.

Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed,
1789-2008
Henry B. Hogue
Analyst in American National Government
March 31, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL31171
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
c11173008

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

Summary
Of the 158 nominations to the Supreme Court of the United States from 1789 through 2008, 36
were not confirmed by the Senate. The 36 nominations represent 31 individuals whose names
were sent forward to the Senate by Presidents (some individuals were nominated more than
once). Of the 31 individuals who were not confirmed the first time they were nominated,
however, six were later nominated again and confirmed. The Supreme Court nominations
discussed here were not confirmed for a variety of reasons, including Senate opposition to the
nominating President, nominee’s views, or incumbent Court; senatorial courtesy; perceived
political unreliability of the nominee; perceived lack of ability; interest group opposition; and fear
of altering the balance of the Court. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary has played an
important role in the confirmation process, particularly since 1868.
All but the most recent of these nominations have been the subject of extensive legal, historical,
and political science writing, a selected list of which is included in this report.
This report will be updated as warranted by events.

Congressional Research Service

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

Contents
The Confirmation Process ........................................................................................................... 1
Summary of Unsuccessful Nominations ...................................................................................... 2
Factors Behind Unsuccessful Nominations .................................................................................. 5
Opposition to the President ................................................................................................... 6
Opposition to the Nominee’s Views....................................................................................... 7
Opposition to the Incumbent Court...................................................................................... 10
Senatorial Courtesy............................................................................................................. 10
Allegations of Political Unreliability ................................................................................... 11
Perceived Lack of Qualification or Ability........................................................................... 11
Interest Group Opposition ................................................................................................... 11
Fear of Altering the Court ................................................................................................... 12
Application of the Factors to the Miers Nomination............................................................. 12
The Committee on the Judiciary and Unsuccessful Nominations ............................................... 14
Additional Information on Nominations .................................................................................... 14
Additional Resources ................................................................................................................ 25
CRS Products...................................................................................................................... 25
Other Resources.................................................................................................................. 25

Tables
Table 1. Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008, by Final Disposition ............. 2
Table 2. Summary of Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008 ........................... 4
Table 3. Supreme Court Nominations, by President, 1789-2008................................................. 16
Table 4. Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008 ............................................. 18

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 26

Congressional Research Service

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

he announcement by Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor of her intention to retire and
the death of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in the summer of 2005 created the need
T for two new Supreme Court appointments. The process for making these appointments led
to three nominations to the Associate Justice position. The first two of these nominations were
subsequently withdrawn by President George W. Bush, while the third—of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.—
was confirmed by the Senate. The two withdrawn nominations—of John G. Roberts, Jr., and
Harriet E. Miers—are the latest of 36 nominations to Supreme Court posts that have failed to be
confirmed. These two nominations exemplify the range of this class of Supreme Court
nominations. The Roberts nomination to Associate Justice was withdrawn as a formality so that
the President could nominate him to be Chief Justice. Therefore, although the first nomination
was not confirmed, the nominee was confirmed for another position. The Miers nomination, on
the other hand, was withdrawn without the expectation that she would subsequently be nominated
for another position on the Court. Consequently, neither this particular nomination nor the
nominee was confirmed.
Over the course of the nation’s history, approximately one-quarter of the presidential nominations
to the Supreme Court of the United States have failed to place a new Associate or Chief Justice on
the bench. Of the 158 nominations to the Court between 1789 and 2008, 114 individuals were
confirmed and served, 7 individuals were confirmed and declined to serve, 1 confirmed nominee
died before he could take his seat, and 36 nominations were not confirmed. This report discusses
this last group of Supreme Court nominations. These 36 nominations that did not lead to
confirmation represent 31 individuals whose names were sent forward to the Senate by Presidents
(some of those 31 individuals were nominated more than once). The Supreme Court nominations
discussed here were not confirmed for a variety of reasons, including Senate opposition to the
nominating President, the nominee’s views, or the incumbent Court; senatorial courtesy;
perceived political unreliability of the nominee; perceived lack of ability; interest group
opposition; and fear of altering the balance of the Court. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary
has played an important role in the confirmation process, particularly since 1868.
Summary discussions of the Senate confirmation process and the unsuccessful nominations
follow. The reasons some nominations have failed confirmation and the role of the Senate
Judiciary Committee are also discussed. Finally, the report includes a detailed table that identifies
each nomination and provides, for each, the facts that can be documented about the dates of
relevant activity and votes in the Judiciary Committee and the full Senate. A list of additional
relevant literature is also provided.
The Confirmation Process
The Constitution of the United States provides for the appointment of a Justice to the Supreme
Court in Article II, Section 2. This section states that the President “shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the [S]upreme Court.” The
practices involved in following this constitutional mandate have varied over the years, but they
have always involved the sharing of the appointment power between the President and the
Senate.1

1 For a more detailed history of the Supreme Court nominations process, see CRS Report RL31989, Supreme Court
Appointment Process: Roles of the President, Judiciary Committee, and Senate, by Denis Steven Rutkus; CRS Report
RL33247, Supreme Court Nominations: Senate Floor Procedure and Practice, 1789-2006, by Richard S. Beth and
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
1

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

Nominations that failed to be confirmed by the Senate have been disposed of in a variety of ways,
including withdrawal by the President, inaction in the committee, inaction in the Senate,
postponement, tabling, rejection on the Senate floor, and filibuster on the Senate floor. Table 1
provides a summary of the unsuccessful nominations by final disposition.
Table 1. Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed,
1789-2008, by Final Disposition
Number of
Disposition
Nominations
Rejected by a vote of the ful Senate
11
Withdrawn by the President without Senate action
2
Referred to committee, withdrawn by the President without further Senate action
2
Postponed or tabled by the Senate, but not withdrawn by the President
5
Postponed or tabled by the Senate and withdrawn by the President
3
No record of referral, motion to consider unsuccessful
2
Referred to committee, but never reported or discharged from committee
4
Referred to committee, hearings held, withdrawn by the President without further
1
Senate action
Discharged from committee, no record of action by the ful Senate
1
Reported from committee, placed on the Executive Calendar, no record of action by
1
the ful Senate
Reported from committee, considered by the Senate, recommitted, and withdrawn by
1
the President
Reported from committee, motion to consider unsuccessful
1
Reported from committee, withdrawn by the President
1
Withdrawn by the President after defeat of cloture motion
1
Total Supreme Court nominations not confirmed
36
Summary of Unsuccessful Nominations
The 36 Supreme Court nominations not confirmed by the Senate represent 31 individuals. Six of
these 31 were later re-nominated and confirmed for positions on the Court. Of the other 25
nominees, four were nominated and failed confirmation more than once. Table 2 provides
summary information concerning unsuccessful nominations.
The first of the six nominees who were not confirmed only to be later re-nominated and
confirmed was William Paterson, nominated by President George Washington. Washington
withdrew the nomination on the day following its submission. He noted that Paterson “was a
member of the Senate when the law creating that office was passed, and that the time for which

(...continued)
Betsy Palmer; and CRS Report RL32821, The Chief Justice of the United States: Responsibilities of the Office and
Process for Appointment, by Denis Steven Rutkus and Lorraine H. Tong.
Congressional Research Service
2

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

he was elected [had] not yet expired.”2 For this reason, President Washington felt that the
nomination was in violation of the Constitution.3 President Washington re-nominated Paterson at
the beginning of the following Congress a few days later, and Paterson was immediately
confirmed.4 In this case, the failure of the first nomination was due to what might be considered
formalities, rather than opposition to the nomination itself.
The last of these six nominations, that of John G. Roberts, Jr., to be an Associate Justice, might be
similarly categorized. On July 29, 2005, President George W. Bush nominated Roberts to replace
retiring Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.5 Subsequently, on September 3, Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist died. On September 6, President Bush withdrew Roberts’ nomination to be
Associate Justice and nominated him to be Chief Justice. The Senate confirmed this nomination
on September 29, 2005.6
All of the other unsuccessful nominations faced opposition in the Senate.
The other four nominees who were later re-nominated and confirmed were Roger B. Taney,
nominated twice by President Andrew Jackson; Stanley Matthews, nominated first by President
Rutherford B. Hayes and later by President James A. Garfield; Pierce Butler, nominated twice by
President Warren G. Harding; and John Marshall Harlan II, nominated twice by President Dwight
D. Eisenhower. Taney’s first nomination, to Associate Justice, was postponed indefinitely by the
Senate. During the next Congress, he was nominated and confirmed as Chief Justice, and he went
on to author the Dred Scott decision. Matthews’ first nomination was never reported out of
committee, but in the following Congress, under a new President, he was re-nominated and
confirmed by a one-vote margin.7 Butler was first nominated to the high court during the third
session of the 67th Congress. Confirmation was blocked during that session, but Butler was re-
nominated and confirmed during the fourth session. Harlan was initially nominated to be an
Associate Justice late in the 83rd Congress, and this nomination remained in committee at the time
of adjournment. His second nomination, at the beginning of the following Congress, was
confirmed a few months later.


2 U.S. Congress, Senate, Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of America, vol. 1, p.
135. (Hereafter cited as Executive Journal.)
3 Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution provides that, “No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which
he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office ... , which shall have been created ... during such time ....” The office to
which Washington was nominating Paterson, Associate Justice, was created by the Judiciary Act of 1789 on September
24, 1789, during which time Paterson was a Senator. Paterson began serving in the Senate on March 4, 1789 and
resigned on November 13, 1790, having been elected Governor of New Jersey (U.S. Congress, House, Biographical
Directory of the American Congress, H.Doc. 607, 81st Cong., 2nd sess. [Washington: GPO, 1950], p. 1655). His term,
however, did not conclude until March 3, 1793 (U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Manual, S.Doc. 106-1, 106th Cong., 1st
sess. [Washington: GPO, 2000], p. 859), and so his appointment to Associate Justice prior to that date would have been
unconstitutional. President Washington re-nominated, and a special session of the Senate of the new Congress
confirmed, Paterson on March 4, 1793. Paterson’s Senate position had covered four years, rather than six, due to the
staggering of Senate terms at the outset of the First Congress, which was called for in the Constitution (Article I,
Section 3) and was implemented in the Senate in May 1789.
4 Executive Journal, vol. 1, p. 139.
5 Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System, available to congressional staff at
http://www.congress.gov/nomis/.
6 Ibid.
7 Executive Journal, vol. 23, pp. 14, 75-76.
Congressional Research Service
3

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

Table 2. Summary of Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008
Total Supreme Court nominations
158
Total Supreme Court nominations not confirmed
36
Nominees who failed to be confirmed at least once
31
Unconfirmed nominees who never served in the position to which they were nominated
24
Unconfirmed nominees later re-nominated and confirmed
6
Unconfirmed nominee who served as a recess appointee in a position to which he was nominated
1
Nominees subject to two or three failed nominations (for a total of nine nominations)
4
Unconfirmed nomination to elevate sitting Associate Justice to Chief Justice
1
Unconfirmed nomination of former Associate Justice to Chief Justice
1
Source: Total Supreme Court nominations calculated using data from Elder Witt, Guide to the U.S. Supreme
Court, 2nd ed. (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1990), pp. 995-998; and Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal,
Harold J. Spaeth, and Thomas G. Walker, The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions, and Developments
(Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1994), pp. 284-290. Other totals summarize information from Table 4
of this report.
Four individuals were the subjects of more than one unsuccessful nomination. The first three,
John C. Spencer, Reuben H. Walworth, and Edward King, were nominees of President John Tyler.
President Tyler had the opportunity to fill two vacancies on the high court. He made nine
nominations of five men in the space of the last 15 months of his presidency. Eight of these
nominations were not confirmed, giving President Tyler the highest tally of unconfirmed Supreme
Court nominations. President Tyler nominated Spencer for the first vacancy. After the Senate
rejected Spencer, Walworth was put forward for the position, and the Senate tabled this
nomination. On June 17, 1844, the last day of the congressional session,8 President Tyler
withdrew the tabled Walworth nomination and re-nominated Spencer. Unable to gain unanimous
consent for the Spencer nomination to be acted upon, Tyler then withdrew Spencer’s name on the
same day and re-nominated Walworth.9 By this time, the nomination (June 5, 1844) of King for
the second vacancy had also been tabled. Tyler went on to re-nominate Walworth and King at the
beginning of the following congressional session. After these two nominations were once again
tabled, they were both withdrawn. The nomination of John M. Read, which followed, was
reported out of committee but never acted upon by the full Senate. Samuel Nelson was President
Tyler’s fifth nominee, and he was confirmed.
The fourth individual subject to multiple unconfirmed nominations was William B. Hornblower,
who was nominated in successive sessions of Congress by President Grover Cleveland. His first
nomination was never reported out of committee; the second nomination was reported out and
rejected.
One of the unsuccessful nominees had previously been Associate Justice, had left the Court, and
this time was being nominated for Chief Justice. Another was a sitting Associate Justice
nominated for elevation to the Chief Justice position. The first of these was also the first
nomination in which the Senate voted not to confirm. John Rutledge had previously served as one
of the first Associate Justices from 1789 to 1791. In addition, he served as Chief Justice in 1795
under a recess appointment by President Washington. When the President nominated him later

8 28th Congress, 1st sess.
9 “Washington: Adjournment of Congress,” Daily National Intelligencer (Washington), June 18, 1844, p. 3.
Congressional Research Service
4

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

that year to succeed John Jay as permanent Chief Justice, however, the Senate asserted its
constitutional power and voted against confirmation. The second such nominee, Justice Abe
Fortas, was a sitting Associate Justice at the time of his nomination by President Lyndon B.
Johnson to be Chief Justice in 1968. The nomination was favorably reported out of committee but
filibustered on the floor of the Senate until the President withdrew the nomination.10
One unsuccessful nomination coincided with a legislative initiative to decrease the size of the
Court. On April 16, 1866, President Andrew Johnson nominated Henry Stanbery to replace John
Catron, who had died the previous May. By the time Stanbery was nominated, however, the
House of Representatives had passed a bill decreasing the number of justices in the Supreme
Court.11 The act, as signed into law on July 23, 1866, called for a decrease in the number of
Associate Justices from nine to six through the process of attrition.12 At the time the bill was
initiated and also at the time its final version was signed, only one position on the Court, that to
which Stanbery was nominated, was vacant. Eight Associate Justice positions remained on the
bench until the death of James M. Wayne in July 1867. Seven Associate Justice positions
remained until a law was passed in April 1869 to increase the number to eight.13
Several scholars have suggested that, by reducing the number of Associate Justice positions,14 the
Republican Congress was trying to thwart the ability of Democratic President Johnson to shape
the Supreme Court, although the record of House and Senate debate is silent as to each chamber’s
intention in this regard.15 The law increasing the Associate Justice positions to eight was passed
within two months of the beginning of the Administration of President Ulysses S. Grant.
Factors Behind Unsuccessful Nominations
There have often been multiple reasons behind the failure of the Senate to confirm a nomination.
The official Senate records, particularly those prior to the 20th century, have usually been silent on
the issues involved. Scholars have used other records in an effort to shed more light on the factors
underlying unsuccessful Supreme Court nominations. This scholarship consists of analysis and
interpretation of these records, and it provides a general understanding of the reasons that more
than one in five nominations has failed to be confirmed by the Senate.
One widely cited scholar in the area of the Supreme Court appointments process and history,
Henry J. Abraham, has developed categories of unsuccessful nominations:

10 For more on the Senate’s consideration of the Fortas nomination, see CRS Report RL31948, Evolution of the
Senate’s Role in the Nomination and Confirmation Process: A Brief History, by Betsy Palmer.
11 H.R. 334 (39th Congress), passed March 8, 1866.
12 An Act to fix the Number of Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, and to change certain Judicial
Circuits, Statutes at Large 14, chap. 210, sec.1, p. 209 (1866).
13 An Act to amend the Judicial System of the United States, Statutes at Large 15, chap. 22, sec. 1, p. 44 (1869).
14 See Joseph P. Harris, The Advice and Consent of the Senate (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 304; Henry J.
Abraham, Justices and Presidents, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 124-125; and J. Myron
Jacobstein and Roy M. Mersky, The Rejected: Sketches of the 26 Men Nominated for the Supreme Court but Not
Confirmed by the Senate (Milpitas, CA: Toucan Valley Publications, 1993), pp. 67-74.
15 See “Supreme Court of the United States,” The Congressional Globe, vol. 72, March 8, 1866, p. 1259; “Supreme
Court Judges,” The Congressional Globe, vol. 74, July 10, 1866, p. 3697; “United States Supreme Court,” The
Congressional Globe, vol. 75, July 18, 1866, p. 3909.
Congressional Research Service
5

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

Among the more prominent reasons have been: (1) opposition to the nominating president,
not necessarily the nominee; (2) the nominee’s involvement with one or more contentious
issues of public policy or, simply, opposition to the nominee’s perceived jurisprudential or
sociopolitical philosophy (i.e., politics); (3) opposition to the record of the incumbent Court,
which, rightly or wrongly, the nominee presumably supported; (4) senatorial courtesy
(closely linked to the consultative nominating process); (5) a nominee’s perceived political
unreliability on the part of the party in power; (6) the evident lack of qualification or limited
ability of the nominee; (7) concerted, sustained opposition by interest or pressure groups; and
(8) fear that the nominee would dramatically alter the Court’s jurisprudential lineup.16
The sections below discuss the nominations with respect to these categories based on the
preponderance of scholarly evidence. Many of the nominations fall into multiple categories. Two
nominations that were not confirmed by the Senate—the first nomination of William Paterson and
the nomination of John G. Roberts to be Associate Justice—do not appear to fall into any of the
following categories. As discussed above, in both cases the nomination was withdrawn as a
formality and the nominee was then renominated and confirmed.
Opposition to the President
Opposition to the nominating President played a role in at least 16 of the 34 nominations that
were not confirmed. Many of the 16 were put forward by Presidents in the last year of their
presidency—seven occurred after a successor President had been elected, but before the transfer
of power to the new administration. Each of these “lame duck” nominations transpired under 19th
century Presidents when the post-election period lasted from early November until early March.
Four one-term Presidents made nominations of this kind. President John Quincy Adams
nominated John J. Crittenden in December 1828, after losing the election to Andrew Jackson.17
President Tyler’s third nomination of Walworth, second nomination of King, and only nomination
of Read all came after Tyler had lost to James Polk.18 President Millard Fillmore nominated
George E. Badger and William C. Micou after Franklin Pierce had been elected to replace him.19
Finally, President James Buchanan forwarded the name of Jeremiah S. Black to the Senate less
than a month before Abraham Lincoln’s inauguration.20 Other nominations where opposition to
the President was a major factor include the remaining unsuccessful Tyler nominations,
Fillmore’s nomination of Edward A. Bradford, and Andrew Johnson’s nomination of Henry
Stanbery.21
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s two unsuccessful nominations (Fortas and Thornberry) occurred
during the last seven months of his presidency, when, having announced he was not seeking re-

16 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, p. 39.
17 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, revised edition, vol. 1 (Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1926), pp. 701-704; William F. Swindler, “The Politics of ‘Advice and Consent,’” American Bar
Association Journal, v. 56, 1970, p. 537.
18 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, vol. 2, pp. 115-120; Swindler, “The Politics of ‘Advice and
Consent,’” pp. 537-538. Notably, Tyler also put forth his one successful nomination out of nine, of Samuel Nelson, a
month before the transfer of power.
19 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, vol. 2, pp. 242-245; Swindler, “The Politics of ‘Advice and
Consent,’” pp. 538-539.
20 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, vol. 2, pp. 363-365.
21 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, pp. 39-41, 124-125. As previously discussed, Congress initiated legislation to
reduce the number of Associate Justices around the time of Stanbery’s nomination.
Congressional Research Service
6

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

election, he was considered by some to be a lame duck even before the election of his successor.
Nineteen Senators issued a statement indicating that, on this basis, they would oppose any
nomination by President Johnson.22 The committee report accompanying the nomination of Abe
Fortas to be Chief Justice, however, suggests that the opposition to Justice Fortas was based, to a
considerable extent, on concern about money received by Fortas for delivering university lectures
while an Associate Justice, Fortas’s close relationship and advisory role with President Johnson
while an Associate Justice, and his judicial philosophy.23
President Rutherford B. Hayes nominated Stanley Matthews in late January 1881, about six
weeks before the transfer of power to the Garfield administration. In this case, however, the
opposition seems to have centered on the nominee and his views, as discussed below, rather than
on the nominating President.
Opposition to the Nominee’s Views
President Washington’s nomination of John Rutledge to Chief Justice, in 1795, was the first
unsuccessful nomination to fail based on the nominee’s political views. Shortly after his
nomination, Rutledge made a strong speech denouncing the controversial and newly ratified Jay
Treaty between the United States and Great Britain. The Senate, which was dominated by
Federalists and had ratified the treaty, rejected the Rutledge nomination. Of the 14 who voted for
rejection, 13 were Federalists, putting them in the position of rejecting a nomination by a
President from their own party.24
Alexander Wolcott’s nomination to the Court 15 years later, by President James Madison, was the
next to be rejected by the Senate. Wolcott’s strong enforcement of the controversial embargo and
non-intercourse acts while a U.S. collector of customs cost him support in the press and the
Senate. His qualifications for the position were also questioned.25
Andrew Jackson’s first nomination of Roger B. Taney in 1835 was the third nomination for which
the lack of success is often attributed to the nominee’s views. In this case, there was also
opposition to the nominating President’s policies. Prior to the nomination, President Jackson had
given a recess appointment to Taney to be Secretary of the Treasury. In that capacity, Taney had,
under Jackson’s direction, removed the government’s deposits from the United States Bank.
Jackson’s Whig opponents in the Senate were incensed by this move, and this led first to the
rejection of Taney as permanent Secretary of the Treasury and then to the failure of his first
nomination to the Court.26

22 Jacobstein and Mersky, The Rejected, pp.131-132.
23 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Abe Fortas, report to accompany the nomination
of Abe Fortas, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., Exec. Rept. 8 (Washington: GPO, 1968).
24 See Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, vol. 1, pp. 129-139; Harris, The Advice and Consent of the
Senate, pp. 42-43; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “Confirming Supreme Court Justices: Thoughts on the Second Opinion
Rendered by the Senate,” University of Illinois Law Review, Winter 1988, pp. 101-117, at 106; Swindler, “The Politics
of ‘Advice and Consent,’” pp. 534-535.
25 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, vol. 1, pp. 410-413; Swindler, “The Politics of ‘Advice and
Consent,’” pp. 535-536; Abraham, Justices and Presidents, pp. 41, 88.
26 Harris, The Advice and Consent of the Senate, pp. 59-64; Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, vol.
1, pp. 798-802.
Congressional Research Service
7

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

President James Polk’s nomination of George W. Woodward in 1845 was rejected when six
Democrats, led by a Senator from the nominee’s home state of Pennsylvania, joined with the
Whigs to oppose it. Woodward’s nativist views have been cited as the principal reason for the
failure of his nomination.27
Ebenezer R. Hoar served as President Ulysses S. Grant’s Attorney General prior to his nomination
to be Associate Justice in 1869. In that capacity, Hoar had alienated Senators by recommending to
Grant nominees for Circuit Judge without regard for the Senators’ preferences. In addition, the
majority of the Senate disliked “his active labors on behalf of a merit civil service system for the
federal government ... and his opposition to Andrew Johnson’s impeachment.”28 Despite praise
for Hoar’s nomination in the press, the Senate rejected it.
Stanley Matthews was nominated first by President Rutherford B. Hayes in 1881, in the last
weeks of Hayes’ presidency. The Senate opposed the nomination because of Matthews’ close ties
to railroad and financial interests, and the Judiciary Committee postponed the nomination.
Although Matthews was subsequently re-nominated by President James Garfield and confirmed,
concerns about him persisted, and the Senate vote, at 24-23, was the closest for any successful
nominee.29
Pierce Butler’s first nomination, by President Warren G. Harding in 1922, was reported favorably
by the Judiciary Committee but blocked from consideration on the Senate floor, in part because of
alleged pro-corporation bias and his previous advocacy for railroad interests in cases that were to
be coming before the Court.30 During the succeeding session, Butler was re-nominated and
confirmed, with 61 Senators in favor and eight opposed.31
John J. Parker, nominated by President Herbert Hoover in 1930, was opposed by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and organized labor based on his
previous statements and writings.32 The NAACP testified in opposition to Parker’s racial views at
his confirmation hearing. Their testimony was based on a statement Parker had made in the
course of an unsuccessful campaign for governor of North Carolina in 1920, in which he opposed
the participation of African-Americans in politics.33 In addition, Parker’s record on labor issues,
as chief judge of the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, was criticized by labor at the hearing.
The American Federation of Labor (AFL), representing several labor groups, objected in
particular to an opinion, authored by Parker, that affirmed a lower court opinion in support of

27 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, pp. 41, 109; Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, vol. 2, pp. 146-
147; Harris, The Advice and Consent of the Senate, p. 69.
28 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, p. 127. See also Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, vol. 2, pp.
501-504, 507; Harris, The Advice and Consent of the Senate, pp. 74-75.
29 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, vol. 2, pp. 622-623; Abraham, Justices and Presidents, pp.
135-137.
30 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, pp. 190-192; “Senate Sends Back Butler Nomination,” New York Times,
December 5, 1922, p. 1; and “Shipstead Attacks Butler on 4 Points,” New York Times, December 9, 1922, p. 5.
31 Executive Journal, vol. 61, part 1, pp. 76, 104-105.
32 For a description of the Parker nomination and a differing perspective on his record, see Harris, The Advice and
Consent of the Senate, pp. 127-132. Abraham, Justices and Presidents, (pp. 42-43) also discusses the nomination and
contests the claims offered by opponents.
33 U. S. Congress, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee, Confirmation of Hon. J. Parker to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, hearings, 71st Cong., 2nd sess., April 5, 1930 (Washington: GPO,
1930), pp. 74-79.
Congressional Research Service
8

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

“yellow dog” contracts, in which employees agreed not to join a union as a condition of
employment.34
President Dwight D. Eisenhower first nominated John Marshall Harlan II to be an Associate
Justice in late 1954, but that nomination was never reported from committee. Among the
objections to his nomination was the perception by some Senators that Harlan was “‘ultra-liberal,’
hostile to the South, [and] dedicated to reforming the Constitution by ‘judicial fiat.’”35
Eisenhower re-nominated Harlan at the beginning of the next Congress, in early 1955, and he was
then confirmed.
As noted previously, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s nomination of Justice Abe Fortas in 1968 for
elevation to Chief Justice failed for several reasons, including his judicial philosophy. Although
the Committee on the Judiciary reported the nomination favorably, several committee members
strongly dissented in the committee’s printed report. One Senator wrote that Fortas’s “judicial
philosophy disqualifies him for this high office.” Another criticized Fortas as part of the majority
on the Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren (the Warren Court) making an “extremist
effort ... to set itself up as a super-legislature.” A third Senator also found Fortas lacking on the
“broader question of the nominee’s judicial philosophy which includes his willingness to subject
himself to the restraint inherent in the judicial process.” Yet another Senator objected to
“positions taken by Justice Fortas since he went on the Supreme Court as Associate Justice
[which had] reflected a view to the Constitution insufficiently rooted to the Constitution as it is
written.”36 Opposition to Fortas was also based on money he received for delivering university
lectures while an Associate Justice and his close relationship and advisory role with President
Johnson while an Associate Justice.
President Richard M. Nixon’s nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. in 1969 also failed partly
on the basis of his perceived views. Like the Fortas nomination, the Haynsworth nomination was
reported favorably by the Committee on the Judiciary. In this case, the dissenting views in the
committee’s written report focused on perceived ethical lapses on the part of Judge Haynsworth.
In addition, a joint statement by five Senators referred to “doubts about his record on the
appellate bench,” and one Senator opposed the nomination on the basis of the judge’s record on
civil rights issues.37 Furthermore, Haynsworth drew criticism from labor and minority groups on
the basis of his record. One historian has suggested that because of the recent rejection of Fortas
on the basis of ethical questions, the ethical questions concerning Haynsworth played the largest
role in his rejection.38
President Nixon’s nomination of G. Harrold Carswell in 1970 was also opposed partly on the
basis of his perceived views. The Committee on the Judiciary reported the nomination favorably
with several dissenting views. One statement, issued jointly by four Senators, opposed the
nomination in part because his “decisions and his courtroom demeanor [had] been openly hostile

34 Ibid., pp. 23-60.
35 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, p. 263.
36 All quotes from U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Abe Fortas, report to accompany
the nomination of Abe Fortas, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., Exec. Rept. 8 (Washington: GPO, 1968), pp. 15-44. See also
Abraham, Justices and Presidents, pp. 43-45.
37 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., report to accompany
the nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., 91st Cong., 1st sess., Exec. Rept. 91-12 (Washington: GPO, 1969), pp.
24, 48.
38 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, pp. 14-15.
Congressional Research Service
9

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

to the black, the poor, and the unpopular.”39 A more persistent theme in the dissent, however, was
a perceived lack of competence and qualification for the position.40
Robert H. Bork, nominated by President Reagan in 1987, was also rejected on the basis of his
views. Much has been written about this nomination, and it remains controversial. The
Committee on the Judiciary reported the nomination unfavorably after 12 days of hearings.
Although the written report raised some concerns about the nominee’s evaluation by the
American Bar Association and academic and legal communities and his role in the firing of
Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox during the Nixon administration, the bulk of the report detailed
concerns about and opposition to his publicly stated positions and judicial philosophy.41
Opposition to the Incumbent Court
The rejection by the Senate of a Supreme Court nominee on the basis of opposition to the
incumbent Court is closely related to opposition on the basis of the nominee’s views. In this case,
the views and record of the incumbent Court majority are opposed, whereas the nominee is
presumed to support the Court’s views. In the case of Abe Fortas’s nomination for Chief Justice,
for example, the opposition of many Senators to the Warren Court has been cited as an influential
factor. Fortas had been an Associate Justice for almost three years at the time of his nomination,
and some opposition hinged on his positions while on the Court, as discussed above. In addition,
however, his elevation was opposed because of his affiliation with the Warren Court and its wider
reputation. This opposition to the Warren Court in the context of the Fortas nomination is
reflected in the individual views of a Senator in the committee report.42 In addition, during the
confirmation hearings, another Senator pointedly brought up a Warren Court opinion with which
he disagreed, Mallory v. United States,43 although, as he acknowledged, the case had preceded
Fortas’s appointment as Associate Justice by eight years.44
Senatorial Courtesy
At least seven Supreme Court nominations have failed to be confirmed partly on the basis of
deference to the objections of the nominees’ home-state Senators. New York’s Senators objected
to the nominations of Reuben H. Walworth by President Tyler.45 President Polk’s nomination of
George W. Woodward of Pennsylvania was rejected, in part, due to the objection of one of the
Senators from that state.46 The last failed Supreme Court nominations that were attributed, in part,

39 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of George Harrold Carswell, report to accompany
the nomination of George Harrold Carswell, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., Exec. Rept. 91-14 (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 13.
40 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, pp. 15-18.
41 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be an Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, 100th Cong., 1st sess., Exec. Rept. 100-7 (Washington: GPO, 1987).
42 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Abe Fortas, report to accompany the nomination
of Abe Fortas, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., Exec. Rept. 8 (Washington: GPO, 1968), pp. 20-30.
43 354 U.S. 449 (1957). For the Senator’s remarks, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nominations
of Abe Fortas and Homer Thornberry, hearings, 90th Cong., 1st sess., July 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 1968
(Washington: GPO, 1968), p. 191.
44 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, p. 44.
45 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, pp. 27-28.
46 Swindler, “The Politics of ‘Advice and Consent,’” p. 538; Abraham, Justices and Presidents, p. 41.
Congressional Research Service
10

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

to senatorial courtesy came before the Senate in 1893-1894, when opposition by New York’s
Senators was instrumental in the failure of the nominations of William Hornblower and Wheeler
H. Peckham, both also of New York.47 No unsuccessful Supreme Court nomination since that
time has been attributed to senatorial courtesy.48
Allegations of Political Unreliability
One unsuccessful nominee was opposed in the Senate in part because of the perception that he
was a “political chameleon.”49 One of President Grant’s nominees for Chief Justice, Caleb
Cushing, “had been, in turn, a regular Whig, a Tyler Whig, a Democrat, a[n Andrew] Johnson
Constitutional Conservative, and finally a Republican.”50 The failure of his nomination has also
been attributed to his advanced age (74) and a letter of introduction of a friend Cushing wrote to
Confederate President Jefferson Davis in 1861.51
Perceived Lack of Qualification or Ability
As noted previously, President Madison’s nomination of Alexander Wolcott52 and President
Nixon’s nomination of G. Harrold Carswell53 were opposed in part because of their perceived lack
of qualification and ability. President Grant’s nomination of George H. Williams faced similar
opposition.54 Williams also suffered from allegations of ethical misconduct.55
Interest Group Opposition
Interest groups were involved in confirmation fights as far back as 1881, when the Grange
mounted a campaign in opposition to the Matthews nomination.56 Interest groups testified in
opposition to (and, in some cases, support of) many of the Supreme Court nominations that were
not confirmed in the 20th century, including Parker, Fortas, Thornberry, Haynsworth, Carswell,
and Bork. The number of organized interest groups testifying at the confirmation hearings grew
from two for the Parker nomination to more than twenty for the Bork nomination.57 Interest
groups have been active in unsuccessful Supreme Court confirmation processes in a number of

47 Swindler, “The Politics of ‘Advice and Consent,’” p. 541; Abraham, Justices and Presidents, pp. 27-28.
48 For a discussion of senatorial courtesy, see Harris, The Advice and Consent of the Senate, pp. 215-237.
49 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, p. 45. See also Harris, The Advice and Consent of the Senate, p. 76; Swindler,
“The Politics of ‘Advice and Consent,’” pp. 540-541.
50 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, p. 45.
51 Harris, The Advice and Consent of the Senate, p. 76; see also Jacobstein and Mersky, The Rejected, pp. 87-93 for a
description of this nomination.
52 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, p. 41; Jacobstein and Mersky, The Rejected, pp. 14-17; Swindler, “The Politics of
‘Advice and Consent,’” p. 535.
53 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, 16-17. See also U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of
George Harrold Carswell, report to accompany the nomination of George Harrold Carswell, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., Exec.
Rept. 91-14 (Washington: GPO, 1970), pp. 13-17, 32-33, 36-38.
54 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, pp. 45-56; Harris, The Advice and Consent of the Senate, pp. 75-76.
55 Jacobstein and Mersky, The Rejected, pp. 82-87.
56 John A. Maltese, The Selling of Supreme Court Nominees (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995),
chapter 3.
57 Maltese, The Selling of Supreme Court Nominees, chapter 6.
Congressional Research Service
11

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

other ways, as well, including conducting research on nominees’ positions, lobbying Senators,
providing information to the media, conducting television ad campaigns, sending mailings, and
organizing constituent letters and calls.58 Observers of the Supreme Court confirmation process
have suggested that interest group opposition has not only grown, but has also been effective in
preventing confirmations. The impact of interest group opposition relative to other factors is a
matter of continuing study.59
Fear of Altering the Court
In addition to the above-mentioned reasons for not confirming a nomination, the Senate may fear
altering the jurisprudential philosophy of the Court. In this case, opposition would be not only to
the perceived views of the nominee, but also to the impact the nominee could have on the Court’s
ideological balance. The best-documented case where this factor appears to have been influential
was President Reagan’s nomination of Robert H. Bork. Bork was nominated to replace Associate
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who had been the swing voter on an often evenly divided bench. If
confirmed, Bork was expected to tip the Court to the conservative side, and some of the
opposition to his nomination came from those who opposed this change.60
Application of the Factors to the Miers Nomination
Scholars have only begun to assess the unsuccessful nomination of Harriet E. Miers to be
Associate Justice. Analysis of the factors contributing to the nomination’s failure are therefore
preliminary. Both Miers and President Bush cited the Senate requests for White House documents
as the chief reason for the withdrawal of her nomination.61 Journalistic accounts of the Miers
nomination, however, have suggested that a combination of factors led to the withdrawal.62 Many
of the factors identified by Abraham seem to apply in the Miers case. Opposition to the nominee’s
perceived views, for one, appears to have played a role. For example, a position Miers took in a

58 Christine DeGregorio and Jack E. Rossotti, “Campaigning for the Court: Interest Group Participation in the Bork and
Thomas Confirmation Processes,” in Interest Group Politics, 4th ed., Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds.
(Washington: CQ Press, 1995), p. 215; and Gregory A. Caldeira, Marie Hojnacki, and John R. Wright, “The Lobbying
Activities of Organized Interests in Federal Judicial Nominations” (paper presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association).
59 See, for example, Jeffrey A. Segal, Charles M. Cameron, and Albert D. Cover, “A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting:
Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations,” American Journal of
Political Science, vol. 36 (February 1992), p. 96; and Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, “Lobbying for Justice:
Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States Senate,” American Journal of Political
Science, vol. 42 (April 1998), p. 499.
60 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, pp. 356-359; Jacobstein and Mersky, The Rejected, pp. 160-170.
61 U.S. President (G. W. Bush), “Statement Announcing the Withdrawal of the Nomination of Harriet E. Miers To Be
an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 41
(Oct. 27, 2005), p. 1608; Harriet E. Miers, “The Letter of Withdrawal,” Washington Post, October 28, 2005, p. A7.
62 For press accounts in the immediate aftermath of Miers’s withdrawal, see, for example, Elisabeth Bumiller and Carl
Hulse, “Court in Transition: The Overview,” New York Times, October 28, 2005, p. A1; John Harwood, John D.
McKinnon, Jeanne Cummings, and Jess Bravin, “Hot Seat: In Seeking New Court Nominee, Bush Has Little Margin of
Error—As Miers Withdraws, Pleasing Right Will Spark Big Fight; Consensus Pick Has Risks—CIA Leak Probe Adds
to Woes,” Wall Street Journal, October 28, 2005, p. A1; and Peter Baker and Amy Goldstein, “Nomination Was
Plagued By Missteps From the Start,” Washington Post, October 28, 2005, p. A1. For a later, more detailed account,
see Jan Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Conflict: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Control of the United States
Supreme Court (New York: Penguin Press, 2007), pp. 248-284.
Congressional Research Service
12

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

1993 speech reportedly contributed to opposition to her nomination by at least one conservative
interest group, and it raised concerns for some conservative Senators.63 In addition, some
conservative observers expressed concerns that Miers, a self-identified conservative, would be
ideologically unreliable. Addressing concerns about Miers’s views and ideological reliability was
made more difficult for her supporters by the relatively sparse available record of her views on
controversial constitutional issues. As a close legal advisor to President Bush, much of her most
relevant writing in these areas would likely be found in White House documents, and these
documents were not made publicly available because of their confidential nature.64
Three other factors identified by Abraham—perceived lack of qualifications, interest group
opposition, and fear of altering the Court—also seemed to contribute to the nomination’s failure.
Some observers raised questions about Miers’s qualifications for the position, and these concerns
appear to have intensified as she met individually with Senators. Furthermore, her response to the
questionnaire of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary was seen as inadequate by the chair and
ranking member of that committee.65 Miers also faced interest group opposition, but this case was
unusual because the opposition came predominantly from conservative groups that had
previously been allied with the President who submitted the nomination.66 Finally, in a variation
on Abraham’s “fear of altering the Court” factor, it seemed that some conservatives feared that
Miers, if confirmed, would not alter the Court, as they had long hoped an appointee of a
Republican President would do.67
In addition to the factors identified by Abraham, another factor that may have played a part in the
failure of this nomination was the close proximity of the nominee to the President. Miers’s
position in the Bush Administration, as Counsel to the President, raised questions for some about
whether she would be able to rule fairly on presidential power issues that might come before the
Court.68 In addition, many documents related to her work for the President, which might have
shed light on her views and qualifications, were not made available by the White House, despite
bipartisan requests.

63 Jo Becker, “In Speeches From the 1990s, Clues About Miers Views,” Washington Post, October 26, 2005, p. A1;
Charles Hurt and Ralph Z. Hallow, “Women’s Group Calls for Miers Withdrawal,” Washington Times, October 27,
2005, p. 1; David D. Kirkpatrick, “Nominee Is Pressed on Her Abortion Views,” New York Times, October 27, 2005, p.
A18.
64 Charlie Savage, “Bush Says He Won’t Air Memos from Miers,” Boston Globe, October 25, 2005, p. A1.
65 Elisabeth Bumiller and Carl Hulse, “Bush’s Court Choice Ends Bid After Attack by Conservatives,” New York
Times, October 28, 2005, p. A1; Robin Toner, David D. Kirkpatrick, and Anne E. Kornblut, “Weeks Erosion in
Support for the Nomination,” New York Times,” October 28, 2005, p. A16.
66 Charles Hurt and Ralph Z. Hallow, “Women’s Group Calls for Miers Withdrawal,” Washington Times, October 27,
2005, p. 1.
67 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Kansas Senator, Looking at Presidential Bid, Makes Faith the Bedrock of Campaign,” New
York Times, October 14, 2005, p. A18; Jonathan Weisman, “The Rift’s Repercussions Could Last Rest of Term,”
Washington Post, October 28, 2005, p. A8.
68 Amy Goldstein and Charles Babington, “Miers’s Autonomy Will Be at Issue,” Washington Post, October 27, 2005,
p. A1.
Congressional Research Service
13

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

The Committee on the Judiciary and Unsuccessful
Nominations
Since 1816, the Senate has had a standing Committee on the Judiciary. Prior to that development,
one of the three unsuccessful nominations was referred to a select committee. Between 1816 and
1868, 11 of the 16 unsuccessful nominations were referred to the Judiciary Committee. Since
1868, almost all Supreme Court nominations, including all that were ultimately not confirmed,
have been automatically referred to the Judiciary Committee.69
Of the unsuccessful nominations that have been referred to the Judiciary Committee, seven were
never reported or discharged. The first four, Henry Stanbery, Stanley Matthews, William
Hornblower, and John Marshall Harlan II, are discussed above. The fifth was Homer Thornberry,
nominated by President Lyndon B. Johnson to replace Justice Abe Fortas as Associate Justice
when he was nominated for elevation to Chief Justice. When Fortas’s nomination was withdrawn
by the President, the open position for Thornberry was effectively eliminated, and his nomination
was also withdrawn. At that time, the Thornberry nomination had not been reported by the
Judiciary Committee. The sixth of these nominations was that of John G. Roberts to be Associate
Justice. Before the Judiciary Committee acted on this nomination, Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist died, creating a vacancy. Roberts’ nomination to be Associate Justice was withdrawn,
shortly before hearings on the nomination were to begin, so that he could be nominated to be
Chief Justice. The last of this group of seven nominations is that of Harriet E. Miers. Although the
Judiciary Committee had scheduled hearings on her nomination to be Associate Justice, her
nomination was withdrawn in the face of opposition before any formal committee action.
Although their first nominations were never reported, second nominations of Matthews,
Hornblower, and Harlan in subsequent sessions of Congress were reported to the full Senate, and
Roberts’ nomination to be Chief Justice during the same session of Congress was also reported to
the full Senate. Only in the cases of Stanbery, Thornberry, and Miers did nominations that had
been referred to committee fail to be reported out of committee on any occasion. The first two of
these nominations were to fill Associate Justice vacancies that ceased to exist while the
nominations were pending,70 and the last, as just mentioned, was withdrawn prior to any formal
committee action.
Additional Information on Nominations
This report provides two additional tables of information concerning Supreme Court nominations
through the end of 2008.

69 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, History of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
1816-1981, Senate Document no. 97-18, 97th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1982), p. iv.
70 As previously discussed, on April 16, 1866, President Andrew Johnson nominated Henry Stanbery to replace John
Catron, who had died the previous May. By the time Stanbery was nominated, however, the House of Representatives
had passed a bill decreasing the number of justices in the Supreme Court. As discussed just above, the anticipated
vacancy to which Thornberry was nominated ceased to exist when Fortas failed to be confirmed as Chief Justice.
Congressional Research Service
14

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

Table 3 shows, by President, the number of vacancies, number of nominations, and disposition of
nominations. Table 4 provides detailed information on the course and fate of each of the 36
unsuccessful Supreme Court nominations.71 A variety of sources were used to develop this table,
as identified in the table notes. Although most of these sources are widely available, some,
particularly older committee records, are located at the National Archives and Records
Administration. Among the official sources, the Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the
Senate of the United States of America and committee records, where available, provided the most
information. Where the Journal showed no evidence of a debate or vote on the floor of the
Senate, the indices of other official sources were also checked for evidence of any other Senate
activity related to the nomination. These sources included the Congressional Globe,
Congressional Record, Annals of Congress, and Senate Journal. Where the table indicates that
there was no debate or further Senate action, there is no known official record that provides
additional information. A list of related literature follows Table 4.

71 For information all Supreme Court nominations (i.e., those that were unsuccessful and those that were successful),
see CRS Report RL33225, Supreme Court Nominations, 1789 - 2006: Actions by the Senate, the Judiciary Committee,
and the President, by Denis Steven Rutkus and Maureen Bearden.
Congressional Research Service
15

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

Table 3. Supreme Court Nominations, by President, 1789-2008
Actual or
Confirmed
Prospective
and Declined
President
Vacancies During
Confirmed
Not
or Died Prior
(party)
Presidencya
Nominations
and Served
Confirmed
to Service
Washington
10 14
10
2
2
(Federalist)
J. Adams (Fed.)
3
4
3
0
1
Jefferson
3 3
3
0
0
(Democratic-
Republican)
Madison (Dem.-
2 5
2
1
2
Rep.)
Monroe (Dem.-
1 1
1
0
0
Rep.)
J. Q. Adams
2 2
1
1
0
(Dem.-Rep.)
Jackson
7 8
6
1
1
(Democratic)
Van Buren (Dem.)
2
2
2
0
0
W. H. Harrison
0 0
0
0
0
(Whig)
Tyler (Whig)
2
9
1
8
0
Polk (Dem.)
2
3
2
1
0
Taylor (Whig)
0
0
0
0
0
Fillmore (Whig)
2
4
1
3
0
Pierce (Dem.)
1
1
1
0
0
Buchanan (Dem.)
2
2
1
1
0
Lincoln
5 5
5
0
0
(Republican)
A. Johnson
2b 1
0
1
0
(Dem.)
Grant (Rep.)
4
8
4
3
1
Hayes (Rep.)
3
3
2
1
0
Garfield (Rep.)
1
1
1
0
0
Arthur (Rep.)
2
3
2
0
1
Cleveland (1)
2 2
2
0
0
(Dem.)
B. Harrison (Rep.)
4
4
4
0
0
Cleveland (2)
2 5
2
3
0
(Dem.)
McKinley (Rep.)
1
1
1
0
0
T. Roosevelt
3
3
3
0
0
Congressional Research Service
16

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

Actual or
Confirmed
Prospective
and Declined
President
Vacancies During
Confirmed
Not
or Died Prior
(party)
Presidencya Nominations
and Served
Confirmed
to Service
(Rep.)
Taft (Rep.)
6
6
6
0
0
Wilson (Dem.)
3
3
3
0
0
Harding (Rep.)
4
5
4
1
0
Coolidge (Rep.)
1
1
1
0
0
Hoover (Rep.)
3
4
3
1
0
F. D. Roosevelt
9 9
9
0
0
(Dem.)
Truman (Dem.)
4
4
4
0
0
Eisenhower
5 6
5
1
0
(Rep.)
Kennedy (Dem.)
2
2
2
0
0
L. B. Johnson
4c 4
2
2
0
(Dem.)
Nixon (Rep.)
4
6
4
2
0
Ford (Rep.)
1
1
1
0
0
Carter (Dem.)
0
0
0
0
0
Reagan (Rep.)
4
5
4
1
0
G. H. W. Bush
2 2
2
0
0
(Rep.)
Clinton (Dem.)
2
2
2
0
0
G. W. Bush
2 4
2
2
0
(Rep.)
Totals
124
158
114
36
8
a. Includes unfilled vacancies remaining from previous administration; some vacancies are counted for more
than one administration. The term “prospective vacancy” refers to those cases in which a Justice has
announced his or her intention to leave office, but remains in the position pending the appointment of a
replacement.
b. Both positions were abolished, one until the Grant administration, the other permanently.
c. One of these vacancies was the expected Associate Justice vacancy created when Johnson nominated Abe
Fortas for elevation to Chief Justice. When the Fortas nomination was not successful, this expected vacancy
ceased to exist.
Congressional Research Service
17

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

Table 4. Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008
Date
Received in
Confirmation
Committee Votes, Reports, and
Date(s) of Senate
Final Disposition
Nominee President
Senatea
Hearing Date(s)b
Recommendations
Debate
(Vote)
William
Washington Feb. 27, 1793
Nomination predates standing Judiciary Committee; no record
No record of debate
Withdrawn, message
Patersonc
of other committee referral
received Feb. 28, 1793
John Rutledge
Washington Dec. 10, 1795
Nomination predates standing Judiciary Committee; no record
Dec. 11, 15, 1795
Rejected (10-14),
(for Chief
of other committee referral
Dec. 15, 1795
Justice)d
Alexander
Madison
Feb. 4, 1811
Nomination predates standing Judiciary Committee; referred to Feb. 5, 6, 7, 13, 1811
Rejected (9-24),
Wolcotte
select committee on Feb. 7, 1811. The committee reported on
Feb. 13, 1811
Feb. 13, 1811; no record of committee hearings, vote or
recommendation
John J.
J. Q. Adams Dec. 18, 1828
No record of hearings Reported on Jan. 26, 1829 with the
Jan. 29, 30, 1829; Feb. 2,
Postponedg (23-17),
Crittendenf
(referred)
recommendation that the Senate not
3, 4, 5, 9, 12, 1829
Feb. 12, 1829
act on the nomination during that
session
Roger B. Taneyh
Jackson
Jan. 15, 1835
No record of referral to the Judiciary Committee
Jan. 20, 1835; Feb. 2,
Postponed indefinitely
1835; Mar. 3, 1835
(24-21), Mar. 3, 1835
John C. Spenceri Tylerj
Jan. 9, 1844
No record of hearings Reported on Jan. 30, 1844; no record Jan. 31, 1844
Rejected (21-26),
(referred)
of committee vote or
Jan. 31, 1844
recommendation
Reuben H.
Tyler
Mar. 13, 1844
No record of hearings Reported on June 14, 1844; no
June 15, 1844
Tabled (27-20),
Walworthk
(referred)
record of committee vote or
June 15, 1844; withdrawn,
recommendation
message received June 17,
1844
Edward Kingl Tyler June
5,
1844 No record of hearings Reported on June 14, 1844; no
June 15, 1844
Tabled (29-18),
(referred)
record of committee vote or
June 15, 1844
recommendation
John C. Spencerm Tyler
June 17, 1844
No record of referral to the Judiciary Committee
No record of debate on
Withdrawn, message
(withdrawn on
the nomination
received June 17, 1844
the same day)
Reuben H.
Tyler
June 17, 1844
No record of referral to the Judiciary Committee
Motion to consider the
No record of further
Walworthn
nomination was
action
objected to,
June 17, 1844
CRS-18

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

Date
Received in
Confirmation
Committee Votes, Reports, and
Date(s) of Senate
Final Disposition
Nominee President
Senatea
Hearing Date(s)b
Recommendations
Debate
(Vote)
Reuben H.
Tyler
Dec. 10, 1844
No record of hearings Reported on Jan. 21, 1845; no record No record of debate
Tabled, Jan. 21, 1845
Walwortho
(referred)
of committee vote or
(no record of vote);
recommendation
withdrawn, message
received Feb. 6, 1845
Edward Kingp
Tyler
Dec. 10, 1844
No record of hearings Reported on Jan. 21, 1845; no record No record of debate on
Tabled, Jan. 21, 1845
(referred)
of committee vote or
the nomination
(no record of vote);
recommendation
withdrawn, message
received Feb. 8, 1845
John M. Readq
Tyler
Feb. 8, 1845
No record of hearings Reported on Feb. 14, 1845; no
Unsuccessful motion to
No further record of
(referred)
record of committee vote or
consider nomination,
action
recommendation
Feb. 26, 1845
George W.
Polk
Dec. 23, 1845
No record of hearings Reported on Jan. 20, 1846; no record Jan. 21, 22, 1846; motion Nomination rejected (20-
Woodwardr
(referred)
of committee vote or
to postpone rejected
29), Jan. 22, 1846
recommendation
(21-28), Jan. 22, 1846
Edward A.
Fillmore Aug.
21,
1852
No record of hearings Reported on Aug. 30, 1852; no
Aug. 31, 1852
Tabled Aug. 31, 1852
Bradfords
(referred)
record of committee vote or
(no record of vote)
recommendation
George E.
Fillmore
Jan. 10, 1853
No record of referral to the Judiciary Committee
Jan. 14, 20, 24, 1853;
Postponed (26-25),
Badgert
Feb. 7, 11, 1853
Feb. 11, 1853
William C.
Fillmore
Feb. 24, 1853
No record of hearings No record of committee vote;
No record of debate
No record of action after
Micouu
(referred and
ordered discharged on Feb. 24, 1853,
discharge
discharged on
the same day as referred
the same day)
Jeremiah S. Blackv Buchanan
Feb. 6, 1861
No record of referral to the Judiciary Committee
Motions to consider the
No record of further
nomination unsuccessful, action
Feb. 6, 12, 21, 1861
Henry Stanberyw
A. Johnson
Apr. 16, 1866
No record of hearings No record of committee actionx
No record of debate
No record of action after
(referred)
referraly
Ebenezer R.
Grant
Dec. 15, 1869
No record of hearings Reported adversely on Dec. 22, 1869; Dec. 22, 1869,
Rejected (24-33),
Hoarz
(referred)
no record of committee vote
Feb. 3, 1870
Feb. 3, 1870
CRS-19

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

Date
Received in
Confirmation
Committee Votes, Reports, and
Date(s) of Senate
Final Disposition
Nominee President
Senatea
Hearing Date(s)b
Recommendations
Debate
(Vote)
George H.
Grant
Dec. 2, 1873
Hearings held Dec.
Reported favorably on Dec. 11, 1873; Debated Dec. 11, 15,
Withdrawn, message
Williams (for
(referred Dec.
16, 17, 1873 after
no record of committee vote
1873; nomination
received Jan. 8, 1874
Chief Justice)aa
4, 1873)
recommittal
Hearings held after recommittal;
recommitted to the
nomination withdrawn by the
Judiciary Committee,
President; committee returned
Dec. 15, 1873
nomination to the Senatebb
Caleb Cushing
Grant
Jan. 9, 1874
No record of hearings Reported favorably on Jan. 9, 1874dd
No record of debate
Withdrawn, message
(for Chief
(referred)
received Jan. 14, 1874
Justice)cc
Stanley
Hayes
Jan. 26, 1881
No record of hearings Addressed on Feb. 7, 1881; addressed No record of debate
No record of action after
Matthewsee
(referred)
and postponed Feb. 14, 1881ff
committee
postponementgg
William B.
Cleveland
Sept. 19, 1893
No record of hearings Addressed on Sept. 25, 1893;
No record of debate
No record of further
Hornblowerhh
(referred)
October 25, 30, 1893
action
William B.
Cleveland
Dec. 6, 1893
No record of hearings Addressed on Dec. 11, 14, 18, 1893;
Jan. 15, 1894
Rejected (24-30),
Hornblower
(referred)
Reported adversely, Jan. 8, 1894ii
Jan. 15, 1894
Wheeler H.
Cleveland
Jan. 22, 1894
No record of hearings Addressed Jan. 29, 1894; Feb. 5, 6, 12, Feb. 15, 16, 1894
Rejected (32-41),
Peckhamjj
(referred)
1894; committee reportedly equal y
Feb. 16, 1894
divided;kk reported without
recommendation, Feb. 12, 1894
Pierce Butlerll
Harding
Nov. 23, 1922
No record of hearings Reported Nov. 28, 1922
No record of debate
Placed on the Executive
(referred)
Calendar on Nov. 28,
1922; No record of
further actionmm
John J. Parkernn
Hoover
Mar. 21, 1930
April 5, 1930oo
Reported adversely, Apr. 21, 1930pp
Apr. 28, 29, 30, 1930;
Rejected (39-41), May 7,
(referred)
May 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 1930
1930
John Marshal
Eisenhower
Nov. 9, 1954
No record of hearings No record of committee vote or
No record of debate
No record of further
Harlan IIqq
(referred)
report
actionrr
Abe Fortas (for
L. B.
June 26, 1968
July 11, 12, 16, 17, 18,
Committee voted to approve on
Sept. 24, 25, 26, 27, 30,
Cloture motion defeated
Chief Justice)ss
Johnson
(referred)
19, 20, 22, 23, 1968;
Sept. 17, 1968uu; reported favorably
1968; Oct. 1, 1968
(45-43), Oct. 1, 1968;
Sept. 13, 16, 1968tt
on Sept. 20, 1968
Withdrawn, message
received Oct. 4, 1968
CRS-20

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

Date
Received in
Confirmation
Committee Votes, Reports, and
Date(s) of Senate
Final Disposition
Nominee President
Senatea
Hearing Date(s)b
Recommendations
Debate
(Vote)
Homer
L. B.
June 26, 1968
July 11, 12, 16, 17, 18,
No record of committee vote or
No record of debate
Withdrawn, message
Thornberryvv
Johnson
(referred)
19, 20, 22, 23, 1968;
report
received Oct. 4, 1968xx
Sept. 13, 16, 1968ww
Clement F.
Nixon Aug.
21,
1969
Sept. 16, 17, 18, 19,
Committee voted 10-7 in favor of
Nov. 13, 14, 17, 18, 19,
Rejected (45-55), Nov. 21,
Haynsworth, Jr.yy
(referred)
23, 24, 25, 26, 1969zz
confirmation on Oct. 9, 1969aaa;
20, 21, 1969
1969
reported favorably on Nov. 12, 1969
G. Harrold
Nixon
Jan. 19, 1970
Jan. 27, 28, 29, 1970;
Committee voted 13-4 in favor of
Mar. 13, 16, 17, 18, 19,
Rejected (45-51), Apr. 8,
Carswellbbb
(referred)
Feb. 2, 3, 1970ccc
recommending for confirmation on
20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 31,
1970
Feb. 16, 1970ddd; reported on Feb. 27, 1970; Apr. 3, 6, 7, 8,
1970
1970
Robert H.
Reagan July
7,
1987 Sept. 15, 16, 17, 18,
5-9 against on Oct. 6, 1987; reported
Oct. 21, 22, 23, 1987
Rejected (42-58), Oct. 23,
Borkeee
(referred)
19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28,
on Oct. 13, 1987ggg
1987
29, 30, 1987fff
John G. Roberts,
G.W. Bush
July 29, 2005
No hearings
No committee action
No Senate debate
Withdrawn, message
Jr.hhh
(referred)
received Sept. 6, 2005
Harriet E.
G.W. Bush
Oct. 7, 2005
No hearings
No committee action
No Senate debate
Withdrawn, message
Miershhh
(referred)
received Oct. 28, 2005
a. The date of the President’s nomination and the date the nomination is received in the Senate are often, but not always, the same. As used in this column, “referred”
indicates that the nomination was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on that date.
b. The committee’s deliberations were held in closed session until the early 20th century. CRS Report RL31989, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Roles of the President,
Judiciary Committee, and Senate, by Denis Steven Rutkus.
c. Nomination information from U.S. Congress, Senate, Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of America, vol. 1, pp. 134-135. (Hereafter cited
as nominee, Executive Journal.) Paterson was later nominated again and confirmed.
d. Rutledge, Executive Journal, vol. 1, pp. 194-196. Rutledge served as an Associate Justice from February 15, 1790, through March 5, 1791. Although Rutledge was never
confirmed as Chief Justice, he served in the position from August 12, 1795, through December 15, 1795, under a recess appointment by President Washington.
(“Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,” at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/about.html.)
e. Wolcott, Executive Journal, vol. 2, pp. 165-67.
f.
Crittenden, Executive Journal, vol. 3, pp. 622-623, 636-639, 643-644.
g. Although the Senate did not take up a motion to “postpone indefinitely,” as it did on other similar occasions, it passed a resolution which had the effect of postponing.
(See Crittenden, Executive Journal, vol. 3, p. 644.)
h. Taney, Executive Journal, vol. 4, pp. 459, 463, 465, 484. Taney was later nominated to be Chief Justice and confirmed.
i.
Spencer was the subject of two nominations not confirmed. Information concerning the first nomination can be found at Executive Journal, vol. 6, pp. 207-208, 227, 229.
CRS-21

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

j.
In 1844 and 1845, President John Tyler forwarded nine nominations involving only five men. Eight of the nine were not confirmed. Of those nominees who were not
confirmed, Walworth was nominated three times, Spencer and King were nominated twice, and Read was nominated once. Samuel Nelson was nominated once and
confirmed.
k. Walworth was the subject of three nominations not confirmed. Information concerning the first nomination can be found at Executive Journal, vol. 6, pp. 243-244, 332,
344-345, 353.
l.
King was the subject of two nominations not confirmed. Information concerning the first nomination can be found at Executive Journal, vol. 6, pp. 306, 332, 345.
m. Spencer, Executive Journal, vol. 6, pp. 353-354.
n. Walworth, Executive Journal, vol. 6, p. 354.
o. Walworth, Executive Journal, vol. 6, pp. 355, 357, 387, 391.
p. King, Executive Journal, vol. 6, pp. 355, 357, 387, 392.
q. Read, Executive Journal, vol. 6, pp. 392, 396.
r. Woodward, Executive Journal, vol. 7, pp. 10, 36-38.
s. Bradford, Executive Journal, vol. 8, pp. 440-441, 448, 452.
t. Badger, Executive Journal, vol. 9, pp. 10, 18-20, 26-28, 34. President Millard Fillmore indicated that he regarded the postponement of the Badger nomination as
“equivalent to a rejection” in his message nominating William C. Micou (p. 34).
u. Micou, Executive Journal, vol. 9, pp. 34-36.
v. Black, Executive Journal, vol. 11, pp. 260-261, 271, 278.
w. Stanbery, Executive Journal, vol. 15, part 1, pp. 720-721.
x. Senate Judiciary Committee minutes are available for the session during which this nomination was pending. Specific information regarding this nomination or any other
nomination, however, was not recorded. See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “Senate Judiciary Committee, 39th-40th Congress, 1st sess.: Minutes,”
RG 46.15, U.S. National Archives.
y. There is no record of action on this nomination. The Associate Justice position to which Stanbery was nominated was eliminated by statute after his nomination. He
was nominated and confirmed for U.S. Attorney General in July 1866.
z. Hoar, Executive Journal, vol. 17, pp. 314, 316, 328-330.
aa. Williams, Executive Journal, vol. 19, pp. 119, 166, 183, 188-189, 210.
bb. The date of this action is not specified in committee records. See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “Papers re Nominations (P-W),” drawer Sen:
43B-A5 12, RG 46.15, U.S. National Archives.
cc. Cushing, Executive Journal, vol. 19, pp. 212-213, 218.
dd. The official vote of the committee is not reported. According to one press account, the committee was unanimous (“The Chief Justiceship,” New York Tribune, January
10, 1874, p. 1), while another reported a waiving of the formal referral of the nomination (“The Chief Justiceship,” New York Times, January 10, 1874, p. 1).
ee. Matthews, Executive Journal, vol. 22, p. 469.
CRS-22

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

ff. According to committee minutes, “The nomination of Stanly [sic] Matthews was taken up and on motion the further consideration of same was postponed until next
Monday [February 21, 1881].” The committee minutes contain no further report of action on the nomination during the remaining days of the 46th Congress. (U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Judiciary Committee 46th-48th Congress, 1st Session: Minutes, pp. 53-54.)
gg. Matthews was later nominated by President James A. Garfield and confirmed.
hh. Hornblower was the subject of two nominations not confirmed. The first was at the end of the first session of the 53rd Congress, and the second was at the beginning
of the second session of the same Congress. Executive Journal, vol. 29, part 2, pp. 138, 142, 243, 251, 339, 352-353.
ii. The official vote of the committee was not recorded. The New York Times reported the vote as 7-4 against (“Unfavorable to Mr. Hornblower,” New York Times, January
9, 1894, p. 1), and the New York Tribune reported 5-3 against (“To Reject Mr. Hornblower,” New York Tribune, January 9, 1894, p. 2).
jj. Peckham, Executive Journal, vol. 29, part 2, pp. 356, 408, 421-423.
kk. The official vote of the committee was not recorded. The New York Times reported the vote as 5-5 (“Peckham’s Friends Hopeful,” New York Times, February 13, 1894,
p. 1).
ll. Butler, Executive Journal, vol. 60, pp. 29, 63.
mm. Butler was later re-nominated by President Harding and confirmed.
nn. Parker, Executive Journal, vol. 69, part 1, pp. 525, 643, 655, 673, 682, 691, 695-696, 699, 705, 710, 718-722.
oo. See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Confirmation of Hon. John J. Parker to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, hearings, 71st
Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1930).
pp. The official committee vote was not reported in the Executive Journal. The New York Times reported a 10-6 vote against the nomination on April 21, 1930 (“Committee,
10 to 6, Rejects Parker,” New York Times, April 22, 1930, pp. 1, 23). Another source provides a different vote count, 9-8, with the same outcome (Joseph P. Harris,
Advice and Consent of the Senate [New York: Greenwood Press, 1968], p. 129).
qq. Harlan, Executive Journal, vol. 96, p. 834.
rr. Harlan was later re-nominated by President Eisenhower and confirmed.
ss. Fortas, Executive Journal, vol. 110, pp. 332, 516, 521, 527, 529, 554-556, 569-570, 592.
tt. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Abe Fortas, report to accompany the nomination of Abe Fortas, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., Exec. Rept. 8
(Washington: GPO, 1968). See also U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nominations of Abe Fortas and Homer Thornberry, hearings, 90th Cong., 2nd sess.
(Washington: GPO, 1968).
uu. The official committee vote was not reported in the Executive Journal. The New York Times reported an 11-6 vote in favor of the nomination on September 17, 1968
(“Fortas Approved by Senate Panel; Filibuster Looms,” New York Times, September 18, 1968, pp. 1, 13).
vv. Thornberry, Executive Journal, vol. 110, pp. 332, 592.
ww. The Thornberry hearings were conducted in conjunction with the Fortas hearings. See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nominations of Abe Fortas
and Homer Thornberry, hearings, 90th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1968).
xx. With the nomination of Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice withdrawn, an Associate Justice vacancy was no longer anticipated.
yy. Haynsworth, Executive Journal, vol. 111, pp. 590, 768-770, 772-773, 776.
zz. See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., hearings, 91st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1969).
CRS-23

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

aaa. Vote tal y from U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., report to accompany the nomination of Clement F.
Haynsworth, Jr., 91st Cong., 1st sess., Exec. Rept. 91-12 (Washington: GPO, 1969); date of vote from U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Legislative and
Executive Calendar, 91st Cong., 1st and 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 434.
bbb. Carswell, Executive Journal, vol. 112, pp. 1, 79, 117, 121, 125, 127-130, 139-141, 144-148.
ccc. See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, George Harrold Carswell, hearings, 91st Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1970).
ddd. Vote tal y from U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of George Harrold Carswell, report to accompany the nomination of George Harrold
Carswell, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., Exec. Rept. 91-14 (Washington: GPO, 1970); date of vote from U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Legislative and
Executive Calendar, 91st Cong., 1st and 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 442.
eee. Bork, Executive Journal, vol. 129, pp. 493, 665, 669-771.
fff. See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, hearings, 5 parts,
100th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1987).
ggg. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Legislative and Executive Calendar, S.Prt. 100-153, 100th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1989). See also
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, report to accompany the
nomination of Robert H. Bork, 100th Cong., 1st sess., Exec. Rept. 100-7 (Washington: GPO, 1987).
hhh. Information concerning the nominations of John G. Roberts, Jr., and Harriet E. Miers was obtained from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information
System, available to congressional staff at http://www.congress.gov/nomis/.
CRS-24

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

Additional Resources
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31989. Supreme Court Appointment Process: Roles of the President, Judiciary
Committee, and Senate, by Denis Steven Rutkus.
CRS Report MM70010, Supreme Court Appointment Process. Online Video and Audio. Video and
Audio Tapes., by Denis Steven Rutkus.
CRS Report RL32821. The Chief Justice of the United States: Responsibilities of the Office and
Process for Appointment, by Denis Steven Rutkus and Lorraine H. Tong.
CRS Report RL33247. Supreme Court Nominations: Senate Floor Procedure and Practice, 1789-
2006, by Richard S. Beth and Betsy Palmer.
CRS Report RL33225. Supreme Court Nominations, 1789 - 2006: Actions by the Senate, the
Judiciary Committee, and the President, by Denis Steven Rutkus and Maureen Bearden.
Other Resources
Abraham, Henry J. Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of the U.S. Supreme Court
Appointments from Washington to Clinton, 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
1999).
Ginsburg, Ruth Bader. “Confirming Supreme Court Justices: Thoughts on the Second Opinion
Rendered by the Senate.” University of Illinois Law Review, vol. 1988, pp. 101-117.
Greenburg, Jan Crawford. Supreme Conflict: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Control of the
United States Supreme Court (New York: Penguin Press, 2007).
Harris, Joseph P. The Advice and Consent of the Senate: A Study of the Confirmation of
Appointments by the United States Senate (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968).
Jacobstein, J. Myron, and Roy M. Mersky. The Rejected: Sketches of the 26 Men Nominated for
the Supreme Court but Not Confirmed by the Senate (Milpitas, CA: Toucan Valley
Publications, 1993). (Note: The authors do not include the Paterson nomination.)
Maltese, John Anthony. The Selling of Supreme Court Nominees (Baltimore, MD: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1995).
Massaro, John. Supremely Political: The Role of Ideology and Presidential Management in
Unsuccessful Supreme Court Nominations (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
1990).
Massey, Calvin R. “Getting There: A Brief History of the Politics of Supreme Court
Appointments.” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, vol. 19 (fall 1991), pp. 1-21.
Congressional Research Service
25

---

.
Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2008

Sulfridge, Wayne. “Ideology as a Factor in Senate Consideration of Supreme Court
Nominations.” The Journal of Politics, vol. 42, no. 2 (May 1980), pp. 560-567.
Thorpe, James A. “The Appearance of Supreme Court Nominees Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee.” In The First Branch of American Government: The United States Congress and
Its Relations to the Executive and Judiciary, 1789-1989, vol. 2, Joel Sibley, ed. (Brooklyn,
NY: Carlson, 1991), pp. 515-546.
Tulis, Jeffrey K. “The Appointment Power: Constitutional Abdication: The Senate, the President,
and Appointments to the Supreme Court.” Case Western Reserve Law Review, vol. 47
(summer 1997), pp. 1331-1357.

Author Contact Information

Henry B. Hogue

Analyst in American National Government
hhogue@crs.loc.gov, 7-0642




Congressional Research Service
26

---