedly language in a letter written to the U.N. Secretary General by the PRC’s U.N. Ambassador Wang Guangya
concerning Taiwan’s current bid for “meaningful participation” in the U.N. “China gives U.N. bid cold shoulder,”
CNA, September 10, 2008.
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For Taiwan Democracy
Many Americans have welcomed the 2008 election results as a sign that Taiwan’s democracy has
continued to ripen and mature. They say Taiwan’s democratic development has been validated by
having passed the “Huntington test” for established democracies—having two successful,
consecutive changes of government through a free and peaceful electoral process.64 Those
harboring concern about how the DPP’s supporters would take such a defeat were reassured
greatly by the gracious concession speech of candidate Frank Hsieh and the widespread DPP
acceptance of the results of the democratic process. To some watching the March 22, 2008
election, the Taiwan electorate also appeared to have attained a new level of maturity and
sophistication, apparently motivated more in its election decisions by pragmatic calculations of
governmental performance than by more emotional issues involving U.N. membership or
sovereignty issues.65
Some, however, suggest that functional political pluralism in Taiwan may be in trouble over the
short term. An effective democracy requires a viable opposition, and the overwhelming KMT
electoral victories in 2008 left Taiwan’s polity lopsided, the opposition effectively crushed. The
DPP has been demoralized and decimated further by the political scandals involving former
President Chen, who brought the party from a fledgling opposition party to the pinnacle of power.
The scandals, wrote DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen, have brought the DPP “a kind of sadness so
painful it cannot be soothed, and a kind of disappointment so grave it cannot be overcome.”66
Despite the warming U.S.-Taiwan relationship under the KMT, then, many feel that U.S. interests
in having Taiwan remain a full-fledged democracy may be compromised should the opposition
remain too feeble effectively to monitor and hold accountable the majority party.
Legislation in the 111th Congress
H.Con.Res. 18 (Linder)
Expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should resume normal diplomatic
relations with Taiwan. The measure calls on the President to abandon the “one-China” policy,
adopt a “one-China, one-Taiwan” policy that recognizes Taiwan sovereignty, and begin
establishing normal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The measure also calls on the President to
aggressively support Taiwan’s membership in the U.N. and other international organizations for
which statehood is a requirement. The measure was introduced on January 9, 2009, and referred
to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
H.Con.Res. 55 (Berkley)
Recognizing the 30th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. The resolution reaffirms the
unwavering U.S. commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act, reaffirms strong U.S. support for
64 Samuel P. Huntington defined this process in his book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century, Norman and London, 1991. Taiwan qualifies by virtue of the DPP having wrested power from the KMT in
2000 and the KMT having regained power in 2008.
65 Many U.S. and other foreign election observers were in Taiwan before and after the March 22 election, including this
author. This report draws heavily on these personal observations and insights.
66 DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen, “An open letter to DPP supporters,” Taipei Times, August 27, 2008, p. 8.
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Taiwan’s democratic development, and supports deepening U.S.-Taiwan ties. The measure was
introduced on February 23, 2009, and referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, which held mark-up on March 19, 2009. The
Subcommittee forwarded the bill to the full Committee, amended, by voice vote the same day.
Chronology
03/18/09—U.S. American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) chairman Ray Burghardt said that the United
States was “comfortable with what’s happening” in Taiwan-PRC engagement. The same day,
former President Chen Shui-bian appeared at his final pre-trial hearing before going on trial for
corruption, scheduled to begin March 26, 2009.
03/17/09—The first luxury cruise ship (Ocean Mystery) to sail directly to Taiwan from the PRC
(Shanghai) arrived at Keelung, reportedly carrying 1,600 PRC tourists.
03/16/09—In its first quadrennial report (QDR), Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense said that Taiwan
would cut its military personnel from 275,000 to 215,000 over the next five years – part of a plan
to create an all-volunteer force by December 2014.
03/14/09—The Taiwan government urged the PRC to jettison its “anti-secession” law. The law,
passed in March 2005, justifies the use of force to prevent Taiwan independence.
01/13/09—World Health Organization officials sent a letter to the Taiwan government stating that
the island henceforth would be included in the International Health Regulations (IHR), a set of
legally binding rules governing international commitment to disease surveillance, alert, and
response
01/07/09—Taiwan’s cross-strait negotiator, Chiang Pin-kung, began a visit to four PRC cities to
discuss issues facing Taiwan investors in the mainland.
12/12/08—Former Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian was indicted on charges of corruption,
having been arrested on November 12, 2008.
11/21/08 – On November 21, 2008, Taiwan’s Lien Chan, a former Vice-President and Premier,
met with PRC President Hu Jintao during the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
meeting in Peru. It was said to be the highest-level meeting between the two sides in an
international forum since 1949.
10/03/08—The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of the possible Foreign
Military Sale of six different types of defense articles and equipment, totaling approximately $6.4
billion.
09/08/08—Taiwan announced that it would cancel the live-fire exercise portion of its annual five-
day military exercises, in deference to warming ties between Taiwan and the PRC.
09/08/08—Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry announced it would seek closer participation in the 16-
member Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Taiwan has taken part every year in the PIF since joining in
1993, but because of PRC objections has been restricted to dialoguing only with its 6 diplomatic
South Pacific partners.
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08/27/08—The Pentagon announced the sale of 58 Harpoon missiles as well as related support,
logistics, and training equipment to Taiwan worth about $101 million.
08/19/08—Taiwan’s Special Investigation Unit (SIU) announced it was inviting the Taipei-based
Central Bank of China (CBC) and the cabinet-level Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) to
assist in investigating the source of $21 million in a Swiss bank account in the name of former
President Chen Shui-bian’s daughter-in-law, Huang Jui-ching. SIU investigators said they were
looking into possible irregularities in the second-phase financial reform initiated by President
Chen in 2004 as a potential source of the funds.
08/18/08—Prosecutors in Taiwan named five suspects in an alleged high-level money laundering
scheme involving former President Chen Shui-bian. They included Chen Shui-bian; his wife Wu
Shu-jen; Chen’s son Chen Chih-chung and his wife Huang Jui-ching; and Wu’s brother Wu
Ching-mao.
08/17/08—Tsai Ing-wen, head of Taiwan’s DPP party, said the current political crisis had come
about because the DPP put too much faith and trust in Chen Shui-bian.
08/14/08—Former Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian held a press conference to resign from DPP
membership. He admitted failing fully to declare campaign funds and for wiring millions of
dollars overseas, and apologized for causing “humiliation” and “irreparable damage” to the party.
08/14/08—Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) confirmed that the Swiss
Confederation’s Department of Justice sought assistance from Taiwan about suspected money
laundering by Chen’s daughter-in-law, Huang Jui-ching.
08/14/08—Taiwan submitted a proposal to the UN Secretariat via St. Vincent and the Solomon
Islands (2 of Taiwan’s diplomatic relationships), asking the UN to consider permitting Taiwan to
have “meaningful participation” in the organization’s specialized agencies.
08/13/08—A spokesman for Taiwan’s presidential office said that this year’s UN bid would focus
on “participation” in specialized UN agencies.
08/12/08—AIT Chairman Ray Burghardt gave a dinner for President Ma in Los Angeles. Ma also
met with Members of Congress.
08/12/08—Taiwan President Ma YJ left for state visits to Paraguay and the Dominican Republic,
returning on the 19th. He flew a commercial flight to the United States—a first for a Taiwan
president—and transited through LA (coming) and through San Francisco (returning home).
07/27/08—Taiwan’s Sports Affairs Council (SAC—a cabinet-level council) announced that
several Taiwan Ministers would attend the 2008 Olympic Games at IOC invitation using National
Olympic Committee ID cards. In the past, China’s protests had led to the issuance of the less
prestigious “Guest Card” for Taiwan officials.
07/22/08—Taiwan’s SEF chairman, Chiang Pin-kung, was reported as having said he wants to
study and promote the creation of a cross-strait comprehensive economic cooperation agreement
(CECA).
07/17/08—Taiwan’s cabinet announced it would revise regulations limiting investment by Taiwan
companies in China, and that new measures would be put into place August 1. Preliminary reports
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said that the current investment cap would be abolished for some companies and raised to 60% of
net worth for other companies.
06/12/08—The first cross-strait meetings in a decade began between China and Taiwan in Beijing
at the Diaoyutai State Guest House, conducted by SEF and ARATS. The two sides reportedly
agreed to set up permanent offices in each other’s territory and to begin regular weekend direct
charter flights.
05/26/08—KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung visited China and met with PRC Party Secretary Hu
Jintao at the latter’s invitation in the highest-level contact between the two sides of the Taiwan
Strait.
05/20/08—Ma Ying-jeou was inaugurated President of Taiwan.
05/19/08—Tsai Ing-wen, considered a moderate in the DPP Party and a former Vice-Premier, was
elected chairwoman of the Party.
05/19/08—The WHO rejected Taiwan’s bid for observer status.
03/22/08—KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou was elected president of Taiwan, defeating the rival
DPP ticket of Frank Hsieh.
For Additional Reading
CRS Report RS22853, Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential Election, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
CRS Report RL33684, Underlying Strains in Taiwan-U.S. Political Relations, by Kerry
Dumbaugh.
CRS Report RS22388, Taiwan’s Political Status: Historical Background and Ongoing
Implications, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, by Shirley A. Kan.
CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements
from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, by Shirley A. Kan.
Author Contact Information
Kerry Dumbaugh
Specialist in Asian Affairs
kdumbaugh@crs.loc.gov, 7-7683
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