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The central government’s limited writ and perceived corruption are helping sustain a Taliban
insurgency, and feeding pessimism about the Afghanistan stabilization effort. However, ethnic
disputes remain confined largely to political debate and competition, enabling President Karzai to
try to focus on accepting U.S. and international advice on how to improve governance, reversing
security deterioration, and on winning re-election in presidential elections slated for August 20,
2009. Karzai is running for re-election, but he faces substantial loss of public confidence and
fluid coalitions of potentially strong election opponents. Despite the government’s widely noted
shortcomings, many agree that the country has made substantial progress on personal and
political freedoms since the fall of the Taliban regime.
At the same time, over the past year U.S. officials have been shifting away from reliance on
building the central government and toward promoting local governing bodies and security
initiatives as a complement to efforts to build central government capabilities. That trend is likely
to continue, based on press reports of a pending review of U.S. strategy being conducted by the
Obama Administration. See CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.

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Post-Taliban Political Transition and Political Landscape .............................................................. 1
Government Performance................................................................................................................ 3
Official Corruption.................................................................................................................... 4
Increasing Focus on Local Solutions and Governance ............................................................. 5
Overall Human Rights Issues.................................................................................................... 6
Funding Issues........................................................................................................................... 7
2009 Elections ................................................................................................................................. 7
Outlines of the Contest.............................................................................................................. 8

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Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process ......................................................................... 10

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Author Contact Information ...........................................................................................................11

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U.S. policy during 2001—2008 has been to extend the authority and encourage reform of
Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai and his central government, predicated on the observation
that weak and corrupt governance is causing some Afghans to acquiesce to Taliban insurgents as
providers of security and credible justice. Karzai’s is the first fully elected government in Afghan
history, although there were parliamentary elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah (the last
were in 1969). Presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections, and adoption of a constitution
were part of a post-Taliban transition roadmap established by a United Nations-sponsored
agreement of major Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany on December 5, 2001, (“Bonn
Agreement”),1 after the Taliban had fallen. The political transition process is depicted in the table
below. The United States provides about 20,000 forces to a 50,000 troop NATO-led peacekeeping
coalition there; another 14,000 U.S. troops continue the original post-September 11 counter-
terrorism mission in Afghanistan.
Since its formation in late 2001, Karzai’s government has come to be progressively dominated by
ethnic Pashtuns, who are about 42% of the population and traditionally have governed
Afghanistan. However, the National Directorate for Security (NDS, the Intelligence directorate)
continues to be headed by a non-Pashtun (Amrollah Saleh, a Tajik), and, adhering to a tacit
consensus, the other security ministries (Defense, Interior) tend to have non-Pashtuns in key
deputy or subordinate positions. One prominent example is the defense ministry, in which the
chief of staff is a Tajik (Bismillah Khan), who reports to a Pashtun Defense Minister (Abdul
Rahim Wardak).
It is the National Assembly (parliament), particularly the 249 seat elected lower house (Wolesi
Jirga), that is the key institution for the ethnic minorities to exert influence. Many seats in the
lower house are held by personalities and factions prominent in Afghanistan’s recent wars. The
lower house is divided into (mainly Pashtun) pro-Karzai, (mainly minority) opposition figures,
and “independents” of varied ethnicities, not strictly organized according to Afghanistan’s 90
registered political parties. Karzai has not formed his own party, but his core support in the Wolesi
Jirga consists of former members of the hardline conservative Pashtun-based Hizb-e-Islam party;
and supporters of Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf—a prominent Islamic conservative mujahedin party
leader.
Another base of support for Karzai in the lower house has been the contingent from Qandahar
(Karzai’s home province), including several Karzai clan members, and, to a lesser extent,
Helmand province. One clan member in the body is his cousin Jamil Karzai, and another is
relative by marriage Aref Nurzai. Karzai’s elder brother, Qayyum, was in the lower house
representing Qandahar until his October 2008 resignation due to health reasons, although
Qayyum continues to travel abroad and represent his brother informally, including at 2008 and
2009 meetings to explore negotiated settlements with Taliban figures. Also pro-Karzai are former
Pashtun militia and Taliban leaders, including Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who had gained
fame for leading the Afghan component of the failed assault on Osama bin Laden’s purported

1 For text, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
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redoubt at Tora Bora in December 2001; Pacha Khan Zadran (Paktia) who, by some accounts,
helped Osama bin Laden escape Tora Bora; and Mullah Abdul Salam (“Mullah Rocketi”), from
Zabol.
The “opposition,” led by ethnic minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara) of the anti-Taliban
“Northern Alliance,” view as a betrayal Karzai’s firing of many of the non-Pashtuns from the
cabinet—such as former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (dismissed in 2006). However,
the bloc says its disputes with Karzai will remain political and peaceful. In April 2007, Wolesi
Jirga Speaker Yunus Qanooni and former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani, both
prominent Northern Alliance figures (the 1994-2001 anti-Taliban alliance of ethnic minorities),
organized a broader opposition bloc called the “United Front” (UF). The bloc includes both of
Karzai’s vice presidents, and some Pashtuns prominent in the Soviet-occupation era such as
Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi (Khost Province) and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, who chairs parliament’s
defense committee. The UF advocates amending the constitution to give more power to
parliament and to empower the elected provincial councils (instead of the President) to select
governors and mayors. Fearing Pashtun consolidation, the UF has been generally opposed to
Karzai’s overtures to Taliban fighters to end their fight and join government—an initiative that
has begun to draw some backing from the U.S. and British governments as a means of ending or
reducing the Taliban insurgency.
Even before the formation of the UF, the lower house opposition first showed its strength in
March 2006, following the December 19, 2005 inauguration of parliament, by requiring Karzai’s
cabinet to be approved individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition leverage. However,
Karzai rallied his support and all but 5 of the 25 nominees were confirmed. One of those defeated
was a female nominee for Minister of Women’s Affairs, leaving Afghanistan without any women
ministers. (The post had been held by a female since it was established in 2002.) In May 2006,
the opposition compelled Karzai to change the nine-member Supreme Court, the highest judicial
body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as chief justice.
Parliament approved his new Court choices in July 2006, all of whom are trained in modern
jurisprudence.
In May 2007, the UF achieved a majority in parliament to oust Karzai ally Rangin Spanta as
Foreign Minister. Karzai refused to replace him, instead seeking a Supreme Court ruling that
Spanta should remain, on the grounds that his ouster was related to a refugee issue (Iran’s
expulsion of 100,000 Afghan refugees), not a foreign policy issue. The Court has, to date,
supported Karzai, and Spanta remains Foreign Minister, although the UF continues to challenge
his “legitimacy” in that role.
Karzai and the UF often battle for the support of the many “independents” in the lower house.
Among them are several outspoken women, intellectuals, and business leaders, such as the 38
year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), a leading critic of war-era faction leaders. In May 2007
the lower house voted to suspend her for this criticism for the duration of her term. She continues
to legally challenge the expulsion but, to date, remains barred. Others in this camp include Ms.
Fauzia Gailani (Herat Province); Ms. Shukria Barekzai, editor of Woman Mirror magazine; and
Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai minister who champions parliamentary powers. U.S.-
based International Republican Institute (IRI) has helped train the independents; the National
Democratic Institute (NDI) has assisted the more established factions.
Karzai has fewer critics in the Meshrano Jirga, partly because of his 34 appointments (one-third
of that body). He engineered the appointment as Speaker an ally, Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, a noted
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Islamic scholar and former mujahedin party leader who headed the post-Communist mujahedin
government for one month (May 1992) and who has since 2003 headed an effort to reconcile with
Taliban figures (Peace and Reconciliation Commission, or “PTSD” program). Karzai also
appointed Northern Alliance military leader Muhammad Fahim, perhaps to compensate for his
removal as Defense Minister, although he resigned after a few months and later joined the UF.
There is one Hindu, and 23 women; 17 are Karzai appointees and 6 were selected in their own
right.
This body tends to be more Islamist conservative than the lower house, advocating a legal system
that accords with Islamic law, and restrictions on press and Westernized media broadcasts. In late
2008, the body approved a resolution opposing a U.S.-Afghan plan to establish local security
organs to help keep Taliban infiltrators out of Afghan communities. The plan, now termed the
“Public Protection Force,” is being tested in provinces south of Kabul (see below).
On less contentious issues, the executive and the legislature have worked well. During 2008,
parliament passed a labor law, a mines law, a law on economic cooperatives, and a convention on
tobacco control. It also confirmed several Karzai nominees, including the final justice to fill out
the Supreme Court. Both houses of parliament, whose budgets are controlled by the Ministry of
Finance, are staffed by about 275 Afghans, reporting to a “secretariat.” There are 18 oversight
committees, a research unit and a library.
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U.S. policy has been to help expand Afghan institutions and to urge reforms such as merit-based
performance criteria and weeding out of the rampant official corruption. Afghan ministries are
growing their staffs and technologically capabilities, although still suffering from a low resource
and skill base. During the Bush Administration, U.S. officials generally refrained from publicly
criticizing Karzai when, in the interests of political harmony, he has indulged faction leaders with
appointments and tolerated corruption. However, President Obama and his senior aides, including
the new envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, have been
somewhat more publicly critical of Karzai’s shortcomings than were Bush Administration
officials.
Karzai has marginalized several major regional strongmen but has been hesitant to confront them
to the point where their followers go into armed rebellion. Karzai argues that compromises with
faction leaders and tribes are needed to keep the government intact as he focuses on fighting
“unrepentant” Taliban insurgents. In 2008, some observers cited Karzai’s handling of prominent
Uzbek leader Abdurrashid Dostam as evidence of political weakness. Dostam is often referred to
as a “warlord” because of his command of partisans in his redoubt in northern Afghanistan
(Jowzjan and Balkh provinces), and he is widely accused of human rights abuses of political
opponents in the north. To try to separate him from his militia, in 2005 Karzai appointed him to
the post of chief of staff of the armed forces. On February 4, 2008, Afghan police surrounded
Dostam’s villa in Kabul in response to reports that his followers attacked and beat an ethnic

2 Some information in this section is from the State Department reports on human rights in Afghanistan for 2007.
March 11, 2008 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100611.htm; the International Religious Freedom Report,
released September 19, 2008. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/2007/90225.htm; and Defense Department “Report on
Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” June 2008
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Turkmen rival, but Karzai did not order his arrest for fear of stirring unrest among Dostam’s
followers. To try to resolve the issue without stirring unrest, in early December 2008 Karzai
purportedly reached an agreement with Dostam under which he resigned as chief of staff and
went into exile in Turkey in exchange for the dropping any case against him.3
Karzai also has curbed prominent Tajik political leader, former Herat governor Ismail Khan, by
appointing him Minister of Energy and Water. In February 2007, both houses passed a law giving
amnesty to so-called “warlords”; Karzai altered the draft to give victims the right to seek justice
for any abuses; Karzai did not sign a modified version in May 2007, leaving the status unclear.
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Partly as a result of what many Afghans view as a “predatory” central government, some Afghans
are said to be losing faith in the government and in Karzai’s leadership, to the point where his re-
election appears increasingly uncertain. The issue of official corruption has become a key U.S.
agenda item as Karzai’s leadership image fades. Some observers, such as former Coordinator for
Counter-Narcotics and Justice Reform Thomas Schweich, in a July 27, 2008 New York Times
article, have gone so far as to assert that Karzai, to build political support, is deliberately
tolerating officials in his government who are allegedly involved in the narcotics trade. The New
York Times reported allegations (October 5, 2008) that another Karzai brother, Qandahar
provincial council chief Ahmad Wali Karzai, has protected narcotics trafficking in the province.
Press reports in January 2009 allege that government positions and mundane functions such as
government processing of drivers licenses are “for sale” or routinely require bribes in exchange
for action.4 Several high officials, despite very low official government salaries, have acquired
ornate properties in west Kabul since 2002. Other observers who have served in Afghanistan say
that Karzai has appointed some provincial governors to “reward them” and that these
appointments have gone on to “prey” economically on the populations of that province.
Transparency International, a German organization that assesses governmental corruption
worldwide, ranked Afghanistan in 2008 as 176th out of 180 countries ranked in terms of
government corruption.
To try to address the criticism, in August 2008 Karzai, with reported U.S. prodding, set up the
“High Office of Oversight for the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy” with the power to
investigate the police, courts, and the attorney general’s office, and to catalogue the overseas
assets of Afghan officials. Karzai said publicly in December 2008 that he believes that many high
officials have bank accounts overseas, such as in Dubai. In October 2008, Karzai replaced the
ministers of Interior, of Education, and of Agriculture with officials, particularly the new Interior
Minister (former Soviet-era official Muhammad Hanif Atmar) believed to be dedicated to reform
of their ministries and weeding out of official corruption. However, Atmar’s appointment incurred
further UF concern because Atmar, a Pashtun, replaced a Tajik (Zarrar Moqbel) in that post. In
December 2008, the lower house voted Commerce Minister Amin Farhang out of office (nearly
unanimous vote) for failing to bring down energy prices. In July 2008, Karzai fired Sabit on July
16, 2008, after Sabit declared his intention to run against Karzai in 2009, although some Afghans
say Sabit himself owned property abroad and was corrupt. Some of these anti-corruption steps
have been recommended in studies within the State Department, the Afghan government, and the

3 CRS e-mail conversation with National Security aide to President Karzai. December 2008.
4 Filkins, Dexter. “Bribes Corrode Afghan’s Trust in Government.” New York Times, January 2, 2009.
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U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime which is responsible for assisting Afghanistan on counter-
narcotics.
Karzai’s popularity also is being undermined by civilian casualties resulting from U.S./NATO
operations. Following an August 21, 2008, airstrike that some Afghans said killed 90 civilians
(the incident is in dispute) near Herat city, the Afghan cabinet called for bringing foreign forces
under Afghan law, replacing an 2001 interim “status of forces agreement” with the coalition.
Afghanistan and the United States conducted a joint investigation of the incident. However,
several similar but smaller incidents have occurred since, and Karzai has sharpened his criticism
of the use of air strikes, and in January 2009 he demanded an Afghan role in operational decisions
such as whether and when to use airpower.
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In part to address the flaws of the Afghan government, U.S. policy has shifted away from
empowering the central government and instead promoting local security and governance
solutions. The Afghan government asserts that it itself is promoting local governance as the next
stage in Afghanistan’s political and economic development. A key indicator of this shift came in
August 2007 when Karzai placed the selection process for local leaders (provincial governors and
down) in a new Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)—and out of the Interior
Ministry. The IDLG, with advice from India and other donors, has also developed plans to
empower localities to decide on development priorities.
Many believe that the key to effective local governance is the appointment of competent
governors. In March 2008 Karzai replaced the weak and ineffective governor of Helmand -
Asadullah Wafa - with Gulab Mangal, who is from Laghman Province and who the U.N. Office
of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) said in an August 2008 report is taking relatively effective action
to convince farmers not to grow crops other than poppy. A subsequent UNODC report in
February 2009 said his efforts are likely to result in a reduction of cultivation in Helmand in
2009. However, there are reports Karzai wants to replace him with the former governor, Sher
Mohammad Akhundzadeh, who is accused of human rights abuses when he was governor during
2002-2005 but who remains powerful in the province. The UNODC report said that improving
governance in some provinces had contributed to the increase to 18 “poppy free” provinces (out
of 34), from 13 in the same report in 2007. Another four provinces might move into that category
in 2009, according to UNODC.
Governing Qandahar is a sensitive issue in Kabul because of Karzai’s active interest in his home
province. The governor of Qandahar was changed (to former General Rahmatullah Raufi,
replacing Asadullah Khalid) after the August 7, 2008 Taliban assault on the Qandahar prison that
led to the freeing of several hundred Taliban fighters incarcerated there. Karzai changed that
governorship again in December 2008, naming Canadian-Afghan academic Tooryalai Wesa as
governor, perhaps hoping that his ties to Canada would assuage Canadian reticence to continuing
its mission in Qandahar beyond 2011.
The IDLG is also the chief implementer of the recently-launched “Social Outreach Program”
which provides financial support (about $125 per month) and other benefits to tribal and local
leaders in exchange for their cooperation with U.S./NATO led forces against the Taliban
insurgency. The civilian aspects of the program are funded partly by USAID. The more
controversial security aspect of the program is the Public Protection Force, referred to above.
Afghan officials say it is not a resurrection of the traditional tribal militias (“arbokai”) that
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provided local security before Afghanistan’s recent wars, but that the program is under the
authority of the Interior Ministry. U.S. commanders say U.S. weapons will not be provided to the
militias, only training, but some weapons may come from the Afghan government. The security
components of the program are partially funded with DoD funds (the Commanders Emergency
Response Program or CERP). The program has been launched in Wardak province and will also
be implemented in Kapisa, Ghazni, and Lowgar in early 2009. Some see the shift toward new
local militias as a reversal of the 2001-2007 programs to disarm militias nationwide.
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On human rights issues, the overall State Department judgment is that the country’s human rights
record remains poor, according to the Department’s report for 2008 (issued February 25, 2009).
The security forces are widely cited for abuses and corruption, including torture and abuse of
detainees. There has been some backsliding in recent years on media freedoms. A press law was
passed in September 2008 that gives some independence to the official media outlet, but also
contains a number of content restrictions, and requires that new newspapers and electronic media
be licensed by the government. Prior to the new law, Afghanistan’s conservative Council of
Ulema (Islamic scholars) has been ascendant. With the Council’s backing, in April 2008 the
Ministry of Information and Culture banned five Indian-produced soap operas on the grounds that
they are too risque, although the programs were restored in August 2008 under a compromise that
also brought in some Islamic-oriented programs from Turkey. At the same time, there have been a
growing numbers of arrests or intimidation of journalists who criticize the central government or
local leaders. On the other hand, freedoms for women have greatly expanded since the fall of the
Taliban with their elections to the parliament (numbers in the table below), their service at many
levels of government, including a governorship (Bamiyan Province), and their growing presence
in the judiciary (67 female judges), the press, and the private sector. Wearing the burqa (head-to-
toe covering) is no longer required but many women still wear it.
The September 2008 International Religious Freedom report says the Afghan government took
limited steps during the year to increase religious freedom. Still, members of minority religions,
including Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and Baha’i’s, often face discrimination; the Supreme Court
declared the Baha’i faith to be a form of blasphemy in May 2007. In October 2007, Afghanistan
resumed enforcing the death penalty after a four-year moratorium, executing 15 criminals. One
major case incurring international criticism has been the January 2008 death sentence, imposed in
a quick trial, against 23-year-old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing material
critical of Islam. On October 21, 2008, a Kabul appeals court changed his sentence to 20 years in
prison; he remains in jail but has several avenues of appeal remaining. Afghanistan was again
placed in Tier 2 in the State Department’s June 4, 2008, Trafficking in Persons report for 2008 on
the grounds that it does not fully comply with minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking in persons. However, the report says it is making significant efforts to do so, including
by establishing anti-trafficking offices in the offices of the Attorney General in all 34 provinces.
One positive development is that Afghanistan’s Shiite minority, mostly from the Hazara tribes of
central Afghanistan (Bamiyan and Dai Kundi provinces) can celebrate their holidays openly, a
development unknown before the fall of the Taliban. Some Afghan Shiites follow Iran’s clerical
leaders politically, but Afghan Shiites tend to be less religious and more socially open than their
co-religionists in Iran. The Minister of Justice is a Shiite, the first of that sect to hold that post.
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USAID has spent about $440 million (FY2002-2007) to build democracy and rule of law, and
assist the elections. A FY2008 supplemental funding request included $100 million to assist with
the presidential elections in 2009. For FY2009, $707 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF)
was requested which will be used in part to enable the Karzai government to “extend the reach of
good governance....” Some of the aid for FY2009 is being extended to the IDLG for its operations
and to support the Social Outreach Program discussed above. In FY 2009, according to a
September 25, 2008 State Department fact sheet, USAID is providing $8.5 million to support the
IDLG and to fund the Social Outreach Program and a separate “Governor’s Performance Fund”
intended to promote good governance. Another $95 million is going to the IDLG to help it
construct new district centers and rehabilitate fifty provincial and district offices. For
comprehensive tables on U.S. aid to Afghanistan, by fiscal year and by category and type of aid,
see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman.
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The next major political milestone in Afghanistan is the 2009 presidential and provincial
elections. In February 2009, Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC) set August
20, 2009 as the election date. This caused the UF bloc—which had wanted the elections by April
21, 2009 in accordance with a strict interpretation of the constitution that stipulates that Karzai’s
term ends on May 22, 2009—to say it would not “recognize” Karzai’s presidency after May 22.5
The IEC, which issued a statement on its election date determination on February 3, 2009, says
that the constitution (Article 31) allows for a later date than May 22 if security and other
conditions preclude the holding of “universal, fair, and transparent” elections by the earlier date.
The IEC, in its statement, gave several justifications for its decision to move the elections to late
August, including the difficulties in registering voters, printing ballots, training staff, making the
public aware of the elections, and the dependence on international donations to fund the elections,
in addition to the security questions.6 It is also possible that the grave security situation could still
derail the elections entirely, in which case a loya jirga would convene to select a president.
In response to the UF criticism that he seeks to prolong his term, Karzai said in late February
2009 that he will run for re-election no matter when the IEC sets the election—even if the body
moves the election to the April 21, 2009 date. To reinforce that assertion, on February 28, 2009,
Karzai issued a presidential decree directing the IEC to set the elections in accordance with all
provisions of the constitution. That was widely read as a call for the IEC to hold them by April
21, 2009, as demanded by the UF and other opposition figures. However, observers say Karzai’s
decree was largely political because it is widely recognized that Afghan authorities would not be
ready to hold elections by that earlier date, and that the IEC is likely to fall back on the Article 33
requirement that the election date must be set to provide for universal access to the vote. The
Obama Administration publicly came out still favoring the August 20 date to allow time for the
U.S.-led coalition to secure the election. Karzai’s decree was viewed as an attempt to defuse the

5 According to Article 61 of the constitution, the elections are to take place 30-60 days before the May 22 expiration of
the presidential term.
6 Statement of the Independent Election Commission Secretariat. February 3, 2009, provided to CRS by a Karzai
national security aide.
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UF’s call for him to step down on May 22 and allow the elections to be run by a caretaker
government—Karzai now argues he offered to submit to the public will before the constitutional
end of his term and he cannot be accused of trying to remain in power unconstitutionally.
Politically, Karzai had first preferred the August 2009 date because it gives him more time to
restore his popularity and gives more time for the infusion of U.S. troops (about 17,000 additional
due by August 2009) to secure the Pashtun areas which will be the source of many Karzai votes.
The UF sensed vulnerability on the part of Karzai and the April 2009 date appeared to suit that
faction politically. However, as 2009 has progressed, the opposition had largely changed its
position on the election date because April is too early to field a candidate that might defeat
Karzai. Candidates have until 75 days prior to the election to declare, although there would likely
be some allowance in that deadline if the elections were, indeed, held on April 21, 2009.
Despite the political dispute between Karzai and his opponents, enthusiasm among the public
appears to be high, and pre-election maneuvering is advancing, according to observers.
Registration (updating of 2005 voter rolls) began in October 2008 and has been completed as of
the beginning of March 2009. However, there were also reports of some registration fraud, with
some voters registering on behalf of women who do not, by custom, show up at registration sites.
U.S./NATO military operations in some areas, including in Helmand in January 2009, were
conducted to secure registration centers. Still, registration percentages in restive areas were lower
than in more secure areas.
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In the election-related political jockeying,7 it has long been assumed Karzai would run for re-
election. The conventional wisdom among observers is that the two-round election virtually
assures victory by a Pashtun. Anti-Karzai Pashtuns have been attempting, unsuccessfully, to
coalesce around one challenger, possibly former Interior Minister Ali Jalali (who resigned in 2005
over Karzai’s compromises with faction leaders), or former Finance Minister (2002-2004) and
Karzai critic Ashraf Ghani. In December 2008, Ghani, a member of the prominent Ahmedzai
clan, returned to Afghanistan to a welcoming ceremony in which he was “nominated” for
president by “32 political parties,” according to Afghan media. He has since appeared on U.S.
media broadcasts saying Karzai has failed to establish legitimate and successful governance. On
February 28, 2009, he declared on Afghan television that he would run. Also declaring that day
was another perceived strong Pashtun candidate, the 48 year old deputy speaker of the lower
house of parliament Mirwais Yasini.
There has apparently been discussion of an agreement under which a Pashtun might head a UF
ticket—a move that would be intended to win votes from both Pashtuns and minorities. Observers
at first said that talks were under way for Jalali to head the UF slate, but accounts circulating in
January 2009 said the ticket might be headed by Pir Gaylani, a Pashtun leader of a moderate, pro-
monarchy mujahedin faction during the anti-Soviet war. The Gaylani family is prominent in
Afghanistan including several family members serving in both houses of the National Assembly.
Gaylani’s son-in-law is Anwar al-Haq Ahady, the former Finance Minister and Central Bank
governor, who appears on the verge of declaring his candidacy as well and is said to be a strong
candidate.

7 Some of the information in this paragraph obtained in CRS interviews with a Karzai national security aide. December
2008.
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However, it does not appear Ahady, or Gaylani, will head a UF slate. Burhanuddin Rabbani
(Afghanistan president during 1992-1996) as the elder statesman of the UF bloc, is reportedly
insisting that he or another Tajik head the ticket—an insistence that purportedly held up a deal for
Gaylani or Jalali to head the UF slate. If Rabbani does not head the UF ticket, another name
widely mentioned is former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah (a Tajik). The UF slate is likely to
include Ahmad Zia Massoud, the brother of mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masoud, killed
purportedly by Al Qaeda two days before the September 11 attacks on the United States.
Some observers say that Karzai’s main opponents—particularly Ghani and Jalali—spend most of
their time outside Afghanistan, and are basing their election strategy on creating the impression
that the Obama Administration prefers that Karzai not be re-elected. It is not certain that, even if
this impression took hold, that Afghan voters would cast their ballots on this basis. However, both
are relatively well known inside Afghanistan for their past service and their large clan and official
affiliations.
Other potential contenders include Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqqeq; Ramazan Bashardost
(another Hazara); Sabit (Pashtun, mentioned above); and Pashtun figure Hedayat Arsala Amin.
Bashardost is running on an avowed “anti-corruption” platform based on his public role as a
whistle-blower against specific alleged government abuses. Rumors have recently abated that
Bush Administration U.S. Ambassador to U.N., Afghan-born Zalmay Khalilzad, might himself
run.
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Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process
Interim Administration
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key
security positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai
reaffirmed as leader by June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional
Afghan assembly).
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong
presidency, a rebuke to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance
presidential power, but gave parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men
and women equal rights under the law, allows for political parties as long as they are
not “un-Islamic”; allows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter
7, Article 15). Set out electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential,
provincial, and district elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-
hereditary position of “Father of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential Election
Elections for President and two vice presidents, for 5-year term, held Oct. 9, 2004.
Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia
Masud, a Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud,
who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the Sept. 11 attacks, and Karim
Khalili, a Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents. Second highest vote getter,
Northern Alliance figure (and Education Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%). One female
ran, got about 1%. Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq got 11.7%; and Dostam won
10%. Funded with $90 million in international aid, including $40 million from U.S.
(FY2004 supplemental, P.L. 108-106).
Parliamentary Elections
Elections held Sept. 18, 2005 on Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates
stood as individuals, not part of party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower
house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house
(Meshrano Jirga, House of Elder). Voting was for one candidate only, although
number of representatives varied by province, ranging from 2 (Panjshir Province) to
33 (Kabul Province). Herat has 17; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni, 11
seats each. The body is 28% female (68 persons), in line with the legal minimum of 68
women - two per each of the 34 provinces. Upper house appointed by Karzai (34
seats, half of which are to be women), by the provincial councils (34 seats), and
district councils (remaining 34 seats). There are 23 women in it, above the 17
required by the constitution. Because district elections (400 district councils) were
not held, provincial councils selected 68 on interim basis. 2,815 candidates for
Wolesi Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was 57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5
million registered. Funded by $160 million in international aid, including $45 million
from U.S. (FY2005 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 109-13).
Provincial Elections/
Provincial elections held Sept. 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections.
District Elections
Exact powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial
council sizes range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. Total seats
are 420, of which 121 held by women. l3,185 candidates, including 279 women. Some
criticize the provincial election system as disproportionately weighted toward large
districts within each province. District elections not held due to complexity and
potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Cabinet
Full-term 27 seat cabinet named by Karzai in December 2004. Heavily weighted
toward Pashtuns, and created new Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. Rahim Wardak
named Defense Minister, replacing Northern Alliance military leader Mohammad
Fahim. Qanooni not in cabinet, subsequently was selected Wolesi Jirga Speaker.
Northern Alliance figure Dr. Abdullah replaced as Foreign Minister in March 2006.
Cabinet reshuffle in October 2008 including appointment of Atmar as Interior
Minister.
Next Elections
Presidential and provincial elections to be held Aug. 20, 2009, although the date is
currently under review. Parliamentary, district, and municipal elections in 2010. Each
election to cost $100 million. Elections also to be held for 23,000 “Community
Development Councils” (CDC’s) nationwide that decide development priorities.
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Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612

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