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Nearly half a million miles of oil and gas transmission pipeline crisscross the United States.
While an efficient and fundamentally safe means of transport, many pipelines carry hazardous
materials with the potential to cause public injury and environmental damage. The nation’s
pipeline networks are also widespread, running alternately through remote and densely populated
regions; consequently, these systems are vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack. The 109th
Congress passed the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-468) to improve pipeline
safety and security practices. The 110th Congress passed the Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), which mandates pipeline security inspections
and potential enforcement (§ 1557) and requires federal plans for critical pipeline security and
incident recovery (§ 1558). The 111th Congress is overseeing the implementation of these acts and
examining ongoing policy issues related to the nation’s pipeline network.
The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), within the Department of Transportation (DOT), is the lead
federal regulator of pipeline safety. The OPS uses a variety of strategies to promote compliance
with its safety regulations, including inspections, investigation of safety incidents, and
maintaining a dialogue with pipeline operators. The agency clarifies its regulatory expectations
through a range of communications and relies upon a range of enforcement actions to ensure that
pipeline operators correct safety violations and take preventive measures to preclude future
problems. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal agency for security in all modes of transportation—
including pipelines. The agency oversees industry’s identification and protection of pipelines by
developing security standards; implementing measures to mitigate security risk; building
stakeholder relations; and monitoring compliance with security standards, requirements, and
regulation. While the OPS and TSA have distinct missions, pipeline safety and security are
intertwined.
Federal activities in pipeline safety and security are evolving. Although pipeline impacts on the
environment remain a concern of some public interest groups, both federal government and
industry representatives suggest that federal pipeline programs have been on the right track. As
oversight of the federal role in pipeline safety and security continues, Congress may focus on the
effectiveness of state pipeline damage prevention programs, the promulgation of low-stress
pipeline regulations, federal pipeline safety enforcement, and the relationship between DHS and
the DOT with respect to pipeline security, among other provisions in federal pipeline safety
regulation. In addition to these specific issues, Congress may wish to assess how the various
elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security activity fit together in the nation’s overall strategy to
protect transportation infrastructure.

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Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Pipeline Industry Characteristics............................................................................................... 1
Pipeline Safety Record........................................................................................................ 2
Pipeline Security Risks ....................................................................................................... 2
Office of Pipeline Safety ........................................................................................................... 3
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002.......................................................................... 4
OPS Pipeline Security Activities ........................................................................................ 5
Transportation Security Administration .................................................................................... 6
TSA Pipeline Security Plan................................................................................................. 6
TSA Pipeline Security Activities ........................................................................................ 7
Security Incident Investigations.......................................................................................... 9
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ................................................................................ 10
Key Policy Issues ...........................................................................................................................11
Pipeline Damage Prevention ....................................................................................................11
Low-Stress Pipeline Regulations .............................................................................................11
OPS Safety Enforcement......................................................................................................... 13
Federal Pipeline Security Authority ........................................................................................ 14
Pipeline Security Regulations ................................................................................................. 15
TSA Pipelines Security Resources .......................................................................................... 16
Additional Issues..................................................................................................................... 16
Distribution Integrity Management................................................................................... 16
Mandatory Pipeline Assessment Intervals ........................................................................ 17
Conclusion..................................................................................................................................... 18

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Table 1. TSA Pipeline Security Initiatives....................................................................................... 7

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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 18

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Nearly half a million miles of oil and gas transmission pipeline crisscross the United States.2
These pipelines are integral to U.S. energy supply and have vital links to other critical
infrastructure, such as power plants, airports, and military bases. While an efficient and
fundamentally safe means of transport, many pipelines carry volatile or flammable materials with
the potential to cause public injury and environmental damage. The nation’s pipeline networks are
also widespread, running alternately through remote and densely populated regions; consequently,
these systems are vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack. The 2006 partial shutdown of the
Prudhoe Bay, Alaska oil field, the largest in the United States, due to pipeline safety problems
demonstrated this vulnerability.
The 109th Congress passed the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-468) to
improve pipeline safety and security practices. The 110th Congress passed the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), which mandates pipeline
security inspections and potential enforcement (§ 1557) and requires federal plans for critical
pipeline security and incident recovery (§ 1558). The 111th Congress is overseeing the
implementation of these acts and examining ongoing policy issues related to the nation’s pipeline
network.
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Roughly 170,000 miles of oil pipeline in the United States carry over 75% of the nation’s crude
oil and around 60% of its refined petroleum products.3 There are nearly 200 interstate oil
pipelines, which account for roughly 80% of total pipeline mileage and transported volume.4 The
U.S. natural gas pipeline network consists of around 210,000 miles of interstate transmission,
85,000 miles of intrastate transmission, and 40,000 miles of field and gathering pipeline, which
connect gas extraction wells to processing facilities. Around 100 systems make up the interstate
network. Another 90 or so systems operate strictly within individual states.5 These interstate and
intrastate gas transmission pipelines feed around 1.1 million miles of regional lines in some 1,300
local distribution networks.6 Natural gas pipelines also connect to 113 liquefied natural gas
(LNG) storage sites, which augment pipeline gas supplies during peak demand periods.7

1 Parts of this report were previously published in CRS Report RL31990, Pipeline Security: An Overview of Federal
Activities and Current Policy Issues, by Paul W. Parfomak.
2 Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), “National Transportation Statistics,” September 2008. http://www.bts.gov/
publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_10.html. In this report “oil” includes petroleum and other
hazardous liquids such as gasoline, jet fuel, diesel fuel, and propane, unless otherwise noted.
3 BTS, September 2008.
4 Richard A Rabinow, “The Liquid Pipeline Industry in the United States: Where It’s Been, Where It’s Going,”
Prepared for the Association of Oil Pipe Lines, April 2004, p. 4.
5 James Tobin, Changes in U.S. Natural Gas Transportation Infrastructure in 2004, Energy Information
Administration (EIA), June 2005, p. 4.
6 BTS, September 2008.
7 Michelle M. Foss, “Introduction to LNG,” Center for Energy Economics, University of Texas at Austin, January
2007, p. 5.
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Taken as a whole, releases from pipelines cause few annual fatalities compared to other product
transportation modes. Oil pipelines reported an average of 2.6 deaths per year from 2004 through
2008; gas transmission pipelines reported an average of 1.0 death per year during the same
period.8 Accidental pipeline releases result from a variety of causes, including third-party
excavation, corrosion, mechanical failure, control system failure, and operator error. Natural
forces, such as floods and earthquakes, can also damage pipelines. According to the Department
of Transportation (DOT), there were 103 oil pipeline accidents and 63 gas transmission pipeline
accidents in 2008.9 Although pipeline releases have caused relatively few fatalities in absolute
numbers, a single pipeline accident can be catastrophic. For example, a 1999 gasoline pipeline
explosion in Bellingham, Washington, killed two children and an 18-year-old man, and caused
$45 million in damage to a city water plant and other property. In 2000, a natural gas pipeline
explosion near Carlsbad, New Mexico, killed 12 campers, including four children.10 In 2006,
damaged pipelines on the North Slope of Alaska leaked over 200,000 gallons of crude oil in an
environmentally sensitive area. Such accidents have generated substantial scrutiny of pipeline
regulation and increased state and community activity related to pipeline safety.11
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Pipelines are vulnerable to vandalism and terrorist attack with firearms, with explosives, or by
other physical means. Some pipelines may also be vulnerable to “cyber-attacks” on computer
control systems or attacks on electricity grids or telecommunications networks.12 Oil and gas
pipelines have been a target of terrorists outside and within the United States. In Colombia, for
example, rebels have bombed the Caño Limón oil pipeline and other pipelines over 950 times
since 1993.13 In 1996, London police foiled a plot by the Irish Republican Army to bomb gas
pipelines and other utilities across the city.14 Militants in Nigeria have repeatedly attacked
pipelines and related facilities, including the simultaneous bombing of three oil pipelines in May,
2007.15 A Mexican rebel group similarly detonated bombs along Mexican oil and natural gas
pipelines in July and September, 2007.16 In June, 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice arrested
members of a terrorist group planning to attack jet fuel pipelines and storage tanks at the John F.

8 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, “Significant Pipeline Incidents,” Web page, February 9,
2009. http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/safety/SigPSI.html
9 Ibid.
10 National Transportation Safety Board, Pipeline Accident Report PAR-03-01, February 2003.
11 See, for example: Janet Zink, “Fueling the Resistance,” St. Petersburg Times, December 16, 2007; W. Loy, “Slope
Mayor Questions Leak Detection,” Anchorage Daily News, March 14, 2006; J. Nesmith and R. K. M. Haurwitz,
“Pipelines: The Invisible Danger,” Austin American-Statesman, July 22, 2001.
12 J.L. Shreeve, “Science & Technology: The Enemy Within,” The Independent. London, UK, May 31, 2006, p. 8.
13 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Security Assistance: Efforts to Secure Colombia’s Caño Limón-Coveñas
Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but Challenges Remain, GAO-05-971, September 2005, p. 15; Stratfor
Forecasting, Inc.,” Colombia: The FARC’s Low-Level Pipeline Campaign,” Stratfor Today, June 23, 2008.
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/colombia_farcs_low_level_pipeline_campaign?ip_auth_redirect=1
14 President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s
Infrastructures, Washington, DC, October 1997.
15 K. Houreld, “Militants Say 3 Nigeria Pipelines Bombed,” Associated Press, May 8, 2007.
16 Reed Johnson, “Six Pipelines Blown Up in Mexico,” Los Angeles Times, September 11, 2007. p A-3.
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Kennedy (JFK) International Airport in New York.17 Natural gas pipelines in British Columbia,
Canada were bombed four times between October 2008 and January 2009.18
Since September 11, 2001, federal warnings about Al Qaeda have mentioned pipelines
specifically as potential terror targets in the United States.19 One U.S. pipeline of particular
concern and with a history of terrorist and vandal activity is the Trans Alaska Pipeline System
(TAPS), which transports crude oil from Alaska’s North Slope oil fields to the marine terminal in
Valdez. TAPS runs some 800 miles and delivers nearly 17% of United States domestic oil
production.20 In 1999, Vancouver police arrested a man planning to blow up TAPS for personal
profit in oil futures.21 In 2001, a vandal’s attack on TAPS with a high-powered rifle forced a two-
day shutdown and caused extensive economic and ecological damage.22 In January 2006, federal
authorities acknowledged the discovery of a detailed posting on a website purportedly linked to
Al Qaeda that reportedly encouraged attacks on U.S. pipelines, especially TAPS, using weapons
or hidden explosives.23 In November 2007 a U.S. citizen was convicted of trying to conspire with
Al Qaeda to attack TAPS and a major natural gas pipeline in the eastern United States.24 To date,
there have been no known Al Qaeda attacks on TAPS or other U.S. pipelines, but operators
remain alert.
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The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-481) and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Act
of 1979 (P.L. 96-129) are two of the key early acts establishing the federal role in pipeline safety.
Under both statutes, the Transportation Secretary is given primary authority to regulate key
aspects of interstate pipeline safety: design, construction, operation and maintenance, and spill
response planning. Pipeline safety regulations are covered in Title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.25 The DOT administers pipeline regulations through the Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS) within the Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA).26 The OPS
has approximately 180 full-time equivalent staff, including inspectors, based in Washington,
D.C., Atlanta, Kansas City, Houston, and Denver.27 In addition to its own staff, the OPS’s

17 U.S. Dept. of Justice, “Four Individuals Charged in Plot to bomb John F. Kennedy International Airport,” Press
release, June 2, 2007.
18 “Fourth Canadian Gas Pipeline Bombed,” United Press International, January 5, 2009.
19 “Already Hard at Work on Security, Pipelines Told of Terrorist Threat,” Inside FERC, McGraw-Hill Companies,
January 3, 2002.
20 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., Internet page, Anchorage, AK, February 8, 2009. http://www.alyeska-pipe.com/
about.html.
21 D. S. Cloud, “A Former Green Beret’s Plot to Make Millions Through Terrorism,” Ottawa Citizen, December 24,
1999, p. E15.
22 Y. Rosen, “Alaska Critics Take Potshots at Line Security,” Houston Chronicle, February 17, 2002.
23 W. Loy, “Web Post Urges Jihadists to Attack Alaska Pipeline,” Anchorage Daily News, January 19, 2006.
24 U.S. Attorney’s Office, Middle District of Pennsylvania, “Man Convicted of Attempting to Provide Material Support
to Al-Qaeda Sentenced to 30 Years’ Imprisonment,” Press release, November 6, 2007; A. Lubrano and J. Shiffman,
“Pa. Man Accused of Terrorist Plot,” Philadelphia Inquirer, February 12, 2006, p. A1.
25 Safety and security of liquified natural gas (LNG) facilities used in gas pipeline transportation is regulated under
CFR Title 49, Part 193.
26 PHMSA succeeds the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), reorganized under P.L. 108-246,
which was signed by the President on November 30, 2004.
27 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009: Appendix,
February 2008, p. 922.
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enabling legislation allows the agency to delegate authority to intrastate pipeline safety offices,
and allows state offices to act as “agents” administering interstate pipeline safety programs
(excluding enforcement) for those sections of interstate pipelines within their boundaries.28 Over
400 state pipeline safety inspectors are available in 2009.
The OPS safety program is funded primarily by user fees assessed on a per-mile basis on each
regulated pipeline operator (49 U.S.C. § 60107). P.L. 109-468 authorizes annual OPS
expenditures (§ 18) of $79.0 million in FY2007, $86.2 million in FY2008, $91.5 million in
FY2009, and $96.5 million in FY2010. The President’s FY2009 budget request included $93.3
million for pipeline safety.29
The OPS uses a variety of strategies to promote compliance with its safety standards. The agency
conducts physical inspections of facilities and construction projects; conducts programmatic
inspections of management systems, procedures, and processes; investigates safety incidents, and
maintains a dialogue with pipeline operators. The agency clarifies its regulatory expectations
through published protocols and regulatory orders, guidance manuals, and public meetings. The
OPS relies upon a range of enforcement actions, including administrative actions and civil
penalties, to ensure that operators correct safety violations and take measures to preclude future
safety problems. From 2004 through 2008, the OPS initiated over 1,400 enforcement actions
against pipeline operators. Civil penalties proposed by the OPS for safety violations during this
period totaled approximately $23.3 million.30 The OPS also conducts accident investigations and
systemwide reviews focusing on high-risk operational or procedural problems and areas of the
pipeline near sensitive environmental areas, high-density populations, or navigable waters.
Since 1997, the OPS has increasingly encouraged industry’s implementation of “integrity
management” programs on pipeline segments near “high consequence” areas. Integrity
management provides for continual evaluation of pipeline condition; assessment of risks to the
pipeline; inspection or testing; data analysis; and followup repair, as well as preventive or
mitigative actions. High-consequence areas include population centers, commercially navigable
waters, and environmentally sensitive areas, such as drinking water supplies or ecological
reserves. The integrity management approach directs priority resources to locations of highest
consequence rather than applying uniform treatment to the entire pipeline network.31 The OPS
made integrity management programs mandatory for most operators with 500 or more miles of
regulated oil pipeline as of March 31, 2001 (49 C.F.R. § 195).
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On December 12, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of
2002 (P.L. 107-355). The act strengthened federal pipeline safety programs, state oversight of
pipeline operators, and public education regarding pipeline safety.32 Among other provisions, P.L.

28 49 U.S.C. 601. States may recover up to 50% of their costs for these programs from the federal government.
29 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, February 2008, p. 921.
30 Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), “PHMSA Pipeline Safety Program: Summary of Enforcement Actions,” Web page,
February 9, 2009. http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/enforce/Actions_opid_0.html
31 Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), Pipeline Safety. Pipeline Integrity Management in High
Consequence Areas (Hazardous Liquid Operators with 500 or More Miles of Pipeline), Federal Register, December 1,
2000, p. 75378.
32 P.L. 107-355 encourages the implementation of state “one-call” excavation notification programs (§ 2) and allows
(continued...)
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107-355 required operators of regulated gas pipelines in high-consequence areas to conduct risk
analysis and implement integrity management programs similar to those required for oil
pipelines.33 The act authorized the DOT to order safety actions for pipelines with potential safety
problems (§ 7) and increased violation penalties (§ 8). The act streamlined the permitting process
for emergency pipeline restoration by establishing an interagency committee, including the DOT,
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Bureau of Land Management, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, and other agencies, to ensure coordinated review and permitting of
pipeline repairs (§ 16). The act required DOT to study ways to limit pipeline safety risks from
population encroachment and ways to preserve environmental resources in pipeline rights-of-way
(§ 11). P.L. 107-355 also included provisions for public education, grants for community pipeline
safety studies, “whistle blower” and other employee protection, employee qualification programs,
and mapping data submission.
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Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63), issued during the Clinton administration, assigned
lead responsibility for pipeline security to the DOT.34 At the time, these responsibilities fell to the
OPS, since the agency was already addressing some elements of pipeline security in its role as
safety regulator. In 2002, the OPS conducted a vulnerability assessment to identify critical
pipeline facilities and worked with industry groups and state pipeline safety organizations “to
assess the industry’s readiness to prepare for, withstand and respond to a terrorist attack.... ”35
Together with the Department of Energy and state pipeline agencies, the OPS promoted the
development of consensus standards for security measures tiered to correspond with the five
levels of threat warnings issued by the Office of Homeland Security.36 The OPS also developed
protocols for inspections of critical facilities to ensure that operators implemented appropriate
security practices. To convey emergency information and warnings, the OPS established a variety
of communication links to key staff at the most critical pipeline facilities throughout the country.
The OPS also began identifying near-term technology to enhance deterrence, detection, response,
and recovery, and began seeking to advance public and private sector planning for response and
recovery.37
On September 5, 2002, the OPS circulated formal guidance developed in cooperation with the
pipeline industry associations defining the agency’s security program recommendations and
implementation expectations. This guidance recommended that operators identify critical

(...continued)
states to enforce “one-call” program requirements. The act expands criminal responsibility for pipeline damage to cases
where damage was not caused “knowingly and willfully” (§ 3). The act adds provisions for ending federal-state
pipeline oversight partnerships if states do not comply with federal requirements (§ 4).
33 A 2006 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that the OPS’s gas integrity management program
benefitted public safety, although the report recommended revisions to the OPS’s performance measures. See GAO.
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety: Integrity Management Benefits Public Safety, but Consistency of Performance Measures
Should Be Improved, GAO-06-946, September 8, 2006, pp. 2-3.
34 Presidential Decision Directive 63, Protecting the Nation’s Critical Infrastructures, May 22, 1998.
35 Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), RSPA Pipeline Security Preparedness, December 2001.
36 Ellen Engleman, Administrator, Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), statement before the
Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, House Energy and Commerce Committee, March 19, 2002.
37 Ellen Engleman, Administrator, Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), statement before the
Subcommittee on Highways and Transit, House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, February 13, 2002.
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facilities, develop security plans consistent with prior trade association security guidance,
implement these plans, and review them annually.38 While the guidance was voluntary, the OPS
expected compliance and informed operators of its intent to begin reviewing security programs
within 12 months, potentially as part of more comprehensive safety inspections.39
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In November 2001, President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107-
71) establishing the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the DOT. According to
TSA, the act placed the DOT’s pipeline security authority (under PDD-63) within TSA. The act
specified for TSA a range of duties and powers related to general transportation security, such as
intelligence management, threat assessment, mitigation, security measure oversight and
enforcement, among others. On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Among other provisions, the act transferred to DHS the Transportation Security Administration
from the DOT (§ 403). On December 17, 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), clarifying executive agency responsibilities for identifying,
prioritizing, and protecting critical infrastructure.40 HSPD-7 maintains DHS as the lead agency
for pipeline security (par. 15), and instructs the DOT to “collaborate in regulating the
transportation of hazardous materials by all modes (including pipelines)” (par. 22h). The order
requires that DHS and other federal agencies collaborate with “appropriate private sector entities”
in sharing information and protecting critical infrastructure (par. 25). TSA has joined both the
Energy Government Coordinating Council and the Transportation Government Coordinating
Council under provisions in HSPD-7. The missions of the councils are to work with their industry
counterparts to coordinate critical infrastructure protection programs in the energy and
transportation sectors, respectively, and to facilitate the sharing of security information.
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HSPD-7 also required DHS to develop a national plan for critical infrastructure and key resources
protection (par. 27), which the agency issued in 2006 as the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (NIPP). The NIPP, in turn, required each critical infrastructure sector to develop a Sector
Specific Plan (SSP) that describes strategies to protect its critical infrastructure, outlines a
coordinated approach to strengthen its security efforts, and determines appropriate funding for
these activities. Executive Order 13416 further required the transportation sector SSP to prepare
annexes for each mode of surface transportation with the following information:
• identification of existing security guidelines, requirements, and gaps,
• description of how the SSP plan will be implemented for each mode,
• respective roles of government entities and the private sector,
• processes for review of information sharing mechanisms, and

38 James K. O’Steen, Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), Implementation of RSPA Security
Guidance, presentation to the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, February 25, 2003.
39 Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), personal communication, June 10, 2003.
40 HSPD-7 supersedes PDD-63 (par. 37).
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• processes for assessing security guideline compliance and revision.41
In accordance with the above requirements the TSA issued its Transportation Systems Sector
Specific Plan and Pipeline Modal Annex in May, 2007.
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Pipeline security activities at TSA are led by the Pipeline Security Division (PSD) within the
agency’s Office of Transportation Sector Network Management.42 According to the agency’s
Pipeline Modal Annex (PMA), TSA has been engaged in a number of specific pipeline security
initiatives since 2003 as summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. TSA Pipeline Security Initiatives
Initiative Description
Participants0
Pipeline Policy and
Coordination, development, implementation, and monitoring of
TSA, DHS, DOT,
Planning
pipeline security plans
DOE
Sector Coordinating
Government partners coordinate interagency and cross-
TSA, DOE, Other
Councils and Joint
jurisdictional implementation of critical infrastructure security
agencies, Industry
Sector Committee
Corporate Security
On-site reviews of pipeline operator security
TSA, Industry
Reviews (CSR)
Pipeline System Risk
Statistical tool used for relative risk ranking and prioritizing CSR TSA, Industry
Tool
findings
Pipeline Cross-Border
U.S. and Canadian security assessment and planning for critical
TSA, Canada
Vulnerability
cross-border pipeline
Assessment
Regional Gas Pipeline
Regional supply studies for key natural gas markets
TSA, DOE, INGAA,
Studies
GTI, NETL, Industry
Cyber Attack
Training/presentations on Supervisory Control and Data
TSA, GTI
Awareness
Acquisition (SCADA) system vulnerabilities
Landscape Depiction
Incorporates depiction of the pipeline domain with risk analysis
TSA
and Analysis Tool
components
International Pipeline
International forum for U.S. and Canadian governments and
TSA, Canada, Other
Security Forum
pipeline industry officials
agencies, Industry
“G8” Multinational
Multinational-sharing of pipeline threat assessment methods,
TSA, DHS, State
Security Assessment and advisory levels, effective practices, and vulnerability information;
Dept., G8 Nations
Planning
also develops a G8-based contingency planning guidance
document
Security Awareness
Informational compact discs about pipeline security issues and
TSA
Training
improvised explosive devices
Stakeholder Conference Periodic information-sharing conference calls between key
TSA, Other agencies,
Calls
pipeline security stakeholders
Industry
Pipeline Blast Mitigation Explosives tests on various pipe configurations to determine
TSA, DOD, Other

41 Executive Order 13416, “Strengthening Surface Transportation Security,” December 5, 2006.
42 These offices were formerly known as the Pipeline Security Program Office and the Intermodal Security Program
Office, respectively.
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Initiative Description
Participants0
Studies resiliency
characteristics
agencies
Virtual Library Pipeline
Development of TSA information-sharing Web portal
TSA
Site
Source: Transportation Security Administration, Pipeline Modal Annex, June 2007, pp. 10-11.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Transportation_Pipeline_Modal_Annex_5_21_07.pdf
a. Key: DHS = Dept. Of Homeland Security, DOE = Dept. of Energy, G8 = Group of Eight (U.S., U.K.,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia),GTI = Gas Technology Institute, INGAA = Interstate
Natural Gas Association of America, NETL = National Energy Technology Laboratory, TSA =
Transportation Security Administration.
In 2003, TSA initiated its Corporate Security Review (CSR) program, wherein the agency visits
the largest pipeline and natural gas distribution operators to review their security plans and
inspect their facilities. During the reviews, TSA evaluates whether each company is following the
intent of the OPS security guidance, and seeks to collect the list of assets each company had
identified meeting the criteria established for critical facilities. In 2004, the DOT reported that the
plans reviewed to date (approximately 25) had been “judged responsive to the OPS guidance.”43
As of February 2009, TSA had completed 85 CSR’s covering all of the largest 100 pipeline
systems and 85% of total U.S. pipeline throughput. The agency plans to conduct 12 additional
CSR’s in 2009, including revisiting major systems determined to be at highest risk. 44 According
to TSA, the “CSR results continue to indicate that industry is doing a good job in security” and
has been supportive of the CSR program.45 Nonetheless, past CSR reviews have identified
inadequacies in some company security programs such as not updating security plans, lack of
management support, poor employee involvement, inadequate threat intelligence, and employee
apathy or error.46
In addition to the initiatives in Table 1, TSA has worked to establish qualifications for personnel
seeking unrestricted access to critical pipeline assets and has developed its own inventory of
critical pipeline infrastructure.47 The agency has also addressed legal issues regarding recovery
from terrorist attacks, such as FBI control of crime scenes and eminent domain in pipeline
restoration. In October 2005, TSA issued an overview of recommended security practices for
pipeline operators “for informational purposes only ... not intended to replace security measures
already implemented by individual companies.”48 The agency released revised guidance on
security best practices at the end of 2006, and plans to release another revision in 2009.49
The mission of TSA’s Pipeline Security Division currently includes developing security
standards; implementing measures to mitigate security risk; building and maintaining stakeholder
relations, coordination, education and outreach; and monitoring compliance with security

43 Department of Transportation (DOT), “Action Taken and Actions Needed to Improve Pipeline Safety,” CC-2004-
061, June 16, 2004, p. 21.
44 Transportation Security Administration, Personal communication, February 17, 2009.
45 Ibid.
46 Mike Gillenwater, TSA, "Pipeline Security Overview," Presented to the Alabama Public Service Commission Gas
Pipeline Safety Seminar, Montgomery, AL, December 11, 2007.
47 TSA, TSA Multi-Modal Criticality Evaluation Tool, TSA Threat Assessment and Risk Management Program, slide
presentation, April 15, 2003.
48 TSA, Intermodal Security Program Office, Pipeline Security Best Practices, October 19, 2005, p. 1.
49 Transportation Security Administration, Personal communication, February 17, 2009.
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standards, requirements, and regulations. The President’s FY2009 budget request for DHS did not
include a separate line item for TSA’s pipeline security activities. The budget request did include
a $37 million line item for “Surface Transportation Security,” which encompasses security
activities in non-aviation transportation modes, including pipelines.50 The PSD has traditionally
received from the agency’s general operational budget an allocation for routine operations such as
regulation development, travel, and outreach. According to the PSD, the budget funds 12 full-
time equivalent staff within the office. These staff will conduct pipeline security inspections,
maintain TSA’s asset database, support TSA’s multi-modal risk models, develop new security
standards, and issue regulations, as required.51
In January, 2007 testimony before Congress, the TSA Administrator stated that the agency
intended to conduct a pipeline infrastructure study to identify the “highest risk” pipeline assets,
building upon such a list developed through the CSR program. He also stated that the agency
would use its ongoing security review process to determine the future implementation of baseline
risk standards against which to set measurable pipeline risk reduction targets.52 Provisions in the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) require TSA,
in consultation with the OPS, to develop a plan for the federal government to provide increased
security support to the “most critical” pipelines at high or severe security alert levels and when
there is specific security threat information relating to such pipeline infrastructure (§ 1558(a)(1)).
The act also requires a recovery protocol plan in the event of an incident affecting the interstate
and intrastate pipeline system (§ 1558(a)(2)).
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In addition to the above pipeline security initiatives, the TSA Pipeline Security Division has
performed a limited number of vulnerability assessments and supported investigations for specific
companies and assets where intelligence information has suggested potential terrorist activity.
The PSD, along with the OPS, was involved in the investigation of an August, 2006 security
breach at an LNG peak-shaving plant in Lynn, MA.53 Although not a terrorist incident, the
security breach involved the penetration of intruders through several security barriers and alert
systems, permitting them to access the main LNG storage tank at the facility. The PSD also
became aware of the JFK terrorist plot in its early stages and supported the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s associated investigation. The PSD engaged the private sector in helping to assess
potential targets and determine potential consequences. The PSD worked with the pipeline
company to keep it informed about the plot, discuss its security practices, and review its
emergency response plans.54

50 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009: Appendix,
February 2008, p.486.
51 Transportation Security Administration, Pipeline Security Division, personal communication, February 17, 2009.
52 Hawley, Kip, Asst. Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Security, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation hearing on Federal Efforts for Rail and Surface Transportation Security, January 18, 2007.
53 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), “Pipeline Safety: Lessons Learned From a
Security Breach at a Liquefied Natural Gas Facility,” Docket No. PHMSA-04-19856, Federal Register, Vol. 71, No.
249, December 28, 2006, p. 78269; TSA, Intermodal Security Program Office, personal communication, August 30,
2006.
54 TSA, July 6, 2007.
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One area related to pipeline safety and security not under either the OPS’s or TSA’s primary
jurisdiction is the siting approval of new gas pipelines, which is the responsibility of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Companies building interstate gas pipelines must first
obtain from FERC certificates of public convenience and necessity. (FERC does not oversee oil
pipeline construction.) FERC must also approve the abandonment of gas facility use and services.
These approvals may include safety and security provisions with respect to pipeline routing,
safety standards and other factors.55 As a practical matter, however, FERC has traditionally left
these considerations to the OPS.56
On September 14, 2001, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) notified FERC
regulated companies that it would “approve applications proposing the recovery of prudently
incurred costs necessary to further safeguard the nation’s energy systems and infrastructure” in
response to the terror attacks of 9/11. FERC also committed to “expedite the processing on a
priority basis of any application that would specifically recover such costs from wholesale
customers.” Companies could propose a surcharge over currently existing rates or some other cost
recovery method.57 In FY2005, the commission processed security cost recovery requests from 14
oil pipelines and 3 natural gas pipelines.58 The FERC’s FY2006 annual report states that “the
Commission continues to give the highest priority to deciding any requests made for the recovery
of extraordinary expenditures to safeguard the reliability and security of the Nation’s energy
transportation systems and energy supply infrastructure.”59 The FY2007 annual report does not
mention pipeline security.
In February 2003, FERC handed down a new rule (RM02-4-000) to protect critical energy
infrastructure information (CEII). The rule defines CEII as information that “must relate to
critical infrastructure, be potentially useful to terrorists, and be exempt from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act.” According to the rule, critical infrastructure is “existing and
proposed systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, the incapacity or destruction of which
would negatively affect security, economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of
those matters.” CEII excludes “information that identifies the location of infrastructure.” The rule
also establishes procedures for the public to request and obtain such critical information, and
applies both to proposed and existing infrastructure.60
On May 14, 2003, FERC handed down new rules (RM03-4) facilitating the restoration of
pipelines after a terrorist attack. The rules allow owners of a damaged pipeline to use blanket
certificate authority to immediately start rebuilding, regardless of project cost, even outside
existing rights-of-way. Pipeline owners would still need to notify landowners and comply with

55 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. 18 C.F.R. 157.
56 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), personal communication, May 22, 2003.
57 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), News release, R-01-38, Washington, DC, September 14, 2001.
58 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Annual Report FY2005,
2006, p. 19. These are the most recent specific figures reported.
59 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Annual Report FY2006,
2007, p. 23.
60 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), News release, R-03-08, Washington, DC. February 20, 2003.
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environmental laws. Prior rules limited blanket authority to $17.5 million projects and 45-day
advance notice.61
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The 111th Congress is overseeing the implementation of the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of
2006 (P.L. 109-468) and pipeline security provisions in the Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53). In its ongoing oversight of federal pipeline safety
and security activities, Congress may examine a number of key issues which have drawn
particular attention in policy debate. P.L. 109-468 and P.L. 110-53 contain additional provisions
not discussed in this report.
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According to OPS statistics, excavation damage has been the single greatest cause of accidents
among all pipeline systems over the last 10 years.62 Some policy makers have proposed the
establishment of federal civil penalties for violations of state “one-call” notification programs to
prevent excavation damage to underground pipelines. While supporting stronger enforcement of
excavation damage prevention programs, other stakeholders have argued that such enforcement is
best performed by state regulators responsible for administering one-call programs rather than by
the federal government. They favor an approach which encourages state enforcement, unless the
federal government determines that a state’s enforcement efforts are ineffective.63 Consistent with
this approach, P.L. 109-468 prohibits federal enforcement in states already imposing such
penalties (§ 2). The act also authorizes grants to states (and certain municipalities) for improving
damage prevention programs if the states have been certified (under 49 U.S.C. § 60105-60106) or
can demonstrate that they are establishing an “effective” program, as subsequently defined (§ 2).
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Pipelines operated at less than 20% of the specified minimum strength of the material from which
they are constructed are classified as “low-stress” pipelines under 49 C.F.R. § 195.2. According to
the OPS, federal pipeline safety regulations originally did not apply to low-stress pipelines
because they operated at low pressures, were not prone to accidents, and were thought to pose
little risk to the public. In 1994, however, the OPS extended its hazardous liquid pipeline
regulations under 49 C.F.R. § 195 to include low-stress pipelines that (1) transport highly volatile
liquids, (2) are not located in rural areas, (3) are located offshore, or (4) are located in waterways
used for commercial navigation (§ 195.1(b)(3)).
The regulation of low-stress pipeline regulations has come under greater Congressional scrutiny
since March 2006, after a spill from a BP pipeline oil pipeline led to the partial shutdown of the
Prudhoe Bay area oil field on the North Slope of Alaska. In its March 15, 2006, Corrective Action

61 Schmollinger, Christian, “FERC OKs Emergency Reconstruction,” Natural Gas Week, May 13, 2003.
62 Karen Butler, Office of Pipeline Safety, "Thoughts on PHMSA Data," Pipeline Safety – What More Needs To Be
Done?, Pipeline Safety Trust Conference, New Orleans, LA, November 20, 2008.
63 Felt, T., President and CEO, Explorer Pipeline, Statement before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality hearing on Reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act, July 27, 2006.
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Order (CAO) issued to BP, the OPS found that BP’s pipelines met the definition of a “hazardous
pipeline facility” under 49 U.S.C. § 60112(a), which grants general authority under the statute,
but that specific federal pipeline safety regulations under 49 C.F.R. § 195 did not apply at that
time because BP’s pipelines were classified as “low-stress” and fell under the exception in 49
C.F.R. § 195.1(b)(3).64 In August, 2006, BP announced additional disruption of North Slope oil
supplies to conduct major pipeline repairs “following the discovery of unexpectedly severe
corrosion and a small spill from a Prudhoe Bay oil transit line.”65 BP subsequently admitted to
flaws in its maintenance models and, in retrospect, the inadequacy of its overall maintenance
program for its North Slope operations.66
On September 6, 2006, the OPS published in the Federal Register proposed rules for risk-based
regulation of hazardous liquid low-stress pipelines located in “unusually sensitive areas” and
exempted from its regulations under 49 C.F.R. § 195.67 The OPS defines an unusually sensitive
area (USA) as “a drinking water or ecological resource area that is unusually sensitive to
environmental damage from a hazardous liquid pipeline release” (49 C.F.R. § 195.6).68 Although
USAs would be identified on a site-by-site basis, the OPS has indicated that the North Slope is a
USA.69
P.L. 109-648 required the OPS to promulgate final regulations for low-stress hazardous liquids
pipelines by December 31, 2007 (§ 4). Although the OPS initially expected to finalize regulations
in USAs by the end of 2006, the agency required more time to incorporate additional provisions
under P.L. 109-648. The agency announced modifications to its 2006 proposed rules for low-
stress hazardous liquid pipelines on May 18, 2007.70 On September 7, 2007, the OPS requested
approval from the Office of Management and Budget to collect additional data needed to develop
its low-stress pipelines regulations.71 The agency issued the final regulations effective July 3,
2008.72 In reviewing the OPS’s final criteria for low-stress pipeline regulation, Congress may
consider the balance between the potential safety benefits and the potential costs of stricter safety
programs in light of BP’s pipeline problems and potential problems among similar pipeline
systems elsewhere in the United States.

64 Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Admin. (PHMSA), Corrective Action Order in the Matter of BP Exploration
(Alaska), Inc., Respondent, CPF No. 5-2006-5015H, March 15, 2006.
65 BP Exploration Alaska, Inc., “BP to Shutdown Prudhoe Bay Oil Field,” Press release, August 6, 2006.
66 Marshall, S., President, BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., Comments to the Joint Alaska Senate and House Resources
Committee, August 18, 2006.
67 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), “Pipeline Safety: Protecting Unusually Sensitive
Areas From Rural Onshore Hazardous Liquid Gathering Lines and Low-Stress Lines,” Federal Register, Vol. 71, No.
172, September 6, 2006, pp. 52504-52519.
68 49 C.F.R. § 195.6 further define “drinking water” or “ecological resource” areas.
69 Dept. of Transportation (DOT), “U.S. Department of Transportation Proposes New Safety Requirements for Rural
Low-Stress and Gathering Pipelines in Unusually Sensitive Areas,” Press release, PHMSA 8-06, August 31, 2006.
70 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), “Pipeline Safety: Protecting Unusually Sensitive
Areas From Rural Low-Stress Hazardous Liquid Pipelines,” Federal Register, Vol. 72, No. 96, May 18, 2007, pp.
28008-28016.
71 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), “Request for Public Comment and Office of
Management and Budget Approval for a New Information Collection,” Federal Register, Vol. 72, No. 173, September
7, 2007, pp. 51489-51490.
72 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), “Protecting Unusually Sensitive Areas From
Rural Onshore Hazardous Liquid Gathering Lines and Low-Stress Lines: Final Rule,” PHMSA—RSPA—2003—
15864, Federal Register, Vol. 73, June 3, 2008. p. 31634.
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The adequacy of the OPS’s enforcement strategy has been an ongoing concern of Congress,
particularly after the fatal pipeline accidents in Washington and New Mexico. A report from the
General Accounting Office in 2000 called into question fundamental changes in OPS’s
enforcement strategy at the time, such as sharply reducing the use of fines to enforce compliance
with pipeline safety regulations.73 Provisions in the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002
(P.L. 107-355) put added scrutiny on the effectiveness of the OPS’s enforcement strategy and
assessment of civil penalties (§ 8). A 2004 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
reexamining OPS enforcement stated that the agency had made a number of changes in its
enforcement strategy with the potential to improve pipeline safety. The report concluded,
however, that the effectiveness of the strategy could not yet be determined because OPS’s
program had not incorporated “clear program goals, a well-defined strategy for achieving those
goals, and performance measures linked to the program goals.”74 In March 2006 testimony before
Congress, the GAO reported that the OPS had adopted measures that appeared to be responsive to
the agency’s earlier concerns, although the GAO had not reviewed the strategy or its
implementation in depth.75
In April 2006, PHMSA testified before Congress that the OPS had institutionalized a “tough-but-
fair” approach to enforcement, “imposing and collecting larger penalties, while guiding pipeline
operators to enhance higher performance.”76 According to the agency, $4 million in proposed civil
penalties in 2005 was three times greater than penalties proposed in 2003, the first year higher
penalties could be imposed under P.L. 107-355 (§ 8(a)).77 Proposed penalties totaled $9 million in
2008.78
Notwithstanding the agency’s efforts to change its pipeline safety enforcement strategy, some
analysts have held that the OPS’s enforcement actions have not been sufficiently transparent to
the public, other government agencies, or industry.79 P.L. 109-468 requires the agency to issue
monthly summaries of OPS enforcement actions including violation and penalty information for
each action, and provide a mechanism for pipeline operators to make response information
available to the public (§ 6). To meet these requirements, the OPS has established an Internet
portal with pipeline safety enforcement information.80

73 General Accounting Office (GAO), Pipeline Safety: The Office of Pipeline Safety Is Changing How It Oversees the
Pipeline Industry, GAO/RCED-00-128, May 2000, p. 22.
74 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Pipeline Safety: Management of the Office of Pipeline Safety’s
Enforcement Program Needs Further Strengthening, GAO-04-801, p. 3.
75 Siggerud, K. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Testimony before the House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and Pipelines hearing on Pipeline Safety, GAO-06-474T,
March 16, 2006, p. 11.
76 Gerard, S.L., Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Admin.(PHMSA), Testimony before the House Energy and
Commerce Committee, Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee hearing on Pipeline Safety, Serial No. 109-84, April 27,
2006, p. 14.
77 Ibid.
78 Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin. (PHMSA), “Summary of Enforcement Actions,” Web page,
February 9, 2009. http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/enforce/Actions_opid_0.html
79 Epstein, L.N. July 27, 2006.
80 Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), “PHMSA Pipeline Safety Program: Enforcement,” Web page, May 15, 2007.
http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/enforce/Enforcement.html
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Congress has repeatedly raised questions about the appropriate division of pipeline security
authority between the OPS and TSA.81 Both the OPS and TSA have played important roles in the
federal pipeline security program, with TSA the designated lead agency since 2002. In 2004, the
DOT and DHS entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) concerning their respective
security roles in all modes of transportation. The MOU notes that DHS has the primary
responsibility for transportation security with support from the DOT, and establishes a general
framework for cooperation and coordination. The MOU states that “specific tasks and areas of
responsibility that are appropriate for cooperation will be documented in annexes ... individually
approved and signed by appropriate representatives of DHS and DOT.”82 On August 9, 2006, the
departments signed an annex “to delineate clear lines of authority and responsibility and promote
communications, efficiency, and nonduplication of effort through cooperation and collaboration
between the parties in the area of transportation security.”83
In January, 2007, the PHMSA Administrator testified before Congress that the agency had
established a joint working group with TSA “to improve interagency coordination on
transportation security and safety matters, and to develop and advance plans for improving
transportation security,” presumably including pipeline security.84 According to TSA, the working
group developed a multi-year action plan specifically delineating roles, responsibilities, resources
and actions to execute 11 program elements: identification of critical infrastructure/key resources
and risk assessments; strategic planning; developing regulations and guidelines; conducting
inspections and enforcement; providing technical support; sharing information during
emergencies; communications; stakeholder relations; research and development; legislative
matters; and budgeting.85
P.L. 109-468 required the DOT Inspector General (IG) to assess the pipeline security actions
taken by the DOT in implementing its 2004 MOU with the DHS (§ 23). The Inspector General
published this assessment in May 2008. The IG report states that
PHMSA and TSA have taken initial steps toward formulating an action plan to implement
the provisions of the pipeline security annex.... However, further actions need to be taken
with a sense of urgency because the current situation is far from an “end state” for enhancing
the security of the Nation’s pipelines.86

81 For example, see Hon. William J. Pascrell, Jr., statement at the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and Pipelines, hearing on Pipeline Safety, March 16, 2006.
82 Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) and Dept. of Transportation (DOT), Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation on Roles and Responsibilities, September 28,
2004, p. 4.
83 Transportation Security Admin. and Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., “Transportation Security
Administration and Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Cooperation on Pipelines and Hazardous
Materials Transportation Security,” August 9, 2006.
84 Barrett, T.J., Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Testimony before
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation hearing on Federal Efforts for Rail and Surface
Transportation Security, January 18, 2007.
85 TSA, Pipeline Security Division, personal communication, July 6, 2007.
86 U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Actions Needed to Enhance Pipeline Security, Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Report No. AV-2008-053, May 21, 2008, p. 3.
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The report recommended that PHMSA (OPS) and TSA finalize and execute their security annex
action plan, clarify their respective roles specifically in LNG facility security, and jointly develop
a pipeline security strategy that maximizes the effectiveness of their respective capabilities and
efforts.87 According to TSA, “working with PHMSA has improved drastically” since the release
of the IG report.88 The two agencies now maintain daily contact, share information in a timely
manner, and collaborate on security guidelines and incident response planning.89 It remains to be
seen how the increasing collaboration between the OPS and TSA will affect pipeline security
practices in the field and the nation’s ability to respond to any future pipeline security incidents.
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As noted earlier in this report, federal pipeline security activities to date have relied upon
voluntary industry compliance with OPS security guidance and TSA security best practices. By
initiating this voluntary approach, the OPS sought to speed adoption of security measures by
industry and avoid the publication of sensitive security information (e.g., critical asset lists) that
would normally be required in public rulemaking.90 Provisions in P.L. 109-468 require the DOT
Inspector General to “address the adequacy of security standards for gas and oil pipelines” (§
23(b)(4)). P.L. 110-53 similarly directs TSA to promulgate pipeline security regulations and carry
out necessary inspection and enforcement—if the agency determines that regulations are
appropriate (§ 1557(d)). Addressing this issue the 2008 IG report states that
TSA’s current security guidance is not mandatory and remains unenforceable unless a
regulation is issued to require industry compliance.... PHMSA and TSA will need to conduct
covert tests of pipeline systems’ vulnerabilities to assess the current guidance as well as the
operators’ compliance.91
Although TSA’s FY2005 budget justification stated that the agency would “issue regulations
where appropriate to improve the security of the [non-aviation transportation] modes,” the agency
has not done so for pipelines, and is not currently working on such regulations.92 The pipelines
industry has expressed concern that new security regulations and related requirements may be
“redundant” and “may not be necessary to increase pipeline security.”93 The PHMSA
Administrator in 2007 testified that enhancing security “does not necessarily mean that we must
impose regulatory requirements.”94 TSA officials have questioned the IG assertions regarding
pipeline security regulations, particularly the IG’s call for covert testing of pipeline operator
security measures. They argue that the agency is complying with the letter of P.L. 110-53 and that

87 Ibid. pp. 5-6.
88 Transportation Security Administration, Personal communication, February 17, 2009.
89 Ibid.
90 GAO, Pipeline Security and Safety: Improved Workforce Planning and Communication Needed, GAO-02-785,
August 2002, p. 22.
91 U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, May 21, 2008, p. 6.
92 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation Security Administration Fiscal Year 2005 Congressional
Budget Justification, Washington, DC, February 2, 2004, p. 20; TSA, Pipeline Security Division, personal
communication, February 17, 2009.
93 American Gas Association (AGA), American Petroleum Institute (API), Association of Oil Pipelines (AOPL), and
American Public Gas Association (APGA), joint letter to members of the Senate Commerce Committee providing
views on S. 1052, August 22, 2005.
94 Barrett, T.J. January 18, 2007.
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its pipeline operator security reviews are more than paper reviews.95 In accordance with P.L. 110-
53 (§ 1557 (b)), has begun implementing a multi-year program of pipeline system inspections,
including documentation of findings and follow up reviews.96 In its oversight of potential pipeline
security regulations, Congress may evaluate the effectiveness of the current voluntary pipeline
security standards based on findings from the TSA’s CSR reviews, pipeline inspections, and
future DOT Inspector General reports.
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Congress has long been critical of TSA’s funding of non-aviation security activities, including
pipeline activities. For example, as one Member remarked in 2005, “aviation security has
received 90% of TSA’s funds and virtually all of its attention. There is simply not enough being
done to address ... pipeline security.”97 At its current staffing level, TSA’s Pipelines Security
Division has limited field presence for inspections and possible enforcement of future regulations.
TSA’s plan to focus security inspections on the largest pipeline and distribution system operators
seeks to make the best use of limited resources. The concern is that TSA currently lacks sufficient
resources for rigorous security plan verification and a credible threat of enforcement, so operator
compliance with security guidance may be inadequate, leaving the pipeline network as a whole
less secure than it might be with more universal inspection and enforcement coverage. P.L. 110-
53 specifically authorizes funding of $2 million annually through FY2010 for TSA’s pipeline
security inspections and enforcement program (§ 1557(e)). It is an open question whether $2
million annually would be sufficient to enable TSA to meet congressional expectations for federal
pipeline security activities.
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In addition to the issues mentioned above, Congress may consider several issues related to
proposed legislation or otherwise raised by pipeline stakeholders.
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As noted earlier in this report, the OPS made integrity management programs mandatory for oil
transmission pipelines in 2001 and for gas transmission pipelines in 2003. Congress and other
stakeholders have since sought to extend these regulations to natural gas distribution pipelines,
such as those operated by regional natural gas utilities. Because distribution pipelines are
designed and operate differently from transmission lines, the OPS has been developing
approaches to structuring unique regulations for distribution systems. Natural gas distribution
companies have sought flexible, risk-based options in any future integrity management
regulations directed at distribution systems.98 P.L. 109-468 mandates the promulgation by OPS of

95 Sammon, John, Transportation Security Administration, Testimony before the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, Railroad, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee hearing on Implementation of
the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006, June 24, 2008.
96 TSA, Pipeline Security Division, personal communication, February 17, 2009.
97 Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, opening statement before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation,
hearing on the President’s FY2006 Budget Request for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), February 15,
2005.
98 E. F. Bender, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, testimony before the House Committee on Transportation and
(continued...)
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minimum standards for integrity management programs for distribution pipelines by December
31, 2007 (§ 9). The agency issued proposed standards for public comment on June 25, 2008.99
PHMSA officials reportedly have indicated that they seek to issue final regulations by mid-
2009.100 As the OPS’s study of distribution integrity management measures continues, Congress
may act to ensure that any resulting regulations balance the potential benefits of improved
pipeline safety with the potential costs to distribution pipeline operators.
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The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 requires that natural gas pipelines operators subject
to the act perform integrity management reassessments at least every seven years after an initial
baseline assessment (§ 14a). Some pipeline operators believe that this reassessment interval may
be too prescriptive and may not be appropriate for all pipelines. Operators argue that assessing
pipelines too frequently is costly and inefficient, diverting limited safety resources from other
uses with greater pipeline safety benefits.101 Based on assessments conducted through 2005, “and
the generally safe condition of gas transmission pipelines,” the GAO concluded in 2006 that the
seven year reassessment interval “appears to be conservative.”102 The GAO recommended that
Congress permit pipeline operators to reassess gas transmission pipelines at intervals based on
risk factors, technical data, and engineering analyses. The agency believed such a revision would
allow the OPS more flexibility to establish longer or shorter reassessment intervals as warranted
by pipeline conditions.103 According to OPS testimony in June 2008, the Secretary of
Transportation has corresponded with House Energy and Commerce committee regarding the
agency’s plans for exempting pipeline operators from the seven year interval requirement, but this
correspondence has not been released publicly.104 The OPS has since concurred with the GAO’s
recommendation for extending reassessment intervals and is reviewing its authority to do so
through the grant of special permits to individual operators.105

(...continued)
Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and Pipelines, hearing on Pipeline Safety, March 16, 2006, p. 10.
99 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), “Pipeline Safety: Integrity Management
Program for Gas Distribution Pipelines,” PHMSA-RSPA-2004-19854, Federal Register, Vol. 73, No. 123, June 25,
2008, p. 36015.
100 “Technical Advisory Committee Meetings for DIMP and CRM,” DOT Pipeline Compliance News, RCP Inc.,
January 2009. http://www.dotpipeline.org/newsletters/DOTNewsJanuary2009_web.htm#6
101 J. L. Mohn, Panhandle Energy, testimony before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and Pipelines, hearing on pipeline Safety, March 16, 2006, p. 9.
102 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Natural Gas Pipeline Safety: Risk-Based Standards Should Allow
Operators to Better Tailor Reassessments to Pipeline Threats, GAO-06-945, September 8, 2006. p. 3.
103 Ibid. p. 6.
104 Gerard, Stacy, Asst. Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Testimony
before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Railroad, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
Subcommittee hearing on Implementation of the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006,
June 24, 2008.
105 Elizabeth Komiskey, Office of Pipeline Safety, "High Consequence Areas and Pipeline Assessment Intervals,"
Pipeline Safety – What More Needs To Be Done?, Pipeline Safety Trust Conference, New Orleans, LA, November 20,
2008.
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Both government and industry have taken numerous steps to improve pipeline safety and security
since 2001. Federal activities in these areas are evolving and agency responsibilities are still
being sorted out. Although pipeline impacts on the environment remain a concern of some public
interest groups, both federal government and industry representatives suggest that federal pipeline
programs have been on the right track.
As oversight of the federal role in pipeline safety and security continues, questions may be raised
concerning the effectiveness of state pipeline damage prevention programs, the promulgation of
low-stress pipeline regulations, federal pipeline safety enforcement, the relationship between
DHS and the DOT with respect to pipeline security, and particular provisions in federal pipeline
safety regulation. In addition to these specific issues, Congress may wish to assess how the
various elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security activity fit together in the nation’s overall
strategy to protect transportation infrastructure. For example, diverting pipeline resources away
from safety to enhance security might further reduce terror risk, but not overall pipeline risk, if
safety programs become less effective as a result. Pipeline safety and security necessarily involve
many groups: federal agencies, oil and gas pipeline associations, large and small pipeline
operators, and local communities. Reviewing how these groups work together to achieve common
goals could be an oversight challenge for Congress.

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Paul W. Parfomak

Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure Policy
pparfomak@crs.loc.gov, 7-0030

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