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The 111th Congress may consider extending the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), the
centerpiece of the Bush Administrations efforts to prepare foreign security forces to participate in
international peacekeeping operations. Established in mid-2004, GPOI is a multilateral, five-year
program with planned U.S. contributions of some $660 million from FY2005 through FY2009.
GPOI’s primary purpose is to train and equip 75,000 military troops, a majority of them African,
for peacekeeping operations by 2010. GPOI also provides support for the Center of Excellence
for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), an Italian training center for gendarme (constabulary police)
forces in Vicenza, Italy. In addition, GPOI is promoting the development of an international
transportation and logistics support system for peacekeepers, and is encouraging an information
exchange to improve international coordination of peace operations training and exercises in
Africa. In June 2004, G8 leaders pledged to support the goals of the initiative.
GPOI incorporates previous capabilities-building programs for Africa. From FY1997 to FY2005,
the United States spent just over $121 million on GPOI’s predecessor program that was funded
through the State Department Peacekeeping (PKO) account: the Clinton Administration’s African
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor, the Bush Administrations’s African
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. (The term ACOTA is now
used to refer to GPOI’s training program in Africa.) Some 16,000 troops from ten African nations
were trained under the early ACRI/ACOTA programs. Some $33 million was provided from
FY1998 to FY2005 to support classroom training of 31 foreign militaries through the Foreign
Military Financing account’s Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC).
Within a year after GPOI was initiated in late 2004, the Administration began expanding the
geographical scope of GPOI to selected countries in Central America, Europe, and Asia. In 2006
and 2007, the program was further expanded to countries in Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific.
GPOI now includes 51 “partner” nations and organizations throughout the world, although the
emphasis is still on Africa. According to figures provided by the State Department, almost 57,600
peacekeeper trainees and peacekeeper trainers were trained as of January 31, 2009. Funds
allocated to the GPOI program from FY2005 to FY2007 totaled, as of May 2007, some $278
million. For FY2008, Congress fully funded the Bush Administration’s $95.2 million GPOI
request, and the State Department allocated a bit more, some $96.44, million to GPOI. Through
March 6, 2009, the State Department notified Congress of $26.72 million allocated to GPOI.
Congress has tended to view the concept of the GPOI program favorably, but the 109th Congress
balked at providing funding for a number of reasons: a lack of a strategic plan and evaluation
program, perceived laxness in management, and a sense of a less than full commitment to the
program by State Department, among others. The State Department has taken some steps to
remedy these perceived shortcomings.
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Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Purposes and Goal..................................................................................................................... 1
Achievements to Date ............................................................................................................... 1
Funding to Date......................................................................................................................... 2
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
GPOI Purposes and Activities ......................................................................................................... 3
GPOI Goals and Needs ............................................................................................................. 3
Demand for Peacekeepers................................................................................................... 4
Need for Gendarme/Constabulary Forces........................................................................... 5
U.S. Peacekeeping Training and Assistance, Pre-GPOI, in Sub-Saharan Africa ...................... 5
The Transition to GPOI Training and Assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa ................................. 6
Development of a “Beyond Africa” Program............................................................................ 7
Western Hemisphere ........................................................................................................... 7
Asia/South Asia/Pacific Islands .......................................................................................... 8
Greater Europe (Europe and Eurasia) ................................................................................. 8
Middle East ......................................................................................................................... 9
Foreign Response and Contributions ........................................................................................ 9
Administration Funding Requests and Congressional Action ....................................................... 10
FY2005-FY2008 GPOI Funding............................................................................................. 10
Issues for the 111th Congress ................................................................................................... 13
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Table 1. GPOI Allocations, FY2005-FY2008 ............................................................................... 12
Table 2. GPOI Training Summary, FY2005-First Third, FY2009................................................. 15
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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 17
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As the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) enters the last of its five planned years, the
111th Congress may begin considering whether to extend training for foreign military and police
forces through this program. (In October 2008, the National Security Council’s Deputies
Committee approved a five-year renewal of GPOI’s mandate.) Previous Congresses have
generally endorsed the concept of this program, but also have questioned whether the program is
as well-managed as possible and whether it will achieve its goals. The 111th Congress may wish
to consider whether its concerns, stated in past legislation, have been met.
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Established to train 75,000 international peacekeepers by 2010, GPOI was the George W. Bush
Administration’s signature initiative to build international peacekeeping capacity. The
Administration launched the five-year $660 million (in FY2005-FY2009 funds) initiative in mid-
2004 as a means to alleviate the perceived shortage worldwide of trained peacekeepers and
“gendarmes,” as well as to increase available resources to transport and sustain them
(“Gendarmes,” also known as constabulary police, are police with a combination o f policing and
military skills considered vital to the semi-stable environments of peace operations, where the
potential for outbreaks of rioting and other violence creates a need for specially-trained police
forces.). While the United States has provided considerable support to implement several peace
processes and to support peacekeepers in the field from a variety of budget accounts for well over
a decade, until GPOI it had provided relatively little funding to build up foreign military
capabilities to perform peacekeeping operations.1
In plans for GPOI after 2010, State Department officials state that the program’s emphasis would
shift from direct training to building the capacity of foreign nations to develop their own
peacekeeping infrastructure and capabilities.
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As of the end of January 2009, GPOI funds have supported the training of 54,245 military troops
as peacekeepers and of 3,350 military personnel to train others in peacekeeping skills. Of those
trained, GPOI reports that as of January 30, 2009, some 46,115 troops from 21 countries were
deployed to 18 peacekeeping operations and 1 election observer mission, and another 4,860
troops were in the process of being deployed.2 In addition, GPOI has supported the training of
1 The term “peacekeeping” is used generically here. It covers the range of activities referred to elsewhere as peace
operations, stability operations, or stabilization and reconstruction (S&R)operations.
2 These missions include the U.S.-run mission of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), two NATO-run operations, x African
Union run operations, 10 United Nations operations, a joint African Union- United Nations mission, and two other
operations. The NATO missions are the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) within Operation Enduring
Freedom, in Afghanistan, and the Kosovo Force (KFOR.). The African Union-run operations are AMIS in Sudan and
AMISOM in Somalia. The 10 U.N. operations are MINURSO in Western Sahara,, MINUSTAH in Haiti, MONUC in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, ONUB in Burundi, UNFIL in Lebanon, UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNMIL
in Liberia, UNMIS in Sudan, UNOCI in the Ivory Coast, and UNOSIL in Sierra Leone. GPOI trained troops have also
contributed to UNAMID, the joint African Union-United Nations operation in DARFUR> The other two missions are
the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC) and and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
(RAMSI).
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1,932 police trainers from 29 countries at the Italian-run Center of Excellence for Stability Police
Units (CoESPU) in Vicenza, Italy.
In addition to training peacekeepers, GPOI supports a variety of institutions specializing in or
contributing to peacekeeping operations. These include 22 peace operations training centers
around the world, as well as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS).
GPOI also provides funds for the Transportation Logistics Support Arrangement (TLSA), which
has supported troops deploying to several peacekeeping missions,3 and other GPOI deployment
equipment funding has supported troops deploying to some of these and other missions.4 In total,
as of January 30, 2009, GPOI had contributed $65.4 million to provide equipment to and
transport troops deployed to seven missions, according to GPOI officials.
In total, all GPOI-funded activities helped deploy 46,115 troops from 21 countries to 18
peacekeeping operations and 1 election observer mission, as of January 30, 2009, with an
additional 4,860 troops about to deploy at that time.
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Through FY2008, GPOI funding totaled $374.46 million. In addition, the State Department has
notified Congress of $26.72 million that it intended to obligate through March 6, 2009. With these
funds, GPOI has provided for the training of 57,595 peacekeepers and peacekeeping trainers as of
January 31, 2009.5 (For a breakdown of this number by country, see Table 2, below.) The Bush
Administration’s FY2009 request called for $106.2 million in peacekeeping operations funds.
According to GPOI officials, if funded for FY2009 at the FY2008 level of $95.2 million, the
program is on track to reach the 75,000-person training goal by mid-2010.
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Before mid-2004, the United States provided peacekeeping capacity-building assistance to
foreign militaries primarily under two programs, the African Contingency Operations Training
and Assistance program (ACOTA) and its predecessor program, and the Enhanced International
Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC). Both ACOTA and EPIC have been subsumed under
the GPOI budget line. ACOTA is still the term used to refer to the Africa component of GPOI,
however, and is implemented by the State Department’s Africa Bureau.
Overall responsibility for GPOI rests with the State Department Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs’ Office of Policy, Plans, and Analysis (PM/PPA). (Information about GPOI is available at
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoiteam/gpoi/index.htm). PM/PPA works closely with DOD
offices to plan and carry out the program.
3These are AMISOM, AMIS, UNAMID, and UNIFIL.
4 These are AMIS, AMISOM, MINUSTAH, UNMIS, and OEF/ISAF.
5 Information provided by Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, e-mail of February 23, 2009.
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Impetus for GPOI came from the Department of Defense (DOD), where officials in the Office of
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) worked with the State Department for
over a year and a half to develop the proposal. Officials in SO/LIC’s section on peacekeeping
developed the plan as a means to expand and improve the ACOTA program—with more and
better exercises and more equipment—as well as to extend the program beyond Africa to other
parts of the world. Policymakers hoped that the availability of peacekeeping training would
encourage more countries to participate in peacekeeping operations, enable current donors to
provide a greater number of troops, and increase the number of countries which potentially could
serve as lead nations, according to some analysts.
The GPOI budget is part of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Peacekeeping (PKO) account,
also known as the “voluntary” Peacekeeping account, under the Military Assistance rubric. The
PKO account funds activities carried out under Section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended (FAA).6 Section 551 authorizes the President to provide assistance for
peacekeeping operations and other programs to further U.S. national security interests “on such
terms and conditions as he may determine.” (This provides some flexibility to the President, but
is not tantamount to the discretion that he can exercise when funding is provided
“notwithstanding any other provision of law.”)
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In his September 21, 2004 address to the opening meeting of the 59th session of the U.N. General
Assembly, President Bush asserted that the world “must create permanent capabilities to respond
to future crises.” In particular, he pointed to a need for “more effective means to stabilize regions
in turmoil, and to halt religious violence and ethnic cleansing.” A similar rationale prompted the
Clinton Administration to formulate the ACRI training program in 1996 and underlies the current
search for new strategies and mechanisms to prevent and control conflicts.7
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To accomplish these ends, the Bush Administration set three major GPOI goals:
• Train some 75,000 troops worldwide, with an emphasis on Africa, in
peacekeeping skills by 2010. (The number is the total to be trained by all
participating countries, according to a State Department official.)
• Support Italy in establishing a center to train international gendarme
(constabulary) forces to participate in peacekeeping operations (see section
below); and
6 The State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations account (i.e., PKO, also known as the “voluntary” peacekeeping
account) funds U.S. contributions to peacekeeping efforts other than assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping
operations. U.N. assessed contributions are funded through the State Department’s Contributions to International
Peacekeeping Account (CIPA).
7 For more information on this topic, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions:
Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and
Reconstruction Capabilities, by Nina M. Serafino.
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• Foster an international deployment and logistics support system to transport
peacekeepers to the field and maintain them there.
Through GPOI, the State Department also promotes the exchange of information among donors
on peace operations training and exercises in Africa. This is accomplished through donors
meetings which serve as a “clearinghouse” to facilitate coordination. The first of these State
Department meetings was held in Washington, D.C. on October 7-8, 2004.8 The United Kingdom
hosted a second meeting in February 2006, the Russian Federation hosted a third in June 2006,
and Germany hosted a fourth in March 2007. All four of these meetings focused solely on Africa,
according to a State Department official. The State Department is planning the first global
clearinghouse for later this year (2007), which will include information exchanges on efforts to
build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide.
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For many analysts, a continued effort to improve the peacekeeping skills of African and other
military forces is an important step towards controlling devastating conflicts, particularly in
Africa. In the mid-1990s, several developed nations provided most of the peacekeepers. The
perception that developed nations would not be able to sustain the burden indefinitely, as well as
the perception that the interests of those nations in Africa were not sufficient to ensure needed
troop commitments there, led international capacity-building efforts to focus on Africa.
As of the end of December 2004, shortly after GPOI first started up, almost 25,000 of the nearly
58,000 military personnel who were participating in the current 17 U.N. peacekeeping operations
were from the 22 African troop-contributing nations. (African nations provided over half of the
military personnel—roughly 24,000 of 47,000—in the seven U.N. peacekeeping operations in
Africa.) Africa’s military contribution to U.N. peacekeeping at the end of 2004 was over double
that at the end of 2000; five of the top ten African contributors, who provided some 98% of the
military contribution, received training under the ACRI/ACOTA program. African contributions
to the U.N. international civilian police pool (CIVPOL) remained just about the same over those
four years: 1,213 in December 2004 (of a total of 6,765 from all nations) compared to 1,088 in
December 2000.
African militaries also participate in regional peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the
Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU). (The
first ECOWAS peacekeeping mission was deployed to Liberia in 1990. Subsequent missions were
deployed to Liberia once again, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, and most recently the Côte d’Ivoire.
The AU deployed its first peacekeepers to Burundi in 2003 and Sudan in 2004. All missions but
Sudan eventually became U.N. operations.) Both organizations are trying to develop an African
stand-by peacekeeping force, comprised of contributions from five regional organizations, by
2010. Under GPOI, the United States will work to enhance and support the command structures
and multilateral staff of ECOWAS and the AU.
8 The United States European Command (EUCOM) held two previous “clearinghouse” meetings in May and December
2004.
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A second capability in short supply is the specialized units of police with military skills to handle
temporary hostile situations such as unruly crowds.9 Several countries have such forces (e.g., the
Italian carabinieri, the French gendarmerie, and the Spanish Guardia Civil, among others). In the
United States these are referred to as constabulary forces.
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From 1996 through 2004, the United States provided field and staff training to develop military
capabilities for peacekeeping through the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its
successor program, ACOTA. Early in FY2005, ACOTA was subsumed under GPOI. Under
ACRI/ACOTA, the United States trained some 16,000 troops from 10 African nations:10 Benin,
Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal,11 and
Uganda. (It also trained a small number of gendarmes who received the same training as the
others.)
The United States also provided non-lethal equipment to the militaries that it trained. This
included communications packages, uniforms, boots, generators, mine detectors, Global
Positioning Systems (GPS), and medical and water purification equipment.
Initially, under ACRI, U.S. soldiers provided field training and oversaw classroom training
provided by private contractors. Because of the demand for U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan,
private contractors also began to conduct field training. By the time GPOI was initiated, private
contractors, many of whom reportedly were retired military personnel and reservists, conducted
most of the training, while active duty military officers played a minimal role. This remains true
today.
9 Gendarme/constabulary forces are trained in both military and policing skills, but are less heavily armed than soldiers.
According to the Clinton Administration’s Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD-71), constabulary tasks include the
regulation of peoples’ movements when necessary to ensure safety; interventions “to stop civil violence, such as
vigilante lynchings or other violent public crimes” and to “stop and deter widespread or organized looting, vandalism,
riots or other mob-type action;” and the dispersal of “unruly or violent public demonstrations and civil disturbances.”
(Text: The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations, February 24, 2000, pp 9-10.) Constabulary forces
often can deploy more rapidly than other international civilian police because they usually deploy as “formed units”
(i.e., in previously formed working groups) instead of as individuals. They also are often equipped with their own
communication and logistical support. See CRS Report RL32321, Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability
Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions, by Nina M. Serafino.
10 ACRI provided training in traditional peacekeeping skills where there is an existing cease-fire or peace accord. The
more muscular ACOTA, initiated in 2002, has also provided training in the skills needed for African troops to perform
peacekeeping tasks in more hostile environments, including force protection, light-infantry operations and small-unit
tactics. Information from a State Department official and Col. Russell J. Handy, USAF, Africa Contingency Operations
Training Assistance: Developing Training Partnerships for the Future of Africa. Air and Space Power Journal, Fall
2003, as posted online at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/fal03/handy.html. ACOTA also
put greater emphasis on the “train the trainer” aspect. As of 2005, training packages included Command and Staff
Operations Skills, Command Post Exercises (i.e., exercises, often computer-bases, of headquarters commanders and
staff) and Peace Support Operations Soldier Skills field training, according to a State Department fact sheet.
11 Military personnel from two of these nations were trained only briefly under ACRI. Training for the Côte d’Ivoire
was halted because of a military coup, and for Uganda, because of that country’s involvement in the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of Congo.
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Funding for ACRI, which like ACOTA was provided under the State Department’s Peacekeeping
Operations (PKO) account, totaled $83.6 million during its six fiscal years (FY1997-FY2002).
(Additional support for ACRI was provided through the Foreign Military Financing program.)
ACOTA was funded at $8 million in FY2003 and $15 million in FY2004.
Other support for classroom training of foreign militaries was provided through the EIPC, a “train
the trainer” program which began in FY1998 and was subsumed under the GPOI rubric. EIPC
provided assistance to selected countries—some 31 as of early 2005—by designing and
implementing a comprehensive, country-specific peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance
training and education program to enhance a nation’s institutional structure to train and deploy
peacekeepers. EIPC funding, provided under the Foreign Military Financing Program, totaled
about $31.5 million through FY2004.
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GPOI was designed as a program with worldwide reach, but its emphasis was always intended to
remain on Africa. In FY2005, all but a few hundred peacekeeper trainees were from outside
Africa, and thus far the great majority of trainees are Africans. (For a detailed account of the
number of trainees from each country, see Table 2 at the end of this report. This table provides
the number of trainees trained using the funds from each fiscal year, not the number of trainees
actually trained in that fiscal year. Because training is still being conducted with previous fiscal
year funds, these numbers will change.) Training in Africa continues to be conducted under the
ACOTA program, which is implemented by the State Department’s Africa Bureau.
In GPOI’s first year, during FY2005, nearly 11,000 African troops were trained using funds
initially appropriated for ACOTA under the regular budget and additional funds appropriated for
GPOI. This number included six battalions from Senegal that were then deployed to specific
peacekeeping missions.12 Other ACOTA partners whose troops were trained using FY2005 funds
were Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Senegal; at least one
other may have been trained with FY2005 funds.
GPOI’s Africa ACOTA component now consists of 20 partners: 18 partner states and two partner
organizations. The states are Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. (However, as the State
Department has suspended all non-humanitarian assistance to Mauritania and Niger, no GPOI
assistance is being provided to those countries at this time.) In addition, GPOI provides assistance
to the African Union and ECOWAS, which are also partners. This assistance includes sponsoring
retired U.S. Army officers contracted as advisors to these institutions.
As of February 23, 2009, GPOI funds have provided training under the ACOTA program for
55,263 peacekeepers, according to the State Department GPOI office. Of these, some 45,606 have
been deployed or where in the process of deploying to a UN or other peace operation as of that
date. In addition, since FY2005, ACOTA has trained 12,627 more peacekeepers from GPOI
12 The Senegalese were trained to participate in missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Côte
d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Darfur.
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partner countries using other PKO funds and funds from the Netherlands. Of those, 12,127 have
been deployed or were in the process of deploying as of February 23, 2009.13
In addition, GPOI supports five peace operations training centers in Sub-Saharan Africa. These
are located in Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, and South Africa.
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In July 2005, the State Department initiated a training and equipping program for countries
outside of Africa (informally referred to at the time as the “Beyond Africa” program)14 in order to
extend GPOI training to three new regions: Latin America, Europe, and Asia. (As in Africa, some
equipment is provided during training, but only that needed for the training itself. Trained troops
are not provided with equipment needed for operations until they deploy.) The number of partner
countries outside of Africa has grown to 31.
The largest number of partners outside Africa are in Asia/South Asia and the Pacific Islands,
where there are 14 partner states. Ten partner states are in the Western Hemisphere, six in Europe
and Eurasia, and one in the Middle East.
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The Latin American program began in Central America, where GPOI funds were initially used to
train and equip soldiers from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, as well as to
upgrade an existing facility in order to establish a peacekeeping training center in Guatemala.
Through this support, Central American countries were able to stand up a battalion of about 600
Central American troops, as part of the Conferencia de Fuerzas Armadas Centroamericanas
(CFAC).
There are now 10 Western Hemisphere partner states: Belize, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Some 1,867
peacekeepers and trainers from Western Hemisphere partner countries and 5 from Canada (which
is not a partner) received GPOI training, as of January 31, 2009. Although Bolivia is a partner
state, it has not yet participated in GPOI activities.
GPOI supports eight peace operations training centers in the Western Hemisphere. These are
located in Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and
Uruguay.
The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) runs major peacekeeping exercises under GPOI
auspices. In 2009, the PKO of the Americas will be held in multiple phases geared to the needs of
each participant. Events are now scheduled to be held in March and May at six locations, with
additional events in June or July.
13 Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, e-mail of February 23, 2009.
14 The Department of Defense transferred the $80 million in P.L. 108-447 (Division J Section 117) supplemental
appropriations to be used for GPOI programs in June 2005. Funds became available for obligation in mid-July, 15 days
after the State Department notified Congress of its spending plans.
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In Asia, the first countries to be extended train-and-equip assistance and provided some logistical
support were Bangladesh, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Thailand (which was subsequently suspended
because of a military coup and reinstated in February 2008). GPOI funds were also used establish
and install communications equipment in a Peace Support Operations Collaboration Center
(PSOCC) in Mongolia.15
Currently, there are 14 partner states in good standing in these regions: Bangladesh, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan,
Thailand, Tonga, and Vietnam. In addition, Fiji is a partners state, but it is currently under
sanctions and not eligible for GPOI assistance. India chose not to join GPOI as a partner state, but
Indian personnel have participated in some GPOI training events through the use of non-GPOI
funds. Personnel from Australia, Brunei, Japan, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea,
New Zealand, and Singapore have also participated in GPOI training events, although GPOI did
not fund the travel and accommodations for personnel from these countries. In all, some 3,287
peacekeepers and peacekeeping trainers from those regions have been trained using GPOI funds.
GPOI supports peacekeeping operations training centers in five countries in these regions:
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, and Thailand.
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In Europe, the first countries whose troops were offered training and other support under GPOI
were Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the Ukraine. Bosnia was provided information
technology support for its training center and a U.S. instructor with FY2005 funds.
Currently, GPOI has six partners states in greater Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Romania, Macedonia, and the Ukraine. Some 53 peacekeepers and peacekeeping trainers
from this area have participated in GPOI training events, including 12 from France, Germany,
Italy and the United Kingdom, which are not partner countries.16
GPOI funds supports peace operations training centers in three countries in Greater Europe:
Albania, Bosnia and Ukraine. GPOI also has provided pre-deployment equipment to SEEBRIG,
the seven-member multinational South East Europe Brigade, composed of personnel from
Albania, Bulgaria, Italy, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey.17
15 This project was part of plans for what was formerly referred to as the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN).
16 However, GPOI did not pay the individual costs of each of these participants, including travel, per diem, and any
other expenses.
17 SEEBRIG as an entity does not hold the presidential determination necessary to receive direct GPOI support, but
GPOI provides support to SEEBRIG through direct assistance to Romania, which hosted the SEEBRIG headquarters.
Original plans were to provide pre-deployment training for troops participating in the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), the NATO peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan, but were changed when it was determined there was
no need for it.
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GPOI’s first and currently only Middle Eastern partner state is Jordan, which was added in
FY2006. Two peacekeepers from Jordan have participated in GPOI training. (One person from
Lebanon also participated in GPOI training, but his participation was not funded by GPOI.).
GPOI funds support a peacekeeping operation center in Jordan.
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G8 leaders18 endorsed the GPOI goals (above) at their June 2004 summit meeting at Sea Island,
GA, adopting an “Action Plan on Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations.”19
(This was actually the third G8 Action Plan concerning peacekeeping in Africa. In June 2002, the
G8 Summit at Kananaskis, Canada, adopted a broad Africa Action Plan that contained sections on
conflict resolution and peace-building efforts. The more specific Joint Africa /G8 Plan to Enhance
African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations was developed over the next year
and presented at the June 2003 Summit at Evian-les-baines, France.20)
As indicated by the GPOI “clearinghouse” concept, several G8 countries have significant
programs in Africa that predated GPOI. In addition to the United States, France and the United
Kingdom (UK) conduct bilateral training programs with African militaries. Germany and the UK
provided the assistance necessary to launch the regional Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping
Training Center in Ghana, which opened in 2004, and Germany is providing continuing
assistance. The European Union and other countries, most prominently Canada, Italy, France and
the Netherlands, have also assisted the Center. Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police
Units (CoESPU)
In his September 2004 speech to the United Nations, President Bush referred to Italy as a joint
sponsor of GPOI, because it co-sponsored with the United States the Sea Island G8 peacekeeping
action plan. Italy also had moved to establish a school for training gendarme forces even before
the United States Congress had provided funding for U.S. support for the school. Italian
carabinieri, who are widely viewed as a leading model and have played a prominent role in
providing constabulary forces to peacekeeping and stabilization operations,21 established the
Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) as an international training center at
Vicenza in March 2005.
Italy is providing not only the facility, but also most of the staff for the “train the trainer”
program. As of mid-2006, some 145 carabinieri were attached to CoESPU, of which about 25
were instructors and training staff. At the same point, two U.S. military service members were
attached to the center. One serves as the Deputy Director, although DOD’s commitment to fill that
slot extends only through 2010. CoESPU would like a commitment of five U.S. military service
18 G8 refers to the “Group of 8” major industrialized democracies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the
United Kingdom and the United States. G8 heads of state, plus representatives from the European Union, meet at
annual summits.
19 Text available at http://www.g8usa.gov/d_061004c.htm.
20 Texts available at http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/kananaskis/afraction-en.pdf and http://www.g8.gc.ca/
AFRIQUE-01june-en.asp.
21 According to Carabinieri officials interviewed by the author, as of mid-November 2004, some 1,300 carabinieri
were deployed in missions to Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Albania, and Palestine.
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members, one as Deputy Director and others to assist with information, training, and studies and
research efforts, including the development of doctrine. France and Russia have provided guest
instructors.
A U.S. contribution of $10 million for the school’s operation and training programs was
transferred to Italy in late September 2005. (According to CoESPU officials, the U.S.
contribution covers about one-third the cost of running the school.)22 CoESPU’s goal, by 2010, is
to train 3,000 mid-to-high ranking personnel at Vicenza and an additional 4,000 in formed units
in their home countries.
CoESPU offers high-level courses (for staff officers ranking from Lt. Colonels to Colonels and
their civilian equivalents) consisting of four-and-a-half weeks of classes (approximately 150
classroom hours) in international organizations, international law (including international
humanitarian law), military arts in peace support operations, tactical doctrine, operating in mixed
international environments with hybrid chains of command, and the selection, training, and
organization of police units for international peace support operations.
The Center also offers a course for junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers (sergeant
majors to captains) and their civilian equivalents. This course covers the materials taught in the
high-level course with an emphasis on training in the more practical aspects, including checkpoint
procedures, VIP security and escorts, high-risk arrests, border control, riot control, election
security, and police self-defense techniques.
(The first high-level class graduated 29 officers on December 7, 2005. The first class consisted of
officers from Cameroon, India, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, and Senegal. A pilot course for the
middle-management level began on January 13, 2006, and seven weeks later graduated about 100
officers. Students for this course were drawn from the same six countries as those at the first-high
level course.)
CoESPU is also developing a lessons-learned and doctrine writing capability in order to serve as
an interactive resource for SPUs. It intends to develop a coherent and comprehensive SPU
doctrine to promote interoperability in the field, to ensure that doctrine is the basis of training
standards and methods, and to respond to questions from SPU commanders in the field, as well as
to support pre-mission and in-theater training exercises.
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Funding for GPOI totaled $374.46 million from FY2005 through FY2008. Initial dedicated
funding of $96.7 million in FY2005 was contained in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for
FY2005 (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447), split between the Department of State (almost 20%) and the
22 Author’s interviews at CoESPU, June 2006.
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DOD (80% as funds to be transferred to State) budgets.23 For FY2006, the State Department
allocated $100.4 million to GPOI, which was slightly more than half of the total PKO account,
but some $14 million below the President’s request.24 For FY2007, the Administration requested
$102.6 million for GPOI funding. House and Senate action signaled some discontent with the
program.25 The final continuing resolution26 that funded most government operations and
programs through FY2007, including GPOI, left the decision on the amount of GPOI funding for
FY2007 largely to the State Department, albeit in the context of a reduced availability of funds.27
23 Although the initiative had long been in the works, President Bush approved GPOI in April 2004, two months after
the FY2005 budget request was submitted to Congress. To fund the initiative at approximately $100 million in
FY2005, the Administration proposed that 80% be DOD funds and the remaining 20% be ACOTA State Department
funds. The Armed Services committees did not back GPOI because of concerns that its inclusion in the DOD budget
would divert funds from U.S. troops. GPOI’s strongest support seemed to come from Senate foreign affairs authorizers
and appropriators. Nevertheless, in the end, Congress divided the FY2005 GPOI funding in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447) as follows. Section 117 of Division J (“Other Matters”)
provided that “$80 million may be transferred with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense” to the Department of
State Peacekeeping Operations account, where it was allocated to GPOI. Division D of H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447
contained $20 million in State Department PKO funding for the ACOTA account and nearly $1.8 million in EPIC
Foreign Military Financing funding. Both accounts which are now subsumed under GPOI.
24 The Bush Administration requested $114.4 million for FY2006 GPOI funding. The House FY2006 Foreign
Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 3057 (as reported by the House Appropriations Committee (HAC), H.Rept. 109-
152, on June 24 and passed on June 28), contained $96.4 million for GPOI. In its report, the HAC expressed its support
for GPOI as a means for the United States to “reduce the emphasis on the use of military troops for these operations.” It
explained that it had provided $18 million less than the request because it did not expect that all $63 million indicated
for equipment and transportation outside of Africa could be obligated and spent in 2006. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee version of the State Department authorization bill for FY2006 and FY2007 (S. 600, S.Rept. 109-35,
reported on March 10, 2005, and returned to the calendar on April 26) would have authorized $114.4 million for
FY2006 and such sums as may be necessary for FY2007 for GPOI. The House version (H.R. 2601, H.Rept. 109-168, as
reported by the House International Relations Committee on July 13, 2005 and passed on July 20) The Senate version
of the bill (as reported June 30 and passed July 20), contained $114.0 million for GPOI. does not mention GPOI and
does not detail accounts in such a way as to indicate whether GPOI is funded. There was no further action on the bill.
In the end, Congress did not dedicate any funds specifically for GPOI (or for any other program in the PKO account) in
the conference version of the FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriation bill (H.Rept. 109-265, P.L. 109-102, signed
into law November 14, 2005), which funded the PKO account at $175 million—$20.8 million below the
Administration’s request of $195.8 million. The State Department eventually allocated an estimated $100.4 million for
25 The House was disinclined to provide full funding.25 Senate appropriators expressed discontent with State
Department management of the program. They proposed that GPOI funding be transferred to a new FMF program and
recommended that the COESPU program be either fully funded by other countries or be transferred to the State
Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) In the Senate Appropriations
Committee (SAC) version of H.R. 5522, the State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Bill for
FY2007 (S.Rept. 109-277), approved by SAC on June 29, 2006, funding for GPOI would be transferred from the PKO
account to a new program under the Foreign Military Financing Program. S.Rept. 109-277 stated that the State
Department “has failed to demonstrate a requisite level of commitment to the program, instead viewing funds provided
for GPOI as a funding source for other activities.” [The State Department transferred $57 million in GPOI funds to
support urgent needs of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur, Sudan, according to a State Department
official.] The report also scored the State Department for ignoring committee guidance on GPOI and for its inability “to
articulate any plan for the use of fiscal year 2005 funding until calendar year 2006.” S.Rept. 109-277, p. 92.
The SAC recommended that a Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund be created under FMF, the purpose of which
would be “identical to GPOI, namely, to identify the critical shortfalls in the training, equipment, and capabilities of our
allies to serve in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.” To decide on the allocation of funds, the Assistant
Secretary of State for Political-Military [Pol-Mil] Affairs would consult with commanders of the U.S. regional military
commands (U.S., Pacific, Central, European, and Southern) to identify “the most critical training and equipment
shortfalls of our peacekeeping partners and regional allies” in order to develop a three year plan and program to address
those needs. S.Rept. 109-277, p. 92.
26 Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007 (H.J.Res. 20, P.L. 110-5, signed into law February 15, 2007.
Amends P.L. 109-289, division B, as amended by P.L. 109-369 and P.L. 109-383.)
27 Congress, in effect, reduced the amount of funding available for the GPOI program by funding the overall PKO
(continued...)
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The State Department’s FY2007 GPOI obligations totaled $81 million (i.e., $1 million less than
provided for in the House-passed FY2007 Foreign Operations bill, H.R. 5522). (An earlier
version of the Continuing Resolution had set the House-passed amount as the level for FY2007
GPOI funding.) For FY2008, Congress fully funded the Bush Administration’s budget request for
$92.5 million in GPOI funding. (This funding was contained in the omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008 [H.R. 2764, Division J; P.L. 110-161, signed into law December 26,
2007]).28 The State Department allocated almost $4 million more.
Table 1. GPOI Allocations, FY2005-FY2008
(in $ millions)
FY2009 Notified to
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008
Congress through
Category
Actualsa Actualsb Acutals Actuals
3/06/09c
African Contingency Operations Training
and Assistance (ACOTA)
28.92 35.00 40.39 44.00
11.28
Africa Regional HQ Support: African Union
(AU) and the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS)
10.01
9.71
7.15
7.16
4.51
East Asia and the Pacific
7.74
11.00
6.55
9.42
7.73
Europe and Eurasia
5.05
6.00
4.00
5.80
0
Near East (i.e., Jordan)
0
0.65
1.30
1.00
0
South & Central Asia
0.93
5.00
7.36
10.33
0.50
Western Hemisphere
6.49
11.70
8.45
11.65
2.70
Deployment Equipment and Depots
16.98
15.82
1.79
2.52
0
Center of Excellence for Stability Police
0
Units (CoESPU)
15.00
0
0
0
Transportation and Logistics Support
0
Arrangement 5.00
4.00
4.00
3.18
Program Management
0.55
1.51
0
1.39
0
Total
96.66 100.36 81.00 96.44
26.72
Source: Department of State, as of February 18, 2008.
Notes: Some totals do not add due to rounding.
(...continued)
budget at $223.25 million, while earmarking $50 million for peacekeeping operations in Sudan. Congress thus provided
$173.25 million for other (than Sudan peacekeeping) PKO programs in FY2007, i.e., $27.25 million less than the
Administration’s $200.5 million PKO budget request and the same as the FY2006 PKO budget. State Department plans
for FY2007 included spending for two new programs totaling some $31 million, the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism
Initiative (TSCTI) and Liberia, that were not included in the FY2006 budget.
28 Although the Act does not specify funding for GPOI, the Joint Explanatory Statement on the final version of the
omnibus appropriations bill specifies that the executive branch is to take into account House and Senate Committee
report language on bills incorporated into the omnibus when implementing the legislation. The House Report (H.Rept.
110-197) accompanying the original State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill
recommends full funding.
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a. As GPOI was not created until late 2004, FY2005 actuals include funds originally appropriated elsewhere:
$14.88 million in Peacekeeping Account (PKO) funds for ACOTA; $1.79 million in Foreign Military Financing
for Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC), and an $80 million transfer from DOD.
b. FY2006 funding includes $57 million from FY2006 supplemental appropriations.
c. FY2009 funding levels have not been finalized, although it is expected the total amount will be similar to
FY2008. The amounts reported in this column are those notified to Congress through March 6, 2009, under
the continuing resolution.
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Over the past few years, the State Department responded to concerns of the 109th and the 110th
Congresses to strengthen GPOI. Its steps included producing a strategic plan (the executive
summary of which is publically available),29 facilitating procedures to speed planning and
implementation, and implementing an evaluation program. As of 2008, Congress requested30 that
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigate a number of remaining concerns: the
GAO expressed several concerns about GPOI performance and management in a June 2008
report.31
Among the points the Congress requested the GAO to address were (1) the extent to which
contributing and participating countries maintain records and databases; (2) the quality and
sustainability of the training of individuals and units; (3) the extent to which those trained are
equipped and remain equipped to deploy in peace operations; (4) participating countries capacity
to mobilize those trained; (5) the extent to which trained individuals are deployed; and (6) the
extent to which contractors are used and the quality of their results. The committee also requested
an assessment of whether GPOI is achieving its goals and recommendations as to whether a
country’s participation in GPOI “should require reciprocal participation.”
In its June 2008 report, the GAO doubted, based on information available to it in its investigation,
that GPOI would be able to reach its goal of training 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010. The GAO
stated, however, that it could not evaluate information that the State Department subsequently
provided to demonstrate that GPOI would reach its goal. As of February 2008, GPOI officials are
stating that 75,000 will be trained by mid-2010. GPOI officials also state that the program will, as
recommended by the GAO, ensure that plans for extending GPOI activities beyond 2010 identify
29 U.S. Department of State. Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Global Peace
Operations Initiative (GPOI): Summary of GPOI Strategy for Fiscal Years 2005-2006. September 4, 2006.
30 In action on the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), in
Section 1204 of its version of the bill (S. 1547, reported June 5, 2007), called for a GAO study describing and assessing
the activities and implementation of the GPOI program. This requirement was retained in the final bill (H.R. 4986, P.L.
110-181, signed into law January 28, 2008). In the SASC report accompanying the Senate version of the bill (S.Rept.
110-77), SASC stated that it wanted to “strengthen the likelihood that GPOI will be administered in such a fashion, and
that there will be an expectation, if not a requirement, that GPOI training recipient countries contribute troops to U.N.
missions in the near-term, and that GPOI will increase the number of peacekeepers who can remain ready via sustained
training and equipping programs.” SASC expressed concern as to whether the readiness of GPOI-trained troops “is
being monitored or maintained” and noted that program objectives calling for the establishment of an equipment depot
for and of a multilateral transportation logistics support arrangement (TLSA) have not been fulfilled.30 SASC also
expressed concern that participation by other G-8 members has not met expectations.
31 Government Accountability Office. Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but United States is Unlikely to Complete All
Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements are Needed. GAO-08-754, June 2008.
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the necessary resources for developing long-term peacekeeping skills and infrastructure in
Africa.32 They point to plans to concentrate on building infrastructure in any post-2010 program.
The GAO made several recommendations to improve human rights vetting, program
management, and training content. The following bullets note the recommendations and the steps
that GPOI is taking to meet them. Congress may wish monitor progress on the GAO
recommendations.
• Noting that a number of foreign military troops who received GPOI training had
not been properly vetted, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of State
develop a system for monitoring all GPOI vetting activities and for ensuring that
all individuals are vetted. According to GPOI officials, the recommendation
applies not only to GPOI, but to State Department vetting in general. To improve
the vetting system, according to those officials, the Department has secured
funding to establish a database that will facilitate record-keeping and access to
past vetting cases. GPOI program implementers will use the system when it is
available.
• Judging that GPOI was unable to account for the delivery and transfer of
nonlethal training equipment to partner countries, the GAO recommended that
the Secretary of State monitor implementation, on an ongoing basis, of new
procedures to account for delivery and transfer of nonlethal training equipment to
partner countries. According to GPOI officials, the State Department GPOI
Evaluation Team had identified this accountability problem before the GAO
investigation. The ACOTA program has instituted a sole-source logistics contract
to improve the entire logistics process from acquisition to delivery, and is
establishing a mechanism with its African partners to manage joint inventories.
The State Department is developing procedures with other stakeholders to better
account for equipment that is commercially acquired through the State
Department’s Office of Acquisition Management’s regional procurement support
offices. Similarly, new procedures have been developed by the State Department
and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to account for training equipment
provided through the Foreign Military Sales system, with the U.S. government
retaining title to and custody of defense articles until a designated U.S.
government agent confirms and documents delivery of GPOI material to a
recipient country’s authorized representative or agent.
• In order to improve training, GAO recommended that the Secretary of State
develop, in consultation with DOD a training program for GOP that uses standard
military task lists and related training standards in order to establish program-
wide criteria for evaluating the quality of training and measuring trainee
proficiency. According to GPOI officials, a GPOI contractor, Detica, is working
closely with the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations to develop a set of
essential tasks and corresponding training standards to improve training
programs.
• In regard to U.S. support to CoESPU, GAO recommended that the State
Department work with DOD in order to help Italy staff key unfilled positions in
order to better evaluate progress and monitor results. GAO also suggested that
32 Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained. op. cit., p. 35.
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GPOI provide additional guidance to U.S. missions to help the United States and
Italy collect data on the training and deployment of CoESPU graduates. The State
Department is looking into the possibility of using GPOI funds to provide
additional staff at CoESPU who would help with evaluation and monitoring,
including the development of an alumni database, outreach materials, and
tracking mechanisms. Also, according to GPOI officials, U.S. Embassy staff and
others have been asked to help administer a survey regarding the training
activities and deployments of CoESPU graduates. The results may be available
by mid-2009.
Table 2. GPOI Training Summary, FY2005-First Third, FY2009
(#s trained to standard as of January 31, 2009)
Total #
Total #
Region/Country/
Peacekeepers
Peacekeeper
Organization
Trained
Trainers Trained
Total #
Sub-Saharan Africa
Benin 4,260
195
4,455
Botswana 118
47
165
Burkina Faso
2,535
161
2,696
Burundi 1,291
0
1,291
Cameroon 692
101
793
ECOWAS 287
2
289
Gabon 1,212
161
1,393
Ghana 5,965
169
6,134
Kenya 189
5
194
Malawi 1,063
25
1,088
Mali 880
130
1,010
Mauritania - Suspended
284
20
304
Mozambique 868
161
1,029
Namibia 817
71
888
Niger – Suspended
1,041
107
1,121
Nigeria 9,463
586
10,049
Rwanda 4,789
92
4,881
Senegal 7,829
435
8,264
South Africa
211
114
325
Tanzania 775
24
799
Uganda 4,149
137
4,286
Zambia 563
113
676
Sub-Total Africa
49,254
2,856
52,110
Asia/South Asia/Pacific Islands/Middle East
Australia 20
0
20
Brunei 47
5
52
Bangladesh 190
50
240
Cambodia 187
29
216
Fiji (Khaan Quest participant, see
notes) – Suspended
45
2
47
India 83
2
85
Indonesia 361
72
433
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Total #
Total #
Region/Country/
Peacekeepers
Peacekeeper
Organization
Trained
Trainers Trained
Total #
Japan 3
0
3
Jordan 2
0
2
Korea, Republic of
46
6
52
Laos 3
0
3
Lebanon 1
0
1
Malaysia 322
75
397
Mongolia 640
77
717
Nepal
372
35
407
New Zealand
5
0
5
Papua New Guinea
2
0
2
Philippines (Khaan Quest
participant, see notes)
16
0
16
Singapore 12
0
12
Sri Lanka
60
7
67
Thailand 356
35
391
Tonga (Khaan Quest participant,
see notes)
113
7
120
Subtotal Asia/Central Asia/South
Asia/the pacific
2,888 402
3,290
Greater Europe (Europe and Eurasia)
Albania 254
0
254
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3
0
3
France 3
0
3
Germany 4
0
4
Italy 1
0
1
United Kingdom
5
0
5
Ukraine 27
26
53
Subtotal Greater Europe
297
26
323
Western Hemisphere
Belize 55
10
65
Canada 5
0
5
Dominican Republic
13
2
15
El Salvador
215
7
222
Guatemala 751
16
767
Honduras 255
26
281
Nicaragua 445
5
450
Paraguay 36
0
36
Peru 18
0
18
Uruguay 13
0
13
Subtotal Western Hemisphere
1,806
66
1,872
Total 54,245
3,350
57,595
Sources: Compiled from information provided by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs, February 18, 2009.
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Notes: This table does not include soldiers trained by GPOI-trained trainers. The standard used by evaluators
for inclusion was mastery of at least 80% of the coursework and an 80% or better attendance record. NA = Not
Available.
This table includes three countries that are not GPOI partners but were provided support because they
participated in the GPOI-funded August 2006 Khaan Quest multilateral peacekeeping training exercise in
Mongolia on the invitation of the Mongolian government. It also includes Cameroon, which is not a GPOI
partner (i.e., eligible to receive bilateral assistance). It is listed here as receiving training because it sends students
to the Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU).
# Peacekeepers = # soldiers (and occasionally gendarmes) trained in peacekeeping skills in GPOI courses in
order to deploy to peacekeeping operations.
# Peacekeeper Trainers = # soldiers trained to train other military personnel in peacekeeping skills for
deployment to peacekeeping operations (i.e., soldiers trained under the “train-the-trainer” program).
ȱȱ ȱ
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
nserafino@crs.loc.gov, 7-7667
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