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Š›Œ‘ȱŘŜǰȱŘŖŖşȱ
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
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Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
ž––Š›¢ȱ
With four successive elected civilian governments, the Central American nation of Panama has
made notable political and economic progress since the 1989 U.S. military intervention that
ousted the regime of General Manuel Noriega from power. The current President, Martín Torrijos
of the center-left Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), was elected in May 2004 and
inaugurated to a five-year term in September 2004. Well into his fifth and final year in office,
President Torrijos has faced such major challenges as dealing with the funding deficits of the
country’s social security fund; combating unemployment, poverty, and crime; and developing
plans for the expansion of the Panama Canal. In 2006, the government unveiled its ambitious
plans to build a third lane and new set of locks that would double the Canal’s capacity, and the
project began in September 2007. Panama’s service-based economy has been booming in recent
years, but the global financial crisis and U.S. economic recession has begun to slow economic
growth and the economy is expected to contract in 2009.
Panama is scheduled to hold presidential and legislative elections on May 3, 2009. The two
leading candidates are former government minister Ricardo Martinelli of the small centrist
Democratic Change party and former housing minister Balbina Herrera of the ruling PRD.
Martinelli has topped opinion polls since late 2008, and his lead in the polls increased in 2009
after he struck a deal with the candidate of the Panameñista Party, Juan Carlos Varela, to become
his running mate in an electoral coalition dubbed the Alliance for Change.
The United States has close relations with Panama, stemming in large part from the extensive
linkages developed when the canal was under U.S. control and Panama hosted major U.S.
military installations. The current relationship is characterized by extensive counternarcotics
cooperation, assistance to help Panama assure the security of the Canal, and a proposed bilateral
free trade agreement (FTA). U.S. aid to Panama (including Peace Corps assistance) amounted to
$12.2 million in FY2007 and an estimated $10.6 million in FY2008, including $2.9 million in
FY2008 supplemental assistance under the Mérida Initiative. That program provides aid to
Mexico and Central America to combat drug trafficking, gangs, and organized crime. For
FY2009, an estimated $20.5 million will be provided to Panama, including $8.9 million under the
Mérida Initiative.
In June 2007, the United States and Panama signed a proposed bilateral FTA, which includes
enforceable labor and environmental provisions that had been agreed upon in a bipartisan deal
between U.S. congressional leaders and the Bush Administration in May 2007. Panama’s
National Assembly overwhelmingly approved the agreement in July 2007. The U.S. Congress had
been likely to consider implementing legislation in the fall of 2007, but the September 1, 2007
election of Pedro Miguel González to head Panama’s legislature for one year delayed
consideration. González is wanted in the United States for his alleged role in the murder of a U.S.
serviceman in Panama in 1992. His term expired September 1, 2008, and González did not stand
for re-election. As a result, the 111th Congress may turn to consideration of implementing
legislation for the FTA. For more, see CRS Report RL32540, The Proposed U.S.-Panama Free
Trade Agreement
, by J. F. Hornbeck.

˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
˜—Ž—œȱ
Most Recent Developments............................................................................................................. 1
Political and Economic Conditions ................................................................................................. 3
From the Endara to the Moscoso Administration...................................................................... 3
Endara Government (1989-1994) ....................................................................................... 3
Pérez Balladares Government (1994-1999) ........................................................................ 3
Moscoso Government (1999-2004) .................................................................................... 4
Torrijos Government (2004-2009) ............................................................................................ 5
May 2004 Elections ............................................................................................................ 5
Challenges for the Torrijos Government............................................................................. 6
May 2009 Elections................................................................................................................... 7
Human Rights............................................................................................................................ 8
U.S. Relations................................................................................................................................ 10
Background on the 1989 U.S. Military Intervention............................................................... 10
Status of Manuel Noriega ................................................................................................. 10
Overview of Current U.S.-Panamanian Relations....................................................................11
Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering ............................................................................... 13
U.S. Trade Relations and a Potential Free Trade Agreement .................................................. 15
Operation and Security of the Panama Canal.......................................................................... 16
Historical Background and the Panama Canal Treaties .................................................... 16
Canal Transition and Current Status ................................................................................. 17
Canal Expansion Project ................................................................................................... 18
Contamination of Firing Ranges and San Jose Island............................................................. 19

’ž›Žœȱ
Figure 1. Map of Panama .............................................................................................................. 22

˜—ŠŒœȱ
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 23

˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
˜œȱŽŒŽ—ȱŽŸŽ•˜™–Ž—œȱ
On May 3, 2009, Panama is scheduled to hold elections for President and for the 74-member
National Assembly. The two leading presidential candidates are businessman and former
government minister Ricardo Martinelli of the Democratic Change party and Balbina Herrera of
the ruling Democratic Revolutionary Party.
On January 27, 2009, presidential candidate Ricardo Martinelli of the Democratic Change party
struck a deal with the candidate of the Panameñista Party, Juan Carlos Varela, to become his
running mate in an electoral coalition dubbed the Alliance for Change.
On September 17, 2008, President Bush met with President Torrijos at the White House, where
talks included the status of the bilateral free trade agreement.
On September 7, 2008, former housing minister Balbina Herrera of the ruling Democratic
Revolutionary Party won her party’s presidential primary for the May 6, 2009 presidential
election. In the primary, Balbina narrowly defeated Juan Carlos Navarro, the mayor of Panama
City.
On September 1, 2008, Pedro Miguel González, wanted in the United States for his alleged role
in the murder of a U.S. serviceman in Panama in 1992, ended his one-year term as president of
Panama’s National Assembly, and a new Assembly president was elected.
In August 2008, President Torrijos approved five decree laws reorganizing Panama’s law
enforcement and security services. This included the creation of a National Border Service and a
National Intelligence and Security Service.
On July 6, 2008, businessman Juan Carlos Varela easily won the presidential primary election as
a candidate for the opposition Panameñista Party.
On May 19, 2008, lawyers for former Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega asked a U.S. appeals
court to block his extradition to France on drug-money laundering charges. Noriega was
scheduled to be released on September 9, 2007, from federal prison in Miami after being
imprisoned for nearly 18 years on drug trafficking charges, but will remain in U.S. custody until
he exhausts his appeals. Noriega wants to be returned to Panama, where he faces 20 years for
conviction on a variety of charges.
On September 3, 2007, Panama officially launched its Canal expansion project, with a ceremony
led by former President Jimmy Carter, whose Administration negotiated the Panama Canal
Treaties.
On September 1, 2007, Panama’s legislature elected Pedro Miguel González of the ruling
Democratic Revolutionary Party as head of the legislature for a one-year term. The State
Department issued a statement expressing deep disappointment about the election of González
because of his indictment in the United States for the murder of U.S. Army Sergeant Zak
Hernández and the attempted murder of U.S. Army Sergeant Ronald Marshall in June 1992.
According to the State Department, there is an outstanding U.S. warrant for his arrest. Although
González was acquitted for the Hernández murder in 1997, observers maintain that the trial was
marred by jury rigging and witness intimidation.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
On July 11, 2007, Panama’s unicameral legislature overwhelmingly approved the proposed
bilateral U.S.-Panama free trade agreement by a vote of 58 to 3, with 1 abstention.
On June 28, 2007, Panama and the Unites States signed a bilateral free trade agreement, which
includes enforceable labor and environmental provisions pursuant to the bipartisan trade deal
negotiated between congressional leaders and the Bush Administration in May 2007.
From June 3-5, 2007, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) held
its 37th regular session in Panama City focused on the theme of “Energy for Sustainable
Development.”
On May 10, 2007, congressional leaders and the Bush Administration announced a bipartisan
trade deal whereby pending free trade agreements, including the Panama free trade agreement,
would include enforceable key labor and environmental standards.
On February 16, 2007, President George W. Bush met with President Torrijos in Washington
D.C., with talks focused on the pending free trade agreement and the Canal expansion project.
On February 12, 2007, Panama and the United States signed a declaration of principles intended
to lead to Panama’s participation in the Container Security Initiative (CSI), operated by the
Department of Homeland Security, and the Megaports Initiative, run by the Department of
Energy.
On December 19, 2006, the United States and Panama announced the conclusion of negotiations
for a free trade agreement, but the United States Trade Representative maintained that the
agreement would still be subject to additional discussions on labor in order to ensure bipartisan
support in the 110th Congress.
On October 22, 2006, Panamanians approved the Torrijos government’s Canal expansion project
with over 78% support in a national referendum.
In mid-October 2006, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) helped Panama
solve the mystery of recent deaths ultimately traced to contaminated cough syrup from China. At
least 100 deaths were traced to the contaminant.


˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Řȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱ
Panama has made notable political and economic progress since the December 1989 U.S. military
intervention that ousted the military regime of General Manual Antonio Noriega from power. The
intervention was the culmination of two and a half years of strong U.S. pressure against the de
facto political rule of Noriega, commander of the Panama Defense Forces. Since that time, the
country has had four successive civilian governments, with the current government of President
Martín Torrijos elected in May 2004 to a five-year term. Inaugurated on September 1, 2004,
Torrijos is the son of former populist leader General Omar Torrijos. His electoral alliance, led by
the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), also won a majority of seats in the unicameral
National Assembly.
›˜–ȱ‘Žȱ—Š›Šȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ˜œŒ˜œ˜ȱ–’—’œ›Š’˜—ȱ
—Š›Šȱ ˜ŸŽ›—–Ž—ȱǻŗşŞşȬŗşşŚǼȱ
Before the U.S. intervention, Panama had held national elections in May 1989, and in the
presence of a large number of international observers, the anti-Noriega coalition, headed by
Guillermo Endara, prevailed by a three-to-one margin. The Noriega regime annulled the election,
however, and held on to power. By the fall, the military regime was losing political power and
relied increasingly on irregular paramilitary units, making the country unsafe for U.S. forces and
U.S. citizens. On December 20, 1989, President George H.W. Bush ordered the U.S. military into
Panama “to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug
trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty.” Noriega was arrested on
January 3, 1990, and brought to the United States to stand trial on drug trafficking charges.
As a result of the intervention, the opposition coalition headed by Guillermo Endara that had won
the May 1989 election was sworn into office. During his term, President Endara made great
progress in restoring functioning political institutions after 21 years of military-controlled
government, and under his administration, a new civilian Public Force replaced Noriega’s
Panama Defense Forces. But Endara had difficulties in meeting high public expectations, and the
demilitarization process was difficult, with some police and former military members at times
plotting to destabilize, if not overthrow, the government.
·›Ž£ȱŠ••ŠŠ›Žœȱ ˜ŸŽ›—–Ž—ȱǻŗşşŚȬŗşşşǼȱ
In May 1994, Panamanians went to the polls to vote in presidential and legislative elections that
observers called the freest in almost three decades. Ernesto Pérez Balladares, candidate of the
former pro-Noriega Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), who led a coalition known as
“United People,” won with 33% of the vote. Placing a surprisingly strong second, with 29% of
the vote, was the Arnulfista Party (PA) candidate, Mireya Moscoso de Gruber, heading a coalition
known as the “Democratic Alliance.”
In the electoral race, Pérez Balladares campaigned as a populist and advocated greater social
spending and attention to the poor. He stressed the need for addressing unemployment, which he
termed Panama’s fundamental problem. Pérez Balladares severely criticized the Endara
government for corruption, and he was able to overcome attempts to portray him as someone
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
řȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
closely associated with General Noriega. (Pérez Balladares served as campaign manager during
the 1989 elections for candidate Carlos Duque, who the Noriega regime had tried to impose on
the electorate through fraud.) Instead, Pérez Balladares focused on the PRD’s ties to the populist
policies of General Omar Torrijos, whose twelve-year (1969-1981) military rule of Panama ended
when he died in a plane crash in 1981.
President Pérez Balladares implemented an economic reform program that included liberalization
of the trade regime, privatization of state-owned enterprises, the institution of fiscal reform, and
labor code reform. Tariffs were reduced to an average of 8%.
Pérez Balladares also worked closely with the United States as the date of the Panama Canal
turnover approached. Under his government, Panama and the United States held talks on the
potential continuation of a U.S. military presence in Panama beyond the end of 1999 (the date
Panama was to assume responsibility for defending the Canal). Ultimately negotiations ended
without such an agreement.
Although Panama’s constitution does not allow for presidential reelection, President Pérez
Balladares actively sought a second term in 1999. In 1997, the PRD had begun studying the
possibility of amending the constitution to allow a second bid for the presidency in the May 1999
elections. Ultimately, a referendum was held on the issue in August 1998 but failed by a large
margin.
Late in his administration, Pérez Balladares became embroiled in a scandal involving the illegal
sale of visas to Chinese immigrants attempting to enter the United States via Panama. As a result,
U.S. officials cancelled the former president’s U.S. tourist visa in November 1999.1
˜œŒ˜œ˜ȱ ˜ŸŽ›—–Ž—ȱǻŗşşşȬŘŖŖŚǼȱ
In her second bid for the presidency, Arnulfista Party (PA) candidate Mireya Moscoso was
victorious in the May 1999 elections. Moscoso, who was inaugurated September 1, 1999, for a
five-year term, captured almost 45% of the vote and soundly defeated the ruling PRD’s candidate
Martin Torrijos (son of former populist leader Omar Torrijos), who received almost 38% of the
vote. Until March 1999, Torrijos had been leading in opinion polls, but as the election neared, the
two candidates were in a dead heat. A third candidate, Alberto Vallarino, heading a coalition
known as Opposition Action, received about 17% of the vote.
President Moscoso, a coffee plantation owner and Panama’s first female president, ran as a
populist during the campaign, promising to end government corruption, slow the privatization of
state enterprises, and reduce poverty. She also promised to ensure that politics and corruption did
not interfere with the administration of the Canal. The memory of her husband Arnulfo Arias, a
nationalist who was elected three times as president, but overthrown each time, was a factor in the
campaign, particularly since Arias was last overthrown in 1968 by General Omar Torrijos, the
father of the PRD’s 1999 and 2004 presidential candidate.
Although Moscoso took the presidency, the PRD-led New Nation coalition won a majority of 41
seats in the 71-member unicameral Legislative Assembly. Just days before her inauguration,

1 “Ex-Leader of Panama Linked to Visa Sales,” Washington Post, November 27, 1999; Pablo Bachelet, “U.S. Uses
Visas to Combat Corruption,” Miami Herald, February 21, 2006.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Śȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
however, Moscoso was able to build a coalition, with the support of the Solidarity Party, the
Christian Democratic Party (which later became the Popular Party), and the National Liberal
Party, that gave her government a one-seat majority in the Assembly. In August 2000, the
Christian Democrats deserted the coalition and formed an alliance with the principal opposition,
the PRD. However, corruption scandals in 2002 led to five PRD legislators defecting to support
the Moscoso government, once again giving the President majority support in the Legislative
Assembly.
The Moscoso government partially reversed the trade liberalization process of the Pérez
Balladares by raising tariffs on some agricultural products, some of which reached the maximum
rate allowed under Panama’s World Trade Organization obligations.2
As noted above, Moscoso was elected as a populist, with pledges to end government corruption
and reduce poverty, but her campaign pledges proved difficult to fulfill amid high-profile
corruption scandals and poor economic performance. As a result, the President’s popularity
declined significantly from a 70% approval rating when she first took office in 1999 to only 15%
in 2004.3
˜››’“˜œȱ ˜ŸŽ›—–Ž—ȱǻŘŖŖŚȬŘŖŖşǼȱ
Š¢ȱŘŖŖŚȱ•ŽŒ’˜—œȱ
On May 2, 2004, Panama held elections for president, as well as for a 78-member National
Assembly (formerly known as the Legislative Assembly). In the presidential race, Martín Torrijos
of the PRD won a decisive victory with 47.5% of the vote, defeating former President Guillermo
Endara, who received 30.6% of the vote, and former Foreign Minister José Miguel Alemán, who
received 16.4% of the vote. Torrijos’ electoral alliance also won a majority of seats in the
unicameral legislature, 43 out of 78 seats, which should provide him with enough legislative
support to enact his agenda. Elected at 40 years of age, Torrijos spent many years in the United
States and studied political science and economics at Texas A&M University. He served four
years under the Pérez Balladares government as deputy minister of interior and justice, and as
noted above, became the PRD’s presidential candidate in the 1999 elections.
Leading up to the election, Torrijos had been topping public opinion polls, with 42%-49%
support. In the campaign, he emphasized anti-corruption measures as well as a national strategy
to deal with poverty, unemployment, and underdevelopment. He was popular among younger
voters and had a base of support in rural areas. Torrijos maintained that his first priority would be
job creation.4 He called for the widening of the Canal, a project that would cost several billion
dollars, and would seek a referendum on the issue. During the campaign, all three major
candidates supported negotiation of a free trade agreement with the United States, maintaining
that it would be advantageous for Panama. Endara and Alemán appeared to emphasize the
protection of some sensitive Panamanian sectors such as agriculture, while Torrijos stressed that
such an agreement would make Panama’s economy more competitive and productive.5

2 United States Trade Representative, 2006 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, p. 501.
3 “Toss Up Between Torrijos and Endara,” Caribbean and Central America Report, February 17, 2004.
4 Frances Robles, “Ex-leader’s Son Wins Presidency in Panama,” Miami Herald, May 3, 2004.
5 “Panama: Presidential Candidates Remark on FTA with US,” La Prensa (Panama), January 24, 2004, translated by
(continued...)
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
śȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
‘Š••Ž—Žœȱ˜›ȱ‘Žȱ˜››’“˜œȱ ˜ŸŽ›—–Ž—ȱ
Well into his fifth and final year in office, President Torrijos has faced such major challenges as
dealing with the deficits of the country’s social security fund (Caja de Seguro Social, CSS);
developing plans for the expansion of the Panama Canal; combating unemployment, poverty, and
increasing crime; and contending with the effects of the global financial crisis and U.S. recession
on the Panamanian economy.
After protests and a protracted strike by construction workers, doctors, and teachers in June 2005,
the Torrijos government was forced to modify its plans for reforming the social security fund.
After a national dialogue on the issue, Panama’s National Assembly approved a watered-down
version of the original plan in December 2005. The enacted reform did not raise the retirement
age but will gradually increase required monthly payments into the system and introduces a dual
pension system that combines aspects of privatization with the current system.6 In mid-December
2007, an almost six-week strike by doctors in the public healthcare system was resolved, with the
government offering a 26.7% increase in salaries equivalent and a commitment not to privatize
the system.7
In April 2006, the government unveiled its ambitious plans to build a third set of locks that would
double the Canal’s capacity, and allow larger post-Panamax ships to transit the Canal. Panama’s
Cabinet approved the expansion plan in June, and the National Assembly approved it in July
2006. A referendum on the expansion project took place on October 22, 2006, with 78%
supporting the project. The referendum was viewed as a victory for the Torrijos government,
which advanced the project as integral to Panama’s future economic development and one that
helped restore the President’s popularity.8
The Torrijos government’s agenda also has included judicial, penal and anti-corruption reforms,
as well as an economic development strategy to target poverty and unemployment. The
government implemented a new penal code in May 2008 that takes a tougher stance on crime by
increasing sentences on serious crimes and other measures. In early July 2008, Panama’s
National Assembly gave President Torrijos powers to carry out security sector reforms over the
next two months. In August 2008, President Torrijos enacted five decree laws reorganizing
Panama’s law enforcement and security services, including the establishment of a National
Border Service and a National Intelligence and Security Service (SENIS). Some critics fear that
the actions will lead to Panama’s re-militarization, while Torrijos maintains that the new agencies
are needed to combat growing drug crimes.9 In mid-December 2008, the Torrijos government
approved additional changes to the penal code that increased penalties for the illegal possession
of firearms and introduced sentences for attacking a police official.10

(...continued)
Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
6 Marion Barbel, “Panamanian Congress Approves Modified Social Security Reform,” World Markets Research,
December 22, 2005
7 “Panama: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2008, p. 2.
8 Richard Lapper, “Good Luck, Good Timing,” Financial Times, July 24, 2007.
9 “Panama: Torrijos to Undertake Security Reform by Decree,” Latin American Weekly Report, July 3, 2008; “Torrijos
Forges Ahead with Security Decrees,” Latin American Regional Report, Caribbean and Central America, September
2008.
10 "Panama: Torrijos Pushes Through Changes to Penal Code," Latin American Weekly Report, December 18, 2008
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Ŝȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
Panama’s service-based economy had been booming in recent years, largely because of the
Panama Canal expansion project, but the global financial crisis and the related decline in U.S.
import demand stemming from the U.S. recession has begun to slow down Panama’s economic
growth and the economy is expected to contract in 2009. The economy grew 11.5% in 2007 and
9.2% in 2008, fueled by the Canal expansion project, but is projected to contract 1.3% in 2009,
the first decline in a decade.11 In January 2009, President Torrijos announced the establishment of
a $1.1 billion fund to allow for eased credit access and loans to financial institutions in Panama.
The fund—which is being financed with support from the Inter-American Development Bank, the
Andean Development Corporation, and the National Bank of Panama—was established in order
to counter the tightening of credit because of the global financial crisis.12
Although Panama is categorized by the World Bank as having an upper-middle-income economy
because of its relatively high per capita income level of $5,510 (2007), one of the country’s major
challenges is highly-skewed income distribution with large disparities between the rich and
poor.13 In order to tackle poverty, the Torrijos government initiated a social support program of
conditional cash transfers to poor families (Red de Oportunidades) and in mid-2008, the
government extended the program to include the elderly living in extreme poverty. High inflation
averaging almost 9% in 2008 has made efforts to combat poverty more difficult, but inflation is
expected to be cut by half in 2009. Poverty rates have been reduced from almost 37% in 2002 to
29% in 2007, but the slowdown in economic growth because of the global economic crisis and
U.S. recession threaten to erode progress that has been made in recent years.
Š¢ȱŘŖŖşȱ•ŽŒ’˜—œȱ
Panama is scheduled to hold presidential and legislative elections on May 3, 2009. Since the
Constitution does not allow for re-election, President Torrijos cannot be a candidate. As a result,
jockeying began in early 2008 among presidential aspirants.
While initially in 2008 it appeared that the candidate of the ruling center-left PRD was favored to
win, former housing minister Balbina Herrera, opinion surveys late in the year reflected a
significant shift in favor of businessman and former government minister Ricardo Martinelli of
the centrist Democratic Change (CD) party. Polls in January 2009 showed Martinelli with 43%
support compared to 25% for Herrera and almost 15% for businessman Juan Carlos Varela of the
center-right Panameñista Party (PP, formerly the Arnulfist Party).14 In late January 2009,
Martinelli and Varela struck a deal to run together in a coalition dubbed the Alliance for Change,
with Martinelli leading the ticket and Varela as his running mate. The new alliance further
widened Martinelli’s lead in opinion polls to 50-55%, compared to about 29-32% for Herrera.15
Representing the left-wing of the PRD, Herrera had narrowly won her party’s primary in
September 2008, defeating the mayor of Panama City, Juan Carlos Navarro, who drew support

11 "Country Report: Panama," Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2009.
12 Marion Barbel, "President Unveils U.S. $1.1 billion Anti-Crisis Fund in Panama," Global Insight, January 23, 2009.
13 World Bank, World Development Report 2009.
14 “Panama: Martinelli’s Presidential Prospects Strengthen,” Latin American Weekly Report, January 15, 2009;
“Panama Mogul Extends Lead in Election Race – Poll,” Reuters, January 11, 2009.
15 “Panama: Martinelli and Varela Seal Alliance,” Latin American Regional Report, Caribbean & Central America,
February 2009; and “Martinelli Increases Lead in Panama,” LatinNews Daily, February 3, 2009.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŝȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
from more moderate PRD members. While Herrera ultimately chose Navarro as her running mate
in January 2009, the selection has not boosted her candidacy.
The new Alliance for Change electoral coalition is significant because it increases the chances
that Martinelli might be elected with a majority of support in Panama’s National Assembly, which
will have 74 members after the upcoming election. Before the alliance was announced, Martinelli
was backed just by his small CD party and two other small parties, the Liberal Republican
Nationalist Movement (MOLIRENA) and the Patriotic Union (UP). The addition of Varela’s PP
to Martinelli’s electoral coalition adds the support of Panama’s second largest party, which
currently has the second largest bloc of representatives in the National Assembly. It should be
noted, however, that the ruling PRD remains Panama’s largest party overall, accounting for about
half of Panama’s 1.3 million registered members of political parties. Moreover, in the important
race for the mayor of Panama City, current opinion polls show the PRD’s candidate with a
significant leader over the candidate of the Alliance for Change.16
During the campaign, there have been some scandals related to campaign financing. In March
2009, a Colombian businessman jailed for involvement in a multi-million dollar pyramid scheme,
David Murcia Guzmán, alleged that he had contributed funds to the presidential campaigns of
Balbina Herrera and the PRD’s mayoral candidate for Panama City. Both candidates denied the
accusations, and Herrera accused her main rival, Ricardo Martinelli, of having linkages to the
jailed Colombian. An investigation has been opened into the case by Panama’s Attorney
General.17
ž–Š—ȱ’‘œȱ
The Panamanian government generally respects human rights, but, as noted by the State
Department in its 2008 human rights report (issued in February 2009), serious human rights
problems continue in a number of areas. Prison conditions overall remain harsh, with reported
abuse by prison guards, and prolonged pretrial detentions remained a problem. According to the
report, the judiciary is marred by corruption and ineffectiveness, and is subject to political
manipulation. Other serious problems include discrimination and violence against women,
trafficking in persons, discrimination against indigenous people and other ethnic minorities, and
child labor.
Freedom of the Press. In past years, Panama had been criticized by the State Department and
international human rights groups for vestiges of “gag laws” used by the government to silence
those criticizing policies or officials, but the legislature repealed these laws in May 2005.
Nevertheless, as noted in the State Department’s human rights report, the legislature approved
penal code amendments in May 2007 that allows for the prosecution of journalists who violate
the privacy of public officials or who publish classified information. The new penal code went
into effect in May 2008. Nnongovernmental organizations assert that the new code threatens
freedom of speech and press. As noted in the State Department human rights report, a judge
ordered the seizure of a local newspaper, El Periódico, in September 2008 because it published
the tax returns of a prominent businessman. The paper subsequently went out of business. The

16 “Panama: Panama City Mayoral Battle Takes Centre Stage,” Latin American Weekly Report, March 5, 2009.
17 "Candidates Investigated in Panama," LatinNews Daily, March 24, 2009.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Şȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists expressed alarm over the case, maintaining that
it set a chilling precedent for Panama’s local press.18
The State Department human rights report also cited concerns of journalists and press freedom
organizations that the government attempts to manipulate the free flow of information through the
reward or denial of government advertisements.
Past Human Rights Abuses Under Military Rule. In an attempt to redress human rights abuses
that occurred under military rule (1968-1989) and to prevent their reoccurrence, the Moscoso
government established a Truth Commission in 2001 that documented 70 cases of murder and 40
disappearances, but progress has been slow in investigation and prosecution of these cases. In
October 2008, according to the State Department human rights report, Panama’s Attorney General
announced that investigations had either been opened or reopened in 47 of these 110 cases
because of new evidence. As also noted in the report, the Panamanian government opened an
investigation in July 2008 into the alleged killings of more than 20 persons who reportedly were
thrown from helicopters in the Darien region in 1982-1983, and in December 2008, the Attorney
General charged a former minister of government and justice with homicide for a killing in 1971.
In July 2006, just as a human rights trials was approaching an end, a former military officer
implicated in the 1970 killing of activist Heliodoro Portugal died from an apparent heart attack. In
September 2008, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ordered the Panamanian
government to pay $206,000 to the family of Portugal, and to investigate and prosecute those
responsible for the disappearance.
Displaced Persons. In recent years, violence from the civil conflict in neighboring Colombia has
resulted in hundreds of displaced persons seeking refuge in the neighboring Darién province of
Panama. The Office of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that there are
some 900 displaced Colombians in Panama under temporary humanitarian protection. Their
presence is restricted to a small area in the Darién. According to the State Department’s human
rights report, many of the Colombians have lived in Panama for years, have given birth to
children in Panama, and do not want to return to Colombia because of family and cultural ties to
local Panamanian communities. While many of the displaced are Afro-Colombians, there have
also been indigenous people from Colombia who have fled to Panama because of the violence. In
December 2006, Panama recognized 42 members of Colombia’s Wounaan indigenous group as
refugees.19
According to UNHCR, there are almost 1,000 recognized refugees in the country. In April 2008,
UNHCR lauded Panama for the approval of a new law that will allow long-standing refugees
(those residing 10 years or more) the opportunity to apply for permanent residency. According to
UNHCR, the new law will largely affect refugees from Nicaragua and El Salvador who arrived in
Panama during the Central American conflicts of the 1980s, and will not affect the more recent
refugees from Colombia.20

18 Committee to Protect Journalists, “Judge Orders Seizure of Weekly After Story on Alleged Tax Evasion,” September
8, 2008.
19 “Panama: First Indigenous Colombians Get Refuge,” UNHCR Briefing Notes, December 15, 2006.
20 “UNHCR Welcomes New Panama Law,” UNHCR Briefing Notes, April 1, 2008.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
şȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
Worker Rights. With regard to worker rights in Panama, the State Department’s 2008 human
rights report notes that while Panamanian law recognizes the right of private-sector workers to
form and join unions of their choice, the law requires a minimum of 40 persons to a form a union
and only one union is allowed per business. The International Labor Organization Committee of
Experts criticizes both provisions as violations of workers’ rights to organize, according to the
State Department human rights report. Public servants may not form unions, but they may form
associations, which can bargain collectively, and there is a limited right to strike with the
exception of those areas vital for public welfare and security. The National Federation of Public
Servants (FENASEP), an umbrella organization of 21 public-sector worker associations is not
permitted to call strikes, and the ILO has expressed concerns about this. The State Department
report also noted that child labor was a problem, with violations occurring most frequently in
rural areas at harvest time and in the informal sector.
ǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱ˜—ȱ‘ŽȱŗşŞşȱǯǯȱ’•’Š›¢ȱ —Ž›ŸŽ—’˜—ȱ
The December 20, 1989, U.S. military intervention in Panama, known as Operation Just Cause,
was the culmination of almost two and a half years of strong U.S. pressure, including economic
sanctions, against the de facto political rule of General Noriega, Panama’s military commander.
Political unrest had erupted in mid-1987 when a high-ranking Panamanian military official
alleged that Noriega was involved in murder, electoral fraud, and corruption, which prompted the
formation of an opposition coalition that challenged his rule. The regime nullified the results of
May 1989 national elections, which international observers maintain were won by the opposition
by a 3-1 margin. It also harassed U.S. citizens in Panama, including the killing of a U.S. Marine
lieutenant. President George H. W. Bush ultimately ordered U.S. forces into combat to safeguard
the lives of Americans in Panama, to defend democracy, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect
the operation of the Panama Canal.
In early January 1990, with the restoration of democracy and Noriega’s arrest to face trial in the
United States on drug charges, President Bush announced that the objectives of the U.S.
intervention had been achieved. In terms of casualties, 23 U.S. soldiers and three U.S. civilians
were killed, while on the Panamanian side, some 200 civilians and 300 Panamanian military were
killed. While Congress was not in session during the intervention, in general, Members were
strongly supportive of the action. In February 1990, the House overwhelmingly approved a
resolution, H.Con.Res. 262, stating the President acted appropriately to intervene in Panama after
substantial efforts to resolve the crisis by political, economic, and diplomatic means.
Šžœȱ˜ȱŠ—žŽ•ȱ˜›’ŽŠȱ
In the aftermath of the 1989 U.S. military intervention, General Manuel Noriega was arrested in
January 1990 and brought to the United States to stand trial on drug charges. After a seven-month
trial, Noriega was convicted on eight out of ten drug trafficking charges in U.S. federal court in
Miami in 1992, and sentenced to 40 years in prison. That sentence was subsequently reduced to
30 years, and then to 20 years. With time off for “good behavior,” Noriega was scheduled to be
released from jail on September 9, 2007, but has remained in U.S. custody pending appeals of his
extradition to France.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŖȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
France is seeking Noriega’s extradition, where he faces a 10-year prison sentence for his
conviction in absentia in 1999 on money laundering charges, but would be eligible for a new trial.
Despite having lost all previous appeals, on May 19, 2008, Noriega’s defense filed an appeal on
the grounds that the French government would not respect special protections that were granted to
him in a 1992 ruling as a “prisoner of war” under the Geneva Conventions. In January 2009, a
three-judge panel of the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta heard arguments in the
case.21
Noriega wants to return to Panama in order to appeal his convictions in absentia, including for
two murders: the brutal killing of vocal critic Hugo Spadafora in 1985; and the killing of Major
Moisés Giroldi, the leader of a failed 1989 coup attempt. Panamanian courts sentenced Noriega to
at least 60 years in prison, but the law only allows him to serve a maximum sentence of 20 years,
and according to some reports, 18 years of Noriega’s imprisonment in the United States could be
subtracted from his sentence in Panama.22 Nevertheless, according to Panama’s attorney general,
there are an additional 15 outstanding cases against Noriega, including his responsibility for the
deaths of several members of the Panamanian Defense Forces for their involvement in the failed
1989 coup.23
Noriega’s attorneys argue that since Noriega has been recognized as a prisoner of war in the U.S.
courts, the United States should repatriate him to his native Panama, insisting that this complies
with the Geneva Conventions. U.S. officials have argued that France’s extradition should be
honored because Panama by law does not extradite its nationals.24 Panama had filed an
extradition request for Noriega in 1991.
While Panamanian officials have called for Noriega’s extradition to Panama, they have not
opposed the possibility of Noriega being extradited to France and have stated that the government
would respect the decision of the U.S. courts on this matter. Some observers maintain that the
Panamanian government is reluctant to have Noriega extradited to Panama, since some members
of the ruling Democratic Revolutionary Party worked with Noriega when he controlled the
government and are now reluctant to have Noriega return and revisit cases from the past. Other
observers contend that Panamanian officials are reluctant to have Noriega return because of
recent changes to the penal code that could allow Noriega to serve little, if any, of his sentence.25
ŸŽ›Ÿ’Ž ȱ˜ȱž››Ž—ȱǯǯȬŠ—Š–Š—’Š—ȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
Since the 1989 U.S. military intervention, the United States has had close relations with Panama,
stemming in large part from the extensive history of linkages developed when the Panama Canal
was under U.S. control and Panama hosted major U.S. military installations. Today, about 25,000

21 Jay Weaver, "Manuel Noriega Extradition Goes to Court Wednesday," Miami Herald, January 13, 2009.
22 Kathia Martinez, “A Homecoming for Noriega after Miami Release? Many Hope Not,” Associated Press Newswires,
August 12, 2007.
23 “Torrijos on Edge over Noriega Release,” Latin American Regional Report, Caribbean and Central America, August
2007.
24 Carmen Gentile, “Noriega Court Bid Called a Charade; Aims to Avoid Extradition,” Washington Times, August 14,
2007.
25 Marc Lacey, “An Ambivalent Panama Weights Noriega’s Debt and Threat,” New York Times, July 29, 2007.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŗȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
U.S. citizens reside in Panama, many retirees of the former Panama Canal Commission, and there
are growing numbers of other American retirees in the western part of the country.26
The current U.S. relationship with Panama is characterized by extensive cooperation on
counternarcotics efforts, U.S. assistance to help Panama assure the security of the Canal, and a
proposed bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). Panama is seeking an FTA as a means of
increasing U.S. investment in the country, while the United States has stressed that an FTA with
Panama, in addition to enhancing trade, would further U.S. efforts to strengthen support for
democracy and the rule of law.
U.S.-Panamanian negotiations for a bilateral FTA began in April 2004, and were completed in
December 2006, although at the time U.S. officials stated the agreement was subject to additional
discussions on labor and that the Administration would work with Congress to ensure strong
bipartisan support. Subsequently, congressional leaders and the Bush Administration announced a
bipartisan deal on May 10, 2007, whereby pending FTAs, including that with Panama, would
include enforceable key labor and environmental standards. The United States and Panama
ultimately signed the FTA on June 28, 2007, which included the enforceable labor and
environmental provisions. Panama’s National Assembly overwhelmingly approved the agreement
on July 11, 2007, by vote of 58 to 3, with 1 abstention.
The U.S. Congress had been likely to consider implementing legislation for the agreement in the
fall of 2007, but the September 1, 2007, election of Pedro Miguel González to head Panama’s
legislature for one year delayed consideration of the FTA. González is wanted in the United
States for his alleged role in the murder of a U.S. serviceman in Panama, U.S. Army Sergeant Zak
Hernández, in June 1992. González did not stand for re-election when his term expired September
1, 2008, and was replaced by another PRD official, Raúl Rodríguez, as Assembly president. As a
result, the 111th Congress may turn to consideration of implementing legislation for the FTA.
The United States turned over control of the Canal to Panama at the end of 1999, according to the
terms of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, at which point Panama assumed responsibility for
operating and defending the Canal. All U.S. troops were withdrawn from Panama at that time and
all U.S. military installations reverted to Panamanian control. However, under the terms of the
Treaty on the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, or simply the Neutrality
Treaty, the United States retains the right to use military force if necessary to reopen the Canal or
restore its operations. U.S. officials congratulated Panama on the success of the October 2006
Canal expansion referendum, but also asserted that the challenge for the government is to ensure
that the expansion project is conducted with transparency and without any hint of corruption.27
Because of its relatively high per capita income level, the United States has not provided large
amounts of foreign aid to Panama in recent years. Nevertheless, aid has included development
assistance to improve business competitiveness and trade-led economic growth; child, survival
and health assistance to help in the fight against HIV/AIDS; and security assistance to improve
Panama’s counter-terrorism capabilities, security programs, and maritime interdiction. In recent
years, U.S. foreign assistance (including Peace Corps assistance) amounted to $10.5 million in
FY2006, $12.2 million in FY2007, and an estimated $10.6 million in FY2008, including $2.9

26 U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Panama, September 2008.
27 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Panama, “Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Charles S. Shapiro at
Panama Week,” and “Ambassador Eaton’s Remarks at the Panama Week Power Breakfast,” October 2006.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŘȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
million in FY2008 supplemental assistance under the Mérida Initiative. That new program
provides assistance to Mexico and Central to combat drug trafficking, gangs, and organized
crime. For FY2009, an estimated $20.5 million will be provided to Panama, including an
estimated $8.9 million in Mérida Initiative funding.
A number of U.S. agencies provide support to Panama. The U.S. Agency for International
Development has a mission in Panama administering U.S. foreign aid programs, and the Peace
Corps has over 170 volunteers in the country working on a range of development projects. The
State Department, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the
Department of Homeland Security are involved in providing counternarcotics support to Panama.
The Department of Health and Human Services provided support in 2007 to launch a Regional
Training Center for health-care workers in Panama City that trains students from throughout
Central America. The U.S. Southern Command (Southcom) also provides support to Panama
through military exercises providing humanitarian and medical assistance, and at times provides
emergency assistance in the case of natural disasters such as floods or droughts. Southcom also
has sponsored annual multi-national training exercises since 2003 focused on the defense of the
Panama Canal. Panama also hosts the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute dedicated to
studying biological diversity.
Panama also participates in the Container Security Initiative (CSI) operated by the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection of the Department of Homeland Security, and the Megaports Initiative run
by the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy. Three
Panamanian ports—Balboa, Colón, and Manzanillo—participate in the CSI, which uses a security
regime to ensure that containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are identified and
inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United States. The
Megaports Initiative, which is still being implemented, involves deploying radiation detection
equipment to the three CSI ports in Panama in order to detect nuclear or radioactive materials.28
›žȱ›Š’Œ”’—ȱŠ—ȱ˜—Ž¢ȱŠž—Ž›’—ȱ
An important concern for U.S. policymakers over the years has been securing Panamanian
cooperation to combat drug-trafficking and money-laundering. Panama is a major transit country
for illicit drugs from South America to the U.S. market because of its geographic location and its
large maritime industry and containerized seaports. Moreover, the country’s service-based
economy, with a large banking sector and trading center (Colón Free Zone, CFZ), makes Panama
vulnerable to money laundering. The State Department’s February 2009 International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report
(INCSR) maintains that major Colombian and Mexican drug cartels, as
well as Colombian illegally armed groups use Panama for drug trafficking and money laundering
purposes. The report also maintains that the majority of money laundering in the country relates
to proceeds from drug trafficking (especially the sale in the United States and Europe of cocaine
produced in Colombia) or from the transshipment of smuggled, pirated, and counterfeit goods
through the CFZ.
Drug traffickers use fishing vessels, cargo ships, small aircraft, and go-fast boats to move illicit
drugs—primarily cocaine and heroin —through Panama. Some of the drugs are transferred to
trucks for northbound travel or are placed in sea-freight containers for transport on cargo vessels.

28 U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “NNSA’s Second Line of Defense Program,:
Fact Sheet, December 2008.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗřȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
Traffickers also utilize hundreds of abandoned or unmonitored airstrips as well as couriers who
transit Panama by commercial air flights. There also has been increasing domestic drug abuse,
particularly among youth. Addiction has also increased significantly among Panama’s Kuna
indigenous population, whose lands lie just south of a transit zone for Colombian cocaine.29
According to the 2009 INCSR, the Torrijos administration has “cooperated vigorously” with the
United States on counternarcotics efforts. In 2008, according to the report, the government seized
51 metric tons of cocaine and over $3 million in cash linked to drug trafficking, and confiscated
$1.5 million from bank accounts. U.S. support has included programs to improve Panama’s
ability to intercept, investigate, and prosecute illegal drug trafficking; strengthen Panama’s
judicial system; and improve Panama’s border security. The United States also has provided
resources to modernize and maintain vessels and bases of the National Maritime Service (SMN)
and the National Police (PNP); train and equip an airport drug interdiction team; train offices to
combat police corruption; and develop an effective community policing model to help control an
emerging gang problem.
Looking ahead, the 2009 INCSR encourages Panama to devote sufficient resources to patrol its
land borders with Colombia and Costa Rica and its coastline and adjacent sea-lanes. It also calls
for Panama to increase the number of arrests and prosecutions in the areas of corruption and
money laundering.
Over the past several years, Panamanian cooperation with U.S. law enforcement led to several
major successful anti-drug operations. In January 2006, more than 20 people were arrested in
New York and Panama in a heroin smuggling operation involving dozens of “swallowers” who
transported the drug. In May 2006, law enforcement authorities from the United States, Panama,
and several other countries broke up cocaine smuggling operation that used three islands on
Panama’s Caribbean coast to refuel fast boats and fishing trawlers carrying drugs. In March 2007,
U.S. and Panamanian authorities cooperated in the interdiction of more than 21 tons of cocaine
off the coast of Panama, valued at nearly $300 million, the largest seizure in U.S. history.
Panama has made significant progress in strengthening its anti-money laundering regime since
June 2000 when it was cited as a non-cooperative country in the fight against money laundering
by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a multilateral anti-money laundering body.
Subsequently, the government undertook a comprehensive effort to improve its anti-money
laundering regime by enacting two laws and issuing two decrees in 2000. As a result of these
efforts, the FATF removed Panama from its non-cooperative country list in June 2001.
The 2009 INCSR maintains that Panama has a comprehensive legal framework to detect, prevent,
and combat money laundering and terrorist financing and has provided excellent cooperation with
U.S. law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, the State Department report maintains that
Panama’s level of enforcement, personnel, and resources devoted to anti-money laundering and
combating the financing of terrorism needs to be improved, including the successful prosecution
of cases. The report expressed concern about the issuance of bearer shares, and maintained that
the government should take steps to ensure that these financial instruments are not used for

29 Chris Kaul, “A New Foe Threatens Tribe’s Independent Spirit,” Los Angeles Times, January 3, 2006; “Panama Tribe
Faces Threat as Cocaine Comes Ashore,” Reuters, February 18, 2006; “Panama’s Kuna Fear Drug Threat,” Latin
American Weekly Report
, February 1, 2007.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŚȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
money laundering. It also called on the government to devote more resources in order to ensure
that the CFZ does not enable trade-based money laundering.
ǯǯȱ›ŠŽȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱŠ—ȱŠȱ˜Ž—’Š•ȱ›ŽŽȱ›ŠŽȱ›ŽŽ–Ž—ȱ
Panama has largely a service-based economy, which historically has run a merchandise trade
deficit with the United States. In 2008, the United States had a $4.5 billion trade surplus with
Panama, exporting $377 million in goods and importing $4.9 billion. Panama was the 40th largest
U.S. export market in 2008.30 Panama’s major exports include fish and seafood, and fresh fruits.
Major imports include oil, machinery and other capital goods, consumer goods, and foodstuffs. In
2008, about 38% of Panama’s exports were destined for the United States, while about 30% of its
imports were from the United States. The stock of U.S. foreign investment in Panama was
estimated at $6.2 billion in 2007, largely concentrated in the financial and wholesale sectors. This
almost equaled the combined U.S. foreign investment in the five other Central American
nations.31
With the exception of two years (1988-1989), when the United States was applying economic
sanctions on Panama under General Noriega’s rule, Panama has been a beneficiary of the U.S.
preferential import program known as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) begun in 1984. The
program was amended several times and made permanent in 1990. CBI benefits were expanded
in 2000 with the enactment of the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) (Title II, P.L.
106-200), which provided NAFTA-equivalent trade benefits, including tariff preferences for
textile and apparel goods, to certain CBI countries, including Panama, until September 30, 2008.
Panama and the United States began negotiations for a free trade agreement in April 2004. There
had been expectations that the negotiations would be completed in early 2005, but continued
contention over several issues and a lengthy hiatus prolonged the negotiations until December
2006. These included market access for agricultural products, considered sensitive by Panama;
procurement provisions for the Panama Canal Authority regarding expansion activities; and
sanitary control systems governing the entry of U.S. products and animals to enter the
Panamanian market. Negotiations were suspended for some time in 2006 until after Panama held
its Canal expansion referendum in October, but a tenth round led to the conclusion of negotiations
on December 19, 2006.
Under the proposed agreement, over 88% of U.S. exports of consumer and industrial goods
would become duty-free immediately, while remaining tariffs would be phased out over 10 years.
Over 50% of U.S. agricultural exports to Panama would become duty-free immediately, while
tariffs on most remaining farm products would be phased out within 15 years. In December 2006,
Panama and the United States also signed a bilateral agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary
measures in which Panama will recognize the equivalence of the U.S. food safety inspection to
those of Panama and will no longer require individual plant inspections. Under the FTA, U.S.
companies would be guaranteed a fair and transparent process to sell goods and services to
Panamanian government entities, including the Panama Canal Authority.32

30 Department of Commerce statistics, as presented by World Trade Atlas.
31 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Survey of Current Business,” September 2008,
p. 58.
32 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Free Trade with Panama, Brief Summary of the Agreement,”
(continued...)
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗśȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
When the negotiations were concluded, then-U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab stated that
the agreement would be subject to additional discussions on labor, and that the Administration
would work with both sides of the aisle in Congress to ensure strong bipartisan support before
submitting it to Congress.33 On May 10, 2007, congressional leaders and the Bush Administration
announced a bipartisan trade deal whereby pending free trade agreements would include
enforceable key labor and environmental standards. This included an obligation to adopt and
maintain in practice five basic internationally recognized labor principles: freedom of association;
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; elimination of forced or compulsory labor;
abolition of child labor; and elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation. (For a discussion on worker rights, see the “Human Rights” section above.)
The United States and Panama ultimately signed the proposed FTA on June 28, 2007, with the
enforceable labor and environmental standards outlined in the bipartisan trade deal. Panama’s
National Assembly ratified the agreement on July 11, 2007, by a vote of 58 to 3, with 1
abstention.
The U.S. Congress had been likely to consider implementing legislation for the agreement in the
fall of 2007, but the September 1, 2007, election of Pedro Miguel González of the ruling PRD to
head Panama’s legislature for one year delayed consideration of the FTA. González is wanted in
the United States for his alleged role in the murder of U.S. Army Sergeant Zak Hernández and the
attempted murder of U.S. Army Sergeant Ronald Marshall in June 1992. The State Department
issued a statement expressing deep disappointment about the election of González because of his
October 1992 indictment in the United States for the murder of Sergeant Hernández. Although
González was acquitted in Panama in 1997 for the Hernández murder, observers maintain that the
trial was marred by jury rigging and witness intimidation. González denies his involvement, and
his lawyer asserts that ballistic tests in the murder were inconclusive. While polls in Panama in
2007 showed that Panamanians believed that González should have stepped down, the case also
energized the populist anti-American wing of the ruling PRD.34
González did not seek a second term as president of the National Assembly when his term expired
on September 1, 2008, and another PRD official, Raúl Rodríguez, was elected Assembly
president. As a result, the 111th Congress could consider implementing legislation for the FTA.
For more details on the bilateral FTA, see CRS Report RL32540, The Proposed U.S.-Panama
Free Trade Agreement
, by J. F. Hornbeck.
™Ž›Š’˜—ȱŠ—ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŠ—Š–ŠȱŠ—Š•ȱ
’œ˜›’ŒŠ•ȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ‘ŽȱŠ—Š–ŠȱŠ—Š•ȱ›ŽŠ’Žœȱ
When Panama proclaimed its independence from Colombia in 1903, it concluded a treaty with
the United States for U.S. rights to build, administer, and defend a canal cutting across the

(...continued)
December 19, 2006.
33 Rosella Brevetti, “Panama, United States Conclude Negotiations on Free Trade Pact,” but Labor Issues Remain,”
International Trade Daily, December 20, 2006.
34 Marc Lacey, “Fugitive from U.S. Justice Leads Panama’s Assembly,” New York Times, November 28, 2007.
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ŗŜȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
country and linking the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. (See Figure 1, Map of Panama, at the end of
this report.) The treaty gave the United States rights in the so-called Canal Zone (about 10 miles
wide and 50 miles long) “as if it were sovereign” and “in perpetuity.” Construction of the canal
was completed in 1914. In the 1960s, growing resentment in Panama over the extent of U.S.
rights in the country led to pressure to negotiate a new treaty arrangement for the operation of the
Canal. Draft treaties were completed in 1967 but ultimately rejected by Panama in 1970.
New negotiations ultimately led to the September 1977 signing of the two Panama Canal Treaties
by President Jimmy Carter and Panamanian head of government General Omar Torrijos. Under
the Panama Canal Treaty, the United States was given primary responsibility for operating and
defending the Canal until December 31, 1999. (Subsequent U.S. implementing legislation
established the Panama Canal Commission to operate the Canal until the end of 1999.) Under the
Treaty on the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, or simply the Neutrality
Treaty, the two countries agreed to maintain a regime of neutrality, whereby the Canal would be
open to ships of all nations. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to the Neutrality Treaty
on March 16, 1978, and to the Panama Canal Treaty on April 18, 1978, both by a vote of 68-32,
with various amendments, conditions, understandings, and reservations. Panama and the United
States exchanged instruments of ratification for the two treaties on June 16, 1978, and the two
treaties entered into force on October 1, 1979.
Some treaty critics have argued that Panama did not accept the amendments, conditions,
reservations, and understandings of the U.S. Senate, including the DeConcini condition to the
Neutrality Treaty. That condition states: “if the Canal is closed, or its operations are interfered
with, the United States of America and the Republic of Panama shall each independently have the
right to take such steps as each deems necessary, in accordance with its constitutional processes,
including the use of military force in the Republic of Panama, to reopen the Canal or restore the
operations of the Canal, as the case may be.” However, others argued that Panama, in fact, had
accepted all U.S. Senate amendments. The State Department asserted that Panama expressly
accepted all amendments, conditions, and understandings to the two treaties, including the
DeConcini condition. The United States and Panama signed the instruments of ratification for
both treaties, which incorporated all the Senate provisions. The two countries cooperated
throughout the years on matters related to the canal and established five binational bodies to
handle these issues. Two of the bodies were set up to address defense affairs and conducted at
least sixteen joint military exercises between 1979 and 1985 involving Panamanian and U.S.
forces.
Š—Š•ȱ›Š—œ’’˜—ȱŠ—ȱž››Ž—ȱŠžœȱ
Over the years, U.S. officials consistently affirmed a commitment to follow through with the
Panama Canal Treaty and turn the Canal over to Panama at the end of 1999. That transition
occurred smoothly on December 31, 1999. The Panama Canal Treaty terminated on that date, and
the Panama Canal Commission (PCC), the U.S. agency operating the Canal, was succeeded by
the Panama Canal Authority (ACP), a Panamanian government agency established in 1997.
Under the terms of the Neutrality Treaty, which has no termination date, Panama has had
responsibility for operating and defending the Canal since the end of 1999. As noted above, both
Panama and the United States, however, in exercising their responsibilities to maintain the regime
of neutrality (keeping the Canal secure and open to all nations on equal terms) independently
have the right to use military force to reopen the Canal or restore its operations. This is delineated
in the first condition of the Neutrality Treaty.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŝȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
The secure operation of the Panama Canal remains a U.S. interest since about 13%-14% of U.S.
ocean-borne cargo transits through the Canal. The United States provides assistance to Panama to
improve its ability to provide security for the Canal and to enhance port and maritime security.
U.S. officials have consistently expressed satisfaction that Panama is running the Canal
efficiently, and since 2003, the U.S. military has conducted exercises with Panama and other
countries to protect the Canal in case of attack.35
Headed by Alberto Alemán Zubieta, the Panama Canal Authority has run the Canal for more than
nine years and has been lauded for increasing Canal safety and efficiency. In January 2006, the
Martín Torrijos government established a social investment fund backed by Panama Canal
revenues that invests in schools, hospitals, bridges, roads, and other social projects. The initiative,
according to the government, is designed to show Panamanians that the Canal is contributing to
economic development and improving the quality of life for Panamanians.36
Š—Š•ȱ¡™Š—œ’˜—ȱ›˜“ŽŒȱ
On April 24, 2006, the Panama Canal Authority presented to President Torrijos its
recommendation to build a third channel and new set of locks (one on the Atlantic and one on the
Pacific) that would double the capacity of the Canal and allow it to accommodate giant container
cargo ships known as post-Panamax ships. The proposal would also widen and deepen existing
channels and elevate Gatun Lake’s maximum operating level. According to the proposed plan, the
overall project would begin in 2007 and take from seven to eight years to complete. The
estimated cost of the project is $5.25 billion, to be self-financed by the ACP through graduated
toll increases and external bridge financing of about $2.3 billion that would be paid off in about
10 years. The Panamanian government would not incur any sovereign debt as a result of the
project. According to the ACP, the overall objectives of the expansion project are to (1) achieve
long-term sustainability and growth for the Canal’s financial contributions to the Panamanian
national treasury; (2) maintain the Canal’s competitiveness; (3) increase the Canal’s capacity to
capture the growing world tonnage demand; and (4) make the Canal more productive, safe, and
efficient.37
President Torrijos and his Cabinet approved the expansion project on June 14, 2006, and the
National Assembly overwhelmingly approved it on July 10, 2006, with 72 out of 78 deputies
voting for the project. Pursuant to Panama’s Constitution (Article 319), the project had to be
submitted to a national referendum no sooner than 90 days from the date of approval by the
Assembly. The Torrijos government chose to hold the referendum on October 22, 2006, close to
the anniversary of October 23, 1977, the date when Panamanians approved the two Panama Canal
treaties in a national plebiscite by a two-to-one margin. A poll from early September 2006 showed
almost 64% public support for the Canal expansion project, but on election day the expansion
project received 78% of the vote.

35 Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing, “Testimony on United States Southern Command, United States
Northern Command, and United States Joint Forces Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for
Fiscal Year 2008 and the Future Years Defense Program,” March 22, 2007, Federal News Service.
36 Rainbow Nelson, “Canal Cash to Pay for Social Development,” Lloyd’s List, January 18, 2006.
37 Autoridad del Canal de Panama (ACP), “Proposal for the Expansion of the Panama Canal, Third Set of Locks
Project,” April 24, 2006.
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ŗŞȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
The Torrijos government advanced the project as integral to Panama’s future economic
development. The government maintained that some 7,000 direct jobs would be created by the
project, as well as some 35,000 indirect jobs. President Torrijos asserted that increased revenue
from the Canal arising from the expansion project would allow the government to launch social
development programs and improve living conditions in the country.38
There had been some vocal opposition to the Canal expansion project. The organization known as
the Peasant Coordinator Against the Dams (CCCE, Coordinadora Campesina Contra los
Embalses), consisting of agricultural, civil, and environmental organizations, asserted that the
expansion project would lead to flooding and would drive people from their homes. An umbrella
protest group known as the National Front for the Defense of Economic and Social Rights
(Frenadeso), which was formed in 2005 during protests against social security reforms, called for
a “no” vote.39 Former Presidents Jorge Illueca and Guillermo Endara, as well as former Panama
Canal administrator Fernando Manfredo, also opposed the expansion project, maintaining that the
price was too high and too much of a gamble. Critics feared that the total price tag could rise
considerably and expressed concern that toll increases could make alternative routes more
economically attractive.40
The ACP is moving ahead with the Canal expansion project. The Panamanian government
officially launched the Canal expansion project on September 3, 2007, with a ceremony led by
former President Jimmy Carter whose Administration negotiated the Panama Canal Treaties. The
project is expected to be completed by 2014. In mid-December 2008, the ACP awarded the third
of four dry excavation contracts to a Costa Rican company. The excavation work is to create an
access channel linking the new Pacific locks with the existing Gaillard Cut, which is the
narrowest stretch of the Canal. Despite the global financial crisis, the ACP has been able to
secure financing for the expansion project. In early March 2009, three multinational consortiums
(one led by Bechtel International and another involving Tetra Tech, two companies headquartered
in California) placed bids for the estimated $2.73 billion contract to build the new set of locks.41
˜—Š–’—Š’˜—ȱ˜ȱ’›’—ȱŠ—ŽœȱŠ—ȱŠ—ȱ ˜œŽȱ œ•Š—ȱ
For a number of years, a sensitive area in U.S.-Panamanian relations was Panama’s desire to have
the United States clean up three contaminated firing ranges in Panama as well as San Jose Island
(one of the Pearl Islands) which was contaminated with chemical weapons used in training
exercises during World War II. Those two issues, however, have been dormant for several years.
The three former firing ranges (Empire, Piña, Balboa West) were used by the U.S. military for
live-fire exercises and testing of ground explosives during its tenure in the Panama. The Piña
range was turned over to Panama in June 1999, while the Empire and Balboa West ranges were
turned over in July 1999. Some 60,000 Panamanians live in areas surrounding the ranges, and

38 “Panama: Torrijos Wins Backing to Expand Canal,” Latin American Weekly Report, October 24, 2006; “Panama’s
Torrijos on Referendum Results: ‘Opportunity to Materialize Our Hopes,” Open Source Center (Panama City TVN),
October 23, 2006.
39 “Torrijos Appeals for Approval of Canal Expansion,” Latinnews Daily, September 1, 2006.
40 “Panama: Torrijos Reveals Plans to Expand Canal,” Latinnews Daily, April 25, 2006; Chris Kraul and Ronald
D.White, “Panama is Preparing to Beef up the Canal,” Los Angeles Times, April 24, 2006; John Lyons, “Panama Takes
Step Toward Expanding the Canal,” Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2006.
41 "Panama: Groups Bid on Canal Expansion," Economist Intelligence Unit, Business Latin America, March 9, 2009.
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ŗşȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
reportedly at least 24 Panamanians have been killed in the last two decades by coming into
contact with the explosives.42 Estimates of the cost to clean up the unexploded bombs and other
contaminants range from $400 million to $1 billion.43
U.S. officials maintain that it is not possible to remove the unexploded ordinance without tearing
down the rain forest and threatening the Canal’s watershed. They also point to a Canal treaty
provision which states that the United States is obligated to take all measures “insofar as may be
practicable” in order to ensure that hazards to human life, health and safety were removed from
the defense sites reverting to Panama. In response to a press question while attending Panama’s
centennial celebration in November 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell maintained that the
United States had already met its obligations to clean up the ranges.44
The controversy over the U.S. cleanup of the ranges at times has been an irritant in the bilateral
relationship, but at this juncture appears to be somewhat of a dormant issue. Officials of the Pérez
Balladares government (1994-1999) believed that the United States was reneging on its treaty
commitment and wanted to press the United States to clean up the firing ranges regardless of
economic cost. The Moscoso government raised the issue during her October 19, 1999, meeting
with then President Clinton in Washington. At the time, President Clinton stated that the United
States had met its treaty obligations to clean up the ranges to the extent practicable, but did say
that the United States wanted to stay engaged and work with Panama on the issue. The issue also
came up during then Secretary of State Albright’s visit to Panama on January 15, 2000. In a
December 2001 letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell, Panama’s Foreign Minister reiterated
his county’s call to clean up the three firing ranges.45 In April 2003, Panamanian Foreign Minister
Harmodio Arias asserted that the issue of clearing the firing ranges was not dead.46 During a
November 2005 visit to Panama, President Bush reiterated the view that the United States had
met its obligations under the treaty. According to the President, “we had obligations under the
treaty, and we felt like we met those obligations.” Despite the disagreement, President Bush
indicated that Panama and the United States could discuss the issue in a constructive way since
the two countries have friendly relations.47
With regard to San Jose Island, In May 2002, U.S. Embassy officials in Panama announced that a
plan was being prepared to clean up the island, which was contaminated with chemical weapons
used in training exercises during World War II.48 The Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapon (OPCW) had confirmed in July 2001 that there were several live chemical
bombs on the island, and Panama evacuated residents of the island.49 In September 2003,

42 “No Home on Panama’s Range, U.S. Munitions Scattered Over Canal Training Zones,” Washington Post, January
10, 2000; Vanessa Hua, “U.S. Weapons, U.S. Mess? Panama,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 1, 2002.
43 “An Expensive Farewell to Arms: The U.S. Has Abandoned 51 Military Sites in Canada.” The Gazette (Montreal),
April 28, 2001.
44 U.S. Department of State. International Information Programs. Washington File. “Colin Powell Hails Panama’s 100
Years of Independence,” November 3, 2004.
45 “Panama Asks U.S. Military to Clean Up Former Bases,” Agence France Presse, December 27, 2001.
46 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Highlights: Central America Press, April 8, 2003 (“Panamanian Foreign
Minister Says Firing Range Cleanup Not Dead Issue,” La Prensa)
47 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “President Bush Meets with President Torrijos of Panama,” November 7,
2005; Edwin Chen, “Bush’s Trip Ends with Discord,” Los Angeles Times, November 8, 2005; William Douglas,
“Bush’s Last Stop: Panama,” Miami Herald, November 8, 2005.
48 “U.S. Creates Chemical Weapon Clean-up Plan on Panamanian Island.” EFE News Service, May 27, 2002.
49 “Panama-U.S. Panama Clears Isle After Finding World War II Chemical Weapons.” EFE News Services,
(continued...)
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ŘŖȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ
however, Panama rejected a U.S. offer for the environmental cleanup of the island that would
have reportedly offered more than $2 million in equipment and training so that Panama could
clean up the island. According to Foreign Minister Harmodio Arias, Panama rejected the offer
because it did not want to sign a document releasing the United States from all liabilities.50 A
provision in the FY2004 Foreign Operations appropriations measure (P.L. 108-199, Division D)
would have permitted Foreign Military Financing for the San Jose Island cleanup.

(...continued)
September 6, 2001.
50 Victor Torres, “Foreign Minister Explains Why Panama Rejected U.S. San Jose Island Cleanup Offer,” La Prensa
(Panama), October 12, 2003 (as translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service).
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Řŗȱ


ȱ
Figure 1. Map of Panama

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
ȬŘŘȱ

Š—Š–ŠDZȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’Œȱ˜—’’˜—œȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
ȱ


ž‘˜›ȱ˜—ŠŒȱ —˜›–Š’˜—ȱ

Mark P. Sullivan

Specialist in Latin American Affairs
msullivan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7689




˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Řřȱ