Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs
April 2, 2009
Congressional Research Service
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Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations

Summary
U.S.-Thailand relations are of interest to Congress because of Thailand’s status as a long-time
military ally and a significant trade and economic partner. However, ties have been complicated
by deep political and economic instability in the wake of the September 2006 coup that displaced
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. After December 2007 parliamentary elections returned many
of Thaksin’s supporters to power, the U.S. government lifted the restrictions on aid imposed after
the coup and worked to restore bilateral ties. Since then, street demonstrations have rocked
Bangkok, two prime ministers have been forced to step down because of court decisions, and a
tenuous new coalition has taken over the government. Many questions remain on how relations
will fare as Bangkok seeks political stability. With Thai nationalism apparently on the rise, some
analysts see a risk of drift in the U.S.-Thai relationship, although no major shift in overall
cooperation.
Despite differences on Burma policy and human rights issues, shared economic and security
interests have long provided the basis for U.S.-Thai cooperation. Thailand contributed troops and
support for U.S. military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq and was designated as a major
non-NATO ally by President Bush in December 2003. Thailand’s airfields and ports play a
particularly important role in U.S. global military strategy, including having served as the primary
hub of the relief effort following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The high-profile arrest of
radical Islamic leader Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, in a joint Thai-U.S. operation
in 2003 underscores Thailand’s active role in the U.S.-led war on terrorism. The U.S.-Thai
bilateral trade total in 2007 was over $30 billion.
Since 2006, Thai politics have been dominated by a fight between populist forces led by Thaksin
(now in exile) and his opponents: a mix of conservative royalists and military figures, and other
Bangkok elites. Until the political turmoil of 2006, Thaksin and his populist Thai Rak Thai party
had consolidated broad control of Thai politics through a series of electoral successes beginning
in 2001. Like Thaksin, none of the successive governments has been able to stem the violence of
an insurgency in the southern majority-Muslim provinces. A series of attacks by insurgents and
counter-attacks by security forces has reportedly claimed over 3,600 lives since January 2004.
With its favorable geographic location and broad-based economy, Thailand has traditionally been
considered among the most likely countries to play a major leadership role in Southeast Asia and
has been an aggressive advocate of increased economic integration in the region. A founding
member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Thailand maintains close ties
with China and is pursuing FTAs with a number of other countries. Given its ties with the United
States, Thailand’s stature in the region may affect broader U.S. foreign policy objectives and
prospects for further multilateral economic and security cooperation in Southeast Asia. In the
context of the Pentagon’s transformation and realignment initiatives, current logistical facilities in
Thailand could become more important to U.S. strategy in the region. This report will be updated
periodically.

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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Thailand’s Political Framework............................................................................................. 1
Political Developments Since 2006 Coup .................................................................................... 2
A New Prime Minister Takes Power ...................................................................................... 2
Both Sides Employ Large-Scale Street Protests ..................................................................... 2
Violence in the Southern Provinces ............................................................................................. 3
Background to the Current Conflict ................................................................................. 3
Failure of Successive Governments’ Approach ................................................................ 4
Emerging Patterns in the Insurgency ............................................................................... 4
Little Evidence of Transnational Elements....................................................................... 5
Leadership of Insurgency Unclear ................................................................................... 5
Background: Thailand Politics and Government .......................................................................... 5
Thaksin’s Rise and Fall ................................................................................................... 6
Military Coup Ousts Thaksin................................................................................................. 6
U.S. Response................................................................................................................. 7
U.S.-Thailand Political and Security Relations ............................................................................ 7
Current Strains in Relations................................................................................................... 7
A Long-Standing Southeast Asian Ally.................................................................................. 8
Impact of the 2006 Coup ................................................................................................. 9
Support for U.S. Operations ............................................................................................ 9
Asia Pacific Military Transformation............................................................................... 9
Bilateral Security Cooperation ............................................................................................ 10
Security Assistance ....................................................................................................... 10
Military Exercises ......................................................................................................... 10
Training ........................................................................................................................ 10
Intelligence ................................................................................................................... 10
Law Enforcement.......................................................................................................... 11
Counter-Narcotics ......................................................................................................... 11
Human Rights and Democracy Concerns............................................................................. 11
Under Thaksin .............................................................................................................. 12
Coup and Aftermath ...................................................................................................... 12
U.S.-Thailand Trade and Economic Relations............................................................................ 13
U.S.-Thailand FTA Negotiations ......................................................................................... 13
An Aggressive FTA Strategy ............................................................................................... 14
Thailand in Asia ........................................................................................................................ 14
Growing Ties with China .................................................................................................... 14
Divergence with United States on Burma (Myanmar) Policy ............................................... 15
Refugee Situation................................................................................................................ 16
ASEAN Relations ............................................................................................................... 16

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Thailand......................................................................................................... 18
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Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Thailand 2005-2009 ........................................................................ 17

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 19

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Introduction
An American treaty ally since 1954, Thailand was long praised as an economic and democratic
success story. The U.S.-Thai relationship, solidified during the Cold War, strengthened on the
basis of shared economic and strategic interests. Although some Thais were disappointed that the
United States did not do more to assist Thailand after the devastating 1997-1998 financial crisis,
trade and defense relations continued to develop. Access to military facilities and sustained
military-to-military cooperation made Thailand an important element of U.S. strategic presence in
the Asia-Pacific. After several decades of mostly military dictatorships, by the early 1990s
Thailand established democratic rule, further bolstering its status as a primary U.S. partner in
maintaining stability in Southeast Asia.
By the turn of the century, U.S.-Thai relations appeared to further accelerate. Designated as a
major non-NATO ally in 2003, Thailand contributed troops and support for U.S. military
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra had consolidated
control of politics and was seen as likely to assume a major leadership role in ASEAN. Thaksin
embraced the U.S.-led war on terrorism in the region, a role highlighted by the high-profile 2003
arrest of a radical Islamic leader in a joint Thai-U.S. operation. The start of negotiations in June
2004 for a U.S.-Thailand Free Trade Agreement (FTA) marked Thailand’s possible entry into the
expanding American web of trade pacts with political allies.
Bilateral ties began to fray, however, as concerns rose about Thaksin’s governance. Critics
charged that his administration stifled Thailand’s democratic institutions, prioritized the wealth of
his family and affiliates, and proved incompetent in dealing with a nascent insurgency in the
Muslim-majority southern provinces of Thailand. Deep divisions within Thai society and power
struggles between the old guard and Thaksin’s team surfaced and then exploded with the military
coup that deposed Thaksin in September 2006. In the political turmoil that followed, the United
States strived to maintain the relationship while simultaneously imposing penalties for the
interruption of democratic rule. Military aid, suspended after the coup, was reinstated after
elections in December 2007, but as successive administrations have struggled to hold on to
power, new uncertainty about the durability of the alliance and Thailand’s commitment to
democratic rule have emerged.
One of the primary motivations for maintaining strong relations with Bangkok is the ongoing
competition with Beijing for influence in Southeast Asia. Thailand, long known for its ability to
keep good relations with all parties, enjoys strong economic, political, and cultural ties with both
China and the United States. Mindful of geopolitics, the United States is attempting to balance its
strategic needs with its imperative to remain a champion of democracy in the region.
Thailand’s Political Framework
Managing the U.S. relationship with Thailand has become increasingly challenging as divisions
in Thai society have become more pronounced. The recent turmoil in Thailand (see below)
underscores a growing divide between the rural, mostly poor population and the urban middle
class, largely based in Bangkok. By stoking Thai nationalism and providing inexpensive health
care and other support to rural communities, Thaksin galvanized a populist movement in
Thailand, with the support leading to emphatic electoral victories for his Thai Rak Thai Party, and
then the successor People’s Power Party (PPP). This success threatened the traditional model of
governance, which combines a powerful military backed by the royal family, an elite corps of
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bureaucrats, and a relatively weak executive government. Thaksin’s rise and fall—and the role he
continues to play in Thai politics—have brought these two camps into competition and exposed
deep divisions within Thai society.
The power of the palace, and particularly the intense popularity of the king himself, provides an
important pillar of stability. King Bhumiphol, who has served since 1946, commands tremendous
respect and loyalty from the Thai public and continues to exercise influence over politics. The
king is 81 years old and reportedly in poor health, giving rise to anxiety about succession. Due to
stringent lèse-majesté laws, the issue of royal continuity is not discussed in the press.
Political Developments Since 2006 Coup
Politics in Thailand have been in a state of turmoil since early 2006, particularly so after a
military coup ousted Thaksin Shinawatra as Prime Minister in September 2006. After the coup, an
interim military government took power, generally proving to be ineffective at governance but
orchestrating relatively clean elections in December 2007. The People’s Power Party (PPP), a
successor party to Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party, won a strong victory in parliamentary
elections, but its two subsequent Prime Ministers—Samak Sundaravej and Somchai
Wongsawat—were both forced to resign because of decisions by Thailand’s court system.
Meanwhile, Thaksin, after spending 17 months in exile, returned to Thailand in February 2008
but later fled again. After being denied a visa to remain in Great Britain, he is reportedly spending
time in various countries, including China, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates. He faces a
slew of criminal charges in Thailand, and his ex-wife has already been convicted on tax evasion
charges.
A New Prime Minister Takes Power
In December 2008, Abhisit Vejjaiva, leader of the opposition Democrat Party, was elected by the
parliament as Prime Minister by collecting enough defector votes from former PPP lawmakers.
The PPP has regrouped under the “Phuea Thai” or “For Thais” Party. Since then, the ruling party
received two modest boosts: the coalition gained several seats in January parliamentary by-
elections and survived a no-confidence in March. The government’s immediate fate appears to
hinge on improving Thailand’s export-dependent economy, now teetering due to the global
economic slowdown.
There are structural problems for the government beyond demonstrating an ability to improve
economic conditions. Many members of the hastily-formed coalition are traditional rivals, and
politically and philosophically there appears to be little to bind the group together. Abhisit himself
holds a sterling resume—a young, Oxford-educated economist—but his image does not suggest
he will find ways to reach out to the rural, poor population that has flocked to Thaksin in recent
years. Abhisit’s government seems unlikely to call for new parliamentary elections in order to
seek a mandate, and elections do not need to be held until 2011.
Both Sides Employ Large-Scale Street Protests
Meanwhile, street demonstrations from both sides of the political divide have disrupted Bangkok
for months in fits and starts. After Thaksin’s departure in August 2008, many observers expected
a degree of political stability to return, but demonstrations by anti-Thaksin forces, ongoing for
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several months, swelled in number and aggression through the fall, culminating in a week-long
takeover of Bangkok’s two major airports in late November and early December 2008. The
protests were mostly organized under the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), a group of
activists that spearheaded massive demonstrations that weakened Thaksin’s power before the
coup. The “yellow shirt” protestors, insisting that the government represented a Thaksin puppet
regime, demanded the resignation of both PPP prime ministers. In response, pro-government
demonstrations by the “red shirts” also materialized and confrontations developed. At times, the
demonstrations turned violent, with several deaths on each side. The protests, and particularly the
airports takeover, hurt Thailand’s economy, especially the crucial tourism sector.
After the Constitutional Court ruled that the PPP must disband and Somchai stepped down, the
yellow shirts dispersed, but since then the pro-Thaksin forces have regrouped under the “United
Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship” (UDD). In March 2009, the crowds in Bangkok grew
to the tens of thousands, particularly when Thaksin addressed his supporters via video link. Both
sides have employed tactics designed to provoke a heavy-handed response from the military. The
respective governments in power, however, appear to have been loathe to order a crackdown,
which, they may have calculated, would make the situation appear even more volatile and
chaotic.
Violence in the Southern Provinces
Thailand has endured a persistent separatist insurgency in its majority-Muslim southern
provinces, which includes the provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, and—to a lesser extent—
Songhkla, while dealing with political instability in its capital. Since January 2004, sectarian
violence between insurgents and security forces in Thailand’s majority-Muslim provinces has left
over 3,600 people dead, according to press reports. The groups that have led this surge in violence
are generally poorly understood, and their motives are difficult to characterize. Many believe they
are mostly focused on local autonomy, but even the Thai government has poor understanding of
the diverse groups active in the South. The successive administrations have taken somewhat
different approaches to curbing the violence in the south, but none appear to have found a way to
resolve the ongoing insurgency.
Background to the Current Conflict
The southern region has a history of separatist violence, though the major movements were
thought to have died out in the early 1990s. Thai Muslims have long expressed grievances for
being marginalized and discriminated against, and the area has lagged behind the rest of Thailand
in economic development. The recent death toll of over 3,300 includes suspected insurgents killed
by security forces, as well as victims of the insurgents. This includes both Buddhist Thais,
particularly monks and teachers, and local Muslims.
After a series of apparently coordinated attacks by the insurgents in early 2004, the central
government declared martial law in the region. Moreover, a pattern of insurgent attacks—targeted
shootings or small bombs that claim a few victims at a time and counter-attacks by the security
forces—has developed. The pattern crystallized into two major outbreaks of violence in 2004: on
April 28, Thai soldiers killed 108 insurgents, including 34 lightly armed gunmen in a historic
mosque, after they attempted to storm several military and police outposts in coordinated attacks;
and on October 25, 84 local Muslims were killed: 6 shot during an erupting demonstration at the
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Tak Bai police station and 78 apparently asphyxiated from being piled into trucks after their
arrest. The insurgents retaliated with a series of more gruesome killings, including beheadings,
following the Tak Bai incident.
Failure of Successive Governments’ Approach
The Thaksin government’s handling of the violence was widely criticized as ineffective and
inflammatory. Critics charged that the Thaksin Administration never put forth a sustained strategy
to define and address the problem, that it repeatedly and arbitrarily shuffled leadership positions
of those charged with overseeing the region, and that it failed to implement adequate coordination
between the many security and intelligence services on the ground.
Under the military government, interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont took a more
conciliatory approach by publicly apologizing to Muslim leaders for past government policies in
the South and resurrecting a civilian agency responsible for improving relations between the
security forces, the government, and southern Muslims that Thaksin had abolished. General
Sonthi Boonyaratglin, leader of the coup and the first Muslim commander of the Army, advocated
negotiations with the separatist groups as opposed to the more confrontational strategy pursed by
Thaksin. However, the violence increased in the months following the coup.1 Some analysts said
that a younger generation of more radicalized insurgents resisted the more conciliatory approach
of the new leadership in Bangkok. Criticism emerged that Surayud’s policies were insufficiently
implemented, law enforcement was unable to effectively prosecute cases, and that intelligence
coordination remained abysmal.
The Samak and Somchai governments, under fire from their inception, were unable to devote
sustained attention to the South. Critics maintain that the administration did not focus adequate
resources on the area as it struggled to maintain its hold on power in Bangkok. The region
remains under martial law, which allows security forces to arrest suspects without warrants and
detain them for up to 30 days. Since June 2007, a more concentrated counter-insurgency
campaign know as “Operation Southern Protection” led to far more arrests, but many analysts see
the mass arrests as fueling local resentment. Daily violence ebbed somewhat as a result of the
military crackdown, but observers note an increase in more lethal and bold attacks. Human rights
groups have continued to criticize the military for its mistreatment of Muslim suspects; in March
2008, Human Rights Watch accused the army of torturing an arrested Muslim cleric who later
died in police custody.2
Emerging Patterns in the Insurgency
Close observers note that since late 2007, attacks have become more provocative, more deaths are
caused by increasingly powerful explosions, and the insurgents have directed more attacks at
economic targets, particularly those owned by ethnic Chinese. Some analysts describe a
movement increasingly driven by an Islamist agenda: the insurgents appear intent on driving a
harsher ideological line and labeling conciliatory Muslims as collaborators. Because of the

1 “Thailand’s Leaders Struggle for Solution as Separatists’ Violence Increases,” The New York Times. February 26,
2007.
2 “Thailand: Imam’s Killing Highlights Army Abuse in South,” from Human Rights Watch webpage at
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2008/03/26/thaila18346.htm.
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repeated attacks on state-run schools, many citizens have chosen to send their children to private
Islamic schools. The insurgents’ village-level network has expanded, perhaps driving more local
support.3 As the attacks have become more sophisticated and coordinated, a climate of fear has
developed and division along religious lines has accelerated. According to some reports, 15% of
the Buddhist population has left the region.4
Little Evidence of Transnational Elements
Most regional observers stress that there is no convincing evidence to date of serious Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) involvement in the attacks in the southern provinces, and that the overall long-term
goal of the movement in the south remains the creation of an independent state with Islamic
governance. Many experts characterize the movement as a confluence of different groups: local
separatists, Islamic radicals, organized crime, and corrupt police forces. They stress, however,
that sectarian violence involving local Muslim grievances provides a ripe environment for foreign
groups to become more engaged in the struggle. Some of the older insurgent organizations earlier
were linked to JI, have reportedly received financial support from foreign Islamic groups, and
have leaders who have trained in camps in Libya and Afghanistan. The insurgency has at times
heightened tensions with Malaysia, as many of the leaders are thought to cross the border fairly
easily. Despite these links, foreign elements apparently have not engaged significantly in the
violence.
Leadership of Insurgency Unclear
Identifying the groups directing the insurgency has been challenging, but most analysis suggests
that there is no one organization with authority over the others. Some reports suggest that the
Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) has coordinated other groups that operate largely
autonomously. Other actors are older Islamist separatist groups, including the Pattani United
Liberation Organization (Pulo) and Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP). An organization
called Bersatu at one point claimed to be an umbrella grouping for all the insurgent factions, but
appears to have very limited authority over the disparate networks. The failure of the Thai
government to establish an authority with whom to negotiate limits its ability to resolve the
conflict peacefully.
Background: Thailand Politics and Government
The Kingdom of Thailand, a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of government,
is marked by an important historical dissimilarity from its regional neighbors. Although occupied
by Japan during World War II, Thailand was the only country in Southeast Asia that was not
colonized by Europeans, and it also avoided the wave of communist revolutions that took control
of the neighboring governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.
Thailand followed a troubled path to democracy, enduring a series of mostly bloodless coups and
multiple changes of government in its modern history. Although Thailand became a constitutional
monarchy in 1932, it was ruled primarily by military dictatorships until the early 1990s. A
military and bureaucratic elite controlled Thai politics during this period, denying room for

3 “Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup,” International Crisis Group. March 15, 2007.
4 Zach Abuza, “Wake Up Call,” e-newsletter. March 20, 2007.
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civilian democratic institutions to develop. Brief periods of democracy in the 1970s and 1980s
ended with reassertions of military rule. After Thai soldiers killed at least 50 people in
demonstrations demanding an end to military dominance of the government, international and
domestic pressure led to new elections in 1992. The 2006 coup was the first in 15 years.
Thailand’s government is composed of the executive branch (prime minister as head of
government and the king as chief of state), a bicameral National Assembly, and a judicial branch
of three court systems. In the years immediately preceding Thaksin’s election in 2001, the
Democrat Party dominated Thai politics by instituting a series of reforms that enhanced
transparency, decentralized power from the urban centers, tackled corruption, and introduced a
broad range of constitutional rights.
Thaksin’s Rise and Fall
The Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party, formed by Thaksin in 1999, benefitted politically from the
devastation of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on Thailand’s economy, and the subsequent loss of
support for the ruling Democrats. Thaksin’s populist platform appealed to a wide cross-section of
Thais, and many analysts contended that Thaksin and his party enjoyed power unprecedented in
modern Thai politics.5 In February 2005, the TRT won parliamentary elections outright—a first in
Thai politics—and swiftly dropped its former coalition partners to form a single-party
government.
Shortly after TRT’s impressive victory, however, Thaksin’s popularity faltered due to a weak
economy, corruption scandals involving Cabinet members, and his failure to stem violence in the
South. In early 2006, large public demonstrations calling for his ouster gained momentum. The
protestors, mostly members of the urban, educated class, were reportedly unhappy with his
authoritarian style, perceived attacks on the free press, mishandling of the violence in the south,
and most of all, the tax-free sale of his family’s telecommunications firm to a Singapore state
company in a $1.9 billion deal that many suspected was not taxed because of Thaksin’s clout.
Widespread protests led Thaksin to call for a new round of parliamentary elections in April 2006.
After a less-than-convincing victory by his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party in an election boycotted by
the opposition, Thaksin resigned, then quickly stepped back into power as a “caretaker” prime
minister. After Thailand’s king called for the courts to resolve the crisis, the Constitutional Court
ruled the elections invalid, and new elections were set for November 2006. Despite widespread
discontent with Thaksin among the country’s middle class and urban dwellers, Thaksin’s strong
support in rural areas was expected to propel the TRT to a win in the elections.
Military Coup Ousts Thaksin
On September 19, 2006, Royal Thai Army Commander-in-Chief Sonthi Boonyaratglin led a
bloodless military coup in Bangkok, ousting Thaksin and declaring martial law. The coup was the
18th since the formation of the constitutional monarchy in 1932, but the first in 15 years. The new
leaders formed the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR), later changing the name to the
Council for National Security (CNS). King Bhumibol reportedly endorsed the takeover after it

5 See Ganesan, N. “Thaksin and the Politics of Domestic and Regional Consolidation in Thailand,” Contemporary
Southeast Asia
, vol. 26, no. 1 (April 2004).
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occurred. Under interim prime minister Surayud Chulanont, a former Army commander, the
ruling military government struggled to establish credibility and legitimacy in the months that
followed. A series of economic policy moves unnerved investors.
After the coup, the bureaucratic and military elite—with the royal imprimatur—controlled
Thailand, while the political parties appeared marginalized and disorganized. In May 2007, a
junta-appointed constitutional tribunal ruled that TRT must disband because it had violated
election laws in the April 2006 polls and that Thaksin and 110 party executives were banned from
politics for five years. The same day, the court acquitted the opposition Democratic Party of a
series of other election violation charges. Many observers criticized the rulings as delaying the
return to democracy by disenfranchising the most popular political party in Thailand.
In August 2007, a nation-wide referendum on the constitution drafted by a junta-appointed
committee passed narrowly amid tepid turnout. The constitution came under criticism for
reversing many of the democratic principles enshrined in the 1997 charter. Under it, the number
of parliamentary seats are reduced, nearly half of the Senate is appointed by a panel of judges and
bureaucrats, and the coup leaders are granted amnesty. The document, designed to prevent the re-
emergence of a Thaksin-like strongman leader, suggested to some analysts that Thailand may
return to a period of weak, unstable coalition governments.
U.S. Response
Following the coup, U.S. officials faced the challenge of expressing disapproval for the rollback
of democracy while not sacrificing what many view as a crucial relationship in the competition
for influence with China in Southeast Asia. Many observers saw the response as relatively mild.
On September 28, 2006, the U.S. State Department announced the suspension of several
assistance programs under Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-
102): Foreign Military Financing (FMF, for defense procurement), International Military
Education Training funds (IMET, provides training to professionalize the Thai military), and
peace-keeping operation programs. Also suspended were funds for counterterrorism and other
operations appropriated under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2006. The suspended programs totaled over $29 million. Other programs deemed to be in the
U.S. interest continued, according to the State Department. After Surayud was appointed, U.S.
Ambassador Ralph Boyce was reportedly the first foreign diplomat to meet with him.
On February 6, 2008, the U.S. State Department announced that Deputy Secretary of State John
Negroponte had certified to Congress that Thailand had restored a democratically elected
government, thereby removing legal restrictions on assistance that had been imposed after the
coup. A statement from the U.S. Ambassador said that funds were reinstated for programs that
include the International Military Exchange Training (IMET) programs, Foreign Military
Financing (FMF), and the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI).
U.S.-Thailand Political and Security Relations
Current Strains in Relations
The political turmoil in Bangkok and diverging strategic priorities have contributed to some
degree of drift in the overall U.S.-Thailand relationship. Although the alliance remains central to
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Thailand’s foreign policy and the United States reiterates the strategic value of Thailand’s military
facilities, observers on both sides point to unease.6 Struggles over two extradition cases—that of
Victor Bout, a renowned Russian international arms dealer and a lesser known Iranian military
official suspected of aiding a missile parts smuggling operation—have rankled U.S. justice
officials who want access to the two men under the bilateral extradition treaty. Indications that the
United States is looking toward building stronger relations with Indonesia in the Obama
Administration signal to some Thai observers that Thailand is being displaced as the chief U.S
partner in the region. Differing threat perceptions about China also contribute to a sense that the
alliance, while institutionally sound, suffers from a lack of strategic alignment.
A Long-Standing Southeast Asian Ally
The 1954 Manila Pact of the former Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), together with
the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communique, forms the basis of the U.S.-Thai security relationship.
Although SEATO was dissolved in 1977, Article IV (1) of the Manila Pact, which calls for
signatories to “act to meet the common danger” in the event of an attack in the treaty area,
remains in force. Thailand has been considered to be one of the major U.S. security allies in East
Asia, along with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines.
The U.S. security relationship with Thailand has a firm historical foundation based on joint
efforts in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Thailand sent more
than 6,500 troops to serve in the United Nations Command during the Korean War, where the
Thai force suffered over 1,250 casualties.7 A decade later, the United States staged bombing raids
and rescue missions over North Vietnam and Laos from Thailand. During the Vietnam War, up to
50,000 U.S. troops were based on Thai soil, and U.S. assistance poured into the country to help
Thailand fight its own domestic communist insurgency.8 Thailand also sent troops to South
Vietnam and Laos to aid the U.S. effort. The close security ties continued throughout the Cold
War, with Thailand serving as solid anti-Communist ally in the region. More recently, Thai ports
and airfields played a crucial role in maintaining the flow of troops, equipment, and supplies to
the theater in both the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars.
In October 2003, President Bush designated Thailand as a “major non-NATO ally,” a distinction
which allows more access to U.S. foreign aid and military assistance, including credit guarantees
for major weapons purchases.9 An agreement concluded with the United States in July 2001
allows Thailand to purchase advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles for its F-16 fighters, a
first for a Southeast Asian state.10 Thaksin authorized the reopening of the Vietnam-era U.S.
airbase in Utapao and a naval base in Sattahip, from which the U.S. military can logistically
support forces in Afghanistan and the Middle East.

6 Crispin, Shawn. “When Allies Drift Apart,” Asia Times. February 14, 2009.
7 See http://korea50.army.mil/history/factsheets/allied.shtml (official public access website for Department of Defense
Commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Korean War).
8 The Eagle and the Elephant: Thai-American Relations Since 1833 (Bangkok: U.S. Agency for International
Development, 1997).
9 Under section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President can designate a non-North Atlantic Treaty
Organization state as a major ally for the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act.
10 Limaye, Satu P. “Minding the Gaps: The Bush Administration and U.S.-Southeast Asia,” Contemporary Southeast
Asia
, vol. 26, no. 1 (April 2004).
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Thailand served as the logistics hub for much of the U.S. and international relief effort after the
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. U.S. relief operations by air and sea for the entire region were
directed out of Utapao air base and Sattahip naval base. Thailand immediately granted full U.S.
access to the bases after the disaster.
Impact of the 2006 Coup
The military coup and subsequent suspension of military aid by the United States threatened to
derail the strong bilateral defense relationship. Following the reinstatement of aid, Thai and U.S.
military officials emphasized their commitment to a smooth resumption of close military ties.
Several of the programs listed below were suspended under Section 508 of the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102). In May 2007, the annual “Cobra Gold”
multinational military exercises went forward despite the suspension of several other military
cooperation programs. The 2008 Cobra Gold exercise were labeled a success as well. By
coincidence, the exercises were being held when Cyclone Nargis devastated parts of Burma.
Working in conjunction with the Thai military, U.S. military assets in place for the exercises also
prepared to offer humanitarian relief to Burma.
Support for U.S. Operations
Thailand strengthened its partnership with the United States by contributing troops to two
American military operations and the broader war on terrorism after the September 11, 2001
attacks. Thailand sent 130 soldiers, largely engineers, to Afghanistan to participate in the
reconstruction phase of Operation Enduring Freedom. Thai forces were responsible for the
construction of a runway at Bagram Airbase, medical services, and some special forces
operations.11 Although Thailand remained officially neutral during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, it
contributed to reconstruction efforts in Iraq by dispatching over 450 troops, including medics and
engineers, to the southern city of Karbala. The deployment proved unpopular with the Thai
public, particularly after the deaths of two soldiers in December 2003. In spring 2004, Thaksin
threatened to withdraw the troops early if the security situation continued to disintegrate and
resisted U.S. calls to postpone the withdrawal until after the January 2005 Iraqi elections. The
withdrawal was completed in September 2004.
Thailand reportedly provided a “black site” where U.S. Central Intelligence Agency officials were
allowed to secretly hold suspected terrorists. According to press reports, two major Al Qaeda
figures captured in Pakistan were flown to Thailand for interrogation by U.S. officials.12 CIA
officials have not confirmed the existence of the site.
Asia Pacific Military Transformation
The U.S. Department of Defense initiative to transform and realign the U.S. military around the
globe provides potential opportunities for increased security cooperation with Thailand. Pentagon
planners are breaking with the quantitative assurance of keeping 100,000 troops on the ground in
East Asia in favor of a more mobile, capability-based force. U.S. military planners have
emphasized a “places, not bases” concept in Southeast Asia in which U.S. troops can temporarily

11 “Thai Soldiers Help Rebuild Afghanistan,” The Nation (Thailand), July 4, 2003.
12 “CIA Operates Secret Prisons Outside U.S.,” Wall Street Journal Asia. November 2, 2005.
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use facilities for operations and training, without maintaining a lengthy and costly permanent
presence. Facilities used by the U.S. military in Thailand fall under the Pentagon’s “cooperative
security location” concept, in which countries provide access in exchange for upgrades and aid.13
Bilateral Security Cooperation
Security Assistance
The United States has provided funds for the purchase of weapons and equipment to the Thai
military through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. As a major non-NATO ally,
Thailand also qualifies for the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, which allows for the
transfer of used U.S. naval ships and aircraft. The United States faces stiff competitors in the
foreign military sales market in Thailand, particularly because other countries are more willing to
engage in barter trade for agricultural products.
Military Exercises
Training opportunities for U.S. forces in Thailand are considered invaluable by the U.S. military.
Thailand and the United States have conducted over 40 joint military exercises a year, including
Cobra Gold, America’s largest combined military exercise in Asia. In the May 2007 exercises,
about 3,000 Thai troops and 2,000 U.S. forces conducted humanitarian, civic action, and
peacekeeping missions. Nearly twenty other countries from Europe and Asia either participated in
or acted as observers for the 2007 exercises.
Training
Tens of thousands of Thai military officers, including many of those in top leadership positions
throughout the services and in the civilian agencies, have received U.S. training under the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Designed to enhance the
professionalism of foreign militaries as well as improve defense cooperation with the United
States, the program is regarded by many as a relatively low-cost, highly effective means to
achieve U.S. national security goals.
Intelligence
Intelligence cooperation between Thailand and the United States reportedly increased markedly
after the September 11, 2001 attacks, culminating in the establishment of the Counter Terrorism
Intelligence Center (known as the CTIC) in 2001. The CTIC, which combines personnel from
Thailand’s intelligence agency and specialized branches of the military and armed forces,
provides a forum for CIA personnel to work closely with their Thai counterparts, sharing facilities
and information daily, according to reports from Thai security officials.14 Close cooperation in
tracking Al Qaeda operatives who passed through Thailand reportedly intensified into active

13 Kaplan, Robert D., “How We Would Fight China,” The Atlantic Monthly. June 2005.
14 Crispin, Shawn, and Leslie Lopez, “U.S. and Thai Agents Collaborate in Secret—Cold-War-Style Alliance Strikes
Jemaah Islamiyah Where It Least Expects It.” Asian Wall Street Journal, October 1, 2003.
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pursuit of suspected terrorists following the 9/11 strikes.15 The most public result of enhanced
coordination was the arrest of suspected Jemaah Islamiyah leader Hambali, outside of Bangkok in
August 2003. Other intelligence cooperation focuses on counter-narcotics or specialized military
intelligence.
Law Enforcement
In 1998, the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) Bangkok was established to
provide legal training for officials to combat transnational crime.16 The center is open to
government officials from any Southeast Asian country, with the exception of Burma (Myanmar).
ILEA Bangkok aims to enhance law enforcement capabilities in each country, as well as to
encourage cross-border cooperation. Instruction for the courses is provided largely by the Royal
Thai Police, the Thai Office of the Narcotics Control Board, and various U.S. agencies, including
the Diplomatic Security Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Internal Revenue Service.17
Counter-Narcotics
Counter-narcotics cooperation between Thailand and the United States has been extensive and
pre-dates the foundation of ILEA-Bangkok. Coordination between the DEA and Thailand’s law
enforcement agencies, in conjunction with a mutual legal assistance treaty and an extradition
treaty, has led to many arrests of international drug traffickers. Specialized programs include the
establishment of Task Force 399, in which U.S. Special Forces train Thai units in narcotics
interdiction tactics.18
Human Rights and Democracy Concerns
Some members of Congress and other U.S. officials have criticized Thailand’s record on human
rights. Thailand has neither signed the United Nations Convention Against Torture nor joined the
International Criminal Court. According to the 2008 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report
and other NGOs’ accounts, the emergency decree issued for the southern provinces gives security
forces power to restrict basic rights of citizens. The State Department reports few developments
in the Ministry of Justice investigations of the approximately 1,300 extrajudicial killings during
Thaksin’s 2003 “War on Drugs”; Human Rights Watch puts the number killed at 2,500 and is
more harsh in its criticism of the failure to hold any officials accountable for the deaths. The
emergency decree on administrative rule announced in summer 2005 alarmed international rights
groups. The United Nations Human Rights Committee, among others, has voiced concern that the
executive order and other developments were undermining Thailand’s democratic process and
human rights record.19

15 Ibid.
16 ILEA-Bangkok is one of four ILEAs in the world. The others are located in Hungary, Botswana, and Roswell, New
Mexico.
17 Course information from http://www.ileabangkok.com.
18 Chambers, Paul, “U.S.-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.
26, Issue 3. December 2004.
19 See the Office of United Nation High Commissioner for Human Rights website at http://www.ohchr.org/english/.
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Under Thaksin
During Thaksin’s rule, detractors consistently voiced concern that his strongman style threatened
Thailand’s democratic institutions. Charges of cronyism and creeping authoritarianism grew
louder as his political power strengthened. Previously independent watchdog agencies reportedly
weakened under his watch,20 and some commentators alleged that Thaksin undermined anti-
corruption agencies by installing political loyalists to protect the business interests of his family
and members of his cabinet—sometimes one and the same, as Thaksin had a record of appointing
relatives and friends to prominent posts.21 Thaksin insisted that political strength enhances
development, citing Singapore’s economic success and lack of political opposition as a model for
Thailand to follow.22
Outside groups warned that press freedom has been squeezed in recent years, documenting
multiple cases in which critical journalists and news editors were dismissed, and pointing to a
libel suit against an outspoken editor filed by a telecommunications corporation that Thaksin
founded.23 Shin Corporation, Thaksin’s family company, bought the only independent television
station; the others are owned by the government and armed forces.24 Human Rights Watch claims
that Thaksin stifled criticism from the media of his Administration’s controversial policies, such
as the deaths of over 2,000 individuals in the government-sponsored “war on drugs.”25
Coup and Aftermath
The coup itself raised obvious concerns about the democratic process in Thailand. Much of the
Thai press and some long-time Thai watchers embraced the notion that the coup was necessary
for Thailand to move forward; that is, that the military coup represented less of a threat to Thai
democracy than Thaksin’s perceived systematic dismantling of the democratic system. In
addition, much of the state’s apparatus, including the key institutions of the parliament, the
judicial branch, and watchdog agencies, reportedly has been undermined in the past several years.
Uncertainty about the king’s succession compound the concern about Thailand’s ability to
preserve democratic structures and stability in the upcoming years. The 2006 State Department
Human Rights Report outlined how the repeal of the 1997 constitution erodes legal protection of
civil liberties and due process.26 Particularly strong criticism centered on the military
government’s restrictions on freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press,
including internet sites critical of the coup. As political unrest unfolded in recent years, stringent
lèse-majesté laws appeared to be applied with more frequency, leading to criticism from free
speech advocates.27 Because of the rapid turnover in governments in 2008, it remains unclear
what direction Thailand’s human rights approach will take in the future.

20 “Thaksin’s Way-Thailand’s Election,” The Economist. February 5, 2005.
21 “Thailand Risk: Alert—Corruption May Still Go Unchecked,” Economist Intelligence Unit, July 19, 2004.
22 “One Party Rule: Opposition Does Not Need to Be Strong, Says PM,” The Nation (Bangkok), August 10, 2004.
23 “Rights Group Says Libel Suit Deepens Assault on Thailand’s Media,” Agence France Press, August 31, 2004.
24 “Thai Vote: Democratic Backslide?” Christian Science Monitor. February 4, 2005.
25 “Thailand: Libel Suit Deepens Assault on the Press,” Human Rights Watch. September 1, 2004.
26 For full report, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119058.htm.
27 “Thai Officials Move to Quash Dissent in Book, Newspaper,” Washington Post. March 26, 2009.
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U.S.-Thailand Trade and Economic Relations28
As a major recipient of foreign direct investment, and with exports of goods accounting for over
70% of its GDP in 2007,29 Thailand’s economy depends heavily on its trading partners. Economic
relations with the United States are central to Thailand’s outward-looking economic strategy.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. trade with Thailand in 2007 consisted of $8.45 billion
in exports and $22.75 billion in imports.30 Major exports from the United States include
integrated circuits, computer parts, semi-conductors, cotton, aircraft parts, electronics, soybeans,
and oil. Major imports to the U.S. include electronics, jewelry, seafood, clothing, furniture,
natural rubber, auto parts, and rice.31 The State Department reports that although Japan is
Thailand’s biggest trading partner, the United States is currently Thailand’s largest export market
while Thailand is the United States’ 27th largest export destination and 18th largest supplier.
Thailand has long been seen as a strong base for foreign investors, but a series of policy reversals
and new regulations have led to substantial criticism of recent governments. After taking office,
the military government came under criticism from the foreign business community for imposing
currency controls (later partially reversed) and introducing a bill that would restrict foreign
ownership of Thai companies. The amendment to the law affecting foreign business ownership,
stemming from the negative reaction to the sale of Thaksin’s family telecommunications
company to a Singaporean state-owned enterprise, will reportedly exclude several sectors.
International drug companies have reacted negatively to a government decision to issue
compulsory licenses to develop generic versions of patented HIV/AIDS and other drugs.
In order to promote the goal of higher levels of trade and investment, the Department of
Commerce’s International Trade Administration states that current trade concerns regarding
Thailand are intellectual property rights laws and enforcement, concerns addressed through
consultations and technical assistance, improvements in Thai Customs practices, and lack of
transparency and efficiency in the customs regime.32
U.S.-Thailand FTA Negotiations
In October 2003, President Bush and Thaksin announced the intention to negotiate a U.S.-
Thailand FTA. According to Thailand’s Office of Commercial Affairs, as of July 12, 2007, U.S.-
Thailand FTA negotiations have been indefinitely delayed. Even before the suspension of talks,
many analysts said that the prospects for an FTA were poor. Although studies indicate that a U.S.-
Thailand FTA would increase trade and investment for both countries and yield net benefit for
Thailand, negotiations must address a list of challenging issues to reach a successful conclusion.
The agreement sought by the United States is the most comprehensive of the multiple FTAs
Thailand has attempted; the agenda includes issues such as intellectual property rights,

28 This section prepared with assistance from Katherine Qu, CRS Research Associate.
29 Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, July 2008.
30 U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, September 2008.
31 Office of Commercial Thailand Affairs, Royal Thailand Embassy, 2007.
32 “U.S.-Thailand Trade Relations,” International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, September
2007.
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investment, environment, labor rights, textiles, telecommunications, agriculture, electronic
commerce, and government procurement.33
An Aggressive FTA Strategy
Thailand has aggressively pursued FTAs with countries other than the United States in its
campaign to expand trading opportunities. Agreements have been signed with Bahrain, China,
Peru, Australia, Japan, India, and New Zealand. Further deals are possible with South Korea,
Chile, and the European Union (EU). Thailand has championed ASEAN regionalism, seeing the
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA, among ASEAN countries only) as a vehicle for investment-
driven integration which will benefit Thailand’s outward-oriented growth strategy.34 Many
observers see Thailand’s pursuit of FTAs as an indication of its shift away from a multilateral
approach, such as working through the World Trade Organization (WTO), and toward a bilateral
or regional approach.
Thailand in Asia
Although the coup’s impact did not include any widespread violence or precipitous economic
losses, there are concerns about longer-term repercussions for Southeast Asia. Thailand is
important to the region because of its large economy and, until the coup, its relatively
longstanding democratic rule. Regional observers fear that the loss of Thailand as a stabilizing
presence could hurt democratic efforts in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and elsewhere.
Southeast Asia is considered by many Asian experts to be a key arena of soft power competition
between the United States and China: the loss of a democratic government, as well as any
resulting friction with the United States, could be considered an opening for closer Sino-Thai
relations.
The clout of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) may be affected as well.
Thailand was a founding member of ASEAN, and, previous to his political troubles, Thaksin was
considered to be poised to provide crucial leadership for the organization. Thailand has been an
aggressive advocate of increased economic integration in the region: Singapore and other
developed economies may fear that Thailand’s turmoil could set back those efforts as well.
Growing Ties with China
Sino-Thailand ties, historically far closer than Beijing’s relations with most other Southeast Asian
states, have continued to strengthen. Bilateral trade and positive relations have boomed over the
past decade. Even while re-asserting its U.S. alliance, Thailand continued to court China,
including inking agreements on technology, environmental protection, and strategic cooperation.
Military-to-military ties increased through both exchanges and arms sales: China exports major
weapons and military equipment to Thailand, a practice that originated in the 1980s when both
countries supported Cambodian resistance groups, including the Khmer Rouge, against the

33 “Ives to Leave USTR to Take Position in Medical Trade Association,” Inside U.S. Trade, July 16, 2004.
34 Chirathivat, Suthiphand, and Sothitorn Mallikamas, “Thailand’s FTA Strategy: Current Developments and Future
Challenges,” ASEAN Economic Bulletin, vol. 21, no. 1 (April 2004).
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Vietnamese-installed government in Phnom Penh. Many analysts saw the suspension of several
U.S. military programs following the coup as an opportunity for China to expand its influence in
the Thai defense establishment. China participated as an observer for the first time in the May
2008 Cobra Gold exercises, and in July Thailand and China staged a joint anti-terrorism exercise.
Thailand’s strong relationship with China is based on a history far less antagonistic than Beijing’s
past with many other ASEAN countries. After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, Bangkok
pursued a strategic alignment with Beijing in order to contain Vietnamese influence in
neighboring Cambodia. Bangkok restored diplomatic ties with Beijing in 1975, far before other
Southeast Asian nations. Thailand also has no territorial disputes with China in the South China
Sea, unlike Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The sizeable overseas Chinese population in
Thailand assimilated relatively easily and became a strong presence in the business world, and in
the political arena as well. Thai companies were among the first to explore investment
opportunities after the Chinese economy opened up in the late 1970s, pursuing ventures with
China’s state-run enterprises. As other regional powers tentatively began to explore commercial
relationships with China, investment from Sino-Thai companies flourished in the 1990s, fueling a
rebirth of interest in Chinese language and culture in Thailand.35
Given the simultaneous emphasis on building close relationships with the United States and
China, Thailand’s foreign policy could be construed as a classic hedging strategy designed to
avoid dominance by any one power. Some analysts suggest that Bangkok’s embrace of China
indicates a slow move away from the Cold War reliance on the United States, despite enhanced
cooperation in the war on terrorism, and could be an indicator of how Southeast Asia will deal
with China’s increasing influence.36
Divergence with United States on Burma (Myanmar) Policy
Bangkok’s approach toward Burma has long been seen as conflicting with U.S. policy. While the
United States has pursued strict economic and diplomatic sanctions against the regime, Thailand
has led ASEAN’s “constructive engagement” initiative, which favors integration and incentives to
coax Burma into reform.37 For Thailand, this policy minimizes the danger of a large-scale military
struggle and expands Thai business opportunities in Burma. Thailand has been criticized for
supporting the junta through substantial trade, particularly in natural gas. As international groups
struggled for access to Burma to provide humanitarian relief following the cyclone, Burma
granted Thai officials and aid workers entry.
Some congressional leaders also have criticized Bangkok for its treatment of Burmese refugees,
migrant workers, and political dissidents living in Thailand. Backed by human rights groups’
reports, some U.S. lawmakers have leveled charges of arrests and intimidation of Burmese
political activists, as well as the repatriation of Burmese who seek political asylum.38 In the past,

35 Vatikiotis, Michael, “Sino Chic: Suddenly, It’s Cool to Be Chinese,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January 11,
1996.
36 Vatikiotis, Michael, “Catching the Dragon’s Tail: China and Southeast Asia in the 21st Century,” Contemporary
Southeast Asia
, vol. 25, no. 1 (April 2003).
37 See CRS Report RL33479, Burma-U.S. Relations, by Larry A. Niksch
38 See Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Thai Policy Toward Burmese Refugees and Migrants, Human Rights Watch Report,
released February 2004.
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Congress has passed legislation that provides money to refugees who fled Burma, particularly
those in Thailand.39
Refugee Situation
Thailand has long been a magnet for economic and political refugees, particularly from the
neighboring countries of Laos, Cambodia, and, most prominently, Burma. Displaced populations
of ethnic minorities from Southeast Asia have sought refuge across Thailand’s long borders, often
attracted by relatively loose immigration controls and often lenient treatment by Thai authorities.
A strong network of international humanitarian organizations exists in Thailand to provide
assistance to these populations. However, successive Thai governments have expressed
frustration with this continuing presence and periodically have clamped down on the incoming
asylum seekers. Often this response relates to Bangkok’s wish to maintain strong political
relationships with other regional governments.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that over three
decades, around three million asylum seekers have sought refuge in Thailand. Burmese refugees
in Thailand come from a variety of ethnic groups that have fled attacks on their villages by the
Burmese army and warlords. Thailand has been generally cooperative in helping refugees, but
does not want to become an indefinite host, nor does it want to absorb those Burmese who do not
qualify as refugees. Moreover, the camps were intended for temporary use and are not considered
suitable for permanent inhabitation. The Thai government views Burma as presenting the most
immediate source of refugee problems. Another estimated 200,000 refugees and asylum seekers
representing groups (many of them Hmong refugees from Laos) live elsewhere in the country. In
addition, Thailand’s reputation for relative tolerance for refugees, as well as crackdowns in other
recipient countries, has attracted an increasing number of North Korean asylum-seekers.
ASEAN Relations
Thailand’s “local” foreign policy with fellow Southeast Asian nations who make up ASEAN
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Laos, Burma, and
Cambodia) consists of a web of complicated relations. As one of the largest and most
economically developed of the ASEAN countries (including having the largest volume of trade),
Thailand has much to gain for promoting ASEAN’s significance in global affairs. With its
favorable geographic location and broad-based economy, Thailand has traditionally been
considered among the most likely countries to play a major leadership role in Southeast Asia and
has been an aggressive advocate of increased economic integration in the region. Bangkok has
developed strong relations with its Indochina neighbors through infrastructure assistance and
other aid. In turn, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia provide raw materials, inexpensive
manufacturing, and expanding markets for Thailand. Particularly under Thaksin, Thailand
pursued enhanced relations with Singapore based on a common interest in liberalizing trade and
with the Philippines centered on a mutual interest in combating terrorism, but those emphases
have cooled since Thaksin’s departure. Former Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs Surin Pitsuwan
currently serves as ASEAN Secretary General.

39 H.R. 4818, Foreign Operations Appropriations, Section II, Bilateral Assistance.
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Despite cooperative elements, Bangkok’s relations with its neighbors are often characterized by
tension and diplomatic spats. Intermittent tension with Cambodia re-ignited in 2008 over
competing territorial claims of Preah Vihear, a temple situated along the Thai-Cambodian border.
Relations with Singapore were disturbed by the sale of Thaksin’s family firm Shin Corporation to
Singapore’s Temasek Holdings in 2006: the tax-free sale angered many Thais and played a role in
Thaksin’s downfall. Relations with Malaysia have been complicated by an insurgency since 2004
in Thailand’s majority-Muslim southern provinces, which border Malaysia. Many Thai Muslims
are ethnically Malay and speak Yawi, a Malay dialect, and at times the Malaysian public has
grown angry at the perceived violence against Muslims in Thailand. Although successive Thai
administrations have pursued cooperative agreements to help curb the violence, relations have
remained uncertain as the violence continues.
Thailand currently holds the chairmanship of ASEAN, whose two-way trade with the United
States in 2007 stood at over $171 billion, making ASEAN America’s fifth largest trading partner.
Thailand took over the chairmanship from Singapore in July 2008 and will hold it for one and a
half years. Thailand postponed the December 2008 ASEAN Summit Meeting due to the political
turmoil in the capital, prompting complaints from some other ASEAN members.

Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Thailand 2005-2009
(thousands of dollars)
Account FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
estimate
request
CSH
0
0 1,400 992 1,000
DA
0 0 0 0
4,500
ESF 992
990
990
0
0
FMFa 1,488
1,485 0
149
800
IMETa
2,526 2,369
0 1,142 1,400
INCLE 1,608 990 900
1,686
1,400
NADR
1,782 3,989 2,100 2,483 2,000
Peace
Corps
2,143 2,212 2,144 2,278

Totals
10,539
12,035
7,534
8,730
11,100
Sources: U.S. Department of State, USAID.
Notes: CSH = Child Survival Health; DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Funds; FMF =
Foreign Military Sales Financing; IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, & Related.
a. These programs were suspended on September 28, 2006, under Section 508 of the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102) and resumed on February 6, 2008.
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Figure 1. Map of Thailand

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
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Author Contact Information

Emma Chanlett-Avery

Specialist in Asian Affairs
echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov, 7-7748




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