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Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, U.S. attention to
terrorism in Latin America has intensified, with an increase in bilateral and regional cooperation.
In its April 2008 Country Reports on Terrorism, the State Department highlighted threats in
Colombia and the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. Cuba has remained on the
State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982, which triggers a number of
economic sanctions.
U.S. officials have expressed concerns over the past several years about Venezuela’s lack of
cooperation on antiterrorism efforts, its relations with Cuba and Iran, and President Hugo
Chávez’s sympathetic statements for Colombian terrorist groups. In May 2008, for the third year
in a row, the Department of State, pursuant to Arms Export Control Act, included Venezuela on
the annual list of countries not cooperating on antiterrorism efforts.
In the 110th Congress, the House approved H.Con.Res. 188 and H.Con.Res. 385, both
condemning the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos Aires, and
H.Res. 435, expressing concern over the emerging national security implications of Iran’s efforts
to expand its influence in Latin America, and emphasizing the importance of eliminating
Hezbollah’s financial network in the tri-border area. The Senate approved S.Con.Res. 53,
condemning the hostage-taking of three U.S. citizens for over four years by the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
To date in the 111th Congress, one legislative initiative has been introduced, H.R. 375 (Ros-
Lehtinen), with the goal of bolstering capacity and cooperation of Western Hemisphere countries
to counter current and emerging threats, promoting Western Hemisphere cooperation to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and securing universal adherence
to agreements regarding nuclear proliferation.
For additional information, see CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the 111th Congress, and
CRS Report RL32488, Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.

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Terrorism in Latin America: U.S. Concerns .................................................................................... 1
Colombia ................................................................................................................................... 1
Venezuela .................................................................................................................................. 2
Peru ........................................................................................................................................... 2
Tri-Border Area ......................................................................................................................... 3
Cuba .......................................................................................................................................... 3
U.S. Policy....................................................................................................................................... 4
Increased Regional Cooperation Since 9/11.............................................................................. 5

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Author Contact Information ............................................................................................................ 6

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Over the years, the United States has been concerned about threats to Latin American and
Caribbean nations from various terrorist or insurgent groups that have attempted to influence or
overthrow elected governments. Although Latin America has not been the focal point in the war
on terrorism, countries in the region have struggled with domestic terrorism for decades and
international terrorist groups have at times used the region as a battleground to advance their
causes.
The State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism highlights U.S. concerns about
terrorist threats around the world, including in Latin America. The April 2008 report states that
terrorism in the region was primarily perpetrated by terrorist organizations in Colombia and by
the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. According to the report, “there were no known
operational cells of Islamic terrorists” in the region, but it maintained that “pockets of ideological
supporters and facilitators in South America and the Caribbean lent financial, logistical, and
moral support to terrorist groups in the Middle East.” Overall, however, the report maintained that
the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere.
The report also stated that regional governments “took modest steps to improve their
counterterrorism capabilities and tighten border security” but that progress was limited by
“corruption, weak government institutions, ineffective or lack of interagency cooperation, weak
or non-existent legislation, and reluctance to allocate sufficient resources.” The report lauded
counterterrorism efforts in Argentina, Panama, Paraguay, Mexico, and El Salvador, and noted that
Caribbean and Central American countries took steps to improve their border controls and to
secure key infrastructure. It also noted that most hemispheric nations had solid cooperation with
the United States on terrorism issues, especially at the operational level, with excellent
intelligence, law enforcement, and legal assistance relations.
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Colombia has three terrorist groups that have been designated by the Secretary of State as Foreign
Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the
leftist National Liberation Army (ELN), and remaining elements of the rightist paramilitary
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). With more than 32,000 members demobilized,
the AUC remained inactive as a formal organization, but some AUC renegades continued to
engage in criminal activities, mostly drug trafficking, according to the terrorism report. The ELN,
which had dwindling memberships and reduced offensive capability, has participated in peace
talks with the Colombian government, but no agreements have been reached.
The FARC has been weakened by the government’s military campaign against it, including the
killings of several FARC commanders in 2007 and the group’s second in command, Raúl Reyes,
during a Colombian government raid on a FARC camp in Ecuador on March 1, 2008. Moreover,
in May 2008, the FARC admitted that its long-time leader, Manuel Marulanda, had died of a heart
attack in March. Nevertheless, the group has continued terrorist, kidnapping for profit, and
narcotrafficking activities, including murders of elected officials and attacks against military and
civilian targets in urban and rural areas. According to the State Department terrorism report, both
the FARC and the ELN often crossed into Venezuelan territory for rest and resupply, and the
FARC regularly used Ecuadorian territory for rest, recuperation, resupply, and training. On
December 19, 2007, the Senate approved S.Con.Res. 53 (Nelson, Bill) condemning the holding of
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three U.S. citizens by the FARC since February 2003– Thomas Howes, Keith Stansell, and Marc
Gonsalves – and calling for their immediate and unconditional release. (Also see CRS Report
RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress)
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The State Department’s terrorism report stated that “it remained unclear to what extent the
Venezuelan government provided support to Colombian terrorist organizations,” but information
on captured computer files from Colombia’s March 2008 raid of a FARC camp in Ecuador raised
questions about alleged support of the FARC by the Venezuelan government of Hugo Chávez.
Since May 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual determination that Venezuela was not
“cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms
Export Control Act (AECA). As a result, the United States imposed an arms embargo on
Venezuela, which ended all U.S. commercial arms sales and re-transfers to Venezuela. (Other
countries on the Section 40A list include Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria, not to be confused
with the “state sponsors of terrorism” list under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of
1979.) According to the terrorism report, President Chávez continued public criticism of U.S.
counterterrorism efforts and deepened Venezuelan relationships with Iran and Cuba, and his
ideological sympathy for the FARC and ELN, along with high levels of corruption among
Venezuelan officials, limited Venezuelan cooperation with Colombia in combating terrorism. In
addition, according to the report, Venezuelan citizenship, identity, and travel documents remained
easy to obtain, making the country a potentially attractive way-station for terrorists.
U.S. officials and Members of Congress also have expressed concerns about Venezuela’s growing
relations with Iran, especially because of Iran’s links with Hezbollah. On June 18, 2008, the U.S.
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control announced that it was freezing the U.S.
assets of two Venezuelans for providing financial and other support to Hezbollah. In the 110th
Congress, the House approved H.Res. 435 (Klein) in November 2007, which expressed concern
about Iran’s efforts to expand its influence in Latin America, and noted Venezuela’s increasing
cooperation with Iran.
Also in the 110th Congress, two resolutions were introduced related to Venezuela and terrorism,
but no legislative was action on the measures. H.Res. 1049 (Mack), introduced March 13, 2008,
would have called on the Administration to designate Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism.
H.Res. 965 (Issa), introduced February 7, 2008, would have called upon the Chávez government
to implement measures to deny the use of Venezuelan territory and weapons from being used by
terrorist organizations and to resume full cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism
measures.
For additional information on Venezuela and terrorism concerns, see CRS Report RL32488,
Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.
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The brutal Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) insurgency, which the Department of State
has designated as an FTO, was significantly weakened in the 1990s with the capture of its leader
Abimael Guzman, who, after a new trial in 2006, was sentenced to life in prison. According to the
State Department terrorism report, SL has several hundred armed combatants, and the group is
now involved in drug trafficking. The SL killed 20 civilians, 11 police officers, and one military
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member in 2007, and conducted 80 terrorist acts in remote coca-growing areas this year.
According to the terrorism report, the FARC continued to use remote areas along the Colombian-
Peruvian border for rest and to make arms purchases.
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In recent years, U.S. concerns have increased over activities of the radical Lebanon-based Islamic
group Hezbollah (Party of God) and the Sunni Muslim Palestinian group Hamas (Islamic
Resistance Movement) in the tri-border area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which has
a large Muslim population. The TBA has long been used for arms and drug trafficking,
contraband smuggling, document and currency fraud, money laundering, and the manufacture and
movement of pirated goods. A 2009 RAND study examines how Hezbollah has benefitted from
film piracy proceeds in the tri-border.1 The State Department terrorism report maintains that the
United States remains concerned that Hezbollah and Hamas sympathizers are raising funds
among the sizable Muslim communities in the region, but stated that there was no corroborated
information that these or other Islamic extremist groups had an operational presence in the area.
Allegations have linked Hezbollah to two bombings in Argentina: the 1992 bombing of the Israeli
Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 30 people and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli
Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people. In November 2006, an
Argentine judge issued arrest warrants in the AMIA case for nine individuals: an internationally
wanted Hezbollah militant from Lebanon, Imad Mughniyah, and eight Iranian government
officials, including former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani. Interpol subsequently posted a
Red Notice for Mughniyah, and in November 2007, its General Assembly voted to approve
notices for five of the Iranians wanted by Argentina (not including Rafsanjani). In February 2008,
Imad Mughniyah was killed by a car bomb in Damascus, Syria.
Congress has continued to express concern about progress in the investigation of the AMIA
bombing. H.Con.Res. 188 (Ros-Lehtinen), approved by the House by voice vote on July 30,
2007, applauded the Argentine government for increasing the pace of the AMIA investigation,
and called upon the General Assembly of Interpol to issue red notices for five Iranians implicated
in the bombing. H.Con.Res. 385 (Ros-Lehtinen), approved by the House by voice vote on July
15, 2008, condemned the AMIA bombing, and urged Western Hemisphere governments to take
actions to curb activities that supported Hezbollah and other Islamist terrorist organizations.
Another resolution, H.Res. 435 (Klein), approved November 5, 2007 by voice vote, expressed
concern over the emerging national security implications of Iran’s efforts to expand its influence
in Latin America, and emphasized the importance of eliminating Hezbollah’s financial network in
the tri-border area of South America.
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Since 1982, the Department of State, pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act
(EAA) of 1979, has included Cuba among its list of states sponsoring terrorism (the other states
currently on the list are Iran, Sudan, and Syria). Communist Cuba had a history of supporting
revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992, then Cuban
leader Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past.

1 Gregory F. Treverton et al, Film Piracy, Organized Crime, and Terrorism, RAND, 2009.
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Most analysts accept that Cuba’s policy generally did change, largely because the breakup of the
Soviet Union resulted in the loss of billions in subsidies.
The State Department’s terrorism report maintains that Cuba has “remained opposed to U.S.
counterterrorism policy, and actively and publicly condemned many associated U.S. policies and
actions.” It also noted that Cuba maintains close relationships with other state sponsors of
terrorism, such as Iran and Syria, and has provided safe haven for members of several FTOs – the
FARC, ELN, and Basque ETA from Spain. Colombia has publicly acknowledged that it wants
Cuba mediation with the ELN. The terrorism report also maintained that Cuba permits U.S.
fugitives from justice to live legally in Cuba, with many accused of hijacking or committing
violent actions in the United States, although it noted that Cuba stated in 2006 that it will no
longer provide safe haven to new fugitives who may enter the country. In April 2007, Cuba
returned U.S. fugitive Joseph Adjmi, who was convicted of mail fraud in the 1960s. Several
fugitives wanted in Florida for Medicare fraud reportedly fled to Cuba in 2008. In a notorious
case, three brothers (Carlos, Luis, and José Benitez) who reportedly submitted $119 million in
false medical claims have been imprisoned since September 2008 on immigration violations,
although they have not been returned to the United States.2 Cuba has called for the United States
to surrender Luis Posada Carriles and three Cuban Americans that it accused of plotting to kill
Castro and bombing a Cuban airliner in 1976.
Cuba’s retention on the terrorism list has been questioned by some observers. In general, those
who support keeping Cuba on the list point to the government’s history of supporting terrorist
acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government’s
continued hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice.
Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover of the Cold War. They
argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list while North Korea
and Libya have been removed, and maintain that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention
from struggles against serious terrorist threats.
For additional information on Cuba, see CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the 111th
Congress. For background, see CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism
List.
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As in other parts of the world, the United States has assisted Latin American and Caribbean
nations over the years in their struggle against terrorist or insurgent groups indigenous to the
region. For example, in the 1980s, the United States supported the government of El Salvador
with significant economic and military assistance in its struggle against a leftist guerrilla
insurgency. In recent years, the United States has employed various policy tools to combat
terrorism in the Latin America and Caribbean region, including sanctions, anti-terrorism
assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through the
OAS. Moreover, given the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking, one can argue that
assistance aimed at combating drug trafficking organizations in the region has also been a means
of combating terrorism by cutting off a source of revenue for terrorist organizations. The same
argument can be made regarding efforts to combat money laundering in the region.

2 Jay Weaver, “Fugitives make off with Medicare millions,” Miami Herald, January 1, 2009.
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Although terrorism was not the main focus of U.S. policy toward the region in recent years,
attention increased in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.
Anti-terrorism assistance has increased along with bilateral and regional cooperation against
terrorism. Congress approved the Bush Administration’s request in 2002 to expand the scope of
U.S. assistance to Colombia beyond a counternarcotics focus to also include counterterrorism
assistance to the government in its military efforts against drug-financed leftist guerrillas and
rightist paramilitaries. Border security with Mexico also became a prominent issue in bilateral
relations, with attention focused on the potential transit of terrorists through Mexico to the United
States. The United States has imposed sanctions on three groups in Colombia (ELN, FARC, and
AUC) and one group in Peru (SL) designated by the Department of State as FTOs. Official
designation of such groups as FTOs triggers a number of sanctions, including visa restrictions and
the blocking of any funds of these groups in U.S. financial institutions. The designation also has
the effect of increasing public awareness about these terrorist organizations and the concerns that
the United States has about them. As noted above, the United States has included Cuba on its list
of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982, pursuant to section 6(j) of the EAA, and both Cuba and
Venezuela are currently on the annual Section 40A AECA list of countries that are not
cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, lists that trigger a number of sanctions.
Through the Department of State (Diplomatic Security Office, Office of Antiterrorism
Assistance), the United States provides Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training and equipment
to Latin American countries to help improve their capabilities in such areas as airport security
management, hostage negotiations, bomb detection and deactivation, and countering terrorism
financing. Such training was expanded to Argentina in the aftermath of the two bombings in 1992
and 1994. Assistance was also stepped up in 1997 to Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in light of
increased U.S. concern over illicit activities in the tri-border area of those countries. ATA funding
is generally provided through the annual foreign operations appropriations measure under the
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account. In recent
years, ATA for Western Hemisphere countries amounted to $8.9 million in FY2006, $7.3 million
in FY2007, and an estimated $8 million in FY2008. For FY2009, the Administration requested
$9.3 million in ATA for Latin America, with $2.8 million for Colombia and $3 million for
Mexico, and the balance for other countries. Also under the NADR funding account, the United
States began providing Terrorist Interdiction Program assistance for several Latin American
countries in FY2008. An estimated $1.3 million is being provided to Panama, Brazil, and
Nicaragua in FY2008, while the Administration requested $1.2 million for Latin America for
FY2009.
The United States also works closely with the governments of the tri-border area—Argentina,
Brazil, and Paraguay—through the “3+1 regional cooperation mechanism,” which serves as a
forum for counterterrorism cooperation and prevention.
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Latin American nations strongly condemned the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States and took action through the OAS and the Rio Treaty to strengthen hemispheric cooperation
against terrorism. The OAS, which happened to be meeting in Peru at the time, swiftly
condemned the attacks, reiterated the need to strengthen hemispheric cooperation to combat
terrorism, and expressed full solidarity with the United States. At a special session on September
19, 2001, OAS members invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also
known as the Rio Treaty, which obligates signatories to the treaty to come to one another’s
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defense in case of outside attack. Another resolution approved on September 21, 2001, called on
Rio Treaty signatories to “use all legally available measures to pursue, capture, extradite, and
punish those individuals” involved in the attacks and to “render additional assistance and support
to the United States, as appropriate, to address the September 11 attacks, and also to prevent
future terrorist acts.”
In the aftermath of 9/11, OAS members reinvigorated effort of the of the Inter-American
Committee on Terrorism (CICTE) to combat terrorism in the hemisphere. The CICTE has
cooperated on border security mechanisms, controls to prevent terrorist funding, and law
enforcement and counterterrorism intelligence and information. At a January 2003 CICTE
meeting, OAS members issued the Declaration of San Salvador, which pledged to strengthen
hemispheric cooperation through a variety of border, customs, and financial control measures. At
the February 2005 CICTE session held in Trinidad and Tobago, OAS members reaffirmed their
commitment to deepen cooperation against terrorism and addressed threats to aviation, seaport,
and cyber security. CICTE held its seventh annual regular session in Panama from February28-
March 2, 2007, which focused on the protection of critical infrastructure in the region.
OAS members signed the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism in June 2002. The
Convention, among other measures, improves regional cooperation against terrorism, commits
parties to sign and ratify U.N. anti-terrorism instruments and take actions against the financing of
terrorism, and denies safe haven to suspected terrorists. President Bush submitted the Convention
to the Senate on November 12, 2002, for its advice and consent, and the treaty was referred to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Treaty Doc. 107-18). In the 109th Congress, the committee
formally reported the treaty on July 28, 2005 (Senate Exec. Rept. 109-3), and on October 7, 2005,
the Senate agreed to the resolution of advice and consent. The United States deposited its
instruments of ratification for the Convention on November 15, 2005.

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Mark P. Sullivan

Specialist in Latin American Affairs
msullivan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7689

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