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When government officials become aware of an impending disaster they may take steps to protect
citizens before the incident occurs. Evacuation of the geographic area that may be affected is an
option to ensure public safety. If implemented properly, evacuation can be an effective strategy
for saving lives. Evacuations and decisions to evacuate, however, can also entail complex factors
and elevated risks. Decisions to evacuate may require officials to balance potentially costly,
hazardous, or unnecessary evacuations against the possibility of loss of life due to a delayed order
to evacuate.
Some observers of evacuations, notably that from New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, claim
evacuations pose unique challenges to certain segments of society. From their perspective,
special-needs populations, the transit-dependent, and individuals with pets faced particular
hardships associated with the storm. This, they claim, is because some evacuation plans, and the
way in which they were carried out, appeared to inadequately address their particular
circumstances or needs.
In responding to these challenges, Then-senator Obama introduced S. 1685 in the 109th Congress
which would have directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to ensure that each state provided
detailed and comprehensive information regarding its pre-disaster and post-disaster plans for the
evacuation of individuals with special needs in emergencies. President Obama indicated during
his campaign that he would continue to pursue similar evacuation polices.
Another facet of evacuation is sheltering displaced individuals. For short-term sheltering,
federally provided resources include food, water, cots, and essential toiletries. When displaced
individuals need long-term sheltering, federal policy provides financial assistance for alternative
accommodations such as apartments, motels and hotels, recreational vehicles, and modular units.
While federal law provides for certain aspects of civilian emergency evacuation, evacuation
policy generally is established and enforced by state and local officials. In recent years, Members
of Congress have focused, in part, on policy options that addressed issues of equity during
evacuations as well as attempts to integrate federal, state, and local evacuation efforts more fully.
This report discusses federal evacuation policy and analyzes potential lessons learned from the
evacuation of individuals from Hurricane Katrina. Several issue areas that might arise concerning
potential lawmaking and oversight on evacuation policy are also highlighted. This report will be
updated as significant legislative or administrative changes occur.
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Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1
Examples of Federal Evacuation Policy.................................................................................... 1
Evacuations: Lessons Learned .................................................................................................. 3
General Lessons Learned from Evacuations....................................................................... 3
Lessons Learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita........................................................... 4
Potential Congressional Issues .................................................................................................. 6
Low-Income Individuals and Households .......................................................................... 6
Evacuating Foreign Nationals............................................................................................. 6
Federal, State, and Local Integration .................................................................................. 6
Technology.......................................................................................................................... 7
Re-entry into Evacuated Zones........................................................................................... 8
Citizen Participation in Evacuation Planning ..................................................................... 8
Evacuation Fatigue.............................................................................................................. 8
Returning and Relocating Evacuees ................................................................................... 8
Concluding Observations .......................................................................................................... 9
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Table A-1. Selected Federal Evacuation Authorities ......................................................................11
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Appendix. Statutory Authority for Evacuations .............................................................................11
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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 13
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 13
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Threats of impending disasters—such as hurricanes, floods, volcanic eruptions, the movement of
airborne hazardous material, or unstable conditions at nuclear power plants—may provide
officials an opportunity to save lives by encouraging or mandating civilian evacuation. Moving a
population out of harm’s way through evacuation can save lives and substantially reduce
exposure to hazards. Evacuations, however, can create complex challenges for officials and
emergency managers. For example, officials need to time the evacuation accurately to ensure the
impending disaster does not occur while people are evacuating. Evacuations can also be
hazardous. Reportedly, more people died during the Hurricane Rita evacuation than from the
actual hurricane.1 Officials also need to take into account individuals who lack adequate
transportation or have special needs. Special-needs individuals generally require more time to
prepare to evacuate and travel out of the area. In such cases, it may be safer to have the special-
needs population remain in the area and “shelter in place.”2
Evacuation has three basic components. First is the departure of people from a stricken or
threatened area. Second is the temporary resettlement of evacuees, and the provision of shelter
and resources to them. Third is the final return of evacuees to either to their predisaster residence,
or an alternate location. This report examines the federal role in the removal and return of citizens
from affected areas.3 The report reviews potential lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina4
evacuation. It also suggests several policy options that Congress might consider if it wished to
integrate federal, state, and local evacuation efforts more fully, or address some of the social
disparities that could complicate or hinder evacuations.
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In general, federal policy defers to the states to enact laws pertinent to evacuation.5 Using
authority from state laws and local ordinances, state and local officials may suggest or require the
evacuation of residents from homes and communities before certain catastrophes occur.6 Rather
than taking the lead in evacuations, the federal government facilitates the evacuation process
through federal statutes that authorize agency heads to use federal resources to assist in the
evacuation of civilians. Brief descriptions of four federal authorities follow.
1 “In Texas, Governor Orders Improvements to Evacuation Plans,” New York Times, March 22, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/22/national/22texas.html.
2 “Shelter in place” refers to taking protective measures while remaining in the affected area.
3 Another component of evacuation is sheltering. For more information on federal sheltering policy, see CRS Report
RL34087, FEMA Disaster Housing and Hurricane Katrina: Overview, Analysis, and Congressional Issues, by Francis
X. McCarthy.
4 Hurricane Katrina made U.S. landfall on August 29, 2005.
5 The appendix to this report identifies selected federal statutory citations that appear to be most pertinent to domestic
evacuation. This report does not comprehensively review all federal evacuation policies.
6 State laws generally authorize governors to order and enforce the evacuation of residents under emergency situations.
See CRS Report RL32287, Emergency Management and Homeland Security Statutory Authorities in the States,
District of Columbia, and Insular Areas: A Summary, by Keith Bea, L. Cheryl Runyon, and Kae M. Warnock.
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The Robert T. Stafford Disaster and Relief Emergency Assistance Act (hereafter the Stafford Act)
authorizes the President to direct the Secretary of Defense to use resources to perform necessary
emergency work to preserve life and property. This may take place even before the President
issues a major disaster or emergency declaration.7 The President may also issue the declaration
before the incident to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe by providing assistance for
“precautionary evacuations.”8
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As mentioned previously, the final component of an evacuation is the return of evacuees to their
predisaster residences or, if needed, to alternative locations. As amended by the Post Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (hereafter the Post Katrina Act), Section 425 of the
Stafford Act states that the President may provide transportation assistance to “relocate
individuals displaced from their predisaster primary residences as a result of an incident ... or
otherwise transported from their predisaster primary residences ... to and from alternative
locations for short or long-term accommodation or to return an individual or household to their
predisaster primary residence or alternative location, as determined by the President.” Under this
authority the role of the federal government has been expanded not only to assist in the removal
of citizens, but to return disaster victims, or to relocate them. Scant information exists on the
implementation of this relatively new authority for the return of evacuees to their predisaster
residence. The issue of returning evacuees to their residences will be touched on later in the
report.
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Another way in which the federal government facilitates evacuations is through assigning roles
and responsibilities to various federal agencies, states and localities, and nonprofit organizations.
The National Response Framework (NRF), administered by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), establishes the roles and
responsibilities of federal and certain non-federal entities when incidents overwhelm state or local
governments. For example, the NRF identifies state, local, and tribal governments as having the
responsibility of “ordering the evacuation of persons from any portions of the state threatened by
the incident, giving consideration to the requirements of special-needs populations and those with
household pets or service animals.”9
The NRF includes “Incident Annexes,” which are documents that address specific hazard
situations.10 One of the annexes, the Mass Evacuation Incident Annex, assigns DHS and FEMA
the responsibility of coordinating mass evacuations. With the support of other federal agencies
7 42 U.S.C. 5170b(c). For background on the Stafford Act and presidential declaration authority, see CRS Report
RL33053, Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, and Funding, by
Keith Bea.
8 42 U.S.C. § 5192(a)(1).
9 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, January 2008, p. 39.
10 There are seven Incident Annexes that accompany the NRF: Biological, Food and Agriculture, Mass Evacuation,
Nuclear/Radiological, Catastrophic, Cyber, and Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation.
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and nonprofit organizations, the Annex also provides overall guidance for integrating the efforts
of federal, state, local, and tribal governments during the evacuation of large numbers of people.
According to the Annex:
Federal support to mass evacuation operations will be provided at the state/tribal level and
scaled to the incident.... Regardless of the scale of the incident, coordination among
numerous command entities will be required to carry out the major functions of evacuation
operations.11
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Established in 1985, FEMA’s National Hurricane Program (NHP) helps protect communities from
hurricane hazards through various projects and activities. The NHP also provides assistance to
state and local agencies in developing hurricane evacuation plans. One of the ways this is
achieved is through NHP’s Hurricane Evacuation Studies (HES). HES helps states and localities
determine the probable effects of a hurricane, identify appropriate shelters, and predict public
response to a hurricane and hurricane advisories.12
NHP also conducts hazard and vulnerability analyses for coastal communities. Analyses include
an assessment of a hurricane’s impact, a review of existing roads and transportation systems, and
an analysis of the population (e.g., demographic characteristics). The information gained from
analyses helps communities determine evacuation zones (areas vulnerable to the hurricane),
develop evacuation maps, and determine clearance times.
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Studies on evacuations have identified several techniques that can make evacuations more
effective. For example, informing citizens about evacuation routes and shelter locations as part of
a community preparedness activity can help reduce the amount of time it takes for a household to
evacuate. Without this information, households are generally slow to react to an evacuation
order.13 Making provisions, such as gasoline, portable restrooms, and water available along the
route can also positively influence the effectiveness of an evacuation. Having tow trucks along
egress routes to move vehicles can also help to keep the roads clear.14
The use of hazard analyses and evacuation analyses may also produce a more effective
evacuation. Hazard analyses are used to identify areas susceptible to a hazard’s impact.
Evacuation analyses assess the size of the affected population and its capability to transport itself.
Additionally, evacuation analyses help identify modes of transportation to be used in the
evacuation and potential evacuation routes.
11 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Mass Evacuation Incident Annex, June 2008, p. 5.
12 Information on the National Hurricane Program can be obtained at http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/nhp/.
13 Ronald W. Perry, Michael K. Lindell, and Marjorie R. Greene, Evacuation Planning in Emergency Management
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1981), p. 145.
14 Ronald W. Perry and Michael K. Lindell, Emergency Planning (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2007), pp.
172-173.
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These lessons were derived primarily from disasters and emergencies such as wildfires,
hazardous material spills, and hurricanes that would not be categorized as a large-scale, or
catastrophic incident. The evacuations as a result of some of these do not involve long-term
displacement, or the need to evacuate a large population. Hurricane Katrina and Rita, however,
did offer lessons on large-scale evacuations.
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Hurricanes Katrina and Rita increased our knowledge of evacuations from large-scale incidents.
Studies and reports covering the evacuations prompted by Hurricane Katrina also found
techniques that make evacuations more effective.15 In general, they stated that implementation of
the evacuations of many of the individuals affected by Hurricane Katrina went relatively
smoothly because of successful evacuation procedures. Some examples of these procedures
include the use of traffic management techniques such as “contra-flow” (making the in-bound and
out-bound lanes uni-directional) which proved to be very effective. The use of conference calls to
coordinate evacuation efforts also produced positive results.
However, reports also asserted that other aspects of the evacuations needed significant
improvement. The evacuation of New Orleans and Jefferson Parish was particularly troublesome;
In fact, they were so problematic they tended to negatively shape public perception of the
evacuation as a whole.
One account that criticized the Hurricane Katrina evacuation said that the call to evacuate
appeared to be “weak, bureaucratic, and confusing.”16 Perhaps as a result of such criticisms, calls
to evacuate during Hurricane Ike17 used stronger language to convey the seriousness of the event.
It is unclear, however, if stronger language was more effective than other factors in getting
individuals to heed notices to evacuate. Another factor that influenced the way in which people
were evacuated for Hurricane Ike was the experience of gasoline shortages and gridlock. In some
disasters, a phenomenon known as “shadow evacuation” takes place. Shadow evacuations consist
of individuals leaving the area without being told to do so. During the Hurricane Rita evacution,
non-mandated departures burdened evacuation routes and created fuel shortages. In Hurricane
Ike, efforts such as persuading individuals in non-evacuation zones not to leave, and asking
families not to evacuate in multiple vehicles helped reduce shadow evacuations.18
The Hurricane Katrina evacuations also underscored the significance of timing an evacuation.
According to one view, large metropolitan areas generally need 48 hours to evacuate (for
Louisiana, the preferred minimum amount of time to conduct a major evacuation is 72 hours).19
However, the earlier an evacuation is ordered, the greater the likelihood there will be an error in
15 Examples include U.S. Congress, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 109-377 (Washington: GPO,
2006); U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A
Nation Still Unprepared, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 109-322 (Washington: GPO, 2006); and Todd Litman, Lessons
From Katrina and Rita: What Major Disasters Teach Transportation Planners,” Journal of Transportation
Engineering, vol. 132, no. 11 (January 2006).
16 Douglas Brinkley, The Great Deluge (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), p. 59.
17 Hurricane Ike made U.S. landfall on September 13, 2008.
18 Interview of Mayor Bill White by Jim Lehrer on the PBS Newshour, aired September 11, 2008.
19 Ivan Van Veerden and Mike Brown, The Storm (New York: Viking, 2006), p. 47.
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the weather forecast. The inability to predict a storm track compounds the difficulties of
evacuation decision making.
In the case of Hurricane Katrina, evacuations were declared late, or not at all, in two of
Louisiana’s most populous areas: New Orleans and Jefferson Parish. According to one
congressional report, a more complete evacuation of these areas could have saved lives and
reduced human suffering.20 Another congressional report concluded that the incomplete
evacuation led to the need for a post-hurricane evacuation. Federal, state, and local officials had
not anticipated the need for a second evacuation. As a consequence, problems in communication,
lack of situational awareness, and a shortage of bus drivers resulted in poor implementation of the
second evacuation.21
Economically disadvantaged individuals, those with pets, and special-needs populations22 also
experienced difficulty during the evacuations. Some households who wished to leave the area
could not because of a lack of transportation. Special-needs populations were underserved
because some were too frail for transport.23 Others depended on service animals (animals that are
trained to perform tasks for individuals with disabilities, such as guiding people who are blind,
alerting people who are deaf, or pulling wheelchairs). Some of these individuals were helpless
because their animals could not navigate flooded streets. Others elected not to evacuate because
shelters had no provisions for their pets and they feared leaving their pets behind.
Much of the post-Hurricane Katrina legislation is directed at these problems. For example, some
of the legislation enacted after Hurricane Katrina includes grants for states and localities to
develop evacuation plans and ensure that these plans include provisions for special needs
populations. Another example is legislation directed toward ensuring that evacuation plans
address individuals with household pets and service animals. Table A-1 in the appendix to this
report includes some of this legislation.
Finally, the House report24 concluded that the responsibility to evacuate did not reside solely
within the government. Many individuals were aware of the need to evacuate but chose not to.
Some had waited out hurricanes in the past and believed they could do the same for Hurricane
Katrina. Others simply failed to recognize the seriousness of the hurricane. Despite the severity of
the event, the amount of evacuation planning that takes place, and the necessary resources at
hand, there will always be individuals who choose to remain in the affected area.
20 U.S. Congress, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina, A Failure of Initiative, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 109-377 (Washington: GPO, 2006), p. 103.
21 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation
Still Unprepared, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 109-322 (Washington: GPO, 2006), pp. 594-595.
22 Examples of special-needs populations identified in FEMA’s Interim Emergency Management Planning Guide for
Special Needs Populations (August 15, 2008) include individuals in need of additional response assistance, individuals
with disabilities, individuals who live in institutionalized settings, elderly individuals, children, people from diverse
cultures who have limited English proficiency or who are non-English speaking, and those who lack transportation.
23 David M. Dosa, Nancy Grossman, Terrie Wetle, and Vincent Mor, “To Evacuate or Not to Evacuate: Lessons
Learned From Louisiana Nursing Home Administrators Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,” Journal of the
American Medical Directors Association, vol. 8 , no. 3 (March 2007), p. 147.
24 U.S. Congress, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina, A Failure of Initiative, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 109-377 (Washington: GPO, 2006), p. 113.
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During a review of issues related to evacuation, displacement, and sheltering policies, Congress
might move to consider options for better integrating federal, state, and local efforts during
evacuation. Congress might also review options addressing issues of inequity, encourage changes
that could make the decision to evacuate more precise, or take no action.
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The Stafford Act stipulates that relief and assistance be provided “without discrimination on the
grounds of ... economic status.”25 FEMA has responsibility to provide for the evacuation of
disaster victims and provide for evacuation as part of federal emergency preparedness efforts.26
Congress might assess whether existing evacuation plans and procedures comport with the
requirements of the Stafford Act, and whether other efforts are required to ensure that low-income
individuals and households receive necessary aid.
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Foreign nationals living in the United States face particular problems during natural disasters.
Lack of adequate documents for personal identification—a problem for many victims as a result
of being evacuated from their homes or the loss of or damage to personal items and records—has
specific consequences under immigration laws. Enforcement of immigration laws may also
inhibit foreign nationals’ access to emergency disaster relief. According to §401 of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, unauthorized aliens are eligible
for short-term, in-kind emergency disaster relief and services or assistance that deliver in-kind
services at the community level, provide assistance without individual determinations of each
recipient’s needs, and are necessary for the protection of life and safety. Unauthorized aliens who
are receiving federal disaster aid, however, have no immunity from deportation, according to
DHS officials. In the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, many displaced aliens
reportedly feared that seeking government help might lead to their deportation. DHS arrested,
detained, and ordered deported an unspecified number of unauthorized aliens displaced by the
2005 hurricanes.28 It is possible that this situation may inhibit those who fear deportation from
evacuating, potentially placing these individuals at risk during catastrophic incidents. Congress
might elect to review the relationship between evacuation policy and immigration policy.
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In conjunction with DHS, the U.S. Department of Transportation issued a report entitled Report
to Congress on Catastrophic Hurricane Evacuation Plan Evaluation. The report found that
25 42 U.S.C. 5151(b).
26 6 U.S.C. 314(a)(9)(C).
27 This section was authored by Ruth Ellen Wasem, CRS Specialist in Immigration Policy.
28 For a more complete analysis, see CRS Report RL34500, Unauthorized Aliens’ Access to Federal Benefits: Policy
and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem; CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum, Noncitizen Eligibility for Disaster-
Related Assistance, by Alison Siskin, February 15, 2002; and CRS Report RL33091, Hurricane Katrina-Related
Immigration Issues and Legislation, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
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federal, state, and local emergency plans and operations for evacuations were not well
integrated.29 Congress could consider measures to improve jurisdictional integration.
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Congress might consider expanding FEMA grants for the research and development of emerging
technologies that could improve evacuation planning and decision-making. Such advances in
technology include the use of geographic information systems (GIS) to help emergency managers
make more informed decisions regarding evacuations. Some of the ways in which GIS can be
used are determining efficient evacuation routes and identifying and mapping areas containing
populations who might have difficulty evacuating (e.g., nursing home residents, hospital patients,
and non-English speaking groups). Recently, GIS and aerial photography were combined to
create a real-time application called “Virtual Alabama.” The program offers a panoramic view of
the Alabama coastline allowing emergency mangers to direct assets and responders where they
are needed most. The program also allows for real-time evacuation routing and vehicle and asset
tracking.30
A citizen-evacuation system is also being developed that employs radio-frequency identification
(RFID) and wireless technologies to help individuals during emergencies and disasters. When
finished, the system should provide real-time information on evacuees to assist officials in
tracking the evacuation of special-needs populations and tracking individuals to help reunite
families after an emergency or a disaster. The system is also designed to help reduce the number
of dangerous search-and-rescue operations that need to be conducted during and after disasters.31
Another example of an emerging technology might be a software tool that applies operations
research methods to help emergency managers better decide whether and when to order
evacuations.32 Using operation research methods enables a modeler to identify bottlenecks in
evacuations and used to predict problems and solutions for a complex evacuation situation. Such
tools might aid the emergency managers in conducting evacuations more efficiently by clearing
out inhabitants in stages. Software and other tools could also help planners optimize the location
of relief supplies before a hurricane made landfall.33 Congress could consider approaches for
making such technology more readily available to state and local emergency managers, or fund
further research in the area.
29 U.S. Department of Transportation, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Report to
Congress on Catastrophic Hurricane Evacuation Plan Evaluation, June 1, 2006, chapter 5, “Findings and
Recommendations,” available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/hurricanevacuation/chapter5.htm.
30 Testimony of Alabama Department of Homeland Security Director James M. Walker, Jr., in U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and oversight, Ready to Lead? DHS
and the Next Major Catastrophe, 110th Cong., June 11, 2008. See http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/
20080611154609-65973.pdf.
31 Michael Keating, “Texas Taps AT&T to Develop Emergency Evacuation and Notification Tool,” GovPro,
December 5, 2007, http://www.govpro.com/News/Article/76845/.
32 Operations Research applies mathematical modeling, statistics, probability queuing theory, decision analysis, and
similar techniques to solve complex management problems.
33 For example, see MIT News, Saving Lives Through Smarter Hurricane Evacuations, David Chandler, MIT News
Office, August 28, 2008, available at http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2008/hurricanes-0828.html.
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Evacuation policy may present difficult choices to inhabitants of hazardous areas. Individuals
who choose not to evacuate remain in their residences and retain access to their property.
Whereas, in some instances, evacuees may not be granted reentry to their residences for
prolonged periods of time. This tension may be problematic for the implementation of evacuation
policy for at least two reasons. First, it creates a disincentive to evacuate and potentially places
individuals at risk because some may be concerned about being absent from their property for a
prolonged period. Second, it may create an inequity between those who evacuate and those who
stay, because those who remain may be able to protect their property and begin the recovery
process more quickly than those who evacuate. If this topic were of interest, Congress might
explore options related to this tension. For example, Congress might create incentives for
individuals to evacuate and create mechanisms to ensure a timely yet safe return to an evacuated
area.
Many city and county codes require damaged residences to be inspected before individuals are
allowed to re-enter their homes. After large disasters, however, there often is a lack of inspectors
available for conducting inspections. If this were of concern, Congress might consider expanding
the Stafford Act’s Public Assistance program34 to include programs that bring outside inspectors
to an affected area to hasten the inspection process.
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It has been argued that the success of an evacuation is significantly enhanced when citizens
participate in evacuation planning. Citizens are less likely to resist evacuation orders when there
is increased citizen participation because they believe they had a say in how the evacuations
should be conducted.35 Congress might explore options for increasing citizen participation in state
and local evacuation planning. Such options might increase citizen “buy-in” and could lead to
more complete evacuations.
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Hurricanes generally occur in close succession, which sometimes necessitates more than one
evacuation. Under such circumstances individuals may become “burned out” and reluctant to
heed orders to evacuate. This was a concern for officials during Hurricane Ike; they stated that
evacuation fatigue may have contributed to an incomplete evacuation. If Congress wished to
address this issue, it could offer grants to universities and colleges to study evacuation fatigue and
produce methods to increase citizen participation in evacuations, even when they occur in
succession.
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As discussed earlier in this report, the Post Katrina Act amends Section 425 of the Stafford Act to
provide transportation assistance to relocate displaced individuals to and from alternative
34 42 U.S.C. 5172 § 406
35 Ronald Perry and Alvin Mushkatel, Minority Citizens in Disasters, University of Georgia Press (Georgia: 1986),
p. 144.
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locations for short or long-term accommodation, or to return an individual or household to their
predisaster primary residence, or alternative location.
This amendment expands the role of the federal government beyond merely assisting states and
localities in evacuations by authorizing the federal government to return evacuees to their
predisaster residence. Furthermore, administering the return of evacuees raises issues that may
involve oversight by Congress. If evacuees were flown out of the area, does the federal
government cover the cost for return airfare? Or can the return of evacuees be accomplished with
a less expensive mode of transportation such as a bus? Since the Hurricane Katrina evacuation,
many individuals and households have purchased new furnishing and belongings. Is the federal
government responsible to pay for the return of these belongings? If so, the federal government
may have to reimburse individuals and households for such items as moving vans and rental
trucks. If individuals and households do not get reimbursed for moving their belongings, some
may not have the economic means to do so themselves.
On August 13, 2008, the National Advisory Committee (NAC)36 stated that while it supports the
return of disaster victims to their homes when transported by FEMA, NAC could not reach a
consensus on how to proceed with the return policy and identified some concerns relating to the
issue.37 For one, NAC noted that providing transportation for evacuees back to their homes may
prove to be difficult for FEMA to manage. Another concern was the clarity of the policy. NAC
requested that FEMA establish clear guidance concerning the criteria for transportation
assistance. Some may argue that such concerns may indicate a need for congressional oversight.
If this amendment proves costly or difficult to administer, Congress may elect to re-examine this
policy.
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Prior to Hurricane Katrina, evacuations were primarily a state and local responsibility. Because of
lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, federal policy has become more active and establishes
standards to be met. Federal legislation authorizing the return or relocation of evacuees was
enacted after Hurricane Katrina. Also, Congress amended the Stafford Act to ensure that
transportation-dependent groups are included in state and local evacuation plans. President
Obama’s platform of addressing the requirements of special-needs populations in evacuation
policy may also deepen federal involvement.38
As the federal government becomes more involved in evacuations, there may be a fundamental
shift in the roles and responsibilities of the various actors involved in evacuations. Federal
assumption of more responsibility in evacuations creates standards and guidelines for states and
localities to follow. While some may contend that this shift will save lives, others may argue that
an increased federal role will intrude on state sovereignty, or be an unfunded mandate.
36 The National Advisory Council (NAC) advises the Administrator of FEMA on all aspects of emergency
management. NAC incorporates input from state, local, and tribal governments, as well as the private sector in the
development and revision of the national preparedness goal, the national preparedness system, the National Incident
Management System (NIMS), the National Response Framework (NRF), as well as other related plans and strategies.
37 Minutes from the National Advisory Council meeting in Washington DC, held on August 13, 2008.
38 Obama and Biden 2008 campaign website, http://origin.barackobama.com/issues/homeland_security/.
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As it currently stands, states and localities will have to increase planning, dedicate resources, and
possibly shift priorities as they work to ensure special-needs groups are not left out of evacuation
plans. The identification of transportation-dependent groups is part of the evacuation process. A
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that some emergency
management officials did not have a good understanding of the size, location, and composition of
the transportation disadvantaged in their community.39 Beyond the issues discussed in this report,
Congress might elect to monitor how well states are (1) identifying populations in their
jurisdiction that may experience difficultly evacuating, (2) incorporating these groups in their
evacuation plans, and updating them periodically as demographic characteristics change, and (3)
inquiring how well states and localities are anticipating potential problems in their evacution
planning, rather than merely using the lessons learned from past failures.
39 United States Government Accountability Office, Disaster Preparedness: Preliminary Observations on the
Evacuation of Vulnerable Populations due to Hurricanes and Other Disasters, GAO/GAO-06-790T, May 18, 2006, p. 4.
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Table A-1 lists examples of evacuation-related statutes. Although the provisions address many
issues, two prevalent themes are (1) integrating federal, state, and local evacuation efforts; and (2)
addressing equity issues that may arise as a result of an evacuation.
Table A-1. Selected Federal Evacuation Authorities40
General Federal Evacuation Policy
Summary
Citation
Approved
Federal employees and their dependents may receive federal
5 U.S.C. §§ 5709,
July 4, 1966
assistance if they must evacuate.
5725
The need for a mass evacuation may meet the criteria of a
6 U.S.C. § 701(4)
Oct. 4, 2006
catastrophic incident.
The role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 6 U.S.C. § 314
Nov. 25, 2002
includes evacuating disaster victims.
Evacuation Preparedness
Summary
Citation
Approved
Emergency preparedness activities include non-military civilian
42 U.S.C. 5195a
May 22, 1974
evacuation of personnel during hazards.
National Construction Safety Teams (NCSTs) must evaluate
15 U.S.C. 7301,
Oct. 01, 2002
technical aspects of evacuation procedures and recommend
7307-7308
research.
Emergency plans completed by local emergency planning
42 U.S.C. 11003
Oct. 17, 1986
committees (LEPCs) must include evacuation plans.
Owners of facilities where a hazardous chemical release occurs 42
U.S.C.
Oct. 17, 1986
must provide information on precautions to be taken, including
11004(b)(2)
evacuation.
The Secretary of Transportation must establish incident
46 U.S.C. 70104(b)
Nov. 25, 2002
response plans for facilities and vessels that include evacution
procedures.
Congressional finding that private and public sector emergency P.L.
108-458,
Dec. 17, 2004
preparedness activities should include evacuation plans.
§ 7305,
118 Stat. 3848
The Director for Emergency Communicationsa shall provide
6 U.S.C. § 721
Oct. 4, 2006
technical assistance to states and localities to develop
evacuation plans.
Amends the Stafford Act to ensure that state and local
42 U.S.C. §
Oct. 4, 2006
emergency preparedness operational plans address the needs of
5170b(a)(3)(J)
individuals with household pets and service animals following a
major disaster or emergency.
40 A recent statutory search of the Legislative Information System (LIS) system using the term “evacuations” revealed
roughly 1,700 statutory provisions concerning some component of evacuation. Bonnie Mangan, Information Research
Specialist in the CRS Domestic Social Policy Division, assisted with the compilation of this list.
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Special-Needs
Summary
Citation
Approved
All public transportation agencies that are deemed to be at high 6
U.S.C.
§
Aug. 3, 2007
risk of a terrorist attack, as determined by the DHS Secretary,
1134(c)(2)(C)
must include appropriate evacuation and communication
measures for the elderly and individuals with disabilities.
FEMA is responsible for supporting state, local, and tribal
6
U.S.C.
§
Oct. 4, 2006
governments in creating operational plans for mass evacuations
753(b)(4)(A)(I) (ii)(iii)
that include short- and long-term sheltering and
accommodation. Operational plans must also contain provisions
to help populations with special needs, keep families together,
and expedite the location of missing children.
The disability coordinator of a major disaster is responsible for 6 U.S.C. § 321b(b)(6) Oct. 4, 2006
promoting the accessibility of telephone hotlines and websites
for the purposes of emergency preparedness, evacuations, and
disaster relief.
FEMA is authorized to provide grants to states and localities
6 U.S.C. § 321a(a)(1) Oct. 4, 2006
through the State Homeland Security Grant Program, or the
and (b)(4)
Urban Area Security Initiative, for the development and
maintenance of mass evacuation plans, including provisions for
individuals located in hospitals, nursing homes, and other
institutional living facilities.
FEMA is authorized to provide grants for states and localities to 6
U.S.C.
§
Oct. 4, 2006
develop procedures for informing the public of an evacuation,
321a(b)(5)(a)(b)(c)
which include individuals with disabilities or other special needs,
individuals with limited English proficiency, or others who might
have difficulty interpreting evacuation information.
a. Within FEMA’s Office of Emergency Communications.
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Bruce R. Lindsay
Analyst in Emergency Management Policy
blindsay@crs.loc.gov, 7-3752
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This report has been adapted from CRS Report RS22235, Disaster Evacuation and Displacement Policy:
Issues for Congress, by Keith Bea.
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