Zimbabwe: The Power Sharing Agreement
and Implications for U.S. Policy
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
March 25, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34509
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Zimbabwe: The Power Sharing Agreement and Implications for U.S. Policy
Summary
After almost a year of uncertainty following Zimbabwe’s March 2008 elections, opposition leader
Morgan Tsvangirai was sworn as Prime Minister of a new coalition government on February 11,
2009. The establishment of the new government comes five months after a power-sharing
agreement was signed in an effort to resolve the political standoff resulting from the flawed 2008
elections. For the first time since independence, the ruling party has lost its majority in the
National Assembly. The results of the presidential race, belatedly announced in May 2008 amid
rising tensions, indicated that Tsvangirai had received more votes than the incumbent, President
Robert Mugabe, but had failed to garner the 50% needed to avoid a runoff. Days before that
runoff was scheduled to take place, in late June 2008, Tsvangirai pulled out of the race, citing
widespread political violence and the absence of conditions for a free and fair election. Mugabe
was declared the winner in the runoff, but many observer missions suggest the poll did not reflect
the will of the people. On September 15, 2008, after weeks of negotiations, Tsvangirai and
President Mugabe reached an agreement to form a unity government. As part of the deal, Mugabe
remains head of state, with Tsvangirai as Prime Minister and cabinet and gubernatorial positions
divided among the parties. Disputes over the allocation of key ministries delayed implementation
of the agreement. As mediation efforts continued, the United States, the European Union, and
several African leaders called for Mugabe’s resignation. A final agreement was reached in
January 2009, and the new coalition government was established in early February.
The parties to the agreement now face significant challenges in working together to promote
political reconciliation and to address serious economic and humanitarian needs. Politically
motivated violence and repression followed the March elections, which were held amidst a
deepening economic crisis. Zimbabwe’s gross domestic product (GDP) has decreased over 50%
in the last decade, the inflation rate rose to over 200 million percent in 2008, and the
unemployment rate is almost 90%. The adult HIV prevalence rate of 15% has contributed to a
sharp drop in life expectancy, and more than three quarters of the population now reportedly
requires food aid. Over 4,000 have died since August 2008 from a widespread cholera outbreak
that has infected more than 90,000. Deteriorating conditions in the country have led many
Zimbabweans to immigrate to neighboring countries, creating a substantial burden on the region.
In South Africa, immigrants have been the target of xenophobic attacks.
International donors have cautiously welcomed the January 2009 agreement, but many are
skeptical that the coalition government will be able to implement needed reforms. Robert
Mugabe’s administration has been seen as autocratic and repressive by its critics, and its human
rights record is poor. The government has suppressed freedom of speech and assembly, and many
contend that it has restricted access to food, already scarce, in opposition areas. Former U.S.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice labeled Zimbabwe an “outpost of tyranny,” and Bush
Administration officials accused Mugabe's party of rigging the 2008 election and orchestrating
political violence. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have been
similarly critical of Mugabe’s rule. The United States has enforced targeted sanctions against top
Zimbabwe officials and associates since 2002. Congress has expressed its opposition to the
government’s undemocratic policies in the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of
2001 (P.L. 107-99) and other subsequent legislation. For more background, see CRS Report
RL32723, Zimbabwe, by Lauren Ploch.
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Zimbabwe: The Power Sharing Agreement and Implications for U.S. Policy
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
March 2008 Elections ................................................................................................................. 2
Election Preparations ............................................................................................................ 2
Alleged Vote Buying ............................................................................................................. 3
Pre-Election Violence............................................................................................................ 3
Election Monitoring .............................................................................................................. 4
Press Restrictions .................................................................................................................. 4
Election Results .......................................................................................................................... 5
Parliament............................................................................................................................. 5
The Presidency ..................................................................................................................... 5
Runoff Elections Called ........................................................................................................ 6
June 2008 Runoff Election .......................................................................................................... 7
Planning for a Coalition Government?................................................................................... 8
Post-Election Violence .......................................................................................................... 9
The Power-Sharing Agreement.................................................................................................. 11
Coalition Government Formed ............................................................................................ 11
Some Policy Reforms Begin, but Challenges Remain .......................................................... 12
Cholera Outbreak................................................................................................................ 13
International Reactions.............................................................................................................. 13
The Southern African Development Community (SADC).................................................... 15
The African Union (AU) ..................................................................................................... 16
South Africa........................................................................................................................ 17
The United Nations ............................................................................................................. 18
U.S. Policy on Zimbabwe.......................................................................................................... 20
Current U.S. Policy ............................................................................................................. 20
U.S. Assistance ................................................................................................................... 21
Congressional Interest ......................................................................................................... 22
Policy Options .......................................................................................................................... 23
Diplomatic Pressure ............................................................................................................ 23
Humanitarian Assistance ..................................................................................................... 23
Economic Recovery ............................................................................................................ 24
Accountability and Reform ................................................................................................. 26
Tables
Table 1. Regional Efforts to Block Arms Transfer to Zimbabwe................................................. 14
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 27
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Zimbabwe: The Power Sharing Agreement and Implications for U.S. Policy
Introduction
President Robert Mugabe, 85, and his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic
Front (ZANU-PF), have ruled Zimbabwe since its independence in 1980. Rising inflation and
unemployment rates contributed in the late 1990s to the creation of the opposition Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC). The MDC enjoyed initial success, campaigning against a
referendum in 2000 that would have expanded the president’s powers, made government officials
immune from prosecution, and allowed the uncompensated seizure of white-owned land for
redistribution to black farmers. The referendum failed, and the MDC won nearly half the
parliamentary seats in that year’s election. ZANU-PF has since taken numerous, often
undemocratic actions to maintain power. After months of uncertainty following a power-sharing
agreement, known as the Global Political Agreement, negotiated in September 2008 between
ZANU-PF and the opposition, the parties reached a final accord in January 2009 that has led to
the creation of a coalition government with senior positions divided among the parties (see “The
Power-Sharing Agreement” below). Given longstanding tensions between ZANU-PF and the
MDC, many observers remain skeptical that the parties will truly share power, or that they will be
able to adequately address the country’s economic collapse or the deteriorating humanitarian
situation. A recent nationwide cholera outbreak affecting over 90,000 has drawn additional
international attention to the crisis.
Background
Following years of political tensions and a violent March 2007 assault by police on government
critics that drew widespread international criticism, then-South African President Thabo Mbeki
initiated a mediation effort between the Government of Zimbabwe and the opposition. The main
objective of the mediation, as described by Mbeki, was to create political conditions for free and
fair elections, the results of which would be accepted by all parties. Although the negotiations
resulted in the amendment of some laws seen to restrict press freedom and political activity, the
talks were abandoned after Mugabe announced that elections would be held on March 29, 2008.1
Human rights activists argue that the legislative changes were cosmetic and that the talks failed to
create a level playing field prior to the elections.2
1 The Electoral Laws Amendment Act, which came into effect in January 2008, eliminated one of the two electoral
administration bodies and required polling places to be located in areas readily accessible to the public. It also
established a continual voter registration process and explicitly prohibited intimidation during the campaign period.
2 See, for example, Human Rights Watch (HRW), All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral
Conditions in Zimbabwe’s Coming General Elections, Vol. 20, No. 2(A), March 2008, and International Crisis Group
(ICG), Africa Report No. 138, Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election, March 20, 2008.
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March 2008 Elections
Election Preparations
Many domestic and international observers assert that Zimbabwe’s elections since 2000 have
fallen short of democratic standards. In the period preceding the March 2008 elections, civil
society activists reported significant pre-election irregularities. Critics charged that the Zimbabwe
Election Commission (ZEC), which oversees elections, lacked independence, and that it was
further crippled by limited administrative capacity and budget shortages.3 Election reports from
domestic groups suggest that the registration process was, at best, inconsistent, and there is no
indication that the ZEC addressed alleged inaccuracies in the voters’ roll from previous elections.
The March elections were Zimbabwe’s first attempt at holding “harmonized” elections for all
levels of government (local, National Assembly, Senate, and presidential) simultaneously. In
addition to the logistical challenges this posed, civic groups argued that the complexity of a four-
ballot election required a nationwide voter education campaign. They claim that the ZEC’s
education efforts were inadequate and that independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
were barred from engaging in voter education programs of their own.
The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), a domestic observer group composed of 38
NGOs, alleges that the ruling party redrew constituencies4 to ensure its continued hold on power.
In its pre-election report, ZESN argued that there were not enough polling stations designated for
urban areas, where the MDC is believed to have its strongest support. ZESN’s report also
suggested that, as in past elections, the ruling party manipulated state resources for campaign
purposes.5 And despite amendments to two laws, the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and
the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), which critics suggest restrict
freedom of speech and assembly, advocacy groups argue that the police selectively interpreted the
laws and significantly limited the MDC’s ability to campaign.6 Sections of POSA which prohibit
false statements “prejudicial” to the state and criminalize statements construed as engendering
hostility toward the president remain in effect.
3 The ZEC has been led by Justice George Chiweshe, a former military officer. Reports indicate that the Commission
and its regional offices have been staffed by numerous former military personnel. For more detail, see Zimbabwe
Human Rights NGO Forum, Can the Elections be Free and Fair in the Current Environment?, March 18, 2008.
4 Parliament passed Constitutional Amendment No. 18 in late 2007, increasing the number of parliamentary seats from
120 to 210. Following a rushed delimitation exercise, the ZEC presented its final report, outlining changes to several
constituency and ward boundaries, with no time for debate before parliament adjourned at the end of January 2008.
5 Lance Guma, “Election Body Calls for More Polling Stations,” SW Radio Africa, March 11, 2008, available at
http://www.allafrica.com.
6 Amendments to POSA allowed groups to present notifications for rallies and demonstrations to the nearest police
station, and if denied approval, provided for appeals to be dealt with in a timely manner by the local magistrates court
rather than the Home Affairs Minister. Amendments to AIPPA abolished the “journalism without accreditation”
offense, although journalists remain prohibited from covering official events, like elections, without accreditation.
HRW, All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral Conditions in Zimbabwe’s Coming General
Elections, Vol. 20, No. 2(A), March 2008.
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Alleged Vote Buying
In addition to the allegedly partisan administration of the elections, many observers contend that
the government used public resources to buy votes. In the weeks preceding the polls, President
Mugabe announced significant salary increases for the military and civil servants and signed into
law the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Bill, requiring foreign-owned firms to
transfer 51% of their shares to domestic investors. His administration also reportedly distributed
vehicles and agricultural equipment worth millions of U.S. dollars to ZANU-PF supporters.7 At
the same time, in a country where almost half the population was considered by the World Food
Program at that time to be malnourished, domestic groups reported numerous incidents of
opposition supporters being denied access to state food supplies.8 NGOs operating in Zimbabwe
reported that the ban on their distribution of food and other humanitarian aid prior to the runoff
continued until August, despite claims by the government that it had been lifted.9
Pre-Election Violence
According to a domestic human rights group, the year prior the 2008 elections was marked by a
significant increase in incidents of politically motivated violence from previous years.10 The
government routinely deployed riot police to break up demonstrations, meetings and rallies,
despite changes to the laws regulating freedom of assembly. In January 2008, police allegedly
teargassed and assaulted protestors in Harare after a local magistrate overruled a police order
banning their march.11 In February, members of the Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe
reported being abducted and beaten by ZANU-PF supporters; according to their accounts several
members of the police and intelligence service were present during the attacks.12 According to
reports, the perpetrators were not arrested, but the union leaders were charged with violating a
law that prohibits the distribution of pamphlets in public areas.13
Several of the country’s security service chiefs, including the heads of the army and the police,
publicly announced that they would not recognize an electoral victory by anyone other that
Mugabe.14 In speeches and statements to the press, they and other public officials, including the
President himself, referred to opposition leaders as traitors or puppets of the West. In October
2007, the International Bar Association issued a report accusing Zimbabwe’s police of being
“blatantly partisan” and suggesting that the force’s failure to guarantee equal protection of the law
“is a major obstacle to democracy in Zimbabwe and a considerable impediment to free and fair
7 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Can the Elections in Zimbabwe be Free and Fair in the Current
Environment? March 18, 2008.
8 “Concern Over Pre-Election Environment, Election Update (1),” ZESN Press Statement, January 25, 2008.
9"Zimbabwe: NGO Ban Starting to Bite," IRIN, July 7, 2008.
10In 2007, there were 603 reported incidents of torture, 865 incidents of assault, and 2,766 reports of arrest and
detention. In the months directly preceding the elections, from November 2007 to March 2008, there were 1,775
reported incidents of political violence, according to Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Can the Elections in
Zimbabwe be Free and Fair in the Current Environment? March 18, 2008.
11 “Zimbabwe: Opposition Activists Teargassed, Beaten,” IRIN, January 23, 2008.
12HRW, All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral Conditions in Zimbabwe’s Coming General
Elections,Vol. 20, No. 2(A), March 2008.
13ICG, “Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election,” March 20, 2008.
14 “Zim Prisons Chief Orders Officers to Vote Mugabe,” Reuters, February 29, 2008.
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elections.”15 As part of the 2008 electoral reforms, police were banned from the polling stations to
allay fears of intimidation. However, just over a week before the elections President Mugabe
issued a decree allowing police into polling stations, allegedly to help disabled voters.
Election Monitoring
The Government of Zimbabwe reportedly invited election observers from over 40 countries and
regional organizations, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the
African Union (AU), but barred observers from countries considered to be critical of its
policies.16 CNN and other western media organizations and journalists were reportedly denied
permission to cover the elections.17 The AU observer mission, led by former President of Sierra
Leone Tejan Kabbah, issued a preliminary statement after the elections suggesting that the vote
was generally free and fair and expressed the will of the people. He urged all parties to accept the
results. The SADC mission found the elections to be “a credible expression of the will of the
people” but noted concerns regarding opposition access to the media, inflammatory statements by
senior security officials, the presence of police officers at polling stations, and the delay in the
publication of the voters’ roll. Two members of the delegation, both from South Africa’s largest
opposition party, refused to sign the report, calling the elections “chaotic” and “deeply flawed.”18
Other observer groups differed with the SADC findings. The delegations of the World Council of
Churches and the African Council of Churches found the elections to be “skewed in favor of the
incumbent who openly utilized state resources to his advantage” and reported media bias,
“violence, intimidation and outright confrontation,” and the use of food as a “political tool.”19
Press Restrictions
Two international journalists, one a Pulitzer Prize-winning American correspondent for the New
York Times, were arrested in April 2008. After several days in jail, they were released on bail but
were blocked from leaving the country. They were later acquitted. Several other journalists, both
domestic and foreign, have been arrested since the elections. The director of the ZESN was
briefly detained by police in April and questioned about possible ties to the Washington-based
National Democratic Institute, which monitors elections worldwide. The editor of The Standard,
the country’s only remaining independent newspaper, was arrested for printing an editorial by
opposition leader Arthur Mutambara entitled, “A Shameful Betrayal of National Independence.”
He was later released, but charged with publishing statements prejudicial to the state. Mutambara
was arrested weeks later.
15International Bar Association, Partisan Policing: An Obstacle to Human Rights and Democracy in Zimbabwe, An
International Bar Association Human Rights Institute Report, October 2007.
16 “First Poll Observers in Zimbabwe,” BBC, March 11, 2008.
17 “CNN Denied Permission to Cover Elections in Zimbabwe,” CNN, March 25, 2008.
18Statement issued by South African Member of Parliament Diane Kohler Barnard, “DA Rejects SADC Assessment of
Zimbabwe Election as ‘Peaceful and Credible,’” available at http://www.da.org.za.
19 “Ecumenical Observers Challenge Zimbabwe Election Process and Demand Respect for the Will of the People,”
World Council of Churches Press Release, April 29, 2008.
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Election Results
Parliament
The MDC, which split into two factions in 2005 (known as MDC-T and MDC-M for their
respective leaders, Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara), remained divided for the March
elections, and this division likely cost the party several parliamentary seats.20 The ZEC, widely
criticized for its delayed release of the electoral results, announced the National Assembly results
four days after the election. The MDC factions, which reunited on April 28, won a majority in the
220-seat National Assembly with 109 seats, over ZANU-PF’s 97.21 Three weeks after the
election, the electoral commission conducted a recount of 23 of these races, an overwhelming
majority of which were won by the opposition.22 The original results were upheld. On April 6, the
ZEC announced that the ruling party had retained its majority in the Senate, where over one-third
of its 93 members are appointed by the president. Of the 60 seats directly elected, ZANU-PF won
30, MDC-Tsvangirai 24, and MDC-Mutambara 6. Several senior ruling party members lost their
parliamentary seats, including the Ministers of Justice, Agriculture, Mines, Energy, and Transport,
and several senior MDC-M parliamentarians, including Mutambara, lost to MDC-T candidates.
The Presidency
The MDC’s decision to contest the election while still divided may also have cost the party a
clear victory in the initial presidential race. In February 2008, then-ZANU-PF senior member
Simba Makoni announced his intention to run against President Mugabe in the upcoming
elections.23 He was subsequently expelled from the party and ran as an independent, although he
was rumored to have been supported by several senior ruling party officials. MDC faction leader
Arthur Mutambara, who had planned to run against Mugabe and Tsvangirai, withdrew as a
presidential candidate and expressed his support for Makoni. It is unclear how many supporters of
his faction voted for Makoni instead of Tsvangirai.
The main MDC faction claimed victory for Tsvangirai days after the election with over 50% of
the votes cast, basing its claim on tallies of poll results posted outside the polling stations and
constituency centers immediately following the elections. Some have differed with the MDC
count, suggesting that while Tsvangirai almost certainly received more votes than Mugabe, he
20 A Financial Times report suggests that ZANU-PF won ten parliamentary seats that would have been claimed by the
MDC had its votes not been split between the two factions. “Acrimonious Division Cost MDC Success,” Financial
Times, April 4, 2008.
21The Tsvangirai faction won 99 seats and MDC-Mutambara won 10. One seat was won by an independent, and three
seats were subject to by-elections in June 2008 due to candidates’ deaths. In those by-elections, MDC-T won one seat
and ZANU-PF won two.
22 According to press reports, the ZEC conducted the recount in violation of a court order to stop recounts for 23
parliamentary constituencies. The MDC had petitioned the court on the basis that ZANU-PF’s requests for recounts
were not valid because they were not filed within 48 hours of the election in accordance with ZEC rules. The court
allegedly ruled that a recount could not be ordered until after the original results were released.
23Makoni, 57, served as Finance Minister from 2000 to 2002 and was reportedly dismissed after criticizing the
administration’s economic policies.
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may not have achieved the necessary 50% to avoid a runoff.24 ZESN noted that results were not
posted in three constituency tabulation centers despite a legal requirement to do so.
The results of the presidential race were not officially announced until five weeks after the
elections. The opposition called for a nationwide strike on April 14 to protest the delayed release
of results, asking supporters to stay home rather than to demonstrate publicly. Dozens of
opposition supporters, including a newly elected member of parliament, were reportedly arrested
that day for allegedly trying to incite violence or for obstructing the freedom of movement.
According to reports, the strike was unsuccessful. With over 80% unemployment, some analysts
suggest many Zimbabweans could not afford to miss a day’s wages; other Zimbabweans said they
had not heard of the strike.25 On the evening of May 2, the ZEC declared that Tsvangirai had
received 47.9% of the votes, while Mugabe received 43.2% and Makoni 8.3%. Some in the
international community questioned whether the government’s delay in releasing the presidential
results should be considered a political coup. The MDC appealed unsuccessfully to the courts to
have the results released, but the electoral commission claimed that it could not do so until a
“process of verification of the presidential ballots” was complete.26
Runoff Elections Called
Although the opposition accused the government of manipulating the presidential results and
initially objected to participating in a runoff, Morgan Tsvangirai agreed to stand against President
Mugabe in a second round of voting.27 ZESN also questioned the validity of the presidential
results, saying, “ZESN cannot substantiate ZEC figures as the network is not aware of the chain
of custody of the ballot materials during the aforementioned period” and claiming that the
delayed announcement of the presidential results undermined the impartiality of the ZEC. These
concerns were echoed by the United States and others.
Having waited for over a month to hear the final results from the first round of elections,
Zimbabweans faced another significant delay before the second round. While the electoral law
requires the government to hold a runoff within 21 days of announcing the initial results, the ZEC
declared that the runoff would not be held until June 27, three months after the first round. Some
analysts questioned whether the government could afford another election, estimated to cost up to
$60 million. According to official Reserve Bank figures, government borrowing in the first three
months of 2008 was 43% above the projected budget deficit for the year.28
The MDC initially called for the immediate deployment of election observers from outside Africa
(in addition to the SADC and AU observers) as well as the deployment of regional peacekeepers
during the runoff. The party later modified its demands, saying that an increased SADC and AU
observer presence would be sufficient, if combined with an immediate repeal of restrictions on
the MDC’s ability to campaign and an end to political violence. The opposition nevertheless
remained largely unable to hold public rallies, which were banned by police in the capital in mid-
24According to ZESN, Tsvangirai received 49.4% of the vote and Mugabe 41.8%.”ZESN poll projections on March 29
presidential elections,” ZESN press release, March 31, 2008.
25 “Zimbabwe Opposition Strike Fails,” BBC, April 16, 2008.
26 “Opposition Unites Against Mugabe,” Al Jazeera, April 28, 2008.
27The MDC suggested that the government had access to the ballot boxes for over two weeks in April without
opposition or observer supervision, and thus they could not be sure the ballots had not been manipulated.
28 “Crisis Looms After Harare Vote-Buying,” Financial Times, April 11, 2008.
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April. Tsvangirai, who left the country a week after the elections amidst MDC concerns about his
safety, returned on May 25. Given post-election statements by government officials accusing him
of treason, many believed he would not be allowed to campaign freely inside the country.29 The
MDC leader had been tried, and acquitted, for treason in 2004. Based on interviews with high-
ranking Zimbabwean officials, the International Crisis Group (ICG) issued a report suggesting a
Tsvangirai victory in the runoff could trigger a military coup.30
June 2008 Runoff Election
During the weeks following the announcement of the presidential results, reports of political
violence increased dramatically. Critics contend that the violence was a government-orchestrated
attempt to punish opposition supporters and ensure a Mugabe victory in the runoff.31 According to
media reports, security forces and militias manned roadblocks and detention centers throughout
the country, despite the increased presence of over 500 international monitors from SADC and
the AU. In July, the Washington Post reported on the government's alleged campaign of violence
against the opposition, referred to as "Coercion. Intimidation. Beating. Displacement.," or CIBD,
and alleged that the ruling party's inner circle was divided on the effort, which reportedly targeted
mid-level MDC organizers, and ordinary citizens, for severe beatings or death. President Mugabe
was quoted in the press saying, "We shed a lot of blood for this country. We are not going to give
up our country for a mere X on a ballot. How can a ballpoint pen fight with a gun?"32
Tsvangirai was detained by police several times during the runoff campaign, and on two
occasions sought refuge in the Dutch Embassy. The MDC's Secretary General, Tendai Biti, was
arrested in June 2008 upon return from South Africa and was charged with treason. After two
weeks in jail, he was released on bail. On June 13, former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
joined over 40 African leaders and former heads of state, including the group known as the
Elders, in a letter calling on the government to stop the violence, postpone the runoff, and ensure
conditions for free and fair elections.
On June 22, less than a week before the runoff, ZANU-PF supporters, armed with sticks, iron
bars, and rocks, blocked an MDC rally in Harare. Citing the high number of attacks against MDC
supporters and the lack of a level playing field, Tsvangirai withdrew from the race the following
day. By MDC accounts, over 100 of its supporters have been killed since the March elections, and
tens of thousands displaced. Despite public comments from African observer missions and a
presidential statement from the U.N. Security Council arguing that conditions for a free and fair
election did not exist due the high level of violence, the government held the runoff as scheduled.
Mugabe was declared the winner with over 85% of the vote and inaugurated on June 29, 2008.
29Referring to an alleged letter between Tsvangirai and Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Zimbabwe’s Herald accused the
MDC leader of plotting “illegal regime change” and quoted outgoing Justice Minister Chinamasa , “It is clear... that
Tsvangirai along with Brown are seeking regime change in Zimbabwe,and on the part of Tsvangirai, this is
treasonous...There is no doubting the consequences for acting in a treasonous manner.” The MDC says the letter is a
forgery. See “Zimbabwe Opposition Accused of Treason,” CNN, April 17, 2008.
30ICG, “Negotiating Zimbabwe’s Transition,” Africa Briefing No. 51, May 21, 2008.
31Human Rights Watch called the violence "a brutal campaign of torture and intimidation" and documented direct
involvement by the security forces. "Zimbabwe: Army Behind New Wave of Human Rights Abuses," HRW Press
Release, April 30, 2008.
32"Zimbabwe Election: Mugabe Threatens to Arrest Opposition Leaders" The Guardian, June 17, 2008.
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SADC fielded over 400 observers for the second round. In their preliminary report, the observers
found the pre-election environment marred by "politically motivated violence resulting in loss of
life, damage to property, and serious injuries sustained and hindering political activities." They
also noted the "disruption of campaigning of the opposition party and the regrettable inaction of
the law enforcement agencies," and cited harassment of their own observers. The SADC mission
found that the pre-election period did not conform to SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing
Democratic Elections, which impinged on the credibility of the electoral process. Ultimately, the
delegation reported that runoff "did not represent the will of the people of Zimbabwe."33
The observer delegation from the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was similarly critical of the
runoff, saying, "political tolerance in Zimbabwe has deteriorated to the lowest ebb in recent
history." The delegation reported witnessing roadblocks and "male-dominated groups [that]
intercepted voters and gave them pieces of paper on which they were required to write the serial
number of their ballots" at many polling stations. The PAP's report questioned the impartiality of
the ZEC, and found that "the current atmosphere prevailing in the country did not give rise to the
conduct of free, fair and credible elections."34 The African Union team echoed the SADC and
PAP findings, declaring that process fell short of accepted AU standards.35
Planning for a Coalition Government?
Prior to the runoff, Zimbabwe’s state-controlled media sent mixed signals about the regime’s
post-election plans. On April 23, the government-owned Herald newspaper printed an editorial
that suggested SADC should mediate between the parties to create a transitional coalition
government, led by President Mugabe, that would organize new elections.36 The following day
the paper announced on its website that a unity government was “not feasible.” According to the
May 2008 ICG report, some senior ZANU-PF members, including Vice President Joyce Mujuru
and Reserve Bank governor Gideon Gono, tried to convince the president to accept a unity
government, but were overruled by senior security officials. Critics alleged that the ruling party
might try to exercise influence over the courts to overturn the MDC’s parliamentary majority.
Both parties challenged the results of over 50 parliamentary races, and although the new
parliament has been sworn in, the judiciary’s findings still could affect the balance of power in
the parliament. Central to the concerns of ZANU-PF hardliners, critics assert, are questions
regarding immunity for serious human rights abuses committed since independence. Both parties
issued public statements after the elections indicating a willingness to negotiate, but ZANU-PF
declared that Tsvangirai must acknowledge Mugabe's victory as a prerequisite. Tsvangirai refused
to do so. Some believe ZANU-PF had planned to negotiate even before the runoff, but wanted to
enter the talks from a position of power, with Mugabe having won the second round.
33Preliminary Statement Presented by the Hon. Jose Marcos Barrica of the SADC Observer Mission, issued on June 30,
2008.
34Interim Statement Presented by the Hon. Marwick Khumalo of the Pan-African Parliament Observer Mission, issued
on June 30, 2008.
35Preliminary Statement of the African Union Observer Mission, issued on June 29, 2008.
36 “West Should Stop Blocking Zimbabwe’s Way Forward,” The Herald (Harare), April 23, 2008.
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Post-Election Violence
As noted above, although observers suggest that the March 29 election day was largely peaceful,
reports of politically-motivated violence subsequently increased to a level not seen in two
decades, according to advocacy groups. In May, the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human
Rights reported that its doctors had treated hundreds of victims with injuries consistent with
assault and torture since the election date, and that “the violence is now on such a scale that it is
impossible to properly document all cases.”37 The MDC has alleged that over 100 of its
supporters have been killed. U.S. Ambassador James McGee implicated the ruling party in
orchestrating the attacks (see “U.S. Policy on Zimbabwe” below).38
ZANU-PF and the Zimbabwean army have denied involvement with the violence, although the
army, police,; intelligence service; “war veterans;”39 and Zimbabwe’s National Youth Service,
also known as the “Green Bombers,” have all been implicated. One week after the elections, self-
styled war veteran leader Jabuli Sibanda warned, “It has come to our realization that the elections
were used as another war front to prepare for the re-invasion of our country.... As freedom
fighters, we feel compelled to repel the invasion,” echoing a frequent Mugabe refrain that an
opposition victory would be tantamount to the British reinstating colonial rule. The state-owned
Herald newspaper, contributed to fears of a white takeover in the wake of the election, reporting,
“an increasing number of white former commercial farmers are reportedly threatening resettled
black farmers throughout the country with eviction from their farms or face the wrath of an
anticipated ‘incoming MDC government.’”40 These pronouncements coincided with farm
invasions throughout the country, and by April 16 the Commercial Farmers Union reported that
over 100 of the estimated remaining 400 white farmers had been forced off their lands.
Since independence, Mugabe’s regime has employed terminology associated with military-style
campaigns for government programs ranging from the implementation of price controls, known
as Operation Reduce Prices, to the demolition of informal urban settlements, or Operation
Murambatsvina (translated as “Clean Out the Filth”).41 Reports suggest that the recent round of
violence had its own campaign name, Operation Mavhoterapapi (“Who did you vote for?”).42
Critics note the government’s historic use of violent tactics against political opponents, pointing
to the infamous Operation Gukurahundi (“The rain that washes away the chaff before the rain”),
the violent “pacification” campaign by a North Korean-trained military unit, the 5th Brigade, in
the 1980s against alleged dissidents and supporters of ZANU-PF’s political rival, the Zimbabwe
African People’s Union (ZAPU). Gukurahundi is now better known as the Matabeleland
Massacres, which resulted in the deaths of as many as 20,000 civilians, mostly from the Ndebele
ethnic group in the southwest.43 That 5th Brigade was led by then-Lt. Col. Perence Shire, now
37As of May 9, 2008 the group reported treating 900 people. See “Mbeki Meets Mugabe for Talks,” Al Jazeera, May 9,
2008.
38Statement by Ambassador James McGee, “Breaking the Silence on Political Violence in Zimbabwe,” issued on May
8, 2008.
39Some “war veterans” have questionable credentials and some were too young to have participated in the liberation
struggle. Other veterans disagree with ZANU-PF’s policies.
40 “White Former Farmers Threaten Blacks with Eviction,” The Herald, May 7, 2008.
41For more information, see CRS Report RL32723, Zimbabwe, by Lauren Ploch.
42 “Zimbabwe: Operation Glossary - A Guide to Zimbabwe’s Internal Campaigns,” IRIN, May 1, 2008.
43For further information on Operation Gukurahundi, see the report by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
and the Legal Resources Foundation, Breaking the Silence - Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in
Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980-1988, April 1999, available at http://www.sokwanele.com/pdfs/BTS.pdf.
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commander of Zimbabwe’s Air Force. Other security officials involved in the campaign were
elevated to senior government posts, including Defense Minister Sydney Sekeremayi and Rural
Housing Minister Emerson Mnangagwa. Mnangagwa, then Minister of State Security in charge of
intelligence, once reportedly warned that the government would burn down “all the villages
infested with dissidents.” He has been considered a possible successor to Mugabe within the party
and has been rumored to be in charge of Joint Operations Command (JOC), a secretive group of
the country’s security chiefs and top commanders that some allege control the government.44
Zimbabwe’s rural areas appear to have been the hardest hit by the post-election violence; the U.S.
Embassy in Harare documented thousands who fled the countryside for urban areas in the months
after the March elections. Most Harare medical clinics were at full capacity during the height of
the violence, according to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).45
Zimbabwe’s largest farmers’ union reported that militias displaced over 40,000 farm workers, and
there were widespread reports of burned homes, granaries, and livestock.46 Human Rights Watch
detailed the “re-education” and torture of more than 70 MDC supporters, seven of whom
reportedly died from their injuries, in Mashonaland province on May 5.47 Amnesty International
reported that victims were often denied medical access and that humanitarian organizations have
been targeted by militias for providing assistance.48 The United Nations’ resident representative in
Zimbabwe warned of an impending crisis, stating, “there is an emerging pattern of political
violence inflicted mainly, but not exclusively, on suspected followers of the MDC.” The level of
violence was confirmed by an 8-person SADC mission, “we have seen it, there are people in
hospital who said they have been tortured, you have seen pictures, you have seen pictures of
houses that have been destroyed and so on.”49
Some who fled to the cities faced further intimidation. Police repeatedly raided the offices of both
the MDC and ZESN. Hundreds were arrested in the MDC raids, many of whom had reportedly
already suffered attacks in their rural homes and fled to the MDC offices for refuge. In these
raids, the police, allegedly looking for subversive documents, took computers and documents. On
May 9, police arrested the leaders of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) based on
speeches made at a worker’s day rally. The head of the Progressive Teacher’s Union was also
arrested. On May 5, more than 50 people were reportedly beaten by riot police during a public
protest against the ongoing violence in the city of Bulawayo; eleven members of a women’s
advocacy group were arrested.
Some Zimbabwean officials, including the police chief, have accused the MDC of rigging and
inciting violence. More than ten newly elected MDC legislators were arrested in the wake of the
March elections. If convicted, they could lose their parliamentary seats. Over 100 election
officers were arrested on charges of committing fraud and abusing public office in favor of the
MDC. Independent reports suggest that teachers, who held many of the election officer positions,
were specifically targeted by government supporters.
44See, for example, “The Opposition Goes for Broke,” The Economist, May 17, 2008, and “Zimbabwe Under Military
Rule, Former Minister Claims,” Pretoria News, May 12, 2008.
45USAID, Zimbabwe: Complex Emergency and Drought, Situation Report 1, May 16, 2008.
46 “Hunger Drives Post-Election Violence, Deepens Poverty,” IRIN, May 9, 2008.
47 “Zimbabwe: End Violence Before June Runoff,” HRW Press Release, May 16, 2008.
48 Amnesty International, “Zimbabwe Violence Reaches Crisis Levels,” May 16, 2008.
49 “Call for State of Emergency Over Zim Violence,” Mail & Guardian, May 14, 2008.
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The Power-Sharing Agreement
Questions surrounding the legitimacy of the Zimbabwe government in the wake of the March and
June 2008 elections left the country mired in political uncertainty for much of 2008. President
Mugabe delayed the swearing in of the new parliament and the naming of a new cabinet as Mbeki
and other international leaders pressed for talks between the parties. When the parliament was
sworn in on August 25, Lovemore Moyo, an MP from the MDC Tsvangirai faction, was elected
as Speaker. He received 110 votes, beating MDC-M MP Paul Themba-Nyathi, who had received
98 votes, including those of most ZANU-PF members of parliament. Two MDC-T MPs were
arrested prior to the swearing in, but were later released.
On September 15, after several weeks of negotiations overseen by Mbeki, Mugabe and Tsvangirai
signed a power-sharing arrangement aimed at resolving the political standoff. The agreement,
known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA), outlined a time frame for the drafting and
adoption of a new constitution.50 As part of the deal, Tsvangirai would become Prime Minister in
a new unity government, and cabinet positions would be divided among the parties. The MDC
factions would take 16 ministerial positions, three of which would come from the MDC-M
faction, and ZANU-PF would take 15 positions. Mugabe, who remains head of state under the
arrangement, would lead the cabinet, but reports suggested that Tsvangirai, who would chair a
Council of Ministers, would be responsible for the day-to-day management of government
affairs.51 Early reports claimed that Tsvangirai would gain control of the police force, while
Mugabe would retain control of the armed forces. The text of the agreement, however, left the
oversight of the police, which falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs, undetermined, and
ZANU-PF has refused to relinquish the position.
In the months after the agreement was signed, the MDC accused the government of abducting and
torturing over forty opposition and civil society leaders, including human rights activist Jestina
Mukuko. Mukuko’s whereabouts were reportedly unknown for three weeks before she was
presented in court on charges of treason. Southern African leaders continued to call on the parties
to implement the agreement, and for the parties to share the Home Affairs ministry, but
Tsvangirai, citing the continued harassment of his colleagues, declared the deal to be unworkable.
After the government of Zimbabwe announced plans to name a new cabinet with or without
Tsvangirai’s participation, SADC leaders renewed efforts to bring the parties together, and on
January 31, amid reports of significant internal debate among the MDC leadership, Morgan
Tsvangirai announced that he would join in a coalition government with President Mugabe.
Coalition Government Formed
On February 11, 2009, Morgan Tsvangirai was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe.
Arthur Mutambara was sworn in as a Deputy Prime Minister, as was MDC vice-president
Thokozani Khupe. The positions were created as part of a constitutional amendment approved
unanimously by the legislature on February 5 that formalized the coalition government and the
GPA. The new ministers and governors were sworn in on February 13. The MDC factions gained
control of several key ministries, including Finance, Public Service, Water, Energy and Power
50 The text of the agreement is available online at [http://www.nimd.org/document/807/zimbabwe-agreement].
51"Zimbabwe Rivals Sign Power-Sharing Deal," Reuters, September 15, 2008.
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Development, Public Works, Health, Education, Commerce, and State Enterprises, which
oversees parastatals. The party hopes to use the Ministry of Constitutional and Parliamentary
Affairs to press for its goal of constitutional reform. The controversial Ministry of Home Affairs
will be co-chaired by an MDC and a ZANU-PF Minister, and the MDC’s ability to affect change
within the police service, still led by a ZANU-PF loyalist, remains uncertain. The arrest of an
MDC ministerial nominee, Roy Bennett, just hours before the ministers were sworn in has raised
serious concerns regarding the MDC’s ability to secure the release of several of its supporters
who are still being held in prison. Bennett and Jestina Mukuko, along with several others, were
released on bail weeks later, but others remain in custody.
Some Policy Reforms Begin, but Challenges Remain
U.S. Ambassador James McGee has termed the coalition government an “imperfect union,” but
also an opportunity. He has suggested, though, that real power sharing between the two parties
remains, to date, limited.52 The continued detention of political activists and the ongoing eviction
of white farmers has led some observers, including Ambassador McGee, to question the
commitment of some within the government to restoring the rule of law in Zimbabwe. President
Mugabe, at his 85th birthday celebration, declared that “the few remaining white farmers should
quickly vacate their farms, as they have no place there…I am still in control and hold executive
authority.”53 He and ZANU-PF ministers have dismissed a 2008 ruling by a SADC tribunal that
found Zimbabwe’s land redistribution program to be illegal, in part because it was based on racial
discrimination.54 Prime Minister Tsvangirai has called the evictions acts of theft and ordered
police to arrest violators; police compliance with his order remains in question.
The coalition government’s early moves to address the country’s economic collapse have been
met with cautious approval by international donors. The position of Finance Minister was given
to MDC Secretary General Tendai Biti, who was absolved of treason charges in early February.
He has been highly critical of Central Bank Governor Gideon Gono in the past, and many
analysts expect the relationship between the two to be contentious. Biti’s initial efforts to revive
the economy, though, appear to be working, at least in the short term. He has cut the
government’s 2009 budget almost in half, from $1.9 to $1 billion, and the Finance Ministry has
begun to implement cash budgeting, allowing the government to spend only what it collects in
revenue, currently estimated at $30 million per month. Soon after the MDC ministers took office,
the government began paying government salaries in vouchers good for $100 U.S. dollars,
regardless of seniority. With foreign currencies like the U.S. dollar and the South African rand
now officially accepted, the government has stopped printing Zimbabwe dollars, which have
become almost worthless. Prices, now pegged to the U.S. dollar, have stabilized and begun to fall,
as has Zimbabwe’s once-rampant inflation rate. The vouchers have encouraged many civil
servants to return to work, including, notably, the country’s teachers, who had been on strike for
months. The $100 per month salary remains low by regional standards, though, and the country’s
unions have warned the government that their members expect salary increases soon.55
52 See the interviews with Ambassador McGee on the State Department’s blog, Dipnote, “Zimbabwe: A Status Report,”
March 24, 2009 at [http://blogs.state.gov/] and on “Morning Edition,” National Public Radio, March 24, 2009.
53 “Who’s Land?” The Economist, March 5, 2009.
54 The case was brought before the regional court by 78 white farmers. The ruling, delivered on November 28, 2008,
found that their evictions had violated the government’s obligation to the rule of law under the SADC treaty.
55 “Zimbabwe Teachers to End Strike,” BBC, February 24, 2009.
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Several international donors, including the United States, have welcomed Biti’s reform agenda,
but remain reluctant to release significant funds for the coalition government. Officials estimate
that some $5 billion will be needed to revive Zimbabwe’s economy, and the Finance Minister has
requested $2 billion from donors to address immediate needs. Maintaining the flow of foreign
currency to pay salary vouchers is particularly critical to ensuring stability, but MDC officials
have acknowledged donor concerns. Prime Minister Tsvangirai, in his inaugural address to the
parliament, warned MPs, “no donor country or institution is going to offer any meaningful
assistance unless our government projects a positive new image.”56 Australia and Sweden have
each offered $10 million dollar aid packages, but those funds are expected to be channeled
through the United Nations and NGOs for humanitarian assistance. To date, only Southern
African governments have publicly indicated a willingness to provide loans or aid directly to the
government. Representatives from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and
the Africa Development Bank (ADB) visited the country in March 2009. The president of the
ADB, to whom Zimbabwe owes an estimated $460 million, called Biti’s initial efforts
“impressive,” and “merit[ing] support,” but called on the country to meet its debt obligations.57
The IMF likewise noted positive steps toward fiscal discipline and offered to provide further
policy advice, but warned that IMF funding would not be renewed until Zimbabwe begins to
repay its debts and establishes “a track record of sound policy implementation [and] donor
support.”58 Zimbabwe owes approximately $89 million to the Fund, an estimated $600 million to
the World Bank, and almost $2 billion to bilateral donors.
Cholera Outbreak
As of mid-March 2009, over 90,000 suspected cases of cholera, including over 4,000 deaths, have
been reported, according to the U.N. World Health Organization. Some health experts suggest the
epidemic could ultimately infect over 100,000 within a short time period, with poor sanitation
conditions compounded by flooding during the current rainy season. Several neighboring
countries have reported confirmed cases in border areas. Cholera, an acute diarrhoeal infection, is
spread by contaminated food and water, and the severity of Zimbabwe’s outbreak has been
attributed to the collapse of the country’s water and sanitation infrastructure and its health
system.59 In Zimbabwe, the reported case fatality rate (CFR) reached almost 6% at its peak in
January 2009, much higher than the normal 1% CFR rate for cholera cases globally. The
country’s CFR decreased to 2.3% in March, and health officials report that the number of cases
reported weekly, while still high, is dropping.60
International Reactions
The international community has been divided over how to respond to the political crisis in
Zimbabwe, and in the early months of the coalition government, donors remain cautious about
when, and under what conditions, international lending will resume. Western governments like
the United States and the United Kingdom have been highly critical of ZANU-PF policies,
56 Inaugural Address by Prime Minister Tsvangirai to the Seventh Parliament of Zimbabwe, March 4, 2009.
57 “ADB Praises Zimbabwe Recovery Plan,” Reuters, February 26, 2009.
58 Tony Hawkins, “IMF Dampens Hopes of Aid to Zimbabwe,” Financial Times, March 25, 2009.
59USAID, “Zimbabwe—Cholera Outbreak,” Fact Sheet #2, Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, December 19, 2008.
60 World Health Organization, “Cholera in Zimbabwe- Update 3,” March 23, 2009.
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particularly in the wake of the 2008 elections. As the weeks progressed after the March polls
without the announcement of official results and world leaders debated whether Zimbabwe was
"in crisis," MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai traveled throughout the region to advocate for
intervention. Almost a month after the elections, he African Union joined the growing number of
calls for the release of the election results. As the delay continued, media attention turned to focus
on a Chinese arms shipment bound for Zimbabwe. In a speech to the House of Commons, British
Prime Minister Gordon Brown called for an international arms embargo against Zimbabwe,
accusing the government of rigging the elections and calling the political situation "completely
unacceptable." The European Union (EU) maintains targeted sanctions against members of
Mugabe's administration, and EU sanctions prohibit member states from selling weapons to the
country. The United States, which also prohibits weapons sales to Zimbabwe and maintains
targeted sanctions, expressed support for Brown's proposal, which was included in a U.S.-
sponsored draft of a U.N. Security Council resolution. Britain's Queen Elizabeth stripped Mugabe
of an honorable Knighthood he received in 1994.
Many analysts suggest that the new coalition government will require a significant influx of
foreign donor assistance to stabilize the economy and address the many humanitarian needs of the
population. However, donors appear wary to commit large-scale funding until they can assess
whether members of the previous administration will adhere to the intent of the power sharing
agreement, working with the MDC to implement reforms necessary to instill donor confidence
and move the country toward a new round of free and fair elections. The reactions of various
international organizations and foreign governments to Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections and to its new
unity government are discussed below.
Table 1. Regional Efforts to Block Arms Transfer to Zimbabwe
On April 18, 2008, as the Chinese freighter An Yue Jiang sat in the waters off South Africa’s port city of Durban
waiting to unload its cargo, the High Court of South Africa issued a court order blocking the cargo’s transfer through
South African territory.61 According to court documents, the ship carried 77 tons of bullets, rocket-propelled
grenades, and mortars bound for Zimbabwe. Freight and dock workers of the South African Transport and Allied
Workers Union (SATAWU) had already refused to unload or transport the shipment. Their protest was backed by
the powerful Congress of Southern African Trade Unions (COSATU) and International Transport Workers’
Federation (ITF), which cal ed for an international boycott of the vessel, dubbed by some as the “Ship of Shame.” The
unions based their protest on concerns that the weapons could fuel violence in the aftermath of Zimbabwe’s
elections.
The international media closely tracked the freighter’s location as it searched for another African port in which to
unload the cargo. Zambia’s President publicly urged regional governments to bar the An Yue Jiang from entering their
waters. He welcomed Mozambique’s decision not to allow the ship access, “because we don’t want a situation which
will escalate the (tension) in Zimbabwe more than what it is.” Then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer
called upon both the regional governments and China to prevent the weapons transfer. On April 22, a Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson announced that the ship would return to China. The An Yue Jiang later docked in
Angola to refuel and unload construction supplies bound for the Angolan market, but was denied permission to
unload its Zimbabwe cargo. It ultimately returned the cargo to China, according to reports.
61High Court of South Africa Durban & Coast Local Division Case No. 4975/08
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The Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Many critics of Mugabe’s leadership in Zimbabwe have faulted the regional body SADC for
inaction in recent years as Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis worsened. However, some
within the organization reportedly advocated for a stronger position to be taken. Zambia’s
recently deceased President, Levy Mwanawasa, who was also the head of SADC before his death,
convened an extraordinary meeting of the Southern African heads of state on April 12, 2008 to
discuss Zimbabwe’s elections. Mwanawasa expressed public concern with the situation in
Zimbabwe in 2007, calling the country “a sinking Titanic whose passengers are jumping out to
save their lives.”62 He convened a similar emergency summit in late March 2007, following the
beating and arrest of opposition officials earlier that month. Although the SADC leaders
reportedly chastised President Mugabe privately at that time, they did not publicly condemn the
regime’s actions and instead appointed President Mbeki to mediate between the ZANU-PF
government and the opposition.
During the April summit, attended by Tsvangirai and Makoni but not Mugabe, the SADC leaders
declined to call the situation in Zimbabwe a crisis. They did, however, publicly urge the
government to release the electoral results “expeditiously,” allow opposition representatives to be
present when vote tabulations were verified, and ensure that a runoff, if needed, would be held in
a “secure environment.” The SADC leaders also called on Mbeki to continue his role as
mediator.63 Mwanawasa reportedly asked the leaders to seek solutions that would allow “the
people’s verdict” to be heard so that Zimbabweans could “turn [over] a new leaf in their history.”
Zimbabwe civil society groups were supportive of SADC’s statements on the electoral results, but
critical of its continued support for Mbeki’s mediation. Mugabe reportedly called the meeting “a
show staged by Britain.”64
Following Tsvangirai's withdrawal from the runoff, President Mwanawasa reportedly commented
that "elections held in such an environment will not only be undemocratic but will also bring
embarrassment to the region."65 President Mwanawasa suffered a stroke on the eve of the Sharm
el-Sheikh summit and passed away in August 2008. Since the runoff, Botswana has taken the
strongest stance on Zimbabwe, declaring on July 4 that it would not recognize Mugabe as
president. President Ian Khama reportedly called on other SADC leaders to do the same, and he
boycotted an August 2008 SADC summit attended by Mugabe.66 In November, Botswana’s
foreign minister called on the international community to isolate Mugabe and urged neighboring
countries to close their borders. Several other international leaders became increasingly critical of
the SADC response to the Zimbabwe crisis—former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan declared
in late 2008, “It’s obvious that SADC could have and should have done more.”67
Reportedly frustrated by the lack of progress on the implementation of the power sharing
agreement and amidst growing criticism from within the region, the SADC heads of state
62 “Zimbabwe ‘A Sinking Titanic,’”Financial Times, March 22, 2007.
63SADC Communique, “2008 First Extra-ordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government Issued on 13
April 2008, in Lusaka, Zambia.”
64Fiona Forde, “Summit on Zim ‘Coup’ Crisis Stalls,” Sunday Independent, April 13, 2008.
65"Tsvangirai Withdrawal: Key Quotes," BBC, June 23, 2008.
66"Botswana Refuses to Recognize Mugabe as President," BBC, July 8, 2008.
67 “Barred from Zimbabwe, but Not Silent,” The New York Times, November 26, 2008.
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convened in late January 2008 for another push to mediate a final settlement on Zimbabwe.68
President Khama attended, as did President Mugabe, and the MDC objected to his being seated
with the other heads of state during the deliberations. South African President Kgalema Motlanthe
announced that a deal had been reached on January 27. The regional body is now considering a
significant economic aid package to assist the coalition government.
The African Union (AU)
The African Union was critical of the violence in Zimbabwe in 2008, but lacked consensus on
how to address the issue. In a communique on April 17, 2008, the African Union expressed
concern over the delayed election results, “which creates an atmosphere of tension that is not in
the least conducive to the consolidation of the democratic process that was so felicitously
launched through the organization of the elections.”69 In early May, Chairman of the AU
Commission Jean Ping led an AU mission to Zimbabwe, Zambia, and South Africa. He called for
Zimbabwe’s political actors to:
conduct their activities in a free, transparent, tolerant, and non-violent manner to enable
eligible Zimbabweans [to] exercise their democratic rights. It is essential also that peace and
security be maintained, and that the will of the people be respected by all stakeholders once
the results are announced.70
At the June 29- July 1 AU Summit in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, Botswana's Vice President joined
leaders from Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana in calling for punitive measures against the
Mugabe regime. The AU ultimately failed to reach agreement on sanctions, but issued a public
call for talks toward a unity government.
While the AU has traditionally deferred to sub-regional mediation efforts, reports suggest the AU
Chairman, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete (who is also a member of SADC), encouraged a
greater role on Zimbabwe by the United Nations. Kenya’s prime minister, Raila Odinga, and
former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan commented that Southern African leaders could do
more to resolve the crisis. Odinga received widespread attention for his comments on Zimbabwe,
and he called on AU leaders not to allow Mugabe to attend the Sharm el-Sheikh summit. Odinga
also called for peacekeepers to be sent to Zimbabwe.
The African Union has some precedent for intervening in support of democracy within its
member countries, should it chose to do so.71 The intervention of AU leaders in the early days of
68 “A Growing Chorus in S. Africa Urges Action on Mugabe,” Washington Post, January 26, 2009.
69African Union Division of Communication and Information, “Communique on the Situation in Zimbabwe,” April 17,
2008.
70Statement by the Chairman of the AU Commission on the Situation in Zimbabwe on May 6, 2008, available at
http://www.africa-union.org.
71In 2005, after the death of the President of Togo, the Togolese army installed his son as president. The AU declared
the intervention to be a military coup and the AU Peace and Security Council demanded the resignation of the new
president and urged members to impose diplomatic, travel, and arms sanctions until elections were held. The president
stepped down the day after sanctions were imposed. It is notable, in the case of Togo, that the relevant regional body,
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) played an important role in denouncing the coup and
leading the campaign for sanctions. In the second instance of AU intervention, the AU suspended Mauritania from all
organizational activities after the country’s military led a successful coup against the president, in office for 21 years.
Reports suggest that most Mauritanians supported the military’s actions. Nevertheless, the AU upheld the suspension
because it opposed the unconstitutional overthrow of a civilian regime. Following an investigation, the AU decided
(continued...)
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the 2007/2008 Kenyan election crisis is viewed by many as having helped move the two opposed
parties toward negotiations and an eventual post-election agreement. Both SADC and the AU are
identified as guarantors of Zimbabwe’s power sharing agreement.
South Africa
Thabo Mbeki, who resigned from his position as President of South Africa in September 2008,
drew substantial criticism at home from opposition parties, trade unions, and civil society groups
for his reaction to Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections. Mbeki, after visiting Mugabe in Harare on his way
to the SADC summit in April, declared he did not believe Zimbabwe was facing a crisis, that the
delayed release of the presidential results was a “natural process,” and that Zimbabweans must
patiently await their release. Tsvangirai criticized Mbeki for his “quiet support for the
dictatorship,” and called for him to step down as mediator in early 2008.72 According to reports,
Mbeki wrote President Bush a letter warning the United States not to interfere in the Zimbabwe
situation after the March elections.73
In the months following Zimbabwe’s general elections, domestic public pressure may ultimately
have forced Mbeki to take a stronger position on the violence there: Mbeki visited the country
several times and in May dispatched six retired generals to investigate reports of attacks on the
opposition. The generals reportedly expressed shock at the level of violence.74
On the day of the runoff, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party issued a public
statement noting the effect Zimbabwe's instability has had on the SADC region, accused the
Zimbabwe government of "riding roughshod over the hard-won democratic rights of the people."
The statement cited "compelling evidence of violence, intimidation and outright terror; the
studied harassment of the leadership of the MDC, including its Presidential candidate, by the
security organs of the Zimbabwean government." The ANC also warned outside players not to try
to impose regime change, and expressed support for President Mbeki's continued mediation
efforts.75 According to local press reports, on July 8, Mbeki declared that there was no legitimate
government in Harare and that the creation of a unity government was necessary.76
An outbreak of xenophobic violence in South Africa in 2008 had some, including the South
African Communist Party, an ANC ally, calling for early elections in South Africa.77 In May and
June 2008, Zimbabweans and other foreign nationals were targeted by mobs in several South
African townships; at least 60 were killed and over 25,000 fled their homes. South Africa is home
to some three to five million illegal immigrants, most from Zimbabwe, and some South Africans
blame them for the country’s high crime and unemployment rates and rising food prices.
(...continued)
against sanctions, but held the suspension until elections were held in 2007. Mauritania was suspended from the AU
again in August 2008 following another coup, and the West African country of Guinea has received similar treatment
after a December 2008 coup.
72Barry Bearak, “Zimbabwe Opponent Criticizes Mbeki,” New York Times, February 14, 2008.
73Michael Gerson, "The Despots' Democracy," Washington Post, May 28, 2008.
74 “Anxiety Grows for Kidnaped Zimbabwe Activist,” Voice of America, May 18, 2008.
75 “South Africa: Finding a Workable Solution to the Crisis,” Press Release issued by the ANC on June 27, 2008.
76 “Mbeki Brands Mugabe's Rule Illegitimate,” Pretoria News, July 8, 2008.
77 “Anti-Foreigner Violence Escalates in South Africa,” Reuters, May 19, 2008.
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President Mbeki condemned the attacks, but the opposition criticized the government for not
addressing tensions earlier. On May 21, Mbeki deployed the army internally for the first time
since the end of apartheid to stem the violence.
Others within the South African government and its ruling party have taken a harder line publicly
on Zimbabwe than Mbeki. “In resolving the problem of Zimbabwe, Thabo Mbeki is not speaking
on behalf of the ANC,” a spokesman for the ANC youth wing declared in April 2008.78 Baleka
Mbete, South Africa’s new Deputy President and former speaker of parliament, called the delayed
release of results a “democratic process gone wrong.” In a gathering of the Inter-Parliamentary
Union, she urged representatives of 147 countries not to remain silent on the issue.79
The president of the ruling ANC, Jacob Zuma, who defeated Mbeki in December 2007 for the
party presidency, was publicly critical of Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections. He openly criticized the
delayed announcement of the March results, saying, “there is a crisis in Zimbabwe. We ought to
stand up and do something about it.” While not directly charging the Mugabe administration with
rigging, he distanced himself from Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” approach. In late April, he told
reporters, “Definitely there is something wrong with those elections.... I think the manner in
which the electoral commission has acted has discredited itself, and therefore that is tantamount
to sabotaging the elections.”80 Zuma did not call for Mbeki to step down as mediator, but said “I
imagine that the leaders in Africa should really move in to unlock this logjam,”81 and called for
African leaders to “assist” Mbeki as mediator, “given the gravity of the situation.”82 As ANC
president, Zuma is expected to be the party's choice to be South Africa’s President after the
country’s April 2009 elections.83 Many analysts have predicted that South African policy toward
Zimbabwe, and Mugabe in particular, could change under a possible Zuma administration if the
coalition government collapses or fails to abide by the GPA.84 He has criticized western
governments, however, for withholding financial assistance from the coalition government.85
The United Nations
In the wake of the March 2008 elections, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon joined the United
States, Great Britain, and France in calling on the U.N. Security Council to address the Zimbabwe
situation. In remarks to the Security Council on April 16, Ban expressed his deep concern with
the delayed release of the electoral results, warning,
Absent a transparent solution to this impasse, the situation could deteriorate further with
serious implications for the people of Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean authorities and the
countries of the region have insisted that these matters are for the region to resolve but the
78 “Zimbabwe’s Political Crisis Enters South Africa Domestic Politics,” Voice of America, April 17, 2008.
79Statement by Speaker Baleka Mbete in Cape Town, April 13, 2008, available at http://www.parliament.gov.za.
80 “Zimbabwe Crisis at Critical Level, Warns Zuma,” CNN, April 24, 2008.
81 “Africa Shows Impatience on Zimbabwe Crisis,” Reuters, April 22, 2008.
82 “Zuma Ratchets Up Rhetoric Over Zimbabwe,” Financial Times, April 22, 2008.
83 Zuma, who has been linked to a number of controversies, was expected to face corruption charges in August 2008,
but the case was dismissed on procedural grounds. Prosecutors appealed and Zuma still faces charges. If convicted
prior to the elections, he would be ineligible to stand for the presidency.
CRS Report RL31697, South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations, by Lauren Ploch.
85 “S. Africa’s Zuma Criticizes West over Zimbabwe,” Reuters, March 26, 2009.
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international community continues to watch and wait for decisive action. The credibility of
the democratic process in Africa could be at stake here.
The Secretary-General, who declared the runoff election illegitimate, engaged world leaders to
determine how the international community could “help the Zimbabwean people and authorities
to resolve this issue.”86 His concern was echoed by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
Louise Arbour, who called the runoff a "perversion of democracy.”87
Thabo Mbeki chaired the April 16 Security Council meeting, which was originally called by
South Africa, as rotating chairman of the Council, to discuss cooperation between the United
Nations and the African Union. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Zalmay Khalilzad
recommended that a U.N.-AU mission visit the country. The only African representative to
address the Zimbabwe issue at the meeting was Tanzanian President Kikwete, who praised SADC
for working to “ensure that the will of the people of Zimbabwe is respected.”88
The U.N. Security Council held a special session on April 29 to discuss Zimbabwe, reportedly at
the behest of incoming Security Council chair Britain. European and Latin American members
pressed for a U.N. envoy to visit the country, while other delegations, including South Africa’s,
rejected the proposal. President Mugabe denounced the closed session as “sinister, racist, and
colonial.”89 On June 22, the Council issued a Presidential Statement condemning the violence and
acts of political repression by the Government of Zimbabwe.
On July 8, 2008, the Group of Eight (G8) nations, many of whom already have bilateral sanctions
in place, agreed to impose sanctions against the Mugabe regime due to the ongoing violence. The
G8's announcement set the stage for a U.S.-sponsored resolution in the U.N. Security Council.
The resolution (S/2008/447) called for targeted sanctions on 14 members of the Mugabe regime,
and an international arms embargo. It also requested the appointment of a U.N. Special
Representative on Zimbabwe, and the creation of a Panel of Experts to monitor and evaluate the
situation and the effects of the sanctions. On July 11, Russia and China vetoed the resolution. The
vote was 9, including Burkina Faso, in favor, and 5 against, with South Africa joining Russia,
China, Vietnam, and Libya in opposition. The United States expressed its disappointment with the
two vetos, particularly that of Russia, which had supported the G8 agreement earlier that week.90
South Africa's Ambassador to the U.N. had repeatedly expressed reservations about imposing
sanctions on Zimbabwe, arguing that the situation in Zimbabwe did not pose a threat to
international security and thus should not be considered to be a matter for the U.N. Security
Council. Some criticized South Africa's position, suggesting that the xenophobic violence against
Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa was only one of several examples of how the political
and economic crisis in Zimbabwe has affected the neighboring region. Some analysts suggest that
the African Union acknowledged the threat to regional security in a July 2 resolution issued
during its Sharm el-Sheikh summit, which noted the "urgent need to prevent further worsening of
the situation and with a view to avoid the spread of the conflict with the consequential negative
86 “U.N. Council and AU to debate Zimbabwe,” Reuters, April 16, 2008.
87 “Elections Won't Be Delayed, Zimbabwe Insists,” International Herald Tribune, June 27, 2008.
88 “Spotlight Turned on Zimbabwe at UN Council,” Reuters, April 16, 2008.
89 “Zimbabwe Dismisses U.N. Talks,” Reuters, April 30, 2008.
90Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Africa
Subcommittee on July 15, 2008.
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impact on the country and the subregion."91 South Africa’s term as a rotating member of the
Security Council expired in January 2009.
U.S. Policy on Zimbabwe
Current U.S. Policy
Although the United States’ ability to influence internal developments in Zimbabwe has been
limited, the U.S. government has been an outspoken critic of the Mugabe Administration. U.S.
policy toward Zimbabwe has included a combination of targeted sanctions against the
Government of Zimbabwe, including financial and visa sanctions against select individuals;92 a
ban on transfers of defense items and services; a suspension of non-humanitarian assistance to the
government; and support for South Africa’s mediation between the parties.
In reaction to the uncertainty following the March 2008 elections, the Bush Administration
repeatedly called for the immediate release of the results, and in April called for all parties to
accept and implement legitimate election results, “including, as appropriate, changes in the
parliament, changes in the government.”93 The State Department later registered “deep concern”
about the inadequate “chain of custody” of the ballot boxes in the weeks after the election, and
expressed its view that conditions on the ground would not allow for a free and fair runoff. Prior
to the runoff, then Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer accused Mugabe of “trying to steal
the election,” saying, “My preferred option would be that the will of the people be accepted. That
Mr. Mugabe does the honorable thing and steps down.”94
The Bush Administration was highly critical of the government’s role in the post-election
violence. In May, a State Department spokesman urged Mugabe to “call off his dogs,”95 and U.S.
Ambassador James McGee publicly condemned what he referred to as a “systematic campaign of
violence designed to block this vote for change...orchestrated at the highest levels of the ruling
party.”96 American diplomats and officials from other foreign embassies report that they were
repeatedly harassed by elements of the Mugabe regime, in violation of the Vienna Convention.
On May 13, Zimbabwean police tried to interfere with a multi-country diplomatic convoy outside
Harare.97 The convoy had been visiting hospitals and an alleged interrogation center, and during
the encounter a policeman reportedly threatened to beat a U.S. embassy official. Ambassador
McGee described seeing evidence of violence of a “massive” scope, including proof that civilians
91African Union Summit Resolution on Zimbabwe, Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, July 2, 2008.
92President Bush imposed these sanctions through Executive Order 13288, issued in March 2003. The Order prohibits
transactions with persons, entities, or organizations found to be undermining democratic institutions and processes in
Zimbabwe, who are included in a Specially Designated Nationals(SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
93News Briefing by State Department Spokesman Tom Casey on April 22, 2008.
94News Briefing by State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack on April 15, 2008, and “Mugabe Trying to Steal
Elections, Says U.S. Official,” CNN, April 24, 2008.
95 Daily Press Briefing by State Department Spokesman Tom Casey, May 1, 2008.
96Statement by Ambassador McGee, “Breaking the Silence on Political Violence in Zimbabwe,” May 8, 2008,
available at http://harare.usembassy.gov.
97 The convoy included the ambassadors of the United States, Britain, the EU, and Japan; the deputy ambassadors of
Tanzania and the Netherlands; and embassy staff and journalists.
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had been interrogated at “torture camp” the convoy visited.98 On June 5, five American embassy
staff and two local embassy workers were detailed by police; one of the local workers was beaten.
Embassy staff collected evidence and documented abuses for submission to the U.N, SADC, and
the AU.
In the months following the elections, the Bush Administration repeated its calls for African
governments to play a greater role in resolving the political impasse. During a visit by the British
Prime Minister to Washington, President Bush told the media, “The United Nations and the A.U.
must play an active role in resolving the situation in Zimbabwe.”99 Former Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice said more bluntly, “It is time for Africa to step up.”100 In December, she called
the power sharing talks a “sham.”101
In the early days of his new administration, President Barack Obama reached out to South African
President Motlathe during the January 2009 SADC summit to express his concern regarding
Zimbabwe and to stress South Africa’s role in resolving the political crisis.102 The State
Department has extended congratulations to Prime Minister Tsvangirai on his inauguration, but
has noted, “We will not consider providing additional development assistance or even easing
sanctions until we see effective governance.”103 U.S. officials met with representatives of like-
minded donor governments and institutions in March 2008 to discuss assistance for Zimbabwe.
They agreed to increase humanitarian aid to the extent possible and to support the goals of the
power-sharing agreement, but predicated the provision of development assistance on progress
toward political and economic reforms.
U.S. Assistance
The United States is one of the largest donors of humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwe, providing
over $93 million in food and other humanitarian aid in FY2007 and $186 million in FY2008.
Since December 2008, USAID has allocated an additional $7.3 million in emergency assistance
to address Zimbabwe’s cholera outbreak, part of which is directed toward water and sanitation
projects. The State Department’s FY2009 foreign assistance request for $45.4 million included
$19.4 million for health programs and $26 million in Economic Support Funds, much of which is
designated for either governance or economic recovery efforts.104 This reflects a substantial
increase from previous years; $23.2 million was obligated in FY2007 and $22.9 million in
FY2008. Democracy and governance assistance has been augmented by funding from USAID’s
global Elections and Political Processes fund (EPP). These resources support political party
98 “U.S. Ambassador Says Zimbabwe Government Doing Nothing to Stop Post-Election Violence,” Voice of America,
May 14, 2008. He was later reportedly summoned by Zimbabwe’s Foreign Minister for allegedly violating diplomatic
protocol and was warned not to interfere in internal affairs.
99Remarks by President Bush during a press conference with Prime Minister Brown at the White House, April 17,
2008.
100On-the-Record Briefing by Secretary Rice in Washington, DC, April 17, 2008.
101Roundtable with Secretary Rice and the Associated Press on December 15, 2008.
102 Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Readout on the President’s Call to South Africa’s President
Motlanthe,” January 27, 2009.
103 Daily Press Briefing by State Department Spokesman Robert Wood, February 11, 2009.
104This amount does not include food aid, which is allocated throughout the year in
response to need. The FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act became law in March 2009.
Final country allocations have yet to be determined.
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strengthening, voter registration, and training of election monitors. According to the State
Department’s Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ), “in anticipation of a more moderate
government arising,” FY2009 funding will support programs to “re-establish and strengthen
democratic institutions, processes and systems, and to build legislative consensus on democratic
reform.” Such programs would support legal reforms, national dialogue on key issues, civil
society advocacy, and enhanced media capacity. In the event of no change in government during
FY2009, the CBJ proposed to reprogram these resources to aid opposition efforts to press for
reforms.
Congressional Interest
Several Members of Congress have issued statements highly critical of the Mugabe
Administration, the delayed release of the 2008 election results, and the political violence in
Zimbabwe. Some have written letters to Administration officials or African leaders. On April 25,
2008 the Senate passed S.Res. 533, introduced by Senator John Kerry, calling for the immediate
release of the presidential results, an end to the political violence and intimidation, and a peaceful
transition to democratic rule. The resolution also supported calls for an international arms
embargo and other targeted sanctions against the Mugabe regime, and encouraged the creation of
a comprehensive political and economic recovery package in the event a democratic government
is installed. The House of Representatives passed H.Res. 1230, sponsored by Representative
Donald Payne and all the House Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, among others,
condemning the violence and calling for a peaceful resolution to the political crisis. The House
also passed H.Res. 1270, sponsored by Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, calling for an
international arms embargo, urging the United Nations to deploy a special envoy to Zimbabwe,
and encouraging the parties to discuss the creation of a government of national unity. Prior to the
June runoff, Representative Adam Schiff had introduced legislation calling on the Zimbabwe
government to postpone the election. Representative Tom Tancredo also introducted legislation,
H.Con.Res. 387, calling for the United States to sever diplomatic ties with Zimbabwe. In the
111th Congress, Representative Ros-Lehtinen has introduced H.Res. 238, declaring the economic
and humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe to be a threat to international security.
President Mugabe has frequently claimed that Western sanctions are to blame for the collapse of
the country’s economy, despite the absence of trade sanctions against Zimbabwe. In 2001,
Congress passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA) (P.L. 107-99),
criticizing the “economic mismanagement” and “undemocratic practices” in Zimbabwe. This
legislation called for consultations with allies on economic sanctions and a travel ban. It also
prohibited U.S. support for financial assistance to Zimbabwe by international financial
institutions until the President has been able to certify that certain conditions pertaining to the rule
of law, democratic elections, and legal and transparent land reform have been met. Zimbabwe
was, however, already ineligible to receive loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) because it is in arrears to
those institutions for debt payments.
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Policy Options105
Following the creation of Zimbabwe’s coalition government, U.S. policymakers are now
reexamining how to approach President Mugabe and his new administration. The Bush
Administration, which initially expressed support for the September 2008 power sharing
agreement, withdrew support months later for any arrangement in which Robert Mugabe would
remain in office. As mentioned above, President Obama’s Administration has taken a “wait and
see” approach and has made the return of effective governance a prerequisite to the lifting
sanctions or the provision of financial support for Zimbabwe's economic recovery. With the
establishment of the unity government, like-minded donor countries and institutions expect
certain economic and political policy changes be made prior to a resumption of financial
assistance; Britain’s initial response has been similar to that of the United States. If the
installation of Tsvangirai and other MDC officials into government positions does not bring about
a change in governance, some in the international community may explore other avenues for
addressing the country's political and economic problems.
Diplomatic Pressure
Certain countries, including the United States, declared the Mugabe Administration illegitimate
after the 2008 elections. Prior to the September agreement, some suggested that these
governments should officially recognize Tsvangirai as President, and allow him to establish a
government in exile. The MDC and others had called for the United Nations to deploy human
rights monitors to investigate the political violence. Although South Africa and SADC have
already deployed inquiry teams, the presence of U.N. monitors could be influential, particularly if
the Zimbabwe government takes no initiative to investigate or prosecute abuses. The Mugabe
Administration has, in the past, reportedly denied similar delegations entry. In November 2008,
the government refused to provide visas to several members of the group of world leaders known
as the Elders, including Kofi Annan and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Based on interviews
in South Africa, Carter declared the crisis there to be “much greater, much worse, than anything
we had ever imagined.”106 There have been calls for members of the Mugabe government to be
referred to international justice regimes, although some observers suggest such calls for justice
should be considered carefully now that the coalition government has been established.
Humanitarian Assistance
The food security situation in Zimbabwe remains critical, with an estimated five million people
having required food assistance in 2008 and almost nine million, over three quarters of the
population, expected to need food aid in the coming months. Several Southern African countries
have suffered from chronic food insecurity in recent years, stemming from a combination of
weather-related and man-made factors, including prolonged drought, floods, poor economic
105There have been a number of studies conducted on policy options to re-engage Zimbabwe, including, Michelle D.
Gavin, Planning for Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Special Report No. 31, October
2007; Todd Moss and Stewart Patrick, The Day After Comrade Bob: Applying Post-Conflict Recovery Lessons to
Zimbabwe, Center for Global Development Working Paper no. 72, December 2005; and “After Mugabe: Applying
Post-Conflict Recovery Lessons to Zimbabwe,” Africa Policy Journal, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, vol. 1, Spring 2006.
106 “Carter Shocked by Zimbabwe Crisis,” BBC, November 24, 2008.
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performance, and the impact of HIV/AIDS. Although drought is partly to blame for Zimbabwe’s
food shortages, analysts believe that disruptions to the farming sector resulting from Mugabe’s
land seizure program are the main reason for reduced food production.107 Nearly all of the
country’s 4,500 commercial farms have now been taken by the government and redistributed or
divided. The government’s land redistribution program is reportedly plagued by inefficiencies,
with large portions of redistributed land not being actively farmed. Tractors and other inputs to
production are in short supply. Thousands of experienced farm workers were reportedly forced to
flee seized commercial farms, and many of those who now hold farmland have no agricultural
expertise. The displacement of farm workers and vandalism that has followed the March 2008
elections also contributes to food insecurity. The 2008 maize harvest was severely affected by a
combination of flooding followed by extreme dry weather. The crop production deficit in much of
the country is estimated at 75 to 100%. Global food needs increased dramatically in 2008, and the
competition for international resources may severely affect the international community’s ability
to address food insecurity in Zimbabwe.
Poor sanitation and water shortages pose serious health risks in Zimbabwe’s urban centers, as the
cholera epidemic highlights. Basic hygiene items, such as soap, have become too expensive for
many residents. In the country’s second largest city, Bulawayo, service delivery, including
garbage collection, has declined severely because of budget shortages, and reports suggest
ambulances and fire trucks sit unused because the city council cannot afford fuel or spare parts.
Severe water shortages also plague Harare. According to U.N. reports, the political violence and
government interference has impeded the delivery of NGO assistance. At his inauguration, Prime
Minister Tsvangirai announced the appointment of a senior cabinet member to coordinate
emergency and development efforts and assured citizens that the government would remove all
duties on food imports.
Economic Recovery108
The United States and other international actors have discussed financial incentives and
assistance to facilitate Zimbabwe’s economic recovery in the event of a democratic transition.
Zimbabwe’s economy has collapsed in the last decade, and every sector of the economy has been
affected. Annual outputs of wheat, maize, and tobacco, once Zimbabwe’s largest foreign
exchange earner, have plummeted. Manufacturing output dropped over 47% in the decade
between 1996 and 2006. Zimbabwe’s mining sector has been similarly affected, although the
platinum industry remains a major income earner for the government.109 World Bank and IMF
lending has been suspended for more than six years due to nonpayment of arrears, and foreign
currency for essential imports, particularly fuel, is in extremely short supply. Zimbabwe’s
inflation rate, at several hundred million percent according to official government figures, is the
107On the land takeovers in Zimbabwe, see AI, Zimbabwe: Power and Hunger—Violations of the Right to Food,
October 15, 2004.
108Information in this section was drawn from a variety of sources, including David Coltart, “A Decade of Suffering in
Zimbabwe: Economic Collapse and Political Repression under Robert Mugabe,” CATO Institute Development Policy
Analysis No. 5, March 24, 2008; Sonia Munoz, “Central Bank Quasi-fiscal Losses and High Inflation in Zimbabwe: A
Note,” IMF Working Paper, April 2007; and “Zimbabwe: Article IV Consultation - Staff Notes,” IMF Country Report
No. 05/360, October 2005.
109Zimbabwe has the world’s second largest reserves of platinum, behind South Africa. The largest mining operations
in the country are controlled by Impala Platinum and Anglo Platinum, respectively. These South African-owned
companies are the world’s largest platinum producers.
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highest in the world and has contributed significantly to the country’s economic collapse.
Zimbabweans have faced steep rises in the prices of food and non-food items, including rents.
These factors have all contributed to increasing pressure on both the people of Zimbabwe and
members of Mugabe’s government. On September 26, 2008, Zimbabwe began officially trading
in foreign currency in an attempt to lower prices. In one of the most public displays of
dissatisfaction among the military to date, shortages of cash caused rioting and looting by army
soldiers in Harare in late November.
According to the IMF, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s quasi-fiscal activities have been
primarily responsible for the surge in the country’s money supply in recent years. Losses from
such activities were estimated to be 75% of GDP in 2006. These activities include monetary
operations to absorb excess liquidity; subsidized credit; sustained foreign exchange losses
through subsidized exchange rates for selected government purchases and multiple currency
practices; and financial sector restructuring. After the government implemented its price control
policy in June 2007, cutting prices of basic commodities by 50% in an effort to stem inflation,
manufacturing output fell more than 50% within six months and many firms were forced to close.
The price controls also resulted in a shortage of basic goods and have contributed to worsening
social indicators. The government’s fast track land reform and more recent policy changes such as
the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act, have created significant uncertainty over
property rights, deterring foreign direct investment and lowering consumer confidence.
In the MDC’s program to revive the economy, the party has committed to stop printing new
money, eliminate price controls, open foreign exchange, and bring in the IMF to assist in
reforming the government’s fiscal policies. 110 Tsvangirai in 2008 floated the idea of replacing the
Zimbabwe dollar with a new currency.111 Some analysts have suggested that the existing dollar
could be temporarily linked to either the South African rand or the U.S. dollar to stabilize its
value. The party’s economic policy stresses a free market approach, and promises to privatize
most state-owned companies, dismantle patronage networks, and simplify the tax code. In
recognition that the government’s bloated budget has contributed significantly to current
economic woes, Tsvangirai initially promised a significantly smaller cabinet, if he were to
become president, as part of a deficit-reduction strategy. The MDC has proposed a land audit and
a program to “harmonize” land-tenure so that those on communal lands can hold an individual
title. The party would consider compensation for those who lost land illegally. It remains unclear
how much influence the MDC will have in pressing its economic policies under the coalition
government, although new Finance Minister Tendai Biti has had some initial successes, such as
paying public servants in foreign currency. Biti will likely face many hurdles in pushing the
MDC’s free market policies and countering the entrenched patronage system that currently exists.
The State Department’s FY2009 budget request states that “If political change ensues and
legislative restrictions are lifted, Zimbabwe will need significant support from the United States,
in coordination with other donors, to reform, rebuild, and recover.” Western donors, including the
United States, have met periodically in Europe to explore reconstruction options, and their
representatives meet regularly in Harare to coordinate existing aid programs. Norway has pledged
a major economic stabilization package from Nordic countries in return for “a true democratic
110See, for example, Morgan Tsvangirai, “Freedom for Zimbabwe,” The Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2008. The
Reserve Bank made a major change to its fiscal policy in May 2008, allowing the Zimbabwe dollar to float to address
hyperinflation. The coalition government “dollarized” the economy in February 2009.
111 “Tsvangirai Promises New Zimbabwe Currency,” The Australian, March 28, 2008.
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election” and the adoption of sound fiscal policies, although the exact amount of such a package
has not been announced. Britain has made similar pledges, and has maintained its willingness to
release funds to pay for parts of an orderly land redistribution program if Mugabe retires and the
rule of law is returned. With Mugabe remaining in office under the September agreement, it is
unclear whether Britain would concede to release such funds. Prime Minister Gordon Brown has
indicated that no assistance will be given until political prisoners are released and restrictive laws
repealed. By some estimates, the cost of Zimbabwe’s economic recovery may be almost $5
billion over a five-year period to cover food support, land reform, health services and education,
infrastructure, balance of payment and budget support, and emergency aid programs. In the event
of “political change” in Zimbabwe, ESF funds in the State Department’s FY2009 request could
be directed toward support for “monetary and fiscal policy reform and economic revitalization,
specifically agricultural and private sector productivity and improvement of the business enabling
environment.”
The World Bank and the IMF have developed strategies for Zimbabwe’s economic recovery.
Given the need to cut government spending to reduce the government deficit, significant donor
assistance will be required to rebuild the public health sector, which according to reports may
have lost as much as 80% of its skilled workforce. The education sector faces similar challenges.
Save the Children UK estimates that attendance at public schools in Zimbabwe dropped from 85
to 20% between 2007 the end of 2008, and that some 30,000 teachers had left the public
education system.112 Reviving the country’s agriculture industry will require delicate handling to
address historical grievances against white Zimbabweans regarding land distribution and
tenure.113 Congress authorized $20 million in its ZDERA legislation for land reform assistance for
FY2002, and some analysts suggest this level of annual assistance may still be appropriate.114
Accountability and Reform
The inability of the country’s judicial system to protect its citizens or their property, or to provide
due process to those seeking remedy or compensation, suggests a fundamental crisis in the
implementation of the rule of law in Zimbabwe. Analysts suggest that the country will require
significant judicial and security sector reforms as part of larger constitutional reforms. The people
of Zimbabwe will also have to determine what level of accountability they may seek, not only for
recent political violence, but for historical grievances and alleged official corruption under the
Mugabe Administration. Tsvangirai has proposed the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission similar to that of South Africa, “striking a healthy balance between reconciliation
and accountability.”115 Prior to the September 2008 agreement, he offered Mugabe “an honorable
exit as... father of the nation,” but it is unlikely that the MDC would consider extending such an
112 “Children and Teachers Unlikely to Return to School as Zimbabwe Term Begins,” Press Release from Save the
Children UK, January 27, 2009.
113The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has suggested that raising the yields of communal farming
areas, which compose 50% of Zimbabwe’s land, could guarantee food security. The country’s annual maize
requirement for human consumption is estimated at 1.4 million metric tons. The FAO estimates that a $50 million
investment annually for three years to train farmers and provide seeds and fertilizer would significantly increase yields
and cost less than what Zimbabwe now pays to import food. See “Zimbabwe: Small Scale Farmers Seen as Backbone
of Food Security,” IRIN, May 15, 2008.
114Gavin, Planning for Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 31, October 2007.
115Morgan Tsvangirai, “Freedom for Zimbabwe,” The Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2008.
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Zimbabwe: The Power Sharing Agreement and Implications for U.S. Policy
offer to all senior security officials implicated in acts of violence.116 According to media reports,
the security chiefs refused to attend Tsvangirai’s inauguration. Under the terms of the power
sharing agreement, a new constitution is expected to be developed within two years; many expect
fresh elections to be held at that point. Mugabe and other senior officials may resist a peaceful
exit from power if they fear subsequent prosecution, as occurred with the former presidents of
Liberia, Chad, and Zambia.117
Author Contact Information
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
116 “Zimbabwe Opposition Seeks Peacekeepers for Run-off,” Reuters, May 11, 2008.
117Former Liberian President Charles Taylor now faces war crimes charges before the Special Court for Sierra Leone at
the Hague; former Chadian President Hissan Habre is expected to be tried in Senegal for human rights abuses
committed by his regime; and former Zambian President Frederick Chiluba is on trial in Zambia for corruption.
Congressional Research Service
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