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The Future Combat System (FCS) is a multiyear, multibillion dollar program at the heart of the
Army’s transformation efforts. It is the Army’s major research, development, and acquisition
program consisting of 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive
communications and information network. FCS is intended to replace current systems such as the
M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The FCS program has been
characterized by the Army and others as a high-risk venture due to the advanced technologies
involved and the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems together so that FCS-
equipped units can function as intended.
The FCS program exists in a dynamic national security environment which could significantly
influence the program’s outcome. Some question if FCS, envisioned and designed prior to
September 11, 2001 to combat conventional land forces, is relevant in current and anticipated
future conflicts where counterinsurgency and stabilization operations are expected to be the norm.
The Army contends, however, that FCS is relevant throughout the “entire spectrum of conflict”
and that a number of FCS technologies and systems have been used effectively in
counterinsurgency and stabilization campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The economic crisis and
budgetary pressures may also play a prominent role in the future of the FCS program. FCS has
achieved a number of programmatic milestones and is transitioning from a purely conceptual
program to one where prototypes of many of the 14 FCS systems are under development. With a
variety of estimates on the total cost of the FCS program, questions have been raised about FCS
affordability. In 2007, citing the impact of past budget cuts, the Army restructured the program
from 18 to 14 systems. In June 2008, primarily in response to both congressional and Department
of Defense (DOD) concerns about deploying FCS technologies to forces in the field sooner and
overall program affordability, the Army restructured the program again. As currently restructured,
the Army will instead focus its initial FCS equipping efforts on Infantry Brigade Combat Teams
(IBCTs) as opposed to heavier FCS BCTs.
The overall FCS program is in a variety of developmental phases, with some technologies having
been fielded to units and others still under development with varying degrees of success. The
111th Congress, in its appropriation, authorization, and oversight roles may wish to review the
FCS program in terms of its projected capabilities, relevance to current and possible future
military operations, and program costs. This report will be updated as the situation warrants.
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Issues for Congress.......................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
FCS Program Origins................................................................................................................ 1
The FCS Program............................................................................................................................ 2
Program Overview .................................................................................................................... 2
Structure.............................................................................................................................. 3
Capabilities ........................................................................................................................ 3
FCS Program Timeline.............................................................................................................. 4
2009 “Go or No Go” Review ............................................................................................. 4
Program Schedule ............................................................................................................... 4
Future Defense Spending and FCS ........................................................................................... 5
Selected FCS Program Issues.................................................................................................... 6
2008 Program Restructuring ............................................................................................... 6
Current FCS High-Risk Areas ............................................................................................ 7
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) ................................................................................... 7
Potential Radio Spectrum Problems ................................................................................... 9
Warfighter Information Network – Tactical (WIN-T) ........................................................ 9
Delay in the Transformational Communications Satellite (TSAT) Program ................... 10
FCS Armor Development ..................................................................................................11
FCS Manned Ground Vehicle Development......................................................................11
FCS Program Budget Issues.................................................................................................... 12
FY2009 FCS Budget Request........................................................................................... 12
FCS—FY2009 Defense Authorization and Appropriations ............................................. 12
FCS and FY2009 Defense Appropriations ....................................................................... 13
FCS Cost Estimates .......................................................................................................... 14
Potential Issues for Congress......................................................................................................... 15
What Is the Future of the 15 FCS BCTs?................................................................................ 15
What Are the Programmatic, Budgetary, and Operational Impacts of the June 2008
Program Restructuring? ....................................................................................................... 15
How Are Major Complementary Programs Affecting the Development of FCS Units? ........ 15
Progress in MGV Development .............................................................................................. 16
The Financial Crisis, Constrained Defense Budgets, and the Future of FCS.......................... 16
Additional Reading........................................................................................................................ 17
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Table 1. FCS Program Schedule...................................................................................................... 4
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Appendix. FCS Subsystems .......................................................................................................... 18
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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 23
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The Future Combat System (FCS) is a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program at the heart of the
Army’s transformation efforts. It is the Army’s major research, development, and acquisition
program and is to consist of 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive
communications and information network. FCS is intended to replace current systems such as the
M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The Army’s success criteria for
FCS is that it should be “as good as or better than” the Army’s current force in terms of “lethality,
survivability, responsiveness, and sustainability.”1
The primary issues presented to 111th Congress are the capabilities and affordability of the FCS
program, and the likelihood, given a myriad of factors, that the Army will be able to field its first
FCS Brigade Combat Team (BCT) by 2015 and eventually field up to 15 FCS BCTs. Key
oversight questions for consideration include the following:
• Future of FCS BCTs.
• Impact of the June 2008 Restructuring.
• FCS Complementary Programs.
• Manned Ground Vehicle Development.
• Constrained Defense Budgets, Economic Issues, and the Future of FCS.
The 111th Congress’s decisions on these and other related issues could have significant
implications for U.S. national security, Army funding requirements, and future congressional
oversight activities. This report will address a variety of issues including the program’s timeline,
budget, program management issues, program developmental progress and challenges, and how
other related programs could affect FCS.
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In October 1999, then Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Eric Shinseki introduced the
Army’s transformation strategy which was intended to convert all of the Army’s divisions (called
Legacy Forces) into new organizations called the Objective Force. General Shinseki’s intent was
to make the Army lighter, more modular, and—most importantly—more deployable. General
Shinseki’s deployment goals were to deploy a brigade2 in four days, a division in five days, and
five divisions in 30 days.3 As part of this transformation, the Army adopted the Future Combat
System (FCS) as a major acquisition program to equip the Objective Force.4
1 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report “Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case is Needed for
Future Combat System’s Successful Outcome,” GAO-06-367, March 2006, p. 2.
2 According to Department of the Army Pamphlet 10-1, “Organization of the United States Army,” dated June 14,
1994, a brigade consists of approximately 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers and a division consists of approximately 10,000 to
18,000 soldiers.
3 Frank Tiboni, “Army’s Future Combat Systems at the Heart of Transformation,” Federal Computer Week, February
(continued...)
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This transformation, due to its complexity and uncertainty, was scheduled to take place over the
course of three decades, with the first FCS-equipped objective force unit reportedly becoming
operational in 2011 and the entire force transformed by 2032.5 In order to mitigate the risk
associated with the Objective Force and to address the near-term need for more deployable and
capable units, the Army’s transformation plan called for the development of brigade-sized units
called the Interim Force in both the active Army and the Army National Guard. These Interim
Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) were the predecessors to the Army’s current Stryker Brigade
Combat Teams (SBCTs).6
General Shinseki’s vision for the FCS was that it would consist of smaller and lighter ground and
air vehicles—manned, unmanned, and robotic—and would employ advanced offensive,
defensive, and communications/information systems to “outsmart and outmaneuver heavier
enemy forces on the battlefield.”7 In order to initiate the FCS program, General Shinseki turned to
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), not only because of its proven ability
to manage highly conceptual and scientifically-challenging projects, but also because he
reportedly felt that he would receive a great deal of opposition from senior Army leaders who
advocated heavier and more powerful vehicles such as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley
infantry fighting vehicle. In May 2000, DARPA awarded four contracts to four industry teams to
develop FCS designs and in March 2002, the Army chose Boeing and Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC) to serve as the lead systems integrators to oversee certain
aspects of the development of the FCS’s 18 original systems. On May 14, 2003, the Defense
Acquisition Board8 (DAB) approved the FCS’s next acquisition phase and in August 2004 Boeing
and SAIC awarded contracts to 21 companies to design and build its various platforms and
hardware and software.
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The Army describes FCS as a joint (involving the other services) networked “system of systems.”
FCS systems are to be connected by means of an advanced network architecture that would
permit connectivity with other services, situational awareness and understanding, and
(...continued)
9, 2004.
4 James Jay Carafano, “The Army Goes Rolling Along: New Service Transformation Agenda Suggests Promise and
Problems,” Heritage Foundation, February 23, 2004, p. 5.
5 Bruce R. Nardulli and Thomas L. McNaugher, “The Army: Toward the Objective Force,” in Hans Binnendijk, ed.
Transforming America’s Military (National Defense University Press, 2002), p. 106.
6 The Stryker is the Army’s name for the family of wheeled armored vehicles that will constitute most of the brigade’s
combat and combat support vehicles. Annex A (Modular Conversion) to Army Campaign Plan, Change 2, September
30, 2005, p. A-1.
7 The following description of the early stages of the FCS program is taken from Frank Tiboni’s Army’s Future
Combat Systems at the Heart of Transformation.
8 The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) is the Defense Department’s senior-level forum for advising the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on critical decisions concerning DAB-
managed programs and special interest programs.
9 Information in this section is taken from the FCS Program Manager System Overview Briefing, December 10, 2008.
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synchronized operations that are currently unachievable by Army combat forces. FCS is intended
to network with existing forces, systems currently in development, and systems that will be
developed in the future. At present, the Army intends to eventually field 15 FCS BCTs equipped
with new FCS manned ground vehicles and will provide selected FCS communications, sensor,
and unmanned vehicle technologies to all 43 of its Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) by
FY2025.
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FCS Brigade Combat Team (BCT) units would include the following:
• Unattended ground sensors (UGS);
• Two classes of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs);
• Three classes of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs): the Armed Robotic Vehicle
- Assault (Light) (ARV-AL), the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV), and
the Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment Countermine and Transport
Vehicle (MULE-T/C);
• Eight types of Manned Ground Vehicles (MGVs);
• The Network; and
• The individual soldier and his personal equipment and weapons.
The FCS is to serve as the core building block of the Army’s Future Force. FCS BCTs are to
consist of:
• Three FCS-equipped Combined Arms battalions (CABs);
• One Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Cannon battalion;
• One Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) squadron;
• One Brigade Support battalion (BSB);
• One Brigade Intelligence and Communications company (BICC); and
• One Headquarters company.
For a more detailed description of FCS subsystems, see Appendix.
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According to the Army, the FCS Brigade Combat Team (BCT) will be designed to be:
• Self-sufficient for 72 hours of high-intensity combat;
• Self-sufficient for seven days in a low to mid-intensity environment;
10 Information in this section is taken from the 2007 Army Modernization Plan, March 5, 2007, pp. 8-11, and FCS
Brigade Combat Team 14+1+1 Systems Overview 14 March 2007, at http://www.army.mil/fcs/whitepaper/
FCSwhitepaper07.pdf.
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• Able to reduce the traditional logistics footprint for fuel, water, ammunition, and
repair parts by 30% to 70%;
• Sixty percent more strategically deployable than current heavy BCTs; and
• Able to operate across larger areas with fewer soldiers.
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FCS completed its System of Systems Preliminary Design Review (PDR) in February 2009. The
PDR is described as “a multi-disciplined technical review to ensure that a system is ready to
proceed into detailed design and can meet stated performance requirements within cost, schedule,
risk, and other system restraints.”11 Despite the Army’s June 28, 2008, decision to significantly
restructure the FCS program “to accelerate FCS deliveries to IBCTs,”12 Army officials have stated
that “the core program has not changed in terms of its time lines.”13
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In 2006 Congress directed that after the February 2009 FCS System of Systems Preliminary
Design Review (PDR), that DOD conduct a FCS Milestone Review to assess (1) if warfighter’s
needs are valid and can best be met through the FCS program; (2) whether the concept of the
program can be developed and produced within existing resources; and (3) should FCS continue
as currently structured, continue in a restructured form or; (4) be terminated. This “Go or No Go”
Review is currently scheduled for August 2009.
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As of March 2009, the FCS program is operating under the schedule depicted below:
Table 1. FCS Program Schedule15
Date
Event
(FY) Event
Description
Systems of Systems
May
A technical review to evaluate the progress and technical adequacy of each major
Preliminary Design
2009 program item. It also examines compatibility with performance and engineering
Review (PDR)
requirements.
Defense Acquisition
The DAB Review will consider the entire FCS core program and determine
Board (DAB) Review
July
viability and technical maturity in order to move the program into the hardware
11 “Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms,” Defense Acquisition University, Fort Belvoir, VA, 12th
ed., July 2005, p. B-121.
12 U.S. Army News Release, “Army to Accelerate Future Combat Systems Deliveries (FCS) to Infantry Brigade
Combat Teams,” Army Public Affairs Office, Washington D.C., June 26, 2008.
13 Ann Roosevelt, “FCS Needs No New Funds to Accelerate, Officials Say,” Defense Daily, June 27, 2008.
14 For information in this section see P.L. 109-364, John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, Section 214.
15 MG Charles A. Cartwright and Mr. Tony Melita, Future Combat Systems (Brigade Combat Team) Defense
Acquisition Board In-Process Review, June 13, 2007, p. 4, and FCS Meeting with the Army’s Capability Integration
Center, March 3, 2009.
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Date
Event
(FY) Event
Description
2009 prototype build phase.
FCS Milestone “Go
August A DOD review established by Section 214, P.L. 109-364 to determine if the FCS
or No Go” Review
2009 program should continue as planned, be restructured, or be terminated.
Systems of Systems
Dec
A technical review to determine if the detailed design satisfies performance and
Critical Design
2011 engineering requirements. Also determines compatibility between equipment,
Review (CDR)
computers, and personnel. Assesses producibility and program risk areas.
Design Readiness
2011 Evaluates design maturity, based on the number of successfully completed system
Review
and subsystem design reviews.
Milestone C
2013 Milestone C approves the program’s entry into the Production and Deployment
(P&D) Phase. The P&D Phase consists of two efforts—Low Rate Initial Production
(LRIP) and Full Rate Production and Deployment (FRP&D). The purpose of the
P&D Phase is to achieve an operational capability that satisfies the mission need.
Initial Operational
2015 IOC is defined as the first attainment of the capability to employ the system as
Capability (IOC)
intended. (Part of the P&D Phase).
Full Operational
2017 The full attainment of the capability to employ the system, including a fully
Capability
manned, equipped, trained, and logistically supported force. (Part of the P&D
Phase).
Note: Event descriptions in this table are taken from the Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms Glossary
published by the Defense Acquisition University, Fort Belvoir, VA, 12th ed., July 2005.
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As previously noted, the FCS program exists in a “dynamic national security environment which
could significantly influence the program’s outcome.” In the past, that environment took into
account the current, counterinsurgency-type operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the belief that
these types of campaigns would likely be the norm for the Army in the future. While these
considerations remain relevant, there are emerging issues that will also factor into the current and
future security environment. One of these considerations how to best balance the needs for
conventional and irregular capabilities in future defense spending.16 These needs will likely be
examined by the ongoing 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and Secretary of Defense
Gates has repeatedly advised the Services to avoid what he has termed “next-war-itis”—the
tendency to procure technologically advanced, costly major weapons systems that have
questionable use in counterinsurgency-style operations such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Programs
such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Marine’s Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), and
FCS have been mentioned as major, multi-year modernization programs with questionable utility
and that will likely be highly scrutinized during the 2010 QDR. The Army is said to be examining
the relevancy of FCS in terms of Iraq and Afghanistan, as the Secretary of Defense suggested that
“gold-plated programs” will be targets of budget cuts as he looks for programs that “provide a 75
percent solution to a warfighting requirement rather than an exquisite system that meets a 99
percent solution.”17 Another budget-related factor is the current financial crisis. The
16 Marina Malenic, “Pentagon Seeks to Rebalance Conventional, Irregular Capabilities in Future Spending,” Defense
Daily, February 13, 2009.
17 Jason Sherman, “Army Asks Broad Question in Girding for QDR: Is FCS Gold-Plated,” InsideDefense.com,
February 20, 2009.
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Administration is expected to significantly change the military’s investment programs, with some
experts forecasting “huge budget cuts ... mostly likely beginning in FY2011,” which will further
influence ongoing FCS affordability and relevancy debates.18 The Army, in response to these and
other related debates, maintains that “FCS is no longer the same program that it was five years
ago” and that the program is no longer focused on the creation of 15 FCS BCTs but instead about
bringing FCS capabilities to all brigades across the Army.19 Army officials note that current
combat vehicles were “designed in the 70’s and fielded in the 80’s,” and they won’t last forever
and, that in an era of persistent conflict, “there will be no timeout for the Army to modernize.”20
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The FCS program has been characterized as a large, risky, and highly complex program. The
following sections address selected program issues, to include important supporting or what are
known as complimentary programs that are necessary for FCS to achieve its full operational
potential.
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On June 26, 2008, primarily in response to both congressional and Department of Defense (DOD)
concerns about getting FCS technologies to forces in the field sooner and overall program
affordability, the Army restructured the program. In an official press release, the Army announced
the restructuring, characterizing it as an effort “to accelerate FCS deliveries to Infantry Brigade
Combat Teams (IBCTs).”21 The Army now plans to field the following technologies to 43 IBCTs
during the 2011 to 2025 time frame:22
• Tactical and Urban Unattended Ground Sensors;
• Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) Launch System (NLOS-LS);
• Network Kits for High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV);
• Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs);
• Small Unmanned Ground Vehicles (SUGVs); and
• Ground Soldier Ensemble, a soldier-worn command and control system for
dismounted soldiers modeled on the Army’s Land Warrior System, which was
terminated by the Army in FY2008.
18 Jason Sherman, “Lynn: Weapon System Modernization Blueprint Unsustainable,” Inside the Air Force, January 16,
2009 and Dave Ahearn, “Experts See Deep Cuts Coming in Defense Procurement, Myriad Programs at Risk,” Defense
Daily, February 19, 2009.
19 Kate Brannen, “With New Administration Looming, Army Stresses the Utility of FCS,” InsideDefense.com,
December 22, 2008.
20 Ibid.
21 U.S. Army News Release, “Army to Accelerate Future Combat Systems Deliveries (FCS) to Infantry Brigade
Combat Teams,” Army Public Affairs Office, Washington D.C., June 26, 2008.
22 Ann Roosevelt, “Army Tightens FCS Focus on Infantry and Current Fight,” Defense daily, June 26, 2008; U.S.
Army News Release, “Army to Accelerate Future Combat Systems Deliveries (FCS) to Infantry Brigade Combat
Teams,” Army Public Affairs Office, Washington D.C., June 26, 2008; and Daniel Wasserbly, “Bringing Soldiers Into
the Network: Army to Align Ground Soldier Program with FCS Spin Out 1 Fielding,” InsideDefense.com, June 30,
2008 and a FCS Acceleration Briefing provided to CRS on July 21, 2008.
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The Army conducted a Preliminary Limited User Test (P-LUT) focused on infantry units at Ft.
Bliss, TX, in July 2008 in lieu of a previously scheduled heavy FCS BCT Limited User Test. A
formal LUT for the infantry BCT is scheduled for FY2009, and the Army hopes to “Spin Out”
these technologies to IBCTs beginning in FY2011. The Army will alter its overall FCS testing
schedule to accommodate the IBCT FCS spin outs. Army officials plan to field IBCT Spin Out
One equipment to both Active and National Guard IBCTs, based on when the units are scheduled
to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan.23
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The Army has identified six current FCS high-risk areas:
• The performance of the Active Protection System (APS) that is intended to
protect MGVs from short-range and long-range anti-tank systems.
• Protecting against rapidly evolving threats to the FCS network.
• Data transfers between FCS systems that have different data security
classifications.
• Software development and integration.
• Network management functions for reliable on-the-move networking.
• Balancing MGV capabilities.
The Army contends that it has an active risk management program to address these and
other risk areas, including risk management at all program levels, resourced risk
mitigation plans, and weekly review by FCS program leadership.
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JTRS radios are software-defined radios that are to be used to provide voice, video, and data
communications to FCS manned and unmanned ground and aerial vehicles. One of the primary
benefits of JTRS is that it is intended to operate on multiple radio frequencies, permitting it to talk
to certain non-JTRS radios that are expected to stay in the Army’s inventory. JTRS is a joint
program and therefore is not a part of the FCS program but is instead what the Army describes as
a “complimentary program.” JTRS is to form the “backbone” of the FCS Network and therefore
of critical importance to the program’s success. Some have criticized the JTRS family of radios as
“falling short of what the FCS requires” in terms of capabilities, range, and encryption but note
that without the high-bandwidth, all digital JTRS “there is simply no way to transmit the vast
amount of data that the new [FCS] networks will require.”25
23 Daniel Wasserbly, “Testing Pushed Back to Next Summer: Army to Reprogram Funding in FY 08, FY 09 for FCS
Spin Out 1 Changes,” InsideDefense.com, June 30, 2008.
24 Information in this section is from a CRS meeting on the FCS Program with the Army’s Capability Integration
Center on March 3, 2009.
25 Sydney J. Freedberg, “Army Struggles Towards the Goal of Wi-Fi Infantry,” National Journal, September 20, 2008.
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A February 2009 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report to the House Subcommittee on Air
and Land Forces analyzes the Army’s plans to equip its forces with wireless communications
networks, including JTRS.26 The report notes that:
The Department of Defense has encountered a number of problems in developing the JTRS
ground mobile radio (GMR) and the handheld, manpack, small form factor (HMS) radio.
The agency issued stop-work orders on contracts for those systems in 2005 and, in 2006,
restructured the entire JTRS program and revised the associated contracts to incorporate a
reduction in the capability of the radios to be purchased. That decision was made to lower
costs and because DOD realized that not all of the originally planned capabilities were
technically feasible. 27
Because of cost increases, program delays, technical difficulties, and less than anticipated
capability, the Services have significantly reduced their plans for purchasing GMRs and HMSs.
Between 2004 and 2007, the Army decreased its GMR planned purchases by 19%; the Marine
Corps, by 91%; and the Air Force, by 89%.28 Over the same timeframe, the Army reduced its
HMS requirement by 66%; the Navy, by 72%; the Marines, by 68%; the Air Force, by 52%; and
the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)—who originally planned to acquire 52,163
HMSs—is no longer participating in the program.29 Even though the other Services have
drastically reduced their JTRS requirements, the Army plans to fund 80% of the entire JTRS
program and will purchase 95% of the radios produced under the program through 2026. The
significant reduction in the number of JTRS GMR and HMS radios to be procured raises issues
for consideration. One issue is that with the Army now planning to buy 95% of the program’s
radios, it can be argued that the JTRS program has become more of an Army program than a joint
program. Another concern is the apparent “vote of no confidence” in the GMR and HMS radios
by the other Services and USSOCOM. While increased costs and program delays may be critical
factors, it is possible that significantly decreased capabilities may be of prime concern, as the
Services often will accept increased costs and delayed procurement if the system in question is
fully capable. It is also possible that because overall procurement quantities have decreased
significantly, that the per unit costs of the GMRs and HMSs may increase significantly.
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Reports suggest that defense officials are considering a less-costly, two-channel GMR version,
which could cost 20% less than the $220,000 per unit, four-channel GMR presently being
developed by Boeing. The “GMR Lite,” also being developed by Boeing, could be used to
supplement four-channel GMRs, but analysts suggest that there needs to be a “business case” to
justify the engineering expenses to develop the GMR Lite. It has been suggested that the GMR
Lite could be used in smaller and non-combat vehicles, and the four-channel version in larger and
26 Information in this section is taken from a CBO Report to the House Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, “The
Army’s Wireless Communications Programs,” February 11, 2009.
27 Ibid., p. 3.
28 Ibid., p. 4.
29 Ibid.
30 Information in this section is taken from Joe Gould, “Amid Budget Debate, Defense Officials Eye Less Costly JTRS
Versions,” IndideDefense.com, March 9, 2009.
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command and control vehicles. General Dynamics is said to also be developing a two-channel
HMS JTRS version that could cost $15,000 per channel.
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One report suggests that the Army’s former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions,
Logistics, and Technology, Claude Bolton, was concerned that within the next five years, the
Army may not have enough radio spectrum “to allow its next-generation networked force [FCS]
to work as it is being designed to.” The concern is that beginning in 2010, when the Army
introduces JTRS and additional technologies designed to transmit vast amount of data from
soldiers, sensors, and unmanned and manned ground and aerial vehicles, the available bandwidth
will become overwhelmed. To get a better appreciation for the potential problem, both the Army
Science Board and RAND Corporation have been asked to estimate the Army’s future bandwidth
needs, and the FCS program is investigating how FCS will perform if the network is degraded by
lack radio spectrum availability and network.
ȱ ȱ ȱȮȱȱǻ ȬǼȱȱ
WIN-T is described as the Army’s “communications network of the future consisting of a three-
tiered architecture of orbital, airborne, and ground links that will provide connectivity to a
dispersed and highly mobile force.”32 WIN-T is intended to permit the Army to communicate and
transfer large amounts of data on the move and is a capability central to the success of the FCS
program.33
Ȭȱ řŚȱ
The Army is presently fielding WIN-T Increment One (which began fielding in 2004 as Joint
Network Node or JNN). WIN-T Increment One is intended to support static headquarters. WIN-T
Increment Two is intended to provide network management and the mobile portion of the system,
including on-the-move satellite communication (SATCOM) and networking line-of-sight radio.
Testing of Increment Two is currently underway and if testing is successful, Increment Two
equipment could begin to enter service in 2011.35 WIN-T Increment Three is slated to enter
service in 2015 and will link UAVs and other intelligence systems to on-the-move ground
systems. WIN-T Increment Four is planned to include linkage to the U.S. Air Force’s
Transformational Communication Satellite (TSAT) system, which will provide a more capable
and protected on-the-move SATCOM system.
31 Information in this section is taken from Kris Osborn “U.S. Army Faces Spectrum Crunch,” Defense News, January
7, 2008: Sandra I. Erwin, “Army Struggling With Rising Demand for Communications,” National Defense, April 2008;
and Alec Klein, “Weapons Upgrade Faces Big Hurdles: Problems With Wireless Technology May Threaten Army’s
Ambitious Plans,” Washington Post, April 8, 2008 .
32 Scott Nance, “Analyst: Advanced Networks to be Rumsfeld Legacy,” Defense Today, Volume 26, Number 233,
December 8, 2005, p. 3.
33 “Army Restructures WIN-T to Meet Future Combat System Requirements,” Inside the Army, July 3, 2006 and Josh
Rogin, “DOD: Projected WIN-T Costs Soars by $2.2 Billion,” Federal Computer Weekly, April 10, 2007.
34 Information in this section is from Giles Ebbut, “WIN-T Restructuring Fuels Greater Demand,” Jane’s International
Defence Review, December 2007, p. 17.
35 Kris Osborn, “2nd WIN-T Phase Adds Ad-Hoc Networking to Moving Vehicles,” Defense News, November 10,
2008, p. 16.
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CBO notes that the Army used $12 billion in supplemental funding to purchase about 1,100 WIN-
T Increment One JNN equipment sets from 2004 to 2007. Beginning in 2009, the Army plans to
acquire 1,837 Increment Two equipment sets at a total cost of more than $3 billion. Increment
Three, which will provide the Army with the “full set of on-the-move Internet communications
capabilities of the original WIN-T program,” is still not yet fully defined and cost estimates are
not available, although some believe that Increment Three will cost as much as the entire original
WIN-T program, which was valued by some sources at a little over $16 billion in 2007.37 Because
Increment Four is still in conceptual development, CBO has no information regarding the
program schedule and potential costs.
ȬȱřŞȱ
The Army and General Dynamics are making preparations to conduct a limited user test of WIN-
T Increment 2 in late March 2009. If the test is successful, a production decision and contract
award could occur in July 2009 to support the next phase of testing, the Initial Operational Test
and Evaluation (IOT&E). If the IOT&E testing is successful, a full rate production decision is
anticipated. General Dynamics is the prime systems integrator and is teamed with Lockheed
Martin, BAE Systems, Harris Corporation, L-3 Communications, and Cisco Systems.
¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻǼȱȱřşȱ
In October 2008, the Pentagon decided to delay the award of a potential $15 to $20 billion
contract for the TSAT until the fourth quarter of FY2010. TSAT is described as a constellation of
satellites that securely transmit large quantities of data at unprecedented speeds, which should
permit military forces to communicate more effectively on the move. Prior to the postponement,
TSAT was scheduled to be available by 2015, but the delay now means that the earliest that the
first TSAT satellites could be launched is around 2019. In December 2009, the TSAT program
was restructured and scaled back and a new draft request for proposal (RFP) was issued. The final
request for bids is anticipated in April 2009, and the winner of the approximately $11 billion
initial contract could be announced by April 2010. There is no guarantee, however, that the TSAT
program will go forward, as some Members have expressed concerns about the program’s
proposed technologies as well as its cost, and some Pentagon acquisition officials believe that
less-complex and less-costly alternatives are available.
36 Information in this section is taken from a CBO Report to the House Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, “The
Army’s Wireless Communications Programs,” February 11, 2009.
37 Josh Rogin, “DOD: Projected WIN-T Costs Soars by $2.2 Billion,” Federal Computer Weekly, April 10, 2007.
38 Information in this section is taken from Ann Roosevelt, “Army Prepares for Limited User Test for General
Dynamics’ WIN-T Increment 2,” Defense Daily, March 10, 2009.
39 Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Pentagon Postpones Big Satellite Contract Until FY10,” Reuters.com, October 20, 2008; Andy
Pasztor, “Pentagon Delays Program to Build New Satellite, Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2008; and Daniel
Wasserbly, “Army:TSAT Delays Would Hinder FCS Comms, But Service Can Wait,” InsideDefense.com, October 27,
2008; Erik Holmes, “U.S. Air Force Details TSAT Plan,” Defense News, January 19, 2009, p. 23.
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Army officials acknowledge that the TSAT delay affects FCSs’ networking capabilities but that
current satellites are sufficient until faster and more capable satellites become available. Army
officials have said that TSAT is not required for the initial fielding of FCS BCTs in 2015 but, in
order to achieve the Army’s full vision of FCS, that the TSAT or an equivalent system will be
required. Some suggest that the TSAT program is “sinking fast”and there is a possibility that the
Army is downplaying the negative operational impact that a TSAT program termination could
have on FCS.
ȱȱŚŗȱȱ
The FCS MGV is being developed with upgradable armor. The Army describes this as an “A plus
B” replaceable armor system, where the A is the vehicle hull and B is attachable armor. Under
this system, the MGV hull or the “A” armor will remain essentially the same once prototyping is
complete and the “B” armor will be improved over time to make it stronger and lighter and then
attached the MGV hull. The Army suggests that there are a number of benefits to this approach.
One benefit is that the FCS MGVs will theoretically be able to “add or change armor to confront
emerging threats,” which could result in extended utility of MGVs as potential threats emerge.
Other suggested benefits are that the MGV could become lighter (therefore more transportable
and maintainable) as newer generations of composite, ceramic, lightweight armors are developed.
The ability to extend the operational life of MGVs with upgradable armor may result in potential
long-term cost savings. Information gained from the development of upgradable, modular armor
is also being applied in the development and upgrading of Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected
(MRAP) vehicles as well as individual body armor, which may also contribute potential cost
savings in these programs as well.
ȱȱ ȱȱŚŘȱ
According to reports, the MGV chassis—which is intended to be the common chassis for all eight
MGV variants—will likely pass an early 2009 preliminary design review, so that prototyping may
begin in 2011. The MGV offers a number of unique features, which may not only improve
operational capabilities but could also result in cost savings over time. The MGV is planned to
have the Army’s first hybrid propulsion system, incorporating a diesel internal combustion engine
that will act as a generator, electric drive motors, and a battery system for energy storage. The
Army maintains that some of the benefits include better fuel efficiency, the ability to generate
significant amounts of power for onboard systems as well as to export outside the MGV, silent
running, and enhanced maintainability. The MGV will also likely incorporate segmented band
track, which should be lighter, less costly, more fuel-efficient, and easier to maintain than the
tracks used currently on Army fighting vehicles. The Army believes that the MGVs will also
improve sustainability. Because the Army intends that there will be greater than 70%
40 Ibid.
41 Information in this section is taken from a CRS visit to Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD on January 23, 2009 for a
demonstration of FCS MGV development and associated advanced armor technologies and Kate Brannen, “Army
Plans Series of Upgrades to FCS Manned Ground Vehicle Armor,” InsideDefense.com, January 26, 2009.
42 Information in this section is taken from Marjorie Censer, “TARDEC Seeking Improvements in FCS Manned
Ground Vehicle Design,” InsideDefense.com, February 2, 2009 and the Army’s FCS Website “Focus On: Manned
Ground Vehicles,” accessed February 25, 2009, https://www.fcs.army.mil/mgvfocus/commonchassis.html.
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commonality between the eight MGV variants, that there will be a significantly reduced support
burden in terms of dedicated soldiers, equipment, and support units which might translate into
cost savings. The Army contends that 80 percent of the MGV’s potential maintenance problems
can be fixed by the vehicle’s crew, which should result in a “reduced logistics foot print.” The
Army notes that the MGV program, as currently envisioned, represents a significant domestic
financial impact. The current MGV program is said to encompass “more than 839 suppliers in 38
states totaling more than $6.2 billion in development cost impact.” This aspect of the program
could become a significant consideration if the FCS program is targeted for restructuring by the
Administration.
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The Administration requested $3.7 billion for FY2009—with approximately $3.3 billion for R&D
and approximately $300 million for procurement. Procurement funds include the manufacturing
and assembly of the first six Non-Line-of-Sight Cannons (NLOS-C) to be fielded in FY2010 and
FY2011 and for software and communications packages that are intended to link the FCS
network to M-1 Abrams, M-2 Bradleys, and modified wheeled vehicles that will serve as
surrogates for FCS MGVs during FCS initial operational tests scheduled for FY2011.
ȯŘŖŖşȱȱ£ȱȱȱŚŚȱ
The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) recommended fully funding the President’s FCS
FY2009 Budget Request. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Air and Land
Subcommittee initially recommended $ 200 million less than the President’s Budget Request.
The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009 (S. 3001/P.L. 110-417)
authorized an increase in FCS RDT&E funding by $33 million while reducing procurement
funding by $137.7 million—a net reduction of $104.7 million as opposed to the original HASC-
proposed $200 million reduction.45 The FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
also contained the following FCS-related provisions:46
• (Section 111) Beginning with the FY2011 Budget Request, requiring separate
procurement funding lines for five FCS equipment classes, including manned
ground vehicles, unmanned ground vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles,
unattended ground sensors, and “other FCS elements”;
43 Information in this section is taken from “The Army Budget - Fiscal Year 2009,” U.S. Army News Release, Army
Public Affairs Office, February 4, 2008 and Daniel Wasserbly, “Army’s FY-09 Budget Includes $3.6 Billion for Future
Combat Systems,” InsideDefense.com, February 11, 2008.
44 For additional information on FY2009 Defense Authorizations and Appropriations, see CRS Report RL34473,
Defense: FY2009 Authorization and Appropriations, by Pat Towell, Stephen Daggett, and Amy Belasco; Press Release,
United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Senate Armed Services Committee Completes Markup of
National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2009,” May 1, 2008; John M. Donnelly, “Defense: House Armed
Services Panel Aims at Administration’s Defense Priorities,” CQ Today, May 7, 2008, p. 11.
45 S. 3001: Duncan Hunter FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act Summary, p. 14.
46 Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany S. 3001, September 2008.
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• (Section 112) A measure that would prohibit the Army from awarding new low-
rate or full-rate production contracts for “major systems or subsystems” of FCS
to companies serving as the program’s lead systems integrator. Under this
provision, program prime contractors would be considered a lead systems
integrator until 45 days after the Secretary of the Army certifies to congressional
defense committees that the contractor is no longer serving as a lead systems
integrator;
• (Section 211) Adds provisions to the FY2009 NDAA (P.L. 109-364) mandated
FCS Systems Milestone Review addressing the use of actual demonstrations—as
opposed to simulations—to demonstrate that software development is on a path
to achieve threshold cost and schedule requirements; if demonstrations of the
communications networks are adequate to inform major program decision points;
the extent to which FCS MGVs are degraded if FCS communications are
degraded; how resistant is the FCS communications network to network attacks,
jamming, and interference; total program cost estimate (including spin-outs) and
confidence level in that estimate; and a program affordability assessment based
on the above-mentioned cost estimate and projected Army budgets.
• (Section 212) Requires that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Integration to submit a report to congressional defense committees by September
30, 2009, on the FCS communications network and software. The report is to
include an assessment of the vulnerability of FCS to enemy network attacks;
electronic warfare and jamming; and adverse weather and complex terrain. Also
the report is to cover FCS’s dependence on satellite communications support,
including network performance in the absence of assumed satellite
communications support. The report will also address how a degraded network
would affect FCS performance and MGV survivability. The report will also
include an assessment developed in coordination with the Director of Operational
Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E) on the adequacy of the FCS communications
network testing schedule as well as an assessment also involving DOT&E on
funding, schedule, and technological maturity of WIN-T and JTRS as they relate
to the FCS program, including spin outs.
• (Section 213) Beginning February 15, 2009, through 2015, the Secretary of the
Army is required to submit a Selected Acquisition Report in accordance with
Section 2432, Title 10, United States Code, for each variant of the FCS manned
ground vehicle (MGV).
ȱȱŘŖŖşȱȱȱŚŝȱ
H.R. 2638 (P.L. 110-329) the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing
Appropriations Act of 2009 provided for, among other things, continuing appropriations for
defense activities that would be covered under a regular FY2009 defense appropriations bill.
Under the provisions of this act, the restructured FCS program was fully funded and $2.6 billion
47 U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations Press Release, “Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Approves
Fiscal Year 2009 Defense Appropriations Bill,” September 23, 2008 and House Committee on Appropriations Press
Release, “Summary: 2009 Defense Appropriations,” September 22, 2008.
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above the President’s request was added to accelerate the unmanned aerial and ground vehicle
programs.
ȱȱȱ
In March 2006, GAO estimated that the current total cost for the FCS program was $160.7 billion
(then-year dollars)—an increase of 76% over the Army’s first estimate.48 In July 2006, the
Department of Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) estimated that the total cost
for the development, procurement and operations of FCS had increased to more than $300
billion.49 The Army maintains that the total cost for the FCS program will be roughly $230
billion, based on an April 2006 estimate from the FCS Program Office.50 An August 2006
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study postulated that, given historic cost growth in similar
programs, that annual FCS costs could reach $16 billion annually, exceeding the Army’s
estimates of $10 billion annually.51 The Army has disputed CBO’s estimates, calling them
“seriously flawed” suggesting that CBO does not address the strategic environment or changing
operational requirements.52 In June 2007, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)—a nonprofit
corporation that administers three federally funded research and development centers—reportedly
concluded that the FCS program would cost $13 billion more than what the Army has estimated,
a conclusion that the Army has rejected.53 Some maintain that this wide disparity in FCS cost
estimates eight years into the program has resulted in a lack of confidence that the FCS program
can be conducted in a cost-efficient manner.
On April 7, 2008 DOD provided Congress with revised cost estimates on a number of defense
acquisition programs. DOD revised the total FCS program cost downward by 1.6% to just over
$159.3 billion, primarily due to the application of revised inflation indices, but also including past
incorrect indices, decreases in other program support, and congressional statutory reductions.54
48 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report “Acquisitions: Business Case and Business Arrangements Key for
Future Combat System’s Success,” GAO-06-478T, March 1, 2006, p. 8.
49 Megan Scully, “Army Sticks to its Guns, Rejects New FCS Cost Estimates,” National Journal’s Congress Daily AM,
July 13, 2006.
50 Ibid.
51 “The Army’s Future Combat Systems Program and Alternatives,” A CBO Study, August 2006, p. xii.
52 Ann Roosevelt, “Army Calls CBO’s FCS Report Seriously Flawed,” Defense Daily, Vol. 231, No. 52, September 19,
2006.
53 Daniel Wasserbly, “Study: Army FCS Program Will Cost $13 Billion More Than Estimated,” InsideDefense.com,
July 30, 2007.
54 DOD Press Release, “Department of Defense Releases Selected Acquisitions Reports,” Number 276-08, April 7,
2008 and Marina Malenic, “DOD Revises FCS Cost Downward Using New Inflation Indicies,” Inside Defense.com,
April 14, 2008.
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The Army’s June 2008 FCS program reorganization focuses exclusively on providing FCS
technologies to IBCTs for the “current fight,” although it might be argued that fielding FCS Spin
Out One in 2011 to the first of 43 IBCTs does not adequately address the needs of commanders in
the field today. The lack of detail about how the 15 FCS BCTs fit into this reorganization and re-
prioritization could lead to speculation that the Army does not intend to field 15 FCS BCTs by
2030. If this is the case, there are significant operational and budgetary issues associated with any
plans to scale back or lengthen the 15 FCS BCT fielding that Congress might wish to explore
with the Army and DOD.
ȱȱȱǰȱ¢ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱ
ȱ ȱŘŖŖŞȱȱǵȱ
The June 2008 restructuring will provide FCS technologies to IBCTs sooner than originally
planned. This focus on IBCTs might be viewed by some as a concession by the Army that FCS
BCTs are less relevant in counterinsurgency and stabilization operations than IBCTs, which
operate dismounted and have a greater interaction with civilians. While this restructuring might
prove to be beneficial, there are a number of longer-term programmatic, budgetary, and
operational impacts associated with this action. Will the FCS program need to be extended
beyond 2030? If FCS BCTs are to be reduced or eliminated, what is the impact on the M-1
Abrams and M-2 Bradley Programs? What are the long-term budgetary implications of the 2008
restructuring—will it increase or decrease the total FCS program cost? How will this
restructuring change the tactical and operational employment of the Army throughout the entire
spectrum of operations? Will the restructuring result in a less or more capable FCS-equipped
force? How will the restructuring affect how the Army conducts operations with the other
Services and allies?
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While many FCS unmanned and manned ground and aerial vehicles are in prototyping phases
and, in some instances, actually being deployed into combat,55 there are concerns that
complementary programs—viewed as essential for FCS to achieve its full potential—are not
achieving the same level of success. The JTRS program, which has been criticized as “falling
short of what FCS requires,”raises some concerns. The decrease in the numbers of GMR and
HMS JTRS versions that the other Services and U.S. SOCOM intend to procure, the significant
per unit cost of the four-channel versions, and the development of less costly and less capable
versions of these radios calls into question the viability of the entire JTRS program. There is also
concern that WIN-T Increments Three and Four are still not as well defined as they should be. In
the case of Increment Four, the final increment intended to tie FCS to the TSAT system, the
55 Matthew Cox, “Guard Stryker Brigade to Deploy with FCS UAVs,” Army Times, November 25, 2008.
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uncertain future of the TSAT program likely has a highly detrimental impact on program planning
and budgeting. It also appears that the overall WIN-T program costs are not yet determined,
which could be a significant issue given current and projected future budgetary constraints.
Requirements mandated in Sections 211 and 212 of the FY2009 NDAA (P.L. 110-417) should
provide Congress with some preliminary insights on how JTRS, radio spectrum difficulties, WIN-
T development, and potential lack of a TSAT system could affect FCS survivability and
effectiveness. The value of these insights are predicated on the level of detail that the Army and
DOD incorporates into these congressional requirements and reports. In particular, Section 211’s
requirements to include a number of these factors into the FCS System Design review could
prove useful in assessing the future viability of the FCS program.
ȱȱ ȱȱ
The MGV common chassis offers a number of potential benefits that will likely be of prime
consideration when evaluating the future of the FCS program. The MGV’s replaceable and
upgradeable armor, hybrid propulsion system, fuel efficiency, and improved maintainability and
sustainability could result in long-term operational cost savings. As a common chassis for the
Army’s tracked vehicle fleet, which could number in the thousands, the MGV might also permit
the Army to decrease the number of personnel that not only crew these vehicles, but also who
maintain and repair them as well, possibly resulting in a reduction of related personnel costs. A
greater than 70% commonality in parts between the eight MGV versions might also result in cost
savings in parts and repair and maintenance tools.
ȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ
ȱśŜȱ
A number of experts suggest that the current financial crisis could decide the ultimate fate of the
FCS program. Some Members have noted that the financial crisis will add to demands on the
federal budget and force reductions in military spending and that the former approach where the
Services “got what the asked for” is no longer realistic. The Administration and DOD leadership
are said to be closely examining the FCS program in terms of affordability and relevance to the
current conflicts. Some DOD officials maintain that the U.S. military should prepare for a period
of constrained defense budgets in light of the current economic downturn and global credit crisis.
In this regard, some believe that the Pentagon will be called on to cancel program outright, as
opposed its past approach, whereby smaller budget cuts were imposed across all programs. If this
does become the case, FCS has been mentioned, along with Missile Defense, as a candidate for
cancellation. Some senior officers note that if we fail to invest in weapons systems such as FCS,
we could leave U.S. forces ill-equipped to fight modernized adversaries in the future. It is likely
that the financial crisis will be a significant new dimension in the FCS affordability argument and
will be an issue of interest for the 111th Congress.
56 John Reed and Jason Sherman, “Murtha: Wall Street Bailout Will Squeeze Future Defense Budgets,” Inside the
Pentagon, September 25, 2008; Emelie Rutherford, “Danzig: Obama Would Examine Army’s Future Combat Systems,
National Missile Defense,” Defense Daily, October 3, 2008; Jason Sherman, “Panel: Fiscal Constraints Will Force Next
Defense Secretary to Consider Program Kills,” InsideDefense.com, October 29, 2008; and August Cole and Yochi J.
Dreazen, “Boots on the Ground or Weapons in the Sky?,” Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2008.
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ȱ¢Ȃȱȱȱ¢ȱǻǼDZȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ
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CRS Report RL32476, U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
CRS Report RS22707, Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
CRS Report RL33161, The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Army’s Future Combat
System (FCS): Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
CRS Report RL34333, Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force or Specialized Units?
Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
CRS Report RS21195, Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development in DOD Programs:
Policy Issues for Congress, by Gary J. Pagliano and Ronald O’Rourke.
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FCS manned ground vehicles (MGVs) are a family of eight different combat vehicles—with
some having more than one variation—that are based on a common platform and are being
designed to be air transportable by the U.S. Air Force. They are to be equipped with a variety of
passive and active protection systems and sensors that the Army hopes will offer them the same
survivability as the current heavy armor force. In addition the Army intends for its MGVs to be
highly reliable, require low maintenance, and have fuel-efficient engines. The following are brief
descriptions of MGV types and variants. All are intended to have a range of 750 kilometers and a
top speed of 90 kilometers per hour (kph)—55 miles per hour:57
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As envisioned, the MCS provides direct and beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) fires, is capable of
providing direct fire support to dismounted infantry, and can attack targets with BLOS fires out to
a range of 8 kilometers. The MCS is intended to replace to current M-1 Abrams tank. The MCS is
to have a crew of two and might also be able to accommodate two passengers. The MCS is to be
armed with a 120 mm main gun, a .50 caliber machine gun, and a 40 mm automatic grenade
launcher.
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As planned, the ICV consists of four versions: the Company Commander version, the Platoon
Leader version, the Rifle Squad version, and the Weapons Squad version. All four versions appear
to be identical from the exterior to prevent the targeting of a specific carrier version. The Rifle
Squad version is to have a two-man crew, and is to be able to transport a nine-man infantry squad
and dismount them so that they can conduct combat operations on foot. The ICV is to mount a 30
or 40 mm cannon.
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The NLOS-C is to provide networked, extended-range targeting and precision attack of both point
and area targets with a wide variety of munitions. Its primary purpose will be to provide
responsive fires to FCS Combined Arms Battalions and their subordinate units. The NLOS is to
have a two-man crew and a fully automated handling, loading, and firing capability.
ȬȬȬȱȱǻȬǼȱǻŗŘŖŚǼȱ
The NLOS-M is intended to provide indirect fires in support of FCS companies and platoons. The
NLOS-M is to have a four-man crew, mount a 120mm mortar, and also carry an 81 mm mortar
for dismounted operations away from the carrier.
57 Information for these descriptions are taken from two Army sources: The Army’s FCS 18+1+1 White Paper, dated
October 15, 2004, and the FCS Brigade Combat Team, August 22, 2007.
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As planned, the RSV will feature advanced sensors to detect, locate, track, and identify targets
from long ranges under all climatic conditions, both day and night. The RSV is to have a mast-
mounted long-range, electro-optical infra-red sensor, sensors for radio frequency (RF) intercept
and direction finding as well as a remote chemical warfare agent detector. RSVs are to also carry
four dismounted scouts, unattended ground sensors (UGS), a Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle
(SUGV) with various payloads, and two Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In addition to the
four scouts, the RSV is to have a two-man crew and a defensive weapons system.
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The C2V is intended to serve as the “hub” for battlefield command and control. It is to provide
information management for the integrated network of communications and sensors for the FCS
brigade combat teams. The C2V is to have a crew of two and carry four staff officers and also be
capable of employing UAVs.
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There are to be two versions of the MV: the MV-E and MV-T. The MV-E would permit combat
trauma specialists to be closer to the casualty’s point of injury as it is to move with combat forces
and evacuate casualties to other treatment facilities. The MV-T is to enhance the ability to provide
Advanced Trauma Management/Advanced Trauma Life Support forward in the battle area and
both MV-E and MV-T would be capable of conducting medical procedures and treatments using
telemedicine systems. Both would have four-man crews and the capability to carry four patients.
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The FRMV would be the FCS Brigade Combat Team’s recovery and maintenance system. The
FRMV is to have a crew of three, plus additional space for up to three recovered crew members.
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Each FCS-equipped brigade will have a number of UAVs.59 While these UAVs are to provide a
variety of capabilities to forces on the ground, some experts note that they could also present an
air space management challenge to not only manned Army aviation assets, but also to Navy,
Marine Corps, Air Force, and other nation’s aircraft that might be providing support to Army
ground operations. The following are brief descriptions of the Army’s two classes of UAVs:
58 Unless otherwise noted, UAV information for these descriptions are taken from two Army sources: The Army’s FCS
18+1+1 White Paper, dated October 15, 2004 and the FCS Brigade Combat Team, August 22, 2007.
59 Sandra I. Erwin, “Army to Field Four Classes of UAVs,” National Defense, April 2003.
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Class I UAVs are intended to provide Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition
(RSTA) at the platoon level. Weighing less than 15 pounds each, these Class I UAVs are intended
to operate in urban and jungle terrain and have a vertical takeoff and landing capability. They are
to be used to observe routes and targets and can provide limited communications transmissions
relay. The Class I UAV are to be controlled by dismounted soldiers and can also be controlled by
selected FCS ground platforms, and have an endurance of 50 minutes over an 8 kilometer area,
and a 10,500 foot maximum ceiling.
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Class IV UAVs are intended to provide the FCS brigade commander with a long endurance
capability. It is intended to stay aloft for 72 continuous hours and operate over a 75 kilometer
radius with a maximum ceiling of 16,500 feet. It is also planned to interface with other manned
and unmanned aerial vehicles and be able to take off and land without a dedicated airfield.
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The ARV was originally intended to come in two variants—the Assault variant and the
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) variant. The RSTA variant has
been deferred as part of the Army’s 2007 FCS program restructuring. The two variants were to
share a common chassis. The Assault Light variant is to provide remote reconnaissance capability,
deploy sensors, and employ its direct fire weapons and special munitions at targets such as
buildings, bunkers, and tunnels. It is also intended to be able to conduct battle damage
assessments, act as a communications relay, and support both mounted and dismounted forces
with direct and anti-tank fire as well as occupy key terrain.
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The SUGV is a small, lightweight, manportable UGV capable of operating in urban terrain,
tunnels, and caves. The SUGV will weigh 30 pounds, operate for 6 hours without a battery
recharge, and have a one kilometer ground range and a 200 meter tunnel range. Its modular
design will permit a variety of payloads which will enable it to perform high-risk intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, and chemical weapons or toxic industrial
chemical reconnaissance.
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The MULE is a UGV that will support dismounted infantry. It is to come in two variants sharing a
common chassis—a transport variant (XM1217) and a countermine variant (XM1218). The
transport variant is to be able to carry 1,900 to 2,400 pounds of equipment and rucksacks for
60 Unless otherwise noted, information for these descriptions are taken from two Army sources: The Army’s FCS
18+1+1 White Paper, dated October 15, 2004 and the FCS Brigade Combat Team, August 22, 2007.
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dismounted infantry and follow them in complex and rough terrain. The countermine variant is to
have the capability to detect, mark, and neutralize anti-tank mines.
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UGS are divided into two groups—Tactical UGS and Urban UGS—and are described as follows:
ȱ ȱǻȦ ȬŗŖǼȱ
Tactical UGS include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors and Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) sensors. These sensors are to employ a variety of
sensing technologies and integrated into the overall FCS network. They are intended to be
deployed by hand, by vehicle, or by robot and have a 48 hour endurance. They are intended to be
expendable, low-cost sensors used for such tasks as perimeter defense, surveillance, target
acquisition, and CBRN early warning.
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Urban UGS can also be employed by soldiers, vehicles, or robots and are intended to provide
situation awareness inside and outside of buildings for force protection and also for previously
cleared buildings and areas.
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NLOS-LS is to consist of missiles in a deployable, platform-independent, container launch unit
(CLU), which can be fired in an unmanned and remote mode. Each CLU is to have a fire control
system and 15 missiles consisting of Precision Attack Missiles (PAM).
The PAM is to have two employment modes—a direct-fire and a fast attack mode or a boost-glide
mode. The missile is intended to receive target information prior to launch and receive and
respond to target location updates while in flight. The PAM can be fired in the laser-designated
mode and transmit near real-time target imagery prior to impact.
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The FCS network is considered the most crucial system of all 14 systems. The FCS network is to
consist of four interactive components—the System-of-Systems Common Operating Environment
(SOSCOE); Battle Command (BC) software; communications and computers (CC); and
intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) systems.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
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The SOSCOE is to enable the integration of a variety of software packages into the FCS network.
It is intended to use commercial, off-the-shelf hardware and allow for the integration of critical
interoperability packages that translate Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and allied message
formats into internal FCS message formats.
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Battle Command mission applications are to include mission planning and preparation, situational
understanding, battle command and mission execution, and warfighter-machine interface.
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Consists of 16 different functions that provide FCS units with the following automated
capabilities:
• The development of deliberate, anticipatory, and rapid-response plans;
• The ability to perform plan assessments and evaluations;
• The ability to perform terrain analysis;
• The conduct of mission rehearsals; and
• The conduct of after action reviews.
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This consists of 10 different packages that allow the user to better comprehend his surroundings.
These packages employ map information and a variety of databases that help to determine enemy
locations and capabilities, infer enemy intentions, and assess the threat to U.S. forces.
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This package contains a variety of planning and decision aids to help commanders make rapid,
informed, and accurate decisions during battle. These packages can also be used in the training
and rehearsal modes.
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This package receives soldier-generated information and displays information across all FCS
platforms for soldier use.
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The Communications and Computer network is intended to provide secure, reliable access to
information over extended distances and complex terrain. This network is not intended to rely on
a large and separate infrastructure because it is to be embedded in the FCS mobile platforms and
move with the combat units. The communications network is to consist of a variety of systems
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such as the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS); Wideband Network Waveform and Soldier Radio
Waveform systems; Network Data Link; and the Warfighter Information Network Tactical
(WIN-T).
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The Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance System is to be a distributed and networked
array of multispectral ISR sensors intended to provide timely and accurate situational awareness
to the FCS force. In addition, the ISR system is intended to help FCS formations avoid enemy
fires while providing precision, networked fires to the unit.
ȱȱ ȱ
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
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