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Zimbabwe’s prospects appeared promising in 1980, as it gained independence after a long
liberation war. Rising inflation and unemployment bred discontent in the 1990s and led in 1999 to
the formation of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The new party
surprised many with its initial success, campaigning against a 2000 referendum that would have
legalized the president’s continued rule, made government officials immune from prosecution,
and allowed the uncompensated seizure of white-owned land for redistribution to black farmers.
The referendum failed, and the MDC won nearly half the seats in the 2000 parliamentary
election. The government of President Robert Mugabe has since taken numerous, often
undemocratic actions to bolster its power.
President Mugabe’s government has been seen in the past decade as autocratic and repressive by
its critics, and its human rights record is poor. The government has suppressed freedom of speech
and assembly, and many contend that the government has restricted access to food, already
scarce, in opposition areas. The MDC, divided over how to respond, split into two factions in
2005, hampering its ability to challenge the ruling party. Reports of political violence rose sharply
after Zimbabwe’s March 2008 elections, when, for the first time since independence, Mugabe’s
party lost its majority in the National Assembly. Mugabe’s re-election as president in the June
runoff has been viewed as illegitimate by the United States and the United Nations Secretary-
General, among others. In September 2008, after several weeks of negotiations, Mugabe and
MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai signed a power-sharing arrangement aimed at resolving the
political standoff. As part of the deal, Tsvangirai became Prime Minister of a new coalition
government in February 2009, and cabinet positions have been divided among the parties. Many
observers are skeptical that the MDC will be able to implement major reforms through the
arrangement, and the cost of rebuilding the country’s economy may be as high as $5 billion.
Zimbabwe’s economic output has decreased dramatically since 1998. Official inflation rose above
200,000,000% in 2008, and unemployment is estimated at more than 90%. The adult HIV
prevalence rate of 15.3% has contributed to a sharp drop in life expectancy, and three-quarters of
the population are expected to require food aid in early 2009. The country has yet to contain a
cholera outbreak with over 78,000 infections and over 3,800 deaths. Deteriorating conditions
have led many to emigrate to neighboring countries, creating a substantial burden on the region.
Robert Mugabe has enjoyed considerable popularity in Africa as a former liberation leader, but
some African leaders have come to see his conduct as damaging to the continent and have urged
democratic reforms. Following controversial elections in 2000 and citing abuses of human rights
and the rule of law, the United States and some other former allies of the government became
vocal critics. The United States has enforced targeted sanctions against top Zimbabwe officials
and associates since 2002. This report provides background on events leading up to the country’s
most recent elections, in March and June 2008. For further discussion of those elections and other
current events, please see CRS Report RL34509, Zimbabwe: The Power Sharing Agreement and
Implications for U.S. Policy, by Lauren Ploch.
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Developments Surrounding the 2008 Elections .............................................................................. 1
March 2007 Arrests............................................................................................................. 1
South African Mediation..................................................................................................... 1
March 2008 Elections ......................................................................................................... 3
Power Sharing Agreement .................................................................................................. 4
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 5
Political Situation ............................................................................................................................ 6
Parliamentary Elections 2005 ................................................................................................... 6
Election-Related Violence................................................................................................... 7
Charges of Election Rigging ............................................................................................... 7
Election Observers .............................................................................................................. 8
Restrictions on Political Freedoms............................................................................................ 9
2005 Senate Elections ..............................................................................................................11
Internal ZANU-PF Struggles ...................................................................................................11
The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) ..................................................................... 12
Origins of the MDC .......................................................................................................... 12
Treason Charges................................................................................................................ 12
Division in the Opposition ................................................................................................ 13
Opposition Defiance Against a Ban on Protests and Rallies............................................. 13
Political Violence .................................................................................................................... 14
Humanitarian Situation.................................................................................................................. 16
Operation Murambatsvina....................................................................................................... 16
Political Motivations? ....................................................................................................... 17
The International Response............................................................................................... 17
Continued Evictions and Operation Garikai..................................................................... 18
Violations of Domestic and International Law ................................................................. 19
Zimbabwe’s Food Crisis ......................................................................................................... 20
Operation Taguta............................................................................................................... 21
Food as a Political Weapon? ............................................................................................. 21
HIV/AIDS ............................................................................................................................... 22
Cholera and the Healthcare System Collapse ......................................................................... 23
The Economy ................................................................................................................................ 23
The IMF and the World Bank.................................................................................................. 23
Attempts to Revive Agriculture Industry ................................................................................ 25
The Mining Industry and Nationalization of Foreign Companies........................................... 25
“Look East” Policy.................................................................................................................. 26
The Military and the Economy................................................................................................ 26
International Perspectives.............................................................................................................. 27
U.S. Policy .............................................................................................................................. 28
Sanctions........................................................................................................................... 28
Congressional Response ................................................................................................... 29
U.S. Support for African Diplomacy ................................................................................ 30
U.S. Assistance ................................................................................................................. 30
Other International Perspectives ............................................................................................. 31
United Kingdom ............................................................................................................... 31
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European Union ................................................................................................................ 32
Commonwealth ................................................................................................................. 32
China and Iran................................................................................................................... 32
Nigeria .............................................................................................................................. 34
South Africa ...................................................................................................................... 34
The African Union ............................................................................................................ 36
SADC................................................................................................................................ 37
Prospects for the Future................................................................................................................. 38
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Figure 1. Map of Zimbabwe.......................................................................................................... 39
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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 39
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With official inflation having risen to a level that prices double in less than 24 hours, Zimbabwe’s
economy continues to collapse, and the outlook for its people remains grave. Following the
March 2007 assault by police on government critics, then-South African President Thabo Mbeki
began a mediation effort between the government of Zimbabwe and the opposition. The talks
resulted in some changes to laws regarded by many as repressive prior to the country’s first
harmonized elections, which were held on March 29, 2008. Human rights activists argue that the
changes were cosmetic and that the talks failed to create a level playing field prior to the
elections.2 Significant reports of political violence followed the elections and a presidential runoff
election, held in June, failed to alleviate the country’s political crisis. Negotiations in South Africa
resulted in a power sharing agreement in September 2008, but the agreement was not
implemented until February 2009, when a new coalition government was formed.
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Zimbabwe received international media attention for the March 2007 crackdown on opposition
and civil society activists, during which one opposition supporter was shot and killed by police
(see “Opposition Defiance Against a Ban on Protests and Rallies” section below). Opposition
leader Morgan Tsvangirai (CHAHN-gih-R-EYE) and several others reportedly received severe
beatings by police following their arrest. They were accused of violating a three-month ban on
public protests instated by the Zimbabwean government in mid-February.3 Tsvangirai was
detained again, with other party members, in late March in a police raid on the opposition
headquarters.
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International criticism of the situation in Zimbabwe grew after the arrests, even among former
allies on the continent. In one of the most critical statements from African leaders, Zambia’s
President Levy Mwanawasa compared the country to “a sinking Titanic whose passengers are
jumping out to save their lives.”4 One of South Africa’s Deputy Foreign Ministers told the South
African parliament, “The South African government wishes to express its concern,
disappointment, and disapproval of the measures undertaken by the security forces in dealing
with the political protests,” blaming the current situation on an “absence of open political
1 For further discussion of the 2008 elections and other current events, please see CRS Report RL34509, Zimbabwe:
The Power Sharing Agreement and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Lauren Ploch.
2 See, for example, Human Rights Watch, All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral Conditions in
Zimbabwe’s Coming General Elections, Vol. 20, No. 2(A), March 2008, and International Crisis Group, “Zimbabwe:
Prospects from a Flawed Election,” Africa Report No. 138, March 20, 2008.
3 The opposition officials were released into the custody of their lawyers days after the arrest. Two opposition officials
who were arrested were later allowed to go to South Africa to receive medical treatment for their injuries. According to
media reports, police initially refused to allow their departure, and another opposition official, Nelson Chamisa, was
allegedly beaten at the airport when he tried to leave.
4 “Zimbabwe ‘A Sinking Titanic,’” Financial Times, March 22, 2007.
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dialogue.”5 Southern African Development Community (SADC) leaders convened an emergency
summit on March 28, 2007.
Given the strong statements made by some southern African leaders, many observers expected the
SADC heads of state to increase pressure on Mugabe to make reforms. Reports suggest that in
private the leaders may have been tough on the Zimbabwean president, who was in attendance,
but their public response was deemed disappointing by human rights activists and critics of the
regime.6 During the summit, the SADC leaders resolved to promote dialogue within the country,
at the same time suggesting that western countries should drop their sanctions against the Mugabe
government and that Britain should provide funding to assist in land reform efforts. South African
President Thabo Mbeki was appointed to mediate between the Zimbabwean government and the
opposition. Mbeki, who opposed calls for regime change, pushed instead for democratic
elections, saying “you might question whether these elections are genuinely free and fair ... but
we have to get the Zimbabweans talking so we do have elections that are free and fair.”7 Talks
between the Mugabe Administration and the MDC factions began in Pretoria in June 2007.
According to human rights activists and the U.S. Department of State, political violence against
opposition leaders and supporters continued in spite of the negotiations.8 The Mugabe
Administration accused the opposition of being responsible for a series of bombings targeting
shops, trains, and police stations, although some observers suggest the attacks were an attempt to
frame the opposition.9 Harassment of university students by police also reportedly increased. On
November 22, 2007, 22 members of the National Constitutional Assembly, a pro-democracy civil
society organization, reportedly sustained severe beatings during a peaceful protest set to coincide
with a visit by President Mbeki to Harare.10
Although the South Africa negotiations resulted in several agreements between the parties,
leading to the amendment of some laws seen to restrict press freedom and political activity, the
talks were abandoned after Mugabe announced that elections would be held on March 29, 2008.
Despite President Mbeki’s report to SADC leaders that his mediation had achieved
“commendable achievements,” Morgan Tsvangirai announced in February 2008 that “nothing has
changed...changes in the law, negotiated by President Mbeki, have not changed the behavior of
the dictatorship.”11
5 “RSA Parliamentarians Urge Stronger Action Against Zimbabwe,” South African Press Association, March 28, 2007.
6 “Zimbabwe Crisis Deepens,” Voice of America, April 6, 2007.
7 “Mbeki Rejects Regime Change,” Financial Times, April 2, 2007.
8 See, for example, Solidarity Peace Trust, Destructive Engagement: Violence, Mediation, and Politics in Zimbabwe,
Johannesburg, July 10, 2007.
9 The government’s allegations are outlined in reports produced by the Zimbabwe Republic Police, Opposition Forces
in Zimbabwe: A Trail of Violence and Opposition Forces in Zimbabwe: The Naked Truth, Volume 2,available at
http://www.moha.gov.zw/. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum has refuted the government’s claims in At Best
a Falsehood, At Worst, A Lie, August 2007, available at http://www.hrforumzim.com.
10 Press Statement of U.S. Department of State Spokesman Sean McCormack, “Zimbabwe: Civil Society Organization
Beatings During President Mbeki’s Visit,” November 26, 2007.
11 Barry Bearak, “Zimbabwe Opponent Criticizes Mbeki,” New York Times, February 14, 2008.
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The two factions of the main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC),
which split in 2005, remained divided prior to the elections. Despite rumors of dissatisfaction
with Mugabe’s continued rule from within his own party, the party’s central committee nominated
Mugabe to be their presidential candidate in March 2007. The committee also supported a
resolution to hold all elections (presidential, parliamentary, and local council) at the same time,
and to reduce the terms for all public offices from six to five years. In addition, they voted to back
efforts to increase the number of parliamentarians from 150 to 210 and the number of senators
from 66 to 84.12 Critics contend that these proposals were an effort to manipulate the electoral
process through gerrymandering, with the new constituencies created in rural areas where the
ruling party had stronger support.13 The ruling Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic
Front party (ZANU-PF) also proposed to allow the parliament to select a new president if the
sitting president resigns, is incapacitated, or dies in office.14 Analysts suggest that Mugabe may
not have intended to serve an entire term if re-elected, instead planning to resign mid-term and
use parliament to hand-pick his successor.15 The proposals were included in a controversial
Constitutional Amendment Bill, which, to the surprise of many observers, was passed by the
parliament in September 2007 with the support of MDC MPs. The final version of the legislation,
did, however, include some changes seen as concessions to the opposition, and reports suggest
that the MDC supported the legislation because of progress in the South Africa negotiations.
In February 2008, then-ZANU-PF senior member Simba Makoni announced his intention to run
against President Mugabe in the upcoming elections. He was subsequently expelled from the
party and ran as an independent, although he was rumored to have the support of several
unnamed senior party officials. Makoni, 57, served as Finance Minister from 2000 to 2002 and
was reportedly dismissed after criticizing the administration’s economic policies. Makoni also
previously served as the executive secretary of SADC. Opposition leader Tsvangirai dismissed
Makoni as “old wine in a new bottle,” but rival MDC leader Arthur Mutambara withdrew as a
presidential candidate and expressed his support for Makoni.
In the pre-election period, civic activists reported significant pre-election irregularities. The
Zimbabwean government invited election observers from over 40 countries and regional
organizations, including SADC, but allegedly barred observers from countries considered to be
critical of its policies.16 Western media organizations and journalists were also reportedly denied
permission to cover the elections.17
Zimbabwe’s first “harmonized” elections were held on March 29, 2008.18 The Zimbabwe
Electoral Commission (ZEC), widely criticized for its delayed release of the electoral results,
12 Text of report on Zimbabwean Radio, “Zimbabwe Ruling Party Endorses Mugabe Candidacy for 2008 Elections,”
BBC Monitoring, April 1, 2007.
13 “Zimbabwe Ruling Party Accused of Manipulating Electoral Process,” Voice of America, April 18, 2007.
14 “Mugabe Said Planning to Amend Constitution Over Possible Mid-Term Resignation,” Financial Gazette, April 13,
2007.
15 Dumisani Muleya, “Mugabe’s Latest Survival Strategy,” Zimbabwe Independent, April 6, 2007.
16 See “First Poll Observers in Zimbabwe,” BBC, March 11, 2008.
17 “CNN Denied Permission to Cover Elections in Zimbabwe,” CNN, March 25, 2008.
18 The 2008 “harmonized” elections were held for all levels of government (local, National Assembly, Senate, and
presidential) simultaneously.
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announced the National Assembly results four days after the election. For the first time since
independence, ZANU-PF lost its majority in the National Assembly. The MDC factions, which
reunited on April 28, won 109 seats in the 220-seat National Assembly, over ZANU-PF’s 97.
After a month of rising tensions, the results of the presidential race were belatedly announced on
May 2. They indicated that opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai had received more votes than the
incumbent, President Robert Mugabe, but had failed to garner the 50% needed to avoid a runoff.19
Although the opposition accused the government of manipulating the results and initially objected
to participating in a runoff, Morgan Tsvangirai agreed to stand against President Mugabe in a
second round of voting. While electoral law requires the government to hold a runoff election
within 21 days of announcing the initial results, the ZEC declared that the runoff would not be
held until June 27, three months after the first round. During the following weeks, reports of
political violence increased dramatically, in what many critics contend was a government-
orchestrated attempt to punish opposition supporters and ensure a Mugabe victory in the runoff.
Several of the country’s security service chiefs, including the heads of the army and the police,
publicly announced that they would not recognize an electoral victory by anyone other that
Mugabe.20 Citing the high number of attacks against MDC supporters and the lack of a level
playing field, Tsvangirai withdrew from the race days before the election. Despite public
comments from African observer missions and a presidential statement from the United Nations
Security Council arguing that conditions for a free and fair election did not exist, the government
held the runoff as scheduled. Mugabe was declared the winner with over 85% of the vote and
inaugurated on June 29, 2008. His electoral victory in the runoff election was declared
illegitimate by several countries, including the United States.
President Mugabe delayed the swearing in of the new parliament and the naming of a new cabinet
as President Mbeki and other international leaders pressed for talks between the parties. When the
parliament was sworn in on August 25, 2008, Lovemore Moyo, an MP from the MDC Tsvangirai
faction, was elected as Speaker. He received 110 votes, beating MDC-M MP Paul Themba-
Nyathi, who had received 98 votes, including those of most ZANU-PF members of parliament.
Two MDC-T MPs were arrested when they arrived for the swearing in, but were later released.
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On September 15, after several weeks of negotiations overseen by Mbeki, Mugabe and Tsvangirai
signed a power-sharing arrangement aimed at resolving the political standoff. The agreement
outlined a time frame for the drafting and adoption of a new constitution. As part of the deal,
Tsvangirai would become Prime Minister in a new unity government. Cabinet positions would be
divided among the parties, with 16 ministerial positions for the MDC factions, three of which
come from MDC-M, and 15 positions for ZANU-PF. Early reports suggested that Tsvangirai
would gain control of the police force, while Mugabe, who remains head of state under the
agreement, would retain control of the armed forces. The text of the agreement, however, left
oversight of the police, which falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs, undetermined, and debate
over which party would control the Ministry delayed the agreement’s implementation for over
four months. As head of state, Mugabe would continue to lead the cabinet, but reports suggest
19 The ZEC declared that Tsvangirai had received 47.9% of the votes, while Mugabe received 43.2% and Makoni 8.3%.
20 “Zim Prisons Chief Orders Officers to Vote Mugabe,” Reuters, February 29, 2008.
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that Tsvangirai, who now chairs a Council of Ministers, will be responsible for the day-to-day
management of government affairs.21
Amid concern that the parties would abandon compromises made in the power sharing
agreement, SADC renewed pressure for the agreement to be implemented in January 2009.
Tsvangirai agreed to join a coalition government on January 31, and, after Zimbabwe’s
parliament amended the constitution to allow its creation, Tsvangirai and new MDC ministers
were sworn in as members of the new government in early February. Many observers remain
skeptical that the parties will be able to work together effectively to implement reforms deemed
necessary by international donors, and, without a significant influx of foreign funding, economic
and social indicators are expected to continue their downward slide. The coalition government
faces considerable challenges in prioritizing humanitarian needs and making the reforms
necessary for economic recovery.
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After years of economic sanctions by the international community and a decades-long civil war
that resulted in more than 30,000 dead, the white minority rule government of Southern Rhodesia
concluded a series of agreements with the black majority in 1979 that resulted in the
establishment of the government of the Republic of Zimbabwe. Among the greatest challenges
facing the new government was the demand by the majority for greater equity in land distribution.
At independence, the white minority, who composed less than 5% of the population, owned the
vast majority of arable land. Many observers considered the country’s white-owned commercial
farms crucial to the country’s economy, although there was a general recognition that land reform
was necessary. Britain initially funded a “willing buyer, willing seller” program to redistribute
commercial farmland, offering compensation to white farmers amenable to leaving their lands.
Dissatisfaction with the pace of land reform grew and led in the 1990s to spontaneous and often
violent farm invasions. At the same time, the country’s labor movement and a segment of its
urban middle class were becoming increasingly critical of the government’s economic
performance. Facing rising political and economic challenges, the government of Zimbabwe
began to implement aggressive land expropriation policies, leading Britain and other donors to
begin withdrawing financial support for resettlement.
In 2000, the government held a referendum to approve changes to the constitution that would
allow land seizures without compensation, a responsibility that in its view lay with Britain. The
referendum was rejected by 55% of voters and was seen as a victory for a new opposition party,
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Within days of the vote war veterans and ruling
party supporters moved onto an estimated 1,000 white-owned farms, and, months later, the
President invoked emergency powers to take land without compensation. During this time there
were numerous attacks against white farmers and their employees, as well as against supporters
of the MDC; more than 30 people were killed.
Since then, the country’s problems have deepened. Substantial political violence and human
rights violations have accompanied elections since 2000. The broad scale of such abuses in the
wake of the 2008 elections brought international condemnation, but little consensus on how best
21 “Zimbabwe Rivals Sign Power-Sharing Deal,” Reuters, September 15, 2008.
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to stop the violence. Reports of government-orchestrated human rights abuses continued for
months afterward. Zimbabwe’s political difficulties have been accompanied by a sharp decline in
living standards, with more than 80% of the population living on less than $1 per day.22 Once
touted as a potential “breadbasket of Africa,” much of Zimbabwe’s population is now dependent
on food aid. More than 15% of adults are infected by the HIV/AIDS virus, and life expectancy
fell from an estimated 56 years in 1990 to 44 in 2008.23 Foreign Policy magazine has ranked
Zimbabwe third in its index of failed states, behind Somalia and Sudan.24 Observers are
concerned that the difficulties confronting Zimbabwe are affecting neighboring countries and
deterring investors from the region.
Zimbabwe at a Glance
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Population: 11.35 million
Approximate size: Slightly larger than Montana
Zimbabwe has been ruled since independence
Population growth rate: -0.787%
by ZANU-PF, which has come under
Life expectancy at birth: 44.28 years
increasing scrutiny from human rights
Ethnic groups: African 98% (Shona 82%, Ndebele 14%,
activists, both at home and abroad. Critics cite
other 2%), Mixed and Asian 1%, White less than 1%
high levels of corruption, political violence,
Languages: English (official), Shona, Sindebele and a
and strictly enforced laws restricting basic
number of tribal dialects.
freedoms. The government contends its
detractors have engaged in a “propaganda
Literacy: Total Population: 90.7%; Male: 94.2%; Female:
87.2%
war” backed by Britain and the United States,
using democracy and human rights as a cover
GDP real growth rate: -6.2%
to push for regime change.25 Many domestic
GDP Per Capita: $200
and international observers have judged
HIV Prevalence Rate: 15.3% (adults, aged 15-49)
elections since 2000 to be “far from free and
fair.” The country’s main opposition party, the
Unemployment: 94%
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC),
Sources: CIA World Factbook; Economist
split over tactical issues in 2005, and despite
Intelligence Unit; UNAIDS
attempts at reconciliation, the party remained
divided until after the March 2008 elections. ZANU-PF has also suffered internal competition,
and some observers suggest that opposition to President Mugabe himself has grown within the
party.
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Zimbabwe held legislative elections in 2005. The elections, like those before them in 2000 and
2002, were controversial, with the opposition disputing the results and alleging government
efforts to deny a fair race. ZANU-PF retained control of the 150-member parliament, taking 108
22 Oxfam International, “Humanitarian Crisis in Zimbabwe,” January 2009.
23 UNAIDS, Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic 2006, and CIA, CIA World Factbook.
24 The Washington-based Foreign Policy magazine uses 12 economic, social, political, and military indicators to rank
countries in order of their “vulnerability to violent internal conflict and social dysfunction.” Zimbabwe’s ranking on the
index dropped 14 points from 2005 to 2006, and two points since then, suggesting the country’s situation has
deteriorated. For more information, see “The Failed States Index,” Foreign Policy, May/June 2007.
25 “Imperialists Can’t Preach Human Rights,” The Herald, January 19, 2007.
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seats (of these, 30 are appointed by the President rather than elected). The MDC won 41 seats,
and one seat went to an independent.26
The MDC’s representation in parliament had declined since 2000, when it won 57 seats in its first
elections. Some observers argue that the MDC did not do as well in the 2005 election because it
delayed a decision to participate until December 2004, leaving little time to campaign. Violence
against MDC voters in past elections, and the alleged use of food distributions by the ruling party
to secure votes, and a general climate of intimidation may have also discouraged MDC support.
Government supporters suggest voters simply lost faith in MDC promises. Opposition access to
the state-run media was severely limited, according to Reporters Without Borders, a Paris-based
organization that supports press freedom.27 The MDC was rarely covered on television or in the
Herald, the government-controlled newspaper, and the stories that did appear were typically
disparaging.
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Although most observers agree that the level of political violence surrounding the 2005 elections
was significantly less than that which preceded the 2000 and 2002 elections, many argue the
election was not “free and fair,” and that there were some incidents of violence. Critics suggest
that state harassment of civil society and the political opposition, combined with limitations on
press and other political freedoms, left little need for violent repression. Nevertheless, the
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, a coalition of 17 human rights organizations, reported
more than 300 assaults in the pre-election period.28
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Many analysts argue that the Zimbabwean political system is undemocratic because elections are
administered by institutions and under laws that many consider biased in favor of ZANU-PF. In
response to democratic protocols established by the Southern African Development Community
(SADC), the government passed the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) Act and the
Electoral Act prior to the 2005 elections. However, the new “independent” ZEC, appointed by the
president, was only established two months before the election, leaving many of the preparations
to the old Electoral Commission, which many considered discredited by its past performance.
According to the U.S.-based democracy advocacy group Freedom House, “despite some
improvements, the Electoral Act granted the ZEC powers to employ security forces, retained
biased residency requirements for voters, denied most expatriates the right to vote, and created an
Electoral Court staffed by a deeply compromised judiciary.”29
The Mugabe government employed other legal tactics seen by critics as designed to intimidate the
opposition and produce a political landscape favorable to ZANU-PF. The 2004 gerrymandering of
constituencies, which the government attributed to population shifts arising from its land reform
26 Jonathan Moyo, former Information Minister, left ZANU-PF and was elected as an independent candidate.
27 Reporters Without Borders, “No Letup in Abusive Media Tactics Three Weeks Before Legislative Elections,” March
8, 2005.
28 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Political Violence Report, March 2005. The forum produces monthly reports
on the human rights situation in Zimbabwe and assists victims of violence. See http://www.hrforumzim.com.
29 Freedom House, “Country Report: Zimbabwe,” Freedom in the World 2006.
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program, resulted in the redistricting of three urban seats held by the MDC into three new rural
constituencies, which ZANU-PF candidates won in 2005. The International Council of Barristers
and Advocates described extensive efforts by ZANU-PF to gain control over the legal system in a
2004 report, suggesting the ruling party had interfered in judicial appointments and forced the
removal of impartial judges “through a combination of psychological and physical intimidation
and threats of violence.”30
The MDC challenged the results of numerous 2005 races in court.31 Their allegations focused on
several largely rural districts in which the ZEC announced voter turnout totals before the vote
results were reported. Once the results came in, the ZANU-PF candidate won in each case, but
the vote for the two candidates added together exceeded the initial ZEC-reported turnout total.
This created a suspicion that additional votes had been given to the ZANU-PF candidates during
the tabulation phase to prevent MDC victories.32 According to the ZEC, they had initially released
early totals coming in to provide an indication of voter turnout, and the discrepancies between
those initial figures and the final tallies were due to poor communications from rural areas. Other
allegations focused on large numbers of voters in contested areas reportedly turned away due to
registration problems.
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Many domestic election observers, such as the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR)
and the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), were critical of the 2005 elections. During
the pre-election period, they cited a lack of transparency surrounding voter registration as a
“significant and serious threat to the overall credibility of the electoral process.” Their reports
cited no incidents of overt political violence, but noted the pre-election period was marked by
intimidation, “politicization of food distribution,” and a lack of media access by the opposition.
The observers contended they were restricted access to the vote counting process at many polling
stations, and that in some cases the total voter tally did not coincide with the total number of
votes cast for the candidates.33 Both groups reported the use of POSA, MOA, and AIPPA
throughout the election period against opposition supporters. The ZLHR report concluded,
“Zimbabwean authorities have failed, on most accounts, to ensure a free and fair electoral
process.”34
The Mugabe government placed limits on foreign observers for the election. No U.S. observers
were invited, and Russia was the only European country asked to send a team. Leading the
30 International Council of Barristers and Advocates, The State of Justice in Zimbabwe, December 2004. The Council
sent an investigative team to Zimbabwe which included Chairmans of the Bar of England and Wales and the Irish Bar,
and Vice Chairman of the South African Bar.
31 Although none of the 2005 results were overturned, a 2006 Zimbabwean supreme court decision gave the opposition
further legal recourse. Against the arguments of the chief justice, the attorney-general, and the justice minister, the
court ruled that the judicial appointment of commissioners to the electoral court was unconstitutional and violated the
principle of separation of powers. “Zimbabwe Court Rules 2005 Electoral Legislation ‘Inconsistent’ with
Constitution,” The Financial Gazette, July 27, 2006.
32 The ZEC eventually halted the release of turnout totals, so it is not known if there were similar discrepancies in other
districts.
33 ZESN, Report on Zimbabwe’s 2005 General Election, April 2005. The ZESN, a coalition of 35 human rights and
civic groups based in Zimbabwe, deployed 260 long-term observers and 6000 observers for the election itself.
34 The report of the ZLHR,a local human rights organization that deployed 44 observers for the election, is available at
http://www.zlhr.org.zw.
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Southern African Development Community (SADC) delegation, South African Deputy President
Mlambo-Ngcuka congratulated Zimbabwe on “the holding of a peaceful, credible, well managed
and transparent election. The people of Zimbabwe have expressed their will in an impressively
instructive manner that will go a long way in contributing to the consolidation of democracy and
political stability not only in Zimbabwe, but also in the region as a whole.”35 The head of South
Africa’s parliamentary observer mission was quoted saying that the delegation had “unanimously
agreed that the elections were credible, legitimate, free and fair.”36 Both statements received
substantial criticism in the international press. The SADC Parliamentary Forum, which consists
of legislators from the region and had issued a report critical of the 2002 election, was not invited
to observe the vote.
Western governments condemned the elections. Based on reports from domestic observers and
U.S. Embassy staff who were allowed to observe the election, U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice issued the following statement:
Although the campaign and election day itself was generally peaceful, the election process
was not free and fair. The electoral playing field was heavily tilted in the government’s
favor. The independent press was muzzled; freedom of assembly was constrained; food was
used as a weapon to sway hungry voters; and millions of Zimbabweans who have been
forced by the nation’s economic collapse to emigrate were disenfranchised.37
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan commended the election’s lack of violence but noted concern
that “the electoral process has not countered the sense of disadvantage felt by opposition political
parties who consider the conditions were unfair.”38
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Legislative actions in the ZANU-PF-dominated parliament raised concerns about human rights in
Zimbabwe. Laws that critics contend have been used to quiet dissent and influence political
developments include the following:
• The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). This 2002
Act requires that all media services be licensed, and that all journalists, including
foreign correspondents, be officially accredited. The government, citing AIPPA,
closed The Daily News, the only remaining independent daily, in 2003. In 2005,
three Zimbabwean correspondents for the Associated Press, Bloomberg News,
and the Times of London, fled Zimbabwe after police raided their office. The
Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) has stated that AIPPA is “one of the
most effective legal instruments of state control over the media and civil society
communication anywhere in the world.”39 The government has countered that
AIPPA encourages responsible journalism.
35 “Zimbabwe’s Enabler; South Africa Falls Short as Monitor of Democracy,” Washington Post, April 4, 2005.
36 “The Real Fraud in Zimbabwe,” Washington Times, April 6, 2005.
37 The statement of Secretary Rice, made on April 1, 2005, is available online at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/
2005/44141.htm.
38 Secretary-General Annan’s statement is available at http://www.un.org/News/ossg/.
39 MISA, Annual Report, April 2003-March 2004; “Media Institute Says Press Restrictions in Zimbabwe Rule Out Fair
Elections,” Voice Of America (VOA), April 5, 2004.
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• The Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Criminal Law (Codification and
Reform) Act (“Criminal Law Code”), and the Miscellaneous Offences Act
(MOA). POSA, also enacted in 2002, prohibits statements deemed to be
“abusive, indecent, obscene, or false” about the president or considered to
“undermin(e) public confidence” in the security forces, and prohibits false
statements prejudicial to the state.40 The measure has been used in the arrest of
thousands of political opponents and in police action to break up public meetings
and demonstrations. Zimbabweans overheard criticizing the President in a public
place have also been jailed. The MOA criminalized “conduct likely to cause a
breach of the peace,” and was often used with POSA against activists. Police and
“persons assisting the police” may use “all necessary force” to stop unlawful
gatherings.41 In 2006 many offences under POSA and MOA were transferred to
the new Criminal Law Code.
• The Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) Act. Critics suggest that the
government has used the PVO Act, enacted in 2002, to limit the activities of
domestic NGOs. They are required to register with the government, and a “probe
team” of intelligence officers has wide powers to investigate groups and demand
documents related to activities and funding. The African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights has recommended that it be repealed.
The opposition had limited success in preventing ZANU-PF from passing other legislation that it
contends would restrict freedoms. The Interception of Communications Bill, which would allow
the government to monitor all Internet, email, and telephone communications for threats to
national security, was stalled by the Parliamentary Legal Committee (chaired by an MDC MP),
but was later revised and approved in June 2007. Critics suggest the revisions were cosmetic.
In the 2005 elections ZANU-PF won over two-thirds of the seats in the House of Assembly,
giving the party the power to amend the constitution. The parliament subsequently passed several
controversial constitutional amendments which some analysts contend breach international
human rights standards. The 2005 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No.17) allowed
the government to limit the right to freedom of movement when it is in “the public interest” or in
“the economic interests of the State” and restricts the right to leave Zimbabwe. Journalists, MDC
officials, and union leaders have had their passports revoked under the act; the government
charged that they planned to lobby abroad for sanctions or military intervention against the
country.42 The act also prevents land owners from challenging the acquisition of agricultural land
by the state. It paved the way for the passage of Gazetted Land (Consequential Provisions) Act in
late 2006, making it illegal for former farm owners to occupy nationalized land and allowing the
government to evict farmers and resettle the land without compensation. The constitutional
amendment also revived the upper house of the parliament, the Senate.
The South Africa-led SADC negotiations led in January 2008 to amendments to both AIPPA and
POSA. Critics suggest the amendments did not adequately address human rights concerns and
were not implemented.43 They cite, for example, a January 2008 MDC “freedom march” that was
40 For the text of the POSA, see http://www.kubatana.net/docs/legisl/posa060203.doc.
41 Solidarity Peace Trust, Policing the State, December 2006.
42 “Title Deeds to 4,000 Farms Nullified,” The Herald, September 23, 2005.
43 Human Rights Watch, All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral Conditions in Zimbabwe’s
Coming Elections, Vol. 20, No. 2(A), March 2008.
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blocked by police despite prior notification of the event, in accordance with the changes to
POSA. Supporters who defied a police ban were reportedly tear-gassed and beaten with batons.
Numerous MDC rallies were likewise blocked in the period preceding the 2008 runoff, despite
court orders allowing the events. The Media Institute of Southern Africa dismissed the
amendments to AIPPA as “dwelling … on inconsequential issues which will not advance basic
freedoms.”44
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Elections to the new 66-seat Senate were held in September 2005, and were marked by record
low voter turnout. Of 26 MDC candidates who ran, seven were elected; ZANU-PF gained the
overwhelming majority of seats. Observers suggest one of the reasons for the low turnout may
have been a lack of solidarity on the part of the opposition, which split prior to the election over
whether to boycott the vote.
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In view of President Mugabe’s advanced age, presidential succession has been a matter of intense
interest to analysts for several years. Prior to the 2008 elections, some analysts expressed concern
that if the elections did not lead to a democratic transfer of power, Zimbabwe could experience a
violent succession struggle or a possible military coup. Under the constitution, the president may
designate one of the country’s two vice presidents to serve as acting president until the next
election, should he leave office, but Mugabe has never done so. One of the vice presidential posts
was vacant prior to the 2004 ZANU-PF party conference, setting off a power struggle that
transformed the political scene by revealing internal party divisions. Despite his age, President
Mugabe is reportedly in good health and in no rush to relinquish his post. Many observers suggest
he has used the country’s anti-corruption authority to check the political ambitions of his party
members. Mugabe endorsed a 2007 proposal to extend the next presidential elections to 2010, but
it was defeated by his party’s central committee.
Prior to the December 2004 party conference, Emmerson Mnangagwa, then speaker of the
parliament and a political veteran long touted as Mugabe’s heir, campaigned actively for the
position of ZANU-PF’s second vice president. His selection to that position would likely have
assured his appointment as national vice president, but Mnangagwa was caught off guard when
Mugabe decided that the country should have a woman in the post. Mugabe’s choice for the
position, Joice Mujuru, was inevitably elected, and she was sworn into office as Zimbabwe’s
second vice president. Mujuru, a veteran of the liberation war and a women’s movement leader,
had been serving as Minister of Water Resources and Infrastructure.
The outcome of any succession struggle within ZANU-PF may be affected by the country’s
ethnic and clan divisions. Mugabe and many key party officials are from the Zezuru clan of the
Shona people, who are dominant in a wide area encircling the capital, Harare. Retired General
Solomon “Rex” Mujuru, a Zezuru and husband of Joice Mujuru, has been one of Mugabe’s
closest advisors and was once regarded as a king-maker. Mnangagwa is seen as a representative
of the large Karanga clan, which has reportedly felt that its turn to control the reins of power has
44 Media Institute of Southern Africa, “AIPPA, POSA, BSA Amendments Signed into Law,” Media Alert Update,
January 12, 2008.
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come. Mnangagwa’s viability as a presidential contender has been hampered by accusations that
he led the purge of alleged regime opponents in provinces of Matabeleland in the 1980s, which is
believed to have resulted in the deaths of 20,000 Ndebele civilians. The events of the 1980s help
to explain why Bulawayo has long been regarded as a center of opposition to the government,
although Mugabe has sought to gain support there by elevating Ndebele to party and government
posts.
Mnangagwa’s power was reduced following the events of 2004, as was that of a number of his
backers, including the former minister of information, Jonathan Moyo. Moyo was fired in early
2005 for his sharp-tongued defenses of the regime and for fights with others in leadership. He is
reported to have deeply angered Mugabe by convening an unsanctioned meeting of Mnangagwa
supporters before the 2004 party convention, allegedly to strategize on ways of derailing the
Mujuru candidacy. Moyo left the party and ran as an independent in 2005. He retained his seat in
the 2008 elections.
According to reports, neither the Mnangagwa nor Mujuru camps initially supported Mugabe’s
proposed term extension. Once a strong Mugabe ally, Solomon Mujuru has been vocal in his
disapproval and is rumored to have been pivotal in blocking the proposal at the party’s national
conference. Some have suggested that Mujuru covertly backed another ZANU-PF official, Simba
Makoni, over his wife as a potential successor to Mugabe. Makoni, a technocrat, was considered
by some analysts to be a compromise candidate, untainted by the corruption scandals that have
plagued others. Mugabe’s own choice for his successor is unknown. Mnangagwa appears to have
reconciled with Mugabe, leading the party’s 2008 election efforts and taking a central role in
guiding the country’s security forces.
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The MDC party rose from the Zimbabwe labor movement. As poverty deepened in Zimbabwe in
the late 1990s, and allegations of corruption against regime leaders became more frequent, the
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) organized a number of strikes and protests. In
September 1999, the MDC was formed on this trade union base with support from many in
Zimbabwe’s churches and in urban areas. In February 2000, MDC members elected the ZCTU
secretary general, Morgan Tsvangirai, born in 1952, as MDC president, and union president
Gibson Sibanda as MDC vice president.
The MDC proved formidable in the 2000 referendum and in the 2000 parliamentary election;
some contend their success may have prompted a range of repressive actions against the party and
its supporters. Among the retaliatory measures alleged, several leaders of the MDC, including
Tsvangirai himself, were arrested and charged with treason two weeks before the MDC leader ran
against Mugabe in the 2002 presidential elections.
ȱȱ
In October 2004, Tsvangirai was acquitted of a treason charge based on a video recorded in
Canada, which the government claimed showed him calling for the “elimination” of Mugabe. The
verdict surprised many observers in view of the regime’s perceived influence over the courts. The
judge stated that the evidence had been unconvincing, with the witnesses produced by the state
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“suspect” and the video unreliable. The government can appeal the verdict, and Tsvangirai may
be tried again because the law does not prohibit double jeopardy. In August 2005, the government
dropped a second treason charge that had been based on claims that he urged violence to bring
down the government in 2004.
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In late 2004, the MDC became increasingly divided in its strategy to defeat the ZANU-PF
government. MDC officials initially decided that the party would not participate in the 2005
parliamentary campaign, unless the government took steps to assure a free and fair election.
Several party members questioned this stance on grounds that non-participation would deprive
the party of any influence in the next parliament. Some reportedly felt that a refusal to participate
would hand control of parliament to Mugabe on a “silver platter.” Tsvangirai supported a boycott,
arguing that the elections should be postponed until substantial electoral reforms could be
implemented. The party did eventually participate “under protest,” but did not do as well as in
previous polls.
In the months prior to the 2005 Senate elections, the MDC was once again divided on whether to
participate. Supported by some civil society groups who suggested the elections were
“meaningless” and “a waste of time and resources,” Tsvangirai argued that participating in the
Senate would legitimize previous “rigged” elections, and vowed instead to lead the opposition
through mass action. He was opposed by a group of MDC politicians led by the party’s secretary-
general, Welshman Ncube, who had also been accused by the government of treason in 2003 (the
charges were subsequently dropped), and Gibson Sibanda. In October, the party’s national council
voted 33-31 to participate in the election, but Tsvangirai overruled the vote and, reportedly in
violation of the party’s constitution, expelled 26 senior officials from the party. He announced the
boycott, touring the country to encourage voters to stay home. The Ncube faction refused to
accept their expulsion and fielded candidates in the Senate race, although they gained only seven
seats.
Both factions held party conferences in early 2006; Tsvangirai was confirmed as the leader of one
faction, while Ncube ceded control of the “pro-senate” faction to Arthur Mutambara, a noted
student leader in the 1980s. The two factions attacked each other in the press, and there were
allegations that the Tsvangirai faction was behind a violent July 2006 assault on Member of
Parliament (MP) Trudy Stevenson and several other Mutambara supporters. Stevenson identified
the youths who attacked her as known followers of the former labor leader, but Tsvangirai denied
the charges and denounced the beatings. Although his faction was reported to have the larger
support base and the backing of the ZCTU, some observers suggested neither faction would be
effective unless they could resolve their differences and reunite.
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On February 22, 2007, the Zimbabwean government announced a three-month ban on political
rallies and public demonstrations in Harare “due to the volatile situation in the country.”45 The
MDC filed an appeal with the High Court to lift the ban, which coincided with an increase in
45 “Rally Ban a Fatal Govt Assault on Social Contract,” Zimbabwe Independent, March 2, 2007. The ban was lifted on
June 29, 2007.
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public activity by the opposition and civic groups. On February 18, despite a High Court decision
allowing Morgan Tsvangirai to launch his presidential campaign at a rally in Harare, police
reportedly used batons and water cannons to break up the event. A rally planned by the
Mutambara faction in Bulawayo was similarly dispersed, and numerous opposition supporters
were arrested. The ban was announced three days later, and police subsequently arrested several
hundred civic activists, according to press reports.
On March 11, 2007, police broke up a Save Zimbabwe Campaign prayer meeting attended by
both Tsvangirai and Mutambara, arresting an estimated 50 members of the opposition and civil
society, including both MDC leaders. Police shot and killed one opposition supporter after MDC
youth reportedly began throwing stones at police. The following day, police arrested an estimated
240 opposition supporters during a demonstration protesting the March 11 crackdown. Media and
human rights reports suggest that Tsvangirai was severely beaten while in custody, and he
appeared in court on March 13 showing signs of head trauma.46 Other opposition and civic
leaders also reportedly sustained injuries after their arrest. The protestors were released into the
custody of their lawyers on March 14 after prosecutors reportedly failed to appear at their court
hearing. The Zimbabwean government contended that the MDC incited violence and was
responsible for attacks on several civilian targets and a Harare police station.47
The March 11 incident spurred international media attention and drew considerable criticism
from many world leaders. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a strong statement,
saying, “The world community again has been shown that the regime of Robert Mugabe is
ruthless and repressive and creates only suffering for the people of Zimbabwe.”48 U.N. Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon also condemned the “reported beating of those leaders in police custody”
and criticized the ban, noting that “such actions violate the basic democratic right of citizens to
engage in peaceful assembly.”49 Several of Zimbabwe’s neighbors, including South Africa and
Zambia, issued statements of concern regarding the incident, and Ghanaian President John
Kufuor, then chairman of the AU, called the event “very embarrassing.”50
ȱȱ
Human rights groups have documented numerous accounts of political violence in recent years.
According to Freedom House, “Zimbabwe’s descent into the ranks of the world’s most repressive
states continued unabated.”51 The State Department reported that Zimbabwe’s government has
“engaged in the pervasive and systematic abuse of human rights, which increased significantly
during the year”and contends that “state-sanctioned use of excessive force increased, and security
46 “Zimbabwe Opposition Leader Taken to Hospital From Court,” CNN, March 13, 2007, and “Mugabe Foes Vow to
Intensify Action,” Washington Post, March 13, 2007.
47 “Zimbabwean Police ‘Fire-Bombed,’” BBC, March 15, 2007.
48 Statement of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Call for Immediate Release of Zimbabwean Opposition
Leaders,” on March 13, 2007.
49 Statement issued by the Spokesman of the U.N. Secretary General on March 12, 2007.
50 “Zimbabwe Leader Faces Growing Condemnation,” Associated Press, March 15, 2007.
51 Freedom House, “Country Report: Zimbabwe,” Freedom in the World 2006: The Annual Survey of Political Rights
and Civil Liberties.
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forces tortured members of the opposition, student leaders, and civil society activists,” in 2007.52
Amnesty International has been similarly critical:
The human rights situation continued to deteriorate, in a context of escalating poverty.
Freedom of expression, assembly and association continued to be curtailed. Hundreds of
people were arrested for participating or attempting to engage in peaceful protest. Police
were accused of torturing human rights defenders in custody. The situation of thousands of
people whose homes were destroyed as part of Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) in
2005 continued to worsen, with no effective solution planned by the authorities. The
government continued to obstruct humanitarian efforts by the UN and by local and
international non-governmental organizations.53
President Mugabe has repeatedly condoned police and military brutality against Zimbabwean
citizens. In 2006, during Heroes’ Day, a holiday honoring war veterans, Mugabe warned that his
security forces “will pull the trigger” against protesters.54 A month later, in an incident caught on
video, Zimbabwean police conducted a particularly violent crackdown against leaders of the
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), who had planned a civic protest to highlight the
impact of inflation on the country’s citizenry. Mugabe sanctioned the police action, saying,
“Some people are now crying foul that they were assaulted, yes you get a beating … when the
police say move, move, if you don’t move, you invite the police to use force.”55 Subsequent mass
ZCTU protests were not held.
Mugabe received international attention for his statement; the U.N. Country Team (UNCT) in
Zimbabwe announced “a profound sense of dismay” over comments that “might be interpreted as
condoning the use of force and torture to deal with peaceful demonstrations by its citizens.”56 The
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture57 has repeatedly requested an invitation from Zimbabwe to
investigate, and the Harare magistrate who heard the case against the ZCTU leaders ordered an
independent investigation into the allegations of police brutality.
The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum reports that there were 586 incidents of torture in
2007, 855 incidents of assault, and 19 incidents of politically motivated abduction/kidnapping.58
These figures suggest an marked increase in political violence from the 2006, during which there
were 368 incidents of torture, 509 incidents of assault, and 11 incidents of politically motivated
abduction/kidnapping.59 Human rights activists suggest that abductions and beatings of opposition
supporters have been “more systematic and widespread” since the events of March 2007.60 And
despite provisions in the new Electoral Laws Amendment Act banning such acts and assurances
52 DOS, “Zimbabwe,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007.
53 Amnesty International (AI), “Zimbabwe,” Annual Report 2007.
54 “Threat by Mugabe,” New York Times, August 16, 2006.
55 See Mugabe’s statement in an article from the government-owned newspaper, The Herald at “Zimbabwe Press
Review for 25 Sep 06”, BBC Monitoring Africa, September 25, 2006.
56 “U.N. Slams President Mugabe,” Zimbabwe Independent, September 29, 2006.
57 The post of Rapporteur was created by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1985 to investigate questions
relating to torture. For information on the Rapporteur’s mandate, see http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/torture/
rapporteur/index.htm.
58 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Political Violence Report, December 2007.
59 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Political Violence Report, December 2006.
60 “Zimbabwe Leaders Accused of Abducting Opponents,” New York Times, March 29, 2007.
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by security officials that the government would take a “zero tolerance” approach to violence,
reports of attacks on opposition supporters rose dramatically after the March 2008 elections.61
Reports suggest that the police have played a significant role in political violence. The Geneva-
based International Commission of Jurists, which investigated the May 2007 detention and
beating of lawyers, expressed shock at the role police played in the attacks and at the “cavalier
response of Zimbabwean authorities.”62
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In May 2005, the Government of Zimbabwe initiated Operation Murambatsvina (variously
translated as “Restore Order” or “Clean Out the Filth”), a massive demolition program aimed at
destroying allegedly illegal urban structures, such as informal housing and markets. By early July
2005, an estimated 700,000 urban Zimbabweans had been rendered homeless or unemployed by
the operation, and an estimated 2.1 million (in total, almost 20% of the population) were
indirectly affected by the demolitions.63 These are considered “low-end estimates,” and some
reports suggest the numbers of those affected was much higher.64 According to some sources,
70% of the country’s urban population may have lost shelter, while approximately 76% lost their
source of income.65 Police and military who carried out the event reportedly arrested forty
thousand for allegedly illegal activities and told those whose homes were destroyed to “return to
their rural origins,” although many had no rural home to which they could return.66
Operation Murambatsvina had a severe impact on the nation’s economy and on the livelihood of
its citizens. For many, this was not the first time they had been forcibly removed from their
homes. As a result of the 2000 land reform program, an estimated 400,000 black laborers on
commercial farms lost their livelihoods and/or homes, and many fled to urban areas to find work.
Political violence surrounding the 2002 elections also forced many from their homes, reportedly
displacing more than 100,000.67 In 2004, under a new phase of land resettlement, an estimated
500,000 who settled on farms during the 2000 invasions were evicted.68 Many of these displaced
inhabited the urban “slums” prior to the demolitions, making their living from trading on the
black market. Given the collapse of the formal economy, 40% of the labor force was estimated to
be informally employed prior to Murambatsvina, while 44% worked in the communal sector
61 Human Rights Watch, All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral Conditions in Zimbabwe’s
Coming General Elections, Vol. 20, No. 2(A), March 2008.
62 For more information, see the Mission’s report at http://www.icj.org.
63 The U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, Report of the Fact-
Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess The Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina, July 2005.
64 A survey by ActionAid International, a Netherlands-based international development agency, found that 840,000
were directly affected and 1.2 million indirectly affected, while a survey by the independent research firm
Afrobarometer reported that an estimated 2.7 million were directly affected.
65 ActionAid International, The Impact of Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order in Zimbabwe, August 2005.
66 Tibaijuka, 13.
67 U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, “World Refugee Survey, Zimbabwe Country Report,” 2003.
68 DOS, “Zimbabwe,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005.
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(including the agriculture industry), and 16% worked in the formal sector.69 Of those living in
towns and cities, an estimated 70% were involved in informal trading prior to the demolitions.
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The government described Murambatsvina as a program designed to restore the capital city to its
former image as “the Sunshine City,” ridding the country’s urban areas of illegal structures that
foster criminal activity and stemming the black market trade in foreign currency.70 Launched
shortly after the disputed 2005 parliamentary elections, many contend the demolitions were a
political move aimed either at preventing mass protests over the growing economic crisis or at
punishing the reputed urban support base of the MDC. The Harare Commission that initiated the
campaign was established in order to contravene the authority of the elected City Council, of
which the MDC held the majority. The mayor of Harare, an MDC politician who was elected by
80% of the vote, was fired in April 2004, along with 19 MDC-allied city councillors, after having
been arrested in 2003 under POSA for holding a public meeting without prior state approval.
The legality of the Harare Commission, which was appointed by the Minister of Local
Government, was challenged in a November 2003 high court ruling that found the Commission
did not have the authority to fire the mayor. A new election was supposed to be held within 90
days, according to law, but when no election occurred, the Harare Commission was reappointed.
The remaining MDC councillors resigned in protest. With the exception of Harare, the local
authorities of the other areas (many of which are MDC-controlled) affected by Murambatsvina
have reported that they were not informed of the demolitions prior to the event. The implications
of this breakdown in governance are reflected by the United Nations, which found that
Murambatsvina “was implemented in a highly polarized political climate characterized by
mistrust, fear and a lack of dialogue between Government and local authorities, and between the
former and civil society.”71
ȱ ȱȱ
International reaction was highly critical. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan named Tanzanian-
born Anna Tibaijuka, Executive Director of UN-HABITAT, as the U.N. Special Envoy on Human
Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe to investigate the humanitarian impact of the demolitions.
Following a fact-finding mission to the country, she issued a comprehensive report, which
concluded:
Operation Restore Order, while purporting to target illegal dwellings and structures and to
clamp down on alleged illicit activities, was carried out in an indiscriminate and unjustified
manner, with indifference to human suffering and, in repeated cases, with disregard to
several provisions of national and international legal frameworks.72
The report also described police preventing civil society and humanitarian organizations from
assisting those affected by the demolitions, and suggested that the groups were operating in a
69 Tibaijuka, 34.
70 “Clean Up Commendable,” The Herald, May 23, 2005.
71 Ibid., 7.
72 Ibid., 7.
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“climate of fear” and practicing “‘self-censorship’ to avoid being closed down or evicted.”73 The
Chairman of the African Union sent his own envoy, but he was prevented from conducting an
assessment (see “International Perspectives,” below). The presentation of the U.N. envoy’s report
to the U.N. Security Council stirred controversy as China, Algeria, Benin, and Russia objected to
debate on the report. The majority of Security Council members voted to allow its discussion,
albeit in a closed session. Secretary-General Annan also issued a strong statement condemning
Murambatsvina, calling on the government of Zimbabwe to stop the evictions and allow
unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance:
“Operation Murambatsvina” has done a catastrophic injustice to as many as 700,000 of
Zimbabwe’s poorest citizens, through indiscriminate actions, carried out with disquieting
indifference to human suffering. I call on the Government to stop these forced evictions and
demolitions immediately, and to ensure that those who orchestrated this ill-advised policy
are held fully accountable for their actions ... the Government must recognize the virtual state
of emergency that now exists, allow unhindered access for humanitarian operations, and
create conditions for sustainable relief and reconstruction.74
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Many observers suggest the Zimbabwean government did little to respond to the U.N. envoy’s
recommendations.75 Reports indicate that forced evictions continued, despite government
declarations to the contrary.76 As was the case during the initial evictions, several thousand of
those made homeless were taken, in some cases reportedly against their will, to police-run “transit
camps” in late 2006. Conditions in these camps were described as dire, often lacking shelter,
water, or basic latrine facilities.77 In keeping with the findings of the U.N. report, Amnesty
International alleges that Zimbabwe has repeatedly prohibited aid organizations, including the
United Nations, from providing the displaced with temporary shelters, such as tents, until
permanent housing became available. Secretary-General Annan expressed his concern in October
2005 over the government’s rejection of U.N. assistance to “tens of thousands,” noting “there is
no clear evidence that subsequent Government efforts have significantly benefitted these
groups.”78 The United Nations was subsequently permitted to erect approximately 2,300 shelters,
a fraction of their target of 40,000.79
In response to international criticism of Murambatsvina, the government announced a new
housing scheme, Operation Garikai, in June 2005. Under Garakai, also known as “Hlalani
Kuhle” (Live Well), new housing for those rendered homeless was to be built with public funds.
The ambitious reconstruction program would allegedly create tens of thousands of new homes,
but given the shortage of building materials and the government’s budgetary problems, it is
highly unlikely the original target of 5,275 homes has been met. Reports suggest that few houses
73 Ibid., 54.
74 The Secretary-General’s statement, made on July 22, 2005, is available online at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/
sgstats.asp?nid=1589.
75 See, for example, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum , “Political Repression Disguised as Civic Mindedness:
Operation Murambatsvina One Year Later,” November 2006 and Political Violence Report, October 2007.
76 U.N., United Nations Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) 2007, July 2007.
77 AI, “Zimbabwe: No Justice for the Victims of Forced Evictions,” September 2006.
78 The October 31, 2005 statement is available at http://www.un.org/News/ossg/.
79 AI, “Zimbabwe,” Annual Report 2007.
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were actually completed, and, instead of going to victims of Murambatsvina, the newly built
houses were more likely to be occupied by soldiers, police, and members of the ruling party.80
The government denied these allegations.
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Human rights organizations have raised questions about how Zimbabwe and the international
community should respond to what some have termed “crimes against humanity,”81 as defined by
Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),82 and whether there is a
“responsibility to protect”83 those affected by Murambatsvina, or by subsequent government
actions. Among the U.N. report recommendations, the envoy suggested:
Although a case for crime against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute might be
difficult to sustain, the Government of Zimbabwe clearly caused large sections of its
population serious suffering that must now be redressed with the assistance of the United
Nations and the international community. The international community should encourage the
Government to prosecute all those who orchestrated this catastrophe and those who may
have caused criminal negligence leading to alleged deaths, if so confirmed by an independent
internal inquiry/inquest. The international community should then continue to be engaged
with human rights concerns in Zimbabwe in consensus building political forums such as the
UN Commission on Human Rights, or its successor, the African Union Peer Review
Mechanism, and in the Southern African Development Community.
The report included a legal analysis of Murambatsvina through international and regional, and
national legal frameworks. Several domestic and international organizations, including the
International Bar Association (IBA), have called for the Zimbabwean government to be brought
before the ICC, not only for violations related to the demolitions, but also for the government’s
alleged support of political violence against its critics. Responding to President Mugabe’s
comments supporting the beating of trade union leaders in 2006, the Executive Director of the
IBA made the following statement:
Mugabe’s statements add to the weight of evidence that torture and other serious violations
of international law are sanctioned at the highest level in Zimbabwe. This underscores the
urgent need for international and regional action to hold the Zimbabwean Government to
account ... the torture of the trade union activists is not an isolated incident, but part of a
dangerous and illegal system of repression which constitutes crimes against humanity in
international law. Decisive action is required by both the United Nations and the African
Union to end impunity and violence in Zimbabwe.84
80 See the AI report; Solidarity Peace Trust, Meltdown: Murambatsvina One Year On, August 30, 2006.
81 Institute of War and Peace Reporting, “Prosecution of Mugabe Urged,” January 20, 2006.
82 The United States is not party to the Rome Statute. For more information, see CRS Report RL31495, U.S. Policy
Regarding the International Criminal Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
83 For more information on the “Responsibility to Protect,” see the Report on the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty, which aims to “reconcil[e] the international community’s responsibility to act in the
face of massive violations of humanitarian norms while respecting the sovereign rights of states.” The report is
available at http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp.
84 The IBA is comprised of Bar Associations and Law Societies around the world. The comments of its Executive
Director can be found at http://www.ibanet.org/iba/article.cfm?article=95.
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Because Zimbabwe is not a signatory of the Rome Statute, a U.N. Security Council resolution
would be needed for any referral to the ICC. Given the objections of some Security Council
members to the envoy’s report itself, which as stated above suggested an ICC case would be
“difficult to sustain,” it is unlikely such a referral would be made. The U.N. Envoy found that
“The Government of Zimbabwe is collectively responsible for what has happened,” but cautioned
that “it appears there was no collective decision-making with respect to both the conception and
implementation. Evidence suggests it was based on improper advice by a few architects of the
operation.”85 According to one media source, though, Zimbabwe’s State Security Minister has
claimed, “All the decisions to do with the operation emanated from the politburo [ZANU-PF’s
inner cabinet] and were sent through me to the government.”86
The government of Zimbabwe has yet to prosecute those who might be responsible for crimes
related to Operation Murambatsvina or the subsequent evictions. The victims, in most cases, lack
the financial resources to seek redress in the courts, although Zimbabwean human rights lawyers
have represented groups of victims on several occasions. In one such case, in November 2005,
residents of a Harare suburb were given a temporary stay of eviction by the High Court, but
police ignored the court order and forcibly moved the group to a transit camp. The inability of the
country’s judicial system to protect its citizens or their property, or to provide due process to
those seeking remedy or compensation, suggests a fundamental crisis in Zimbabwe’s rule of law.
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Several Southern African countries have suffered from chronic food insecurity in recent years,
stemming from a combination of weather-related and man-made factors, including prolonged
drought, floods, poor economic performance, and the impact of HIV/AIDS.87 Zimbabwe has been
particularly hard hit. Grain silos across the country that once held strategic grain reserves three
times the population’s annual food needs now stand empty. Experts attribute this food insecurity
to unexpectedly severe crop failure,88 but some suggest Murambatsvina and other government
policies significantly limited the population’s ability to feed itself, particularly in urban areas.89
USAID and the World Food Program predict that over seven million Zimbabweans, more than
three-quarters of the country’s population, will need food assistance in early 2009.90
Although drought is partly to blame for the country’s food shortages, analysts believe that
disruptions to the farming sector resulting from Mugabe’s land seizure program are the main
reason for reduced food production.91 Nearly all of the country’s 4,500 commercial farms have
85 Tibaijuka, 76.
86 See an excerpt from South-Africa based website ZimOnline in “Ex-Ethiopian Leader Said Behind Zimbabwe’s
Cleanup Operation,” BBC Monitoring Africa, February 20, 2006.
87 For more information on the region’s food crisis, see CRS Report RS21301, The Food Crisis in Southern Africa:
Background and Issues, by Charles E. Hanrahan.
88 United Nations, 2006 CAP Mid-Year Review, June 2006.
89 ActionAid International, The Impact of Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order in Zimbabwe, August 2005. This
study suggests up to 54% of the country may have become food insecure as a result of Murambatsvina. A more recent
USAID study also concluded that Murambatsvina and “more recent evictions “ increased vulnerability, according to its
“Zimbabwe—Drought and Complex Emergency Situation Report #2,” Fiscal Year 2007.
90 USAID, “Zimbabwe—Complex Emergency Situation Report #3,” Fiscal Year 2008.
91 On the land takeovers in Zimbabwe, see AI, Zimbabwe: Power and Hunger—Violations of the Right to Food,
October 15, 2004.
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now been taken over; the government’s land redistribution program is reportedly plagued by
inefficiencies, with large portions of redistributed land not being actively farmed. Tractors and
other inputs to production are reportedly in short supply. Thousands of experienced farm workers
were reportedly forced to flee seized commercial farms, and many of those who now hold
farmland have no agricultural expertise. The government’s introduction of price controls in 2007
may further restrict production—the country’s seed and fertilizer producers report that the
controls have created “unrealistic prices,” which in turn have caused shortages for the latest
farming season.92
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In late 2005, the Zimbabwean government established Operation Taguta (or “Eat Well”), a move
seen by many as an acknowledgment that the government’s farm resettlement policies had failed
to meet the country’s agricultural production needs. With food distribution already under the
control of the Grain Marketing Board, led by military officers, the government established a
command agriculture system, in which the military would be responsible for not only the
distribution, but also the production of food. Since the program’s inception, there have been
numerous reports of the illegal seizure of farm equipment, the destruction of the fruit, vegetable,
and other cash crops small-scale farmers grow to sell at market to support their families, and even
army brutality against farmers. Some critics of the government suggest Operation Taguta was
used by the government as an excuse to deploy military forces throughout the country to control
the population.93
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The ZANU-PF government’s stance on food aid led many observers to suspect that food has been
used as a political weapon, a charge the government denied.94 Despite assessments by multiple
international donor agencies suggesting the need for food assistance, President Mugabe
confounded observers in recent years by repeatedly declaring the country was running a maize
surplus and would not need food aid.95 In 2004, the government stopped a U.N. food needs
assessment and later halted general food aid distribution by donors (targeted food aid to
vulnerable groups continued), despite independent estimates that suggested 4.8 million would
require assistance.96 In March 2005, the government finally acknowledged serious food shortages,
but delayed in signing agreement to allow the World Food Program (WFP) and its implementing
partners to provide assistance until December of that year.97 Reports suggested that the
government maintained tight control of food distributions, until its ban on the distribution of aid
92 “Zimbabwe: The Mother of All Farming Seasons,” IRIN, October 25, 2007.
93 Solidarity Peace Trust, Operation Taguta/Sisuthi, April 2006.
94 AI, Zimbabwe: Power and Hunger.
95 “Mugabe Word for Word,” Sky News, May 24, 2004.
96 AI, Zimbabwe: Power and Hunger, and USAID, 2004 Annual Report for the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA).
97 “ZANU-PF Admits Food Crisis,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting (London), March 7, 2005; “10 More Die of
Hunger in Bulawayo,” Zimbabwe Standard, March 7, 2005; “14 More Die of Hunger in Bulawayo,” Zimbabwe
Standard, February 15, 2005.
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by NGOs prior to the 2008 runoff.98 The government has accused aid agencies of using food to
turn Zimbabweans away from ZANU-PF.
Critics like Pius Ncube, former Catholic Archbishop of Bulawayo, have accused the government
of distributing food only in areas where people would agree to vote for ZANU-PF. During past
elections, civil rights groups and the opposition have reported instances of ZANU-PF holding
campaign rallies in conjunction with government food distributions. In some areas, government
officials distributing food required those in line to show a party card—and MDC supporters were
reportedly turned away. Two 2005 court rulings supported these claims, finding that ZANU-PF
candidates politicized food distribution and used violence against the opposition.99
Ȧ ȱ
In the midst of its political and economic crisis, Zimbabwe is being ravaged by HIV/AIDS. The
country’s HIV prevalence rate is the world’s fifth highest. The United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) estimates that almost one quarter of Zimbabwe’s children are orphans (primarily
attributable to AIDS), the highest percentage globally.100 The epidemic is also causing a severe
strain on the country’s healthcare system; reports suggest that 75% of hospital admissions in
recent years have been AIDS-related, leaving few beds or resources for other patients. To
compound this problem, the economic crisis has resulted in the exodus of many of the country’s
medical professionals. Of those who remain, many are infected with HIV themselves, leaving
Zimbabwe to rely upon assistance from others. The AIDS epidemic is having a crippling effect on
the economy- the inability of infected agricultural workers to adequately contribute to food
production further hamstrings the struggling industry.
Although its infection rate remains high, Zimbabwe is the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa in
which HIV prevalence and incidence rates have declined. While reports suggest evidence of
changes in sexual behavior,101 the country’s high mortality rates also play a role in the decreased
prevalence rate.102 Zimbabwe’s government claims significant resolve to fight the disease. The
country was the first to introduce a tax to finance HIV/AIDS programs (3% on taxable income).
President Mugabe announced in Zimbabwe’s commitment to universal access to antiretroviral
therapy (ART) by 2010. Despite this commitment, access to ART is relatively low, with only
40,000 of 1.3 million HIV positive Zimbabweans on ART in 2008.103
For those who are able to access treatment, the country’s economic crisis is limiting its impact.
Patients taking ART must maintain healthy diets for the treatment to be effective, but with
malnutrition rates high, few are able to benefit. Murambatsvina reportedly displaced an estimated
80,000 infected with HIV/AIDS, leaving many not only food insecure but also without access to
ART. Experts suggest disruptions in ART may lead to increased resistance in HIV-positive
98 “Govt Delays Stall WFP Food Distribution,” Financial Gazette, December 13, 2006.
99 Reference to the rulings, made by Judges Nicholas Ndou and Rita Makarau, can be found in DOS, “Zimbabwe,”
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005.
100 “Zimbabwe Has Highest Percentage of Orphans in the World,” Associated Press, December 6, 2006.
101 UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update, December 2007.
102 Dr. Peter Piot, “Launch of the 2005 AIDS Epidemic Update,” UNAIDS, November 21, 2005.
103 ART figures are available at the website of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR),
http://www.pepfar.gov.
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patients to the most common medication, Nevirapine.104 The displacement and separation of
families may also lead to an increase in unsafe sexual behavior, which could reverse the country’s
decreasing prevalence rate.
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As of February 17, 2009, almost 79,000 suspected cases of cholera, including over 3,700 deaths,
have been reported, according to the U.N. World Health Organization (WHO). Some health
experts suggest the epidemic could ultimately infect over 100,000 within a short time period.
Several neighboring countries have reported confirmed cases in border areas. Cholera, an acute
diarrhoeal infection, is spread by contaminated food and water, and the severity of Zimbabwe’s
outbreak has been attributed to the collapse of the country’s water and sanitation infrastructure
and its health system. In Zimbabwe, the reported case fatality rate (CFR) of 4.7% is much higher
than the normal 1% CFR rate for cholera cases.
Many health experts attribute the high number of cholera cases and the high case fatality rate to
the collapse of Zimbabwe’s healthcare and sanitation systems.105 According to reports, water
treatment and delivery have dramatically declined in recent years, and the decline of many other
basic social services, such as trash collection, pose significant health risks. Public healthcare
providers often lack basic medications, supplies and functioning medical equipment. Many health
workers have migrated to neighboring countries in search of work, and the cost of transport to
and from work for those who remain reportedly outweighs the salary they might receive. Many
public hospitals and clinics have closed due to understaffing.
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The turmoil in Zimbabwe has led to a severe economic contraction, a sharp drop in living
standards for the rural and urban poor, and a massive exodus of Zimbabweans in search of work.
According to the Solidarity Peace Trust, founded by clergy from Zimbabwe and South Africa,
well over three million Zimbabweans were living outside the country by 2004. The Trust
calculated that this amounted to 25%-30% of the total population, or 60%-70% of productive
adults.106 Given the continued economic decline, many more are believed to have fled Zimbabwe
since then. Those who leave the country because of economic hardship often face difficult
conditions because economic refugees are not entitled to political asylum. Many of those who
remain behind now reportedly rely on remittances from family abroad.
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Dubbed “the world’s fastest shrinking economy,” Zimbabwe’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
has declined over 50% since 1998.107 World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
104 Tibaijuka, 40.
105 See, for example, Physicians for Human Rights, Health in Ruins: A Man-Made Disaster in Zimbabwe, January,
2009.
106 Solidarity Peace Trust, An Account of the Exodus of a Nation’s People, November 2004.
107 See, for example, Simon Robinson, “Great Leap Backwards,” Time, May 29, 2005, and the World Bank’s “Country
Brief” on Zimbabwe, available at http://www.worldbank.org.
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lending has been suspended since 2000 due to nonpayment of arrears, and foreign currency for
essential imports, particularly fuel, is in extremely short supply. The IMF suggests that the
inflation rate will not reverse without significant changes in government spending.108
Zimbabweans continue to face steep rises in the prices of food and non-food items.
In December 2003, Mugabe selected Gideon Gono, credited with turning around a troubled
commercial bank, as governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. The move was welcomed by
some, since Gono was regarded as a successful technocrat. However, critics maintain that his
measures to fight corruption and discover illegally held foreign exchange are being used to
damage government opponents and further the interests of ZANU-PF.109 Regardless of Gono’s
efforts, international assessments of Zimbabwe’s economic prospects remain bleak. Ignoring the
advice of the IMF, the government refused to devalue the official exchange rate. Instead, in June
2006, Gono devalued the country’s currency, the Zimbabwe dollar, removing three zeros in an
effort to mitigate inflation.
Under “Operation Sunrise,” the government printed new “rebased” currency, known as “little
heroes,” in an effort to combat corruption and money laundering, according to the government.110
Zimbabweans were given only 21 days to exchange their old currency. Individuals were restricted
from exchanging more than Z$100 million (USD$1000) of the old notes without clearance from
tax authorities (companies were allowed to exchange Z$5 billion). Police arrested more than
3,000 at roadblocks for holding currency over the individual limit and seized a reported $40
million.111 Analysts suggest the devaluation did little to reverse the foreign exchange rate
shortages.112 More recently, in February 2009, Gono devalued the currency again, removing 12
zeros from the Zimbabwe dollar.
In late September 2008, Zimbabwe began officially trading in foreign currency in an attempt to
lower prices, and in February 2009, under the direction of new Finance Minister Tendai Biti of
the MDC, the government began issuing government salaries in U.S. dollars. Biti and Prime
Minister Tsvangirai have pledged to pay salaries in foreign currency in an effort to get
Zimbabweans to return to work.
Zimbabwe is currently restricted from borrowing from the IMF, to which the country still owes
over $100 million. The government paid $120 million in 2005 and $9 million in 2006 to settle
other outstanding arrears with the Fund and to avoid compulsory withdrawal from the IMF. The
source of the funds used to pay the IMF debt has been a source of considerable speculation in the
media.113 Mugabe has dubbed the IMF a “political instrument” and “monster” for regime
change.114 Zimbabwe also owes an estimated $409 million to the World Bank and $300 million to
the African Development Bank. In response to the September 2008 power sharing agreement, the
108 IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, September 2006.
109 “Gono’s Mission Is to Save ZANU-PF, Not the Economy,” LiquidAfrica, December 3, 2004.
110 “Country is Committed to Uprooting All Forms of Corruption,” The Herald, August 24, 2006.
111 “Much Ado About Money,” IRIN, August 18, 2006.
112 “Bag of Bricks: Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe,” The Economist, August 26, 2006, and “Zimbabwe: Millions no
Longer Millionaires,” African Business, October 2006.
113 See, for example, “A Zimbabwean Businessman, His Farms Seized, Takes on Mugabe,” Washington Post, February
24, 2006.
114 “Mugabe’s 82nd Birthday Blast at Zimbabwe,” Business Day, February 21, 2006.
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IMF’s Managing Director encouraged the Zimbabwe government discuss policy reforms with the
Fund and to “take steps to show clear commitment to a new policy direction.”115
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In addition to the ZANU-PF government’s attempts to revive its flagging agriculture industry
through the introduction of a command agriculture system (see “Zimbabwe’s Food Crisis”
section, above), Mugabe administration introduced long-term leases to provide security of tenure
for farmers willing to cultivate land nationalized in the 2005 constitutional amendment. One of
the unintended side effects of Mugabe’s 2000 land reform strategy, which resulted in the abolition
of land tenure, was that farmers were unable to use their land as collateral to obtain bank loans to
invest in their farms. As a result, few commercial farmers were able to find the capital to maintain
productivity. The government began to distribute 99-year leases in November 2006, and among
the initial recipients were 19 white farmers, which came as a shock to many after Mugabe
declared in July 2005 that his land reform program would be complete only when there was “not
a single white on the farms.”116 There are reportedly less than 400 white farmers left in
Zimbabwe. Some suggest financial institutions have been reluctant to accept the new leases as
collateral, given that the government reserves the right to cancel the lease if it deems the farm
unproductive.
The government also announced in 2007 its intention to ration electricity to households across the
country in order to divert its dwindling supplies for irrigation of Zimbabwe’s winter wheat
crop.117 More recent electricity shortages, caused by supply cuts from Mozambique, South Africa,
and Zambia, have compounded Zimbabwe’s economic woes, cutting the production capacity of
the manufacturing and mining sectors by as much 50%, according to some reports.118
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While the country’s agriculture industry founders, its mining industry has continued to bring
much-needed income into Zimbabwe. Mining accounts for almost half of Zimbabwe’s total
foreign currency revenues. Zimbabwe has the world’s second largest reserves of platinum, behind
South Africa.119 In early 2006, the government announced plans to take a 51% share of all
foreign-owned mines for local black investors; 25% of that share would be acquired at no cost to
the government, and mines that refused to part with their shares would be expropriated. After
industry officials cautioned that the plan would deter foreign investment, the proposal was
modified, allowing firms that invested in community projects to keep their majority share. They
voted to approve similar plans to take a majority share in all foreign-owned businesses in
September 2007; the legislation became law in March 2008. The Zimbabwe government insists
that it will not expropriate foreign-owned companies and that the law will not be applied to every
115 IMF, Statement by IMF Managing Director Strauss-Kahn on Zimbabwe, Press Release No. 08/207, September 15,
2008.
116 “In Reversal, Mugabe Seeks White Farmers,” UPI, December 17, 2006.
117 “Zimbabwe to Ration Electricity for Homes to Four Hours a Day,” Reuters, May 10, 2007.
118 “Power Cuts Halt Harare Factories,” Business Day, October 29, 2007.
119 The largest mining operations in the country are controlled by Impala Platinum and Anglo Platinum, respectively.
These South African-owned companies are the world’s largest platinum producers.
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company, but rather “on the basis of capital (investment) and employment levels.”120 Critics argue
the law further deters much-needed foreign investment.
The government has taken steps to crackdown on illegal mining, although some suggest that
members of ZANU-PF may be complicit. Police arrested an estimated 20,000 illegal miners in
late 2006, including several hundred reportedly legal small-scale miners, confiscating gold,
diamonds, emeralds, and gold ore. Since the collapse of the formal economy, many of the
country’s unemployed have resorted to illegal mining, selling their goods on the black market.
According to reports, most of the miners were released after paying fines.
The Kimberly Process, an international government certification scheme designed to prevent
trade in conflict diamonds, has investigated allegations that “blood diamonds” from the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been smuggled along with rough stones from
Zimbabwe into South Africa for export. The government has dismissed the claims as a western
attempt to promote regime change. If the allegations were proven, Zimbabwe’s legal diamond
exports could be banned. In December 2008, the World Diamond Council (WDC) suggested that
Zimbabwe may continue to be a source of illegal exports, and there are allegations of forced labor
in mines by Zimbabwean soldiers.121 The European Union is advocating an investigation into
Zimbabwe’s compliance with its Kimberly obligations. Zimbabwe has been previously linked to
conflict diamonds; senior officials were named in a 2003 U.N. report for profiting from illicit
trade during Zimbabwe’s military operations in the DRC.122
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Blaming the United States, the United Kingdom, and other western governments for the country’s
economic crisis, Mugabe has sought to engender investment and trade opportunities with Asia,
particularly China. Dubbed the “Look East” policy, Mugabe’s efforts have been criticized by his
own party as insufficient to address the economy’s slide. In December 2006, the Parliamentary
Portfolio Committee on Budget, Finance, and Economic Development, chaired by a ZANU-PF
MP, accused the central bank governor of exacerbating inflation with “quasi-fiscal activities” and
warned the administration that “the Far East destinations be viewed as a market in its infancy and
that the traditional market of the West should not be neglected as the nation moves toward
regularizing relations with the international community.”123
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Critics contend that President Mugabe has bought the continued loyalty of the country’s security
forces through patronage and bribery.124 Some observers suggest that loyalty of the security forces
120 “Zimbabwe Clarifies Nationalization Legislation,” Financial Times, March 11, 2008.
121 World Diamond Council Press Release, “WDC Calls for Concerted International Action to Halt Theft of Natural
Resources in Zimbabwe,” December 10, 2008; “Soldiers are the New Illegal Diamond Miners,” IRIN, January 20,
2009.
122 Zimbabwe is a signatory of the Kimberly Process. For more information, see CRS Report RL30751, Diamonds and
Conflict: Background, Policy, and Legislation, by Nicolas Cook.
123 “Zimbabwe: Parliamentary Body Urges State to ‘Normalize’ Trade Ties with West,” BBC Monitoring Africa,
December 8, 2006.
124 “Militarization of State Firms Cause for Worry,” Zimbabwe Independent, May 26, 2006.
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may come at a heavy cost to the economy. In 2006, the government reportedly spent more than
$20 million to purchase new cars for police, military and intelligence officers. The security forces
and civil service also reportedly received an almost 300% pay raise to counter record desertion
rates. Observers continue to speculate on how the government has paid for its military purchases
from China, including a reported $240 million in fighter jets.
In addition to allegations of land and housing handouts to security personnel, critics of the
government highlight a significant number of current and former military officers who have been
appointed to civilian government positions. Mugabe placed current or former military officers in
control of the Ministries of Energy and Industry, the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (in charge of
tax collection), the electoral commission, the state railway, the Grain Marketing Board, and the
parks authority, and several have served in the Senate and ambassadorial posts abroad.
As the economy continues to collapse, there have been signs that the government may be running
out of funds to maintain its security forces. During a parliamentary hearing in mid-2007, the
Defense Secretary reportedly suggested that soldiers were dissatisfied with their low salaries and
that the forces were running out of food and might have to suspend training if new funds were not
released.125 Later that month, Zimbabwean intelligence officials reportedly uncovered a coup plot
led by several senior military officials. Unconfirmed reports suggest that as many as 400
members of the army, air force, and police may have been involved in the plan, which allegedly
aimed to remove Mugabe and to install Emmerson Mnangagwa as president. Mnangagwa, who
has reportedly long sought to succeed Mugabe, denied any knowledge of the plot. Other sources
suggest Vice President Joice Mujuru and her husband were behind the coup attempt and used
Mnangagwa’s name to discredit him. Neither Mnangagwa nor the Mujurus were officially
accused of involvement, although some reports suggest Solomon Mujuru may have been placed
under house arrest for a limited time.126 More recently, in November 2008, soldiers looted Harare
stores after they were unable to access their paychecks.
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The international community has been divided on how to respond to Zimbabwe’s persistent
crises. In general, Western nations and institutions have expressed opposition to Robert Mugabe’s
methods of rule, and have pursued policies intended to pressure the Zimbabwe government for
reforms. In contrast, Mugabe has enjoyed some sympathy in Africa, where he is viewed as an
elder statesman and a leader of the anti-colonial struggle, and among the Non-Aligned nations
generally. This has changed to an extent in recent years, however, with some African leaders
concluding that the Zimbabwe situation is damaging to Africa’s interests and that political and
economic reforms are needed. Nevertheless, African countries supported Zimbabwe in its
successful bid to chair the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development in 2007,
allegedly to show African solidarity against Western opposition. AU member states were unable
to come to a conclusion on how to address Zimbabwe’s political situation at the 2008 AU Summit
in Egypt, despite election observer reports from the AU, SADC, and the Pan-African Parliament
finding that the June runoff was not free or fair.
125 “Soldiers Go Hungry,” Financial Gazette, May 23, 2007.
126 “Army Investigates Reports of Coup Plot,” SW Radio Africa, June 14, 2007.
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The United States has been critical of the ZANU-PF government for its poor human rights record
and lack of respect for the rule of law. Key elements of U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe have
included the imposition of targeted sanctions against high-ranking ZANU-PF members and their
affiliates, support for South Africa to spearhead an African effort to restore democracy, and the
provision of assistance intended to help the country’s poor and strengthen civil society. Former
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during her
2005 confirmation hearing, that Zimbabwe was one of six “outposts of tyranny” worldwide and
that the United States stood with the oppressed people there.127 These remarks provoked an angry
personal response from Mugabe.128 Another State Department official was similarly critical,
suggesting that Zimbabwe “has now become a textbook case of bad and illegitimate
government.”129
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The Mugabe administration has routinely blamed its economic crisis on sanctions from the west.
The United States does not currently have trade sanctions against Zimbabwe, with the exception
of a ban on transfers of defense items and services to the country. The U.S. government has,
however, cancelled all non-humanitarian government-to-government aid.130 Zimbabwe is not
eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) because and its
poor record of economic management and human rights abuses.
The White House has annually renewed U.S. sanctions against ZANU-PF leaders. The sanctions
are intended to punish those responsible for Zimbabwe’s difficulties without harming the
Zimbabwe population at large. The initial sanctions, imposed in 2003, ban travel to the United
States by “senior members of the government of Robert Mugabe and others ... who formulate,
implement, or benefit from policies that undermine or injure Zimbabwe’s democratic institutions
or impede the transition to a multi-party democracy.” Persons who benefit financially from
business dealings with such individuals are also banned, as are the spouses of people in either
group. In 2003, President Bush issued an executive order freezing assets held in the United States
by 75 high-ranking Zimbabwe officials and Mugabe’s wife, Grace.131 Nine firms and farms were
added in 2004, and the list was further expanded in November 2005 to block the assets of 128
individuals and 33 entities. President Bush’s executive order also allows the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to go beyond previous authority and block
the property of additional persons who “have engaged in actions or policies to undermine
127 “Rice Targets 6 ‘Outposts of Tyranny,’” Washington Times, January 19, 2005. The others were Cuba, Burma, North
Korea, Iran, and Belarus.
128 “Zimbabwe’s Mugabe Lashes Out at Rice, Blair at Campaign Launch,” AFP, February 11, 2005.
129 Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Thomas Woods, “Zimbabwe a Textbook Case
of Bad Governance, U.S. Official Says,” February 28, 2005.
130 In 2006, Zimbabwe was found to be in violation of crimes related to human trafficking and was subject to sanction
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-386) for FY2007. In 2007, the State Department found
that Zimbabwe was “making significant efforts” to combat trafficking, and Zimbabwe was moved from a “Tier 3” to a
“Tier 2” designation. The “Tier 2” designation remained in 2008. A Tier 2 rating means that the government still does
not meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making significant efforts to do so. For more
information, see U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip.
131 Seventy-seven individuals are named in the executive order (EO 13288), but one of these, Vice President Simon
Muzenda, has died.
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Zimbabwe’s democratic processes or institutions,” their immediate family members, and any
persons assisting them.132 President Bush added additional names to the list in December 2007
and November 2008.
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Congress made clear its opposition to Robert Mugabe’s policies in the Zimbabwe Democracy and
Economic Recovery Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-99), which criticized “economic mismanagement” and
“undemocratic practices” in Zimbabwe. This legislation called for consultations with allies on
economic sanctions and a travel ban. In the 109th Congress, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed H.Res. 409 in December 2005, condemning Operation Murambatsvina, which the
resolution termed a “humanitarian disaster that has compounded the country’s humanitarian food
and economic crises.” The resolution also called on the U.N. and African regional bodies to
investigate the impact of the demolitions and requested that the Administration use its influence
to advocate further action by the IMF against the Zimbabwean government. Senator Russ
Feingold (D-WI) introduced S.Amdt. 1254, which was included in the final version of the
FY2006 foreign operations appropriations bill (P.L. 109-102). This amendment provided $4
million for democracy and governance activities in Zimbabwe. The Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on African Affairs held a hearing on Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis in
June 2001. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held its most recent hearing on Zimbabwe in
July 2008. The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa has likewise held hearings on
challenges to democracy in Zimbabwe: in June 2000 prior to the parliamentary elections, in
February 2002 prior to Zimbabwe’s presidential elections, and in April 2005 following the
parliamentary elections.
The 110th Congress was active on Zimbabwe. On April 17, 2007, the House of Representatives
passed H.Con.Res. 100, sponsored by Representative Tom Lantos, condemning the Zimbabwean
government’s recent actions against opposition and civil society activists. In June 2007, the
Senate passed parallel legislation, S.Con.Res. 25, introduced by then-Senator Barack Obama.
Former Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton introduced S. 1500, the Support for Democracy and
Human Rights in Zimbabwe Act of 2007, which would have authorized up to $10 million to
support democracy and human rights programs in the country.
Several Members of Congress issued statements highly critical of the Mugabe Administration
surrounding the 2008 elections and the ongoing political violence. Some wrote letters to Bush
Administration officials or African leaders. On April 25, the Senate passed S.Res. 533, introduced
by Senator John Kerry, calling for the immediate release of the presidential results, an end to the
political violence and intimidation, and a peaceful transition to democratic rule. The resolution
also supported calls for an international arms embargo and other targeted sanctions against the
Mugabe regime, and encouraged the creation of a comprehensive political and economic recovery
package in the event a democratic government is installed. The House passed H.Res. 1230,
sponsored by Representative Donald Payne and all the House Members of the Congressional
Black Caucus, among others, condemning the violence and calling for a peaceful resolution to the
political crisis. H.Res. 1270, sponsored by Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, was also passed,
calling for an international arms embargo, urging the United Nations to deploy a special envoy to
Zimbabwe and encouraging the parties to discuss the creation of a government of national unity.
Prior to the June runoff, Representative Adam Schiff introduced legislation calling on the
132 The text of this annex to EO 13288 can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov.
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Zimbabwe government to postpone the election. Representative Tom Tancredo also introduced
legislation, H.Con.Res. 387, calling for the United States to sever diplomatic ties with Zimbabwe.
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During President Bush’s visit to South Africa in 2003, he praised the work of Thabo Mbeki as the
“point man” in seeking a Zimbabwe solution. The statement suggested to some that the United
States was stepping back from a lead role on the Zimbabwe issue and would accede to Mbeki’s
“quiet diplomacy” (see “South Africa” section, below) as the best means of achieving reform in
Zimbabwe.133 Mbeki reportedly assured President Bush at that time that he would be able to bring
about talks between ZANU-PF and the MDC, which did not occur until 2007. In 2004, former
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Jendayi Frazer, who was Ambassador to South Africa
at the time, called for the formation of a “coalition of the willing” to deal with Zimbabwe. Frazer
reiterated South Africa’s position of leverage, and insisted more needed to be done by African
states to return Zimbabwe to democracy.134
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The United States remains the leader in humanitarian relief aid to the Zimbabwean people,
supplying more than $262 million in food aid and disaster assistance since October 2007. The
U.S. government has supplied over $6.8 million in FY2009 specifically to address the cholera
outbreak. In addition to disaster aid, the United States provided $23.2 million in bilateral
assistance for Zimbabwe in FY2007 and an estimated $22.9 million in FY2008. The
Administration requested $45.4 million for FY2009. The State Department stated in its FY2008
Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) that supplemental assistance will be requested if
elections are held during the fiscal year that result in the election of a “reform-minded”
government.135 Similar language was used in the FY2009 request, which states,
If elections do not occur in 2008, or if elections continue the status quo, FY 2009
programming... will be reassessed to determine the most promising course to assist the
democratic opposition to survive and to deepen its voice, thereby maintaining pressure on the
GOZ to reform. Additionally, under a no-change scenario, the United States will promote a
continuing dialogue with domestic and regional audiences on economic mismanagement,
political manipulation, and human rights abuses.
The Obama Administration has welcomed the establishment of the new coalition government, but
has indicated that it will not resume non-humanitarian assistance to the government until “it sees
effective governance.”136 Zimbabwe is not among the countries eligible to participate in the
Millennium Challenge Account program, nor is it a focus country for the President’s Emergency
Plan for AIDS Relief.
USAID has supported local democracy advocates in Zimbabwe through a variety of programs
aimed at ensuring media freedom and strengthening civil society and the legislative process.
USAID partners were reportedly instrumental in documenting the demolitions and human rights
133 “Bush Backs Mbeki on Zimbabwe,” The Guardian (London) July 10, 2003.
134 “US Seeks ‘Coalition’ to Force Zimbabwe Regime Change,” The Independent (UK), August 25, 2004.
135 Department of State, FY2008 Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justification.
136 Daily Press Briefing by State Department Spokesman Robert Wood, February 11, 2009.
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violations during Operation Murambatsvina and assisting in relief efforts. Legal restrictions
continue to limit the ability of journalists and independent newspapers to provide alternative
source for news, and the Zimbabwean government controls all domestic radio and television
broadcasting stations. USAID provides funding for Voice of America to broadcast Studio 7, a
daily program on shortwave and AM radio that USAID describes as “the principal source of
independent electronic media in the country.” Studio 7, along with UK-based Shortwave (SW)
Radio Africa and the Dutch-funded Voice of the People (VOP) have had their broadcasts
periodically interrupted by the ZANU-PF government using Chinese jamming equipment.
The U.S. State Department warns that travelers suspected of having a “bias” against the
government may be refused entry to Zimbabwe.137 In 2006, a delegation of the U.S. Coalition of
Black Trade Unionists (CBTU), led by AFL-CIO Vice President William Lucy, was expelled from
the country. Then-U.S. Ambassador Christopher Dell said,
Clearly, the Zimbabwe government’s decision not to honor the delegation’s visas is the result
of the events of 13 September, when security forces brutally suppressed planned peaceful
demonstrations by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.... This transparent attempt to
deflect international attention from the vicious beatings is itself an example of the
Zimbabwean government’s repression and of its fear of the truth.... There is increasing
acknowledgment that a man who was regarded as a liberator of his people is an oppressor.138
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In 2002, in conjunction with the United States and the European Union, the British Parliament
imposed targeted sanctions on leading members and affiliates of the ZANU-PF regime, as well an
arms embargo and an asset freeze. The UK has imposed travel bans on over 100 members of the
ZANU-PF and close affiliates of the party. Britain continues to provide humanitarian aid in
Zimbabwe. Concurrently, the UK has maintained its willingness to release funds to Zimbabwe to
pay for parts of an orderly land redistribution program if Mugabe retires and the rule of law is
returned. With Mugabe remaining in office under the September 2008 power sharing agreement,
it is unclear whether Britain will concede to release such funds. Mugabe was extremely hostile
toward former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a persistent critic. Speaking at his 81st birthday
celebration, Mugabe said the upcoming election would “kill once and for all the machinations of
that man in Number 10 Downing Street, who for some reason thinks he has the divine power to
rule Zimbabwe and Britain.... On March 31, we must dig a grave not just six feet but 12 feet and
bury Mr. Blair and the Union Jack.”139 Current Prime Minister Gordon Brown has maintained his
predecessor’s position, boycotting the December 2007 EU-Africa Summit to protest Mugabe’s
attendance. In an April 23 speech to the House of Commons, British Prime Minister Gordon
Brown called for an international arms embargo against Zimbabwe, accusing the government of
rigging the 2008 elections and calling the political situation “completely unacceptable.” Britain’s
Queen Elizabeth stripped Mugabe of an honorable Knighthood he received in 1994.
137 DOS’s Consular Information Sheet for Zimbabwe is available at http://travel.state.gov/.
138 “EU Demands Probe into Congress of Trade Union Attacks,” Zimbabwe Standard, September 24, 2006.
139 “Zimbabwe’s Mugabe Marks 81st Birthday With Attack on Opposition, Blair,” AFP, February 26, 2005.
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The European Union was among the first to take action against Mugabe’s government. The EU
imposed targeted sanctions on 19 members of Zimbabwe’s elite and their spouses after pulling the
EU election observer team out of Zimbabwe in February 2002. These “light” sanctions were
upgraded by the EU to target 35 Zimbabwean leaders, and have been renewed yearly, with new
names added in January 2009. Current EU sanctions include a travel ban on over 160 members
and beneficiaries of the ZANU-PF, an arms embargo, and an asset freeze. Mugabe defied the
travel ban in 2005 to attend the funeral of Pope John Paul II. The EU continues to provide
humanitarian assistance to benefit Zimbabwe’s poor.
France has generally been seen as favoring more engagement with the ZANU-PF government
than Britain or other EU members, and it lifted travel restrictions against Mugabe for a visit in
2005. France justified the move by arguing that the inclusion of Mugabe rather than isolation
would provide a quicker path to easing the crisis. Cynics suggest that France may see engagement
with Zimbabwe as a means of extending French influence in southern Africa, where it has
historically not had a major role. Nevertheless, France publicly stressed the need for dialogue
with the opposition before Zimbabwe can improve relations with the international community,
and it declined to invite Zimbabwe to the Franco-Africa Summit in 2007.140
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The Commonwealth of Nations sent a team of observers to the March 2002 presidential election
in Zimbabwe, and the group found “that the conditions in Zimbabwe did not adequately allow for
the free expression of the will of the electors.”141 Consequently, a special committee appointed to
monitor and respond to the vote, consisting of Australia, South Africa and Nigeria, determined
that Zimbabwe would be suspended from the Commonwealth for one year. The suspension was
the first public action against Mugabe by a body that included influential African countries. In
December 2003, the Commonwealth, including 19 other African members, voted to suspend
Zimbabwe indefinitely. On this occasion, the decision was strongly criticized by South Africa’s
President Mbeki, who had by then committed to his policy of quiet diplomacy, and by other
governments in southern Africa. Mugabe responded by withdrawing Zimbabwe from the
Commonwealth and ruling out any further discussions or a possible return.142 Some speculated, as
a result, that the Commonwealth’s action had backfired by placing Zimbabwe fully outside the
bounds of its influence. Others argued that indefinite suspension by a body including many
African members had important symbolic value in Africa and worldwide.
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While many western governments moved to isolate the ZANU-PF government in the last decade,
China and Iran strengthened ties and deepened their involvement in Zimbabwe’s economy. China,
which became active on the continent in the 1950s and 1960s to gain global influence, now looks
to Africa for natural resources to meet the needs of its growing population. A longtime ally of
140 “France, US Say ‘No Zimbabwe-UK Dispute, Call for Internal Dialogue,” BBC Monitoring Africa, July 21, 2006.
141 “Commonwealth Observer Group’s Preliminary Report on Zimbabwean Presidential Elections,” March 14, 2002.
Available at http://www.afrol.com.
142 “Mugabe Rules Out Zimbabwe’s Return to the Commonwealth,” AFP, December 16, 2003.
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ZANU-PF, which it backed during the liberation struggle, China is reported to be Zimbabwe’s
second largest trading partner and its largest investor.143 Many observers see Zimbabwe’s
platinum concessions as a major draw for Beijing, and Chinese firms are playing roles in the cell
phone industry, as well as in television, radio, and power generation. China holds controlling
interest in the country’s only electricity generator.
Some critics worry China’s investment in Zimbabwe comes without the “strings attached” that
Western governments might require, such as commitments to human rights, accountability, and
anti-corruption. Arms agreements between China and Zimbabwe have attracted considerable
attention in recent years, as most Western governments continue to enforce an arms embargo
against the country. Zimbabwe’s $240 million purchase of twelve Chinese fighter jets has drawn
questions from analysts as to why a country that faces no immediate external threat from its
neighbors would need such an air force.144 Reports indicate that Zimbabwe also ordered riot gear,
water cannons, armored vehicles, and AK-47 rifles from China. How impoverished Zimbabwe
could pay for arms from China is a subject of much speculation; Defense Ministry officials have
admitted to being in arrears for the 2005 arms purchases. Some observers suspect that the
acquisitions are covered in some way by China’s growing economic role in Zimbabwe.145
In the face of Western condemnation and isolation, Zimbabwe also found an ally in Iran. During a
2006 visit to Tehran, President Mugabe reportedly secured commitments from Iran for direct aid
and Iranian assistance to its energy, agriculture, and mining industries. Reports indicate that Iran
or one of the Gulf countries may also provide technical assistance to Zimbabwe to revive the
country’s only oil refinery, built 40 years ago to process Iranian crude. Most of Zimbabwe’s fuel
comes by road from South Africa; the country has insufficient foreign currency to import fuel in
bulk through a pipeline from the nearest port, Beira, Mozambique to Zimbabwe.
In spite of Mugabe’s assurances of Iranian assistance, some observers suggest Iran may not have
met his expectations. Despite an agreement signed by the two countries in 2005, little financial
assistance appears to have been provided. As one economic advisor points out, “At the end of the
day, whether its China or Iran, investors want one thing: a return on their investment and they do
not seem to believe they can get that return (from Zimbabwe).”146 Likewise, Mugabe, traveling to
Beijing in 2005 to request assistance to deal with the country’s foreign exchange shortfall and
fuel shortage, received only $6 million for grain imports reportedly because Zimbabwe was
deemed unworthy of significant investment.147 Although Mugabe did secure a $200 million buyer
credit loan from China to promote agricultural production (reportedly the largest loan to
Zimbabwe since western donors ceased lending in 1999), China has dismissed reports that the
countries were negotiating a much larger $2 billion loan meant to revive the country’s flagging
economy.148
143 “Beijing Quietly Cools Relations With Mugabe,” Financial Times, June 5, 2007.
144 Defense analysts describe the K-8 as a trainer jet with light ground attack capabilities. Zambia and Namibia have
likewise purchased K-8s from China.
145 EIU, “The Government is to Buy More Jets from China,” September 15, 2006.
146 Excerpt from South Africa-based website ZimOnline in “Zimbabwe Leader ‘Frantically’ Seeking Allies,” BBC
Monitoring Africa, November 23, 2006.
147 “China Aid ‘Snub’ to Enable South Africa to Extract Concessions from Zimbabwe,” BBC Monitoring Africa,
August 1, 2005.
148 “Zimbabwe, China to Negotiate $2 Billion Dollar Loan Deal,” AFP, December 22, 2006 and China and “Beijing
Cools on Mugabe China in Africa,” International Herald Tribune, May 4, 2007.
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In addition to investment and economic assistance, Zimbabwe’s Asian partners have offered
diplomatic support. A Chinese official visiting in 2004 said that his government “appreciates the
reasons for the land issue” and was opposed to any interference by foreign governments.149 China
played a lead role in trying to quiet U.N. efforts to condemn Zimbabwe for Murambatsvina, and
has vetoed proposed sanctions against the Mugabe Administration by the Security Council.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed support during Mugabe’s visit, saying “We
believe Zimbabweans have every right to defend their sovereignty and land. We are happy that
Zimbabwe has once again taken control over its resources and we support the land redistribution
programme ... We strongly condemn the bullying tactics of a number of (Western) governments
against Zimbabwe.”150
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Although an observer team from Nigeria endorsed the 2002 presidential election in Zimbabwe,
Nigeria’s former president, Olusegun Obasanjo, attempted to mediate the country’s crisis. He was
reportedly concerned about the consequences of the Zimbabwe situation for the credibility of the
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). NEPAD is an initiative aimed at
demonstrating Africa’s capabilities for resolving its own problems in exchange for increased aid,
trade, and investment.151 Obasanjo supported Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth,
and in 2004, he held a long discussion with Tsvangirai and an MDC delegation in the Nigerian
capital. The Nigerian leader then took the Zimbabwe visitors on a personal tour of his farm—an
unusual privilege.152 After the 2005 elections, Obasanjo met again with Tsvangirai, and the
government-owned Herald newspaper accused the Nigerian president of funding the MDC.153 The
country’s new president, Umaru Yar’Adua, has expressed his own concern with the situation in
Zimbabwe, telling journalists at a German-African summit in October 2007 that developments in
the country were “not in conformity with the rule of law.”154
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Former President Thabo Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” toward Zimbabwe drew criticism from some
for its slow pace, although both sides credit Mbeki with playing a critical role in the September
2008 power sharing agreement. Some analysts point out that Mbeki’s reluctance to openly
confront or condemn President Mugabe is understandable on a number of grounds. Mugabe lent
aid and shelter to the African National Congress (ANC), now the ruling party in South Africa,
during its long struggle against white minority rule, creating a bond of gratitude. Mugabe enjoys
considerable popularity around Africa and in South Africa itself, not least because of his moves to
seize lands owned by comparatively wealthy white farmers, and this may have constrained Mbeki
as well.
Nonetheless, many have been dissatisfied that South Africa, which is immensely more powerful
than neighboring Zimbabwe, and which has extensive control over Zimbabwe’s transport links to
149 “Chinese Envoy Supports Zimbabwe’s Land Reforms,” AFP, November 2, 2004.
150 “Iran Slams Sactions Against Zim,” AllAfrica, November 22, 2006.
151 See CRS Report RS21353, New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), by Nicolas Cook.
152 September “Nigeria Rolls Out Red Carpet for Tsvangirai,” Zimbabwe Standard, November 15, 2004.
153 “The SA, Nigeria, and MDC Connection,” The Herald, November 6, 2005.
154 “Hotfoot from Harare,” Africa Confidential, Vol. 48, No. 24, November 30, 2007.
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the outside world, as well as over its electricity supplies, has not been able to do more to improve
the Zimbabwe situation. As Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner, many consider South Africa in a
position to exert substantial leverage. At the same time, South Africa must weigh the unintended
effects of such leverage—state collapse across its northern border could produce a sharp increase
in illegal migration and have a substantial impact on South Africa. Some estimate that three
million Zimbabweans have fled into the country.155 In May 2008, Zimbabwean and other African
immigrants became targets of xenophobic violence throughout South Africa. At least 60 were
killed.
Through his policy of engagement, President Mbeki repeatedly brought the Zimbabwean
government and the MDC together to discuss Zimbabwe’s future. Mbeki’s offer of economic
incentives and an exit strategy for Mugabe in exchange for negotiations with the opposition and a
commitment to free and fair elections have been unsuccessful until recently. In 2005, as the IMF
threatened to expel Zimbabwe from the Fund for debt payment arrears, the country requested a
loan from South Africa for fuel, food, and electricity, as well as to address the IMF payments.
Amid rumors that the South African government would make any loan conditional on economic
and political reforms, the negotiations stalled and Mugabe found another source from which to
repay the IMF dues.156 In early 2006 speech, Mugabe warned Mbeki that he should “keep away”
from interference in Zimbabwe’s affairs.
Mbeki’s Zimbabwe policies drew criticism from within his country; former President Nelson
Mandela, Nobel laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former opposition leader Tony Leon, and
even the ANC’s ally, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), have been vocal
detractors. COSATU, South Africa’s powerful labor confederation, strongly opposed the quiet
diplomacy policy. A certain sympathy on the part of COSATU toward the MDC may be
inevitable, since the MDC has its roots in the union movement. COSATU delegations have been
forcibly expelled from Zimbabwe twice, first in 2004 and more recently in late 2006, when
COSATU members traveled to Harare to express their support for the ZCTU after the incidents of
police violence. One COSATU leader remarked, “we are not quiet diplomats,” and “we will not
keep mum when freedom does not lead to respect for workers and human rights.”157 When the
Mbeki government issued a terse initial statement following the March 2007 arrest of MDC and
civil society activists, COSATU criticized the government for a “disgraceful” response, “in the
face of such massive attacks on democracy and human rights, especially coming from those who
owed so much to international solidarity when South Africans were fighting for democracy and
human rights against the apartheid regime.”158
Defenders of President Mbeki’s approach have argued that he is the only leader with the influence
and prestige needed to sway Mugabe.159 Some observers expressed hope for Mbeki’s mediation
role when the President and Morgan Tsvangirai met in October 2004, after Tsvangirai’s acquittal.
Tsvangirai, who had been critical of quiet diplomacy in the past, said after the meeting that he
welcomed President Mbeki’s efforts to mediate.160 But Mbeki stunned the MDC and many
155 Michael Wines, “Influx from Zimbabwe to South Africa Tests Both,” New York Times, June 22, 2007.
156 “Zimbabwe Pays Part of IMF Debt,” Washington Post, September 2, 2005.
157 “We Are Not Quiet Diplomats,” Daily Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), November 5, 2004.
158 “South Africa Ends ‘s ‘Silence’ on Zimbabwe, Urges Harare ‘to Respect Rule of Law,’” BBC Monitoring Africa,
March 14, 2007.
159 ICG, Zimbabwe: Another Election Chance, 14.
160 “Tsvangirai Changes Tune on Mbeki’s Quiet Diplomacy,” Business Day, October 29, 2004.
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supporters of democracy in Zimbabwe in March 2005, when he told a press conference that he
had “no reason to think that anyone in Zimbabwe will militate in a way so that the elections will
not be free and fair.” He insisted that “there will be a free and fair election in Zimbabwe” and that
“things like access to the public media, things like violence-free election have been addressed.”161
Earlier, he had termed Secretary Rice’s description of Zimbabwe as an outpost of tyranny as “an
exaggeration.”162 These remarks left critics questioning the substance behind Mbeki’s diplomacy.
The future of South Africa’s policy toward Zimbabwe may be determined by Mbeki’s successor,
should the power sharing agreement falter. Mbeki, who resigned in late September 2008, has been
temporarily succeeded by ANC Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe. Former Deputy President
Jacob Zuma, among the possible candidates to represent the ANC in the next elections, was
elected as president of the ANC in December 2007.163 Zuma has referred to the Zimbabwean
president as “a monster,” and although he did not call for Mbeki to step down as mediator after
the 2008 elections, he did encourage African leaders to “assist” Mbeki, “given the gravity of the
situation .”164 The Congress of the People (COPE) party, which emerged in late 2008 as a possible
rival to the ANC’s electoral dominance in the 2009 elections, has encouraged strong action on
Zimbabwe. Prior to the formation of the coalition government, COPE’s leadership took the
position that Zimbabwe’s neighbors should withhold commodities to encourage reforms in the
country.165
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The African Union (AU) and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), have
been supportive of Mugabe in the past. In 2002, an OAU observer team labeled Mugabe’s
election victory legitimate, free, and fair. In July 2004, when the AU allowed a report critical of
the Mugabe government to be circulated at its annual summit, some believed the regional body
might be indicating a change in its approach. The 114-page report, prepared by a delegation from
the African Commission for Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) that visited Zimbabwe in
2002, reportedly criticized the Zimbabwe government for police abuses, press censorship, and
compromising the judiciary.166 The AU tabled the report at the summit, however, and declared it
would keep its contents secret until Zimbabwe has had a chance to respond in detail. According to
some media reports, the Zimbabwean government used procedural regulations and technicalities
to prevent its release.167 The ACHPR passed a resolution in December 2005 calling on the
“government of Zimbabwe to respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of expression” and to
allow a second fact-finding mission to enter the country. The ACHPR resolution was hailed by
human rights advocates, who suggested, “This will exert a lot of pressure on Zimbabwe - this is
the first time such a significant body, so close to African heads of state, observes and condemns
161 “Mbeki Pays Tribute to Zimbabwe, Says Polls Will Be Free and Fair,” AFP, March 2, 2005.
162 “Mbeki Criticizes U.S Over Zimbabwe,” BBC, February 22, 2005.
163 For more information on challenges to a possible Zuma presidency, see CRS Report RL31697, South Africa:
Current Issues and U.S. Relations, by Lauren Ploch.
164 “I’m No Mugabe, but I Have Sympathy for What He Has Done,” The Sunday Telegraph (London), November 26,
2006; “Africa Shows Impatience on Zimbabwe Crisis,” Reuters, April 22, 2008. “Zuma Ratchets Up Rhetoric Over
Zimbabwe,” Financial Times, April 22, 2008.
165 “More Pressure Builds on Mugabe to Step Down,” SW Radio Africa, December 23, 2008.
166 “AU Report Slams Erosion of Rule of Law,” Zimbabwe Independent, July 16, 2004.
167 “It’s the Very Leaders Who Are Denying the People Their Justice,” Financial Gazette, July 20, 2006.
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such defiance of human rights compliance.”168 But like the previous report, the second mission’s
findings were rejected by the AU’s Council of Ministers in 2006 because of “irregularities and
procedural flaws.”169
Some observers and international human rights organizations such as the International Press
Institute (IPI), suggest that the AU’s repeated rejection of ACHPR resolutions on Zimbabwe
tarnished the integrity of the body. As one AU official warned, “If we continue to throw out every
human rights report that comes before us, people out there will stop taking us seriously.”170 IPI
also suggests that refusal of the AU to act on the ACHPR resolutions or to condemn human rights
abuses in Zimbabwe damages the credibility of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
initiative, a vital part of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).171
Should ZANU-PF fail to abide by the terms of the power sharing agreement, criticism from the
AU may have little effect, unless it is accompanied by more substantial policy changes toward
Mugabe’s administration. The government has routinely ignored its detractors and has frequently
denied those who might be critical of the regime access to the country. In 2005, AU Commission
Chairman Alpha Konare sent Tom Nyanduga, Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Internally
Displaced Persons, and Asylum Seekers in Africa, as his envoy to investigate Operation
Murambatsvina. The Zimbabwean government prevented Nyanduga from conducting his
assessment and deported him, accusing the envoy of “western collusion and agenda adoption.”172
More recently, in November 2008, the government reportedly rejected the visa applications of
several members of the Elders, a group of senior world leaders, including Kofi Annan and former
U.S. President Jimmy Carter.
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Many of the 14 members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are linked to
Zimbabwe by a common historical experience, as well as cultural and economic ties, and the
organization has been seen as disinclined to condemn the actions of President Mugabe’s
government. At its August 2004 summit in Mauritius, SADC approved new electoral principles
and guidelines for all its member nations.173 Analysts were hopeful that these rules might
motivate meaningful democratic reforms in Zimbabwe, particularly since they laid out detailed
guidelines for SADC observer missions.174 The signatory countries, including Zimbabwe, are
pledged to allow SADC observers freedom of movement and access. As noted above, the SADC
observer delegation’s favorable report for Zimbabwe’s 2005 elections was considered by critics of
the Mugabe administration to be disappointing.
168 “African Union Slams Human Rights Record,” IRIN, January 3, 2006.
169 International Press Institute, “IPI Disappointed By African Union’s Slow Progress in Criticizing Zimbabwe’s
Record on Human Rights, Press Freedom,” April 4, 2006. IPI is a global network of editors, media executives and
leading journalists in over 110 countries that promotes press freedoms and journalistic standards.
170 “Mkapa Has a Long Shot at Moving ‘Bad Boy’ Mugabe,” AllAfrica, August 25, 2006.
171 For further information on the APRM and NEPAD, see CRS Report RS21353, New Partnership for Africa's
Development (NEPAD), by Nicolas Cook.
172 “Harare Raps African Union Human Rights Body,” U.S. Fed News, July 6, 2005.
173 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (Adopted by the SADC Summit, Mauritius,
August 2004). Available at http://www.iss.co.za.
174 ICG, Zimbabwe: Another Election Chance, 13.
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Although Mugabe’s neighboring leaders have not singled him out for criticism, with the
exception of Botswana, they have been increasingly concerned with the impact of Zimbabwe’s
crisis on their own countries. Southern African leaders blamed Zimbabwe and Swaziland for
undermining economic growth in the region at a SADC Summit in Lesotho in 2006. Botswana
has spoken out in the past on regional problems attributed to Mugabe’s policies, including the
burden placed on the country by Zimbabwe’s refugees. In March 2007, following the arrest of
Tsvangirai and other opposition members, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete traveled to Harare
to discuss the incident, and after the SADC summit, President Mbeki was nominated as mediator.
SADC’s election observer mission to the June 2008 runoff found that the election “did not
represent the will of the people of Zimbabwe,” and called for dialogue among all political
stakeholders toward a negotiated solution.175 Botswana refused to recognize Mugabe as President
after the June 2008 runoff. Pressure from SADC does appear to have brought the Zimbabwe
parties to join together in the new coalition government, but it remains unclear to what extent
they might be willing to enforce the deal if the parties cannot work together.
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Despite hope that the new coalition government might bring change to Zimbabwe, the future of
the country, in the short term, remains grave. Inflation and the cost of living have continue to rise
in 2009, and the country’s agriculture industry shows little sign of recovery. Prospects for
Zimbabwe’s youngest generation are equally grim. Primary school attendance has reportedly
dropped dramatically since 2000, and the cost of school fees has risen exponentially. Many
families are unable to afford basic food items, not to mention medicines or doctors. Analysts have
cited a number of reasons for Zimbabwe’s economic problems, including recurrent drought,
difficulties encountered in implementing economic reforms, and industrial competition from
comparatively cheap South African imports.176 At the same time, analysts place considerable
responsibility for Zimbabwe’s problems on the policies adopted and actions taken by the
government since 1997.
As Zimbabwe’s economy continues to collapse, the country is now at a critical juncture. Prior to
the power sharing agreement, the government took some fiscal measures to reverse the economic
downturn, but as hyperinflation continued to rise, they were largely ineffective. Although the
MDC has taken control of the Ministry of Finance in the unity government, it remains unclear
how much influence the MDC will have in pressing its economic policies, or how effective they
might be in reversing the downturn. The new government will also be hampered if foreign donors
continue to withhold assistance for its recovery plans, estimated to require up to $5 billion. Donor
governments and institutions, on the other hand, must determine whether the coalition
government’s establishment will result in changes to the policies which brought about sanctions
in the first place. The MDC and ZANU-PF, longstanding political foes, must now demonstrate
their willingness to work together to put the country’s economy on the path toward recovery.
175 Preliminary Statement Presented by the Hon. Jose Marcos Barrica of the SADC Observer Mission, issued on June
30, 2008.
176 Teddy Brett and Simon Winter, “Origins of the Zimbabwe Crisis,” Focus (Helen Suzman Foundation), June 2003.
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Figure 1. Map of Zimbabwe
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
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Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
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