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On April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced a number of Department of
Defense (DOD) decisions regarding DOD’s proposed FY2010 defense budget. Among these was
a decision to end the Navy’s Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyer procurement program at three
ships and restart procurement of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers. Gates’
announcement appeared endorse, to some degree at least, a proposal announced by the Navy on
July 31, 2008, to halt DDG-1000 procurement and restart DDG-51 procurement. Until Gates’
April 6 announcement, OSD publicly had reserved judgment on the Navy’s July 2008 proposal,
stating that further analysis of its merits was needed.
Gates stated on April 6 that DOD’s support for building the all three DDG-1000s was contingent
on the Navy reaching an agreement with its two surface combatant builders – General Dynamics’
bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME, and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB) – to
transfer the second DDG-1000 from NGSB to GD/BIW, so that GD/BIW would be the builder of
all three DDG-1000s. On April 8, it was reported that such an agreement had been reached. As a
result, GD/BIW is to build all three DDG-1000s, NGSB is to build the first two DDG-51s to be
procured under the DDG-51 restart, GD/BIW is to build the DDG-51, and the two firms will then
share in the production of subsequent DDG-51s.
The proposed FY2010 budget will request funding to complete the procurement cost of the third
DDG-1000 (which was authorized but only partially funded in FY2009), and funding to procure
the first DDG-51, to be built by NGSB. The FY2011 budget might include funding for two more
DDG-51s, one of which would be built by NGSB, the other by GD/BIW.
Gates’ April 6 announcement left unclear the status of a proposal made by John Young, the DOD
acquisition executive, in memorandum dated January 26, 2009, to begin procuring in FY2012 a
ship called the Future Surface Combatant (FSC) that could be based on either the DDG-51 design
or the DDG-1000 design. If the FSC proposal remains in place as a feature of DOD planning,
then a decision to base the FSC on the DDG-51 would mean that procurement of DDG-51s in
FY2010 and FY2011 would be followed by procurement of modified DDG-51s in FY2012 and
subsequent years, while a decision to base the FSC on the DDG-1000 would mean that
procurement of DDG-51s would cease after FY2011 and procurement of modified DDG-1000s
would begin in FY2012. If the FSC proposal does not remain in place, it would appear that
procurement of DDG-51s of either the current design or a modified design would continue in
FY2012 and subsequent years.
Potential issues for Congress include the following: the merits of DOD’s decision to halt DDG-
1000 procurement and restart DDG-51 procurement; whether the FSC proposal remains in place
following Secretary Gates’ April 6 announcement; whether to complete the procurement funding
for a third DDG-1000 in FY2010; whether to continue with the construction of the second DDG-
1000; whether to fund the procurement of one or two DDG-51s in FY2010; whether to direct the
Navy to build the second and third DDG-1000s to a modified design featuring additional missile-
launch tubes in the place of the DDG-1000’s Advanced Gun Systems (AGSs); whether to provide
direction to DOD regarding the design of DDG-51s procured in FY2010 and beyond; and
whether to provide direction to DOD regarding the FSC proposal (if it remains in place). This
report will be updated as events warrant.
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Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
DDG-1000 (Zumwalt) Program ................................................................................................ 2
DDG-51 (Arleigh Burke) Program ........................................................................................... 6
Surface Combatant Construction Industrial Base ..................................................................... 7
Shipyards ............................................................................................................................ 7
Combat System Manufacturers........................................................................................... 9
Supplier Firms................................................................................................................... 10
Secretary of Defense’s April 2009 Announcement on Destroyer Procurement ...................... 10
Navy-Industry April 2009 Agreement Regarding Builder of Three DDG-1000s ....................11
Navy’s July 2008 Proposal on Destroyer Procurement........................................................... 12
Number of New DDG-51s Proposed ................................................................................ 12
Design of New DDG-51s.................................................................................................. 14
Procurement Cost of New DDG-51s ................................................................................ 14
Navy’s Reasons for Its Change in Position....................................................................... 15
DOD Reaction Prior to Secretary of Defense’s April 2009 Announcement ..................... 19
Issues and Options for Congress ................................................................................................... 21
Relative Merits of DDG-51s and Modified DDG-1000s ........................................................ 21
Status of FSC Proposal............................................................................................................ 22
Third DDG-1000..................................................................................................................... 22
Second DDG-1000 .................................................................................................................. 23
One DDG-51 or Two in FY2010............................................................................................. 23
Design of Second and Third DDG-1000s ............................................................................... 23
Design of DDG-51s Procured in FY2010 and Beyond........................................................... 23
Direction Regarding FSC Proposal ......................................................................................... 23
FY2010 Legislative Activity ......................................................................................................... 24
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Figure D-1. Near-Surface Bow Bulb Design for DDG-51 ............................................................ 43
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Table 1. DDG-1000 Program Funding, FY2002-FY2013............................................................... 5
Table 2. Destroyer Procurement Plans .......................................................................................... 13
Table A-1. Congressional Action on FY2009 Funding Request.................................................... 25
Table D-1. DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Annual O&S Costs.............................................................. 44
Table D-2. 1997 Navy Information on DDG-51 Variants ............................................................. 46
Table E-1. CBO Estimates of Costs for Procuring DDG-1000s or DDG-51s.............................. 65
Table G-1. DDG-1000 Capabilities Relative to DDG-51 Capabilities.......................................... 88
Table G-2. Acquisition Costs for DDG-51s and Modified DDG-1000s ...................................... 93
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Table G-3. Annual O&S Costs for a DDG-51 and a Modified DDG-1000.................................. 94
¡ȱ
Appendix A. FY2009 Legislative Activity.................................................................................... 25
Appendix B. Additional Background Information on DDG-1000 Program.................................. 30
Appendix C. Navy Testimony for July 31, 2008, Hearing ........................................................... 34
Appendix D. Ship Design Options ................................................................................................ 39
Appendix E. FY2009 Oversight Issues Relating to Navy’s July 2008 Proposal For
Destroyer Procurement............................................................................................................... 53
Appendix F. Earlier DDG-1000 Oversight Issues for Congress................................................... 69
Appendix G. Comparisons of DDG-1000 and DDG-51............................................................... 83
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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 99
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On April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced a number of Department of
Defense (DOD) decisions regarding DOD’s proposed FY2010 defense budget. Among these was
a decision to end the Navy’s Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyer procurement program at three
ships and restart procurement of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers. Gates’
announcement appeared endorse, to some degree at least, a proposal announced by the Navy on
July 31, 2008, to halt DDG-1000 procurement and restart DDG-51 procurement. Until Gates’
April 6 announcement, OSD publicly had reserved judgment on the Navy’s July 2008 proposal,
stating that further analysis of its merits was needed.
Gates stated on April 6 that DOD’s support for building the all three DDG-1000s was contingent
on the Navy reaching an agreement with its two surface combatant builders – General Dynamics’
bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME, and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB) – to
transfer the second DDG-1000 from NGSB to GD/BIW, so that GD/BIW would be the builder of
all three DDG-1000s. On April 8, it was reported that such an agreement had been reached. As a
result, GD/BIW is to build all three DDG-1000s, NGSB is to build the first two DDG-51s to be
procured under the DDG-51 restart, GD/BIW is to build the DDG-51, and the two firms will then
share in the production of subsequent DDG-51s.
The proposed FY2010 budget will request funding to complete the procurement cost of the third
DDG-1000 (which was authorized but only partially funded in FY2009), and funding to procure
the first DDG-51, to be built by NGSB.1 The FY2011 budget might include funding for two more
DDG-51s, one of which would be built by NGSB, the other by GD/BIW.
Gates’ April 6 announcement left unclear the status of a proposal made by John Young, the DOD
acquisition executive, in memorandum dated January 26, 2009, to begin procuring in FY2012 a
ship called the Future Surface Combatant (FSC) that could be based on either the DDG-51 design
or the DDG-1000 design. If the FSC proposal remains in place as a feature of DOD planning,
then a decision to base the FSC on the DDG-51 would mean that procurement of DDG-51s in
FY2010 and FY2011 would be followed by procurement of modified DDG-51s in FY2012 and
subsequent years, while a decision to base the FSC on the DDG-1000 would mean that
procurement of DDG-51s would cease after FY2011 and procurement of modified DDG-1000s
would begin in FY2012. If the FSC proposal does not remain in place, it would appear that
procurement of DDG-51s of either the current design or a modified design would continue in
FY2012 and subsequent years.
Potential issues for Congress include the following: whether to complete the procurement funding
for a third DDG-1000 in FY2010; whether to fund the procurement of one or two DDG-51s in
FY2010; whether to direct the Navy to build the second and third DDG-1000s to a modified
design featuring additional missile-launch tubes in the place of the DDG-1000’s Advanced Gun
Systems (AGSs); whether to provide direction to DOD regarding the design of DDG-51s
procured in FY2010 and beyond; and whether to provide direction to DOD regarding the FSC
proposal. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could affect future Navy capabilities,
Navy funding requirements, and the shipbuilding industrial base.
1 Source: Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy: General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman Agree on Destroyer Builds,”
InsideDefense.com, April 13, 2009.
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The Navy initiated the DDG-1000 program in the early 1990s under the name DD-21, which
meant destroyer for the 21st Century. In November 2001, the program was restructured and
renamed the DD(X) program, meaning a destroyer whose design was in development. In April
2006, the program’s name was changed again, to DDG-1000, meaning a guided missile destroyer
with the hull number 1000. The first DDG-1000 is to be named the Zumwalt, so the program is
also referred to as the Zumwalt-class program.
The DDG-1000 is a multimission destroyer with an emphasis on naval surface fire support
(NSFS) and operations in littoral (i.e., near-shore) waters. The DDG-1000 was intended in part to
replace, in a technologically more modern form, the large-caliber naval gun fire capability that
the Navy lost when it retired its Iowa-class battleships in the early 1990s.2 The DDG-1000 was
also intended to improve the Navy’s general capabilities for operating in defended littoral waters,
to introduce several new technologies that would be available for use on future Navy ships, and to
serve as the basis for the Navy’s planned next-generation cruiser, called the CG(X).3
The DDG-1000 is to have a reduced-size crew of 142 sailors (compared to roughly 300 on the
Navy’s current destroyers and cruisers) so as reduce its operating and support (O&S) costs. The
ship is to incorporate a significant number of new technologies, including a wave-piercing,
tumblehome hull design for reduced detectability,4 a superstructure made partly of large sections
of composite materials rather than steel or aluminum, an integrated electric-drive propulsion
system,5 a total-ship computing system for moving information about the ship, automation
technologies for the reduced-sized crew, a dual-band radar, a new kind of vertical launch system
(VLS) for storing and firing missiles, and two copies of a 155mm gun called the Advanced Gun
System (AGS). The AGS is to fire a new rocket-assisted 155mm shell, called the Long Range
Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP), to ranges of more than 60 nautical miles. The DDG-1000 can
carry 600 LRLAP rounds (300 for each gun), and additional rounds can be brought aboard the
ship while the guns are firing, creating what Navy officials call an “infinite magazine.”
With an estimated full load displacement of 14,987 tons, the DDG-1000 design is roughly 55%
larger than the Navy’s current 9,500-ton Aegis cruisers and destroyers, and larger than any Navy
destroyer or cruiser since the nuclear-powered cruiser Long Beach (CGN-9), which was procured
in FY1957.
2 The Navy in the 1980s reactivated and modernized four Iowa (BB-61) class battleships that were originally built
during World War II. The ships reentered service between 1982 and 1988 and were removed from service between
1990 and 1992.
3 For more on the CG(X) program, see CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background, Oversight
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
4 A tumblehome hull slopes inward, toward the ship’s centerline, as it rises up from the waterline, in contrast to a
conventional flared hull, which slopes outward as it rises up from the waterline.
5 For more on integrated electric-drive technology, see CRS Report RL30622, Electric-Drive Propulsion for U.S. Navy
Ships: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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The first two DDG-1000s were procured together in FY2007 using split funding (i.e., two-year
incremental funding) in FY2007 and FY2008. The Navy estimated their combined procurement
cost in the FY2009 budget at $6,325 million.
The FY2009 budget estimated the procurement cost of the third DDG-1000 at $2,653 million.
The third DDG-1000 received $150 million in advance procurement funding in FY2008, and the
Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget requested the remaining $2,503 million. The Navy’s proposed
FY2009 budget also requested $51 million in advance procurement funding for a fourth DDG-
1000 to be procured in FY2010.
The FY2010 defense appropriations bill, which was enacted as Division C of H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-
329 of September 30, 2008, a consolidated appropriations bill, provided $1,508.8 million in
FY2009 DDG-1000 procurement funding, reflecting a decision to procure a third DDG-1000 in
FY2009 using split funding (i.e., two-year incremental funding) in FY2009 and FY2010. The
remaining $1 billion or so needed to complete the procurement cost of the third DDG-1000 is
expected to be requested in the FY2010 budget.
H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 rejected the Navy’s request for $51 million in advance procurement
funding to support the procurement of a fourth DDG-1000 in FY2010, and provided $200 million
in advance procurement funding “to preserve the option to restart the DDG-51 class destroyer
program.”
Until July 2007, it was expected that Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB) would be the
final-assembly yard for the first DDG-1000 and that General Dynamic Bath Iron Works
(GD/BIW) would be the final-assembly yard for the second. On July 17 and 18, 2007, it was
reported that the Navy was considering the option of instead assigning the first ship to GD/BIW
and the second to NGSB. On September 25, 2007, the Navy announced that it had decided to
build the first DDG-1000 at GD/BIW, and the second at NGSB. On January 12, 2009, it was
reported that the Navy, NGSB, and GD/BIW in the fall of 2008 began holding discussions on the
idea of having GD/BIW build both the first and second DDG-1000s, in exchange for NGSB
receiving a greater share of the new DDG-51s that would be procured under the Navy’s proposal.6
As mentioned earlier, on April 8, it was reported that the Navy had reached an agreement with
NGSB and GD/BIW to shift the second DDG-1000 to GD/BIW, and to have GD/BIW build all
three ships. NGSB will continue to make certain parts of the three ships, notably their deckhouses
(i.e., superstructures), which are to be made of composite (i.e., fiberglass-like) like material at
NGSB’s composite manufacturing facility at Gulfport, MS.
Table 1 shows DDG-1000 funding through FY2013, as presented in the FY2009 budget. As
discussed in the notes to the table, the table does not show about $1.1 billion in research and
development funding provided for the predecessor DD-21 program from FY1995 through
FY2001, or funding for DDG-1000 research and development costs planned for fiscal years after
FY2013, or $513 million in outfitting and post-delivery costs planned for fiscal years after
FY2013.
As can be seen in the table, when the $1.1 billion in FY1995-FY2001 research and development
costs are included, the DD-21/DD(X)/DDG-1000 program received a total of about $13,385
6 Christopher P. Cavas, “Will Bath Build Second DDG 1000?” Defense News, January 12, 2009: 1, 6.
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million in funding from FY1995 through FY2008. This total includes about $6,911 million in
research and development funding, and about $6,474 million in procurement funding.
As can be seen in the table, the Navy requested $449 million in FY2009 research and
development funding for the DDG-1000 program. This $449 million is included within $679
million that the Navy requested in FY2009 for a line item (i.e., program element, or PE) in the
Navy’s research and development account called “DDG-1000 Total Ship System Engineering”
(PE0604300N, the 100th line item in the account). This line item was previously called “SC-21
Total Ship System Engineering.” Although this line item is named for the DDG-1000 program, it
includes research and development funding for both the DDG-1000 and CG(X) programs. The
other $230 million requested in this line item is for the CG(X) program.7
Based on the figures in the table, when $1.1 billion in FY1995-FY2001 DD-21/DD(X) research
and development costs and $513 million in post-FY2013 outfitting and post-delivery costs are
included, the Navy estimated the total acquisition (i.e., development plus procurement) cost of a
seven-ship DDG-1000 program at about $28.9 billion in then-year dollars, or an average of about
$4.1 billion per ship, not including additional DDG-1000 research and development costs after
FY2013.
7 As discussed in a previous footnote, SC-21 means surface combatant for the 21st Century and refers to the Navy’s pre-
November 2001 SC-21 program to develop a destroyer called the DD-21 (now called the DDG-1000) and an eventual
cruiser called the CG-21 (now called CG(X)).
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Table 1. DDG-1000 Program Funding, FY2002-FY2013
(as shown in FY2009 budget; figures in millions of then-year dollars, rounded to nearest million; totals
may not add due to rounding)
FY02
Total
thru
thru
FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY13
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy (RDTEN) account
DDG-1000a 4549 756 493 449 521 565 326 174 7832
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account
DDG-1000 and
1010
2557
2757 0 0 0 0 0
6325b
DDG-1001
DD/NREb
994
893 0 0 0 0 0 0
1887b
Construction 16
1664
2757 0 0 0 0 0
4437b
DDG-1002
0 0
150
2503 0 0 0 0
2653
DDG-1003
0 0 0 51
2663 0 0 0
2714
DDG-1004
0 0 0 0 51
2377 0 0
2428
DDG-1005
0 0 0 0 0 50
2569 0
2619
DDG-1006
0 0 0 0 0 0 50
2347
2397
Outfitting/post-
0 0 0 0 16 61 87
132
295
delivery costsc
Subtotal SCN
1010 2557 2907 2554 2730 2488 2706 2479 19430
TOTAL
5559 3313 3399 3003 3250 3053 3032 2653 27262
Source: Navy data provided to CRS on May 8, 2008, and July 7, 2007.
a. DDG-1000 portion of Program Element (PE) 0604300N, DDG-1000 Total Ship System Engineering
(previously called SC-21 Total Ship System Engineering). PE0604300N also includes funding the CG(X)
cruiser program. Figures shown do not include $1,111.4 million in RDTEN funding provided for DD-
21/DD(X) program in FY1995-FY2001. Additional RDTEN funding for the DDG-1000 program required
after FY2013. The Navy states that figure for RDTEN for FY2002-FY2006 does not include congressional
adds to PE0604300N during that period; budget-justification documents show about $41 million in such
additional funding in FY2006 and much smaller amounts in FY2002-FY2005.
b. DD/NRE is detailed design/non-recurring engineering costs for the class. In Navy shipbuilding programs,
DD/NRE costs for a class of ships are traditionally included in the procurement cost of the lead ship(s) in
the class.
c. $513 million in additional outfitting/post-delivery costs programmed after FY2013.
Several major technologies developed for the DDG-1000 are to be used on the CG(X) cruiser and
the Navy’s new Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier8 and other future Navy ships, so at least
some portion of the DDG-1000 program’s research and development costs might be viewed as
8 For more on the CVN-78 program, seeCRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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not truly specific to the DDG-1000 program. Based on the figures in the table, when the DDG-
1000 program’s research and development costs are excluded, the Navy estimates the total
procurement cost of a seven-ship DDG-1000 program (including $513 million in post-FY2013
outfitting and post-delivery costs) at about $19.9 billion in then-year dollars, or an average of
about $2.8 billion per ship.
For additional background on the DDG-1000 program, see Appendix B.
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The Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) program was initiated in the late 1970s with the aim of developing
a surface combatant to replace older destroyers and cruisers that were projected to retire in the
1990s. The DDG-51 was conceived as an affordable complement to the Navy’s Ticonderoga (CG-
47) class cruisers that could be procured, under projected budgets at the time, at a sustained
annual rate of five ships per year.
The DDG-51, like the CG-47, is a multimission surface combatant with an emphasis on air
defense (which the Navy refers as anti-air warfare, or AAW) and blue-water (mid-ocean)
operations. DDG-51s, like CG-47s, are equipped with the Aegis combat system, an integrated
ship combat system named for the mythological shield that defended Zeus. CG-47s and DDG-51s
consequently are often referred to as Aegis cruisers and Aegis destroyers, respectively, or
collectively as Aegis ships. The current version of the DDG-51 design, called the Flight IIA
version, has a full load displacement of about 9,500 tons, which is similar to that of the CG-47s.
The first DDG-51 was procured in FY1985, and a total of 62 were procured through FY2005. The
first ship entered service in 1991, a total of 54 were in service as of the end of FY2008, and the
62nd is scheduled to enter service in 2011.
The DDG-51 design has been changed over time to incorporate various improvements. The Flight
IIA design, which was first procured in FY1994, was a significant change that included, among
other things, the addition of a helicopter hangar. The Aegis system installed on new DDG-51s has
been updated several times, with the most recent DDG-51s being built with a version called
Baseline 7.
DDG-51s (and also some CG-47s) are being modified to receive an additional capability for
ballistic missile defense (BMD) operations. The modification for BMD operations includes,
among other things, the addition of a new software program for the Aegis combat system and the
arming of the ship with the SM-3, a version of the Navy’s Standard Missile that is designed for
BMD operations.9
The Navy has initiated a program for modernizing existing DDG-51s so as maintain their mission
and cost effectiveness out to the end of their projected 35-year service lives.10 In August 2008, it
was reported that the Navy had decided to expand the scope of this program to include the
9 For more on Navy BMD programs, CRS Report RL33745, Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense - Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
10 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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installation of a BMD capability, so that every DDG-51 would eventually have a BMD
capability.11
The Navy has studied the option of extending the service lives of DDG-51s from 35 years to 40
years, and assumed a 40-year life for DDG-51s as part of the FY2009 version of its 30-year
shipbuilding plan for maintaining the Navy’s desired 313-ship fleet.12 As of 2008, however, the
Navy had not yet funded a program to perform the additional maintenance work that would be
needed to extend the ships’ lives to 40 years.
Older CRS reports provide additional historical and background information on the DDG-51
program.13
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All cruisers, destroyers, and frigates procured since FY1985 have been built at two shipyards—
General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) in Bath, ME, and the Ingalls shipyard in
Pascagoula, MS, that forms part of Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB).14 Both yards have
long histories of building larger surface combatants. Construction of Navy surface combatants in
recent years has accounted for virtually all of GD/BIW’s ship-construction work and for a
significant share of Ingalls’ ship-construction work. (Ingalls also builds amphibious ships for the
Navy.) Navy surface combatants are overhauled, repaired, and modernized at GD/BIW, NGSB,
other private-sector U.S. shipyards, and government-operated naval shipyards (NSYs).
The Navy informed CRS on March 11, 2008, that a DDG-1000 would require, by Navy estimates,
about 2.5 times as much shipyard labor to build as would be required to build a DDG-51.15 On
April 10, 2008, the Navy clarified that this ratio was based on the number of labor hours that the
Navy estimates will be needed to build the first two DDG-1000s, and that subsequent DDG-
1000s would require smaller amounts of shipyard labor, reducing the ratio for subsequent ships to
something less than 2.5 to 1.16 (The DDG-51 design, in contrast, is already well down its learning
curve and would not decline by a substantial additional amount through additional production.)
Assuming a rate of learning in the DDG-1000 production process that might be typical for a
complex combatant ship, and taking into account the shared production arrangement for the
11 Otto Kreisher, “BMD Boost,” Seapower, August 2008: 12-14. Equipping all DDG-51s with a BMD capability would
substantially expand the current program of record for Navy BMD platforms, which currently calls for 15 DDG-51s
(and 3 Aegis cruisers) to be equipped for BMD operations.
12 For a discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
13 See CRS Report 94-343, Navy DDG-51 Destroyer Procurement Rate: Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke. [April 25, 1994; out of print and available directly from the author], and CRS Report 80-205, The Navy’s
Proposed Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Guided Missile Destroyer Program: A Comparison With An Equal-Cost
Force Of Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Guided Missile Destroyers, by Ronald O’Rourke. [November 21, 1984; out of
print and available directly from the author]
14 NGSB also includes the Avondale shipyard near New Orleans, Newport News Shipbuilding of Newport News, VA,
and a fourth facility, used for manufacturing ship components and structures made from composites, at Gulfport, MS.
15 Source: Navy Office of Legislative Affairs telephone call to CRS on March 11, 2008.
16 Source: Navy briefing to CRS and CBO on April 10, 2008.
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DDG-1000 (see Appendix B for a description of this arrangement), a seventh DDG-1000, for
example, might require roughly 1.7 to 1.9 times as much shipyard labor to build as a baseline
Flight IIA DDG-51. Other calculations based on these factors include the following:
• Procuring roughly 9.3 to 10.3 Flight IIA DDG-51s through FY2013 would
provide roughly as many shipyard labor hours as procuring ships 3 through 7 in
the 7-ship DDG-1000 program of record.
• Assigning 5.1 to 5.7 of those 9.3 to 10.3 Flight IIA DDG-51s to a shipyard would
provide that shipyard with roughly as many shipyard labor hours as it would
receive it were the primary yard for building ships 3, 5, and 7 in the 7-ship DDG-
1000 program of record.
• Assigning 4.2 to 4.6 of those 9.3 to 10.3 Flight IIA DDG-51s to a shipyard would
provide that shipyard with roughly as many shipyard labor hours as it would
receive it were the primary yard for building ships 4 and 6 in the 7-ship DDG-
1000 program of record.
There are multiple options for supplementing DDG-51 construction work at GD/BIW and NGSB
with other forms of work. These options include but are not limited to the following:
• assigning DDG-51 modernizations to the two yards that built the ships—
GD/BIW and the Ingalls yard at Pascagoula, MS, that forms part of Northrop
Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB);
• assigning Aegis cruiser (i.e., CG-47 class) modernizations to the two yards that
built the ships (again, GD/BIW and the Ingalls yard);17
• having GD/BIW participate in the construction of Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs)
that are built to the General Dynamics LCS design;18
• procuring one or more LPD-17s beyond those in the Navy’s shipbuilding plan,
and perhaps have GD/BIW build parts of those ships (similar to how GD/BIW is
currently building parts of LPD-24 for NGSB);19
• procuring additional LHA-type amphibious assault ships, and perhaps have
GD/BIW build parts of those ships;20
• procuring adjunct non-combat radar ships (an option discussed in Appendix D)
and assigning the construction of those ships to GD/BIW and/or NGSB;
17 For more on the Navy’s program for modernizing its existing Aegis ships (both CG-47s and DDG-51s), see CRS
Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.
18 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
19 GD/BIW was originally slated to build 4 of a then-planned class of 12 LPD-17s, and is currently building parts of
LPD-24, the eighth ship in the class. NGSB previously subcontracted parts of other LPD-17s to a shipyard in Texas.
20 For additional discussion of the amphibious lift goal and the numbers of amphibious ships that might be procured to
support that goal, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and
Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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• procuring AGS-armed versions of the basic LPD-17 class hull—another option
that has been suggested for improving the fleet’s NSFS capabilities (see
Appendix D)—and perhaps have GD/BIW builds parts of those ships;
• procuring two new polar icebreakers for the Coast Guard, and assigning
construction of those ships to NGSB and/or GD/BIW;21
• accelerating the procurement of National Security Cutters (NSCs) for the Coast
Guard (NSCs are built at NGSB); and
• having GD/BIW and/or Ingalls participate in the construction of Fast Response
Cutters (FRCs) for the Coast Guard, and perhaps accelerating the procurement of
these ships.22
In addition to total shipyard hours, another factor to consider for maintaining the shipyards is
whether the mix of work being pursued preserves critical ship-construction skills, including
outfitting skills and combat system integration skills. The options listed above for supplementing
DDG-51 construction work would support such skills to varying degrees.
Increasing the scope of work to be performed in the DDG-51 or CG-47 modernization programs
to include configuration changes like those discussed in Appendix D could increase the amount
of work that would be provided by the first two options above.
Procuring additional ships to be built at NGSB could help support GD/BIW, even if GD/BIW
does not share in their production, by permitting a greater share of DDG-51 construction work to
be assigned to GD/BIW while still adequately supporting NGSB.
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Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are generally considered the two leading Navy surface ship radar
makers and combat system integrators. Lockheed is the lead contractor for the DDG-51 combat
system (the Aegis system), while Raytheon is the lead contractor for the DDG-1000 combat
system, the core of which is called the Total Ship Computing Environment Infrastructure (TSCE-
I). Lockheed has a share of the DDG-100 combat system, and Raytheon has a share of the DDG-
51 combat system.
The issue of which kind of destroyer to procure over the next several years has potentially large
business implications for Lockheed and Raytheon, because TSCE-I and an open-architecture
version of the Aegis system23 are both potential candidates for the basis of the open architecture
21 For a discussion of the option of procuring new polar icebreakers for the Coast Guard, see CRS Report RL34391,
Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
The procurement of the Coast Guard’s newest polar icebreaker, Healy (WAGB-20), was funded in FY1990 through the
Navy’s shipbuilding budget (the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy [SCN] appropriation account).
22 For more on the NSC and FRC programs, see CRS Report RL33753, Coast Guard Deepwater Acquisition
Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
23 In general terms, an open architecture combat system is a combat system that uses non-proprietary computers and
software, and can be easily upgraded with new software provided by multiple vendors. The Navy is working with
Lockheed, in part through the Aegis ship modernization program, to evolve the Aegis system, which was not originally
developed as an open architecture combat system, into an open architecture combat system. For more on the Aegis ship
modernization program, see CRS Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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combat system that is to be installed on the Navy’s planned CG(X) cruiser, and the CG(X)’s
combat system in turn might in turn serve as the basis for the open architecture combat systems of
other future Navy surface ships.
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The surface combatant industrial base also includes hundreds of additional firms that supply
materials and components. Many of the suppliers for the DDG-1000 program are not suppliers for
the DDG-51 program, and vice versa. The financial health of Navy shipbuilding supplier firms
has been a matter of concern in recent years, particularly since some of them are the sole sources
for what they make for Navy surface combatants.
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On April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced a number of Department of
Defense (DOD) decisions regarding DOD’s proposed FY2010 defense budget. Among these was
a decision to end the Navy’s Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyer procurement program at three
ships and restart procurement of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers. Gates stated
that the FY2010 budget request
will include funds to complete the buy of two navy destroyers in FY10. These plans depend
on being able to work out contracts to allow the Navy to efficiently build all three DDG-
1000 class ships at Bath Iron Works in Maine and to smoothly restart the DDG-51 Aegis
Destroyer program at Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls shipyard in Mississippi. Even if these
arrangements work out, the DDG-1000 program would end with the third ship and the DDG-
51 would continue to be built in both yards.
If our efforts with industry are unsuccessful, the department will likely build only a single
prototype DDG-1000 at Bath and then review our options for restarting production of the
DDG-51. If the department is left to pursue this alternative, it would unfortunately reduce
our overall procurement of ships and cut workload in both shipyards.24
Gates’ announcement appears to endorse, to some degree at least, a proposal announced by the
Navy on July 31, 2008, to halt DDG-1000 procurement and restart DDG-51 procurement (see
section below). Until Gates’ April 6 announcement, OSD publicly had reserved judgment on the
Navy’s July 2008 proposal, stating that further analysis of its merits was needed.
As shown in the quoted passage above, Gates stated that DOD’s support for building the all three
DDG-1000s was contingent on the Navy reaching an agreement with its two surface combatant
builders – General Dynamics’ bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME, and Northrop Grumman
Shipbuilding (NGSB) – to transfer the second DDG-1000 from NGSB to GD/BIW, so that
GD/BIW would be the builder of all three DDG-1000s. As a result, GD/BIW is to build all three
DDG-1000s, NGSB is to build the first two DDG-51s to be procured under the DDG-51 restart,
GD/BIW is to build the DDG-51, and the two firms will then share in the production of
subsequent DDG-51s.
24 Opening remarks of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at an April 6, 2009, news conference on DOD decisions
regarding DOD’s proposed FY2010 defense budget.
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The proposed FY2010 budget will request funding to complete the procurement cost of the third
DDG-1000 (which was authorized but only partially funded in FY2009), and funding to procure
the first DDG-51, to be built by NGSB. The FY2011 budget might include funding for two more
DDG-51s, one of which would be built by NGSB, the other by GD/BIW.
Gates’ April 6 announcement left unclear the status of a proposal made by John Young, the DOD
acquisition executive, in memorandum dated January 26, 2009, to begin procuring in FY2012 a
ship called the Future Surface Combatant (FSC) that could be based on either the DDG-51 design
or the DDG-1000 design. If the FSC proposal remains in place as a feature of DOD planning,
then a decision to base the FSC on the DDG-51 would mean that procurement of DDG-51s in
FY2010 and FY2011 would be followed by procurement of modified DDG-51s in FY2012 and
subsequent years, while a decision to base the FSC on the DDG-1000 would mean that
procurement of DDG-51s would cease after FY2011 and procurement of modified DDG-1000s
would begin in FY2012. If the FSC proposal does not remain in place, it would appear that
procurement of DDG-51s of either the current design or a modified design would continue in
FY2012 and subsequent years.
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An April 8, 2009, press report on the Navy’s agreement to have GD/BIW build all three DDG-
1000s stated:
The agreement means all three DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyers will be built at the
General Dynamics Bath Iron Works shipyard at Bath, Maine. Northrop Grumman, which at
one time was the lead yard on the DDG 1000 program, will instead receive construction
contracts for more DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to be built at its Ingalls shipyard
in Pascagoula, Miss.
According to one source familiar with the negotiations, Northrop also would become the lead
yard for the restart of the DDG 51 program and become the planning yard for future
development of the design. The Bath shipyard currently is the lead yard for the DDG 51
program. That element of the agreement, however, couldn’t be quickly confirmed by Defense
News, and the Navy declined to provide details of the agreement.
Northrop also would continue to build the composite-structure deckhouse for all the
Zumwalt-class ships at its facility in Gulfport, Miss....
The Navy and its shipbuilders have been in negotiations over the swap since last fall.
Northrop, which in addition to destroyers builds Coast Guard cutters and three classes of
amphibious ships at the Ingalls shipyard, has had production problems with several of its
programs. The Bath yard is building only DDG 51-class destroyers and is eager to build the
DDG 1000s. Most observers felt the proposed swap was a reasonable reallocation of
resources that would benefit both shipyards and provide the Navy with cost savings.
Northrop, wary of giving up too much, held out for more favorable terms, which apparently
have been agreed to.
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“No shipyard would accept a deal that was unpalatable,” said the source familiar with the
negotiations. “It had to work for everybody.”25
An April 9, 2009, press report on the agreement stated:
Northrop Grumman, which had expected to build one of the DDG-1000 destroyers at its
shipyard in Mississippi, will contribute major components for each of the vessels. It will also
receive contracts for two other destroyers as the Navy restarts production of an earlier
model....
Military officials said the precise financial arrangements still needed to be worked out....
Under the plan, Northrop Grumman will restart production of the DDG-51, also known as
the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, at its Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, Miss., and build the
first two ships. General Dynamics will build the third once it completes work on the DDG-
1000s at the Bath Iron Works. Officials said it was likely that the companies would split any
subsequent orders through some type of competitive bidding.26
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The following discussion of the Navy’s position on destroyer procurement is based primarily on
the Navy’s prepared statement for, and spoken testimony at, the July 31, 2008, hearing on
destroyer procurement before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee.27
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How many DDG-51s does the Navy want to procure?
Table 2 shows (in the upper half) the program of record for destroyer procurement from the
FY2009 budget submission and (in the lower half) the Navy’s July 31, 2008 proposal for
destroyer procurement. The table also shows planned procurement of CG(X) cruisers.
25 Christopher P. Cavas, “All DDG 1000 Construction To Move To Bath,” DefenseNews.com, April 8, 2009.
26 Christopher Drew, “Contractors Agree On Deal To Build Stealth Destroyer,” New York Times, April 9, 2009.
27 Statement of Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and
Resources, and Ms. Allison Stiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Ship Programs), before the Subcommittee
on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces of the House Armed Services Committee, on Surface Combatant Requirements
and Acquisition Strategies, July 31, 2008, 11 pp., and the spoken remarks of McCullough and Stiller, as reflected in the
transcript of the hearing.
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Table 2. Destroyer Procurement Plans
(FY2007-FY2017)
07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Program of record from FY2009 budget submission
DDG-51
DDG-1000 2a 1 1 1 1 1
CG(X)
1 1 1 2 2 2
Navy’s proposed new plan, based on Navy’s July 31 testimony
DDG-51
1 2 1 2 1 1 ? ?
DDG-1000 2a
1b
CG(X)
1?
Sources: FY2009 budget submission; Navy testimony at July 31, 2008, hearing before Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of House Armed Services Committee; August 18, 2008, letters from OSD
and the Navy to Congress; and press reports.
a. Two ships procured in FY2007 using split funding (incremental funding) in FY2007 and FY2008.
b. The Navy indicated at the July 31 hearing that for FY2009, it would prefer to procure a DDG-51 rather
than a third DDG-1000. On August 18, 2008, however, OSD and the Navy informed Congress that OSD
has directed the Navy to support the procurement of a third DDG-1000 in FY2009.
As shown in the table, the Navy on July 31, 2008, proposed procuring a total of eight DDG-51s in
the period FY2010-FY2015, in annual quantities of 1-2-1-2-1-1. The Navy testified at the July 31
hearing that this is the profile the service has proposed to OSD for approval as part of the process
for preparing the Navy’s part of the proposed DOD FY2010-FY2015 Future Years Defense Plan
(FYDP) to be submitted to Congress in early 2009.
The Navy indicated at the July 31, 2008, hearing that for FY2009, it would prefer to procure a
DDG-51 rather than a third DDG-1000. Procuring a DDG-51 in FY2009 would, under the Navy’s
proposal, make for a total of nine DDG-51s in the period FY2009-FY2015. On August 18, 2008,
however, OSD and the Navy informed Congress that OSD had directed the Navy to support the
procurement of a third DDG-1000 in FY2009.28 The Navy testified on July 31 that it remained
28 Letters dated August 18, 2008, from Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Honorable Edward M.
Kennedy; and from Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy, to the Honorable Carl Levin, both posted on the Internet
at InsideDefense.com (subscription required) on August 19, 2008. England’s letter to Senator Kennedy states in
part:The Navy has been directed to ensure that its proposed plan will complete construction of the [two] DDG 1000
ships currently under contract and conform to the President’s FY 2009 budget submission by executing the third DDG
1000. This plan will provide stability of the industrial base and continue the development of advanced surface ships
technologies such as radar systems, stealth, magnetic and acoustic quieting, and automated damage control. Further, the
Navy has proposed to reprogram funds to support additional DDG 51 spare assets in FY 2009 and related planning
activities. The Navy proposal, that has been approved, will provide the dual benefits of buying spares at an economical
price while also protecting future options for restarting DDG 51 production. Winter’s letter to Senator Levin contains
similar language. See also Zachary m. Peterson, “In Reversal of Intentions, Navy Now Says It Wants Third DDG-
1000,” InsideDefense.com, August 19, 2008 (also published in the August 25, 2008 issue of Inside the Navy); Emelie
Rutherford, “Navy Now Wants A Third DDG-1000 Next Year,” Defense Daily, August 20, 2008; Bettina H. Chavanne,
“U.S. Navy to Pursue Funding for a Third DDG-1000,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, August 20, 2008: 4; Philip
(continued...)
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ready to execute construction of a third DDG-1000, should a third DDG-1000 be funded in
FY2009.
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What version of the DDG-51 does the Navy want to procure?
The Navy testified at the July 31, 2008, that the DDG-51s it wants to procure in coming years
would be Flight IIA ships equipped with a version of the Aegis combat system that is the same as
the one that existing DDG-51s will receive under the DDG-51 modernization program—a version
called the Advanced Capability Build (ACB) 12. As mentioned earlier, in August 2008, it was
reported that the Navy has decided to expand the scope of the DDG-51 modernization program to
include the installation of a BMD capability, so that every DDG-51 would eventually have a
BMD capability.29 ACB 12 includes the BMD capability. It is apparently on this basis that the
Navy testified at the July 31 hearing that the new DDG-51s that would be built under its proposal
would be BMD-capable.
In describing the DDG-51’s capabilities at the July 31, 2008, hearing, the Navy stated that the
ship’s ASW equipment included, among other things, a towed array sonar. A towed array sonar
was part of the Flight I and Flight II DDG-51 designs, but was removed from the Flight IIA
design. The suggestion from the Navy’s testimony is that the new Flight IIA ships that the Navy
wants to procure would include a towed array sonar.
CRS testimony at the July 31 hearing discussed several options for modifying the design of the
DDG-51s that would be procured under the Navy’s proposal so as to reduce the ships’ O&S costs,
or equip each ship with an AGS or additional missile-launch tubes or an improved radar.30 The
Navy’s testimony at the July 31 hearing indicated that the Navy is not contemplating procuring
DDG-51s with such design modifications.
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What would the new DDG-51s cost to procure?
The Navy’s prepared statement for the July 31, 2008, hearing states:
Given the truncation of the DDG 1000 program at two ships, the Navy estimate for
procurement of a single DDG 51 class ship in FY 2009 is $2.2 billion. This estimate utilizes
the latest audited Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRAs) rates. Impacts for [DDG-51]
production line restart and contractor furnished equipment/government furnished equipment
(...continued)
Ewing, “Lawmaker: Third DDG 1000 Far From Done Deal,” NavyTiomes.com, August 21, 2008; Rebekah Gordon,
“Navy’s DDG-1000 Move Pleases Industry Stakeholders, Lawmakers,” Inside the Navy, August 25, 2008.
29 Otto Kreisher, “BMD Boost,” Seapower, August 2008: 12-14. Equipping all DDG-51s with a BMD capability would
substantially expand the current program of record for Navy BMD platforms, which currently calls for 15 DDG-51s
(and 3 Aegis cruisers) to be equipped for BMD operations.
30 Statement of Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service, before the House
Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces hearing on Surface Combatant
Warfighting Requirements and Acquisition Strategy, July 31, 2008, pp. 2-11.
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obsolescence are included. The Navy has not finalized the acquisition strategy for a FY 2009
DDG 51 and follow-on procurements.31
Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), in a letter to Senator Edward
Kennedy dated May 7, 2008, stated that:
without firm contracts for future ships of either [the DDG-1000 or DDG-51] class, we are
only able to provide a best estimate of the costs we would incur in either of these programs.
Since we are phasing out production of the DDG 51 class, there would be start-up costs
associated with returning this line to production. As a result, the estimated end cost to
competitively procure a lead DDG-51 (Flight IIa—essentially a repeat of the final ships
currently undergoing construction) in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 assuming a truncation of the
DDG 1000 class after the two lead ships would be either $2.2B for a single ship or $3.5B for
two lead ships (built at competing production yards). This estimate is based on a Profit
Related to Offer (PRO) acquisition strategy. The average cost of subsequent DDG 51 Flight
IIa class ships would be about $1.8B (FY09) per ship compared to the $2.6B estimated cost
of subsequent DDG 1000 class ships.32
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that, in constant FY2009 dollars, DDG-51s
would cost about $2.3 billion each if procured at a rate of one per year, and about $1.9 billion
each if procured at a rate of two per year.33 CBO’s estimates, unlike the Navy’s, include outfitting
and post-delivery for the ships. Excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs from CBO’s
estimates to make them more directly comparable to the Navy’s estimates would reduce CBO’s
estimates at the margin, but not dramatically.
¢Ȃȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ
Why did the Navy change its position on destroyer procurement?
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The Navy testified that it has changed its position on destroyer procurement primarily because of
a recent change in its assessment of likely future threats to Navy forces. This change in the threat
assessment, Navy officials testified, led to a corresponding change in capability requirements for
Navy destroyers to be procured over the next few years.
The Navy testified that, over the last two years, its assessment of threats posed by ballistic
missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and modern non-nuclear-powered submarines
operating in blue waters has increased. The Navy’s prepared statement and spoken testimony at
the July 31, 2008, hearing include multiple references to ballistic missiles, ASCMs (including the
31 Statement of Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and
Resources, and Ms. Allison Stiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Ship Programs), before the Subcommittee
on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces of the House Armed Services Committee, on Surface Combatant Requirements
and Acquisition Strategies, July 31, 2008, p. 8.
32 Source: Letter dated May 7, 2008, from Admiral G. Roughead to the Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, posted on the
Internet at InsideDefense.com (subscription required) on May 30, 2008.
33 Statement of Eric J. Labs, Senior Analyst, [on] The Navy’s Surface Combatant Programs before the Subcommittee
on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, July 31, 2008,
Table 2 on p. 7.
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proliferation of ASCMs to non-state actors such as the Hezbollah organization)34, and modern
non-nuclear-powered submarines capable of blue-water operations.35 The Navy also testified that
it now believes it has more than enough capacity, as a result aircraft-delivered precision-guided
munitions and Tomahawk cruise missiles, to meet requirements for providing fire support for
forces ashore.
Navy officials testified that, as a result its changed threat assessment, the Navy now needs to use
destroyer procurement over the next several years to improve the fleet’s capabilities for BMD,
area-defense AAW, 36 and blue-water antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Navy officials testified that
while the DDG-1000 is well-suited for NSFS and for operations in littoral waters, it is not capable
of area-defense AAW or BMD operations, and its sonar system is not optimized for blue-water
ASW operations. The DDG-51 design, they testified, is capable of BMD and area-defense AAW
operations, and its sonar is optimized for blue-water ASW operations. Consequently, the Navy
testified, the DDG-51 is better suited than the DDG-1000 for meeting the Navy’s changed
capability requirements for destroyers to be procured over the next several years. Navy officials
testified at the July 31, 2008, that modifying the DDG-1000 design to make it capable of BMD,
area-defense AAW, and blue-water ASW operations “is unaffordable from the Navy’s
standpoint.”
The Navy’s assertion at the July 31, 2008, hearing that the DDG-1000 would not be capable of
area-defense AAW operations came as a surprise to some observers, because it appeared to
contradict prior Navy descriptions of the DDG-1000’s capabilities. The Navy appeared to back
away from this assertion in its testimony at an April 2009 hearing on shipbuilding issues.37
¢ȱ
Although the Navy at one point in its spoken testimony stated that affordability was not a factor
behind its new position—its proposal to build DDG-51s rather than DDG-1000s is intended to be
roughly budget-neutral over the period FY2010-FY2015—cost considerations appear to have
played some role in the Navy’s thinking:
• The Navy testified that “production costs of DDG 51s are known,” that “the costs
associated with DDG 51 class shipbuilding are well understood,” and that the
procurement cost of the DDG-51 is “quantifiable.” The Navy did not make the
same statements about the DDG-1000. This suggests that the Navy believes that
34 The Hezbollah organization fired a Chinese-made C-802 ASCM at an Israeli corvette in July 2006, killing four
sailors and damaging the ship.
35 For a press article discussing what adversary weapons the changed threat environment might include, see Christopher
P. Cavas, “Missile Threat Helped Drive DDG Cut,” Defense News, August 4, 2008: 1.
36 An area-defense AAW system is capable of defending not only the ship on which it is installed, but other ships in the
area as well. An AAW system capable of defending only the ship on which it is installed is referred to as a point-
defense AAW system. Area-defense AAW systems generally can intercept aircraft and antis-ship cruise missiles at
longer ranges than point-defense AAW systems. U.S. Navy ships need to be able to use the SM-2 interceptor to be
considered capable of area-defense AAW operations. Navy ships that can fire only shorter-ranged interceptors, such as
the Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) or the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), are considered capable of point-
defense AAW operations only. The Navy testified on July 31 that the DDG-1000 as currently design cannot
successfully employ the SM-2.
37 Prepared statement and spoken testimony of Rear Admiral Bernard McCullough, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Integration of Capabilities and Resources, at an April 1, 2009 hearing on Navy shipbuilding before the Defense
subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee.
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the procurement cost of the DDG-51 is known with better confidence than the
procurement cost of the DDG-1000, and that procuring DDG-51s would
consequently pose less risk of cost growth than procuring DDG-51s.
• The Navy’s testimony also makes reference to having enough “capacity” to meet
regional combatant commander demands for surface combatants for maintaining
day-to-day forward deployments and participating in engagement activities with
other countries. “Capacity” is a term usually used to refer to the quantity of
something (as opposed to “capability,” which usually refers to the kinds of things
that something can do). The Navy’s use of the term “capacity” suggests that the
service has concluded that procuring DDG-51s instead of DDG-1000s will
permit the Navy to procure a larger number of destroyers over the next several
years.
• As mentioned above, the Navy testified that the option of modifying the DDG-
1000 design so as to give it a capability for BMD and area-defense AAW, and to
improve its capability for blue-water ASW, “is unaffordable from the Navy’s
standpoint.”
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Although the Navy did not say so at the July 31 hearing, developments in the CG(X) program
may be an additional factor behind the Navy’s decision to change its position on destroyer
procurement. The Navy originally wanted to use the DDG-1000 hull design as the basis for the
CG(X) design, because doing so would minimize CG(X) hull-design costs and take advantage of
the DDG-1000 production learning curve to reduce recurring CG(X) production costs. The
potential for reusing the DDG-1000 hull in the CG(X) program was one of the Navy’s arguments
in previous years for moving ahead with DDG-1000 procurement. It no longer appears, however,
that the Navy intends to use the DDG-1000 hull as the best hull design for the CG(X).38 If the
Navy no longer considers the DDG-1000 hull as the best hull design for the CG(X), that might
have removed a reason for the Navy to support continued procurement of the DDG-1000.
In addition, as mentioned earlier, the date for procuring the lead CG(X) reportedly may be
deferred to about FY2017. The CG(X) is intended to provide the fleet with improved AAW and
BMD capabilities. If the date for procuring the lead CG(X) has slipped several years, this may
have made it more necessary in the minds of Navy leaders to use procurement of destroyers over
the next few years to begin achieving that goal. If the scheduled date for procuring the lead
CG(X) had remained FY2011, the Navy might have deemed it acceptable to procure two more
DDG-1000s in FY2009 and FY2010 before switching to CG(X) procurement the following year,
38 A July 2, 2008, letter from John Young, the DOD acquisition executive (the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), to Representative Gene Taylor, the chairman of the Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, stated: “I agree that the Navy’s
preliminary design analysis for the next-generation cruiser indicates that, for the most capable radar suites under
consideration [for the CG(X)], the DDG-1000 [hull design] cannot support the radar.” (Letter dated July 2, 2008 from
John Young to Representative Taylor, p. 1.) In addition, the CG(X) may be a nuclear-powered ship, and it is not clear
that the DDG-1000 can accommodate one-half of the twin-reactor plant that the Navy has designed for its new Gerald
R. Ford (CVN-78) class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. If the DDG-1000 hull cannot accommodate one-half of the
Ford-class plant, then the Navy might have judged that designing a new hull for the CG(X) that can accommodate one-
half of the Ford-class plant would cost less or pose less technical risk than designing a new reactor plant that can fit into
the DDG-1000 hull. (For more on the CVN-78 program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class
Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.)
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even if the capabilities of those two additional DDG-1000s were not optimized for the Navy’s
stated new mission priorities. In addition, the Navy might have viewed the up-front cost of
restarting the DDG-51 production line as not worth the effort, if only two or three DDG-51s were
to be procured in FY2009 and FY2010 before switching over to the CG(X) in FY2011. In the
context of a deferral of the lead CG(X) to FY2017, however, the Navy was presented with the
prospect of several more years of destroyer production before switching to procurement of the
CG(X). This created the prospect of procuring several additional DDG-1000s with capabilities
not optimized for the Navy’s stated new mission priorities. In addition, it created the prospect that
the up-front costs of restarting the DDG-51 production line could be amortized over eight or more
DDG-51s, as opposed to two or three.
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An August 31, 2008 press report based on remarks made by Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of
Naval Operations, states:
The Navy took the unusual step of abruptly canceling construction of its expensive new class
of destroyers last month because the ships lack abilities that top commanders believe are
necessary to protect U.S. interests, according to the service’s senior officer.
Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations, said the DDG-1000 Zumwalt class
destroyer does not have crucial missile and air defense capabilities and defending it against
submarines would be difficult. The last [i.e., third] ship in the class will cost $2.6 billion.
“I started looking at the DDG-1000. It has a lot of technology, but it cannot perform broader,
integrated air and missile defense,” Roughead said in his first interview since the
controversial move to cancel the destroyer program....
The Zumwalt class was designed to operate in coastal waters close to shore, but the Navy is
developing a less costly ship39 for that.
Roughead also noted that design compromises resulted in the removal of some of its
torpedoes, making it more vulnerable to submarines.
“Submarines can get very close, and it does not have the ability to take on that threat,”
Roughead said.
The destroyer was originally designed as a ship that could move close to shore and fire its
guns in support of ground forces. But Roughead said there is little call for the Navy to fire
guns on shore.
“If you go back, from the end of Vietnam to our present time, we have only shot about a
thousand bullets [from naval guns],” he said. “And I look at the world and I see proliferation
of missiles, I see proliferation of submarines. And that is what we have to deal with.”
The Zumwalt class is also designed to be difficult for enemy radar to detect. But Roughead
said the Navy was evaluating questions about that technology.
39 This is an apparent reference to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
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Correcting the air defense shortcomings would add billions of dollars to its cost, he said,
making it prudent instead to build more of the previous-generation DDG-51 Arleigh Burke
class destroyers. Additional models of the Arleigh Burke would cost about $1.8 billion
apiece....
Roughead said the first two Zumwalt destroyers would help demonstrate the capabilities and
problems of new technology in the ship, including its hull design and innovations designed
to reduce the number of sailors needed to operate it.
But he was less enthusiastic about building a third ship. The Navy agreed to the additional
vessel because money was already in the current budget proposal, he said.
“It will be another ship with which to demonstrate the technologies,” he said. “But it still will
lack the capabilities that I think will be in increased demand in the future.”...
The Navy, which has 280 ships, is pushing for a 313-ship fleet, but shipbuilding problems
are an obstacle.
Roughead said that shifting production from the Zumwalt to the Arleigh Burke class would
allow him to build three more vessels.
“I am doing everything I can to increase the capability and capacity of the fleet,” Roughead
said. “Shipbuilding dominates my thinking.”40
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Prior to Secretary Gates’ April 2009 announcement, how did DOD react to the Navy’s July 31,
2008, proposal?
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At a July 22, 2008, meeting between senior OSD and Navy officials, OSD agreed to allow the
Navy to brief to Congress the Navy’s proposal to stop DDG-1000 procurement and restart DDG-
51 procurement, but did not grant its approval for the proposal. John Young, the DOD acquisition
executive (the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), reserved
judgment on the Navy’s proposal at the time, stating on July 24 that “more analysis and
40 Julian E. Barnes, “Navy Cancels New Destroyers,” Los Angeles Times, August 31, 2008.
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discussion was necessary before there was agreement.”41 Young reiterated this position in remarks
to reporters at the end of October 2008.42
An August 18, 2008, letters from Gordon England to Senator Kennedy, and from Donald Winter
to Senator Levin, both state in part:
The way ahead for [destroyer procurement in] FY2010 and beyond will of course be
determined by the Department’s [i.e., DOD’s] continuing assessment of existing and
evolving threats, ensuring that it delivers those capabilities best suited to meet our national
security needs both now and in the foreseeable future. This will include, but not be limited
to, defense against missile threats and the challenging requirement to operate in littoral
environments. As the Department [of Defense] develops its FY 2010-2015 budget, all of
these considerations will be weighed to ensure we build the right Navy for the future.43
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An October 6, 2008, press report stated that:
Another blow was struck last month to the U.S. Navy’s embattled DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class
advanced destroyer program when a top-level Pentagon review board agreed to eliminate the
operational requirements for the ship.
No official decision was reached during the Sept. 18 meeting of the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC), but uniformed sources said a memorandum was drafted to reflect
cancellation of the requirements, which justify the need for a particular weapon program....
Marine Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, chaired the Sept.
18 meeting, which reportedly was attended by about 60 officers and officials. Along with the
vice chairman, the four vice chiefs of the military services fill out the JROC membership.44
41 See, for example, Tony Capaccio, “U.S. Navy Confirms Plans to Curtail Construction of Destroyers,” Bloomberg
News, July 24, 2008; Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy Admits Plan to Truncate DDG-1000 At Two Hulls As DOD
Hedges,” Inside the Navy, July 28, 2008; Christopher P. Cavas, “DDG Question Remains Open in Congress, DoD,”
Defense News, July 28, 2008: 4; and Emelie Rutherford, “Pentagon Seeks Info On Navy Destroyer Shift, Senators
Suggest Holding Funds,” Defense Daily, July 28, 2008.Earlier in this decade, Young was the Navy’s acquisition
executive (the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition), during which time he was
a principal figure in restructuring the DD-21 program into the DD(X) program and in defending the DD(X) program
against various criticisms. Since April 2008, Young has publicly defended the DDG-1000 program and expressed
skepticism about the cost effectiveness of stopping DDG-1000 procurement and restarting DDG-51 procurement. (See,
for example, Bettina H. Chavanne, “Pentagon Acquisition Chief’s memo Points to Value of DDG-1000,” Aerospace
Daily & Defense Report, July 29, 2008.)
42 See Andrea Shalal-Esa, “More Analysis Needed on Destroyer—Pentagon,” Reuters, October 30, 2008; Geoff Fein,
“More Analysis Needs To Be Done Before Deciding On Path Ahead For DDG-1000, Young Says,” Defense Daily,
October 31, 2008; Zachary M. Peterson, “DOD Acquisition Czar: Future Destroyer Plan Needs More Analysis,” Inside
the Navy, November 3, 2008.
43 Letters dated August 18, 2008, from Gordon England to the Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, and from Donald C.
Winter to the Honorable Carl Levin.
44 Christopher P. Cavas, “DDG 1000 Takes Another Hit—From JROC,” Defense News, October 6, 2008: 4.
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A January 26, 2009, memorandum for the record from John Young, the DOD acquisition
executive, stated that “The Navy proposed and OSD [the Office of the Secretary of Defense]
agreed with modification to truncate the DDG-1000 Program to three ships in the FY 2010 budget
submission.” The memo proposed procuring one DDG-51 in FY2010 and two more FY2011,
followed by the procurement in FY2012-FY2015 (in annual quantities of 1, 2, 1, 2) of a ship
called the Future Surface Combatant (FSC) that could be based on either the DDG-51 design or
the DDG-1000 design. The memorandum stated that the FSC might be equipped with a new type
of radar, but the memorandum did not otherwise specify the FSC’s capabilities. The
memorandum stated that further analysis would support a decision on whether to base the FSC on
the DDG-51 design or the DDG-1000 design.
Secretary Gates’ announcement of April 6, 2009 did not explicitly address the proposal for an
FSC discussed in the January 26, 2009, memorandum. Gates’ stated on April 6 that “the DDG-
1000 program would end with the third ship,” but depending on how the term “DDG-1000
program” is defined, that statement may or may not preclude the option of an FSC based on the
DDG-1000 design.45
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The situation regarding destroyer procurement following Secretary Gates’ April 2009
announcement poses several potential issues and options for Congress, including those discussed
below.
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One potential oversight issue for Congress in FY2010 concerns the merits of DOD’s decision to
stop DDG-1000 procurement and restart DDG-51 procurement, compared to an alternative of
continuing DDG-1000 procurement while modifying the DDG-1000 design to align its
capabilities more closely with the Navy’s revised mission priorities. As stated earlier, the Navy
testified at the July 31, 2008, hearing that modifying the DDG-1000 design so as to give it a
capability for BMD and area-defense AAW, and to improve its capability for blue-water ASW, “is
unaffordable from the Navy’s standpoint.” Although the Navy stated at the hearing that it had
performed an analysis to support its proposal for stopping DDG-1000 procurement and restarting
DDG-51 procurement, the Navy has not made public its detailed data on the comparative costs,
capabilities, and technical and schedule risks of restarting DDG-51 procurement vs. modifying
the DDG-1000 design and procuring modified DDG-1000s. As also stated earlier, the Navy in
April 2009 testimony appears to have backed away from its July 2008 argument that the DDG-
1000 will not be capable of area-defense AAW, leaving BMD and open-ocean ASW as the two
areas for which the DDG-1000 would appear to need design modifications to better align it with
the Navy’s revised mission priorities. Information on the relative capabilities of the DDG-51 and
45 Memorandum for the record dated January 26, 2009, from John Young, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics), entitled “DDG 1000 Program Way Ahead,” posted on InsideDefense.com (subscription
required).
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DDG-1000 designs is presented in Appendix G. Information on potential modifications to the
DDG-1000 design (and also the DDG-51 design) is presented in Appendix D.
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A second potential issue for Congress in FY2010 concerns the status of the proposal in the DOD
acquisition executive’s memorandum of January 26, 2009, for procuring in FY2012 and
subsequent years a ship called the Future Surface Combatant (FSC) that could be based on either
the DDG-51 design or the DDG-1000 design.
As mentioned earlier, Secretary Gates’ announcement of April 6, 2009 did not explicitly address
the FSC proposal. Gates’ stated on April 6 that “the DDG-1000 program would end with the third
ship,” but depending on how the term “DDG-1000 program” is defined, that statement may or
may not preclude the option of an FSC based on the DDG-1000 design.
If the FSC proposal remains in place as a feature of DOD planning, then a decision to base the
FSC on the DDG-51 would mean that procurement of DDG-51s in FY2010 and FY2011 would
be followed by procurement of modified DDG-51s in FY2012 and subsequent years, while a
decision to base the FSC on the DDG-1000 would mean that procurement of DDG-51s would
cease after FY2011 and procurement of modified DDG-1000s would begin in FY2012. Potential
features for the FSC could include some of the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 design options presented
in Appendix D. If the FSC proposal does not remain in place, it would appear that procurement
of DDG-51s of either the current design or a modified design would continue in FY2012 and
subsequent years.
For Congress, a potential question is when DOD plans to clarify whether the FSC proposal
remains in place following Secretary Gates’ April 2009 announcement.
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A third issue for Congress in FY2010 is whether to complete the procurement funding for the
third DDG-1000 in FY2010. As mentioned earlier, the proposed FY2010 budget is expected to
request the $1 billion or so needed to complete the ship’s estimated procurement cost. Potential
options for Congress include approving the Navy’s funding request; approving part of the request
and deferring the rest of the ship’s procurement cost to one or more future fiscal years; and
rejecting the request, canceling the ship, and rescinding the ship’s prior-year procurement
funding.
In considering this issue, Congress may consider a number of factors, including the operational
value of a third DDG-1000, the potential funding impact on other defense programs of deferring
some of the third DDG-1000’s procurement cost to one or more future fiscal years, the potential
operational benefits of spending the third DDG-1000’s procurement funding on other defense
programs (or to cover any construction cost overruns on the first DDG-1000s), and the industrial-
base impact of not building a third DDG-1000. Congress’ consideration of this issue could relate
to its consideration of whether to procure two DDG-51s in FY2010 rather than the one that is
expected to be included in the Navy’s proposed FY2010 budget (see section below). Congress’
consideration of this issue might also be related to its consideration of whether to direct the Navy
to build the third DDG-1000 (and also the second) to a modified configuration that replaces the
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ship’s two Advanced Gun Systems (AGSs) with additional missile-launch tubes (see section
below).
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A fourth potential issue for Congress is whether to continue with the construction of the second
DDG-1000, or alternatively cancel the ship and rescind its funding. Canceling the second ship
could be related to a decision to cancel the third ship as well. Under such a scenario, only one
DDG-1000 would be built, in part as a technology demonstrator, although the ship would be an
operational asset as well. In considering this issue, potential factors to consider would include the
cost, operational, and industrial-base impact of building one DDG-1000 rather than two or three.
Congress’ consideration of this issue might also be related to its consideration of whether to direct
the Navy to build the second DDG-1000 (and also the third) to a modified configuration that
replaces the ship’s two Advanced Gun Systems (AGSs) with additional missile-launch tubes (see
section below).
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A fifth potential issue for Congress in FY2010 is whether to fund the procurement of two DDG-
51s in FY2010, rather than the one that is expected to be included in the Navy’s proposed
FY2010 budget. In considering this issue, Congress may consider several factors, including the
cost, operational value, and industrial-base impact of procuring a second DDG-51 in FY2010
while perhaps also canceling the procurement of a third DDG-1000.
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A sixth potential issue for Congress in FY2010 is whether to direct the Navy to build the second
and third DDG-1000s to a design featuring additional missile-launch tubes in the place of the
current DDG-1000 design’s Advanced Gun Systems (AGSs). In considering this option, potential
factors to consider include cost of conducting the necessary ship redesign work, the impact on the
ships’ procurement cost, the operational impact of the resulting improvement in the ships’ area-
defense AAW, ASW, and strike capabilities (by being able to store and fire additional SM-2
missiles, anti-submarine rockets [ASROCs], and Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles), and the
operational impact of the resulting reduction in the ships’ naval surface fire support (NSFS)
capabilities.
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A seventh potential issue for Congress is whether to provide direction to the Navy regarding the
design of DDG-51s procured in FY2010 and beyond. Some potential modifications to the current
DDG-51 design are discussed in Appendix D.
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An eighth potential issue for Congress is whether to provide direction to the Navy regarding the
FSC proposal (if it remains in place following Secretary Gates’ April 2009 announcement). Such
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direction could pertain to whether the proposal should be retained or dropped, to the design of the
FSC, or to the acquisition strategy to be followed in procuring the ship.
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The proposed FY2010 defense budget is expected to be submitted to Congress in early May.
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Table A-1 summarizes congressional action regarding FY2009 research and development,
procurement, and advance procurement funding for the DDG-1000 and DDG-51 programs.
Table A-1. Congressional Action on FY2009 Funding Request
(figures in millions of then-year dollars, rounded to nearest million)
Authorization
Appropriation
Req.
HASC
SASC Comp.a HAC/D SAC/D Comp.a
DDG-1000 research and
449 449 449 449 n/a n/a 455g
developmentb
Destroyer procurement and advance procurement fundingc
Procurement funding for
2503 0 2503 2503 0e 2503?f 1509
third DDG-1000
Advance procurement
51
51 51
450
or
n/a 0
funding for fourth DDG-
400d
501e
1000
Advance procurement
0
0 349 n/a 397f 200
funding for DDG-51
program
Procurement funding for
0 0 0 0
n/a
n/a 0
DDG-51 program
Total of procurement and
2554
400d
2554
2903
n/a
n/a 1709
advance procurement
Sources: FY2009 Navy budget submission, committee reports on FY2009 defense authorization bills, joint
explanatory statement and associated funding tables on compromise version of FY2009 defense authorization
bill, press releases on the HAC/D and SAC/D markups of the FY2009 defense appropriation bills, and
explanatory statement on compromise version of FY2009 defense appropriation bill.
Notes: Req. is administration’s request; HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed
Services Committee, HAC/D is Defense subcommittee of House Appropriations Committee; SAC/D is Defense
subcommittee of Senate Appropriations Committee; Comp. is compromise version of bill. n/a = not available.
a. In lieu of conference reports on the FY20009 defense authorization and appropriation bills, there were
compromise versions of the two bills, each accompanied by an explanatory statement intended to serve the
same general function as a conference report.
b. DDG-1000 portion of Program Element (PE) 0604300N, DDG-1000 Total Ship System Engineering
(previously called SC-21 Total Ship System Engineering), in the Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation, Navy (RDT&EN) account. PE0604300N also includes funding the CG(X) cruiser program.
c. Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account.
d. To be used “for the construction of DDG 51 class destroyers or DDG 1000 class destroyers.”
e. A July 30, 2008, press release from Representative John Murtha, chairman of the Defense subcommittee of
the HAC, summarizing the subcommittee’s markup of the bill, stated that the markup includes “a reduction
of $2.5 billion for the third DDG-1000” and provides $450 million in advance procurement funding for the
DDG-1000 program, but is unclear as to whether the $450 million includes or is in addition to the $51
million in advance procurement funding that was requested for the DDG-1000 program. One press report
states that the total amount of advance procurement funding recommended by the subcommittee mark was
$501 million (i.e., $450 million that was in addition to the requested $51 million). (Zachary M. Peterson,
“House Appropriators Promote ‘Skip Year’ in DDG-1000 Program” Inside the Navy, September 8, 2008.)
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f. A September 10, 2008, press release from the SAC summarizing the markup of the bill by the Defense
subcommittee of the SAC stated that the markup “Supports the budget request for oneDDG-1000
Zumwalt class destroyer” and “Adds $397 million in advance procurement of oneDDG-51 class ship.”
g. The explanatory statement for the compromise version of the bill increases the request forDDG-1000
research and development work by $6.3 million, with the increase going to “Floating Area Network Littoral
Sensor Grid” ($4.8 million) and “Bio/Nano-MEMS [micro electro-mechanical systems] for Defense
Applications” ($1.5 million).
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The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-652 of May 16, 2008) on H.R.
5658, recommended reducing the Navy’s request for FY2009 DDG-1000 procurement funding
from $2,503 million to zero, and increasing the Navy’s FY2009 request for DDG-1000 advance
procurement funding from $51 million to $400 million. (Page 79, lines 010 and 011.) The $400
million in advance procurement funding would be used “for the construction of DDG 51 class
destroyers or DDG 1000 class destroyers.” (Page 83) The report recommended approval of the
DDG-1000 portion of the Navy’s request for FY2009 research and funding request for the DDG-
1000 and CG(X) programs. (Page 186, line 97.) With regard to procurement and advance
procurement funding, the report states that:
The committee authorizes a reallocation of funding in the Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy account and the National Defense Sealift Fund. The committee recommends: full
funding for the 10th ship of the LPD 17 class; an increase in advance procurement funding
for the Virginia class submarine program, necessary for the procurement of 2 ships in fiscal
year 2010; advance procurement for the final 2 ships of the T-AKE class; and advance
procurement for the construction of DDG 51 class destroyers or DDG 1000 class destroyers.
The committee notes that due to the overall delay in the DDG 1000 destroyer program, the
Navy would be unable to execute the full funding request in fiscal year 2009 for the third
ship of the planned seven ship class. Additionally, the committee is concerned with potential
significant cost overruns in the DDG 1000 program and considers it prudent to pause the
program until technological challenges are completely understood.
The committee authorizes these programs without prejudice to any specific program. The
committee also understands the Navy is strongly considering re-starting the DDG 51 class
destroyer upgraded with an improved radar system to fill an urgent need in ballistic missile
defense. The committee would only support that decision if the industrial base for surface
combatant construction is not affected. The committee expects the Secretary of Defense,
subject to the availability of appropriations, to enter into advance procurement and advance
construction contracts for the construction of surface combatants balanced between the two
current surface combatant shipyards, taking into account workforce challenges still in effect
on the Gulf Coast due to the lingering economic effects of Hurricane Katrina. (Page 83)
See also the additional views of Representative Niki Tsongas on pages 654-655 of the report.
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The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 110-335 of May 12, 2008) on S.
3001, recommended approval of the Navy’s requests for FY2009 procurement and advance
procurement funding for the DDG-1000 program. (Page 58, lines 010 and 011.) The report
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recommended approval of the DDG-1000 portion of the Navy’s request for FY2009 research and
funding request for the DDG-1000 and CG(X) programs. (Page 181, line 97.)
ȱ
In lieu of a conference report, there was compromise version of S. 3001 that was accompanied by
a joint explanatory statement. Section 4 of S. 3001 states that the joint explanatory statement
“shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this Act as if it were a joint
explanatory statement of a committee of conference.” The joint explanatory statement states:
The agreement would authorize full funding for the third DDG-1000 class destroyer without
prejudice to any potential future Department of Defense decision to truncate the DDG-1000
class acquisition program in favor of a return to DDG-51 class destroyers.
However, the agreement would authorize $349.0 million for surface ship advance
procurement which would permit the Navy to acquire major spares for DDG-51 destroyers
or buy advance procurement should the Secretary of Defense determine that there is a
validated requirement to produce more of these ships.46
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The House Appropriations Committee did not file a report on the FY2009 defense appropriations
bill. On July 30, 2008, Representative John Murtha, the chairman of the Defense subcommittee of
the House Appropriations Committee, issued a press release summarizing the subcommittee’s
markup of the bill that day. The press release states that the subcommittee mark includes “a
reduction of $2.5 billion for the third DDG-1000” and provides $450 million in advance
procurement funding for the DDG-1000 program, but is unclear as to whether the $450 million
includes or is in addition to the $51 million in advance procurement funding that was requested
for the DDG-1000 program.47 A September 8, 2008 press report states that the total amount of
advance procurement funding recommended was $501 million (i.e., that the $450 million was in
addition to the $51 million). The press report states:
House appropriators this summer cut the Navy’s request to fund the third DDG-1000
destroyer in its fiscal year 2009 budget—a move made by the committee to allow the
program to mature and control future costs, according to details provided in the closely held
report accompanying the July mark-up.
“The committee notes that the third DDG-1000 is being requested in the third year of the
program and believes that the program would benefit from inserting the traditional ‘skip’
year into the program prior to appropriating funding for the third ship,” the report states.
46 Joint Explanatory Statement to accompany S. 3001, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009, pp. 1-2.
47 July 30, 2008, press release from the office of the Honorable John P. Murtha, entitled “Murtha Summary of the FY09
Defense Appropriations Bill,” p. 2.
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A copy of the House Appropriations defense subcommittee FY-09 defense appropriations
mark-up report was obtained last week by InsideDefense.com.
Noting that the Virginia-class submarine program has been cited by Navy officials as the
model for the DDG-1000 program—both ships are being built by two separate shipyards
teamed together by the government—House appropriators write that the third ship of the
Virginia-class program was appropriated in the fourth year of the program.
“This should result in less rework and help reduce the overall cost of the third ship,”
lawmakers write of the decision to not fund the third DDG-1000 in FY-09.
The subcommittee does provide nearly $501 million in advance procurement funds to “help
maintain the industrial base,” according to the report.48
ȱ
The Senate Appropriations Committee did not file a report on the FY2009 defense appropriations
bill. On September 10, 2008, the committee issued a press release summarizing the markup of the
bill that day by its Defense subcommittee. The press release stated that the subcommittee
“supports the budget request for one DDG-1000 Zumwalt class destroyer” and “adds $397
million for advance procurement of one DDG-51 class ship.”49
ȱ
In lieu of a conference report, there was compromise version of the FY2009 defense
appropriations bill that was incorporated as Division C of H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 of September
30, 2008. (H.R. 2638, originally the FY2008 Department of Homeland Security appropriations
bill, was amended to become an FY2009 consolidated appropriations bill that included, among
other things, the FY2009 defense appropriations bill.) The compromise version of H.R. 2638 was
accompanied by an explanatory statement. Section 4 of H.R. 2638 states that the explanatory
statement “shall have the same effect with respect to the allocation of funds and implementation
of this Act as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference.”
The explanatory statement provides $1,508.8 million in FY2009 DDG-1000 procurement
funding, consisting of a reduction of exactly $1 billion from the requested figure of $2,502.8
million, plus an increase of $6 million for “AGS Pallets.” The explanatory statement notes that
the $1-billion reduction reflects a decision to procure a third DDG-1000 in FY2009 using use
split funding (i.e., two-year incremental funding) in FY2009 and FY2010. The explanatory
statement also rejects the Navy’s request for $51 million in FY2009 DDG-1000 advance
procurement funding to support the procurement of a fourth DDG-1000 in FY2010, and provides
$200 million in DDG-51 advance procurement funding “to preserve the option to restart the
DDG-51 class destroyer program.” The explanatory statement states:
Surface Combatant Funding
48 Zachary M. Peterson, “House Appropriators Promote ‘Skip Year’ in DDG-1000 Program,” Inside the Navy,
September 8, 2008.
49 Source: September 10, 2008, press release from Senate Appropriations Committee entitled “Senate Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee Approves Fiscal Year 2009 Defense Appropriations Bill,” p. 2.
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The bill includes $1,507,603,000 [sic] for the first year of split funding for the DDG-1000
program. The Navy is directed to budget for the remaining funding requirement in fiscal year
2010 and to award a construction contract consistent with the ship’s current acquisition
schedule and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) review described in the next
section. The bill also includes $200,000,000 in advance procurement funding to preserve the
option to restart the DDG-51 class destroyer program.
Surface Combatant Funding
The Navy’s recent decision to truncate production of the DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class
destroyers and restart production of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers will require
a program review by the [Department of Defense] Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC). Therefore, the Department [of Defense] is directed to complete a JROC program
review, as expeditiously as possible, that examines the Navy’s proposal and addresses the
warfighting requirements implications of this decision and revalidates future surface
combatant warfighting requirements prior to the obligation of any fiscal year 2009
procurement funds for either destroyer program.
The explanatory statement increases the request for FY2009 DDG-1000 research and
development work by $6.3 million, with the increase going to “Floating Area Network Littoral
Sensor Grid” ($4.8 million) and Bio/Nano-MEMS [micro electro-mechanical systems] for
Defense Applications” ($1.5 million).
With regard to the JROC review mentioned in the language above from the explanatory
statement, an October 6, 2008, press report stated that:
Another blow was struck last month to the U.S. Navy’s embattled DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class
advanced destroyer program when a top-level Pentagon review board agreed to eliminate the
operational requirements for the ship.
No official decision was reached during the Sept. 18 meeting of the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC), but uniformed sources said a memorandum was drafted to reflect
cancellation of the requirements, which justify the need for a particular weapon program....
Marine Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, chaired the Sept.
18 meeting, which reportedly was attended by about 60 officers and officials. Along with the
vice chairman, the four vice chiefs of the military services fill out the JROC membership.50
50 Christopher P. Cavas, “DDG 1000 Takes Another Hit—From JROC,” Defense News, October 6, 2008: 4.
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This appendix presents additional background information on the DDG-1000 program. It presents
information on the DDG-1000 program as it existed just prior to the Navy’s late-July 2008
change in position on future destroyer procurement.
ȱȱȱ
The program known today as the DDG-1000 program was announced on November 1, 2001,
when the Navy stated that it was replacing a destroyer-development effort called the DD-21
program, which the Navy had initiated in the mid-1990s, with a new Future Surface Combatant
Program aimed at developing and acquiring a family of three new classes of surface
combatants:51
• a destroyer called DD(X) for the precision long-range strike and naval gunfire
mission,
• a cruiser called CG(X) for the air defense and ballistic missile mission,52 and
• a smaller combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to counter
submarines, small surface attack craft (also called “swarm boats”) and mines in
heavily contested littoral (near-shore) areas.53
On April 7, 2006, the Navy announced that it had redesignated the DD(X) program as the DDG-
1000 program. The Navy also confirmed in that announcement that the first ship in the class,
DDG-1000, is to be named the Zumwalt, in honor of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, the Chief of
Naval operations from 1970 to 1974. The decision to name the first ship after Zumwalt was made
by the Clinton Administration in July 2000, when the program was still called the DD-21
program.54
51 The DD-21 program was part of a Navy surface combatant acquisition effort begun in the mid-1990s and called the
SC-21 (Surface Combatant for the 21st Century) program. The SC-21 program envisaged a new destroyer called DD-21
and a new cruiser called CG-21. When the Navy announced the Future Surface Combatant Program in 2001,
development work on the DD-21 had been underway for several years, while the start of development work on the CG-
21 was still years in the future. The current DDG-1000 destroyer CG(X) cruiser programs can be viewed as the
descendants, respectively, of the DD-21 and CG-21. The acronym SC-21 is still used in the Navy’s research and
development account to designate the line item (i.e., program element) that funds development work on both the DDG-
1000 and CG(X).
52 For more on the CG(X) program, see CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background, Oversight
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
53 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
54 For more on Navy ship names, see CRS Report RS22478, Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.
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Since September 30, 2005, the Navy has managed the DDG-1000 program through a series of
separate contracts with major DDG-1000 contractors, including Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding
(NGSB), General Dynamics Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW), Raytheon, and BAE Systems (the
maker of the AGS). Under this arrangement, the Navy is acting as the overall system integrator
for the program.
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Under a DDG-1000 acquisition strategy approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) on February 24, 2004, the first DDG-1000
was to have been built by NGSB, the second ship was to have been built by GD/BIW, and
contracts for building the first six were to have been equally divided between NGSB and
GD/BIW.
In February 2005, Navy officials announced that they would seek approval from USD AT&L to
instead hold a one-time, winner-take-all competition between NGSB and GD/BIW to build all
DDG-1000s. On April 20, 2005, the USD AT&L issued a decision memorandum deferring this
proposal, stating in part, “at this time, I consider it premature to change the shipbuilder portion of
the acquisition strategy which I approved on February 24, 2004.”
Several Members of Congress also expressed opposition to Navy’s proposal for a winner-take-all
competition. Congress included a provision (Section 1019) in the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for 2005 (H.R. 1268/P.L. 109-13 of May 11, 2005) prohibiting a winner-take-
all competition. The provision effectively required the participation of at least one additional
shipyard in the program but did not specify the share of the program that is to go to the additional
shipyard.
On May 25, 2005, the Navy announced that, in light of Section 1019 of P.L. 109-13, it wanted to
shift to a “dual-lead-ship” acquisition strategy, under which two DDG-1000s would be procured
in FY2007, with one to be designed and built by NGSB and the other by GD/BIW.
Section 125 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163) again prohibited
the Navy from using a winner-take-all acquisition strategy for procuring its next-generation
destroyer. The provision again effectively requires the participation of at least one additional
shipyard in the program but does not specify the share of the program that is to go to the
additional shipyard.
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On November 23, 2005, the USD AT&L, granted Milestone B approval for the DDG-1000,
permitting the program to enter the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. As
part of this decision, the USD AT&L approved the Navy’s proposed dual-lead-ship acquisition
strategy and a low rate initial production quantity of eight ships (one more than the Navy
subsequently planned to procure).
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Until July 2007, it was expected that NGSB would be the final-assembly yard for the first DDG-
1000 and that GD/BIW would be the final-assembly yard for the second. On July 17 and 18,
2007, it was reported that the Navy was considering the option of instead assigning the first ship
to GD/BIW and the second to NGSB. The potential switch in construction sequence reportedly
was being considered by the Navy in part because the Navy believed it could provide some
additional help in maintaining GD/BIW’s work force as its DDG-51-related construction work
winds down, and because it could also provide some additional time for NGSB to recover from
Katrina-related damage.55
On September 25, 2007, the Navy announced that it had decided to build the first DDG-1000 at
GD/BIW, and the second at NGSB.56 The difference in the two ships’ construction schedules
(about one year) is driven in large part by the production capacities of vendors making certain
components for the ships—some of these vendors can make only one ship-set worth of
components at a time.
On January 12, 2009, it was reported that the Navy, NGSB, and GD/BIW in the fall of 2008
began holding discussions on the idea of having GD/BIW build both the first and second DDG-
1000s, in exchange for NGSB receiving a greater share of the new DDG-51s that would be
procured under the Navy’s proposal.57
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On February 14, 2008, the Navy awarded contract modifications to GD/BIW and NGSB for the
construction of the two lead ships. The awards were modifications to existing contracts that the
Navy has with GD/BIW and NGSB for detailed design and construction of the two lead ships.
Under the modified contracts, the line item for the construction of the dual lead ships is treated as
a cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) item.
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Under an acquisition strategy approved by the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition
executive and documented in an updated Acquisition Strategy Report (ASR) of February 13,
2008, the Navy intended to conduct a single competition between GD/BIW and NGSB for the
contracts to build the five remaining ships in the previously planned seven-ship program (i.e.,
ships three through seven). The winner of the competition was to have built three ships (the third,
fifth, and seventh ships in the program, which were to have been procured in FY2009, FY2011,
and FY2013, respectively), while the other firm was to have built two ships (the fourth and sixth
ships in the program, which were to have been procured in FY2010 and FY2012, respectively).
55 Christopher P. Cavas, “First DDG 1000 Could Shift To Bath,” Defense News, July 17, 2007; Geoff Fein, “Navy
Exploring Workload Options For DDG-1000,” Defense Daily, July 18, 2007.
56 Geoff Fein, “Bath Iron Works To Take Delivery of First Set of DDG-1000 Equipment,” Defense Daily, September
26, 2007; Christopher P. Cavas, “Bath To Build First DDG 1000,” DefenseNews.com, October 1, 2007; and Chris
Johnson, “Navy Changes Equipment Delivery For First Two DDG-1000 Destroyers,” Inside the Navy, October 1, 2007.
57 Christopher P. Cavas, “Will Bath Build Second DDG 1000?” Defense News, January 12, 2009: 1, 6.
58 The information presented in this section is based on an April 10, 2008, Navy briefing to CRS and CBO on the
DDG-1000 program.
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Under this strategy, each firm would have built a minimum of two ships, and the two firms would
in effect have competed for the right to build the remaining fifth ship. In light of the shared
production arrangement for the DDG-1000 program (see discussion below), the two firms more
specifically would have been competing for the right to build certain portions of that fifth ship,
and to perform the final-assembly work on that ship—work that would amount to about 50% of
the total shipyard labor hours needed to build that fifth ship. The two firms could also be viewed
as having been competing for the timing of their respective second ships, as the winner’s second
ship would have been the ship to be procured in FY2009, while the other firm’s second ship
would have been the ship to be procured in FY2010.
The Navy intended to structure the contract with the winning firm as a fixed-price incentive fee
(FPIF) contract to build the ship that was to have been procured in FY2009, with priced options
for building the ships that were to have been procured in FY2011 and FY2013. The Navy
intended to structure the contract with the other firm as an FPIF contract to build the ship that was
to have been procured in FY2010, with a priced option to build the ship was to have been
procured in FY2012. If one or more of the third and subsequent ships were not procured in the
years in which the Navy currently planned procure them, the options would not have been
exercised and the Navy might have conducted a new competition to determine who would have
built the follow-on ships in the program.
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NGSB and GD/BIW have agreed on a shared-production arrangement for building DDG-1000s.
Under this arrangement, certain parts of each ship will be built by NGSB, certain other parts of
each ship will be built by GD/BIW, and the remaining parts of each ship would be built by the
yard that does final-assembly work on that ship. Each firm’s repeating portion of the ship would
amount to about 25% of the labor hours for the ship; the yard that does the final-assembly work
on the ship would also perform the remaining 50% or so of the labor hours needed to build the
ship. The arrangement can be viewed as somewhat analogous to the joint-production arrangement
for Virginia-class submarines that was proposed by industry and the Navy, and then approved by
Congress in Section 121 of the FY1998 defense authorization act (H.R. 1119/P.L. 105-85 of
November 18, 1997).59
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Section 123 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163 of January 6,
2006), limited the procurement cost of the fifth DDG-1000 to $2.3 billion, plus adjustments for
inflation and other factors.
59 For more on the Virginia-class joint-production arrangement, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Attack Submarine
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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This appendix reprints in its entirety the text of the Navy’s prepared statement for the July 31,
2008, hearing on destroyer procurement before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces
subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.60 The text states:
Chairman Taylor, Ranking Member Bartlett, and distinguished Members of the Seapower
and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, the Department is committed to executing the
Cooperative Maritime Strategy, modernizing our fleet, and building the fleet of tomorrow.
The Navy urges your support to fully fund the Department’s 2009 shipbuilding request. The
Navy requests the Committee’s support for the Navy’s recent plan to truncate the DDG 1000
program at two ships and reopen the DDG 51 line to better align our surface combatant
investment strategy with our nation’s warfighting needs. The Navy continues to address the
dynamic capability requirements of the Fleet while balancing the demands placed on limited
resources and producing a plan that provides maximum stability for the industrial base.
Modernizing the Fleet’s cruisers and destroyers and executing an affordable shipbuilding
plan are crucial to constructing and maintaining a 313 ship Navy with the capacity and
capability to meet our country’s global maritime needs. In an age of rapidly evolving threats
and fiscal constraints, we must ensure we are building only to our highest priority
requirements and that the mission sets we envision for the future represent the most likely of
those potential futures.
Surface combatants are the workhorses of our Fleet and central to our traditional Navy core
capabilities. Our cruisers, destroyers, and the new littoral combat ships bring capabilities to
the fleet, that enable us to deter our enemies, project power, deploy forward and control the
seas.
Strategic Environment
Rapidly evolving traditional and asymmetric threats continue to pose increasing challenges
to Combatant Commanders. State actors and non-state actors who, in the past, have only
posed limited threats in the littoral are expanding their reach beyond their own shores with
improved capabilities in blue water submarine operations, advanced anti-ship cruise missiles
and ballistic missiles. A number of countries who historically have only possessed regional
military capabilities are investing in their Navy to extend their reach and influence as they
compete in global markets. Our Navy will need to outpace other Navies in the blue water
ocean environment as they extend their reach. This will require us to continue to improve our
blue water anti-submarine and anti-ballistic missile capabilities in order to counter improving
anti-access strategies.
The Navy remains committed to having the capability and capacity to win our Nation’s wars
and prevent future wars. The rise of violent extremism has become a greater threat as it
rapidly evolves with diverse and adaptive capabilities. These often stateless organizations
pose further challenges with their aspirations of weapons of mass destruction development
and desire to proliferate missiles and other highly, technologically advanced weapons. All of
60 Statement of Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and
Resources, and Ms. Allison Stiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Ship Programs), before the Subcommittee
on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces of the House Armed Services Committee, on Surface Combatant Requirements
and Acquisition Strategies, July 31, 2008, 11 pp.
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these threats require the Navy to have the capacity to build partnerships and continue our
efforts of investing in maritime domain awareness; intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance programs; and having both kinetic and non-kinetic effects capabilities. We
call on our surface combatants to conduct these operations and execute the Maritime Strategy
today, and we will continue to call on them to provide maritime supremacy from the
ungoverned spaces of the littorals to vast expanses of our world’s oceans.
Challenges
The challenge for the Navy is to maintain traditional core naval capabilities while
simultaneously enhancing our ability to conduct expanded core roles and missions to ensure
naval power and influence can be applied on the sea, across the littorals, and ashore. It is no
longer feasible or affordable to purchase the most capable, multi-mission platform and then
limit its use to execute tailored mission areas or focus on specific threats. As asymmetric
threats continue to evolve, so will traditional threats. The Navy must find affordable and
adaptable ways to fill current and future warfighting gaps.
Beyond addressing capability requirements, the Navy needs to have the right capacity to
remain a global deterrent and meet Combatant Commander warfighting requirements.
Combatant Commanders continue to request more surface ships and increased naval
presence to expand our cooperation with new partners in Africa, the Black Sea, the Baltic
Region, and the Indian Ocean and maintain our relationships with our allies and friends.
Therefore, we must increase surface combatant capacity in order to meet Combatant
Commander demands today for ballistic missile defense, theater security cooperation, steady
state security posture and to meet future demands as we standup Africa Command
(AFRICOM) and the FOURTH Fleet in SOUTHERN Command. The Navy also continues to
remain committed to our Ballistic Missile Defense partners around the globe, including
Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, and Spain.
Future Force
The 30 year ship building plan was designed to field the force structure to meet the
requirements of the national security strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review meeting
the FY 2020 threat. The 313-ship force floor represents the maximum acceptable risk in
meeting the security demands of the 21st century. In the balance of capability and capacity,
the Navy has found that there are increased warfighting gaps, particularly in the area of
integrated air and missile defense capability. Capacity also matters, and capacity is capability
for the Irregular War we are in today.
The DDG 1000 program is developing a capable ship which meets the requirements for
which it was designed. The DDG 1000, with its Dual Band Radar and sonar suite design are
optimized for the littoral environment. However, in the current program of record, the DDG
1000 cannot perform area air defense; specifically, it cannot successfully employ the
Standard Missile-2 (SM-2), SM-3 or SM-6 and is incapable of conducting Ballistic Missile
Defense. Although superior in littoral ASW, the DDG 1000 lower power sonar design is less
effective in the blue water than DDG-51 capability. DDG 1000’s Advanced Gun System
(AGS) design provides enhanced Naval Fires Support capability in the littorals with
increased survivability. However, with the accelerated advancement of precision munitions
and targeting, excess fires capacity already exists from tactical aviation and organic USMC
fires. Unfortunately, the DDG 1000 design sacrifices capacity for increased capability in an
area where Navy already has, and is projected to have sufficient capacity and capability.
The DDG 51 is a proven, multi-mission guided missile destroyer. She is the Navy’s most
capable ship against ballistic missile threats and adds capacity to provide regional ballistic
missile defense. DDG 51 spirals will better bridge the ballistic missile defense gap to the
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next generation Cruiser. Production costs of DDG 51s are known. The risks associated with
re-opening the DDG 51 line are less than the risks of continuing the DDG 1000 class beyond
2 ships when balanced with the capability and capacity of pursuing the 313 ship fleet.
Current Execution
The Department is committed to executing the acquisition plan for our future force.
Acquisition Professionals and Requirements Officers are working closely to maintain the
Department’s commitment to an affordable shipbuilding and modernization plan.
DDG 51 Destroyer Program and Production Restart Assessment
The capability of DDG 51 Class ships being built today is markedly more advanced than the
initial ships of the class. The DDG 51 Class was developed in three incremental flights, with
upgraded technology and capability built into each subsequent hull. Ships are currently being
constructed at both General Dynamics (GD) Bath Iron Works (BIW) and Northrop
Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB). 62 ships have previously been authorized and appropriated,
with the most recent procurement of three ships in FY 2005. A total of 53 ships have been
delivered to the Navy. Five ships remain under construction at GD BIW, and 4 at NGSB.
The last ship currently under construction, DDG 112, is scheduled for delivery in FY 2011.
All material for DDG 51 Class ships currently under construction has been procured, with
the majority of the long lead material purchased in an Economic Order Quantity buy in FY
2002.
DDG 51 class production has been extremely stable, with successful serial production at both
shipbuilders. Despite some setbacks, such as the impacts of Hurricane Katrina at NGSB, the
costs associated with DDG 51 class shipbuilding are well understood. The Aegis Weapon
System has been incrementally developed successfully to add increased capabilities and
transition to the use of open architecture and increased use of commercial systems.
Additionally, the DDG 51 modernization program is currently modernizing the Hull,
Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) and Combat Systems. These combined upgrades
support a reduction in manpower and operating costs, achieve expected service life, and
allow the class to pace the projected threat well into the 21st century.
Based upon a Navy assessment, including discussions with both current shipbuilders, to
explore any subcontractor issues, a restart of DDG 51 procurement in FY 2009 is feasible.
However, several ship and Government Furnished Equipment vendor base issues (including
configuration change issues and production line re-starts) must be addressed in order to
award and construct additional ships, which will increase ship costs above the most recently
procured ships. The most notable being the restart of the DDG 51 reduction gear production.
The Navy is confident that these issues can be resolved to support a FY 2009 restart. DDG
51 class restart beyond FY 2009 presents significant risks and therefore additional costs.
However, both shipbuilders have indicated to the Navy that these lead time challenges can be
mitigated with advance procurement and an adjusted build sequence, and that DDG 51
restart in FY 2009 is executable in both shipyards. Regarding the combat systems, the last
production contracts were awarded in 2006. The cost and ease of restarting those production
lines is a function of time, and part availability on military specification items which would
need to be addressed.
Given the truncation of the DDG 1000 program at two ships, the Navy estimate for
procurement of a single DDG 51 class ship in FY 2009 is $2.2 billion. This estimate utilizes
the latest audited Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRAs) rates. Impacts for production
line restart and contractor furnished equipment/government furnished equipment
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obsolescence are included. The Navy has not finalized the acquisition strategy for a FY 2009
DDG 51 and follow-on procurements. The Navy will carefully consider stability of the
industrial base during the planning of the specific strategy.
DDG 1000 Class Destroyer Program
The Navy remains ready to begin construction of DDG 1000. A rigorous systems
engineering approach for the program has been employed to mitigate the risk involved with
building a complex lead ship surface combatant. This approach included successful building
and testing of the 10 critical technologies via Engineering Development Models. Naval
Vessel Rules were also fully incorporated prior to commencing detail design. Design of the
Mission Systems is now nearly 100 percent complete. Detail design will be approximately 85
percent complete prior to the start of fabrication, and will be more complete than any other
previous surface warship.
The systems engineering approach for DDG 1000 has been well conceived and well
executed. However, overall, the remaining program risk involved in integrating the Mission
Systems, 10 EDM’s, and the ship detail design is still moderate. Particularly, the Dual Band
Radar and Integrated Power System have further land-based testing to complete, and the
software development for the Total Ship Computing Environment continues. Careful
planning has been conducted so that where further development does continue on systems,
these have been partially tested to the point that any potential changes are not likely to affect
software or system interfaces, with a low risk of affecting either detail design or software
development.
As such, the maturity of the ship design, critical technologies, and mission systems support
commencement of production. However, it is accurate that the integration of a complex, lead
ship, surface combatant with significant new technologies always entails risk. And though
the Navy cost estimate for DDG 1000 is based on a detailed, bottoms-up approach, this
complex integration does increase the cost risk.
Truncation of the program at two ships will result in cost impacts due to program shutdown,
continuation of required class service tasks, and potential increased costs for DDG 1000 and
1001 and other programs. Additionally, the RDT&E efforts for the DDG 1000 program,
which include software development and other critical efforts, must continue in order to
deliver completed ships and in the CVN 78 Class.
Conclusion
Your Navy remains committed to building the fleet of the future and modernizing our current
fleet. The Navy’s top shipbuilding priority remains achieving a surface combatant
shipbuilding program that is equally capable of assuring peace today and access to the global
economy tomorrow regardless of the threats posed in an uncertain future. To accomplish
this, we are steadfast in our intention to not use procurement accounts for other Navy
program offsets. Procurement and R&D investments made today will serve our country and
fleet well beyond 2020 as we modernize the fleet we have and build the fleet we need.
Continuing to build DDG 51s enables us to expand warfighting capacity and capability in
areas needed by Combatant Commanders and allows us to reach the 313 ship level sooner.
Meeting evolving blue water and near-land threats that the DDG 51 can match provides less
risk to the joint warfighter. There is less risk associated with the affordability of maintaining
DDG 51 line versus continuing the DDG 1000 line. The Navy is ready to restart DDG 51
production, and is committed to successfully delivering DDG 1000 and 1001 from which, we
will inform new ship class designs. The Navy has not finalized the acquisition strategy for
FY 2009 DDG 51 and follow-on procurements, however acquisition planning is fully
underway to execute this change in the Navy’s shipbuilding requirements. The Department
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urges the Committee’s support for full funding of the surface combatant procurement
account for FY 2009 and approving our proposal regarding DDG’s. Thank you for your
continued support and commitment to our Navy. I look forward to continuing to work
closely with you to make our maritime services and nation more secure and prosperous.
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This appendix presents some ship design options that policymakers may consider for reducing
DDG-51 O&S costs, or for improving fleet capabilities through procurement of modified DDG-
51s, modified DDG-1000s, or other ships. Parts of this appendix are adapted from CRS testimony
at the July 31, 2008, hearing on destroyer procurement before the Seapower and Expeditionary
Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee,61 which in turn was based on
information in the Navy program of record, past briefings and other information provided by the
Navy and industry to CRS on the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs, industry briefings to CRS
on DDG-51 and DDG-1000 design options that were done at CRS’ request, and open-source
information.
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Although the Navy’s proposal for restarting DDG-51 procurement calls for procuring essentially
repeat copies of the current Flight IIA DDG-51 design, policymakers may consider the alternative
of procuring a modified version of the DDG-51 design. A modified version could have lower
O&S costs, and could be better aligned with a potential policy goal of using DDG-51
procurement to improve the fleet’s capabilities for NSFS or for BMD and area-defense AAW (the
latter two referred to in this appendix as Integrated Air and Missile Defense, or IAMD).
In deciding whether destroyer procurement over the next several years should focus on providing
improved NSFS capabilities or improved IAMD capabilities, policymakers could consider several
factors, including current and potential U.S. Navy operations, the operational requirements for
conducting these operations, current and projected threats or challenges associated with these
operations, and current or projected Navy or DOD programs (other than destroyer procurement)
for countering these threats or overcoming these challenges.
A key system for providing improved NSFS capability is the 155mm Advanced Gun System
(AGS) and the associated 155mm Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP). Key systems for
providing improved IAMD capabilities include higher-capability radars and vertical-launch tubes
for IAMD interceptors.
The Navy has procured different versions of the DDG-51 design over time. A significant change
in the design occurred in FY1994, when the Navy shifted DDG-51 procurement to the Flight IIA
version of the ship, which included, among other things, the addition of a helicopter hangar and
the repositioning of the ship’s aft SPY-1 radar arrays. Prior to implementing the Flight IIA design,
the Navy seriously considered a version with even larger-scale changes, called the Flight III
design, that would have included, among other things, lengthening the ship’s hull to make room
for additional mission systems.
Compared to the option of procuring repeat Flight IIA DDG-51s, procuring a modified version of
the DDG-51 design would incur additional nonrecurring design and engineering costs, as well as
additional recurring production costs due to loss of learning at the shipyard associated with
61 Statement of Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service, before the House
Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces hearing on Surface Combatant
Warfighting Requirements and Acquisition Strategy, July 31, 2008, 17 pp.
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changing the ship’s design and (for some of the options discussed below) the enlargement of the
ship. Depending on the exact option pursued, the nonrecurring design and engineering costs could
total in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Given the number of DDG-51s that may be procured
between now and the procurement of a lead CG(X) in FY2015, FY2016, or FY2017, these
additional costs might be deemed cost effective in terms of making it possible to procure DDG-
51s that have lower O&S costs and are better aligned with a possible policy goal of using DDG-
51 procurement to provide the fleet with improved NSFS or IAMD capabilities.
DDG-51 configuration options that may be procured in coming years include but are not limited
to the following:
• the current Flight IIA design;
• a modified version with additional features for reducing O&S costs;
• a modified version with additional features for reducing O&S costs and an AGS;
• a modified version with additional features for reducing O&S costs and
additional vertical-launch tubes;
• a modified version with additional features for reducing O&S costs and an
improved radar; and
• a modified version with additional features for reducing O&S costs, additional
vertical-launch tubes, and an improved radar.
Each of these options is discussed below. The first of these options might be ready for
implementation sooner than the others. If so, and if procurement of a modified DDG-51 design
were desired, procurement of DDG-51s over the next several years could begin with procurement
of the current Flight IIA design and then shift to the modified design when the modified design
was ready for procurement.
Although the option of procuring the current Flight IIA DDG-51 design might be ready for
implementation sooner than the other options, the Navy and other observers have cautioned that
the time line for restarting procurement of the current Flight IIA design could be extended by the
need to restart or reestablish vendors for certain key DDG-51 components, such as the reduction
gear.
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This option, which might be considered the baseline option, has the lowest nonrecurring design
and engineering costs and the lowest recurring production costs of all the options presented here.
It would maximize the number of DDG-51s that could be procured for a given amount of
procurement funding. It would also pose the lowest amount of technical, schedule, and cost risk.
It would have higher life-cycle O&S costs then the next option discussed below, and perhaps
higher O&S costs than some of the other options discussed below as well. Procuring the current
Flight IIA design would provide more of the same capabilities that DDG-51s currently provide
for the fleet, but the ships might not be considered particularly well-aligned if a possible policy
goal was to use DDG-51 procurement to provide improved (as opposed to additional) capabilities
for NSFS or IAMD. As mentioned above, the current Flight IIA design could be procured as a
bridge to procurement of one of the modified designs discussed below.
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This option would procure Flight IIA ships that were modified to include features for reducing the
ships’ annual O&S costs. Potential features of this kind include but are not limited to the
following:
• adding automated equipment and making other changes to reduce crew size;
• adding some electric-drive equipment for interconnecting parts of the ship’s
mechanical-drive propulsion system so as to permit the system to operate more
like an integrated electric drive system; and
• installing a near-surface bow bulb above the existing sonar dome to improve
hydrodynamic efficiency.
The discussion below of how these three features could reduce DDG-51 O&S costs uses as its
starting point the table below on annual DDG-1000 and DDG-51 O&S costs, which is reprinted
from Admiral Gary Roughead’s May 7, 2008, letter to Senator Kennedy on the DDG-1000 and
DDG-51.62
(FY$M)
DDG 1000
DDG 51
Operating (steaming)
$18.5 $15.7
Maintenance
$10.3 $5.6
Manpower
$8.5 $19.9
Total
$37.3 $41.2
Crew Size
[Total 120]
[Total 296]
14 officers
24 Officers
106 enlisted
272 Enlisted
Source: Letter dated May 7, 2008, from Admiral G. Roughead to the Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, p. 2. The
figures shown in brackets for total crew size were added to the table by CRS.
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Admiral Roughead’s letter states that the above table “does not include personnel reduction
savings expected from the DDG Modernization program.” The Navy informed CRS on July 25,
2008, that the DDG-51 modernization is not expected to reduce DDG-51 crew size, but that the
size of the DDG-51 crew has, for other reasons, been reduced recently from the figure of 296
shown in the table to 278, a reduction of 18 people.63
Additional actions might permit a further reduction in DDG-51 crew size: a 2003 industry
briefing to CRS on DDG-51 modernization for reduced manning discussed various steps for
reducing crew size by about 100.64 The House Armed Services Committee’s report (H.Rept. 108-
491 of May 14, 2004) on the FY2005 defense authorization bill (H.R. 4200) similarly stated:
62 Source: Letter dated May 7, 2008, from Admiral G. Roughead to the Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, posted on the
Internet at InsideDefense.com (subscription required) on May 30, 2008.
63 Source: Navy information provided to CRS by telephone, July 25, 2008.
64 Source: Industry briefing to CRS on DDG-51 modernization for reduced manning, August 8, 2003.
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The committee notes that the Navy is scheduled to commence a DDG-51 modernization plan
in fiscal year 2005 with new construction and subsequently extend modernization to in-
service destroyers. The committee is aware that the foundations for DDG-51 modernization
are: increased warfighting capability, leverage of the DDG—51 shipbuilding program,
reduction of total ship ownership costs, and use of open architecture. In addition to those
factors, the committee believes that reduction in crew size from the present approximately
300 to an objective of 200 personnel should also be part of the foundation of an even more
aggressive modernization program.
According to the Navy, a DDG-51 class ship costs $25.0 million per year to operate,
including $13.0 million for the crew. The Navy estimate is that its present modernization
plan could reduce the crew cost per ship by $2.7 million per year. A larger reduction in crew
size would clearly appear to result in significant savings over the estimated 18 years of
remaining normal service life, especially noting that per capita personnel costs may be
expected to increase during that period.65
Using the figures in the table from Admiral Roughead’s May 7 letter, if additional steps can
reduce ship crew size by another 32 people, for a total reduction of 50—one-half the figure of 100
mentioned in the 2003 industry briefing and the 2004 committee report—then annual manpower
costs for the DDG-51 could be reduced from the figure of $19.9 million shown in the table to
about $16.5 million, a reduction of about 17%.
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As discussed in two CRS reports,66 one maker of electric-drive propulsion equipment has
proposed increasing the planned scope of the Navy’s program for modernizing its DDG-51s to
include adding some electric-drive propulsion equipment to the ships’ existing mechanical-drive
propulsion plants. The option could also be applied to new-construction DDG-51s. The added
equipment would more fully interconnect the mechanical-drive components on each ship,
producing what the firm refers to as a hybrid propulsion plant. The firm estimates that the
addition of this equipment would reduce DDG-51fuel use by about 16%. This option, the firm
estimates, would have a non-recurring engineering cost of $17.1 million and a recurring cost
(including both equipment cost and installation cost) of $8.8 million per ship.67
Using the figures in the table from Admiral Roughead’s May 7 letter, reducing DDG-51 fuel use
by 16% would reduce the ship’s annual operating (steaming) cost from the figure of $15.7 million
shown in the table to about $13.2 million—a reduction of about $2.5 million. The Navy has
informed CRS that the operating (steaming) cost figures in the May 7 letter are based on fuel
costs as of February 2008 and reflect a fuel cost of $112.14 per barrel.68 If fuel in coming years
costs more than $112.14 per barrel, the dollar savings associated with a 3.9% reduction in fuel use
65 H.Rept. 108-491, pp. 122-123.
66CRS Report RL33360, Navy Ship Propulsion Technologies: Options for Reducing Oil Use - Background for
Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, and CRS Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
67 Source: Briefing by the firm DRS dated December 19, 2007, with estimated percentage fuel-savings and cost figures
reconfirmed by telephone call with CRS on July 17, 2008. DRS also stated in the phone call that one Navy official had
stated that the reduction in fuel use could be greater than DRS estimates because the commanders of ships with this
equipment would likely adjust ship speeds to operate the ship more often at the hybrid system’s most-efficient speed
points (i.e., the system’s “sweet spots”).
68 Source: Navy information provided to CRS by telephone, July 25, 2008.
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would be greater than $2.5 million per year. The obverse would be true if fuel in coming years
costs less than $112.14 per barrel.
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As discussed in a CRS report,69 a study by the Navy’s David Taylor Model Basin estimated that
fitting a near-surface bow bulb—essentially a shaped piece of steel—onto a DDG-51class
destroyer could reduce its fuel use by 3.9%.70
Figure D-1. Near-Surface Bow Bulb Design for DDG-51
(bulb above, existing sonar dome below)
A document from the hydromechanics department of the Naval Surface Warfare Center
Carderock Directorate summarizing efforts by that department through 1999 to improve the
hydrodynamic and operational performance of the DDG-51 similarly states that in tests of this
proposal:
69CRS Report RL33360, Navy Ship Propulsion Technologies: Options for Reducing Oil Use - Background for
Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
70 Dominic S. Cusanelli, “Stern Flaps and Bow Bulbs for Existing Vessels, Reducing Shipboard Fuel Consumption and
Emissions,” available online at http://www.unep.fr/ozonaction/events/military/proceedings/Presentation%20Material/
24%20-%20Cusanelli%20-%20SternFlaps.doc. The study is undated but refers to a test that was “recently completed in
Dec. 2000.” As also stated in CRS Report RL33360, Navy Ship Propulsion Technologies: Options for Reducing Oil
Use - Background for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, an earlier (1994) study by the same organization estimated that
79 existing Navy cruisers and destroyers could be fitted with bow bulbs for a total development and installation cost of
less than $30 million, and that the constant-dollar life-cycle fuel savings of the 79 ships would be $250 million.
(Dominic S. Cusanelli, “Development of a Bow for a Naval Surface Combatant which Combines a Hydrodynamic Bulb
and a Sonar Dome,” paper presented at the American Society of Naval Engineers Technical Innovation Symposium,
September 1994.) DOD stated in 2000 that fitting bulbous bows onto 50 DDG-51s (a total of 62 DDG-51s have been
procured) could save $200 million in life-cycle fuel costs. (U.S. Department of Defense, Climate Change, Energy
Efficiency, and Ozone Protection, Protecting National Security and the Environment. Washington, 2000. (Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Security), November 2000) p. 5. Available online at
https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/Library/Air/Climate_Change/dodclimatechange.pdf.)
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Ship performance improvement was projected for the entire ship speed range across all sea
states tested, resulting in significant annual fuel savings.
Analysis of seakeeping data and extreme sea wave load tests indicate that the bow bulb had
no significant impact on ship motions or hull girder loads. Acoustic transfer function tests
data from a vibracoustic model concluded that the bow bulb should have little noticeable
impact on the sonar self-noise levels.71
Using the figures in the table from Admiral Roughead’s May 7 letter, reducing DDG-51 use by an
additional 3.9% would reduce the ship’s annual operating (steaming) cost from the figure of $15.7
million shown in the table to about $12.7 million—a reduction of $3.0 million. This savings
figure is again based on a fuel cost of $112.14 per barrel.
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Table D-1, below, summarizes the potential reductions in annual DDG-51 O&S costs from the
three options discussed above. The total figure of $34.8 million shown in the final column of the
table is about 15% less than the figure of $41.2 million from the table in Admiral Roughead’s
May 7 letter. These figures would need to be adjusted for the options discussed later in this
statement to take into account the configuration changes of those options.
Table D-1. DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Annual O&S Costs
DDG 51 with
potential O&S cost
(FY$M)
DDG 1000
DDG 51
reductions
Operating
$18.5 $15.7 $12.7
(steaming)
Maintenance $10.3
$5.6
$5.6
Manpower $8.5 $19.9 $16.5
Total $37.3
$41.2
$34.8
Crew Size
120 Total:
296 Total:
246 Total
(14 officers, 106
(24 Officers, 272
enlisted)
Enlisted)
Source: Letter dated May 7, 2008, from Admiral G. Roughead to the Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, p. 2 (first
two data columns) and CRS review of Navy and industry data (third data column).
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This version of the DDG-51 design would include an AGS as well as features for reducing O&S
costs. The purpose in procuring this version would be to provide the fleet with improved NSFS
capabilities. Under this option, the Flight IIA design would be modified by removing the 5-inch
gun and perhaps also the forward 32-cell vertical launch system (VLS) battery, lengthening the
ship forward of the deckhouse through the insertion of a hull plug, and installing an AGS with a
magazine capable of storing as many LRLAP rounds as can be fitted, with a goal of 300.
71 Document entitled “Recent Design Programs, DDG 51,” available online at http://www.nswccd.navy.mil/hyd/mul-
gal/doc-gal-1/documents/DDG51.pdf.
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Some of the sources that CRS consulted expressed doubts or concerns about the technical
feasibility or engineering difficulty of this option. Other sources expressed fewer concerns along
these lines. A redesign of the AGS’s ammunition storage and handling space would be needed to
accommodate the AGS in the DDG-51 hull.
The Navy informed CRS in 2005 that it might be possible to fit the existing DDG-51 hull with
one AGS, that doing so would likely require the removal of 5-inch gun and the forward 32-cell
VLS battery, and that in this configuration, the DDG-51 might carry about 120 LRLAPs.72
At a March 14, 2008, hearing on shipbuilding issues before the Seapower and Expeditionary
Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Vice Admiral Barry McCullough
was asked what platforms other than the DDG-1000 might be equipped with an AGS. He replied:
Well, sir, I will tell you we looked at [whether] could you put the Advanced Gun System in
an Arleigh Burke [DDG-51] hull. And without doing a detailed shock analysis on it, I will
tell you physically it fits. We’d have to do some arrangement changes in it. But you can put
the gun in there. And my concern is the magazine capacity. Outside of that, we haven’t
looked at putting it in any other hull form. So I’ll get back to you on that.73
This comment, like the information that the Navy provided to CRS in 2005, appears to relate to
an installation that does not involve lengthening the DDG-51 hull. Lengthening the DDG-51 hull
forward of the deckhouse could provide additional space and weight-carrying capacity for
additional LRLAP rounds, and perhaps also permit the retention of the forward 32-cell VLS
battery. The Navy and industry in the past have studied options for lengthening the DDG-51 hull
by various lengths to accommodate various capability upgrades, such as additional VLS cells;74
the maximum possible hull extension might be 55 or 56 feet.75 An extension of 55 or 56 feet
might permit a magazine of more than 300 rounds, or alternatively might permit the retention of
at least some of the ship’s forward VLS cells.
Because the AGS requires much more electrical power to operate than the DDG-51’s current 5-
inch gun, equipping the DDG-51 with an AGS might require the installation of an additional
72 Source: Navy briefing to CRS on DDG-1000 and DDG-51 capabilities, June 10, 2005.
73 Source: Transcript of hearing. The idea of backfitting an AGS onto an existing Spruance (DD-963) class destroyer,
so that the ship could be used as a risk-reduction platform for the DDG-1000, was explored by a group of three Navy
lieutenants in a 2003 study done while at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The study’s preferred installation
option, which involved the removal of the ship’s aft 5-inch gun but no hull extension, resulted in a magazine with an
estimated capacity of 304 LRLAP rounds. (Julie Higgins, Jason Rhoads, and Michael Roach, Advanced Gun System
(AGS) Backfit, DD-988 Naval Gunfire Support Ship Conversion, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 13.413,
Project in Naval Ship Construction, Spring 2003, 30 pp.)
74 For example, the Navy in 1988 studied design options for a Flight III version of the DDG-51 design that included
hull extensions, in various locations along the hull, of 30 feet, 40 feet, and 46 feet. The CNO gave initial approval to a
Flight III design concept incorporating a 40-foot extension (12 feet forward and 28 feet aft), and the design was
intended to begin procurement in FY1994. (Source: Donald Ewing, Randall Fortune, Brian Rochon, and Robert Scott,
DDG 51 Flight III Design Development, Presented at the Meeting of the Chesapeake Section of The Society of Naval
Architects and Marine Engineers, December 12, 1989.) The Flight III design was canceled in late-1990/early-1991.
Subsequent studies led to the current Flight IIA design, which does not include a hull extension. A 1994 CRS report
discussed the option of lengthening the DDG-51 design by about 12 feet to increase the forward VLS battery from 32
cells to 64 cells. (See CRS Report 94-343, Navy DDG-51 Destroyer Procurement Rate: Issues and Options for
Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke [April 25, 1994; out of print and available directly from the author]), pp. CRS-27 to
CRS-28.
75 Sources: Recent discussions with industry officials and Navy information provided to CRS in 1997.
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electrical generator. The best location for such a generator might be in one of the ship’s two
helicopter hangar spots, which would reduce the ship’s helicopter hangar capacity from two
helicopters to one.
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This version of the DDG-51 design would include additional vertical-launch tubes as well as
features for reducing O&S costs. The purpose in procuring this version would be to provide the
fleet with improved IAMD capabilities.
Additional vertical-launch tubes could be installed by lengthening the ship’s hull forward of the
deckhouse. A 1994 CRS report discussed, on the basis of Navy information, how a 12-foot
extension could permit the installation of 32 additional VLS cells.76 In 1997, to support research
that CRS was conducting into possible alternatives to the Navy’s proposed Arsenal Ship,77 the
Navy provided CRS with information on how lengthening the DDG-51 hull so as to install
additional VLS tubes might change the ship’s procurement cost. The information is summarized
in Table D-2, below. The estimated changes in procurement cost were parametric, rough order of
magnitude (ROM) estimates only, subject to further engineering evaluation, and did not include
detail design or nonrecurring engineering costs. Although the table shows variants equipped with
Mk 41 VLS tubes (the kind currently used on Navy surface ships), adding vertical launch tubes of
a newer design may also be possible.
Table D-2. 1997 Navy Information on DDG-51 Variants
Number
of
Hull
Rough recurring
Number of Mk 41 VLS tubes (%
5-inch extension procurement cost
Variant
change relative to Flight IIA)
guns
(in feet) (relative to Flight IIA)
Current Flight
IIA design
96
1
0
1.00
Option 1
128 (+ 33%)
1
12
<1.05
Option 2
160 (+ 67%)
1
30
<1.10
Option 3
192 (+100%)
1
<56
<1.15
Option 4
256 (+167%)
1
56
<1.20
Source: U.S. Navy data provided to CRS on April 9, 1997, except for the figure of 12 feet shown for the variant
with 32 additional VLS cells, which is U.S. Navy data provided for CRS Report 94-343, Navy DDG-51 Destroyer
Procurement Rate: Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke [April 25, 1994; out of print and available
directly from the author]). The cost figures in the table are rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimates and do
not reflect any detailed design or engineering costs typically reflected in a lead-ship cost. The cost estimates
provided by the Navy to CRS, though ROM estimates, were more precise than shown here, and were labeled
business sensitive. They have been rendered more approximate by CRS for presentation in this table. The costs
76 See CRS Report 94-343, Navy DDG-51 Destroyer Procurement Rate: Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke [April 25, 1994; out of print and available directly from the author]), pp. CRS-27 to CRS-28.
77 The Arsenal Ship program was aimed at acquiring a small number of relatively simple and inexpensive surface ships,
each armed with about 512 VLS tubes. The program was cancelled in 1997. For more on the program, see CRS Report
97-455, Navy/DARPA Arsenal Ship Program: Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, and CRS Report
97-1004, Navy/DARPA Maritime Fire Support Demonstrator (Arsenal Ship) Program: Issues Arising From Its
Termination, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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of the options as estimated by the Navy did not differ from one another in exact increments of 5%. See also
Figure 6 on page 131 from Dean A. Rains, “Methods For Ship Military Effectiveness Analysis,” Naval Engineers
Journal, March 1994: 126-135; and Table 3 on page 26 from Dean A. Rains, “Naval Ship Affordability,” Naval
Engineers Journal, July 1996: 19-30.
As shown in the table, all these options retain the DDG-51’s 5-inch gun. If the gun is considered
not critical for the ship’s intended concept of operations, it could be eliminated from the design,
which would reduce the design’s procurement cost. Supporters of eliminating the 5-inch gun
might argue that the gun is not critical because it does not contribute to a goal of providing
improved IAMD capabilities, and because the Navy already has 106 5-inch guns on 22 existing
Aegis cruisers (two guns each) and 62 DDG-51s already in service or under construction (one
gun each). Opponents of eliminating the 5-inch gun could argue that the absence of a gun would
reduce the mission flexibility of the ship.
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This version of the DDG-51 design would include an improved radar in the place of the DDG-
51’s current SPY-1 radar, as well as features for reducing O&S costs. The purpose in procuring
this version would be to provide the fleet with improved IAMD capabilities.
The improved radar would use active-array radar technology, as opposed to the older passive-
array technology used in the SPY-1. The active-array technology would be similar to that used,
for example, in the DDG-1000 dual band radar. Multiple industry sources have briefed CRS on
their proposals for modifying the DDG-51 design to include an active-array radar with greater
capability than the SPY-1.
If the DDG-51 hull is not lengthened, then modifying the DDG-51 design to include an improved
radar would require removing the 5-inch gun to make space and weight available for additional
equipment needed to support operations with the improved radar. Lengthening the hull might
provide enough additional space and weight capacity to permit the 5-inch gun to be retained.78
Supporting equipment to be installed would include an additional electrical generator and
additional cooling equipment.79 The best location for the generator might be in one of the ship’s
two helicopter hangar spots, which would reduce the ship’s helicopter hangar capacity from two
helicopters to one.
Due to the higher cost of the improved radar compared with the SPY-1 and the cost for the
additional generator and cooling equipment, modifying the DDG-51 design to this configuration
would increase the recurring procurement cost of the ship. Information provided to CRS by
industry suggests that if the hull is not lengthened, the increase might be in the general range of
$100 million, or perhaps or more. If the hull were lengthened, the cost increase would be greater.
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This version of the DDG-51 design would include both additional vertical-launch tubes and an
improved radar, as well as features for reducing O&S costs. The purpose in procuring this version
would be to provide the fleet with improved IAMD capabilities. This option would require the
78 Some sources consulted by CRS believe that the 5-inch gun could be retained, even if the hull is not lengthened.
79 Some sources consulted by CRS believe that an additional electrical generator might not be needed.
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hull to be lengthened. The resulting ship would be more expensive in all respects (nonrecurring
design and engineering costs, procurement costs, and annual O&S costs) and more capable than
the other options discussed here.80 If the ship’s hull were lengthened by 55 or 56 feet, the
resulting ship might be roughly 25% more expensive to procure than the current Flight IIA
design, or perhaps more than that.
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Policymakers may consider the option of altering the current program for modernizing existing
DDG-51s81 so as to produce modernized ships with configurations similar to the modified
configurations discussed above for new-construction DDG-51s. Each of the modified
configurations discussed above might be achievable through modernizations of existing DDG-
51s.
Altering the DDG-51 modernization program to include such changes to the ship configuration
would
• increase the cost of the modernization program;
• increase the amount of shipyard work associated with each modernization, which
could have implications for supporting the shipbuilding industrial base (see
discussion below);
• produce ships with lower O&S costs than currently planned;
• produce ships that are aligned more closely with a possible policy goal of
providing the fleet with improved NSFS or IAMD capabilities; and
• permit the modernization effort to produce ships with improved NSFS
capabilities while the new-construction effort produces ships with improved
IAMD capabilities, or vice versa, thus pursuing both of these potential policy
goals.
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DDG-1000 design options that policymakers may consider include but are not necessarily limited
to those discussed below. As with the DDG-1000 options discussed above, modifying the DDG-
1000 design could incur additional nonrecurring design and engineering costs, and could affect
the estimated procurement cost of the ship.
80
Depending on the amount of reduction in annual O&S costs, it is possible that this ship might be comparable to, or less
expensive than, a baseline DDG-51 Flight IIA in terms of annual O&S costs.
81 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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This option would more closely align the DDG-1000 design with a goal of providing the fleet
with improved IAMD capabilities by removing the ship’s two AGSs and their magazines and
using the freed-up space for additional vertical launch tubes.
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This option, which would also more closely align the DDG-1000 design with a goal of providing
the fleet with improved IAMD capabilities, is similar to the previous option, except that the
DDG-1000 would also be equipped with a radar with more capability than the radar in the current
DDG-1000 design. (The higher-capability radar would use active-array technology, like the
current DDG-1000 radar, but would use that technology in a radar with more fully populated
arrays.) A radar with a certain amount of additional capability could be accommodated without
redesigning the DDG-1000 deck house; a radar with a greater amount of additional capability
could be accommodated through a partial redesign of the deckhouse (i.e., a redesign that would
affect the deckhouse but not require a change to the ship’s basic hull design). Due to the space
needed for the additional cooling units that would be needed to support a higher-capability radar,
this option might result in a smaller number of additional vertical launch tubes than the previous
option.
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This option would more closely align the DDG-1000 design with a goal of providing the fleet
with improved blue-water ASW capabilities by replacing the DDG-1000’s current bow-mounted
sonar, which is optimized for littoral (i.e., near-shore) ASW operations, with a bow-mounted
sonar optimized for blue-water ASW operations. The new sonar could be the same as, or similar
to, the DDG-51’s bow-mounted sonar. This option might be combined with either of the two
previous options to provide the fleet with improved IAMD and blue-water ASW capabilities.
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A September 12, 2008, press report relating to options such as those outlined above stated:
Raytheon [RTN] has a proposal on the table with the Navy to make the emergent Zumwalt-
class DDG-1000 destroyers missile defense platforms, according to a company official.
In an interview yesterday with sister publication Space and Missile Defense Report, Taylor
Lawrence, president of Raytheon Missile Systems, noted that the Zumwalt-class destroyers
have stealth capabilities, able to move in close to enemy shores without being detected by
enemy radar.
“The good thing about Zumwalt is, it’s really the advanced ship, with the advanced combat
system, and the advanced components of missiles and everything that brings it together to
give it ... the best capability that the Navy could have for the next few years,” Lawrence
said....
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“The thing we’re talking about right now is even more over and above some of the
capabilities that is in its [the Zumwalt] current requirements ... specifically about missile
defense,” Lawrence said.
“Is it a missile-defense-capable ship? And our answer—and we put proposals on the table—
is, it could be.”
A Zumwalt missile defense system would be equipped with the same family of missiles that
Raytheon built for the Aegis system, Lawrence added.
But, he added, the Zumwalt “would be a far more capable missile defense ship.”
Additionally, he said, “our proposal says let’s do some things that basically enhance the
missiles so that they’re compatible across, say, the Aegis system and the Zumwalt class and
then even our coalition partners.”
That would be accomplished, he said, by putting a data link on board the ships that “could
talk to either one ... can talk to Aegis, talk to Zumwalt, talk to our coalition partners. We
think that that’s really the future. You make the missile interoperable across all those
configurations. If you do that, then if the Navy chooses to make Zumwalt a missile-defense-
capable ship, it becomes very easy to do—and we think very affordable.”
The Zumwalt combat system could track an enemy missile, and “the Zumwalt could be,
then, a missile-defense-capable ship, with an SM-3 [interceptor], or SM-6, by itself,” with a
dual data link on the missile.
Thus far, the Navy hasn’t accepted the Raytheon offer, deciding that the Zumwalt “is not a
missile-defense-capable ship because they’ve decided, so far, not to buy that capability,”
Lawrence said.
But the same could be said of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers until they are upgraded with
the Aegis/SM-3 ballistic missile defense capability, he said. “These are ... enhancements to
the baseline destroyers, and you can do the enhancement to either one.”
Where all that comes down is a decision as to how many of each type of ship the Navy
wishes to procure. “The big debate is, how much of either one do you want to do,” Lawrence
said. “We believe that we have a proposal on the table that would make the Zumwalt the
most capable missile defense destroyer in the fleet. But [first] you need to do a few things to
the [interceptor] missiles, you need to do a few things to the combat system, you need to buy
that incremental capability.”
As well, Zumwalts could function well in area air warfare, taking out incoming enemy air
threats, Lawrence added.
“You put the SM-2s on board, eventually SM-6s, you got a very, very capable area air
warfare defense destroyer,” he said.82
82 Dave Ahearn, “Raytheon Pitching Missile Defense Variant of DDG-1000,” Defense Daily, September 12, 2008: 2-3.
Bracketed words and stock-symbol identifiers, as well as ellipses in the interiors of paragraphs, as in the original.
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Another option that policymakers may consider for improving the fleet’s IAMD capabilities in
the near term (i.e., prior to the start of CG(X) procurement) would be to procure a non-combat
ship equipped with a powerful radar to act as an adjunct platform for missile defense operations
and perhaps also air defense operations. The radar on the ship would be a large, active-array radar
that would be considerably more powerful, for example, than the improved radar that could be
installed on a modified DDG-51. The presence in the fleet of such a radar could significantly
improve the fleet’s IAMD capabilities. The ship might be similar to the Cobra Judy Replacement
ship currently under construction.83 A few or several such adjunct ships might be procured,
depending on the number of theaters to be covered, requirements for maintaining forward
deployments of such ships, and their homeporting arrangements. The ships would have little or no
self-defense capability and would need to be protected in threat situations by other Navy ships.
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Another option that policymakers may consider to improve the fleet’s IAMD capabilities in the
near term would be to alter the current program for modernizing Aegis cruisers (CG-47s)84 so as
to include the installation of an improved radar. This option would involve replacing the SPY-1
radar on existing CG-47s with an improved radar using active-array technology similar to the
technology used in the current DDG-1000 radar. This option would require the removal of one of
the CG-47’s two 5-inch guns, as well as the removal of some other mission equipment. It would
also require replacing the ship’s electrical generators and cooling equipment with more capable
models, and replacing the ship’s electrical distribution system.
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Another option that policymakers may consider for improving the fleet’s NSFS capabilities would
be to procure a modified LPD-17 hull equipped with two AGSs has been suggested by both the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
(CSBA) as a potential alternative to procuring DDG-1000s. The two guns and their magazines
would be installed in the aft part of the ship, which would degrade or eliminate the LPD-17
design’s well deck and aviation capabilities. CBO estimated in 2006 that an initial AGS-armed
LPD-17 might cost about $1.9 billion, including $400 million detailed design and nonrecurring
engineering costs, and that subsequent ships might cost about $1.5 billion each.85
83 The Cobra Judy Replacement (CJR) ship is intended to replace the missile range instrumentation ship Observation
Island (TAGM-23). Observation Island is a converted merchant ship operated by the Navy for the U.S. Air Force. The
ship is equipped with a powerful radar, called Cobra Judy, that is used for collecting technical information on foreign-
country ballistic missiles in flight. For more on the CJR program, see http://acquisition.navy.mil/programs/
information_communications/cjr
84 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
85 See Congressional Budget Office, Options for the Navy’s Future Fleet, May 2006, pp. 56-57 (Box 3-1).
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Another option that policymakers may consider for improving the fleet’s NSFS capabilities would
be to procure LHA-6 amphibious assault ships (earlier known as LHA Replacement, or LHA(R)
class ships) to a modified design featuring a lengthened hull and up to four AGSs. One option for
such a modified design would lengthen the LHA-6 hull by 56 to 77 feet forward of the ship’s
deckhouse (i.e., it’s “island” superstructure) and place four AGSs forward of the deckhouse, along
the starboard (i.e., right) edge of the ship. Supporters of this option might argue that building new
LHA-6 class ships to this modified configuration rather than to the current design (which is
equipped with no major-caliber guns) would increase LHA-6 procurement costs by a relatively
small percentage and thus permit the Navy to introduce AGSs into the fleet at a relatively low
additional cost. Supporters might argue that the ship could continue to fire its AGSs while taking
on additional LRLAP shells for the AGSs through the ship’s well deck, creating an “infinite
magazine” similar to that in the DDG-1000 design. Supporters might argue that the location of
the AGSs could permit them to be installed and used with potentially little reduction to the ship’s
other capabilities.
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One potential oversight issue for Congress in FY2009 concerned the timing of the Navy’s
announcement its change in position on destroyer procurement. The announcement came well
after the submission of the Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget and the spring budget-review
hearings held by the House and Senate Armed Services committees and the Defense
subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. A potential oversight
question for Congress was, Why did the Navy not announce its changed position prior to the
budget submission, or at least prior to the spring budget-review hearings?
An October 9, 2008, news report quoting Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, the Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources, stated:
McCullough added that the process the Navy undertook to make its decision was done right.
“First we conducted an in-depth evaluation [within] the Navy. Once we came to the
conclusion that rendered the decision that the Navy made then we socialized this with OSD,
because we want to have a solidified Navy position and then we wanted a solidified ‘big’
department-wide position. Once we received approval from OSD to go forward, that’s when
we took it to Congress,” he explained. “That’s the right way to do it.”
It wasn’t approval of the plan, McCullough added, it was the approval to go to Congress with
the Navy’s proposal. “That’s what we did. We think that’s the right way to do business.”
“From the outside, it looks like the timing was bad. The timing was hard and we realized that, but
we wanted to make sure we had the decision right and then we wanted to make sure we briefed
OSD on where we wanted to take the Navy and then go to Congress,” McCullough said. “As I
look back on it, I really think we did it right, and it’s required some intense socialization with
industry, with members of Congress that have an interest in it from an industrial base concern.86
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A second potential oversight issue in FY2009 concerned the availability of the Navy’s analytical
basis for its new position on destroyer procurement. The Navy testified at the July 31, 2008,
hearing that the service’s new position is based on an analysis performed in the Assessment
division (N81) of the Navy’s Resources, Requirements and Assessments office (N8). As of the
July 31 hearing, the Navy had not shared the analysis with at least some of the Members present
at the hearing, who asked to see the analysis. Potential oversight questions for Congress included
the following:
86 Geoff Fein, “Navy Needs Ships It Can Evolve To Meet Growing Ballistic, Cruise Missile Threats, Official Says,”
Defense Daily, October 9, 2008.
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• When does the Navy intend to share its analysis with Members of Congress and
congressional staff who have not yet seen it?
• When was the analysis performed, and what DOD offices, parts of the Navy
other than N81, or industry firms participated in the analysis?
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A third potential oversight issue for Congress in FY2009 concerned the Navy’s changed threat
assessment. Potential oversight questions for Congress included the following:
• What are the specific developments over the last two years concerning ballistic
missiles, ASCMs, and submarines that caused the Navy to alter its threat
assessment? (The Navy indicated at the July 31 hearing that it could discuss this
matter in detail only in a classified setting.)87
• Is the Navy correct in its judgment that these developments require reorienting
destroyer procurement over the next several years toward a goal of improving the
fleet’s BMD, area-defense AAW, and blue-water ASW capabilities?
• Why, after arguing for years that the Navy needs the improved NSFS capabilities
of the DDG-1000, does the Navy now believe that it has more than enough
capability in this area? What recent changes in warfighting scenarios, concepts of
operations, or acquisition programs have occurred to support this conclusion?
Does the Marine Corps agree with the Navy that there is more than enough NSFS
capability?
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The discussion below provides additional information bearing on the issue of the Navy’s changed
assessment regarding the adequacy of Navy NSFS capabilities.
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A March 2006 Navy report to Congress on the Navy’s NSFS programs stated:
In the 1970’s, the Navy adopted the 5-inch/54-caliber gun as the standard gun system aboard
surface combatants [i.e., cruisers and destroyers] with [the gun having] a range of 13 nautical
miles (nm). It was intended for general purpose use against surface craft, slow moving
aircraft, and near shore targets. Additionally, four IOWA Class BBs [battleships] were
brought back into service to provide longer-range shore fire support.
With the retirement of the [Iowa-class] battleships in 1992, the surface Navy was left with
only the short-range 5-inch/54 caliber guns to conduct Naval gunfire support missions. New
and improved coastal defense systems meant the Navy must develop platforms capable of
87 A October 9, 2008, news report quoted Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Integration of Capabilities and Resources, as stating: “I have had several classified briefings with staffers and members
[of Congress] to explain how rapidly the threat has changed over the last three years. It’s hard to talk about that in an
open hearing.” (Geoff Fein, “Navy Needs Ships It Can Evolve To Meet Growing Ballistic, Cruise Missile Threats,
Official Says,” Defense Daily, October 9, 2008.)
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delivering fires ashore from greater distances than were achievable with the MK45 Mod 2,
5”/54 caliber gun.
In the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1992 and FY1993, Congress directed the
Navy to “establish a Naval surface fire support R&D [research and development] program”
and investigate “potential technologies and weapons systems for improving ship-to-shore fire
support,” as well as to formally “report on ship-to-shore fire support requirements.” The
Navy was also tasked to conduct a cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) based
on their findings. The Secretary of Defense, through the Institute for Defense Analysis
(IDA), was required to provide an additional study of requirements and cost effective
alternatives. The Navy and Marine Corps signed a Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS)
Mission Needs Statement in July 1992, emphasizing the importance of NSFS in support of
amphibious operations.
Results from the Navy’s NSFS study, the IDA study, and the NSFS COEA shared a common
theme: a combination of systems are required and precision guided munitions are needed to
maintain accuracy across longer ranges for NSFS. The Navy’s NSFS COEA, issued in
March 1994, found that a new 155-mm, 60-caliber gun with an advanced propellant and
precision-guided munitions, coupled with the Tomahawk missile, is the most cost effective
NSFS solution. The Navy proposed a research and development program to develop the 155-
mm gun and accompanying precision guided munition, as well as upgrade the current MK45,
Mod 2, 5”/54 gun, resident on guided missile cruisers and destroyers, to achieve greater
ranges until the new 155-mm gun became operational. Based on affordability and timeliness,
the Chief o f Naval Operations (CNO) approved a new NSFS plan in December 1994, to
focus on a “near term” NSFS solution by upgrading the existing 5”/54 gun to allow for
increased range and to develop an accompanying 5-inch precision guided munition. Plans to
develop the near-term 155-mm gun and munitions were cancelled, but were kept in
consideration as a long term NSFS solution. The 155 mm solution is currently supported by
the Advanced Gun System (AGS), which will be installed on DD(X) [i.e., DDG-1000].
Today the Navy continues to invest in NSFS requirements. The MK45 Mod 2, 5”/54 gun has
been upgraded to a MK45 Mod 4, 5”/62 gun, and the Naval Fires Control System has
achieved Initial Operating Capability (IOC). The extended range 5” munition [or ERM—also
known as the Extended Range Guided Munition, or ERGM] suffered setbacks due to
technical and financial constraints, but is scheduled for a FY 2011 IOC. DD(X) will be
delivered with AGS and the Long [R]ange Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) in FY 2013 to
satisfy mid term requirements. In addition, the Navy continues research on potential
technologies that will answer far term requirements.
NSFS requirements have recently been validated and documented in accordance with the
Joint Capability Integration and Development System [JCIDS} through the Joint Fires in
Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littoral Initial Capabilities Document (ICD),
known as the Joint Fires ICD. This Joint Fires ICD defines the NSFS measures of
effectiveness for various ranges of military operations from major combat operations to the
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and identified four capability gaps not covered by the
existing systems and programs of record....
From 1996 to 2002, in various letters to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Marine Corps
established NSFS requirements that mirrored the range, volume of fire, and lethality of
current ground based artillery systems. Specifically, the capability of the 155-mm towed
artillery with rocket-assisted projected was noted. NSFS requirements were expressed in
specific detail in terms of “near,” “mid,” and “far” term requirements.
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1. Near term requirements were defined as 41 to 63nm. (Standoff distance (25nm) plus
maximum range of Marine Corps 155-mm artillery (16nm) plus range for threat artillery
(22nm)
2. Mid term requirements were defined as 63 to 97nm. (Operational radius of CH-46E
(75nm) plus range for threat artillery (22nm)
3. Far term requirements were described as 97 to 262nm. (Range of the MV-22 (240nm) plus
range for threat artillery (22nm)....
The Joint Fires ICD incorporates the requirements of the U.S. Army, Special Operations
Command, and other applicable organizations. The Joint Fires ICD defined four requirement
gaps that are currently not filled:
(1) Ability to transmit/receive required targeting information from Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance sources to command and control systems.
(2) Ability to engage moving point and moving area targets under adverse weather
conditions.
(3) Ability to engage known/identified targets when friendly forces are in close contact or
when collateral damage is a concern.
(4) Ability to provide volume fires to suppress targets.
The Navy continues to work to close these joint gaps. SACC(A) [the Supporting Arms
Coordination Center (Automated)] significantly closes gap (1). The use of ERM and LRLAP
projectiles frees up tactical air assets in order to engage moving targets, thus minimizing gap
(2). ERM and LRLAP will significantly close gap (3). The use of MRSI [Multiple Round
Simultaneous Impact] capability of ERM and LRLAP has demonstrated the ability to play a
role in minimizing the volume fires requirement of gap (4)....
The Navy’s NSFS Program was initiated as part of a larger strategy to meet USMC [U.S.
Marine Corps] stated requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. However, NSFS
will support all Joint maneuver forces ashore at extended ranges and will provide responsive
and persistent fire support for all other operations. The NSFS program will represent
economy over time as fewer rounds will be required to achieve the desired effects on most
targets due to greatly enhanced accuracy, precision and lethality. Ships will no longer need to
fire 300 rounds to cover one target during a fire support mission for units ashore. An
individual target may potentially be engaged with as few as two rounds more accurately,
more quickly, and at a greater range than is currently possible. Programs such as ERM and
LRLAP represent transformation capabilities first conceived in 1992, and continue today to
provide balance to the fire support triad [consisting of NSFS, close air support from tactical
air, and organic fires from artillery and mortars].88
The report includes views and recommendations of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps. The CNO’s views and recommendations state in part:
88 Report to Congress On Naval Surface Fire Support, Prepared by: Director of Surface Warfare, Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, March 2006, pp. 1-2, 4, 7, 10. Although the report is dated March 2006 on its cover, the
accompanying transmission letters to Congress are dated April 4, 2006.
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The Extended Range Munition (ERM) and Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) are
the first sea fired NSFS weapons designed specifically to support the land battle and the
challenging “call for fire” environment at extended ranges....
Finally, I am most encouraged by the efforts of the Navy-Marine Corps team to get our
NSFS requirements approved by the Joint Staff. We have received JROC [Joint
Requirements Oversight Council] approval of the Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary
Operations in the Littorals Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) and the ERM Capability
Development Document (CDD). 2006 also marks the kick off of a far-reaching NSFS
Analysis of Alternatives that will set the course for future acquisition programs. It is
important that the Navy ensures the Joint Force Commander has a robust capability to
support ground forces at all times and in all conditions.89
The Commandant’s views and recommendations state in part:
Firepower, including responsive, lethal, and persistent fires from U.S. Navy surface ships, is
essential in expeditionary operations against irregular and conventional forces. A robust set
of round-the-clock (24/7), all-weather, sea-based fire support capabilities is fundamental to
the success of naval or special operations forces engaged in littoral combat operations. As we
look at operating across an extended battlefield, Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS)
capability will require greater range, volume, and accuracy....
In December 2005, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated the Joint Fires in
Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals Initial Capabilities Document (ICD),
and recognized NSFS as a potential solution for mitigating several of the identified fire
support gaps to include—the ability to engage targets in close support of maneuver forces or
with collateral damage concerns, and the ability to provide volume fires over a large area or
for sustained periods of time (e.g., suppression)....
Our existing liabilities in conventional ammunition are range and availability. Current NSFS
systems remain our only available all-weather fires capability for ship to shore operations;
however, at 13 nautical miles (nm), conventional 5” ammunition does not meet our
requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare....
The use of Tactical Tomahawk [TACTOM—the newest version of the Tomahawk land
attack missile] for tactical-level fire support is not feasible. While designed to be more
flexible and responsive, relative to conventional [i.e., earlier-design] Tomahawk missiles, the
release authority and cost of the TACTOM drive it to remaining a strike weapon suited for
operational and strategic employment....
As the planned second phase of the NSFS roadmap, the DD(X) [i.e., DDG-1000], in
conjunction with the DDGs’ ERGM fires, is a program of record that is planned to satisfy the
Marine Corps’ NSFS requirements. With two 155 Advanced Gun Systems (AGS) and 600
Long Range Land Attack Projectiles (LRLAP) per ship capable of engaging targets with
precision accuracy in excess of 63nm (threshold [objective]), the DD(X) provides the range,
lethality, and volume to address a larger piece of the target set, complementing the DDG’s
NSFS capabilities. DD(X) provides our first integrated, sea-based counter-fire capability....
We have a requirement for counter-fire detection capability. DD(X) will have the first
integrated counter-fire system that will address this capability gap. An interim capability is
required. The Marine Corps would like to see this capability proliferated to all AEGIS
89 Report to Congress On Naval Surface Fire Support, Chief of Naval Operations’ views and recommendations.
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equipped surface combatants. Integration of a CBR [counter-battery radar] functionality into
AEGIS may represent a relatively low cost solution to meet this capability requirement.90
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A November 2006 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on NSFS stated:
In December 2005, more than a decade after the Navy and Marine Corps began to formulate
requirements, agreement was reached on the capabilities needed for naval surface fire
support. However, quantifiable measures are still lacking for volume of fire—the delivery of
a large quantity of munitions simultaneously or over a period of time to suppress or destroy a
target. Until further quantifiable requirements are set for volume of fire, it is difficult to
assess whether additional investment is necessary or the form it should take.
The Navy’s Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer have cost more, taken
longer to develop and field than anticipated, and will deliver fewer capabilities than
originally promised. Largely due to technical challenges, the Extended Range Munition is
expected to exceed the original cost estimate for development by 550 percent, and the Navy
has delayed delivery of initial capability by 11 years. The munition’s path for development
and fielding remains uncertain as key technologies and munition design have not been
adequately demonstrated. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently assumed oversight
of the program, and while a comprehensive review has not yet been held, there are ongoing
studies that could assist such a review. The Navy has reduced Zumwalt class land attack
munitions by 50 percent and cut ship quantities from 32 to 7. The primary reason for reduced
capabilities are cost pressures created by the Navy’s original concept of revolutionary
performance at an unrealistically low cost. The Navy plans to begin construction of the first
two ships in the Zumwalt class in fiscal year 2008.
The recent study of future fire support needs approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council identifies four capability gaps: command and control of fire support; engaging
moving targets in poor weather; engaging targets when collateral damage is a concern; and
engaging targets that require a large volume of fire. The analysis that forms the basis of the
joint study contends that while the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer
offer significant capabilities in some scenarios, they do not provide enough capability to
meet all fire support needs. The Navy, through its surface warfare directorate, has begun
analyzing the three engagement gaps, but the Navy has not chosen an organization to analyze
the gap in command and control, which is essential for target assignment and information.
Any attempts to accept the risks or invest in programs to fill remaining gaps should also
involve the expeditionary warfare directorate as the Marine Corps representative. The
expeditionary warfare directorate does not have a formal role in developing requirements,
determining capabilities, and managing resources for systems that provide naval surface fire
support.91
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In late March 2008, the Navy announced that it would cease funding the development of the
ERGM due to dissatisfaction with the development program’s progress.92 The ERGM was
90 Report to Congress On Naval Surface Fire Support, Commandant of the Marine Corps’ views and recommendations.
91 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Challenges Remain in Developing Capabilities for
Naval Surface Fire Support, GAO-07-115, November 2006, summary page.
92 See, for example, Dan Taylor, “Navy To Examine Its Options After Pulling Plug on Munition Program,” Inside the
(continued...)
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intended to extend the firing range of the Aegis ships’ 5-inch guns to 50 nautical miles, or almost
four times their current range of 13 nautical miles. The Navy reportedly is considering possible
alternatives to ERGM for an extended-range 5-inch shell.93 Skeptics might argue that, until a
replacement for the ERGM program is identified and funded, the Navy’s termination of the
ERGM program would, other things held equal, increase the apparent need for procuring a ship
equipped with the AGS and the LRLAP.
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A September 22, 2008, press report states:
Under the direction of senior Pentagon leadership, the Navy and Marine Corps will study
gaps in naval surface fires support for Marines ashore, a capability once advertised as the
reason the Navy needed to build the new DDG-1000 destroyer.
A Sept. 8 joint memorandum for the record signed by Lt. Gen. George Flynn, commander of
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, deputy
chief of naval operations for integration of resources and capabilities, states that the Office of
the Secretary of Defense has directed the two services to conduct a joint expeditionary fires
analysis of alternatives in time for a Defense Acquisition Executive Review slated for June
2009.
“We believe this [analysis] is the appropriate process to determine the best solution for
current gaps in 24/7 expeditionary fire support with an eye to refining the role of [naval
surface fires support] in meeting Marine Corps and joint needs across the range of military
operations,” the three-star officers write in the memo.
“We expect the [study] to underpin the Department of the Navy strategy for [naval surface
fires support] out to the 2020 time frame, synchronizing our weapons, shipbuilding and
supporting capabilities efforts and investments,” Flynn and McCullough add.
In a speech last week, McCullough said the Navy is not “walking away” from providing
naval surface fires despite the planned truncation of the DDG-1000 program to three hulls,
down from seven, in favor of building more DDG-51 vessels, which lack the littoral
capabilities long cited as the reason the service needed the newer ship.
“I’ve been asked [in light of the DDG-1000 decision] if we were walking away from the
fires,” McCullough said Sept. 16 at a luncheon sponsored by the Surface Navy Association.
“Nothing could be further from the truth.”
However, retired Marine Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, who led Marine Corps Combat
Development Command in the mid-1990s, expressed doubt that the latest study will produce
any concrete result.
(...continued)
Navy, March 31, 2008. See also William Matthews, “Guided Munition May Be Canceled,” NavyTimes.com, March 21,
2008; Geoff Fein, “Navy Likely To Terminate ERGM Program In Coming Days,” Defense Daily, March 24, 2008;
William Matthews, “End of ERGM Spotlights Other Future Guns,” NavyTimes.com, April 1, 2008.
93 See, for example, Dan Taylor, “Navy To Examine Its Options After Pulling Plug on Munition Program,” Inside the
Navy, March 31, 2008; Tom Kington, “U.S. navy Eyes Italian Guided Munition,” Defense News, May 12, 2008: 10;
“Starting Over,” Defense Daily, June 9, 2008; Geoff Fein, “BAE-Lockheed Martin Partner To Develop ERM For
Navy,” Defense Daily, July 3, 2008.
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“For 12 years the Navy has repeatedly sought letters or requested studies detailing the
Marine Corps’ naval surface fire-support requirements,” Van Riper wrote in an e-mail to
Inside the Navy. “When provided such specific requirements Navy leaders have acted
irresolutely. In several cases they touted new technologies that never lived up to their
promises. I am not convinced that the Navy has been or is serious today about naval surface
fire support.”...
In March, the Navy pulled the plug on Raytheon’s Extended Range Guided Munition
(ERGM) program due to myriad developmental issues. ERGM was meant to fill the Navy’s
extended range munition (ERM) requirement for a five-inch precision projectile with an
enhanced range and greater accuracy than current munitions.
The Navy canceled the ERGM program entirely in July.
“We are still very interested in firing an extended range projectile,” McCullough said last
week when asked about the subject.
Yet, retired Marine officers such as Van Riper remain doubtful of the Navy’s sincerity in
such efforts.
“Based on my own experiences and having observed since 1995 the Navy’s failure to
adequately support improvements to naval surface fire support, I am skeptical that this latest
effort will be any different than those of the past,” Van Riper said.
Robert Work, a naval analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
explained that the Marine Corps wants fire support in a range of 41 to 63 nautical miles with
the ultimate goal of 200-plus nautical miles in order to support an MV-22 Osprey insertion.
However, challenges remain to reaching this goal.
“Are you going to be able to have a five-inch round that goes 41 to 63 nautical miles?” Work
said. “What type of rounds would allow you to fire at a greater range? Also, are there other
platforms that you can put the Advanced Gun System on? How would loitering [unmanned
aerial vehicles] with small-diameter bombs help you?”
Work suggested that arming UAVs with bombs could be considerably cheaper than firing the
AGS.
Naval surface fires are important to Marines to allow naval maneuver.
“When you have naval maneuver and when you are doing naval maneuver close to a coast,
being able to be covered by fire is an extreme advantage,” Work said. “It’s a capability that
is useful, but the question you have to ask is, how much do you need and how much are you
willing to pay for it? And what is the most cost-effective way to do it?”94
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A September 29, 2008, press report states:
94 Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy, Marine Corps To Study Naval Surface Fires Requirement Gaps,” Inside the Navy,
September 22, 2008. Words in brackets as in original.
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A variety of platforms could end up providing naval surface fires for Marine Corps forces
ashore, Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, the Navy’s top programmer, told Inside the Navy last
week....
“I don’t think there’s going to be one material solution to this mission set, I think it’s going
to end up being multiple material solutions,” McCullough said in a Sept. 24 interview. “I
think that’s what we need to go after so that we have a variety of platforms that can service
those requirements.”...
“We remain fully committed to naval surface fires requirements both for the Marine Corps
and for the joint force,” McCullough said....
“We have looked at putting AGS on the DDG-51 hull and believe that’s viable,” he said.
“Now whether we choose to do that or not, we’ll see, but that is a viable alternative.”
The LPD-17 amphibious ship has been considered by naval analysts as a possible candidate
for AGS as well.
“LPD-17 is a huge ship; we haven’t looked at it specifically, but it would seem to me we
could probably put it on there,” McCullough said when asked about the possibility.
Further, the sea service will continue to pursue an extended range five-inch projectile despite
the cancellation of Raytheon’s Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM) program earlier
this year due to myriad developmental issues. ERGM was meant to fill the Navy’s extended
range munition (ERM) requirement for a five-inch precision projectile with an enhanced
range and greater accuracy than current munitions.
“We’re going to recommence efforts to get at a five-inch extended range projectile,”
McCullough said last week.
Another option for the surface fires mix the admiral predicts is to use the Non-Line of Sight
missile system being developed for the Littoral Combat Ship.
“If you look at the Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) missile system that we put on LCS, that’s got
a GPS guidance capability and could be used for fires,” the three-star admiral suggested. “It
currently has a range in excess of 20 miles and while that doesn’t meet the current threshold
of 41 miles, it’s well in excess of our current capability with five-inch projectiles and the net-
explosive weight of the projectile and NLOS missile is about the same.”
However, despite McCullough’s statements defending the Navy’s commitment to providing
Marines with naval surface fires, some retired Marine officers remain doubtful.
“When provided such specific requirements Navy leaders have acted irresolutely,” retired
Marine Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper wrote in a recent e-mail. “In several cases they touted new
technologies that never lived up to their promises. I am not convinced that the Navy has been
or is serious today about naval surface fire support.”
Naval analyst Robert Work, a vice president at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, told ITN [Inside the Navy] recently that surface fires are important to provide
for naval maneuver, but questions linger about how much is needed and at what cost.
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“When you have naval maneuver and when you are doing naval maneuver close to a coast,
being able to be covered by fire is an extreme advantage,” Work said. “It’s a capability that
is useful, but the question you have to ask is, how much do you need and how much are you
willing to pay for it? And what is the most cost-effective way to do it?”95
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A fourth potential oversight issue for Congress for FY2009 concerned the Navy’s selection of the
Flight IIA DDG-51 as its preferred ship to procure over the next several years for responding to
the changed threat assessment. Potential questions for Congress included the following:
• What options did the Navy examine for modifying the DDG-1000 design so as to
improve its capabilities for area-defense AAW, BMD, and blue-water ASW? As
discussed in Appendix D, such options might include giving the ship an ability
to employ the SM-2 missile so as to provide area-defense AAW; removing one or
both of the DDG-1000’s two AGSs and installing additional missile-launch tubes
in their place; equipping the ship with a more powerful radar; and replacing the
ship’s sonar with one better optimized for blue-water ASW operations. Are such
modifications technically feasible, what would they cost, and how would they
change DDG-1000 program risks?
• What options did the Navy examine for modifying the Flight IIA DDG-51 design
so as to reduce its O&S costs or improve its capabilities for BMD and area-
defense AAW? (For a discussion of potential such options, see Appendix D.) Are
such modifications technically feasible, what would they cost, and how would
they change DDG-51 program risks?
• How does the Navy’s preferred option of procuring Flight IIA DDG-51s compare
with the options of procuring modified DDG-1000s or modified DDG-51s in
terms of factors such as overall acquisition cost; life-cycle O&S cost; capabilities
provided; technical, cost, and schedule risk; implications (if any) for the CG(X)
program; and industrial-base implications? Did the Navy accurately measure and
assess all these factors in deciding in favor of procuring Flight IIA DDG-51s?
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Regarding the DDG-1000’s ability to fire the SM-2 missile and conduct area-defense AAW
operations, to eventually accept the successor SM-6 AAW interceptor, and to be modified to
conduct BMD operations using the SM-3 BMD interceptor, a September 2, 2008, press report
states:
The DDG-1000 2004 JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council]-approved Operational
Requirements Document [ORD] clearly states, “DDX [i.e., DDG-1000] will establish local
air superiority using the SM-2 family of Surface to Air Missiles.” This capability is included
in the requirements and design of the DDG-1000 today, a Raytheon spokesperson tells
Defense Daily. Overall, at baseline configuration, the Zumwalt [DDG-1000] Dual Band
Radar (DBR) has 37 percent better performance than a SPY-1 D [radar on a DDG-51] in a
95 Zachary M. Peterson, “McCullough: Mix of Solutions For Naval Surface Fires Is Likely,” Inside the Navy,
September 29, 2008.
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blue water AAW environment and 50 percent better performance in a littoral environment,
the spokesperson says. “Further, the Zumwalt radar suite is specifically designed for
capability growth for the emerging BMD mission. This is achieved by simply ‘fully
populating’ the [DBR] array faces with additional electronics,” the spokesperson adds. “The
most affordable and quickest path to upgrade to even more superior AAW and BMD is via
the completion of the DDG-1000 TSCE-based96 mission equipment. Our estimate is that it
would be about one-quarter the cost of upgrading the DDG-51 system and would result in
200+ percent more capability for BMD.”...
“As previously stated, Zumwalt mission equipment was designed to accommodate the SM-2
family of missiles and is therefore easily scalable to accommodate the SM-3 and SM-6,” the
spokesperson notes. “Traditionally, [the Navy] funds the ships-side of a weapon for the ship-
side of the interface and missile-side of the weapon for the missile-side of the interface.
Confusion arises when interface changes to the S[M]-2 family of missiles are attributed to
the ship-side.” The missile interface changes required are known and “costed,” the
spokesperson adds. “The cost to modify the [SM-2] missile for Zumwalt is approximately
four times less than redesigning the DDG-51 radar, C2 and significant HM&E97
modifications which are represented in the [DDG-51] modernization budgets.”...
“The U.S. Navy-initiated technology study, [called] TI-37, concluded in 2003/04 that the
SM-6 could be integrated into the TSCE-based mission system at relatively low cost to either
the ship system or the missile, due to the flexibility of the DDG-1000 open architecture,” the
spokesperson says. “In February 2008, a detailed technical paper was presented showing a
clear path to the integration of the SM-3 missile into DDG-1000 with only minor changes
due to the open architecture flexibility built into the DDG-1000. All of this data was
delivered to the [Navy] in a non-proprietary form per the requirements of the DDG-1000
program.”98
A September 12, 2008, press report relating to potential modified versions of the current DDG-
1000 design stated:
Raytheon [RTN] has a proposal on the table with the Navy to make the emergent Zumwalt-
class DDG-1000 destroyers missile defense platforms, according to a company official.
In an interview yesterday with sister publication Space and Missile Defense Report, Taylor
Lawrence, president of Raytheon Missile Systems, noted that the Zumwalt-class destroyers
have stealth capabilities, able to move in close to enemy shores without being detected by
enemy radar.
“The good thing about Zumwalt is, it’s really the advanced ship, with the advanced combat
system, and the advanced components of missiles and everything that brings it together to
give it ... the best capability that the Navy could have for the next few years,” Lawrence
said....
96 This is a reference to the Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE), the computer system and software for moving
information around the DDG-1000.
97 This is a reference to the ship’s basic hull, mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) systems.
98 Consecutive short items entitled “To Build Or Not To Build,” “Standard Missiles,” and “Missile Integration,” in
“Defense Watch,” Defense Daily, September 2, 2008. The bracketed phrase, “[the Navy],” appears in the original; other
bracketed phrases added by CRS.
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“The thing we’re talking about right now is even more over and above some of the
capabilities that is in its [the Zumwalt] current requirements ... specifically about missile
defense,” Lawrence said.
“Is it a missile-defense-capable ship? And our answer—and we put proposals on the table—
is, it could be.”
A Zumwalt missile defense system would be equipped with the same family of missiles that
Raytheon built for the Aegis system, Lawrence added.
But, he added, the Zumwalt “would be a far more capable missile defense ship.”
Additionally, he said, “our proposal says let’s do some things that basically enhance the
missiles so that they’re compatible across, say, the Aegis system and the Zumwalt class and
then even our coalition partners.”
That would be accomplished, he said, by putting a data link on board the ships that “could
talk to either one ... can talk to Aegis, talk to Zumwalt, talk to our coalition partners. We
think that that’s really the future. You make the missile interoperable across all those
configurations. If you do that, then if the Navy chooses to make Zumwalt a missile-defense-
capable ship, it becomes very easy to do—and we think very affordable.”
The Zumwalt combat system could track an enemy missile, and “the Zumwalt could be,
then, a missile-defense-capable ship, with an SM-3 [interceptor], or SM-6, by itself,” with a
dual data link on the missile.
Thus far, the Navy hasn’t accepted the Raytheon offer, deciding that the Zumwalt “is not a
missile-defense-capable ship because they’ve decided, so far, not to buy that capability,”
Lawrence said.
But the same could be said of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers until they are upgraded with
the Aegis/SM-3 ballistic missile defense capability, he said. “These are ... enhancements to
the baseline destroyers, and you can do the enhancement to either one.”
Where all that comes down is a decision as to how many of each type of ship the Navy
wishes to procure. “The big debate is, how much of either one do you want to do,” Lawrence
said. “We believe that we have a proposal on the table that would make the Zumwalt the
most capable missile defense destroyer in the fleet. But [first] you need to do a few things to
the [interceptor] missiles, you need to do a few things to the combat system, you need to buy
that incremental capability.”
As well, Zumwalts could function well in area air warfare, taking out incoming enemy air
threats, Lawrence added.
“You put the SM-2s on board, eventually SM-6s, you got a very, very capable area air
warfare defense destroyer,” he said.99
99 Dave Ahearn, “Raytheon Pitching Missile Defense Variant of DDG-1000,” Defense Daily, September 12, 2008: 2-3.
Bracketed words and stock-symbol identifiers, as well as ellipses in the interiors of paragraphs, as in the original.
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Regarding the question of comparative costs for procuring DDG-1000s or DDG-51s, CBO
believes that DDG-1000s will cost about 55% more to build than the Navy estimates. (The
substantial difference of opinion between the Navy and CBO on estimated DDG-1000
construction costs has been a major DDG-1000 program oversight issue; for further discussion of
the issue, see the section entitled “Accuracy of Navy Cost Estimate” in Appendix F.) Using a
hypothetical annual procurement rate for DDG-51s that differs from the Navy’s proposed profile
as shown earlier in Table 1, CBO testified at the July 31 hearing that:
Building the newest generation of destroyers and cruisers—the DDG-1000 Zumwalt class
guided-missile destroyer and the CG(X) future cruiser (the intended replacement for the
Ticonderoga class guided-missile cruiser)—would probably cost significantly more than the
Navy estimates.
Building two DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class destroyers—the class of destroyer currently in
use—per year would cost less than building one DDG-1000 per year. Procuring three DDG-
51s per year would cost about 35 percent more than buying a single DDG-1000. Counting
projected operating costs over a period of 35 years, the total ownership cost of five DDG-
1000s would almost equal that of eight DDG-51s.100
Table E-1, below, reproduces a table from CBO’s July 31 testimony showing CBO’s estimates of
the comparative costs of procuring DDG-1000s and DDG-51s at certain annual rates. The annual
rates shown in the table for procuring DDG-51s differ from the Navy’s proposed profile shown
earlier in Table 2.
Table E-1. CBO Estimates of Costs for Procuring
DDG-1000s or DDG-51s
(FY2009-FY2013, in billions of constant FY2009 dollars)
09
10 11 12 13
Total
DDG-1000 (one per year)a
3.7
3.8 3.6 3.7 3.6 18.5
DDG-51 (annual procurement rate starting in FY2010)
One per year
0.4b 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 9.6
Two per year
0.4b 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.9 15.7
Three per year
0.4b 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 21.4
Memorandum:
DDG-1000
(Navy’s
estimate)
2.5
2.5 2.2 2.3 2.0 11.4
Source: Table reproduced from Statement of Eric J. Labs, Senior Analyst, [on] The Navy’s Surface Combatant
Programs before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
House of Representatives, July 31, 2008, Table 2 on p. 7. The notes below are reproduced from the original
table.
Notes: All figures include outfitting and post-delivery costs. The Navy has announced that it will recommend
ending the DDG-1000 program at two ships and resume building DDG-51s in 2010.
100 Statement of Eric J. Labs, Senior Analyst, [on] The Navy’s Surface Combatant Programs before the Subcommittee
on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, July 31, 2008,
p. 1.
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a. Figures exclude amounts needed to pay for potential cost overruns on the first two DDG-1000s.
b. Figure represents an assumption about the costs of restarting the production of DDG-51s.
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A fifth potential oversight issue for FY2009 concerned Navy information on the question of
whether the DDG-1000 can employ the SM-2 (i.e., Standard Missile, version 2) air-defense
interceptor missile, and consequently perform area-defense AAW.101 The Navy testified at the
July 31, 2008, hearing that the DDG-1000 cannot successfully employ the SM-2, and
consequently cannot perform area-defense AAW. This came as a surprise to observers who have
believed for years that the DDG-1000 could employ the SM-2 and perform area-defense AAW.
This belief was based in part on the following:
• Navy briefing slides on the DD(X)/DDG-1000 program from 2002 to 2008 have
consistently listed the Standard Missile as among the weapons to be carried by
the DDG-1000.
• The Navy’s designation of the ship in 2006 as DDG-1000 (meaning a guided
missile destroyer with hull number 1000) rather than DD-1000 (meaning
destroyer with hull number 1000) implied that the ship would have an area-
defense AAW capability. For U.S. Navy surface combatants, the use of a “G”
(meaning a guided missile ship) in the ship’s designation traditionally has meant
that the ship was equipped with an area-defense AAW system.
The Navy’s FY2009 budget submission contains, in the service’s research and development
account, a project that appears aimed at making changes to SM-2 Block IIIB missile (the
currently used version of the SM-2) so as to integrate the SM-2 Block IIIB with the DDG-1000
combat system. The description of the project states in part that:
Production representative missiles will be built between FY10 & FY12 for the 21 missiles
that the DDG 1000 require for Developmental Test & Operational Test (DT&OT) in FY12
and FY13. SM2 IIIB will have dual use on AEGIS Cruisers/Destroyers & DDG 1000.102
As mentioned in the previous section, a September 2, 2008, press report states that:
The DDG-1000 2004 JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council]-approved Operational
Requirements Document [ORD] clearly states, “DDX [i.e., DDG-1000] will establish local
air superiority using the SM-2 family of Surface to Air Missiles.” This capability is included
in the requirements and design of the DDG-1000 today, a Raytheon spokesperson tells
Defense Daily
101 An area-defense AAW system is capable of defending not only the ship on which it is installed, but other ships in
the area as well. An AAW system capable of defending only the ship on which it is installed is referred to as a point-
defense AAW system. Area-defense AAW systems generally can intercept aircraft and antis-ship cruise missiles at
longer ranges than point-defense AAW systems. U.S. Navy ships need to be able to use the SM-2 interceptor to be
considered capable of area-defense AAW operations. Navy ships that can fire only shorter-ranged interceptors, such as
the Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) or the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), are considered capable of point-
defense AAW operations only.
102 Source: Description of Project 0439, Standard Missile Improvement, within Program Element (PE) 0604366N,
Standard Missile Improvements, in Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Budget Estimates, Justification of
Estimates, February 2008, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, Budget Activity 5, R-1 Line Item No 101,
Exhibit R-2a, page 5 of 16 (pdf page 417 of 974). See also page 4 of 16 (pdf page 416 of 974).
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“As previously stated, Zumwalt mission equipment was designed to accommodate the SM-2
family of missiles and is therefore easily scalable to accommodate the SM-3 and SM-6,” the
spokesperson notes. “Traditionally, [the Navy] funds the ships-side of a weapon for the ship-
side of the interface and missile-side of the weapon for the missile-side of the interface.
Confusion arises when interface changes to the S[M]-2 family of missiles are attributed to
the ship-side.” The missile interface changes required are known and “costed,” the
spokesperson adds. “The cost to modify the [SM-2] missile for Zumwalt is approximately
four times less than redesigning the DDG-51 radar, C2 and significant HM&E modifications
which are represented in the [DDG-51] modernization budgets.”... 103
A September 17, 2008, press report states:
While DDG-1000 can carry and shoot off the Standard Missile-2 (SM), it can’t, as currently
configured, communicate with the SM once it is fired, according to a top Navy official.
The inability of DDG-1000 to “talk” with SM-2 is one of several reasons that the ship can’t
perform area air defense or ballistic missile defense, Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, deputy
chief of naval operations for integration of capabilities and resources (N8), told attendees
yesterday during a speech to the Surface Navy Association.
The Navy has invested $80 million to develop an X-band communications link so the ship
and missile can talk, and the service is evaluating further funding for this effort in Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) 10, McCullough said....
One shortcoming of DDG-1000, McCullough mentioned in response to a question, was that
while DDG-1000 can carry and launch the SM-2, it can’t communicate with the missile once
it is in flight.
According to the Navy, DDG-1000 cannot employ SM-2, SM-3 or SM-6, and BMD
capability is not included in the ship’s Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE).
“Additional Research and Development investment through 2013 would be required for
DDG-1000 to have these capabilities.”104
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
• Was a capability to employ the SM-2 missile, and thus to provide area-defense
AAW, ever included in the DDG-1000 design?
• If so, when was this capability removed from the DDG-1000 design, and why? If
the capability was removed for cost reasons, what were the savings associated
with the decision?
• If a capability to employ the SM-2 missile, and thus to provide area-defense
AAW, was never included in the DDG-1000 design, why did Navy briefing slides
on the DD(X)/DDG-1000 program from 2002 to 2008 consistently list the
Standard Missile as among the weapons to be carried by the DDG-1000, and why
was the ship designated in 2006 as DDG-1000 rather than DD-1000? During the
103 Consecutive short items entitled “To Build Or Not To Build” and “Standard Missiles” in “Defense Watch,” Defense
Daily, September 2, 2008. The bracketed phrase, “[the Navy],” appears in the original; other bracketed phrases added
by CRS.
104 Geoff Fein, “DDG-1000 Lacks Ability To ‘Talk’ With SM-2, Can’t Do Air Defense Mission, Official Says,”
Defense Daily, September 17, 2008: 1-2.
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years that the Navy supported continued DDG-1000 procurement and defended
the DDG-1000 against various criticisms, did the Navy believe it was
advantageous to have others believe, incorrectly, that the ship could fire the SM-2
and provide area-defense AAW?
• If the Navy’s intention was to integrate an area-defense AAW missile (either the
SM-2 or the planned successor missile, the SM-6) into the DDG-1000 combat
system at a later date, should the Navy have noted this in its July 31 testimony?
• What does the DDG-1000 Operational Requirements Document [ORD] state
with regard to the ship’s ability to use the SM-2 missile?
• What is the status of Project 0439 within PE 0604366N of the Navy’s research
and development account, which appears aimed at integrating the SM-2 Block
IIIB missile into the DDG-1000 combat system? Has the Navy altered the project
since the submission of the FY2009 budget in February 2008?
If the Navy at some point mis-described the DDG-1000’s AAW capability with regard to employ
the SM-2, what implications might that have, if any, regarding the dependability of Navy
descriptions of other ship capabilities for the DDG-1000, the DDG-51, or other ships?
As mentioned earlier, in April 2009 testimony, the Navy appeared to back away from its assertion
that the DDG-1000 would not have an area-defense AAW capability.
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This appendix presents some oversight issues for Congress specifically regarding the DDG-1000
program. Prior to the Navy’s announcement in late July 2008 that it wanted to stop DDG-1000
procurement at two ships and restart DDG-51 procurement, these and other DDG-1000 program
oversight issues were presented in the main body of this CRS report.
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One potential oversight issue for Congress specific to the DDG-1000 program concerns the
accuracy of the Navy’s cost estimate for the program.
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The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) believes that the Navy is significantly underestimating
DDG-1000 procurement costs. Consistent with previous CBO testimony and reports, CBO
testified at the July 31, 2008, hearing on destroyer procurement before the Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that it believes
DDG-1000s will each cost about 55% more than the Navy estimates. CBO testified that:
The Navy had planned to buy one DDG-1000 Zumwalt class destroyer each year between
2009 and 2013, in addition to the two authorized in 2007. The service’s 2009 budget
suggests that the Navy expected the first two ships to cost $3.2 billion each [in constant
FY2009 dollars] and the next five to cost an average of $2.3 billion each [in constant
FY2009 dollars]—reflecting an increase of about $200 million per ship for the last five ships
compared with the costs projected in the Navy’s 2008 budget. CBO, by contrast, estimates
that the first two DDG-1000s would cost about $5.0 billion apiece [in constant FY2009
dollars] and that the next five would have cost an average of $3.6 billion each [in constant
FY2009 dollars].
The Navy’s cost goals and estimates for the DDG-1000 program and its predecessors, the
DD(X) and DD-21, have increased several times since 1996 ... ; further growth in the ship’s
cost is likely. The Navy’s current estimate for the two lead-ship DDG-1000s prices the ship
at about $250 million [in constant FY2009 dollars] per thousand tons of lightship
displacement (the weight of the ship minus its crew, materiel, weapons, or fuel). By contrast,
the lead ship of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class destroyer cost about $390 million [in
constant FY 2009 dollars] per thousand tons, and the lead ship of the Ticonderoga class
cruiser cost more than $400 million [in constant FY2009 dollars] per thousand tons.... CBO
used the DDG-51 lead-ship cost as its basis for estimating the cost of the lead ship of the
DDG-1000 class, adjusting for the size of the ship.
The Navy has asserted that the basis for CBO’s estimate may not be valid because the DDG-
51 had a number of problems in the early stages of its construction that should not be
expected to occur during the construction of the first DDG-1000s. Specifically, the design of
the lead DDG-51 was disrupted and delayed because a new design tool being used at the
time was incomplete and not well understood. It had to be abandoned and the design
restarted using more traditional methods. The design of the lead DDG-51 was thus about 20
percent complete when construction began. By contrast, according to the Navy, the design of
the DDG-1000 progressed far more smoothly; the Navy expects to have the design 85
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percent complete when construction begins this summer. In addition, because the DDG-51 is
a smaller, more compact ship, the Navy believes that, on a ton-for-ton basis, it has been more
difficult to build than the DDG-1000 class is designed to be. (The more open internal spaces
of the DDG-1000 mean that it would not be as difficult to install piping, wiring, and other
components, and, thus, on a ton-for-ton basis, it should be less time-consuming, and
therefore less expensive, to build than a DDG-51.)
Although the Navy may not encounter the same problems constructing the lead DDG-1000s
that it did when constructing the lead DDG-51, CBO expects that the service will encounter
other problems that will increase the costs of the DDG-1000 and delay its construction. As
Navy officials have stated, lead ships are often very difficult to build, and many problems
typically occur during construction. Problems with the first littoral combat ships (for which
costs doubled) and with the lead ship of the LPD-17 class amphibious transport dock (for
which costs increased by 80 percent and construction time more than doubled) illustrate the
difficulties the Navy has encountered recently in constructing lead ships. Both the LCS and
the LPD-17 are much less complex technologically than the DDG-1000 will be. In addition,
while the designs of the littoral combat ships and DDG-51 were 20 percent to 30 percent
complete at the start of fabrication, the design of the LPD-17 was about 80 percent complete
at the start of fabrication—and it was arguably the Navy’s most troubled lead-ship program
over the past 20 years. Experience with the Virginia class submarine program raises similar
concerns. Recently, Navy officials stated in testimony before the Congress that, when
construction of those new submarines began, the Virginia class program was at about the
same point in its design that the DDG-1000 will be. The cost of the first two ships of the
Virginia class exceeded their budget by an average of 17 percent.
Moreover, the DDG-1000 program is incorporating 10 major new technologies in the lead
ship of the class that are intended to improve on technologies used in the previous-generation
DDG-51 destroyer. Those technologies include electric drive and a distributed power system,
a tumblehome hull (one in which the sides of the ship slope outward to increase stealthiness),
an advanced gun system, new radars, and composite materials and stealth-enhancing coatings
for the deckhouse. In the past, the Navy typically introduced three or four major new
technologies into a new class of surface combatant.
A comparison of the Navy’s estimate for two additional DDG-51s and its estimate for the
seventh DDG-1000, which was slated to be purchased in 2013, illustrates the risk for cost
growth in the latter program. In information recently provided to the Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Seapower of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Navy stated that if
the Congress authorized the purchase of two new DDG-51s in 2009—ships that would
benefit from lessons learned during the construction of 62 similar ships—the cost would be
about $3.3 billion, or slightly less than $1.7 billion each. At the same time, in its fiscal year
2009 budget submission to the Congress, the Navy stated that the cost to build the seventh
DDG-1000 in 2013 would be about $2.4 billion in 2013 dollars. Deflating the cost of the
seventh DDG-1000 using the inflation index for shipbuilding that the Navy provided to CBO
brings the Navy’s estimate for that ship to about $1.9 billion [in constant FY2009 dollars]
(excluding outfitting and postdelivery costs). The lightship displacement of the DDG-1000 is
about 5,000 tons (or more than 50 percent) greater than that of the DDG-51s being
constructed today. In effect, the Navy’s estimates imply that those 5,000 extra tons, as well
as the 10 new technologies being incorporated in the DDG-1000 class, will increase the
ship’s cost by only $200 million, or about 10 percent.
If CBO’s cost estimates for the lead DDG-1000s are realized—CBO’s estimate is about 55
percent higher than the Navy’s for the cost of procuring the first two DDG-1000s—the lead
ships of the DDG-1000 program would still experience lower cost growth than the Navy’s
other lead-ship programs did over the past 20 years. According to an analysis conducted in
2006 by the Department of Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group, commonly known
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as the CAIG, five of eight lead-ship programs experienced cost growth of over 60 percent.
The CAIG’s analysis at the time did not include the Virginia class submarine program, the
first two ships of which experienced cost growth of 11 percent and 25 percent. (Those ships
were built under a teaming arrangement and assembled in two different shipyards). The
analysis also did not include the first two littoral combat ships, which have experienced cost
growth of about 100 percent.105
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The Government Accountability office (GAO) similarly believes that cost growth in the DDG-
1000 program is likely. GAO testified at the July 31, 2008, hearing that:
Costs of the DDG 1000 ships are likely to exceed current budgets. If costs grow during lead
ship construction due to technology, design, and construction risks, as experience shows is
likely, remaining funds may not be sufficient to buy key components and pay for other work
not yet under contract.
Despite a significant investment in the lead ships, the remaining budget is likely insufficient
to pay for all the effort necessary to make the ships operational. The Navy estimates a total
shipbuilding budget of $6.3 billion for the lead ships. Of this amount, the Navy has
approximately $363 million remaining in unobligated funds to cover its outstanding costs
and to manage any cost growth for the two lead ships, but known obligations for the lead
ships, assuming no cost growth during construction, range from $349 million to $852
million....
The main discrepancy is the current estimated cost of the combat systems. In order to create
a cash reserve to pay for any cost increases that may occur during construction of the lead
ships, the Navy has deferred contracting and funding work associated with conducting
shipboard testing of the combat systems—and in some cases has also delayed purchasing and
installing essential ship systems until later in the construction sequence. The Navy has
estimated the cost of these combat systems to be around $200 million, while the contractor’s
estimate is over $760 million. If the agreed-on cost approaches the contractor’s estimate, the
Navy will not have enough in its remaining funds to cover the cost.
There is little margin in the budget to pay for any unknown cost. To ensure that there was
enough funding available in the budget to cover the costs of building the lead ships, the Navy
negotiated contracts with the shipbuilders that shifted costs or removed planned work from
the scope of lead ship construction and reduced the risk contingency in the shipbuilders’
initial proposals. For example, the Navy stated that it shifted in excess of $100 million
associated with fabrication of the peripheral vertical launch system from the scope of ship
construction and funded this work separately using research and development funding. As a
result, this work is no longer included in the $6.3 billion end cost to construct DDG 1000.
To the extent that the lead ships experience cost growth beyond what is already known, more
funding will be needed to produce operational ships. However, these problems will not
surface until well after the shipyards have begun construction of the lead ships. Cost growth
during construction for lead ships has historically been about 27 percent, and an independent
estimate by the Department of Defense already projects the cost of the two lead ships to be
105 Statement of Eric J. Labs, Senior Analyst, [on] The Navy’s Surface Combatant Programs, before the Subcommittee
on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, July 31, 2008,
pp. 3-6. For an example of an earlier CBO report with a similar passage, see Congressional Budget Office, Resource
Implications of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2009 Shipbuilding Plan June 9, 2008, pp. 20-23.
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$878 million higher than the Navy’s budget. With ships as expensive as DDG 1000, even a
small percentage of cost growth could lead to the need for hundreds of millions of dollars in
additional funding.106
GAO’s testimony at the July 31, 2008, hearing was based on a longer GAO report on the DDG-
1000 program that was released on the day of the hearing.107
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Although the Navy publicly stands by its DDG-1000 cost estimates, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) testified in July 2007 that the Navy had assigned a confidence level
of about 45% to its own estimates, meaning that the Navy itself believed there was about a 55%
chance that DDG-1000s will exceed the Navy’s estimates. GAO testified that:
One way to improve the cost-estimating process is to present a confidence level for each
estimate, based on risk and uncertainty analyses. By conducting an uncertainty analysis that
measures the probability of cost growth, the Navy can identify a level of confidence for its
estimates and determine whether program costs are realistically achievable. Navy cost
analysts told us that they used quantitative risk analyses to test the validity of cost estimates
of CVN 78 and DDG 1000. We believe that the Navy and the Department of Defense (DOD)
should take this a step further—requiring a high confidence level threshold when making
program commitments and budget requests. The Defense Acquisition Performance
Assessment Panel recommended an 80 percent confidence level, meaning that a program has
an 80 percent chance of achieving its estimated costs. Whether this is the right level warrants
thoughtful discussion, but it is worth noting that analyses for CVN 78 and DDG 1000 were
well below an 80 percent confidence level (in the case of DDG 1000 at around 45 percent)—
increasing the likelihood that costs will grow above budget.108
GAO’s July 2007 testimony was presented while Congress was considering the Navy’s proposed
FY2008 budget. In its proposed FY2009 budget, the Navy has increased its estimate of DDG-
1000 procurement costs by about 6.9%.109 In light of this increase, it is possible that the Navy’s
confidence level has increased from 45% to some higher figure.
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On October 1, 2007, it was reported that the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), a cost-
estimating office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, had estimated that the first two
106 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Zumwalt-Class Destroyer Program Emblematic of
Challenges Facing Navy Shipbuilding, Statement of Paul L. Francis, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management,
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, July 31, 2008 (GAO-08-1061T), pp. 6-8.
107 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Cost to Deliver Zumwalt-Class Destroyers Likely to
Exceed Budget, GAO-08-804, July 2008. 56 pp.
108 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy
Shipbuilding Programs, Statement of Paul L. Francis, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team,
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, July 24, 2007 (GAO-07-943T), pp. 17-18.
109 Under the FY2008 shipbuilding plan, the Navy estimated the combined end cost of the seven DDG-1000s at
$18,185 million in then-year dollars; under the FY2009 shipbuilding plan, the Navy estimates their combined end cost
at $19,136 million in then-year dollars. There is no change in the years in which the ships are to be procured.
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DDG-1000s would together cost about $7.2 billion to procure, or about 14% more than the
Navy’s combined estimate for the two ships in 2007.110
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A second potential oversight issue for Congress specific to the DDG-1000 program concerns the
affordability and cost effectiveness of the DDG-1000 program.
Prior to the July 31, 2008, hearing on destroyer procurement before the Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the affordability
and cost-effectiveness of the DDG-1000 program was explored extensively at a two-part hearing
on the DDG-1000 program held on July 19 and 20, 2005, before the Projection Forces
subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. At the end of the July 19 portion of the
hearing, DOD and Navy witnesses were asked by the subcommittee chairman, Representative
Roscoe Bartlett, to provide the subcommittee with their own individual views on the procurement
cost figures at which the lead DDG-1000 and a follow-on DDG-1000 (defined as the fifth ship)
would become unaffordable. At the beginning of the July 20 portion of the hearing,
Representative Bartlett stated that the figures provided by the witnesses ranged from $4 billion to
$4.5 billion for the lead ship and $2.5 billion to $2.9 billion for the fifth ship. The Navy’s current
cost estimates for the first and fifth DDG-1000s are below these figures; CBO’s current cost
estimates for the first and fifth DDG-1000s are substantially above these figures.
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A third potential oversight issue for Congress specific to the DDG-1000 program concerns
technical risk in the program, which can affect the Navy’s ability to build DDG-1000s on
schedule and within budgeted costs. Over the past several years, GAO has reported on the
technical risks involved in developing the several significant new technologies that are to be
incorporated into the DDG-1000. The Navy over the years has worked to retire these risks. GAO
testified at the July 31, 2008, hearing on destroyer procurement before the Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that:
The DDG 1000 program has from the onset faced a steep challenge framed by demanding
mission requirements, stealth characteristics, and a desire to reduce manning levels by more
than half that of predecessor destroyers. These requirements translated into significant
technical and design challenges. Rather than introducing three or four new technologies (as
is the case on previous surface combatants), DDG 1000 plans to use a revolutionary hull
form and employ 11 cutting-edge technologies, including an array of weapons, highly
capable sensors integrated into the sides of a deckhouse made primarily of composite
material—not steel, and a power system designed for advanced propulsion as well as high-
powered combat systems and ship service loads. This level of sophistication has necessitated
a large software development effort—14 million to 16 million lines of code. All of this is to
be accomplished while splitting construction between two shipyards. The Navy believes this
approach and schedule is important to managing shipyard workloads, as starting later would
have caused shipyard workload to drop too low. In a sense, then, the construction approach
110 “Sticker Price,” Defense Daily, October 1, 2007. See also Christopher P. Cavas, “DDG 1000 Contract Talks Hit
Rough Seas,” DefenseNews.com, October 15, 2007, which refers to “a recent non-Navy estimate” of $7.2 billion for the
two ships.
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and schedule became an additional challenge as they became constraints on the pace of
technology and design development. To meet these multiple and somewhat conflicting
demands, the Navy structured its acquisition strategy to develop key systems and mature the
design before starting to build the ship. While the Navy has made good decisions along the
way to address risk, it is already likely, shortly before the Navy embarks on ship
construction, that additional funding will be necessary or trade-offs will need to be made to
develop and deliver DDG 1000 ships.
Despite multiple and somewhat competing demands, the Navy conceived a thoughtful
approach and achieved developmental successes on DDG 1000. Developing 10 prototypes of
the ship’s critical systems helped to create confidence that a number of technologies would
operate as intended, and the Navy’s plan to mature the ship’s design before starting
construction aims to reduce the risk of costly design changes after steel has been cut and
bulkheads built. For example, the Navy successfully demonstrated the advanced gun system
through initial guided flight and testing on land. In other cases, such as for the integrated
power system, tests brought to light technical problems, which the Navy was able to address
by going to an alternate technology. However, notwithstanding these efforts, significant
challenges remain in developing the ship’s design and a number of key components—in
particular, the deckhouse, volume search radar, and the integrated power system. Moreover,
the ship’s capability is contingent on an unprecedented software development effort.
Recently, the Navy restructured the schedule to buy more time for development—a good
decision. However, as construction of the first ship has not yet begun, the Navy may have
exhausted its options for solving future problems without adding money and time.
Although the initial phases of the design are complete, the shipbuilders will be pressed to
complete a large amount of design work by October 2008 when lead ship construction
begins. From August 2007 through May 2008, the shipbuilders finished work on 16 of the
100 design zones (individual units that make up the ship’s design) leaving 5 months to finish
the final design phases in 84 zones leading up to the start of construction. While the
shipbuilders believe they can finish the design by the start of ship construction, delays in the
development of the ship’s key systems could impede completion of the design and
eventually interfere with DDG 1000 construction. If the shipbuilders cannot finish planned
design work prior to the start of lead-ship construction, the program is at greater risk for
costly rework and out-of-sequence work during construction.
To maintain the start of ship construction in 2008 while continuing to develop the ship’s
technologies, the Navy recently realigned the program’s schedule. Rather than delivering a
fully mission-capable ship, the Navy will take ownership of just the vessel and its
mechanical and electrical systems—including the ship’s power system—in April 2013. At
that point, the Navy plans to have completed “light-off” of the power, mechanical, and
electrical systems. Light-off refers to activating and testing these systems aboard ship. The
Navy deferred light-off of the combat systems—which include the radars, guns, and the
missile launch systems—by over 2 years until May 2013. According to the Navy, conducting
light-off in phases allows the program to test and verify the ship’s major systems, in
particular the integrated power system, in isolation and creates additional time to mature the
combat systems, as well as the software that supports these systems, before ship installation
and shipboard testing. However, since the Navy will only test and inspect the hull prior to
taking ownership of the vessel, it will not have a full understanding of how the ship operates
as a complete and integrated system until after final shipboard testing of the combat systems
in 2014.
While the restructure maintains the construction schedule, it does delay verifying the
performance of the integrated power system before producing and installing it on the ship.
Tests of a complete integrated power system with the control system will not occur until
2011—nearly 3 years later than planned. To meet the shipyard’s schedule, the Navy will buy
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a power system intended for the third ship and use it in land-based tests. As a result, the
integrated power system will not be demonstrated until a year after the power systems have
been produced and installed on the two lead ships—an approach that increases exposure to
cost and schedule risk in production.
Finalizing deckhouse manufacturing and assembly processes are essential to constructing
and delivering the deckhouse as planned. Changes to the manufacturing processes for
deckhouse production are ongoing. The shipbuilder is validating process changes through
production and inspection of a series of test units, culminating with a large-scale prototype
manufactured to the same thickness and other specifications of the deckhouse. Final
validation of the manufacturing processes for deckhouse construction will not occur until
after construction, inspection, and shock testing of the large-scale prototype. However, test
and inspection activities are not scheduled for completion until after the deckhouse
production readiness review in September 2008. Problems discovered during testing and
inspection may require additional changes to manufacturing methods. Moreover, facility and
machinery upgrades necessary to construct and assemble the deckhouse are not all scheduled
to be complete until March 2010—over a year after the start of construction of the first
deckhouse. While the shipbuilder expects to complete efforts to meet the construction
schedule, if difficulties occur, the deckhouses may not be delivered to the shipyards on time,
disrupting the construction sequence of the ships.
Further, the volume search radar (one of two radars in the dual band radar system) will not
be installed during deckhouse construction as initially planned. Instead, installation will
occur at the shipyard when the first ship is already afloat, a more costly approach. The
change was partly due to delays in developing the volume search radar. Land-based
demonstrations of the volume search radar prototype originally planned to be done before
starting ship construction will not be completed until 2009—almost 2 years later.
Development difficulties center on the radar’s radome and transmit-receive units. The
contractor has been unable to successfully manufacture the radome (a composite shield of
exceptional size and complexity), and the transmit-receive units (the radar’s individual
radiating elements) have experienced failures operating at the voltage needed to meet range
requirements. While the Navy believes that the voltage problem has been resolved,
upcoming land-based tests will be conducted at a lower voltage—and without the radome.
The Navy will not demonstrate a fully capable radar at its required power output until after
testing of the first production unit sometime before combat systems light-off in 2013.
Crucial to realizing DDG 1000’s required manning reductions is the ability to achieve a high
degree of computer automation. If the ship’s software does not work as intended, crew size
would need to be increased to make up for any lack of automation. Given the risks associated
with the ship’s software system, referred to as the total ship computing environment, the
Navy initially planned to develop and demonstrate all software functionality (phased over six
releases and one spiral) over 1 year before ship light-off. As a result of changes in the
software development schedule, the Navy eliminated this margin. Until recently, the Navy
was able to keep pace with its development schedule, successfully completing the first three
software releases. However, the Navy is now entering the complex phases of software
development when ship functionality is introduced. The Navy certified release 4 without the
release meeting about half of the software system requirements, mainly because of issues
coding the ship’s command and control component—the heart of the ship’s decision-making
suite. Problems discovered in this release, coupled with the deferred work, may signify larger
software issues that could disrupt the development of releases 5 and 6 and prevent the timely
delivery of software to meet the ship’s schedule.111
111 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Zumwalt-Class Destroyer Program Emblematic of
(continued...)
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GAO’s testimony at the July 31, 2008, hearing was based on a longer GAO report on the DDG-
1000 program that was released on the day of the hearing.112
As individual DDG-1000 technologies mature, technical risk in the DDG-1000 program will shift
more to the follow-on task of system integration—of getting all ship’s technologies to work
together smoothly in a single platform. In past defense acquisition programs, system integration
has often proven to be at least as challenging as the task of developing individual new
technologies.
As mentioned in the “Background” Section, the Navy since September 30, 2005, has been acting
as the system integrator for the DDG-1000 program. Problems in the execution of the Coast
Guard Deepwater program113 and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program led to a reexamination
in Congress in 2007 of the concept of the private-sector lead system integrator (LSI), and to a
desire among some Members to shift certain acquisition functions, including system design and
integration, from the private sector, to where they had migrated starting in the 1990s, back to the
federal government. The Navy’s decision in 2005 to begin acting as the system integrator for the
DDG-1000 program will make the program an early test of DOD’s ability to once again perform
the system-integration function following the downsizing of DOD’s technical and acquisition
workforce that occurred when acquisition functions were earlier transferred to the private sector.
The DDG-1000 program, in addition to being an early test of DOD’s abilities in this area, may
represent a fairly challenging test, given the number of significant new technologies that are to be
integrated into the ship.
In discussing the system-integration task, Navy officials argue that the DDG-1000 program office
has the authority and resources to access technical capacity throughout the Navy, including
expertise at Navy research, development, and testing centers in various parts of the country. Navy
officials also argue that the engineering development models (EDMs) that it has used to develop
key technologies for the DDG-1000 have been designed not only to develop the ability of each
technology to work as a stand-alone item, but also to integrate well with other systems when
installed on the ship. Navy officials also argue that since its beginning in the 1980s, the Navy has
been responsible for managing a large number of contractors who make various components of
the DDG-51 (including the Aegis combat system) that are then provided by the Navy to the
shipbuilders as government-furnished equipment (GFE). By comparison, Navy officials argue,
the task of overseeing the integration of the DDG-100 combat system will require the Navy to
work with only two contractors (Raytheon and BAE).114
(...continued)
Challenges Facing Navy Shipbuilding, Statement of Paul L. Francis, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management,
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, July 31, 2008 (GAO-08-1061T), pp. 3-6.
112 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Cost to Deliver Zumwalt-Class Destroyers Likely to
Exceed Budget, GAO-08-804, July 2008. 56 pp.
113 For additional discussion of the Deepwater program, see CRS Report RL33753, Coast Guard Deepwater
Acquisition Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
114 Source: Navy briefing to CRS and CBO on April 10, 2008.
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A fourth potential oversight issue for Congress specific to the DDG-1000 program concerns the
ship’s mission requirements, and whether they were appropriately determined, particularly in the
context of potential ship affordability.
The DDG-1000’s capabilities reflect an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the
DDG-1000 that was approved by the Joint Staff of DOD in February 2004. Key performance
parameters included in this document include having two AGSs that can each fire 10 rounds per
minute, for a total of 20 rounds per minute.115 DOD stated in 2005 that
During the restructuring of the DD-21 program into the DD(X) program, the Navy re-
evaluated each DD-21 Key Performance Parameter (KPP) to determine the potential for
minimizing the size of the ship and ultimately the cost. The Navy made many adjustments
and the resulting DD(X) KPPs represent the Navy’s minimum requirements. No other known
alternative meets all of the DD(X) KPPs and provide the sustained, precision, long-range
naval surface fire support that the United States Marine Corps requires.116
Some observers speculate that the Navy and DOD established requirements for the DDG-1000
without a full appreciation of how large and expensive a ship design the requirements would
generate. Naval analyst Norman Friedman, the author of numerous books on U.S. warship
designs, stated in a 2004 book on U.S. destroyer designs that
In past [Navy ship design] practice, the naval policymakers in OpNav [the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations] would write a draft set of [ship] characteristics.... The
Preliminary Design branch of BuShips [the Bureau of Ships] or NAVSEA [the Naval Sea
Systems Command] would develop sketch designs to meet the requirements. Often the
OpNav policymakers would find the results outrageous—for example, exorbitantly
expensive. Such results would force them to decide just how important their various requests
had been. Eventually Preliminary Design would produce something OpNav found
acceptable, but that might not actually be built....
In contrast to past practice, no preliminary design [for the DDG-1000] was drawn up to test
the cost of various requirements. Each requirement was justified in operational terms, (e.g., a
level of stealth that would reduce detectability by some percentage); but those sponsoring the
ship had no way of knowing the impact that a particular combination of such requirements
would have. Normally NAVSEA would have created a series of sketch designs for exactly
that purpose.117
An August 2005 trade press article suggested that growth in DD-21/DDG-1000 requirements (and
cost) over time may have been related to the disestablishment of a Navy ship-design board called
the Ship Characteristics Improvement Board (SCIB)—an entity that Admiral Michael Mullen,
who became the Chief of Naval Operations on July 22, 2005, reestablished under a new name:
115 Statement by The Honorable Kenneth J. Krieg, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics), Before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces, House Armed Services Committee, United States House of
Representatives, July, 19, 2005, p. 2.
116 Ibid, pp. 6-7.
117 Norman Friedman, U.S. Destroyers, An Illustrated Design History, Revised Edition. Annapolis, Naval Institute
Press, 2004, pp. 437 and 447-448. Punctuation as in the original.
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Adm. Michael Mullen, the chief of naval operations, has directed the Navy to re-establish a
high-level panel to closely monitor and control the requirements and configurations of new
ships in a bid to rein in the skyrocketing cost of new vessel procurement.
Adm. Robert Willard, vice chief of naval operations, is leading the effort as part of a larger
undertaking to draw up alternative options for the Navy’s current shipbuilding program....
In essence, sources said, Mullen is looking to reconstitute the Ship Characteristics
Improvement Board, which eventually became inactive in 2002. For more than 100 years,
the Navy has maintained a high-level group of officials to advise service leaders on ship
design and configuration. This group, established in 1900 as the General Board has gone
through many name changes, including the Ship Characteristics and Improvement Board in
the early 1980s and, until 2002, the Ship Characteristics and Improvement Panel.
Navy officials say that the panel’s oversight began to wane in the late 1990s, just as the DD-
21 program—originally envisioned as a $750 million replacement for Spruance-class
destroyers—took off, before becoming officially inactive in 2002. Requirements during this
time were added to the new destroyer program, some of which raised eyebrows in the Navy,
such as the need for a flag officer quarters. No other ship in that class has accommodations
for an admiral. Still, the DDG-1000 has come to be regarded as a technology carrier for
future surface ships and the price tag has ballooned to $3 billion a copy.
Mullen’s goal, spelled out in a July 25 memo to Willard and provided to InsideDefense.com,
is to put in place a “process that adequately defines warship requirements and manages
changes to those requirements (e.g. Ship Characteristics Improvement Board) in a
disciplined manner, with cost and configuration control as the paramount considerations.”...
A recent RAND study conducted at the request of Mullen’s predecessor, retired Adm. Vern
Clark, concluded that a key cause for climbing ship costs is the number of requirements
tacked on to a program, according to a consultant familiar with the findings of the study,
which has not been made public.
“So, what I think Mullen has in the back of his head is, ‘I’ve got to get the requirements
process for ships back under control or we’re always going to end up, every time we talk
about a new destroyer, with a $3 billion ship,’” said a former senior Navy official.
This senior official, who was in a key Pentagon position as the DD-21 program commenced,
said that without a panel overseeing the ship’s configuration and true requirements the new
destroyer program became weighed down with capabilities that carried a high price tag.
“In hindsight, we realized that we had put requirements on the ship that no one had really
vetted for its cost impact on the ship. For example, it was to operate acoustically silent and
risk free in minefields,” said the official. “If the SCIB had existed, this probably would not
have happened.”118
A March 2007 report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) made a
similar point:
For nearly a century, the Navy’s SCIB—a group of high-ranking DoN [Department of the
Navy] officials—worked to balance desired warship warfighting requirements against their
118 Jason Sherman, “Mullen To Bring Back Panel To Control Ship Configuration, Cost,” Inside the Navy, August 8,
2005.
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impact on a ship’s final design and production costs. The primary reason why the Navy lost
cost control over the DD-21/DD(X)/DDG-1000 was that just as the ship entered its design
definition phase, the power of the Navy’s SCIB was waning, replaced by a Joint
requirements definition process with no fiscal checks and balances.119
Some observers, such as Norman Friedman, have raised questions about the Navy’s decision to
use a tumblehome (i.e., inward-sloping) hull for the DDG-1000. A 2006 magazine article by
Friedman, for example,
• raised questions about the implications of a tumblehome hull for the ship’s ability
to deal with underwater damage;120
• asked whether the Navy knew at the outset of the DDG-1000 design process how
much a decision to incorporate a tumblehome hull (and other survivability
features) would increase the size of the ship; and
• questioned whether the reduced visibility of the tumblehome hull to certain types
of radars—the central reason for using a tumblehome hull—will be negated by its
visibility to high-frequency (HF) surface wave radars that are now for sale on the
international market.
The article, which refers to the DDG-1000 by the previous designation DD(X), stated:
In the case of the DD(X), the overriding requirement [in determining the hull design] was to
minimise radar cross section—stealth. Much of the hull design was dictated by the attempt to
reflect radar pulses away from the radar emitting them, so that radar returns would be
minimised. By now the main technique is well known: slope all flat surfaces and eliminate
the corner reflector created by the juncture of the hull and water....
If the ship could be stabilized sufficiently [against rolling from side to side], then she would
never (or almost never) present any vertical surfaces [to a radar]. In the case of DD(X),
stabilization is apparently achieved using ballast tanks. Such tanks in turn demand internal
volume deep in the ship. Overall, stealth demands that as much as possible of the overall
volume of the ship be buried in her hull, where the shape of the ship can minimise radar
returns. That is why, paradoxically, a carefully-designed stealthy ship will be considerably
larger—for more internal volume—than a less stealthy and more conventional equivalent. In
the case of DD(X), there were also demands for improved survivability. The demand for
stealth implied that anti-ship missiles were the most important envisaged threat. They hit
above water, so an important survivability feature would be to put as much of the ship’s
vitals as possible below water—which meant greater demands for underwater volume....
Once the tumblehome hull had been chosen, [the ship’s designers] were apparently also
constrained to slope the bow back [creating a surface-piercing or ram bow] instead of, as is
usual, forward....
119 Robert Work, Know When To Hold ‘Em, Know When To Fold ‘Em: Thinking About Navy Plans For The Future
Surface Battle Line, Washington, Center For Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2007. p. 6. (CSBA Backgrounder,
March 7, 2007.)
120 Other observers have also expressed concerns about the stability of the DDG-1000’s tumblehome hull in certain see
conditions. For a discussion, see Christopher P. Cavas, “Is New U.S. Destroyer Unstable?,” DefenseNews.com, April 2,
2007.
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There were numerous reasons why [past] naval architects abandoned tumblehome hulls and
ram bows. Tumblehome reduces a ship’s ability to deal with underwater damage. When a
conventional flared (outward-sloping) hull sinks deeper in the water, its waterplane area [the
cross-section of the ship where it intersects the plane of the water] increases. It becomes
somewhat more stable, and it takes more water to sink it deeper into the water. Because the
waterplane area of a tumblehome ship decreases as it draws more water, such a ship is easier
to sink deeper. Tumblehome also apparently makes a ship less stable, and hence less capable
of resisting extreme weather conditions. The larger the ship, the more extreme the weather
has to be to make that critical. Critics of DD(X) have concentrated on the danger; defenders
have concentrated on how extreme the critical weather condition would be.
In the end, whether the DD(X) hull form is attractive depends on an evaluation of anti-radar
stealth as a design driver. About a decade ago, the DD(X) design concept was sold on the
basis of a lengthy (and, incidentally, unclassified) analysis, the gist of which was that a
heavily-armed surface combatant could play a decisive role in a Korean scenario...
The key analytic point... was that it would be very important for the ship to come reasonably
close to enemy shores unobserved. That in turn meant anti-radar stealth. However, it soon
came to mean a particular kind of anti-radar performance, against centimetric-wave radars
[radars with wavelengths on the order of centimeters] of the sort used by patrol aircraft (the
ship would fire [its weapons] from beyond the usual horizons of shore-based radars). As it
happens, anti-ship missiles use much the same kinds of radars as patrolling aircraft, so it
could be argued that the same anti-radar techniques would be effective in the end-game in
which missiles would approach the ship....
Without access to files of the time, it is impossible to say whether those approving the
[DDG-1000] project realised that its stealth and survivability characteristics would produce a
14,000 to 17,000 ton destroyer. About the same time that DD(X) characteristics
(requirements) were being approved, the decision was taken at [the] Defense Department
(not Navy) level that there would be no internal feasibility design. In the past, the feasibility
stage had the very useful role of showing those setting requirements what their implications
would be. At the very least, the Navy’s senior leadership would have been given warning
that they would have to justify a drastic jump in destroyer size when they wanted to build
DD(X). That jump might well have been considered justified, but on the other hand the
leadership might also have asked whether a somewhat less dramatic approach would have
been acceptable.
About a decade after the requirements were chosen, with DD(X) well advanced, the situation
with regard to stealth may be changing. Shaping is relevant only at relatively short [radar]
wavelengths. For about a quarter-century, there has been talk of HF surface wave radars,
which operate at wavelengths of about 10 to 200 meters—i.e. at wavelengths the size of a
ship. Canada currently operates this type of radar, made by Raytheon, for surveillance of the
Grand Banks; another is being tested in the Caribbean. Australia has bought this kind of
radar to fill gaps in over-the-horizon radar coverage. Turkey is buying such radars for sale
for some years. In 2005 it was reported unofficially that China had bought [a] Russian HF
surface wave radar the previous year.
It seems almost certain that HF surface wave radar can defeat any kind of stealth shaping
designed primarily to deal with shorter-wave[length] radars. Moreover, [HF surface wave]
radars have an inherent maximum range (due to the way they operate) of about 180nm.... At
long range [the radar’s beam] is not nearly accurate enough to aim a missile. However, we
can easily imagine a netted system which would use the long-range [HF surface wave] radar
to define a small box within which the target ship would be. A missile with GPS [Global
Positioning System] guidance could be flown to that box, ordered to search it....
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If the argument given here is realistic, then the considerable sacrifices inherent in the DD(X)
design no longer seem nearly as attractive. It can still be argued that a design like the DD(X)
is attractive well out to sea, beyond the reach of coastal radars. In that case, however, there
may be other signatures which can be exploited. For example, ships proceeding at any speed
create massive wakes.... it is clear that the wake produces a radar return very visible from an
airplane or, probably, from a space-based radar....
In the end, then, how much is stealth worth? As a way of avoiding detection altogether,
probably less than imagined. That leaves the rather important end-game, the hope being that
decoys of some sort greatly exceed actual ship radar cross-section. That is probably not a
foolish hope, but it does not require the sort of treatment reflected in [the] DD(X).
Now, it may be that the Untied States typically faces countries which have not had the sense
to buy anti-stealth radars (though we would hate to bet on that). In that case, DD(X) may
well be effectively invisible to them. So will a lot of less thoroughly stealthy ships.121
An October 6, 2008, press report stated that:
Another blow was struck last month to the U.S. Navy’s embattled DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class
advanced destroyer program when a top-level Pentagon review board agreed to eliminate the
operational requirements for the ship.
No official decision was reached during the Sept. 18 meeting of the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC), but uniformed sources said a memorandum was drafted to reflect
cancellation of the requirements, which justify the need for a particular weapon program....
Marine Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, chaired the Sept.
18 meeting, which reportedly was attended by about 60 officers and officials. Along with the
vice chairman, the four vice chiefs of the military services fill out the JROC membership.122
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
• SCIB and DDG-1000 requirements. Are the DDG-1000’s requirements partly a
result of inadequate discipline, following the disestablishment of the SCIB, in the
Navy’s process for setting requirements for new ships? If the SCIB had remained
in existence during the DD-21/DDG-1000 design process, which of the DDG-
1000’s current requirements would have been reduced or eliminated?
• Tumblehome hull. How much did the decision to use a tumblehome hull (and
other survivability features) increase the size and cost of the DDG-1000? In the
mid-1990s, when design work began on the ship now known as DDG-1000, how
well did the Navy understand the relationship between using a tumblehome hull
and ship size and cost? What effect does the tumblehome hull have on the DDG-
1000’s ability to deal with underwater damage? To what degree will HF surface
wave radars negate the stealth characteristics of the DDG-1000 design?
• AGSs. Since the DDG-1000 is the only ship planned to carry AGSs, and since
AGSs are viewed by the Marine Corps as necessary to meet Marine Corps
121 Norman Friedman, “The New Shape of Ships,” Naval Forces, No. II, 2006: 56-58, 60, 62-63. Italics as in the
original. Friedman makes somewhat similar comments in chapter 17 (pages 431-450) of U.S. Destroyers, An Illustrated
Design History, Revised Edition, op cit.
122 Christopher P. Cavas, “DDG 1000 Takes Another Hit—From JROC,” Defense News, October 6, 2008: 4.
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requirements for naval surface fire support capability, should the AGSs be
considered the most-critical payload element on the DDG-1000, and certain other
payload elements, though desirable, be considered as possibly less critical by
comparison?
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This appendix provides information on the capabilities and costs of the DDG-1000 and DDG-51
designs, as presented by the Navy and DOD on five occasions prior to the July 31, 2008, hearing
on destroyer procurement before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee:
• in July 19, 2005, Navy testimony before the Projection Forces subcommittee of
the House Armed Services Committee;
• at a June 10, 2005, Navy briefing to CRS;
• at an April 10, 2008, Navy briefing to CRS and CBO; and
• in a May 7, 2008, Navy letter to Senator Kennedy; and
• in a July 2, 2008, DOD letter to Representative Taylor.
The appendix concludes with a section on comparing the costs of DDG-51s and modified DDG-
1000s.
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The DDG-1000 and DDG-51 are both multimission destroyers, but they have somewhat different
mission emphases. The DDG-1000 design features a stronger emphasis on land-attack operations
and operations in littoral waters. The DDG-51 design is more oriented toward blue-water
operations.
Consistent with its larger size, higher procurement cost, and greater use of new technologies, the
DDG-1000, the Navy believes, is more capable than the DDG-51 design in several respects. The
Navy states that it designed the DDG-1000 for “full-spectrum littoral dominance” and believes
the DDG-1000 would be considerably more capable than the DDG-51 in littoral operations. The
Navy believes that because of its reduced signatures, defensive systems, number of gun shells in
its magazine, and ability to resupply gun shells while underway, the DDG-1000 would have
considerably more capability than the DDG-51 to enter defended littoral waters and conduct
sustained operations there. The Navy believes that because of its guns, aviation capabilities,
special operations forces (SOF) support capabilities, and small-boat capabilities, the DDG-1000
would be able to perform more littoral missions than the DDG-51. The Navy believes that
because of its radars and C4I/networking capabilities, replacing a DDG-51 with a DDG-1000 in a
carrier strike group would increase the strike group’s anti-air warfare (AAW) capabilities by
about 20%. The Navy believes that because of differences in their sonar capabilities, the DDG-51
has more blue-water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability than the DDG-1000.
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At the July 19 portion of a July 19-20, 2005, hearing before the Projection Forces subcommittee
of the House Armed Services Committee, Navy officials testified that, compared to the DDG-51
design, the DDG-1000 design’s capability improvements include, among other things,
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• a threefold improvement in capability against anti-ship cruise missiles, including
significantly better radar performance in situations involving near-land radar
clutter;
• a 10-fold improvement in overall battle force defense capability, in part because
of a 5-fold improvement in networking bandwidth capacity;
• 15% more capability to defend against group attacks by enemy surface craft (i.e.,
“swarm boats”);
• a 50-fold improvement (i.e., reduction) in radar cross-section, which dramatically
enhances survivability and reduces by half the total number of missiles that need
to be fired in an intercept engagement;
• a 10-fold increase in operating area against mines in shallow-water regions;
• three times as much naval surface fire support capability, including an ability to
answer 90% of Marine Corps calls for fire within five minutes, permitting the
ship to meet stated Marine Corps firepower requirements—a capability otherwise
unavailable in the surface fleet—giving the ship a capability roughly equivalent
to one-half of an artillery battalion, and permitting a 65% reduction in Marine
Corps artillery;
• a ship design that allows underway replenishment of gun shells, creating the
equivalent of an almost-infinite ammunition magazine and permitting nearly
continuous fire support;
• almost 10 times as much electrical capacity available for ship equipment, giving
the ship an ability to support future electromagnetic rail guns and high-energy
laser weapons; and
• features such as an automated fire-suppression system, peripheral vertical launch
system, and integrated fight-through-damage power system that significantly
increase ship survivability.123
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The following comparison of DDG-1000 and DDG-51 capabilities is based on information
provided by the Navy to CRS at a briefing on June 1, 2005. The information has been updated in
some places to account for changes since 2005.
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The DDG-51 and DDG-1000 designs each have about a 10% growth margin. For the roughly
9,000-ton DDG-51, this equates to about 900 tons of growth margin, while for the 14,987-ton
DDG-1000, this equates to about 1,400 tons of growth margin.
123 Source: Points taken from Statement of Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Before The
House Armed Services Committee Projection Forces Subcommittee, July 19th, 2005, and Statement of The Honorable
John J. Young, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), and RADM Charles S.
Hamilton, II, Program Executive Officer For Ships, Before the Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee on DD(X) Shipbuilding Program, July 19, 2005.
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The two designs are roughly equivalent in terms of maximum sustained speed, cruising
endurance, and seakeeping (i.e., stability in rough seas). The DDG-1000’s draft (28 feet) is
somewhat less than the DDG-51’s (31 feet). Other things held equal, this might give the DDG-
1000 an ability to operate in (or be berthed at) places where the water depth is sufficient for the
DDG-1000 but not for the DDG-51. The DDG-1000’s length (600 feet) is greater than the DDG-
51’s (505 feet). Other things held equal, this might give the DDG-51 an ability to be berthed in
spaces that are long enough for the DDG-51 but not for the DDG-1000.
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The DDG-51 has 7.5 megawatts (MW) of electrical power for its weapon systems, while the
DDG-1000 design, with its integrated electric-drive system, can provide up to 78 MW for its
weapons and power systems by diverting power from propulsion to weapons and systems.
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The DDG-1000 has a smaller radar cross-section and lower infrared, acoustic, and magnetic
signatures than the DDG-51. The two designs are roughly equivalent in terms of the detectability
of their radar and other electromagnetic emissions. The DDG-1000’s reduced signatures, DDG-
1000 supporters, will make the DDG-1000 harder to detect, localize, classify, and target, giving
the DDG-1000 a significant advantage in engagements against enemy forces.
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The Navy states that the DDG-1000 would be able to keep fighting after an attack like the one
that disabled the USS Cole (DDG-67) on October 12, 2000.
The two designs are roughly equivalent in terms of degree of compartmentalization and ship
stability when flooded. The DDG-1000’s vertical launch system (VLS) is more heavily armored
than the DDG-51’s. The DDG’s fire-suppression system is automated only in the engine room
and magazine, while the DDG-1000’s system is automated throughout the ship, making it safer
and more effective. The DDG-51’s flood-control system is not automated, while the DDG-1000’s
is, which the Navy believes will make it more effective. The DDG-1000’s electrical power
distribution system is an “integrated fight-through” system, meaning that it is designed to
automatically isolate damaged areas and reroute electrical power around them. All critical DDG-
1000 systems are dual-fed, meaning that if power from one source is cut off, it can be routed
through a second source. The DDG-51’s electrical power distribution system lacks these features.
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The C4I124 and networking systems on the DDG-1000 would have five times as much bandwidth
as those on the DDG-51. The C4I/networking capability of the DDG-1000 is equivalent to that on
the LHD-8 amphibious assault ship. In addition to improved warfighting capability, this increased
124 C4I stands for command and control, communications, computers, and intelligence.
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bandwidth would provide sailors aboard the DDG-1000 a better ability to “reach back” to
information sources ashore when conducting at-sea maintenance of shipboard equipment,
potentially increasing the availability rates of shipboard equipment.
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The DDG-1000 has facilities for embarking and supporting a flag-level officer and his staff, so
that they could use the ship as platform for commanding a group of ships. The DDG-51 does not
have such facilities.
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The radars on the two ships are roughly equivalent in terms of dB gain (sensitivity) and target
resolution. The firm track range of the DDG-1000’s dual-band radar—the range at which it can
maintain firm tracks on targets—is 25% greater for most target types than the firm track range of
the DDG-51’s SPY-1 radar. The DDG-1000’s AAW combat system would be able to maintain
about 10 times as many tracks as the DDG-51’s Aegis system. The DDG-1000’s radar has much
more capability for resisting enemy electronic countermeasures and for detecting targets amidst
littoral “clutter.” As a result of the better performance amidst littoral clutter, the Navy believes
that ships escorted by the DDG-1000 in defended littoral waters would have three times as much
survivability as ships escorted by the DDG-51.
The two designs would use the same types of area-defense and point-defense interceptor
missiles.125 They would also use the same flares, chaff, and decoys to confuse enemy anti-ship
cruise missiles, but the Navy believes these devices would be more effective on the DDG-1000
because of the DDG-1000’s reduced signatures.
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The DDG-1000 would have considerably more naval surface fire support (NSFS) capability than
the DDG-51. The DDG-51 has one 5-inch gun, while the DDG-1000 has two 155mm Advanced
Gun Systems (AGSs). The DDG-51’s gun can fire an initial salvo of 20 rounds per minute and
can subsequently fire at a sustained rate of four rounds per minute (20/4). The DDG-1000’s two
guns have a combined firing rate of 20/20. The shells currently fired by the DDG-51’s gun have a
range of 13 nm. Future shells are to have a range of up to 50 nm. The shells to be fired by the
DDG-1000’s guns are to have a range of 63 to 74 nm, and consequently could cover (at 74 nm)
more than three times as much area ashore (assuming a 25 nm standoff from shore) as a shell with
a range of 50 nm. The shells fired by the DDG-51 carry 8 pounds of explosive, while those fired
by the DDG-1000 are to carry 24 pounds of explosive. When fired at less than maximum range,
the shells fired by the DDG-1000 can alter their flight paths so that six to eight of them can hit a
target at the same time; the shells to be fired by the DDG-51 do not have this capability. The
DDG-51 carries 600 of the 13nm-range shells or 230 of 62nm-range shells, while the DDG-1000
carries a total of 600 of its shells. It might be possible to fit the DDG-51 with one of the 155mm
guns to be carried by the DDG-1000; it would likely require the removal of both the DDG-51’s 5-
125 As discussed earlier, the Navy, as part of its testimony at the July 31, 2008, hearing on destroyer procurement before
the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, stated that the DDG-
1000 cannot successfully employ the SM-2 or perform area-defense AAW.
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inch gun and its forward (32-cell) VLS. In this configuration, the DDG-51 might carry about 120
of the gun’s 155mm shells.
The 155mm guns on the DDG-1000 could be replaced in the future with an electromagnetic rail
gun or directed-energy weapon. The DDG-51 does not have enough electrical power to support
such weapons.
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The DDG-51’s sonar system is more capable for blue-water ASW operations, while the DDG-
1000’s system is more capable for littoral ASW operations. The DDG-1000’s bow-mounted sonar
and towed array can interact to more rapidly triangulate targets. The Flight IIA DDG-51 lacks a
towed array. The DDG-1000’s radar would have more capability than the DDG-51’s radar for
detecting submarine periscopes.
The DDG-51 has six torpedo tubes for firing lightweight (12.75-inch diameter) anti-submarine
torpedoes, while the DDG-1000 has none, but the Navy does not believe these tubes to be of
significant operational value against potential future threats. Both ships can launch lightweight
torpedoes from their helicopters or fire the Vertical Launch Antisubmarine Rocket (VLA), which
is armed with a lightweight torpedo.
The ships would use the same countermeasures for confusing enemy torpedoes, but the Navy
believes these countermeasures would be more effective on the DDG-1000 because of the DDG-
1000’s reduced signatures.
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The DDG-1000’s bow-mounted sonar includes an in-stride mine-avoidance capability; the DDG-
51’s sonar suite has less capability for detecting mines. The DDG-51 can be built to a design that
permits the ship to embark and operate the Remote Minehunting System (RMS); six ships in the
DDG-51 program (DDGs 91 to 96) have been built to this design. The Navy says that the DDG-
1000’s reduced acoustic and magnetic signatures would translate into a significantly greater
operating area in mined waters.
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The DDG-51 has 90 missile-launching tubes in its VLS, while the DDG-1000 has 80. The DDG-
51’s VLS tubes can accommodate a missile up to 21 inches in diameter, 21 feet in length, and
about 3,000 pounds in weight. The DDG-1000’s VLS tubes can accommodate a missile up to 24
inches in diameter, 22 feet in length, and about 4,000 pounds in weight. The gas-management
(i.e., heat-management) system of the DDG-1000’s VLS tubes can accommodate a hotter-burning
missile than the gas-management system of the DDG-51’s VLS, so the DDG-1000 might be more
capable of using future missiles if they are hotter-burning.
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The DDG-51 can embark and operate two SH-60 helicopters but does not have electronics for
launching and recovering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The DDG-1000 can embark,
operate, and provide full maintenance for two SH-60 helicopters or one SH-60 helicopter and
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three UAVs. The DDG-1000’s flight deck is larger than the DDG-51’s and can accommodate all
joint rotary-wing aircraft, including the MV-22, the CH-53, and the H-47. The DDG-1000’s flight
deck is 10 feet higher off the water and can therefore be used for full flight operations in a sea
state (i.e., sea condition) that is at least one step higher (i.e., rougher) than is possible for the
flight deck on the DDG-51.
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The DDG-1000 has additional berthing for 20 SOF personnel (i.e., a platoon), as well as a space
for SOF mission planning and spaces for stowing SOF gear. The DDG-51 lacks these features.
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The DDG-51 can embark two seven-meter boats that are deployed and recovered with a davit.
The DDG-1000 can embark two 11-meter boats and four rubber raiding craft that are deployed
and recovered with a stern ramp, which permits faster and safer launching and recovering, and
launch/recovery operations in higher sea states.
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On the DDG-51, enlisted crew berthing spaces accommodate 20 to 60 sailors each. On the DDG-
1000, every sailor would have a stateroom, and each stateroom would accommodate four sailors.
The Navy believes these features would improve crew quality of life, which can improve
retention rates.
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At an April 10, 2008, briefing to CRS and CBO, Navy officials presented a briefing slide
providing a comparison of the DDG-1000 design’s capabilities relative to the DDG-51 design’s
capabilities. The briefing slide is reprinted below (with some editing changes for readability) as
Table G-1.
Table G-1. DDG-1000 Capabilities Relative to DDG-51 Capabilities
Item
DDG-1000 compared to DDG-51
Radar cross section
Significantly smaller
Ship detectability by threat aircraft
Threat must fly lower and closer to detect the ship
Firm track range on enemy anti-ship
Significant improvement, especially in land-clutter environments
cruise missiles
Performance against small boat swarm
Engage small boats at 3 times the effective range and engage 10 times
raids
more threats
Safe operating area in areas with enemy
Significantly larger
bottom mines
Land attack capability
3 times as much lethality and 40% greater range than Extended Range
Guided Munition (ERGM)a
Manning
50% less crew
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Item
DDG-1000 compared to DDG-51
Electrical power
Sufficient capacity for rail gun, laser weapons, and future radar upgrades
Source: Navy briefing slide #7, entitled “Multi-Mission Combatant,” in Navy briefing to CRS and CBO, April 10,
2008. CRS has edited the words in the table to make them easier to understand.
a. ERGM was a 5-inch extended-range guided munition for the 5-inch guns on Navy cruisers and destroyers.
The Navy in 2008 canceled development of ERGM.
In addition to the information presented in Table G-1, another slide in the Navy briefing stated
that the DDG-1000’s radar cross section will be similar to that of a fishing boat.126 Navy officials
have also stated separately that the DDG-1000’s acoustic signature will be similar, at certain
speeds, to that of certain U.S. Navy submarines.127
In elaborating on the point in Table G-1 pertaining to the DDG-1000’s electrical power, Navy
officials stated at the briefing that at a speed of 20 knots, the DDG-1000 would have 58
megawatts of power available for powering non-propulsion shipboard systems. The briefing
stated that the DDG-51, by comparison, has 7.5 megawatts of power available for non-propulsion
systems.
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A May 7, 2008, letter from Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), to
Senator Edward Kennedy that was obtained by a defense trade publication and posted on its
website provided information on the comparative costs and capabilities of the DDG-1000 and
DDG-51. The letter stated:
Thank you for your letter of April 21, 2008, concerning cost estimates for the continuation of
the DDG 51 program and the DDG 1000 program.
As you indicated in your letter, without firm contracts for future ships of either class, we are
only able to provide a best estimate of the costs we would incur in either of these programs.
Since we are phasing out production of the DDG 51 class, there would be start-up costs
associated with returning this line to production. As a result, the estimated end cost to
competitively procure a lead DDG-51 (Flight IIa—essentially a repeat of the final ships
currently undergoing construction) in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 assuming a truncation of the
DDG 1000 class after the two lead ships would be either $2.2B for a single ship or $3.5B for
two lead ships (built at competing production yards). This estimate is based on a Profit
Related to Offer (PRO) acquisition strategy. The average cost of subsequent DDG 51 Flight
IIa class ships would be about $1.8B (FY09) per ship compared to the $2.6B estimated cost
of subsequent DDG 1000 class ships. Below is the breakdown of the one and two ship FY09
DDG 51 estimates, compared to that of the DDG 1000 in the same year. DDG 1000 costs
include FY08 advanced procurement funds:
126 Navy briefing slide #8, entitled “Zumwalt Advantage,” in Navy briefing to CRS and CBO, April 10, 2008.
127 Source: Spoken testimony of Navy officials at hearing before Seapower subcommittee of Senate Armed Services
Committee on April 8, 2008.
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DDG 51
DDG 51
DDG 1000
(FY$M)
(FY09)
(FY09)
(FY09)
Qty 1
2
1
Plans/Basic [construction]
854.4
1607.8
1393.3
Change Orders
39.1
76.1
66.0
Government Furnished Equip
1138.2
1556.7
1126.8
Other 56.4
57.5
66.6
Total Ship Cost
2088.1
3298.1
2652.6
The table provided below compares the annual operations and support costs for the DDG 51
and DDG 1000 class ships.
(FY$M)
DDG 1000
DDG 51
Operating (steaming)
$18.5 $15.7
Maintenance
$10.3 $5.6
Manpower
$8.5 $19.9
Total
$37.3 $41.2
Crew Size
14 officers
24 Officers
106 enlisted
272 Enlisted
The total annual cost for the DDG 51 is a class average based on 17 years of operations and
maintenance, and does not include personnel reduction savings expected from the DDG
Modernization program. While there are cost savings associated with the DDG 1000’s
smaller crew, they are largely offset by higher estimated maintenance costs for this
significantly more complex ship.
Clearly the relative value of the DDG 1000 resides in the combat system (Dual-Band Radar,
Volume Search Radar, ASW Suite, etc) that provide this ship with superior warfighting
capability in the littoral. However, the DDG 51 can provide Ballistic Missile Defense
capability against short and medium range ballistic missiles and area Anti-Air Warfare
capability (required in an anti-access environment) where the DDG 1000 currently does not.
Upgrading the DDG 1000 combat system with this capability would incur additional cost.
The DDG 51 class also possesses better capability in active open ocean Anti-Submarine
Warfare than does the DDG 1000.
On balance, the procurement cost of a single DDG 51 is significantly less than that of a DDG
1000, and the life-cycle costs of the two classes are similar. I appreciate the opportunity to
share my perspective on these two alternatives with you. A similar letter has been sent to
Senator Martinez. As always, if I can be of further assistance, please let me know.128
On June 3, 2008, John Young, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, questioned the accuracy of the
cost figures in the May 7 letter, stating, among other things, that he believed the annual operating
128 Source: Letter dated May 7, 2008, from Admiral G. Roughead to the Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, posted on the
Internet at InsideDefense.com (subscription required) on May 30, 2008. Emboldening in the second table as in the
original. See also Thomas Duffy, “Navy Says DDG-100, DDG-51 Annual Operating Costs Are Rated Even,” Inside the
Navy, June 2, 2008.
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and support cost of the DDG-1000 would be about $10 million less than that of a DDG-51, and
that the procurement cost figures in the letter relied on certain assumptions that might not prove
accurate. Young’s testimony was viewed as defending the DDG-1000 more strongly than did the
CNO’s May 7, 2008, letter.129
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A July 2, 2008, letter from John Young, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics (i.e., the DOD acquisition executive), to Representative Gene Taylor
that was obtained by a defense trade publication and posted on its website provides additional
comments regarding the DDG-1000 and DDG-51, as well as information about the readiness of
the DDG-1000 design to enter production. The letter stated:
I agree that the Navy’s preliminary design analysis for the next generation cruiser indicates
that, for the most capable radar suites under consideration, the DDG 1000 hull cannot
support the radar. This applies just as well to the DDG 51 hull. However, it is my
understanding that engineering analysis shows that the existing DDG 1000 hull design can
support significantly more capable radar suites than the existing DDG 51 hull design.
Moreover, while it is not possible to quickly estimate the production cost of a redesigned
DDG 51 alternative, I suspect that, given the dense and complex nature of the DDG 51 hull,
as compared to that of the DDG 1000 hull, the cost of a redesigned DDG 51 very likely will
be equal to or greater than that of a DDG 1000.
Your letter also warns that cost over-runs for the DDG 1000 program might cripple the
Navy’s shipbuilding programs. I am equally concerned that restarting the DDG 51 program
would pose risk to the shipbuilding budget and inject additional cost for the following
reasons:
—Direct production hours for one DDG 1000 ship are about 2.5 times that of one DDG 51
restart ship. This validates DOD’s experience that two to three DDG 51 destroyers need to be
purchased annually to sustain the production workload base for two surface combatant
shipyards. That number of DDG 51 ships costs more per year than one DDG 1000 follow
ship. The cost per year for modified DDG 51 ships would be even higher.
—Several ship and vendor base issues, including equipment obsolescence, main reduction
gears, configuration change issues, and re-start of production lines, would need to be
resolved in order to award and construct additional DDG 51 class ships.
—The costs for the two DDG 1000 ships would increase if that program is truncated to only
two ships.
—There will be program shutdown costs for the DDG 1000 program if the program is
truncated to only two ships.
—The Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation efforts for the DDG 1000 program must
continue in order to deliver two complete lead ships and to support the Dual Band Radar for
the CVN 21 program.
129 See, for example, Emelie Rutherford, “Young Claims Inaccuracies, Assumptions In Navy Destroyer Cost
Comparison,” Defense Daily, June 5, 2008; and Dale Eisman, “Warning: Delay On Ship Will Run Up Navy’s Costs,”
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot,” June 4, 2008: D1.
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In reference to your concern that there is no Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
or U.S. Marine Corps requirement for fire support that can only be provided by the DDG
1000, the JROC validated the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the DDG
1000 program. The ORD includes a requirement to provide precise and sustained naval fires
at extended ranges. The DDG 1000 with its advanced Gun System firing the Long Range
Land Attack Projectile is the only ship that can achieve that validated requirement.
I remain convinced that the DDG 1000 program is poised for proper execution. Unlike DDG
51, LPD 17, and LCS, where the level of concurrent design, development, and construction
were critical flaws, leading to significant cost increases on the lead ships, the DDG 1000
program benefits from early technology maturation, and experienced design team using a
mature design tool, proven production processes, and other factors as outlined below:
—Design Drawing Status: DDG 1000 is significantly more mature in detail design than was
LPD 17 or DDG 51 at the same points in the program. For example, at the time of the Detail
Design and Construction (DD&C) contract award, DDG 1000 detail design products were 55
percent complete, compared to 0 percent for LPD 17 and DDG 51. At the start of fabrication,
DDG 1000 detail design products will be approximately 80-85 percent complete, compared
to 20 percent for DDG 51 and 20-30 percent for the two LCS designs. While design products
for the LPD 17 were also in the 80 percent complete range at the start of fabrication, this
came about only after a long delay to fix and prove the design tool during the detail design
phase, a lesson learned and avoided for the DDG 1000 program.
—Initial Module Construction: The jointly developed design of DDG 1000 is on schedule to
be more mature than any previous shipbuilding program at start of construction. The design
and build of the machinery block in advance of first ship construction completed in June
2008. This effort has been extremely beneficial as a risk reduction measure.
—Design Tool Maturity: The DDG 1000 team of contractors worked together on 3-D
modeling during preliminary and system design for 6 years in advance of the DD&C phase.
—Early Technical Product Definition: Contractor-developed technical products enabled
early development of design products (system diagrams, vendor statements of work, etc.),
which are typically developed during the early stages of detail design. DDG 1000 leveraged
these early developments to help the program reduce the risk of rework and poor quality than
undermine early-start initiatives such as those experienced on other shipbuilding programs.
—Technology Maturity: The combined DDG 1000 design team learning and use of the 3-D
Product Modeling Tool 6 years in advance of the DD&C ensures that the right quantity of
qualified human capital resources are allocated in support of the DD&C phase.
—Phase III Cost Performance: Cost performance on DDG 1000 was within 2.5 percent of
budget on the $2.7B development effort on Phase III, leading to the DD&C phase.
—Current Phase Cost Performance: The current design, development, and integration
contract is performing at an overall cost performance index of 1.02 and a schedule
performance index of 0.99 through April 2008. Detail design and transition to production are
on cost and schedule.130
130 Source: Letter dated July 2, 2008, from John J. Young, Jr., to the Honorable Gene Taylor, posted on the Internet at
InsideDefense.com (subscription required) on July 11, 2008. See also Geoff Fein, “DDG-1000 Hull Can’t Support Most
Capable Radar Planned For CG(X), Pentagon Official Says,” Defense Daily, July 11, 2008.
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If the blank cells in Table G-2 and Table G-3 were filled in with figures from a source such as
the Navy or CBO, the tables would provide acquisition and operating and support (O&S) cost
data for comparing the options of procuring either Flight IIA DDG-51s (the Navy’s proposal) or
modified DDG-1000s as a means of improving the fleet’s BMD, area-defense AAW, and open-
ocean ASW capabilities. Such cost information could provide additional perspective for assessing
the Navy’s statement at the July 31, 2008, hearing that modifying the DDG-1000 design to make
it capable of BMD, area-defense AAW, and blue-water ASW operations “is unaffordable from the
Navy’s standpoint.” Table G-2 assumes that procurement of surface combatants would shift to
CG(X)s beginning in FY2017, and that procurement of modified DDG-1000s would continue at a
rate of one per year through FY2016.
The cost and ship-quantity data in the two tables, if provided by a source such as the Navy or
CBO, could be combined with a comparison of the relative capabilities of the two resulting
groups of DDG-51s and modified DDG-1000s to arrive at an overall comparison of the cost-
effectiveness of the two options.
Table G-2. Acquisition Costs for DDG-51s and Modified
DDG-1000s
(costs in millions constant FY2010 dollars)
FY 10 FY 11 FY 12 FY 13 FY 14 FY 15 FY 16 To completea Totala
Navy proposal: DDG-51s
Quantity 1 2 1 2 1 1
0
RDT&Eb
SCNc
WPNd
Total
Alternative option: Modified DDG-1000se
Quantity 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
7
RDT&Eb
SCNc
WPNd
Total
Source: Table prepared by CRS. Blank cells to be filled in with figures from sources such as the Navy or CBO.
On October 22, 2008, CRS asked the Navy to fill in the blank cells; as of the date shown on the cover of this
CRS report, the Navy had not provided to CRS a version of the table with the blanks filled in.
a. “To complete” column includes any costs beyond FY2016 needed to complete costs for the ships procured
in FY2010-FY2016. “Total” column includes both FY2010-FY2016 and “To complete” column.
b. Research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) costs for the ships procured in FY2010-FY2016.
Excludes costs that the Navy plans to incur for DDG-51s procured in FY2005 and prior years (such as costs
for the DDG-51 modernization program) and costs that the Navy plans to incur to support the
construction of the three DDG-1000s procured in FY2007-FY2009. Includes all ship and weapon RDT&E
costs needed to achieve the modified DDG-1000 described in note e below.
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c. Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) costs for the ships procured in FY2010-FY2016, including
outfitting and post-delivery costs. Excludes FY2010 cost for the DDG-1000 procured in FY2009 using split
funding in FY2009 and DY1010 (and any other SCN costs for the three DDG-1000s procured in FY2007-
FY2009).
d. Weapon Procurement, Navy (WPN) costs for the weapons needed to arm the ships procured in FY2010-
FY2016.
e. Current DDG-1000 design modified as follows:
—AGSs and associated magazines in the current DDG-1000 design deleted and additional missile-launch
tubes installed in their place.
—Ship and missile modifications as needed for the ship to successfully employ SM-2, SM-3, and SM-6
missiles and otherwise give the ship a BMD and area-defense AAW capability not less than that of Flight
IIA DDG-51 with ACB 12.
—Ship’s bow sonar and other ASW combat system elements changed as needed to give the ship an open-
ocean ASW capability not less than that of Flight IIA DDG-51.
Table G-3. Annual O&S Costs for a DDG-51 and a Modified
DDG-1000
(costs in millions of constant FY2010 dollars)
Cost elementa
DDG-51
Modified DDG 1000b
Operating (steaming), assuming crude oil cost of:
$ 50 per barrel:
$100 per barrel:
$150 per barrel:
Maintenance
Manpower
Total, assuming crude oil cost of:
$ 50 per barrel:
$100 per barrel:
$150 per barrel:
Total crew size
Source: Table prepared by CRS. Blank cells to be filled in with figures from sources such as the Navy or CBO.
On October 22, 2008, CRS asked the Navy to fill in the blank cells; as of the date shown on the cover of this
CRS report, the Navy had not provided to CRS a version of the table with the blanks filled in.
a. Average annual cost, calculated on 35-year life-cycle basis so as to capture periodic costs, such as costs for
periodic depot maintenance.
b. Current DDG-1000 design modified as described in previous table.
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On October 31, 2008, it was reported that:
Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) has asked the Navy to provide him data comparing costs
between the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 as well as documentation supporting the Navy’s
assertion that the plan to restart the Arleigh Burke class of destroyers would be budget
neutral.
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Because of the questions surrounding the Navy’s decision to go back to DDG-51, which,
according to service officials, were based on rapid changes in the global security
environment that outstripped the capability set that DDG-1000 was designed to combat,
Kennedy is asking for an “apples-to-apples” comparison of the two destroyers.
“I believe this would entail providing complete cost data on a DDG-51, as envisioned by the
Navy after restart of the production line, and on a DDG-1000 that has modifications the
Navy believes are critical to perform the ballistic missile defense (BMD), area-defense anti-
air warfare and blue-water anti-submarine warfare missions driving the Navy’s desire to shift
between platforms,” Kennedy said in an Oct. 24 letter to Chief of Naval Operations Adm.
Gary Roughead.
The Navy should provide cost estimates that assume: improvements are made to the dual
band radar only as necessary to give the ship capabilities comparable to the radar envisioned
for restarted DDG-51s; and improvements are made that would reflect a growth path to
greater capability while the Navy is waiting on the CG(X) program, Kennedy added.
Additionally, Kennedy questions the Navy’s assertion that the plan to restart DDG-51
production would be budget neutral.
“Even if that were the case, it is not clear to me that the ‘budget neutral’ plan is neutral when
it comes to funding the workload necessary to support the surface combatant industrial
base,” he said. “Therefore, I would like to see how many DDG-51s you plan to procure,
budget quality estimates for that plan, what effect that plan would have on the surface
combatant industrial base, and any associated termination costs while the Navy waits to
begin building the CG(X) in 2017,” Kennedy said.
The Massachusetts senator also noted that a number of questions have yet to be answered in
regard to the Navy’s decision to cap production of DDG-1000 and restart the DDG-51 line.
According to Kennedy, Congress has yet to see:
• intelligence analysis reflecting the coordinated assessment of the Defense Intelligence
Agency supporting these changes to the mix of platforms;
• validation of this shift that is supported by reviews by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council for an Acquisition Category I program;
• an approved acquisition strategy for cruisers and destroyers that supports the approved
requirements baseline and is consistent with the previous Navy studies on what investment is
required to support the surface combatant industrial base;
• evidence that potential changes in the shipbuilding program reflect: modeling and
simulation, including war gaming conclusions regarding combat effectiveness; assessments
of platform operational availability; and cost savings or penalties from changed vessel
manning levels to accomplish missions;
• verification by the commanders of the combatant commands that the Navy’s currently
preferred program would be better than the Navy’s previously preferred shipbuilding
program in meeting their future mission requirements.
Additionally, Kennedy noted that Congress has also yet to see any analysis to support the
Navy’s contention that DDG-51 will offer greater ballistic missile defense, advanced anti-
ship cruise missile defense, and blue-water anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and that the
service couldn’t afford to make DDG-1000 capable of supporting the same missions.
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Kennedy pointed to testimony Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, deputy chief of naval
operations for integration of capabilities and resources, gave to the House Armed Services
Subcommittee on Seapower in July.
“Modifying the DDG-1000s to support these missions is unaffordable from the Navy’s
standpoint,” McCullough said at the hearing.
McCullough made a similar statement in September at a Surface Navy Association luncheon
....
“The Congress still has not seen the analysis to support this statement,” Kennedy said in his
letter to Roughead.
“Even if we are to believe that there is an excess of capacity relative to the fire support
requirement, it is not clear to me that the Navy’s path forward makes the most sense,”
Kennedy added.
Kennedy said it’s his understanding that:
• the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) is included in the baseline and relatively modest research
and development would allow the ship to also employ SM-3 and SM-6 missiles in a ballistic
missile defense (BMD) mission;
• the DDG-1000 could be further optimized for the ballistic missile defense mission through
combat systems modifications and by perhaps deleting the Advanced Gun System and
replacing it with additional missile tubes;
• the DDG-1000 radar has more potential for improvement to achieve capability required to
support more a robust BMD mission, as compared to the radar on DDG-51;
• the DDG-1000 Operational Requirements Document already articulates a recruitment to
provide area air defense capability and that the advances in capability provided by the dual
band radar are well suited to counter the Hezebollah threat often cited;
• the DDG-1000 has an integrated undersea warfare suite that is not only capable of blue
water and littoral anti-submarine warfare, but is also capable of in-stride mine avoidance;
and
• the DDG-1000 platform has more growth potential for carrying bigger, more capable radars
and other new sensors and weapons.131
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On November 4, 2008, it was reported that:
Earlier this year, the Navy tasked Raytheon with looking at how quickly the company could
implement a ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability onto DDG-1000. Of interest to the
Navy was the time frame for adding BMD, which hull would get the capability, what exactly
is the capability the ship would get, as well as what were the risks and challenges in pursuing
131 Geoff Fein, “Kennedy Seeks Cost Comparison Data Between DDG-51 and [DDG-]1000,” Defense Daily, October
31, 2008: 3-5.
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this concept, Mike Moe, director of seapower capability systems for Raytheon integrated
defense systems, told Defense Daily in a recent interview.
“Their time frame they were looking at in this tasking was 2015. We did our analysis, and
came back in 30 days. We found we could do it one year later ... 2016 ... [that] was the
earliest we could provide credible capability,” he said.
As it stand[s] now, in the current operational requirements document (ORD) for Zumwalt,
there is no call for BMD, Moe noted.
Raytheon came up with three options for bringing BMD capability to Zumwalt. The options
looked at radar, software and missiles, Moe said.
The ship would need to have enough capability to radiate enough energy to be able to discern
a target when it was in space and then to put weapons on that target, he added. “So the radar
had to change.”
In Zumwalt’s case, the Dual Band Radar (DBR) would have to be modified, Moe said.
DBR is designed to go across a wide spectrum of the family of ships in the Navy, Moe said,
including the CVN-78 Ford-class of aircraft carriers. DBR has two pieces—the SPY-3 which
is X-band and the Volume Search Radar (VSR) which is S-band, Moe explained.
Raytheon is the prime for the back end for both radars, and Lockheed Martin [LMT]
provides the VSR base on the S-band side, Moe said.
“The VSR was the radar that needed to be adjusted. In the development of VSR, from day
one on Zumwalt, there was space allocated for growth…for other missions or more pressing
threats that might require more volume search even in the air defense spectrum,” he said.
“We had room in there to add additional modules, additional TR (transmitter receiver)
pieces.”
VSR is partially populated, Moe said. It has about 2,600 modules in the current radar, the
one in development right now.
To make it BMD capable, Moe said the radar would have to be fully populated.... fill in the
rest of the blanks that were left for growth in the original design.
One idea was to leave the VLS [sic: VSR] the way it is and see what that could provide in
the way of BMD if the BMD software were added and the missile changed.
A second idea was to fully populate the VLS [sic: VSR] to its fullest extent. A third idea was
to fully populate the VLS [sic: VSR] but also change the duty cycle…that would change the
frequency of how much energy would be put a target, he added.
“Each one of those…the baseline ... the term we use is sensitivity ... so the sensitivity of the
baseline radar is a zero dB sensitivity. So when we did the fully populated we got to a 11 dB
of sensitivity which means more power on target,” Moe explained. “And then with the
change in the duty cycle, we got to 15 dB. So 15 dB of sensitivity was the maximum we
could get out of fully populating [the radar], putting all the modules in all the holes that
weren’t used initially and bring that kind of capability to bear for this capability we are
looking for.”
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The Navy, Moe noted, went right away for the 15 dB. “So that’s where our focus was at, but
we also [priced] the 11 dB capability. So there were really two options off the baseline,
which was zero dB as a reference point.”
So Raytheon grew the radar to be all it could be, against the BMD threat, and they did the
corresponding analysis with their radar folks to see if the solution would give them a credible
capability. “The answer was yes,” Moe said.
In Zumwalt’s combat system, there is no software for a BMD mission, Moe said, although
there was software to integrate the Stand[ard] Missile for area air defense.
“The actual missile defense algorithms for discrimination and those kind of things to work
with a threat in the exo-atmosphere required different algorithms and different software,” he
said. “Because we build that software for all of our radars, the BMD system radars, that was
something we felt would be easy to bring in and leverage into our command and control
system on Zumwalt.”
Moe said Raytheon also looked, from purely a cost point of view, at the Aegis BMD
capability and what could be leveraged from that to save money. But to do that, Moe added,
would require some provisions within the government and some kind of national team
approach because of the proprietary nature of Aegis BMD effort underneath Lockheed
Martin and with the Missile Defense Agency.
“But we saw that as something that certainly should be considered. So we put that into our
assessment of other ways you could go at this requirement to leverage some additional
capability that’s already in play [in] Aegis BMD,” he said.
For the software, Raytheon is going to take that from existing software they use in various
radars for missile defense. Moe said the company would leverage that software into the
additional code they had to change, and bring in the discrimination algorithms to be able to
discriminate the object of interest particularly in the exo-atmospheric threat.
The third option looked at the missiles.
Allowances had to be made for using the SM-3 missile because it is an exo-atmospheric
platform, Moe said. “That was probably the easiest of the pieces.”
Moe added that the Raytheon team looked at a marinized PAC-3 for use on a shipboard
environment or a SM-6 variant that would be competed somewhere downstream.
The missile people were concerned whether or not the missile would fit in the MK 57
launcher, Moe said. And when the Navy moves in 2015 to a 21-inch full up more robust SM-
3, would that missile fit?
“First off, the missile does fit. Every missile that fits in the MK 41 launcher on the current
Aegis fleet will fit in the 57,” Moe said. “In fact we have about 15 to 20 more inches of
vertical room and we have about three more inches of diameter relative to the size of the
modules.”
So everything that can be shot out of an Aegis [Mk] 41 launcher can be shot out of a [Mk] 57
launcher with a lot of margin left, Moe noted.
“The difference is, for SM-3, because it goes exo-atmospheric, it needed a second cable that
references the missile to its ship platform upon launch,” he said. “So it has a zero reference
from where it is launching from as it goes out into space, and that cable provides GPS,
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inertial [navigation] uplink ... [a] reference point upon launch. So [there is] a little difference
for that missile because of how it works.”
After all the analysis, Raytheon told the Navy the company could provide a very credible
capability in the short term…2016, Moe said.
[On] the cost side, non-recurring cost came out to be $389 million for the 11 dB and
approximately $400 million for the 15 dB radar. For recurring costs is was $117 million for
the 11dB solution and $110 million for the 15 dB solution, Moe said.
“So all in all we could provide capability [in] 2016. We would meet the third hull realizing
Zumwalt’s first hull comes out in 2014 and is on schedule right now in the May-June time frame.
A year later, hull two comes out in 2015, and hull three became our ship of choice to meet the
requirement the Navy had given us.”132
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Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
132 Geoff Fein, “Raytheon Says It Can Convert Zumwalt Into A Missile Cruiser By 2016,” Defense Daily, November 4,
2008: 5-7.
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