ȱ
ȱȱȱȱ
DZȱǯǯȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱ
¢ȱǯȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
¢ȱŗŗǰȱŘŖŖşȱ
ȱȱȱ
ŝȬśŝŖŖȱ
ǯǯȱ
řŗşśŝȱ
ȱȱȱ
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
¢ȱ
Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the
former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of
the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The
annual program has grown from $400 million in the DOD budget around $1.1 billion across three
agencies—DOD, DOE, and the State Department. It has also evolved from an emergency
response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a more comprehensive threat reduction and
nonproliferation effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and into the hands of rogue nations or
terrorist groups.
The Department of Defense manages the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which
provides Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance in transporting, storing, and
dismantling nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. U.S. assistance has helped these nations
eliminate the delivery systems for nuclear weapons under the START Treaty, secure weapons
storage areas, construct a storage facility for nuclear materials removed from weapons, construct
a destruction facility for chemical weapons, and secure biological weapons materials.
The State Department manages the International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and
Kiev. These centers provide research grants to scientists and engineers so that they will not sell
their knowledge to other nations or terrorist groups. The State Department has also provided
assistance with export and border control programs in the former Soviet states. The Department
of Energy manages programs that seek to improve the security of nuclear materials at civilian,
naval, and nuclear weapons complex facilities. It also funds programs that help nuclear scientists
and engineers find employment in commercial enterprises. DOE is also helping Russia dispose of
plutonium removed from nuclear weapons and shut-down its remaining plutonium-producing
reactors by replacing them with fossil-fuel plants.
Analysts have debated numerous issues related to U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction
assistance. These include questions about the coordination of and priority given to these programs
in the U.S. government, questions about Russia’s willingness to provide the United States with
access to its weapons facilities, questions about the President’s ability to waive certification
requirements so that the programs can go forward, and questions about the need to expand the
efforts into a global program that receives funding from numerous nations and possibly extends
assistance to others outside the former Soviet Union.
This report complements CRS Report 97-1027, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Programs: Issues for Congress, by Amy F. Woolf, and CRS Report RL31368, Preventing
Proliferation of Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet States, by Michelle
Stem Cook and Amy F. Woolf. It will be updated as needed.
ȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
ȱ
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 3
The Nunn-Lugar Amendment ................................................................................................... 3
A Slow Start .............................................................................................................................. 4
An Evolving Program ............................................................................................................... 5
Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.................................................... 6
Program Objectives................................................................................................................... 6
CTR Funding............................................................................................................................. 8
CTR Projects ............................................................................................................................11
Chain of Custody ...............................................................................................................11
Destruction and Dismantlement........................................................................................ 14
Demilitarization Programs ................................................................................................ 21
State Department ........................................................................................................................... 22
Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise (Science and Technology Centers).............................. 23
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance......................................................... 25
Department of Energy ................................................................................................................... 26
International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation.................................................. 27
MPC&A Funding.............................................................................................................. 27
MPC&A Projects .............................................................................................................. 29
Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (formerly Russian Transition
Initiative).............................................................................................................................. 35
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention ............................................................................. 36
Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI).......................................................................................... 37
Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production ........................................................... 38
Fissile Materials Disposition................................................................................................... 39
Issues for Congress........................................................................................................................ 41
Organization and Coordination ............................................................................................... 42
Strategic Plan .................................................................................................................... 42
Program Coordination....................................................................................................... 43
Access and Transparency ........................................................................................................ 44
Liability Protections and the Umbrella Agreement................................................................. 45
Certifications and Waivers ...................................................................................................... 46
Funding and Focus of the Programs........................................................................................ 49
Funding ............................................................................................................................. 49
Focus................................................................................................................................. 50
Globalization and International Cooperation .......................................................................... 51
The G-8 Global Partnership .............................................................................................. 51
Extending CTR Beyond the Former Soviet Union ........................................................... 53
Global Recognition of National Responsibility ................................................................ 54
ȱ
Table 1. CTR Funding: Requests and Authorization....................................................................... 9
Table 2. CTR Funding for Transportation Security....................................................................... 12
ȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
Table 3. CTR Funding for Fissile Materials Storage ..................................................................... 14
Table 4. CTR Funding for Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) .................................. 16
Table 5. Appropriations for M.C.&A and Related Programs ........................................................ 35
ȱ
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 55
ȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
ȱ
In the budget passed for FY2008, Congress authorized around $1.3 billion for U.S. programs that
provide nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance to Russia and the other states of the
former Soviet Union.1 The Bush Administration requested around $1.1 billion for these programs
in its FY2009 budget—including $414.1 million for DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
program, $572 million for the Department of Energy’s (DOE) nonproliferation programs in
Russia, and around $110 million for State Department nonproliferation programs in the former
Soviet Union.2 With these programs, the United States seeks to help the recipient nations
transport, store, and eliminate nuclear, chemical and other weapons; secure and eliminate the
materials used in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and prevent proliferation of the
knowledge needed to produce these weapons to nations or groups outside the former Soviet
Union. Since FY1992, the United States has appropriated over $10 billion across these three
agencies for these programs.3
President Bush often voiced support for these programs. In November 2001, the White House
noted that “The United States is committed to strong, effective cooperation with Russia and the
other states emerging from the former Soviet Union to reduce weapons of mass destruction and
prevent the proliferation of these weapons or the material and expertise to develop them.”4 At the
U.S.-Russian summit in May 2002, the United States and Russia pledged to “continue
cooperative threat reduction programs and expand efforts to reduce weapons-usable fissile
material.”5 At their summit meeting in Bratislava in February 2005, Presidents Bush and Putin
again agreed to enhance their cooperation in securing nuclear weapons and materials.6
Furthermore, in June 2002, the President joined with the leaders of the G-8 nations to create the
G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. As is
discussed in more detail later in this report, under this partnership, the United States has
committed to provide up to $10 billion over 10 years to pursue nonproliferation and threat
reduction programs in Russia and the other former Soviet states. This amount of $1 billion per
year roughly equals current U.S. expenditures on threat reduction and nonproliferation programs.
President Obama has also embraced the goals of these programs, and has pledged to accelerate
them. According to Administration statements, he has pledged to “lead a global effort to secure all
nuclear weapons materials at vulnerable sites within four years.” He has also pledged to appoint a
1 This includes $425.6 million for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program at the Department of Defense
(DOD); around $804 million for the Department of Energy’s (DOE) nonproliferation programs in Russia and the other
former Soviet states, and around $ 91.6 million for the portion of the State Department nonproliferation programs in the
former Soviet Union.
2 The DOE budget request for nonproliferation assistance programs totaled more than $800 million and the State
Department budget in these areas totaled around $125 million, but both include funding for programs outside the
former Soviet Union.
3 The term “spent” in this statement refers to the amount of money appropriated for threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs. The amount of money actually paid to contractors for the work covered by these programs
is less than the appropriated amount because many projects take years to complete, and payments may occur years after
the money is appropriated.
4 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary Fact Sheet. U.S. Government Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction
Assistance to the Russian Federation. November 13, 2001.
5 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Text of Joint Declaration. May 24, 2002.
6 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Joint Statement by President Bush and President Putin on Nuclear
Security Cooperation. February 24, 2005.
ȱȱȱ
ŗȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
“White House Coordinator for Nuclear Security” who, as a deputy national security advisor,
would coordinate all the U.S. thread reduction and nonproliferation programs.7
Congress has also supported U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction programs in the former
Soviet states. Although some Members have questioned the value and effectiveness of some
specific projects, Congress has authorized most of the funds requested by the Executive Branch in
the years since these programs began. Congress has also helped shape the programs, prohibiting
funding for some types of projects and providing added funding for others.
Many analysts have questioned, however, whether the United States has done all that it could to
prevent the leakage of knowledge, weapons, and materials from the former Soviet states. In its
first budget submission in early 2001, the Bush Administration reduced funding for the DOD
threat reduction programs by nearly 10% and cut more than $100 million out of DOE’s defense
nuclear nonproliferation programs, a funding category that includes U.S. nonproliferation
assistance to Russia.8 The Administration increased funding for these programs in FY2003,
FY2004, and FY2006, but its budget for FY2005 and FY2007 for the DOD threat reduction
programs again showed a 10% decrease. Even with increases in DOE budgets, some analysts
argue that, when combined with declines in the DOD budget, the funding falls short of what is
needed to address the continuing dangers of proliferation from the former Soviet states. Further,
they note that the Bush Administration has began to shift funding away from programs that secure
weapons and materials in the former Soviet states and into programs that provide border security
and assistance to a greater number of nations around the world. Consequently, they argue, if the
funding level does not grow, the United States will not be able to accelerate the programs with the
former Soviet Union to ensure that they effectively stop the proliferation of Russia’s weapons,
materials, and knowledge. These concerns are evident in the congressional action on the FY2008
and FY2009 budgets, which increased several of the threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs.
At issue in the debate over U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs is not only the
total amount of funding that the United States might commit to these programs in the former
Soviet states, but also the priority and sense of urgency that the United States assigns to them.
Congress has identified the expansion of these programs as one of the key steps that might be
taken to implement the 9/11 Commission Report’s recommendations. It also has mandated that
the White House appoint a coordinator for these programs, at the NSC level, to oversee the
government-wide U.S. effort. President Bush never filled this job; President Obama has pledged
that he will.
Many studies have offered recommendations for the size, shape, and operation of these programs
that differ from the approaches taken by the Clinton and Bush Administrations. This report
summarizes many issues raised in these reports and in Congressional debates on the future of
U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance. However, it first reviews the history of
these programs, describing their origins in 1991, their expansion and evolution during the 1990s,
and the changes in their direction during the first two years of the Bush Administration. The
7 See the White House website, The Agenda: Homeland Security.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/homeland_security/
8 Congress eventually restored the funding for DOE’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs and added $223
million more in the FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations (P.L. 107-206) passed after the September 11,
2001 attacks.
ȱȱȱ
Řȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
report also provides a broad summary of many of the program areas and projects supported by
U.S. funding.
ȱ
ȱȬȱȱ
Congress initiated U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to the Soviet Union in
November 1991. A failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the subsequent disintegration of
the Soviet Union had raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons.
Consequently, Senators Nunn and Lugar proposed an amendment to the implementing legislation
for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (P.L. 102-228). The Senate passed
the legislation by a vote of 86-8; the House adopted it through the Conference Report. This
amendment, titled the “Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991,” authorized the use of $400
million in FY1992 Defense Department (DOD) funds to assist the Soviet Union, and its
“successor entities” with efforts to “1) destroy nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and other
weapons, 2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction;
and 3) establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.”9
Senators arguing in support of the program, including Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Biden,
emphasized the potential risks inherent in the Soviet collapse. They noted that the disintegration
of the Soviet Union created “the danger that the ultimate disposition of nuclear weapons in the
new political system will not be conducive to their safety or international stability,” particularly if
the weapons remained in several of the former Soviet republics. These Senators also warned of “a
danger of seizure, theft, sale or use of nuclear weapons or components ... particularly if a
widespread disintegration in the custodial system should occur.” And third, they argued that “any
weakening of control over weapons and components could spill outside the territory of the former
Soviet Union, fueling nuclear proliferation worldwide.”10 Senator Nunn further warned that “we
are on the verge of either having the greatest destruction of nuclear weapons in the history of the
world or the greatest proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and scientific know-how
on how to make these weapons, as well as chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, even biological
weapons the world has ever seen.”11
Senators who supported this legislation also emphasized that, by targeting “U.S. defense
resources at the prompt, safe dismantlement of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Soviet
arsenal,”12 this assistance would “embody a new approach to enhancing our national security, an
approach which fits a dramatically new national security environment.”13 Senator Biden further
stated that, through this legislation, the United States would be “assisting ourselves,” not the
Soviet Union. But others questioned this characterization. They viewed the proposed assistance to
the Soviet Union as foreign aid, which they opposed, and argued that the United States should
9 For more information on this legislation, see CRS Report 94-985, The Nunn-Lugar Program for Soviet Weapons
Dismantlement: Background and Implementation, by Theodor Galdi. (Available from Amy F. Woolf, on request.)
10 See the comments of Senator Richard Lugar in the Congressional Record, November 25, 1991. p. S18005.
11 Ibid. p. S18004.
12 Senator Joe Biden, Congressional Record, November 25, 1991. p. S18002.
13 Senator Sam Nunn, Congressional Record, November 25, 1991. p. S18004.
ȱȱȱ
řȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
instead use its defense resources to fund its own military and national security needs.
Furthermore, some argued that, in providing assistance to the Soviet Union, the United States
would allow the Soviet Union to divert its own resources away from the protection and
dismantlement of its older weapons and towards the development and production of new weapons
that could create new threats to the United States.14 Members have raised these themes on
numerous occasions over the years, debating whether U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction
assistance is a foreign aid program that provides benefits primarily to the recipients or a security
program that provides benefits to both the United States and the former states of the Soviet
Union.
Initially, Congress used the DOD budget to fund U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former
Soviet States. In 1993, DOD began to refer to this effort as the Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) Program. Experts from other agencies, such as the State Department and Department of
Energy, participated in the projects when their expertise was required. In FY1997 these agencies
each took budgetary and management responsibility for the projects that relied on their expertise.
Consequently, although many analysts and observers still use the title “Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program” when referring to the full range of U.S. nonproliferation programs, this is no
longer accurate. This report only uses the term “CTR” when referring to the threat reduction
programs funded by the Department of Defense. It uses the phrase “threat reduction and
nonproliferation assistance” to refer to the full range of programs in DOD, DOE, and State.
ȱ ȱȱ
When Congress created the CTR program, many Members and experts outside government
seemed to envision a relatively simple program where officials from the United States would
travel to the four former Soviet states with nuclear weapons on their territories—Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan—to quickly safeguard and help dismantle nuclear, chemical, and other
weapons. But the program’s implementation was far slower and more complex than many
expected. First, the need to develop and implement coordinated policies among several U.S.
government agencies (primarily DOD, DOE, and the State Department) and within several
organizations in the Pentagon slowed program implementation. Furthermore, the United States
had to negotiate “umbrella agreements” with each recipient nation—setting out the privileges and
immunities of U.S. personnel and to establishing the legal and customs framework for the
provision of aid—before it could spend any money in the former Soviet states. Lingering mistrust
between the parties, along with the high level of secrecy surrounding Russia’s nuclear and
chemical weapons programs complicated this process in 1992 and 1993.
During its first few years in office, the Clinton Administration sought to resolve the bureaucratic
issues that had delayed the program. It offered broader political support to a cooperative
relationship with Russia through a high level commission chaired by Vice President Gore and
Russia’s Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. This commission identified many efforts that later
received funding through the CTR program. The Clinton Administration also provided significant
policy and financial support to the CTR program, overcoming the reticence that had been
expressed by some officials in the first Bush Administration. Consequently, it succeeded in
sharply increasing the rate of expenditures on CTR projects by the mid-1990s. With the
Administration’s support, and with continuing congressional interest in the program, U.S. threat
14 See the comments of Senator Malcolm Wallop. Congressional Record, November 25, 1991. p. S18008.
ȱȱȱ
Śȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
reduction and nonproliferation assistance began to expand and evolve. It expanded to several
agencies, with DOE and the State Department each funding nonproliferation efforts in the former
Soviet Union. It also expanded to include a broader range of programs. Where it had first focused
on improving transportation security and helping with the destruction of strategic offensive
nuclear weapons, it grew to include a wide range of efforts to secure and destroy nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons, the materials used in these weapons and the knowledge needed
to design and produce these weapons. It has also expanded financially, from an initial level of
approximately $400 million per year to a total of nearly $1 billion per year across the three
agencies.
ȱȱȱ
Initially, many in Congress saw U.S. assistance under Nunn-Lugar as an emergency response to
impending chaos in the Soviet Union. Even after the sense of immediate crisis passed in 1992 and
1993, many analysts and Members of Congress remained concerned about the potential for
diversion or a loss of control of nuclear and other weapons. Russia’s economy was extremely
weak and press accounts reported that nuclear materials from Russia were appearing on the black
market in Western Europe. Consequently, many began to view CTR as a part of a long-term threat
reduction and nonproliferation effort. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry referred to CTR
as “defense by other means”15 as the program helped eliminate Soviet weapons that had
threatened the United States and contain weapons and materials that could pose new threats in the
hands of other nations.
By the mid-1990s, many observers also began to view U.S. assistance to the former Soviet states
as a part of the effort to keep weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists. In 1996, experts
testified to Congress that Russian nuclear and chemical facilities, with their crumbling security
and lack of accounting procedures, could provide a source for terrorists seeking nuclear or
chemical materials. In response, Congress expanded the programs that provided security at
facilities with nuclear materials and suggested that more attention be paid to security at facilities
with materials that could be used in chemical or biological weapons.16 In January 2001, a task
force sponsored by the Department of Energy stated that “the most urgent unmet national security
threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-
usable materials in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used
against American troops abroad or citizens at home.”17 Since September 11, 2001, virtually all
analysts who follow U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance have made the link
between the possible quest for weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and the potential for
thwarting them by helping Russia protect its weapons, materials, and knowledge.18
15 See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington, DC, p. 1.
16 The March 1995 nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shinryo cult raised the profile of this
type of threat.
17 The report went on to state that “unless protected from theft of diversion, the former Soviet arsenal of weapons of
mass destruction threatens to become a goldmine for would-be proliferators the world over.” Baker, Howard and Lloyd
Cutler, Co-Chairs, Russia Task Force. A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with
Russia. The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, United States Department of Energy. January 10, 2001. p. 1.
18 Senator Sam Nunn has stated that “Preventing the spread and use of nuclear biological, and chemical weapons and
materials should be the central organizing principle on security for the 21st century.” Remarks by Former U.S. Senator
Sam Nunn, Chairman, Nuclear Threat Initiative. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. International
Nonproliferation Conference. November 14 , 2002.
ȱȱȱ
śȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
The Bush Administration also linked U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to the
former Soviet States to U.S. efforts to keep weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists. In
early 2003, it stated that it had “expanded the strategic focus of the CTR program” to support the
war on terrorism.19 In its budgets presented between FY2004 and FY2007, it increased funding
for several export and border control programs, for programs designed to stem the leakage of
knowledge out of the former Soviet Union, and for an effort to find and recover “radiological
sources”—a type of military device that could provide terrorists with nuclear materials for use in
a “dirty bomb.”20 All of these initiatives focus more on stemming proliferation than on
eliminating nuclear weapons in the former Soviet states. But it did not completely lose the initial
focus. In February 2005, at the Bratislava summit, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed to accelerate
some of the efforts to secure Soviet-era nuclear weapons. As is noted below, this agreement has
shifted additional funding into some of the DOD CTR projects.
The Obama Administration has made few direct comments about the threat reduction programs in
the former Soviet Union, but it has emphasized that some of these programs, when implemented
around the world, can help contain proliferation and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. It has
pledged to accelerate these programs, and to secure all vulnerable materials within four years.
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱ
ȱȱ
At its inception, the CTR program sought to provide Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
with assistance in the safe and secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear
weapons. During the first few years, the mandate for U.S. assistance expanded to include efforts
to secure materials that might be used in nuclear or chemical weapons, to prevent the diversion of
scientific expertise from the former Soviet Union, to expand military-to-military contacts between
officers in the United States and the former Soviet Union, and to facilitate the demilitarization of
defense industries.21 In 1994, Congress also indicated that threat reduction funds could be used to
assist in environmental restoration at former military sites and to provide housing for former
military officers who had been demobilized as a result of the dismantling of strategic offensive
weapons. The 104th Congress reversed this position, however, banning the use of CTR funds for
environmental restoration or housing for military officers. It also denied additional funding for
the Defense Enterprise Fund, which focused on demilitarizing former Soviet defense industries.
By the mid-1990s, Congress and the Clinton Administration had agreed on a mandate for the
CTR program that focused on the “core” objectives of securing and dismantling nuclear and
chemical weapons, along with protecting against the proliferation of knowledge and materials
19 U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union Threat
Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. p. 1.
20 Many analysts believe that this type of weapon, which could disperse radioactive materials across a wide area, might
be particularly attractive to terrorists. For details see CRS Report RS21528, Terrorist "Dirty Bombs": A Brief Primer,
by Jonathan Medalia.
21 For a more detailed description of the changes in the legislative mandate for the CTR program, see CRS Report 97-
1027, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for Congress, by Amy F. Woolf.
ȱȱȱ
Ŝȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
that might be used in the production of these weapons by other nations. The Clinton
Administration outlined this mandate in four key objectives for the CTR program:
• Destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction;
• Transport, store, disable, and safeguard these weapons in connection with their
destruction;
• Establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of these weapons, their
components, and weapons-usable materials; and
• Prevent the diversion of scientific expertise that could contribute to weapons
programs in other nations.22
In the late 1990s, Congress added funds to the CTR budget for biological weapons proliferation
prevention; this effort has expanded substantially in recent years. Congress also expanded the
CTR program to allow the use of CTR funds for emergency assistance to remove weapons of
mass destruction or materials and equipment related to these weapons from any of the former
Soviet republics.23
Its first budget, in FY2002, the Bush Administration reduced CTR funding by nearly 10% from
over $440 million to $403 million. It also began a review of all U.S. threat reduction and
nonproliferation assistance to Russia and the former Soviet states, stating that it sought to “ensure
that existing U.S. cooperative nonproliferation programs with Russia are focused on priority
threat reduction and nonproliferation goals, and are conducted as efficiently and as effectively as
possible.”24 Some analysts welcomed the review, noting that it could provide an opportunity to
revise and expand some programs, but others feared the review would lead to reductions in
funding and the elimination of some programs.
When it announced the results of the review, the Bush Administration stated that it found that
“most U.S. programs to assist Russia in threat reduction and nonproliferation work well, are
focused on priority tasks, and are well managed.”25 But the review did signal a shift in the focus
of U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance. Instead of highlighting projects aimed at
the elimination of nuclear weapons, the Administration indicated that it would expand some
projects that focused on chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation, including increasing
funding for the construction of a controversial chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia.
For many, this change seemed to be a natural response, in the post-September 11 environment, to
growing concerns about the potential link between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
Others, however, saw it as a retreat from the long-standing core objectives of the CTR program.
The Bush Administration confirmed this shift in focus with the release of its FY2004 budget
request for CTR. Where it had requested and received $50 million in FY2002 and around $133
22 U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington, DC. p. 4.
23 DOD has used CTR funds for this purpose in several instances. For example, in November 1997, the United States
purchased 21 nuclear-capable MIG-29 aircraft from the Republic of Moldova before Moldava could sell these aircraft
to a nation seeking nuclear delivery capabilities. In April 1998, using CTR funds, the United States and Great Britain
moved 8.8 pounds of highly enriched uranium and 17.6 pounds of highly radioactive spent fuel from a nuclear reactor
outside Tbilisi, Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland.
24 The White House. Fact Sheet. Administration Review of Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance to the
Russian Federation. December 11, 2001.
25 Ibid.
ȱȱȱ
ŝȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
million in FY2003 for the construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia, it
requested, and Congress authorized, $200.3 million in FY2004. This is nearly 45% of the total
CTR budget request. The Bush Administration also increased funding for biological weapons
proliferation prevention from $17 million in FY2002 to around $55 million in FY2003 and $54.2
million for FY2004. In contrast, funding for strategic offensive arms elimination in Russia
declined from $133.4 million in FY2002 to $70.1 million in FY2003 and $57.6 million in
FY2004.26
Furthermore, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, J.D. Crouch, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, stated that the Bush
Administration had revised the four key objectives for CTR. The program would seek to:
• Dismantle FSU (former Soviet Union) WMD (weapons of mass destruction) and
associated infrastructure;
• Consolidate and secure FSU WMD and related technology and materials;
• Increase transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct;
• Support defense and military cooperation with the objective of preventing
proliferation.27
Although most ongoing CTR projects were consistent with these objectives, the absence of any
specific reference to the destruction of nuclear weapons was notable. In addition, by stating that
the United States seeks to “encourage higher standards of conduct,” the Bush Administration
indicated that it will place a higher priority on Russian openness, cooperation, and compliance
with arms control agreements. This emphasis was evident in the Administration’s decision against
certifying Russia for CTR assistance in 2002. This also presented something of a departure from
the past, when the United States raised issues of transparency, openness, and compliance with
Russia during private meetings, but did not tie these issues directly to the goals of the CTR
program.
ȱȱ
When Congress first passed the Nunn-Lugar Amendment, it authorized the transfer of $400
million in FY1992 funds from other DOD accounts for threat reduction activities in the former
Soviet Union. Few of these funds were spent in FY1992, so Congress extended the transfer
authority for FY1992 funds and authorized the transfer of an additional $400 million from other
DOD accounts in FY1993. In subsequent years, the Clinton Administration requested, and
Congress authorized new appropriations for the CTR program. Table 1 summarizes the amount
of funding the Presidents requested for the CTR program and the amount authorized by Congress
26 The reduced request for FY2004 reflects, in part, the presence of unexpended balances from FY2003. The United
States did not spend these funds because it could not initiate any new contracts during the period after the President did
not certify Russia for participation in the CTR program and before Congress allowed the President to waive the
certification requirement. See Statement of Dr. J.D. Crouch, II. March 4, 2003. p. 4.
27 U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services Statement of Dr. J.D. Crouch II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy. March 4, 2003. p. 4. The Administration has formally incorporated these objectives into
its planning for and reporting on the CTR Program. See U.S. Department of Defense. FY2006 CTR Annual Report to
Congress. December 31, 2004. p. 1.
ȱȱȱ
Şȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
in each of the fiscal years between 1992 and 2006. Congress has authorized just over $6 billion
for CTR since 1992.
Congress has approved the Administration’s request for CTR funding in most years, but has
added or reduced funding in some. In FY1996, the new Republican majority in the House
questioned many elements of the CTR program and the House Armed Services Committee
reduced funding to $200 million. The Senate had approved the Administration’s request, and the
Conference Committee agreed on a compromise of $300 million. The House also reduced the
Administration’s request in FY1997, approving $302.9 million for CTR, but the Senate added
$37 million and the House eventually accepted the Senate’s version in the Conference
Committee.28
Table 1. CTR Funding: Requests and Authorization
($ millions)
Fiscal Year
Request
Authorization
1992 $400
$400
1993 $400
$400
1994 $400
$400
1995 $400
$400
1996 $371
$300
1997 $328
$364.9
1998 $382.2
$382.2
1999 $440.4
$440.4
2000 $475.5
$475.5
2001 $458.4
$443.4
2002 $403
$403
2003 $416.7
$416.7
2004 $450.8
$450.8
2005 $409.2
$409.2
2006 $415.5
$415.5
2007 $372.3
$372.3
2008 $348.0
$428.05
2009 $414.1
$434.1
Total FY1992-FY200
$7285.10
$7336.05
In FY2001, the House reduced President Clinton’s request for CTR to $433 million. The Senate
approved the full request and the Conference Committee settled on $443 million. This reduction
28 This trend, with the House approving less than the President requested and the Senate approving the President’s
request, continued for several years. For details, see CRS Report 97-1027, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Programs: Issues for Congress, by Amy F. Woolf.
ȱȱȱ
şȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
was part of a dispute between the House, on one side, and the Senate and the Clinton
Administration, on the other side, over funding for the chemical weapons destruction facility at
Shchuch’ye in Russia. The House Armed Services Committee had reduced funding for that
program in FY1998 and FY1999; in each of these two years, the Senate and the Conference
Committee approved the Administration’s requests. In FY2000, the House again eliminated all
funding for the construction of Shchuch’ye and mandated, instead, that CTR fund security
improvements at Russia’s chemical weapons storage facilities. The Conference Committee
accepted the House position, but still approved the Administration’s request for $475.5 million for
CTR. In FY2001, the Senate again accepted the House position banning funding for Shchuch’ye
and, this time, accepted a small reduction in total funding for CTR.
In FY1996, when the Clinton Administration’s request for CTR funding declined from $400
million to $371 million, total U.S. spending on threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to
Russia actually increased. In that year, the Materials Protection Control and Accounting Program
(MPC&A) moved from DOD’s CTR budget to the Department of Energy; the Clinton
Administration requested and Congress authorized $70 million for DOE programs. In addition,
$33 million in funding for the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow moved
from the DOD budget to the State Department budget. In subsequent years, as is noted in more
detail below, funding continued to grow for the DOE and State Department programs.
As is evident in the table above, the Bush Administration’s request for CTR funding declined in
both FY2007 and FY2008. And, although the funding request for FY2009 is greater than the
FY2008 request, it falls below the amount authorized in FY2008. For the most part, these
declines reflect reductions in the funding requested for the chemical weapons destruction facility
at Shchuch’ye, as it neared completion, and, to a lesser extent, declines in funding for weapons
elimination programs. The Administration did not propose to offset these reduction with increases
in funding for new existing projects or the initiation of new projects. Congress did not accept this
new funding profile in FY2008. Both chambers added funding for CTR programs. The House
added $50 million, with 42.7 million going to the plant at Shchuch’ye and $7 million allocated to
potential new initiatives in the CTR program. The Senate, for its part, added $80 million to the
CTR budget request, with $50 million of this added funding going to biological weapons
proliferation prevention. Funds were also added to the accounts for strategic offensive arms
elimination in Russia and weapons of mass destruction proliferation prevention. The Conference
Committee (H.Rept. 100-477, Title XIII) accepted the Senate’s funding level, authorizing $428
million for CTR, with much of this added funding going to biological weapons proliferation
prevention. The legislation also authorizes $10 million for new CTR initiatives that are outside
the former Soviet Union. The Conference Committee did not retain the provision approved by the
House that would fund new initiatives in CTR within the former Soviet Union. It did however,
express support for such initiatives (H.Rept. 110-477, Sec. 1306) and request a study by the
National Academy of Sciences that would assess possible initiatives and identify options for
strengthening the program.
Congress also added funds to the Bush Administration’s $414.1 million request for CTR for
FY2009. The House authorized $445.1 million and the Senate authorized $434.1 million for these
programs. The Conference Committee accepted that Senate funding level, adding $10 million
$10.0 million for new initiatives, including activities in states outside of the former Soviet Union,
$1.0 million for additional expenses associated with the Russian chemical weapons destruction
ȱȱȱ
ŗŖȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
activities, and an increase of $9.0 million for weapons of mass destruction proliferation
prevention in the former Soviet Union.29
ȱȱ
In its early years, the Department of Defense divided the CTR program into three distinct project
areas—chain of custody, destruction and dismantlement, and demilitarization.30 Although it no
longer makes these distinctions in its requests for or reports on CTR programs, they serve as a
useful organizational tool when reviewing the history of the programs.
ȱȱ¢ȱ
Chain of custody activities are those designed to enhance safety, security, and control over
nuclear weapons and fissile materials. Many of these were completed during the early years of
CTR. These programs were created, in part, in response to early concerns about the safety and
security of weapons and materials in transit. The United States and the recipient nations also
found it easier to agree on the implementation of projects that focused on transit and storage of
nuclear weapons and materials than to focus on destruction activities. The brief descriptions that
follow summarize some of the key chain of custody activities.31
ȱ¢ȱ
When the Soviet Union collapsed, thousands of nuclear weapons were spread among four states
(Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan), and, within each state, the weapons were dispersed
among hundreds of deployment and storage areas. Soviet President Gorbachev and Russia’s
President Yeltsin had both committed to removing non-strategic nuclear weapons (those with
ranges less than 3,600 miles) from non-Russian republics and storing them in a smaller number of
facilities in Russia. In 1992, after signing the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan also pledged to return all the warheads based on their territories to
Russia.32 Table 2 summarizes the amount of money that the United States has appropriated for
many of these transportation security projects through FY2008.
The United States has helped Russia improve the safety and security of nuclear weapons in
transit. According to DOD, the CTR program “assists in the secure transport of 1,000-1,500
warheads per year.” It has provided armored blankets to protect warheads in transit from potential
attacks, storage containers to hold the warheads during transit, and assistance to enhance the
safety and security of rail cars used to transport warheads from deployment to storage or
dismantlement facilities.
29 P.L. 110-417, Title XIII.
30 This division, and the description in the next few paragraphs come from U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative
Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington, DC. p. 5-6. The fourth category, “Other,” includes administrative expenses
and a special project on Arctic nuclear waste.
31 The Defense Threat Reduction Agency http://www.dtra.mil/oe/ctr/programs/index.cfm.
32 For a description of the nuclear weapons based in non-Russian republics in 1991, see CRS Report RL32202, Nuclear
Weapons in Russia: Safety, Security, and Control Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
ȱȱȱ
ŗŗȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
Table 2. CTR Funding for Transportation Security
($ millions)
Project
Fiscal years
Total appropriation
Armored Blankets
FY1992-FY1993
$3.1
Emergency Response
FY1992-FY1996
$29.2
Railcar security enhancements
FY1992-FY1994
$21.5
Weapons Transportation Security
FY1995-FY2008
$249.7
Source: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project
on Managing the Atom. March 2003.
Ongoing transportation security projects also provide Russia with emergency response vehicles,
training, and support equipment that it might need to respond to a nuclear weapons transportation
accident. Funding for FY2005 supported the procurement and maintenance of specialized
warhead transportation railcars.33 The United States also supported the movement of 45 train
shipments in 2004. This number dropped to 24 shipments in 2005. The United States has required
increased transparency for these shipments, and the process stopped between November 2004 and
May 2005 while the Untied States and Russia resolved this issue. Congress authorized an
additional $30 million for this project in FY2007; the Bush Administration requested, and both
the House and Senate authorized, $37.7 million for FY2008. DOD initially indicated that it
planned to support 70-72 shipments per year through 2011,34 but it has reduced that number to no
more than 4 shipments per month, or 48 per year, for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008. The
funding for these years would also permit DOD to procure around 20 additional cargo railcars for
this effort in FY2008. DOD requested and Congress authorized $40.8 million for transportation
security for FY2009.
ȱȱ¢ȱ
Several CTR projects seek to help Russia improve security at storage facilities for strategic and
tactical nuclear warheads. Russia has three types of storage sites—operational sites, storage sites,
and rail transfer points. The United States does not provide assistance at operational sites. The
Department of Energy has addressed security needs at rail transfer points that store warheads
from the Russian Navy, and plans to do the same at one or more sites for the Strategic Rocket
forces. Under the CTR program, DOD is working to enhance security at both large “national
stockpile storage sites” and smaller storage sites at Navy, Air Force, and Strategic Rocket Force
bases.35 DOD plans to provide perimeter fencing, as a “quick fix” for vulnerable sites, and more
comprehensive upgrades, including alarm systems and inventory control and management
equipment to keep track of warheads in storage.
According to the GAO, this effort was slowed by Russia’s reluctance to provide the United States
with information about the precise number of sites in need of security upgrades and its refusal to
33 Hoehn, William. Preliminary Analysis of U.S. Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2005 Cooperative Threat
Reduction Budget Request. RANSAC. February 10, 2004.
34 U.S. Department of Defense. FY2006 CTR Annual Report to Congress. December 31, 2004. p. 43.
35 The total number of sites remains classified. For details on DOD’s plans, see U.S. General Accounting Office.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security
at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482. March 2003. p. 34.
ȱȱȱ
ŗŘȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
allow the United States access to sites to design appropriate upgrades. For example, DOD
purchased 123 kilometers of perimeter fencing for weapons storage sites; the Russian Ministry of
Defense (MOD) said it would install the fences itself, but it has reportedly made little progress in
doing so.36 Furthermore, the United States purchased and tested equipment for comprehensive
upgrades, but could not install it because Russia’s MOD had not allowed the United States access
to the interior of any storage facilities. The United States and Russia completed agreements in
February 2003 that will provide the United States with a degree of access to these sites.37 U.S.
personnel can now conduct site assessments and other activities that support the installation of
physical security upgrades at a number of weapons storage locations. This change is reflected in
significant increases in funding for site security enhancements in the FY2005 and FY2006 budget
requests for CTR. The United States eventually plans to provide security enhancements at up to
42 permanent storage sites and temporary handling sites in Russia.38 Through 2006, DOD had
completed site upgrades at one of 12 initial sites, and had ordered the equipment to proceed at the
other 11 sites. In a complementary effort, the United States has constructed a Security Assessment
and Training Center so that DOD and MOD personnel can test and select security systems for
weapons storage sites. The United States is also helping Russia develop training programs for
personnel with access to nuclear weapons.
Between FY1995 and FY2007, DOD appropriated just around $745 million for weapons storage
security.39 The Bush Administration requested $74.1 million in FY2006, and reprogrammed $10
million intended for strategic offensive arms elimination to this program area in FY2006, leading
to a total appropriation of $84.1 million. It also requested an additional $44.5 million in the
FY2006 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations package for effort. Then, it requested an
additional $87.1 million for FY2007. Congress approved the added funding in the Emergency
Supplemental Bill and authorized 74.1 million for FY2007. The Administration requested only
$23 million for warhead storage security for FY2008; Congress increased this amount to $47.64
million in the Conference Report on the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill.
The increases in funding for warhead security through FY2007 reflect a commitment made by
Presidents Bush and Putin in February 2005 to accelerate the warhead security upgrades. After
Russia identified all the sites in need of upgrades, the United States agreed to provide assistance
at 15 sites, 8 with funding from the CTR program and 7 with funding from the DOE
nonproliferation budget. They hope to complete these upgrades with funding provided through
2007,40 and plan to move towards funding sustainment activities, rather than further upgrades.
The FY2009 request for weapons storage security declined to $24.1 million, providing further
evidence of the shift in funding to efforts to sustain and support the systems that have been
installed in previous years. Congress approved this request.
36 Ibid. p. 36.
37 U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of Dr. J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy. March 4, 2003.
38 U.S. Department of Defense. FY2006 CTR Annual Report to Congress. December 31, 2004. p. 41.
39 Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project on
Managing the Atom. March 2003.
40 Hoehn, William. Preliminary Analysis of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2007 Cooperative Threat
Reduction Budget Request. Ransac. March 2006. p. 4.
ȱȱȱ
ŗřȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
ȱȱȱ
According to unclassified estimates, Russia inherited more than 30,000 nuclear warheads from
the Soviet Union, along with enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) to produce
thousands more warheads. As it consolidates and reduces its arsenal, Russia has begun to
dismantle thousands of these warheads. Several CTR projects seek to improve the long-term
security of the fissile materials removed from these weapons. Table 3 summarizes the amount of
money that the United States appropriated for projects related to storage of fissile materials in
Russia.
Table 3. CTR Funding for Fissile Materials Storage
($ millions)
Project
Fiscal years
Total appropriation
Fissile Material Containers
FY1992-FY2000
$82.2
Storage Facility Design
FY1993
$15
Storage Facility Construction
FY1994-FY2001
$387
Source: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project
on Managing the Atom. March 2003.
The United States provided Russia with more than 26,000 containers to hold the fissile materials;
it also helped Russia design and build a highly secure storage facility at Mayak that will provide
long-term safe and secure storage for these materials. This facility will hold the equivalent of
fissile material from 25,000 nuclear warheads. The first wing of this building was completed and
certified for use in December 2003; it is now ready to receive nuclear materials for storage.41 The
United States and Russia no longer plan to construct an expected second wing.42 The United
States and Russia are still working, with little progress, to complete a “transparency agreement”
that will allow the United States to confirm that materials stored in the facility actually came from
dismantled warheads. Even without the completion of this agreement, however, the Mayak
facility began to accept nuclear materials for storage in July 2006.
ȱȱȱ
Destruction and dismantlement projects help with the elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other
weapons and their delivery vehicles. To date, many of these projects have helped Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan remove warheads, deactivate missiles, and eliminate launch facilities for
the nuclear weapons covered by the START treaty. The Clinton Administration, and some
analysts outside government, credited U.S. assistance in this area with providing Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan with an incentive to relinquish the nuclear weapons on their territories in
the early 1990s.43 When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it had more than 11,000 warheads
deployed on nearly 1,400 ICBMs, 940 SLBMs and 162 heavy bombers. According to the Defense
41 U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Testimony of Lisa Bronson,
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation. March 10, 2004. (Herein
after referred to as Bronson Testimony.)
42 The absence of funding for the second wing of Mayak was responsible for a significant portion of the decline in the
Bush Administration request for CTR funding, from $443 million in FY2001 to $403 million, in FY2002.
43 U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington, DC. p. 1.
ȱȱȱ
ŗŚȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
Threat Reduction Agency, the CTR program has helped deactivate more than 7,500 warheads,
742 ICBMs, 633 SLBMs, and 155 heavy bombers.44 More than half of the funds appropriated for
CTR support projects in this category. Some of the key areas of destruction and dismantlement
projects are described below.
ȱȱȱȱ
The United States has provided Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance in
eliminating the launchers and infrastructure associated with strategic nuclear weapons deployed
on their territories. This effort is complete in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan; it continues in
Russia. The United States and Ukraine have not agreed on a method to eliminate rocket motors
from SS-24 ICBMs. As a result, DOD did not request any more funding for this project area in
FY2006 and planned to complete its work with prior year funds. In each of these nations, the
United States has provided the recipient nations with technology and expertise needed to
deactivate and dismantle missiles, launchers, submarines, and bombers. It has also helped
construct storage facilities for missiles removed from deployment and fuel removed from
deactivated missiles.
In Russia, the United States is helping to eliminate and dismantle SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs,
disassemble and eliminate components of the SS-N-20 SLBM, eliminate SS-25 ICBMs and their
road-mobile launchers, and destroying rail-mobile SS-24 ICBMs and their launchers. For
FY2006, DOD requested $78.9 million for this project area, an increase of around $20 million
over the budget in FY2005. The increase reflected the fact that Russia had added more missiles
and launchers to the destruction schedule to meet the terms of the Moscow Treaty. However, after
Congress appropriated the requested amount, the Administration reprogrammed funding out of
this project area, leaving only $49.7 million. As was noted above, it transferred $10 million to
weapons storage security. It also transferred $1.1 million to strategic offensive arms elimination
programs in Ukraine and will lose around $5 million in recisions imposed by Congress. The Bush
Administration requested $77 million for this project area in FY2007; Congress approved $78.9
million. It requested $77.9 million for FY2008. The House approved this amount; the Senate,
however, increased funding for strategic offensive arms elimination in Russia to $102.9 million.
According to the Senate Armed Service Committee Report on this legislation (S.Rept. 110-77),
this increase of $25 million should be used to “accelerate the completion of activities at sites ...
where the materials and weapons are stored” and to facilitate the consolidation, dismantlement,
and disposition of these weapons and materials. The Conference Committee (H.Rept. 110-477)
allocated $92.885 million to this project area. DOD requested $79.9 million for Strategic
Offensive Arms Elimination in Russia, and $6.4 million for Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination
in Ukraine in FY2009; Congress authorized these amounts.
Table 4 summarizes the amount of money that the United States has appropriated for several key
strategic offensive arms elimination projects.45
44 For the full CTR scorecard, see Defense Threat Reduction Agency, http://www.dtra.mil/oe/ctr/scorecard.cfm.
45 For a more detailed breakdown of projects in this program area, see U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services.
Statement of Dr. J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. March 4, 2003. p. 4. See
also U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union Threat
Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. pp. 16-21.
ȱȱȱ
ŗśȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
Table 4. CTR Funding for Strategic Of ensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)
($ millions)
Nation
Fiscal years
Total appropriation
Russia FY1993-FY2008 $1463.29
Ukraine FY1993-FY2004 $575.4a
Kazahkstan FY1994-FY1996
$64.6
Belarus FY1994-FY1996 $3.3
Source: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project
on Managing the Atom. March 2003.
a. The Administration did not request any additional funds for this effort in FY2005 or FY2006.
One project funded in this category, the construction of a plant to dispose of liquid fuel removed
from Soviet ICBMs, raised concerns among some in Congress during the Bush Administration.
The United States constructed the facility at a cost of nearly $100 million. However, during
construction, Russia used much of the fuel in rockets in its space-launch program. Consequently,
in 2002, Russia informed the United States that it did not have any fuel for the facility.46
Representative Duncan Hunter stated that the episode represented an example of the potential for
waste in the CTR program.47 Others, however, note that, although unfortunate, this case is the
exception in a program that has spent more than $4 billion on threat reduction projects.
ȱ ȱȱ
Through the CTR program, the United States has helped Ukraine eliminate equipment and
facilities that supported the deployment and operation of nuclear weapons. These facilities
include liquid missile propellant storage facilities, nuclear weapons storage facilities, and
infrastructure at bomber bases. The United States also helped Kazakhstan secure fissile materials
and eliminate facilities at a nuclear weapons storage area and a former chemical weapons
production facility.48 Between FY1994 and FY2003, DOD appropriated $38.2 million for this
program in Ukraine and $44.5 million in Kazakhstan. It has not request any additional funds in
subsequent years.
ȱȱȱ
The Soviet Union had the largest stockpile of chemical weapons in the world. Russia declared
this stockpile to contain 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons. The United States has
questioned the accuracy and completeness of this declaration, a factor that contributed to Russia’s
loss of certification for CTR programs in FY2002. Russia’s chemical weapons are stored at seven
sites in Russia; five sites contain nerve agents in bombs and artillery shells, and three of these
sites and two additional sites house bulk stocks of blister agents.49 Russia has committed, under
46 U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of David K. Steensma, Deputy Assistant Inspector for
Auditing, Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General. March 4, 2003.
47 Hunter, Duncan. “Wasteful ‘Threat Reduction’ in Russia.” Washington Post. March 4, 2003. p. 23.
48 U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union Threat
Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. p. 9.
49 U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
(continued...)
ȱȱȱ
ŗŜȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to destroy these stocks by 2007 (it has requested an
extension until 2012), but it contends that it lacks the financial resources to meet this deadline. A
European consortium, led by Germany, has constructed a destruction facility at Gorny to destroy
the blister agent.50 The United States is assisting Russia with the design and construction of a
facility at Shchuch’ye to destroy all of Russia’s nerve agent. The chemical weapons storage
facility at Shchuch’ye contains nearly half of Russia’s stockpile of artillery shells filled with
nerve agent.51 The new facility is intended to destroy these stocks and those stored at the other
four storage sites, an amount estimated to be around 5,450 metric tons.
Construction on this facility began in March 2003. DOD reports that nearly all the design work
on the facility has been completed and construction is underway. Construction has begun on the
Main Destruction Building, the Bituminization Building, the Administration Building, and the
Material Storage Building. The United States has also begun to install equipment at the
destruction facility and to train the operating personnel. The United States and Russia had hoped
that construction would be completed and the facility would begin operations by the end of 2008.
It would then take around 3.5 years to destroy the stocks of nerve agent, allowing Russia to meet
the 2012 deadline. According to some reports, the facility may be ready to begin operations some
operations by mid-2009, but Russia has claimed that a lack of funding from the United States and
other Global Partnership contributors could delay the elimination of Russia’s chemical weapons
stockpile.
This project has been at the center of much debate during the past eight years. In FY1999, the
House tried to reduce the amount of CTR funding requested for Shchuch’ye by $53.4 million,
arguing that Russia’s chemical weapons posed more of an environmental problem for Russia than
a threat to U.S. security.52 The Defense Authorization Bills for FY2000 and FY2001 prohibited
any additional funding for Shchuch’ye. Congress resumed funding Shchuch’ye in FY2002, when
the Bush Administration requested $50 million for the project. However, in FY2003, when the
Bush Administration requested $133.6 million for Shchuch’ye, the House balked again and
approved $50 million. The House Armed Services Committee argued that the program could not
absorb such a large increase in one year and, because Russia did not yet appear committed to the
elimination of its chemical weapons, that the United States should not accelerate its efforts. The
Conference Report (107-772) also limited funding for Shchuch’ye to $50 million, but it stated
that the Administration could use the remaining $83.6 for other projects related to the storage and
elimination of nuclear weapons, or for chemical weapons destruction if Russia provides a “full
and accurate” disclosure of its chemical weapons stockpile.
The Bush Administration requested $200 million for this project in FY2004. The Senate approved
this amount, but the House, in its version of the FY2004 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1588),
reduced the funding to $171.5 million. It also mandated that the United States could only release
funds in excess of $71 million if Russia and other nations contributed to the project. Specifically,
(...continued)
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482. March 2003. pp. 58-59.
50 For a description of this facility and program see Glasser, Susan B. “Cloud Over Russia’s Poison Gas Disposal.”
Washington Post. August 24, 2002. p. 1
51 The Department of Defense estimates this to be 5,460 metric tons of agent in nearly 2 million rocket and artillery
warheads. See U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union
Threat Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. p. 4
52 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on National Security. National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1999.
Report 105-532, Washington, DC. May 12, 1998. p. 352.
ȱȱȱ
ŗŝȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
the U.S. contribution could not exceed the other nations’ contribution by more than a factor of
two. These provisions reflect concerns expressed by some in the House about a lack of financial
commitment from Russia and other European nations to the Shchuch’ye project. The Conference
Committee rejected the House position, approving the full $200 million for Shchuch’ye and
eliminating the linkage of U.S. funding to funding from other nations. Nevertheless, by December
2003, six other countries had contributed $69 million to the project.53
The Bush Administration requested, and Congress authorized, $158.4 million for Shchuch’ye in
FY2005. The reduction in funding for this project represented most of the reduction in the overall
CTR budget between FY2004 and FY2005. This reduction in funding did not derive from any
significant policy debates about the project; instead, it occurred because the FY2004 budget
included funding for a one-time investment in capital-intensive construction equipment. The
United States did not need to repeat this investment in FY2005.54 The Administration requested,
and received, an additional $108.5 million in its budget for FY2006. It requested only $42.7
million for this project in FY2007; Congress approved this request. The Bush Administration
indicated that the reduction reflected the maturity of the project and the lack of any further capital
investment.
The Bush Administration did not request any additional funding for the Shchuch’ye plant in the
FY2008 budget. This lack of funding raised eyebrows among analysts outside government, as
work at the facility was not yet complete and the facility was not yet operating. The House Armed
Services Committee also questioned this approach and added nearly $43 million to the budget in
the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill for Shchcuch’ye. In its report on the Bill (H.Rept. 110-
46), the committee noted that it did not believe that DOD could complete the project without
additional funding, as the existing budget did not account for the rising costs of construction
materials in Russia. The Conference Committee approved $6 million for this project area,
allowing some work to continue during FY2008. Congress also required that the Secretary of
Defense submit a report on the strategy and cost estimates for completing the Shchcuch’ye
project. The Administration again did not request any funding for Shchcuch’ye in FY2009;
Congress added $1 million. Some analysts outside government believe the United States will
have to provide more funding for this facility in the future.
In the past, Congress has subjected funding for Shchuch’ye to a number of certifications. For
example, it stated that the President must certify that Russia is committed to providing at least
$25 million per year to help construct and operate the facility; that Russia was committed to
destroying all its remaining nerve agent; that other nations were committed to contributing to the
construction of this facility; and that Russia is forthcoming with data about its chemical weapons
stockpile. The President requested that Congress allow him to waive the certification requirement,
so that construction could continue, even if Russia has not met all the conditions. Congress
provided the President with waiver authority, but only for one year, in the FY2003 Defense
Authorization Bill (P.L. 107-248).55 It extended this waiver authority by one more year in the
FY2004 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1588); the Administration submitted this waiver in
53 Bronson Testimony, March 10, 2004.
54 Ibid.
55 The waiver authority for the certification requirements from Shchuch’ye is different from the waiver authority the
President sought for the broader certification requirements included in the CTR legislation. These are discussed in more
detail below.
ȱȱȱ
ŗŞȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
early December 2003.56 For FY2005, the Senate approved unlimited waiver authority for the
President, but the House again limited this authority to one year. The House prevailed in
Conference, with an adjustment to allowing the waiver authority through the end of the calendar
year, rather than the fiscal year (see P.L. 108-375). Congress extended this waiver authority
through 2011.
Between FY1992 and FY2007, DOD allocated nearly $950 million for design and construction at
Shchuch’ye. Congress also appropriated $20 million, in FY1999, to improve security at Russia’s
chemical weapons facilities. Congress mandated this program, after denying funds for chemical
weapons destruction. DOD completed security work at two sites in December 2003 and does not
intend to expand the program, as this would be a short-term effort because Russia has committed
to destroy its stockpile.
ȱȱȱȱǻǼȱ
The Soviet Union reportedly developed the world’s largest biological weapons program,
employing an estimated 60,000 people at more than 50 sites. This weapons complex developed a
broad range of biological pathogens for use against plants, animals, and humans.57 Russia
reportedly continued to pursue research and development of biological agents in the 1990s, even
as the security systems and supporting infrastructure at its facilities began to deteriorate. The
United State began to provide Russia with CTR assistance to improve safety and security at its
biological weapons sites and to help employ biological weapons scientists during the late 1990s,
even though Russia has not provided a complete inventory of the sites or people involved in
biological weapons work.58
The CTR program supports four separate BWTR programs, working at 49 sites that include many
weapons facilities. Through the Biological Weapons Infrastructure Elimination program, the
United States is helping Russia eliminate the infrastructure and equipment at those Biological
Research and Production Centers (BRPCs) that have the capability to produce biological
weapons. Through the Biosecurity and Biosafety program, the United States is helping to enhance
safety and security at these centers to ensure the safe and secure storage and handling of
biological pathogens. This program has been combined with the BW Threat Agent Detection and
Response program, which seeks to develop modern surveillance, warning, and response networks
and to help secure Russia’s central storage facilities for BW pathogens. Finally, through
Cooperative Biodefense Research, the United States and Russia are using cooperative research
projects to increase transparency and discourage the “leakage” of Russian biological weapons
knowledge to other nations. Each of these programs is implemented through the International
Science and Technology Centers, because DOD has been unable to conclude implementing
agreements with the relevant ministries in Russia.59 In addition, CTR funding helped destroy the
huge biological weapons production facility in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan.
56 Memorandum for the Secretary of State, Presidential Determination No. 2004-10. Presidential Determination on
Waiver of Conditions on Obligation and Expenditure of Funds for Planning, Design, and Construction of a Chemical
Weapons Destruction Facility in Russia. The White House. December 9, 2003.
57 For more details on the BWPP programs, see CRS Report RL31368, Preventing Proliferation of Biological
Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet States, by Michelle Stem Cook and Amy F. Woolf.
58 U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482. March 2003. pp. 48-49.
59 Ibid. p. 54.
ȱȱȱ
ŗşȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
The potential proliferation of biological weapons poses one of the key challenges for U.S.
nonproliferation assistance to Russia.60 According to the General Accounting Office, progress in
gaining Russia’s cooperation and implementing these projects has been very slow. The United
States has found it particularly difficult to gain access to four key military facilities. The problem
is further aggravated by the fact that Russia is reducing the size of its complex, leaving many
scientists potentially unemployed or underemployed. In addition, biological pathogens are small
and easily transported, further increasing the proliferation risk.61 The Bush Administration has
expressed its support for these efforts and is in the process of expanding them.
Between FY1997 and FY2005, DOD appropriated around $280 million for these projects. The
Bush Administration requested $54.2 million for these programs in FY2004. Congress approved
this amount but attached some restrictions to the funding. In its version of the FY2004 Defense
Authorization Bill (H.R. 1588), the House had sought to prohibit funding cooperative research at
any site in the Soviet Union until the Secretary of Defense could certify that the site did not house
any prohibited biological weapons research, until the facility had conducted an assessment of its
vulnerability to the loss or theft of pathogens and until it had begun to implement measures to
reduce its vulnerability to the loss or theft of biological agents. The Conference Committee
modified this measure, stating that CTR could not fund cooperative research at a facility until the
Secretary of Defense determines that no prohibited research occurs at the facility and until the
facility plans to implement appropriate security measures. It also permitted the use of up to 25%
of the funds authorized for the project to be expended on making these determinations.
The Bush Administration requested, and Congress authorized, a similar amount—$55 million—
for biological weapons proliferation prevention in FY2005. However, within this total, the
Administration shifted funding away from Cooperative Biodefense Research projects, reducing
this area from $36.6 million in FY2004 to $13.1 million in FY2005, towards bio-security and bio-
safety efforts. This shift reflected, in part, the congressional concerns with possible U.S. support
for ongoing Russian biological weapons programs. It also derived from the Administration’s
plans to expand U.S. bio-safety and bio-security assistance into facilities in Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan and Georgia.62 The Bush Administration requested, and Congress approved, an
additional $60.8 million for BW proliferation prevention in FY2006. It requested an additional
$68.4 million for FY2007, and the 109th Congress approved this request in the FY2007 Defense
Authorization Bill. This legislation also mandated that the National Academy of Sciences pursue
a study that would analyze the challenges and identify opportunities for further cooperation
between Russian and the United States on biological weapons proliferation prevention.
The Bush Administration requested $144.5 million for Biological Weapons Threat Reduction
programs in FY2008, with the funding split between Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Threat Agent
Detection and Response ($125.75 million) and Cooperative Biological Research ($18.75 million).
This request represents a significant expansion in U.S. biological weapons nonproliferation
assistance for the Soviet Union and reflects growing concerns about the threat of biological
60 “The security of existing pathogen libraries, the past scope of work, the current whereabouts of BW and BW-related
experts, and the future disposition of the FSU biological weapons capability are all critical concerns within the threat
reduction agenda.” Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace and Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. November 2002. p. 2.
61 U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482. March 2003. pp. 44-46.
62 Hoehn, William. Preliminary Analysis of U.S. Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2005 Cooperative Threat
Reduction Budget Request. RANSAC. February 10, 2004.
ȱȱȱ
ŘŖȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
weapons proliferation. But some believe this increase may not be sufficient. Senator Richard
Lugar sought to add $100 million for the CTR program in FY2008, with the express purpose of
expanding and accelerating biological weapons nonproliferation programs.63 The Senate reduced
this amount but still added $50 million to the program for FY2008. According to the Senate
Armed Services Committee Report on the bill (S.Rept. 110-77), this funding would support
programs throughout the former Soviet Union and accelerate high-priority efforts. The committee
also requested that the National Academy of Sciences prepare a report on how the United States
might cooperate with other nations in preventing the proliferation of biological weapons. The
Conference Committee (H.Rept. 110-477) authorized $$158.5 million for this program area and
retained the request for a study by the National Academy of Sciences.
The Administration has further increased the request for BWTR program in FY2009 to $184.5
million. As in FY2008, these funds are to be split between Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Threat
Agent Detection and Response ($160 million) and Cooperative Biological Research ($24.4
million). Congress authorized this request for FY2009.
£ȱȱ
Demilitarization programs include projects that are encouraging Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan to convert military efforts to peaceful purposes. The International Science and
Technology Center, which provides grants to Russian weapons scientists and supports cooperative
research with biological weapons scientists, began with funding in this category. Funds for
demilitarization also support Defense and Military contacts between officers in the United States
and those in the former Soviet republics. According to DOD, these contacts between the defense
establishments help “promote counter-proliferation, demilitarization, and democratic reforms.”64
This program includes representatives from Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. DOD has appropriated just over $100 million for Defense and Military
contacts over the life of the CTR program; the Bush Administration requested, and Congress
approved, an additional $11 million for FY2004, $8 million for FY2005, and $8 million for
FY2006. Congress also approved the Administration’s request of $8 million for FY2007. The
request for FY2008 and FY2009 remained the same, at $8 million.
The Bush Administration added a new demilitarization program in FY2003. Through the WMD
Proliferation Prevention Program, the United States is cooperating with the military
establishments, internal security forces, border guards, and custom forces in Kazakhstan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan to improve their border controls. In FY2006, Moldava joined the
effort, with funding provided to begin developing its border control and monitoring systems. This
program is intended to help these nations deter, detect, and interrupt the unauthorized movement
of weapons or related materials across their borders.65 Congress appropriated $40 million for this
program in FY2003; the Bush Administration requested $39.4 million in FY2004 but received
only $29 million. It requested, and Congress authorized, an additional $40 million for FY2005
and $40.6 million in FY2006. It requested and received an additional $37.5 million for this
program in FY2007. The budget request for FY2008 included $37.9 million for this program. The
63 Lugar Wants $100 Million Nunn-Lugar Budget Increase. Press Release. Office of Senator Richard Lugar. February
5, 2007.
64 U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union Threat
Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. p. 6.
65 Ibid. p. 10.
ȱȱȱ
Řŗȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
House approved this request, but the Senate added $14 million, for a total of $51 million. The
Conference Committee approved nearly $48 million. It also allocated the $10 million that
Congress approved for new initiatives to projects in this program area outside the former Soviet
Union. For FY2009, the Bush Administration requested $50.3 million for WMD proliferation
prevention programs in the former Soviet Union; Congress added $9 million, for a total of $59
million for this effort in FY2009.
ȱȱ
The State Department has played an integral role in U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction
programs since their inception. It has taken the lead in negotiating the broad agreements needed
before recipient nations can receive U.S. assistance and in providing for broad policy
coordination among the U.S. agencies and between the United States and recipient nations. The
State Department also manages the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), which it can
use to help nations address problems with proliferation-prone weapons located on their territories.
Congress appropriated approximately $15 million for this fund each year between 1993 and 2003.
The Bush Administration requested, and Congress approved, $35 million for NDF in FY2004,
$31.7 million in FY2005, and $37.5 million in FY2006. It requested $38 million in FY2007 and
$30 million for FY2008, with Congress appropriating $37 million and $33.7 million for those
years, respectively. The Administration has requested an additional $40 million for th NDF in
FY2009. The Administration plans to expand U.S. efforts to help countries establish better
accounting and control mechanisms for nuclear, chemical, and biological materials.66 According
to John Wolf, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, the State Department
also planed to use these funds to “focus on unanticipated opportunities to eliminate missile
systems, chemical agents, and to secure orphaned radiological sources.”67 For example, funding
from this program contributed to the U.S. effort to eliminate Libya’s WMD infrastructure and to
help redirect weapons scientists in Libya and Iraq. The State Department spent a total of around
$38.5 million from this fund between FY1996 and FY2002 in the former Soviet Union.68
The State Department also manages and funds the International Science and Technology Center
(ISTC) in Moscow and its companion Science and Technology Center (STCU) in Kiev, Ukraine.
In the FY2005 budget request, it combined these centers and the biological weapons redirect
program into a new category, called Nonproliferation of WMD expertise. The State Department
also manages the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program. The
following discussion provides more detail about these two program areas.69
66 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Testimony of John S. Wolf. Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation. March 19, 2003.
67 U.S. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittees on Europe and International Terrorism,
Nonproliferation and Human Rights of the House Committee on International Relations Hearing on U.S. Cooperative
Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs. May 8, 2003.
68 Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn et al. Project on
Managing the Atom. March 2003
69 For a more details see Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew
Bunn et al. Project on Managing the Atom. March 2003.
ȱȱȱ
ŘŘȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ
ǻȱȱ¢ȱǼȱ
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, many experts feared that scientists from Russia’s
nuclear weapons complex might sell their knowledge to other nations seeking nuclear weapons.
Many of these scientists had worked in the Soviet Union’s “closed” nuclear cities, where they had
enjoyed relatively high salaries and prestige, but their jobs evaporated during Russia’s economic
and political crises in the early 1990s. Even those scientists who retained their jobs saw their
incomes decline sharply as Russia was unable to pay their salaries for months at a time.
In late 1992, the United States, Japan, the European Union, and Russia established the
International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow. Several other former Soviet
states joined the center during the 1990s, and other nations, including Norway and South Korea,
added their financial support. In late 1993, the United States, Canada, Sweden, and Ukraine
established the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU). Several former Soviet states
have also joined this center, and Japan has joined to provide financial support. In its review of
U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance, the Bush Administration cited these centers
for their achievements and indicated that it planned to expand them.
The State Department has stated that, between 1994 and late 2002, about 50,000 scientists and
engineers participated in research funded by these centers. The Moscow Center funded nearly
1,700 projects that engaged about 41,000 scientists. In 2001, the ISTC in Moscow supported
more than 22,000 scientists with more than $29 million in direct grants.70 In FY2005, the ISTC
received new project funding of $51.3 million, with $21.5 million provided by ISTC “partners,”
organizations or corporations outside government that help fund ISTC programs. The ISTC made
grants of $43.9 million to nearly 25,000 scientists.
The centers fund scientists who have worked on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, but
they have, historically, focused on nuclear scientists, with many projects going to those who work
at institutes in the closed nuclear cities. The State Department estimates that about half of the
participants are senior scientists, which means the programs may have reached a significant
portion of the estimated 30,000 to 70,000 senior scientists and engineers in the Soviet nuclear
complex. However, most of these scientists spend fewer than 50 days per year on projects funded
by the science centers. In the remainder of the time, most continue to work at their primary jobs.
In addition, some of the grants go to research institutes in Russia, rather than directly to scientists,
and some of these funds may be used for administrative or management purposes. Nevertheless,
the income earned from even short-term research projects may undermine incentives these
individuals might otherwise encounter to sell their knowledge to potential proliferant nations.
The Science Centers also sponsor a Partners Program, through which private industry,
universities, and other government agencies can provide funding for and establish contacts with
former Soviet scientists. The program started small, with about 30 partners and $5 million in
projects in 1997; it had grown to 166 partners supporting over 100 projects worth $31 million in
2002. This represented one quarter of the grant funding provided by the science centers in 2002.71
In FY2005, the Partner Program supported provided $21.5 million.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
ȱȱȱ
Řřȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
As of early November 2002, the ISTC in Moscow had received $481 million from its
participating nations, with the United States providing about $171 million of this total. The STCU
in Kiev had received about $60.5 million, with the United States providing about $45 million of
this total. The United States has also provided around $70 million to the ISTC since FY1998 to
support the Biological Weapons Redirection Program.72 This program provides research grants to
Russian biotechnology institutes to redirect scientists to commercial, agricultural, and public
health projects. The State Department collaborates with several other U.S. agencies in this
program.73 In recent years, it has begun to shift grant funding away from Russia’s nuclear
scientists to biological and chemical weapons scientists, thus re-naming the program the Bio-
Chem Redirection program, and to scientists from other former Soviet states. Further, it expects
this decline in funding to force the ISTC to focus more on “graduating scientists” from U.S.
assistance to projects with more commercial viability.74 The State Department operates a third
program within this category, known as the Bio Industry Initiative (BII). This initiative, which
began in 2002, seeks to help Russia reconfigure its large-scale former BW-related facilities so
that they can perform peaceful research issues such as infectious diseases.
For FY2004, the Bush Administration requested $59 million for the science centers and BW
redirection programs, and received about 50.2 million. It did not identify the precise funding for
either of the two. In its FY2005 budget, it requested $50.5 million, with about $30.5 million
going to the science centers, $17 million going to the Bio-Chem Redirect program, and $3 million
going to the BII.75 Congress approved the Bush Administration’s budget request for this program
area in FY2006, appropriating $52.6 million. However, a declining proportion of the budget is
likely to be spent on programs in the former Soviet Union, as this program is expanding to help
redirect scientists in Libya and Iraq.
The Bush Administration requested 22.7 million for the Science Centers in its FY2007 budget. It
also requested $17 million for the Bio-Chem Redirect program and $13 million for the Bio-
Industry Initiative. This total of $52.7 million will be spent primarily in the former Soviet states.
The Administration has requested $2.5 million for the scientist redirection program in Iraq and $1
million for the program in Libya.76 It requested an total of $53.5 million for these two program
areas in FY2008 and $64 million in FY2009.
Analysts have raised numerous questions about the science center programs. One of the first
critiques came from the General Accounting Office, in a study published in 1995. GAO found
that some scientists who received grants from the ISTC “may also continue to be employed by
institutes engaged in weapons work.”77 GAO interpreted this finding to mean that the centers had
not succeeded in redirecting weapons scientists to peaceful endeavors. Other critics of the CTR
program claimed that GAO’s findings indicated that, by supporting Russian weapons scientists,
U.S. funds were supporting Russian weapons programs. The State Department disputed both of
72 Ibid.
73 For more details, see CRS Report RL31368, Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the
Former Soviet States, by Michelle Stem Cook and Amy F. Woolf.
74 U.S. Department of State. FY2004 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations. p. 370.
75 U.S. Department of State. FY2006 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations. p. 135.
76 U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. FY2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign
Operations. pp. 135, 140-144.
77 U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction, Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet
Union: An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 1995. Washington, DC. p. 27.
ȱȱȱ
ŘŚȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
these conclusions, noting that the grants from the ISTC were intended to supplement, not replace,
the scientists’ income from work in other institutes. And, in the years since this report, the State
Department has enhanced its auditing procedures to ensure that ISTC grants support the assigned
projects and do not support work on Russian weapons.
Analysts have also noted that the ISTC and STCU do not have enough money to support full pay
for a significant number of scientists. Consequently, some have questioned whether the centers
achieve their objective of keeping these scientists away from nations or groups seeking weapons
of mass destruction. Others, however, note that, even if the financial support is less than
complete, the cooperation with Russian institutes, and the promise of a fairly steady stream of
funding, helps build relationships and draw these institutes into the “western orbit.”78 To address
this problem, some have suggested that, instead of providing short-term grants, the centers should
focus on projects that will lead to the long-term redirection of scientists out of weapons work.
The State Department seems to agree with this approach, with its growing reliance on the Partners
Program and its acknowledged need to transition Russia’s nuclear scientists to more
commercially viable projects.
¡ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
Many view the potential for smuggling or illegal exports of materials and technology from the
former Soviet Union as a key proliferation concern. The collapse of political control along the
Soviet borders, along with incentives created by the weakness in the economies of the newly
independent states, contributes to this growing concern. The State Department’s Export Control
and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program helps the former Soviet states and other
nations improve their ability to interdict nuclear smuggling and stop the illicit trafficking of all
materials for weapons of mass destruction, along with dual use goods and technologies. The
EXBS program currently has projects underway in more than 30 nations and is expanding its
reach around the globe.79
When designing a nation-specific plan for border control assistance, the United States seeks to
address four key areas. First, if needed, it helps the recipient nation establish the legal and
regulatory basis for effective export controls. It then helps the nation develop appropriate export
licensing procedures and practices. Third, the United States helps the recipient establish and
enhance effective enforcement capabilities. When needed, it provides the recipient with detection
and interdiction equipment and training. Finally, the United States helps establish procedures that
promote effective interaction between government and industry so that business entities in the
recipient nation will abide by the laws and regulations of the new export control regime.
The State Department also provides support to border control efforts in DOD’s CTR program and
the DOE’s nonproliferation program. It seeks to coordinate these and other U.S. efforts to identify
and stop the smuggling of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or materials. Analysts inside
and outside the government have questioned, however, whether the coordination has been
effective. Consequently, the National Security Council is leading an effort to develop a
78 Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn et al. Project on
Managing the Atom. March 2003.
79 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Testimony of John S. Wolf. Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation. March 19, 2003.
ȱȱȱ
Řśȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
government-wide strategic plan for interdiction assistance, which includes but is not limited to
export assistance, that might help stop the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction.
Between FY1998 and FY2002, the State Department allocated $146 million to the EXBS
program for nations in and around the former Soviet Union. Approximately $100 million of this
amount was allocated to Georgia for its border security program. Funding for border security in
the rest of the former Soviet states was around $5-$7 million per year, until the State Department
added $24.7 million from the FY2002 supplemental appropriations. In FY2003, the State
Department requested around $17 million for the EXBS program, with an additional $15 million
allocated to the Georgia Border Security Program. Funding declined in FY2004; the Bush
Administration requested $13.9 million for EXBS and an additional $15 million for the Georgia
Border Security program. In FY2005, the Bush Administration requested a total of $38 million
for EXBS, although only around $19 million was allocated to projects in nations in and around
the former Soviet Union. An additional $11.5 million was allocated to “global” efforts, with the
remaining $7 million allocated to projects in other nations around the world. This trend continued
in FY2006 and FY2007. The budget request for the EXBS program equals $44.4 million.
Congress approved $43.4 million. However, only around $8.5 million of this amount will go to
projects in nations around the former Soviet Union. A far greater amount, around $19 million, is
allocated to nations in other regions such as South Asia and the Near East. The remainder is
allocated to global programs, such as the provision of advisors and equipment and the
development of global regional export controls. For FY2007, the Bush Administration requested
$45.050 million for the EXBS program; less than $6 million would go to states that were once a
part of the Soviet Union. For FY2008, the total request is $41.3 million, but only around 4.5
million will go to states of the former Soviet Union. For FY2009, the request is for $42.1 million,
with less than $4 million going to states of the former Soviet Union.
ȱȱ¢ȱ
The Department of Energy has contributed to U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation
assistance to the former Soviet states from the start, when CTR included a small amount of
funding for materials control and protection. Officials from DOE participated, along with their
counterparts at DOD, in early efforts to outline projects and reach agreement with Russian
officials on assistance to secure nuclear materials. But these government-to-government
negotiations proceeded slowly, in part because Russia’s nuclear energy ministry—known as
Minatom at the time—was less open to cooperation than the Ministry of Defense. Consequently,
projects at facilities that housed nuclear materials did not begin until 1994. In a parallel effort that
sought to reduce these delays, experts from the U.S. nuclear laboratories, which are a part of
DOE, also began less formal contacts with their counterparts in Russia to identify and solve
safety and security problems at Russian facilities. Together, these government-to-government and
lab-to-lab projects evolved into an effort to apply Material Protection, Control and Accounting
(MPC&A) techniques to Russian facilities.
The MPC&A program began with less than $3 million in FY1993. This amount grew to $73
million in FY1995. In FY1996, DOE assumed budgetary and management responsibility for the
program. DOE also initiated a second program, the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, which
sought to provide employment opportunities for scientists and engineers from Russia’s nuclear
weapons complex. In the latter half of the 1990s, DOE expanded these efforts and added several
other programs to its nonproliferation assistance. These programs are now managed by DOE’s
ȱȱȱ
ŘŜȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The discussion below summarizes the
objectives and achievements of many of these efforts.80
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
The International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program seeks to “secure nuclear
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials by upgrading security at nuclear sites, by
consolidating these materials to sites where installation of enhanced security systems have
already been completed, and by improving nuclear smuggling detection capabilities at
international borders.”81 The MPC&A program82 addresses the first of these objectives. The
Materials Consolidation and Conversion Program addresses the second, and the Second Line of
Defense (SLD) and Megaports programs address the third. Each of these is discussed below.
ǭȱȱ
The budget for MPC&A grew rapidly during the 1990s, reaching $169 million in FY2001, the
last year of the Clinton Administration. The Bush Administration, in its budget request for
FY2002, reduced funding for the MPC&A program to $138.8 million, in part because it believed
that the program had enough unexpended funds from prior years to carry on with less funding. Its
first budget also shifted money from Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs to U.S. nuclear
weapons programs. Congress objected to this reduction, and both the Senate and House
Appropriations Committees, in the Energy and Water Appropriations bills for FY2002, restored
funding to the FY2001 level. Furthermore, Congress added $150 million in a supplemental
appropriations bill passed at the end of 2001, after the September 11 attacks had raised new
concerns about the potential threat that terrorists might seek to acquire nuclear materials from
insecure facilities in Russia. The Bush Administration allocated much of this new funding to the
Second Line of Defense and Radiological Dispersion Devices. But the Bush Administration did
increase its budget request for MPC&A in FY2003, to $223 million, so that it could accelerate the
installation of comprehensive upgrades and material consolidation and conversion efforts.83 The
Bush Administration requested $227 million for these efforts for FY2004; Congress approved
$260 million, adding $5 million for “high priority” activities and $28 million for an initiative
under the Second Line of Defense Program (described below).
The Bush Administration requested $238 million for MPC&A in FY2005. The reduction from
FY2004 to FY2005 reflected, in part, the completion of physical security upgrades at Russian
Navy warhead storage sites.84 In the Conference report on the FY2005 Defense Authorization Bill
80 As was the case with the summaries of DOD and State Department programs, these descriptions do not cover all
DOE programs. A complete description of the programs funded under DOE’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
Budget can be found in DOE’s budget documents. See U.S. Department of Energy. FY2006 Congressional Budget
Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2005. pp. 481-497.
81 U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003.
p. 623.
82 This program area included, for a short time, an effort to identify and secure radiological sources that could be used
to make radiological dispersion devices. In the FY2005 budget request, this initiative is combined with two others in a
single initiative known as “International Nuclear and Radiological Cleanout.” See 2005 DOE Budget Rollout. Remarks
by Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham. February 2, 2004, Washington, DC.
83 U.S. House. Committee on Appropriations. Statement of Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy. March 6, 2002.
84 Hoehn, William. Preliminary Analysis of U.S. Department of Energy’s Fiscal Year 2005 Nonproliferation Budget
(continued...)
ȱȱȱ
Řŝȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
(H.Rept. 108-767; P.L. 108-375), Congress authorized the full amount requested by the President.
The House had reduced that amount by around $10 million, citing delays in the program caused
by Russia’s refusal to allow the United States access to some facilities, but the Senate prevailed in
conference. The Appropriations Committee added $84 million to the MPC&A program, for a total
of $322 million. The conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005
(H.Rept. 108-792; P.L. 108-447), notes that this added funding should be used to accelerate
efforts to secure nuclear weapons sites and nuclear materials production sites in Russia.85
The Bush Administration requested $343.4 million for these programs in FY2006. Nearly $100
million of this total was allocated to the Second Line of Defense and Megaports Initiative, leaving
approximately $245 million to secure nuclear materials in Russia. In the FY2006 Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 109-163, H.Rept. 109-360), Congress added approximately $20 million to
this total, in part to accelerate warhead security work at the Strategic Rocket Force facilities. The
Energy and Water Appropriations Committee added $83.6 million to this portion of the DOE
budget, so that DOE could pursue “new opportunities in warhead security work with Russia.
In the FY2007 budget, the Bush Administration requested $413.2 million for MPC&A. Although
this exceeds the Administration’s request for FY2006, it falls below the appropriated amount of
$422.7 million. In addition, it includes $124 million for Second Line of Defense and Megaports,
leaving $298.7 million to secure nuclear materials in Russia. Within this total, as is noted below,
the Administration shifted money among the different project areas, as some ongoing projects
accelerate and others move towards their conclusion. Specifically, the budget indicated that work
at the Rosatom complex, which houses most of Russia’s nuclear weapons materials, would be
reduced, while sustainment activities would increase. Congress did not accept some of these
changes, appropriating a total of $472.7 million for this program area and shifting money among
the budget areas, as is noted in more detail below.
The FY2008 budget request sought a total of $371.7 million for the MPC&A program areas, with
$119.3 million going to the Second line of Defense and Megaports initiatives. This leaves $251.8
million for the efforts to secure nuclear warheads and materials in Russia. The DOE budget
request also reflects continuing declines in the MPC&A budget in the outyears, as many of the
MPC&A upgrades to storage facilities are completed and the program switches to sustainment
activities. DOE also noted that Russia has added some Rosatom sites to its list of sites in need of
upgrades; if these are approved, they would also be added to budget and work effort after
FY2008.
Congress increased, in some cases significantly, funding for the MPC&A programs in the
FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept. 110-477) and the FY2008 Omnibus Appropriations
Bill (H.R. 2764). For example, the House version of the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill
(H.R. 1585) included $401 million for MPC&A, which essentially incorporates $30 million from
the FY2008 Supplemental request into the Authorization Bill. The Senate, for its part, added only
$10 million, authorizing $381.8 million. The Conference Committee added $30 million, with
most of this going to the Second Line of Defense program. On the other hand, the House Energy
and Water Development Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee more than
doubled the request for funding for MPC&A, providing $831.8 million (H.Rept. 110-185). The
(...continued)
Request. RANSAC. February 4. 2004.
85 Congressional Record. November 19, 2004. H10558.
ȱȱȱ
ŘŞȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
committee noted that this program is on the “front line” in the global war on terror because it
seeks to protect the United States against a terrorist using a nuclear device on U.S. soil. As is
noted below, the committee added funding in several areas to accelerate work at Russia’s nuclear
materials facilities and warhead storage facilities, and to expand the Second Line of Defense and
Megaports programs. The Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Bill, in contrast, added only
$20 million to this program area (S.Rept. 110-127). The Omnibus Appropriations Bill for FY2008
includes $624 million MPC&A, with $136 million going to Second Line of Defense and $130.8
million for Megaports (these are described in more detail below).
The President’s budget for FY2009 requests $429 million for MPC&A programs; Congress added
$22 million to this project area. As discussed in more detail below, the budget request for most of
the project areas falls sharply below the amount appropriated in FY2008. These declines, in most
cases, reflect the fact that, with the added funding appropriated in FY2008, many of the ongoing
projects are nearing completion.
Between FY1993 and FY2008, Congress appropriated more $3 billion for the MPC&A program.
With the exception of approximately $380 for the Second Line of Defense and Megaports
program, all of these funds were allocated to efforts to improve security at nuclear warhead and
nuclear material storage facilities in Russia. NNSA has identified 105 nuclear sites, with 243
buildings, that may need assistance in improving their security systems. According to NNSA,
these sites contain approximately 600 metric tons of nuclear materials, enough for around 41,000
nuclear warheads. Within this total, 63 sites belong to the Ministry of Defense, (52 warhead
storage site and 11 Navy fuel storage sites), 11 are a part of the Minatom (now known as
Rosatom)86 weapons complex, and 31 are civilian sites. More than 80% of these materials are
located at the Rosatom/Minatom sites.87
ǭȱȱ
DOE provides MPC&A assistance at Russian facilities in two phases. First, it installs rapid
upgrades that are designed to delay unauthorized access to the storage facilities. These may
include the installation of hardened doors and windows, locks and keys to control access,
perimeter fences, and moveable barriers at entry points. The second phase provides
comprehensive upgrades that are tailored to meet the security needs at each individual facility.
These may include monitoring and detection systems, the relocation of guard forces, the
consolidation of materials, central alarm systems, and electronic access control systems. DOE has
helped improve security at sites that house considerably more than half of the former Soviet
Union’s 600 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials.88 In 2006, DOE altered the way in
which it measures progress in these programs, focusing on the percentage of facilities that had
86 Russia reorganized its government entities, beginning in March 2004. MINATOM, the Ministry of Atomic Energy,
was redesignated as the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy, or Rosatom. Rosatom is still the primary agency
responsible for nuclear weapons. See Matthew Bouldin. Updated Analysis. Russian Government Restructuring and the
Future of WMD Threat Reduction Cooperation. RANSAC. May 2004.
87 U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003.
p. 625.
88 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Statement of Ambassador Linton Brooks. Administrator, NNSA. June
15, 2004. See also, U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction. Additional Russian Cooperation
Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GA)-03-482. Washington, March 2003. p. 4.
See also, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Statement of Paul M. Longsworth. Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. March 10, 2004. (Herein after referred to as Longsworth Testimony.)
ȱȱȱ
Řşȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
received upgrades, rather than the percentage of materials that were captured by the upgrades. By
the end of 2006, DOE had completed rapid upgrades at about 81% of the 215 facilities housing
this material and comprehensive upgrades at about 63% of these facilities.89 DOE reported that,
by September of 2007, it had completed upgrades at nearly 90%, or 193, of the buildings.
When the upgrades are complete, DOE plans to continue “sustainability efforts” to ensure that the
upgrades remain effective in the long term. This program, titled National Programs and
Sustainability, seeks to create regulations, reporting requirements, training and maintenance
facilities, and other infrastructure components to ensure that Russia can continue to operate its
new security systems.90 In the FY2005 budget request, DOE reduced funding for this initiative
from $41 million appropriated in FY2005 to $30 million, continuing a trend of preceding years.
DOE noted in 2004 that funding in this area had declined because DOE altered it priorities to
support increased funding for MPC&A activities in countries outside the former Soviet Union.91
The Administration requested $48.1 million for this project area in FY2007, but Congress
appropriated only $29.7 million. The Administration requested $45.6 million in FY2008, and
Congress appropriated nearly $70 million. The Bush Administration requested $59.3 million for
FY2009.
¢ȱ¡ȱ
DOE has provided assistance to Russia’s Navy by improving security at 39 naval nuclear warhead
storage sites and 11 nuclear fuel storage sites. These sites house approximately 60 metric tons of
weapons-useable nuclear materials and 4,000 nuclear warheads. According to DOE, it had
completed rapid and comprehensive upgrades at all naval nuclear fuel storage sites by the end of
2004, and had completed the comprehensive upgrades at the last two warhead sites in FY2006.
The FY2006 budget request included $6.5 million for this program area, a reduction that reflected
the completion of much of the work. However, in response to the U.S. and Russian commitment
at the Bratislava summit to accelerate work on warhead storage security, Congress approved $16
million for the Navy complex sites in FY2006. The Bush Administration requested an additional
$17.3 million in FY2007; the House and Senate Armed Services Committees approved this
request. The FY2008 budget requests, and Congress appropriated, $13.4 million for this project
area. The FY2009 budget request included $16.4 million. These funds, and the funds appropriated
in FY2007 and FY2008, will be used to provide “sustainability support” at the sites, which
includes training and site level maintenance on the equipment at the sites.
ȱȱȱ
DOE has complete security upgrades at warhead storage sites for Russia’s strategic rocket forces.
The United States has approved upgrades at 25 sites on 11 SRF bases; work on these sites was
completed in late October 2007, nearly two years ahead of schedule.92 It is also upgrading
89 Bunn, Matthew. Securing the Bomb2007. Project on Managing the Atom. Commissioned by the Nuclear Threat
Initiative. September 2007. p. 65.
90 For more details see U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget
Justifications. February 2003. p. 655.
91 Hoehn, William. Preliminary Analysis of U.S. Department of Energy’s Fiscal Year 2005 Nonproliferation Budget
Request. RANSAC. February 4. 2004
92 Chivers, C.J. Securing Russian Nuclear Missiles? U.S. Is Set to Say “Done.” New York Times, October 31, 2007.
ȱȱȱ
řŖȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
security at nine sites under the command of the 12 Main Directorate, the branch of Russia’s
Ministry of Defense responsible for warhead security and maintenance. It plans to complete the
work on upgrades at these sites in FY2009. DOE requested $47.5 million to continue these
activities in FY2006. The Defense Authorization Bill (P.L. 109-163) increased this total by $10
million, and the Energy and Water Appropriations Bill increased it by $86 million. Consequently,
the FY2006 appropriation for this project area was $120.2 million. The Bush Administration
requested, and Congress approved, $129.3 million for this project area in FY2007. The FY2008
budget request included $91.5 million for this project area. The decline in the request reflected
the fact that the accelerated pace of the last few years had brought some of the sites close to
completion. Congress, however, appropriated $121.9 million for this project area. The FY2009
budget requests only $53.6 million, with the decline again reflecting the completion of most of
the work on upgrades. DOE has stated that the FY2009 budget will support sustainment activities
at all these sites.
ȱȱ¡ȱ
Work at Russia’s nuclear weapons complex, managed by the newly organized Rosatom, consists
of seven sites and four “Enterprises of the Nuclear Weapons Complex” in Russia’s nine closed
nuclear cities. The buildings in this complex house around 500 metric tons of “highly attractive”
weapons-useable materials.93 DOE has completed rapid upgrades on buildings that house about
60% of these materials and comprehensive upgrades on buildings that house another 25% of these
materials. By the end of 2006, DOE had completed work on 92 buildings in the Rosatom
complex. The pace of work at these facilities has accelerated, with increased funding and
increased cooperation from Russia, during the past few years. DOE hopes to install security
upgrades at all these facilities by 2008. DOE has stated that an access agreement signed in 2001
has “allowed significant access and acceleration of physical protection systems ... at these large
facilities.”94 In addition, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham reported that, in numerous
meetings with Russia’s Minister of Atomic Energy, Alexander Rumyantsev, he worked “to
accelerate and expand our programs” and to “clear away the bureaucratic obstacles.”95
The FY2006 budget requested $86 million for this program area, a steep increase from the $18.7
million appropriated in FY2004 and a slight reduction from the $88 million appropriated in
FY2005. Congress approved this request. The FY2007 budget requested only $56.5 million for
this program area. DOE noted that the reduction reflected the completion of many of the projects
that were accelerated over the past few years. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees
both approved this request. The House Energy and Water Development Appropriations
Committee, however, increased this request by $65 million, for a total of $121.5 million for
FY2007; the final appropriation was $85 million. The FY2008 budget requested $60.1 million for
this project area. Congress again increased the funding, appropriating $79.1 million. The FY2009
budget request shows a steep decline, with the Bush Administration requesting only $32.3
million. This reduction, again, reflects the completion of many projects that were accelerated over
93 Ibid. p. 639.
94 U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003.
p. 639.
95 “The FY2004 Nonproliferation Budget: Supporting the Ten Principles for Nuclear and Radiological Materials
Security.” Remarks by Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington,
DC. February 10, 2003.
ȱȱȱ
řŗȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
the last few years. DOE has indicated that, in FY2009, the majority of the continuing work will
occur at the sites at Mayak, Arzamas-16, and Chelyabinsk-70.
ȱȱȱ
DOE has assisted with the installation of security upgrades at 31 civilian nuclear sites throughout
the former Soviet Union. These are mainly research facilities that operate nuclear reactors.
According to DOE, these sites contain around 40 metric tons of weapons-useable materials. DOE
has already completed rapid and comprehensive upgrades at most of these facilities; it had
planned to complete the comprehensive upgrades at facilities housing the final 5% of nuclear
materials during FY2006, but this schedule slipped, and they are now due to be completed in
FY2008. It also plans to expand its efforts to secure weapons-useable nuclear materials at civilian
facilities outside the former Soviet Union. DOE has requested, and Congress approved, $47
million for this effort in FY2006, a substantial increase over the $14.6 million appropriated in
FY2005. The Bush Administration requested only $21.2 million for this program area in FY2007.
DOE noted that the decrease reflects the completion of initial upgrades at a facility outside the
former Soviet Union. Congress, however, appropriated $52.7 million for this program area. The
Bush Administration has requested $22.2 million for this effort in FY2008, but Congress again
increased the funding, appropriating $54.2 million. The Bush Administration requested $34.5
million for FY2009. DOE indicates that this funding will help foster “site capabilities” to operate
and maintain the equipment and will provide sustainability support at the 19 sites with completed
upgrades.
ȱȱȱȱ
In addition to securing sites that house nuclear materials, the MPC&A program is providing
Russia and the other former Soviet states with assistance in consolidating these materials in fewer
facilities and converting them to forms that might be less attractive to nations seeking materials
for nuclear weapons. By the end of FY2003, DOE had planned to remove nuclear materials from
about 40% of the 55 buildings that will eventually be cleared of this material. It also plans to
convert about 17 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and low enriched uranium by 2012.
DOE requested $28 million for this effort in its budget for FY2006. Congress added $10 million
to this request in the FY2006 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-163). The Administration
requested an additional $16.8 million for this program area in FY2007. DOE reports that the
decrease is due to a slow-down in the availability of highly enriched uranium, which is blended
down to low enriched uranium with funds in this area. The Senate Armed Services Committee
approved this request, but the House increased it to $21.8 million. The final amount approved for
FY2007 was $27.7 million, reflecting increases in the appropriations process. The FY2008
budget request included $19.7 million for this project area; Congress appropriated this amount.
The budget request for FY2009 includes $20.9 million.
ȱȱȱ¢ȱ
The MPC&A budget also supports an effort to build an infrastructure within Russia that can
operate effectively and be sustained in the recipient nations after the initial and comprehensive
upgrades are complete. These efforts include developing regulations, inspection capabilities, site
safeguards, security programs, and other accounting capabilities. The program will operate
regional technical support facilities that can repair and maintain equipment and develop training
programs for participants. Congress appropriated nearly $40 million for this effort in FY2006 and
ȱȱȱ
řŘȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
$65.1 million in FY2007. The Administration requested $45.6 million for FY2008, but Congress
increased this amount to $69.6 million. The Bush Administration has requested $59.3 million in
FY2009.
ȱȱȱ
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, many analysts have expressed growing concerns about
the possibility that terrorists might acquire nuclear materials that could be used in a “dirty bomb.”
Although such a device would not explode with a nuclear yield, it could, nonetheless, spread
radiological debris across a wide area. Many nations around the world have nuclear materials at
research facilities, hospitals, or power plants that could be used in a dirty bomb. But most
analysts agree that the states of the former Soviet Union pose a greater threat in this regard,
particularly since the Soviet Union left devices with radioactive materials scattered across its
territory. According to Spencer Abraham, the Secretary of Energy, “more attention is being paid
to the risks associated with the misuse of radiological materials” because they are much “more
abundant and much less secure” than weapons-grade materials.96 Consequently, DOE developed a
program to identify these sites, set priorities, and begin security upgrades. This program received
its initial funding in FY2002, with $20 million allocated from the $150 million Congress added to
the MPC&A program in the Supplemental Appropriations (P.L. 107-206) passed after the
September 11 attacks.
DOE identified 35 nuclear waste sites in Russia and the other former Soviet states that posed a
threat for the theft or sale of nuclear materials. These states also have radiological sources at
agricultural research institutes, research reactors, medical facilities, intelligence sites, and defense
facilities.97 DOE is also working with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to identify
and secure facilities that may house these materials in other nations. In FY2005, DOE received
around $24.8 million for this effort. In the FY2006 budget, DOE moved this program to the
Global Threat Reduction Initiative portion of its program and requested an additional $24 million.
It requested $18.3 million for International radiological threat reduction in FY2007 and $6
million in FY2008; this program no longer focuses exclusively on sites in the former Soviet
Union.
ȱȱȱȱ
Through its Second Line of Defense Program, DOE contributes to U.S. efforts to help the former
Soviet states detect and intercept attempts to smuggle nuclear materials out of the country. DOE
has begun to install radiation detection equipment systems at strategic “transit and border sites.”
By the end of FY2006, the program had installed equipment at more than 150 sites and planned to
add 51 more sites in FY2007. According to DOE, it plans to add 49 sites in FY2009. However, a
growing number of these sites are outside the former Soviet Union. DOE also plans to provide
training and communications equipment to border control agents to help them implement the
plan. This program began in FY1998 and received less than $3 million per year for several years.
However, the budget increased to $46 million, and the effort expanded significantly with funding
96 Remarks by Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. International
Nonproliferation Conference. November 14 , 2002
97 U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003.
p. 649.
ȱȱȱ
řřȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
provided under the FY2002 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 107-206). DOE requested, and
Congress approved, $24 million for the core program of Second Line of Defense in FY2006.
Congress also added $28 million in FY2004 for a project known as the Megaports initiative. This
project is developing and deploying radiation detectors for use at the largest foreign seaports that
handle about 70% of the container traffic headed for the United States.98 Megaports is designed
“to detect the trafficking of nuclear or radioactive materials in the world’s busiest seaports.”
According to former Secretary of Energy Abraham, DOE hopes to install detection equipment at
seaports around the globe. The Administration requested $15 million for this program in FY2005
and $73.9 million for this program in FY2006. This funding is included in International Nuclear
Materials and Protection portion of the budget, even though it is not intended for use in the
former Soviet Union. As a result, it is not included in this report’s DOE totals for nonproliferation
projects in the former Soviet Union. It is worth noting, however, that the increase in Megaports
for FY2006 exceeded the increase in the entire International Nuclear Materials and Protection
portion of the budget, signalling a shift in funding out of the former Soviet Union and into
projects in other nations.
The Bush Administration requested a total of $124 million for Second Line of Defense and
Megaports in FY2007. This was an increase of $27 million over the combined budget for the two
programs in FY2006. But it also contained a significant shift, with $84 million allocated to
Second Line of Defense and only $40 million allocated to Megaports. The increase in SLD
reflects the acceleration of efforts to install radiation detection equipment at sites in the Caucuses
region, while the decrease in Megaports is attributed to the completion of the installation of
radiation detection equipment at five ports in 2006. The House and Senate Armed Services
Committee approved the authorization request for SLD; the House Energy and Water
Appropriations Committee added $40 million, for a total of $123.9 million. For Megaports, the
Senate Armed Services approved the Administration’s request, the House added $15 million to
the authorization request, and the Energy and Water Appropriations Committee added $60
million, for a total of $105.1 million. The appropriators noted that this added funding should be
used to expand work at high-risk foreign ports. It reflects a growing concern in Congress with
port security issues.
The FY2007 budget requested $119.3 million for the Second Line of Defense Program, with
$72.5 million allocated to the Core program and $46.8 million allocated to Megaports. However,
Congress appropriated $191.9 million in FY2007, with $116.1 million going to Megaports. In
FY2008, Congress appropriated $266.9 million, with $136 million going to the core program and
$130.8 million going to Megaports. These increases indicated that Congress has placed a high
priority on detecting possible efforts to smuggle nuclear materials. In its request for FY2009, the
Administration is seeking $212 million for SLD, with $78.5 million going to the core program
and $134 million going to Megaports.
Table 5, below, displays the funding history for many of these International Nuclear Materials
and Cooperation programs. It aggregates the funding for the years between FY2002 and FY2005,
then demonstrates how the budgets have evolved through the appropriations for FY2006,
FY2007, and FY2008. The table demonstrates that funding for SLD, much of which is not spent
in the former Soviet Union, has increased sharply in the past few years. In addition, much of the
98 Hoehn, William. Update on Legislation Affecting U.S-Former Soviet Union Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction.
RANSAC. November 17, 2003.
ȱȱȱ
řŚȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
funding in recent years has gone to programs to secure warheads and Navy and SRF sites and
materials at Rosatom sites. As these programs wind down and wrap up in the next few years,
MPC&A funding, and DOE’s contribution to cooperative nonproliferation programs in Russia,
could decline significantly.
Table 5. Appropriations for M.C.&A and Related Programs
(in $ millions)
Program FY2002-FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
(req)
Navy
Complex
$196.6
$16.0 $17.3 $13.2 $16.4
Strategic Rocket Forces
$86.0
$120.2
$152.8
$121.9
$53.7
Rosatom (Minatom) Weapons Complex
$206.2
$85.3
$94.0
$79.0
$32.3
Civilian Nuclear Sites
$82.0
$46.8
$52.7
$54.2
$34.5
Material Consolidation and Conversion
$109.0
$27.7
$23.8
$19.5
$20.9
National Programs and Sustainability
$176.8
$30.0
$65.1
$69.6
$59.3
Second Line of Defense Core Programa $127.2
$24.0 $75.8 $136.0 $78.6
Total
$983.6
$350.0 $481.5 $493.5 $295.7
Source: U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004, FY2005, FY2006, FY2007 Congressional Budget Requests.
Detailed Budget Justifications.
a. This does not include funding for Megaports, which received $24 million in FY2004, $15 million in FY2005,
$73.9 million in FY2006, $116.1 million in FY2007, and $130.8 million in FY2008.
ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ
ǻ¢ȱȱȱ Ǽȱ
In its budget request for FY2006, DOE renamed the Russian Transition Initiative, referring to it
as the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention. The program also moved to the
“Nonproliferation and International Security” portion of the DOE Nonproliferation budget. These
changes reflect the fact that DOE can now spend funds from this program in nations outside the
former Soviet Union, such as in Libya and Iraq.
The Russian Transition Initiative had combined two previous DOE programs, the Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention and the Nuclear Cities Initiative, that sought to stop the leakage of
knowledge out of Russia’s nuclear weapons complex to states or groups seeking their own
nuclear weapons. According to DOE, these programs were designed to help Russia reduce the
size of its nuclear weapons complex, by removing functions and equipment, and to create
“sustainable non-weapons-related work” for scientists through technology projects that have
“commercially-viable market opportunities.”99 The Bush Administration has stated that it hopes
to expand the program from engaging only nuclear scientists to also engaging biological and
chemical weapons scientists. It requested funding to expand the program to two chemical
weapons institutes in FY2004.
99 U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003.
p. 663.
ȱȱȱ
řśȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
ȱȱȱȱ
The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) Program began in 1994. IPP has matched U.S.
weapons labs and U.S. industry with Russian scientists and engineers in cooperative research
projects with “high commercial potential.” DOE claims that this focus on commercialization will
help make the projects self-sustaining in the long term. The IPP program received $35 million in
the FY1994 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, before its funding moved to the Department
of Energy. This initial funding helped establish nearly 200 research projects by 1995. Between
FY1996 and FY2003, IAP received an additional $194 million. In FY2004, the Bush
Administration requested around $23 million for projects funded through IPP, as a part of the
overall request of $39.3 million for the Russian Transition Initiative. Congress approved this
request.
The IPP program was the subject of review and criticism in a GAO study released in February
1999. The report noted that nearly half of the funds appropriated for the IAP program had been
spent at the U.S. nuclear weapons labs and that, after subtracting the taxes, fees, and other
charges removed by Russian officials, the Russian institutes had received only around one-third
of the funds. The report also questioned DOE’s oversight of the programs, noting that program
officials did not always know how many scientists were receiving IAP funding. The report noted
that the projects had not yet produced any commercial successes. DOE responded by stating that
IAP had temporarily employed thousands of scientists in around 170 institutes. DOE also stated
that the program did not subsidize scientists who were performing weapons-related work.
Nevertheless, in FY2000, Congress reduced the Clinton Administration’s request for funding for
the IAP program from $30 million to $25 million and specified that no more than 35% of the
funds be spent at the U.S. labs. It also mandated that the United States negotiate agreements with
Russia to ensure that funds provided under this program are not subject to taxes in Russia.
Furthermore, it requested that the Secretary of Energy review IAP programs for their
commercialization potential.
The IPP Program was once again the subject of a critical GAO report in late 2007.100 This report
noted that DOE had overstated the number of scientists receiving support from this program by
counting both weapons and non-weapons scientists in its totals. It also argues that DOE has
overstated the number of long-term private sector jobs created as a result of this program, mostly
because it does not have an independent way to confirm the reported number. Further, DOE does
not have an exist strategy for the program, or a way to “graduate” institutes once they are self-
sustaining or no longer pose a proliferation threat. This report has raised, anew, questions about
the current value and future worthiness of the program.
DOE reports that the IPP program engaged 13,000 scientists, engineers, and technicians between
FY1994 and FY2002, with 6,700 of them working on projects in 2002. At the end of 2002, IPP
had 176 projects ongoing at 56 institutes in Russia, with 64 of these projects at facilities in the
closed nuclear cities. IPP also had 14 projects at six institutes in Kazakhstan, and 13 projects at
nine institutes in Ukraine. It has also been reported that 13 projects have become commercial
ventures, and that the program has created 850 high tech jobs in Russia. Furthermore, the IPP
program has received around $125 million in private sector matching funds.101
100 U.S. Government Accountability Office. DOE’s Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in the Russia and Other
Countries needs to be Reassessed. GAO-08-189, December 2007.
101 Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn et al. Project on
(continued...)
ȱȱȱ
řŜȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
ȱȱ ȱǻ Ǽȱ
In August 1998, Vice President Gore and then-Prime Minister Carancha signed an agreement
establishing the Nuclear Cities Initiative. This program is designed to bring commercial
enterprises to Russia’s closed nuclear cities, so that Russia can reduce the size of its weapons
complex and so that the scientists and engineers will not be tempted to sell their knowledge to
nations seeking nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia signed an implementing
agreement in September 1998, and the program received its first funding of $15 million in
FY1999. The NCI program received a total of nearly $87 million between FY1999 and FY2003;
the Bush Administration has requested and received an additional $17 million for it within the
funding for the Russian Transition Initiative.
Some Members of Congress and others, including GAO, also raised questions about the value and
effectiveness of the NCI program. In its first budget for FY2002, the Bush Administration sought
to reduce funding from $26 million in FY2001 to $6.6 million, limiting the program to 3 of
Russia’s 10 closed nuclear cities. It also indicated that it might seek to eliminate the program,
merging its functions with the IAP program. Congress accepted this latter proposal, creating the
Russian Transition Initiative, and it initially accepted the reduction in funding for the program.
However, in the supplemental appropriations bill passed after the September 11 attacks, Congress
added $15 million to the NCI program. Nevertheless, with limited funding and uncertain political
support, the NCI program reportedly made limited progress in addressing the employment
problems at Russia’s closed nuclear cities. Some say that the merger with the IAP will bring
stability and progress to the program’s efforts. In late July 2003, the Bush Administration
announced that the NCI program would cease to operate by the end of 2003. The United States
and Russia were unable to agree on the liability provisions in an implementing agreement for the
program. Ongoing projects continued through the end of 2003, but the program did not receive
new funding or begin new projects.
In its FY2005 budget request, the Administration allocated $41 million to the Russian Transition
Initiative. Some of this funding supported ongoing NCI projects in Russia’s closed nuclear cities.
The Administration requested $37.9 million for its new Global Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention Program in FY2006. Congress authorized this amount in the FY2006 Defense
Authorization Act and appropriated around $40 million in the Energy and Water Appropriations
Act. Within this budget, the Administration planned to phase out the last of the NCI programs in
Russia’s closed city of Snezhinsk and to reduce its efforts in the closed city of Sarov. It would
then focus funding on helping to redirect engineers and technicians associated with the shutdown
of Russia’s plutonium production reactors in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk (this program is
described below). Hence, the budget reduction, when combined with the shifting of funds to
nations outside the former Soviet Union, resulted in a contraction of efforts to redirect Russia’s
nuclear scientists and to reduce the size of Russia’s nuclear weapons complex.
In the FY2007 budget request, these two programs moved again, to DOE’s Nonproliferation and
International Security account. The total request for both parts of the program equaled $28.1
million. DOE reported that the decline was due to reduced activity at two sites that were a part of
NCI and to the deferral of work at two commercial sites. The House and Senate Armed Services
Committees both approved the authorization request for these programs, but the Appropriations
(...continued)
Managing the Atom. March 2003.
ȱȱȱ
řŝȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
Committees increased the funding to $39.6 million. The FY2008 budget request sought $20.2
million for these programs. DOE has again indicated that the decline in funding reflects the
termination of the NCI portion of the program. Congress appropriated $30.1 million. The FY2009
budget request includes $23.8 million for these programs.
ȱȱȬ ȱȱȱ
In the early 1990s, the United States and Russia both pledged to end the production of plutonium
for nuclear weapons. Russia, however, balked at suggestions that it shut its three remaining
plutonium production reactors because it used the same reactors to produce light and heat in the
cities of Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk. In an agreement signed in 1994, under the auspices of the high-
level commission chaired by Vice President Gore and Russia’s Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, the
two sides agreed that they would work together to provide alternative energy sources for these
Russian cities. This program began as a part of the DOD CTR program and moved to DOE in
FY2002.
In the original 1994 agreement, Russia stated that it would shut the reactors by 2000, if the
alternative energy facilities were developed in the same time frame. Initially, the two nations
planned to replace the reactors with fossil-fueled power plants, but early studies concluded that
the construction of these plants could cost up to $1 billion. Consequently, the two sides began to
explore the possibility of converting the plutonium production reactors to a type whose spent fuel
did not require reprocessing. These new reactors would no longer produce weapons-grade
plutonium. Each side planned to pay half of the expected $160 million for this conversion project.
However, over the next few years the expected cost of the core conversion more than doubled.
After its financial crisis in 1998, Russia concluded that it could not pay its half. If the project had
continued, the United States might have had to pay more than $300 million. At the same time,
questions about the reactors’ safety raised the possibility that they might need to be closed shortly
after the core conversion was complete.
In late 1999, Minatom proposed that the two sides again pursue the replacement of the nuclear
reactors with fossil fuel plants. After reducing the estimate for the necessary size of the plants, it
estimated that the new project would cost about the same as the core conversion project. In late
2000 and early 2001, the two nations agreed to replace the reactors with fossil fuel plants.
However, in FY2000 and FY2001, Congress prohibited the expenditure of any CTR funds for the
construction of fossil fuel plants. When it completed its review of U.S. nonproliferation and threat
reduction assistance to Russia, the Bush Administration endorsed the reactor shut-down program
and transferred the effort from DOD to DOE.
DOD, DOE, and the State Department have all contributed to this project. The State Department
contributed nearly $4.5 million in FY1995 and FY1999 to feasibility studies. DOD’s budget
included $10 million in FY1995 and $16 million in FY1996. It also included $32 million in
FY2000, but these funds were rescinded after Congress prohibited their expenditure on fossil fuel
plants. Congress transferred $32 million in FY2001 funds and $56 million in FY2002 funds from
DOD to DOE, and appropriated $49 million in the DOE budget for FY2003. The Bush
Administration requested and received $50 million for this effort in FY2004.102 It requested a
similar amount, $50.1 million, to continue this project in FY2005.
102 Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn et al. Project on
(continued...)
ȱȱȱ
řŞȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
The United States and Russia concluded a new agreement to implement the reactor shutdown
program in early 2003. According to NNSA, the new fossil fuel plants will be completed, and the
old nuclear reactors shut down, in 2008 and 2011, assuming there are no further delays in the
implementation of the agreement. The United States and Russia are also implementing efforts to
improve safety at the reactors in the interim.103 At the Seversk site, the program is shutting down
two nuclear reactors and refurbishing an old fossil fuel plant from the 1950s. This project is slated
to be completed by the end of December 2008. At Zheleznogorsk, the United States is not only
helping Russia shut down the nuclear plant, but also helping it construct a new fossil fuel plant.
According to DOE, this project is more than one-third complete, and should be done by 2011.
DOE requested $132 million for this program area in FY2006; this was a substantial increase
over the $44 million appropriated in FY2005. DOE indicated that this request reflected its plans
to expand significantly the construction activities associated with the fossil fuel plants at the
Seversk site. In the FY2006 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-163), Congress increased the
funding for this project to over $200 million. Both the House and the Senate noted that they
wanted to ensure that the shutdown of the Zheleznogorsk reactor remained on schedule. The
Energy and Water Appropriations Act also increased funding for this program, but to only $176.2
million. The FY2007 budget requested $206.6 million for this program. The increase in funding is
again directed at the Zheleznogorsk reactor, with the intent to complete the shutdown by 2010
instead of 2011. Congress appropriated $174.4 million. The FY2008 budget request sought
$181.6 million for this project area. Within this request, funding for the Seversk site declined
sharply, from $84.7 million to $19.4 million, as the project nears completion, and funding for the
Zheleznogorsk site continues to rise, from $119.9 million to $160.8 million. The House Energy
and Water Development Appropriations Committee added $10 million to this request to further
accelerate work Zheleznogorsk. The Senate Appropriators, on the other hand, reduced the request,
providing only $152.6 million. In the final budget, Zheleznogorsk received $159.1 million, and
the total project area $179.9 million. DOE has requested $141.3 million for FY2009. There is no
funding for Seversk, and Zheleznogorsk would receive $139.3 million. The remaining $2 million
is allocated to crosscutting and technical support activities.
ȱȱȱ
In September 1998, the United States and Russia agreed to convert surplus weapons-grade
plutonium to a form that could not be returned to nuclear weapons. In the Plutonium Management
and Disposition Agreement, signed in September 2000, each side agreed to dispose of 34 metric
tons of weapons-grade plutonium, and to do so at roughly the same time. This agreement was
designed to ease concerns about the possible theft or diversion of weapons-grade plutonium by
nations or others seeking to develop their own nuclear weapons.
According to the agreement, the parties could use two methods for disposing of the plutonium—
they could either convert it to mixed oxide fuel (MOX) for nuclear power reactors or immobilize
it and dispose of it in a way that would preclude its use in nuclear weapons. Some analysts have
criticized the MOX option on the principle of opposing any use of plutonium in power
(...continued)
Managing the Atom. March 2003.
103 For details on components of the reactor shut-down program, see U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004
Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003. p. 722-726.
ȱȱȱ
řşȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
generation. From this point of view, nations that do not possess nuclear weapons could use a
plutonium-base power fuel cycle as a cover for developing nuclear weapons. If weapons states
such as Russia and the United States used plutonium for power generation, according to this
argument, it would be more difficult to persuade non-weapons states not to do so. However,
Russia has expressed little interest in the permanent disposal of plutonium, noting that the
material could have great value for its civilian power program. The United States initially
intended to pursue both options. However, after reviewing U.S. nonproliferation policies in 2001,
the Bush Administration concluded that this approach would be too costly. Instead, it outlined a
plan for the United States to convert almost all its surplus plutonium to MOX fuel. Congress
appropriated $152 million for FY2003 to begin construction of three facilities in Savannah River,
SC, to pursue the MOX option, and the FY2004 request included $416 million for construction
and $194 million for operation and maintenance for the U.S. surplus plutonium disposal program.
The FY2005 budget request reduced funding for the U.S. program by about $50 million.
The United States and international community agreed to pay a large portion of the cost for
Russia’s plutonium disposition program. According to the State Department, U.S. allies, including
Great Britain, France, and Japan, pledged to provide $700 million.104 Congress appropriated $200
million for this program for FY1999, but most of these funds have not been spent. The Bush
Administration’s FY2004 budget justification requested $47 million for Russian Fissile Materials
Disposition “Operations and Maintenance,” and prior balances totaling $151 million will be spent
in the Russian Federation “in accordance with a new detailed program execution plan to be
provided to Congress.”105
However, in late July 2003, the Bush Administration announced that the plutonium disposition
program would not pursue additional contracts in 2004 because the United States and Russia were
unable to agree on the liability provisions for a new implementing agreement for the program.
The two nations reportedly reached a liability agreement in 2005, although it has not yet been
signed by Russia’s President Putin. The FY2005 budget included $64 million for U.S. assistance
to Russia on plutonium disposition, under the assumption that the nations would resolve their
differences and the program would resume. Congress authorized and appropriated the requested
amount for FY2005 but questioned the Administration’s ability to begin construction in May
2005, an event which eventually did not occur. The Administration requested an additional $64
million for this program in FY2006, but Congress appropriated only $34 million, again
questioning the timing for the start of the project.
The Administration requested $34.7 million for FY2007 for this project. Both the House and the
Senate Armed Services Committees have expressed wide-ranging and deep concerns about this
program. In particular, Russia has indicated that it may not pursue the MOX program to eliminate
its plutonium, opting instead for the construction of fast breeder reactors that could burn
plutonium directly for energy production. The United States might not fund this effort, as many in
the United States argue that breeder reactors, which produce more plutonium than they consume,
would undermine nonproliferation objectives. As a result of these concerns, the House Armed
Services Committee deleted all funding for this program in Russia in the FY2007 Defense
Authorization Bill. The Senate Armed Services provided the funding, but fenced it pending a
report from the Secretary of Energy; the Conference Committee adopted this approach. Congress
104 U.S. Department of State. Fiscal Year 2002 Performance and Accountability Report. p. 62.
105 U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. DOE/ME-0016.
February 2003. Vol. 1, p. 548.
ȱȱȱ
ŚŖȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
has also questioned the value of continuing with the U.S. MOX program and has reduced funding
for this effort as well.
The Bush Administration did not request any additional funding for this program area in FY2008.
In late November 2007, the United States and Russia announced that they had reached agreement
of how they would proceed with this program.106 Generally, the United States has agreed that
Russia can burn some of the plutonium in breeder reactors but that the reactors will be modified
so that they will not produce more plutonium than they burn. At the same time, the United States
will continue to fund construction of the MOX fuel plant, and Russia will convert some of its
plutonium into this fuel. The Bush Administration has hailed this agreement as providing a way
forward to dispose of plutonium; critics have complained that the agreement will sharply slow the
process of eliminating Russia’s weapons-grade plutonium. This agreement came too late,
however, to change the funding profile for FY2008 and the Omnibus Appropriations Bill does not
contain any funding for this program area. The Bush Administration has indicated that funding
from prior years remains available to support this program. It requested only $1 million for
FY2009 to support technical oversight of the program by the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories.
ȱȱȱ
Congress has addressed a number of issues during the years since it passed the Nunn-Lugar
amendment and DOD established the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Many of these are
discussed in detail in CRS Report 97-1027, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Programs: Issues for Congress. Some of these issues have grown out of concerns with specific
projects, as has been the case with the dispute over the chemical weapons destruction facility at
Shchuch’ye. Others have derived from broader concerns about whether threat reduction
assistance to Russia and the other former Soviet states serves broader U.S. national security goals.
The question of whether U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance represents “defense
by other means”—as former Secretary of Defense William Perry used to argue—or foreign aid—
as some in Congress often assert—continues to echo in debates about these programs. Some
program critics and some Members of Congress also continue to question whether U.S. assistance
allows Russia to divert its own resources to the development and production of new weapons that
could threaten the United States. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld raised this question during his
nomination hearing in January 2001.
On the other hand, as U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to Russia moves
through its second decade, many of the issues discussed during the debates over the programs
reflect new concerns raised during assessments of how the programs performed in their first
decade and how they might improve in the second. Many of these issues also reflect the growing
focus of the programs on the potential link between weapons of mass destruction that might leak
out of Russia and terrorist organizations that might seek these weapons to attack the United States
and its allies. The discussion below reviews many of these issues, describing concerns raised by
those who support and those who criticize the programs. The discussion draws heavily on the
findings and proposals outlined by several recent reports on U.S. threat reduction and
106 Springer, Sebastian. U.S., Russia Agree on Way Ahead for Plutonium Disposition. Inside Defense. Tuesday,
November 20, 2007.
ȱȱȱ
Śŗȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
nonproliferation assistance. These provide a more detailed description of the status of the
programs and proposals for the future.107
£ȱȱȱ
As was noted above, CTR implementation was slow during the program’s early years. The need
to negotiate umbrella agreements with Russia, and to establish a “culture of cooperation,” was a
key reason for the early delays. But some analysts also cite the need to coordinate project
planning among several U.S government agencies as a problem. Many analysts contend that
coordination problems remain today, even though each of the three key agencies—DOD, DOE
and State—funds and manages its own projects. These agencies still need to coordinate their
efforts to avoid duplication and, in some cases, to share resources and expertise. In addition, with
the programs spread among three agencies, no one in the U.S. government takes the lead in
setting policies and priorities for U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance, or in
serving as an advocate for these programs in interagency debates. Some Members of Congress
and analysts outside government have proposed two specific solutions that they believe will
improve implementation of U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance—the creation of
a strategic plan and the designation of an overall program coordinator.
ȱȱ
Many analysts, both inside and outside the U.S. government, believe that U.S. threat reduction
and nonproliferation programs would benefit from the development of a government-wide
strategic plan. Some officials and analysts expected the Bush Administration to develop a more
comprehensive strategic plan for these programs during its review of U.S. nonproliferation
assistance to Russia in 2001.108 That review just identified those programs that would receive
greater resources and expanded mandates. But, according to Senator Pete Domenici, “these
programs frequently are intertwined and interrelated in various complex and difficult ways.”109
According to one analyst who has participated in both DOD and DOE programs, the growth in
U.S. programs “has been by and large, organic, with each agency pursuing its own contacts and
relationships in recipient countries, assembling and justifying its own budget, implementing
107 See, for example, Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace and Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. November 2002.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1117&prog=zgp&proj=znpp; U.S.
Department of Energy. The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board. A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s
Nonproliferation Programs With Russia. Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler. Russia Task Force. January 10, 2001.
http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/rusrpt.pdf; Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and
Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn et al. Project on Managing the Atom. March 2003, http://www.nti.org/e_research/
cnwm/cnwm.pdf, and Einhorn, Robert J. and Michelle A. Flournoy, Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Weapons. An Action Agenda for Global Partnership. CSIS Report. January 2003.
http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/publications_index.html.
108 “I would hope that the real result of the review would lead to a more comprehensive approach, a more integrated
approach, to nonproliferation and threat reduction, so that the individual program can be seen and measured in light of
an overall approach and clear goals, and so the individual programs can support each other more synergistically.” U.S.
House. Committee on Armed Services. Hearing. Department of Energy Budget Request for FY2002. p. 9. Statement of
Gen. John A. Gordon, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration. June 27, 2001.
109 U.S. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and
Federal Services. Hearing. Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) with Non-proliferation
Programs: Non-proliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001. November 14, 2001.
ȱȱȱ
ŚŘȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
programs based on its own culture and approaches, and interacting with its own Congressional
oversight committees.”110 Most analysts agree that a comprehensive strategic plan would allow
for the development of an overall set of goals for U.S. assistance, better coordination among
programs, a more consistent method to set priorities and measure progress, and a coordinated way
to determine when and how the United States had achieved its goals and could complete a
program.
ȱȱ
Many analysts have also called for the creation of a high-level program coordinator or a high-
level interagency committee chaired by a representative of the National Security Council. This
program coordinator would set a consistent direction by setting priorities, resolving competing
demands for budgetary resources, eliminating overlap and redundancy, and coordinating
implementation across agencies. This individual would also raise the political profile of the
programs, bringing consistent political leadership that many analysts believe is lacking. They
argue that continued, coordinated success for the programs requires “active political engagement
at the White House, cabinet, and sub-cabinet political appointee levels in the U.S.
government.”111
Neither the Clinton nor the Bush Administrations accepted proposals for a single, high-level
program coordinator, arguing that interagency coordination already occurs. According to an
official from the Bush Administration, “U.S. policy implementation and oversight of
nonproliferation assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union is coordinated at senior levels
by the Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee, or PCC, chaired by a National
Security Council senior director, with assistant secretary-level representatives from State,
Defense, Energy and other concerned agencies.”112 Others have argued that a new interagency
committee would complicate the existing interagency coordinating process.113
Congress, however, continued to support a high-level coordinator, or czar, for the threat reduction
and nonproliferation programs. In late 2006, Representative Ellen Tauscher and Senator Hillary
Rodham Clinton introduced legislation, known as the Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Act of 2006
(H.R. 6419, S. 4103), that would have created a Senior Advisor to the President for the prevention
of nuclear terrorism. This advisor would have, among other things, been responsible for
“overseeing the development, by the relevant Federal departments and agencies, of accelerated
and strengthened program implementation strategies and diplomatic strategies ... and overseeing
the development of budget requests for these programs and ensuring that they adequately reflect
the priority of the problem.” The first piece of legislation introduced in the 110th Congress, the
Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (H.R. 1, S. 4) took up the
same theme. It would establish an Office of the United States Coordinator for the Prevention of
110 Ibid. Statement of Laura Holgate, Vice President of the Russian Newly Independent States Program, Nuclear Threat
Initiative.
111 Options for Increased U.S. Russian Nuclear Nonproliferation Cooperation and Projected Costs. RANSAC, October
2001.
112 U.S. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and
Federal Services. Hearing. Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) with Non-proliferation
Programs: Non-proliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001. Statement of Vann Van Diepen, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Nonproliferation. November 29, 2001.
113 Ibid. Statement of Marshall Billingslea, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations.
ȱȱȱ
Śřȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism within the Executive Office of the
President. This advisor would, among other things, lead inter-agency coordination of U.S. efforts
to implement its WMD nonproliferation strategy and would oversee “the development of a
comprehensive and coordinated budget for programs and initiatives to prevent WMD
proliferation and terrorism, ensuring that such budget adequately reflects the priority of the
challenges and is effectively executed, and carrying out other appropriate budgetary authorities.”
The Obama Administration has pledged to fill this job at the Director level on the NSC staff.
Most analysts agree that the budget responsibility addressed in this legislation would be critical to
the success of this new policy position. A White House-based nonproliferation “czar” may be able
to communicate high-level interest and political commitment to the programs. However, unless
this individual could control the budgets of the programs involved to ensure that funding levels
matched stated priorities, and unless the individual could implement corrective actions to ensure
that programs achieved their objectives, it seems unlikely that he or she would be able to establish
priorities and enforce them across government agencies. A high-level committee might have
greater success creating a consensus about priorities, because each agency would have a
representative at the table. But it might still find it difficult to match funding levels to these
priorities because each agency’s budget would still reflect the overall priorities and missions of
the agency.
ȱȱ¢ȱ
Many analysts and government officials note that the primary barrier to successful
implementation remains the need to gain access and transparency from officials in the recipient
nations, particularly Russia. As was noted above, Russia was slow to provide the United States
with access to nuclear weapons storage areas, which delayed the implementation of security
improvements at these facilities. It has not provided complete information about or access to
facilities in its biological weapons complex, and, in spite of more than seven years of
negotiations, the United States and Russia still have not completed a transparency agreement for
the facility in Mayak that will store fissile materials removed from weapons. Furthermore, Russia
has not provided the United States with access to many facilities in Russia’s nuclear weapons
complex, leaving large holes in the U.S. ability to improve security for the nuclear materials at
those facilities.
Although many analysts note that Russia’s interest in protecting secret details about its nuclear
weapons programs is understandable, most also argue that this secrecy, and the resulting delays in
program implementation, serve to undermine support in the United States for threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs. While most agree that Russia must step forward to solve this
problem,114 they also note that the United States does not have a “systematic approach to
identifying and addressing these problems.”115 Each agency has developed its own solutions. For
114 The Baker-Cutler report notes that Russian official point out that “transparency and access matters are far from
routine in Russian bureaucracy.” Russia does not have procedures for foreigners to have routine access to facilities in
the nuclear weapons complex, so requests are treated on a case-by-case basis. They need a high-level government
decision to lead to routine access, rather than having it treated on a case-by-case basis. U.S. Department of Energy. The
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board. A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs With
Russia. Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler. Russia Task Force. January 10, 2001. p. 22.
115 Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade. Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. November 2002. p. 4.
ȱȱȱ
ŚŚȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
example, in some cases, DOE has used photographs and diagrams, instead of on-site visits, to
identify security weaknesses and design security improvements at nuclear complex sites. Analysts
have identified this “ad hoc” process as one further incentive for better coordination among threat
reduction programs; a single program coordinator could help agencies identify problems and
share solutions.
In the FY2006 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-163), Congress called on the Administration
to submit a report on the impediments to successful implementation of these programs. The report
is to both identify these impediments and outline U.S. plans to overcome them. Problems with
access to Russian facilities is one of the impediments cited in the reporting requirement.
¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
In 1992, the United States and Russia signed an umbrella agreement that outlined the rights and
responsibilities assumed by each of the parties when implementing programs funded by U.S.
threat reduction assistance. This agreement provides the legal framework that allows for program
implementation; if it were to lapse, the United States could not award any new contracts for
projects funded by U.S. assistance. The original agreement was set to last for seven years; the two
parties agreed to extend it for another seven years in 1999. It was again set to expire in June 2006.
At the time it was signed, this agreement applied only to those programs funded by the
Department of Defense, but the Department of Energy has adopted a similar agreements to cover
many of its programs in the former Soviet Union.
The most contentious elements of the umbrella agreement are the provisions that cover liability
for accidents or incidents that might occur during project implementation. In the original
agreement, Russia assumed all liability, freeing U.S. contractors from the threat of legal action or
the possible need to pay fines and penalties if accidents were to occur. However, in recent years,
Russia has objected to these blanket liability provisions, arguing, at a minimum, that U.S.
contractors should be held liable for accidents resulting from sabotage. As was noted above, this
disagreement impeded the conclusion of a new implementation agreement for DOE’s Plutonium
Disposition Program. When resolving this dispute, the United States was reluctant to ease its
stand that U.S. contractors receive blanket liability protection, in part, because it was afraid that
this would set an unacceptable precedent during negotiations on the broader umbrella agreement.
However, by the middle of 2005, the United States and Russia both recognized that a failure to
resolve the liability debate stalling the Plutonium Disposition Program could, eventually, lead to a
failure to resolve the dispute in negotiations over the umbrella agreement. This, in turn, could
stall or stop a nonproliferation program that most experts agreed had made great strides to secure
weapons and materials in Russia. Conversely, if the two states could find an acceptable solution
for the DOE program’s agreement, it might ease efforts to conclude a new umbrella agreement.
During this process, contractors participating in the DOE program reportedly noted that they
would not object to a provision that placed liability for accidents resulting from sabotage onto the
U.S. companies; they noted that this could expose them to Russia’s legal system, but they also
noted that the United States might address this through a separate international treaty or by
focusing on Russian liability law, rather than by pressing for blanket liability protection.116
116 Fiorill, Joe. Hopes, Pressure Rise for End to U.S.-Russian Stalemate on Liability in Nuclear Security Projects.
Global Security Newswire. July 1, 2005.
ȱȱȱ
Śśȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
The two sides reached agreement on the liability provisions for the DOE programs during the G-8
summit at Gleneagles, Scotland, in July 2005. Reports indicate that, in exchange for the U.S.
giving up its insistence on blanket liability protection in future contracts, the two countries would
set up a separate process for addressing any situations that might arise as a result of sabotage.117
In mid-June 2006, the United States and Russia reached agreement on liability protections and
extended the umbrella agreement for another seven years.118 This concluded the agreement just
days before the existing agreement was due to expire. Reports indicate that the new agreement
retains the original agreement’s blanket liability protections for existing projects but will address
Russia’s concerns when implementing future projects. Hence, U.S. contractors could be liable for
damages caused by sabotage or other accidents, in some circumstances.
ȱȱȱ
The Nunn-Lugar amendment contained six “exclusions” that set out conditions the recipients had
to meet before receiving U.S. threat reduction assistance. The United States could not provide
assistance until the President certified to Congress that each recipient nation was “committed to:”
(1) making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying such
weapons;
(2) forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense
requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction;
(3) forgoing any use of fissionable and other components of destroyed nuclear weapons in
new nuclear weapons;
(4) facilitating United States verification of weapons destruction carried out under section
212;
(5) complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and
(6) observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of
minorities.”119
Congress expected the President to exercise his judgement when deciding whether to issue the
certifications. For example, the legislation states that the recipient nations must be “committed
to” the policies listed in the six exclusions, a standard which can be less demanding than one that
requires precise behavior. The Clinton Administration certified Russia for several years, even
though the United States had questions about Russia’s compliance with chemical and biological
weapons agreements, because Russia’s President Yeltsin had offered verbal assurances of his
commitment to resolve the outstanding questions. Using the same information, the Bush
Administration withheld Russia’s certification. In addition, the exclusions do not define many of
their terms. For example, they state that a recipient must make “a substantial investment” of its
own resources, but it does not define a level of investment that would be necessary. They also
117 Liabilities Deal Rests With Russian Prime Minister for Final Approval. Inside the Pentagon. December 22, 2005.
118 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement with Russia Extended.
June 19, 2006.
119 P.L. 102-228, Sec 211, paragraph (b).
ȱȱȱ
ŚŜȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
state that the recipients must forgo military modernization programs that exceed legitimate
defense requirements, but it does not ban all military modernization or indicate how much would
be too much.
Congress debated adding new or modified exclusions to the CTR legislation several times over
the life of the CTR program. In some years, some Members have sought to provide more precise
standards of behavior for the recipient nations; in others, they have sought to add new
requirements linking receipt of assistance to a greater number of policy areas. Congress has
rejected many of these efforts, particularly if they appeared certain to cut off U.S. threat reduction
assistance to Russia. Instead, it has usually crafted requirements with language that provides the
President with the flexibility to balance U.S. concerns about the recipients’ policies against the
U.S. interest in continuing efforts to contain and eliminate weapons of mass destruction.120
Congress did add new certification requirements related to the construction of the chemical
weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye in FY1998 and FY1999. These stated that “no funds
authorized to be appropriated under this or any other Act for FY1998 for Cooperative Threat
Reduction programs may be obligated or expended for chemical weapons destruction activities ...
until the President submits to Congress a written certification” that:
(A) Russia is making reasonable progress toward the implementation of the Bilateral
Destruction Agreement;
(B) the United States and Russia have made substantial progress toward the resolution, to the
satisfaction of the United States, of outstanding compliance issues under the Wyoming
Memorandum of Understanding and the Bilateral Destruction Agreement; and
(C) Russia has fully and accurately declared all information regarding its unitary and binary
chemical weapons, chemical weapons facilities, and other facilities associated with chemical
weapons.
However, Congress permitted the President to submit an alternative certification, which stated
that “the national security interests of the United States could be undermined by a United States
policy not to carry out chemical weapons destruction activities under the Cooperative Threat
Reduction programs.” But when Congress resumed funding for Shchuch’ye in FY2002, after a
two year prohibition, it restored the certification requirements without the alternative provision.
The United States could not provide funding for chemical weapons destruction activities in
Russia until the Secretary of Defense certified that there has been:
(1) information provided by Russia, that the United States assesses to be full and accurate,
regarding the size of the chemical weapons stockpile of Russia;
(2) a demonstrated annual commitment by Russia to allocate at least $25,000,000 to
chemical weapons elimination;
(3) development by Russia of a practical plan for destroying its stockpile of nerve agents;
120 For a detailed review of the history of the CTR certification requirements, see CRS Memorandum for Congress.
Certification Requirements Affecting the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. By Amy F. Woolf.
December 23, 2002.
ȱȱȱ
Śŝȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
(4) enactment of a law by Russia that provides for the elimination of all nerve agents at a
single site;
(5) an agreement by Russia to destroy or convert its chemical weapons production facilities
at Volgograd and Novocheboksark; and
(6) a demonstrated commitment from the international community to fund and build
infrastructure needed to support and operate the facility.
The Bush Administration announced, in April 2002, that it could not certify that Russia was
committed to its arms control obligations under the Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons
Conventions. This decision stalled many ongoing CTR projects by precluding the signing and
implementation of new contracts. Furthermore, in an effort to balance its stated support for CTR
with this decision, the Administration asked Congress to provide it with the authority to waive the
certification requirements so that it could continue to fund CTR programs in Russia. Most
Members of Congress agreed with the Administration’s view that the CTR programs continued to
serve U.S. national security interests, and the House and Senate each included a waiver authority
in its version of the Defense Authorization Bill. The Senate provided the President with
permanent waiver authority; once passed, the authority would remain available to the President in
all future fiscal years. The House sought a less generous provision, providing the President with
the authority to waive the certification requirements only in FY2003. The Conference Committee,
in Section 1306 (H.Rept. 107-436), provided the President with the authority to waive the
certification requirements for three years. But this waiver only applied to the original six
exclusions, not the separate certification for Shchuch’ye. Congress included one year of waiver
authority for that project in the FY2003 Defense Appropriations Bill (P.L. 107-248), the FY2004
Defense Authorization Bill (P.L. 108-136), and the FY2005 Defense Authorization Bill (P.L. 108-
375).
The three years of waiver authority in the FY2003 Defense Authorization Act expired at the end
of FY2005. The House, in its version of the FY2006 Defense Authorization Bill provided the
President with another three years of waiver authority. The Senate, in contrast, provided the
President with unlimited waiver authority. The Conference Committee adopted the Senate
position. The President must still present a waiver each year, if he cannot certify Russia’s
compliance with the requirements, but this authority is available to him every year. In its version
of the FY2007 Defense Authorization Bill, the Senate approved language that would have
eliminated the certification requirements from the CTR legislation. The House rejected this
approach, although the final version of the Bill continues to provide the President with unlimited
waver authority.
The Bush Administration indicated that it believed that the combination of certification
requirements and Presidential waivers was an essential part of its effort to use the CTR program
to encourage greater openness in Russia and to transform Russian behavior. They allow the
United States to signal to Russia that it will hold it to a high standard, and, although the President
can waive the certifications, he does not have to if Russian behavior does not meet U.S.
standards. Some in Congress support this approach. They agree that the CTR program should be
afforded a high priority, but they note that it cannot proceed in a vacuum, without consideration
for Russian behavior in other policy areas.
Some, however, disagree with this approach. They believe that U.S. threat reduction assistance to
Russia should be of the highest priority, and although Russian policies in other areas are
important, they should not interfere with the elimination and containment of weapons of mass
ȱȱȱ
ŚŞȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
destruction. Some of these Members have proposed that Congress amend the CTR legislation to
remove the certification requirements altogether. Others believe that Congress should provide the
President with permanent waiver authority so that this debate does not stop the program, as it did
in 2002, again in the future.
Some in Congress, however, believe that Russian policies in other areas—such as Russian nuclear
cooperation with Iran, Russian military modernization, and the lack of Russian compliance with
arms control—can create new threats to U.S. security and, therefore, are of higher priority than
threat reduction assistance. They argue that the President should have only a limited ability to
waive the certification requirements.
The 110th Congress addressed this issue again; both the House and Senate versions of the Defense
Authorization Bill would eliminate the certification requirements from the CTR program. The
Conference Report accepted this provision, and, as a result, U.S. assistance under the CTR
program will no longer be subject to the certification requirements that have been the cause of so
much debate.
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
The Bush Administration indicated, through the U.S. commitment to the G-8 Global Partnership
(described below), that it plans to request around $1 billion per year for U.S. threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs in Russia and the other former Soviet states. These programs expanded
sharply in the latter half of the 1990s, when the CTR program receiving a little less than half of
the total appropriation, and the DOE programs growing to consume a majority of the funding. Yet
many analysts argue that the United States should commit a far greater sum to these efforts. The
Baker-Cutler report, for example, released in January 2001, argued that the United States should
spend up to $30 billion over the next 10 years on DOE’s programs to secure nuclear materials.121
This amount did not include funding for DOD or State Department programs, which could total
another $5 billion over the next 10 years if spending continues at the current level.
Most analysts agree that added funding will not necessarily accelerate all U.S. programs. They
acknowledge that implementation problems, such as the absence of access to many facilities and
the U.S. failure to certify Russia for receipt of CTR assistance for most of 2002, slowed progress
and left significant amounts of money unspent. On the other hand, they have identified numerous
programs that might achieve greater results with increased funding. These include the science
centers in Moscow and Kiev, where the United States and its partners have had to limit the
number of scientists who receive research grants because of limits on the available funds. This list
at one time also included the program to dispose of plutonium in Russia, where added funding
might have sped construction of the MOX facility and hasten the elimination of weapons grade
plutonium, and the program to eliminate Russia’s plutonium producing reactors, where greater
funding is now leading to the completion of replacement energy plants. Export and border control
121 U.S. Department of Energy. The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board. A Report Card on the Department of
Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs With Russia. Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler. Russia Task Force. January 10,
2001. p. 20.
ȱȱȱ
Śşȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
programs might also accelerate their progress with added funding, leading to the installation of
improved equipment and procedures at a greater number of border crossing points.
The Bush Administration generally agreed with the need to add funding to some programs to
accelerate their progress, and it took this route with several programs, such as the science centers
and export and border control programs, during its first term. It has also called for added
international funding to help accelerate the shutdown of Russia’s plutonium-producing reactors
and to speed security improvements at storage sites for Russian nuclear warheads. However,
analysts note that, with a fixed budget of around $1 billion per year, the United States will be able
to expand these programs and introduce new programs only if it reduces funding for other
programs. But other programs, such as the effort to help Russia dispose of its weapons-grade
plutonium, could consume rapidly increasing sums in the future. Consequently, a fixed budget
could force trade-offs between projects. For example, in its budget request for FY2004, DOE
sought to add funding to accelerate the blend-down of highly enriched uranium and to fund the
new program to identify and secure radiological sources. At the same time, it has reduced funding
for MPC&A projects in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex.
On the other hand, some current programs may finish their missions in the coming years,
allowing increased funding for other programs. Many of the capital-intensive construction
projects funded during the 1990s fall into this category, as is evidenced by the reduced budgets
for strategic offensive arms elimination and the construction of the chemical weapons destruction
facility. Some have even noted that, as these large projects conclude, the United States might find
it difficult to fulfill its commitment to spend $1 billion each year. DOD’s CTR budget is already
declining, and DOE has noted that its funding for programs in Russia is likely to decline in the
next few years as it completes many of the security upgrades at nuclear weapons storage
facilities. These changes could pave the way for added funding for new projects in the former
Soviet Union, or they could release funds for use on other projects with an anti-terrorism focus,
possibly outside the former Soviet Union. If recent trends continue, however, it seems quite likely
that, while the U.S. budget for nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance may hold steady,
or even increase a little, funding for programs in the former Soviet Union could decline in the
near future.
ȱ
U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have pursued a number of different types of
projects, trying different solutions to different problems. However, most have followed one
theme—these projects have sought to consolidate, contain, and destroy weapons and materials,
and to consolidate and contain weapons knowledge, so that they would not leak out of the former
Soviet Union. In essence, the United States has sought to identify materials and knowledge that
might leak out of Russia and to contain them at their source. Several of the new projects
identified by the Bush Administration, such as the WMD Proliferation Prevention Project at DOD
and DOE Second Line of Defense, take a different approach. Instead of improving security at the
source, they seek set up barriers outside the nuclear weapons complex to prevent these resources
from leaving the territory of the former Soviet Union.
These two approaches can be complementary and provide a “layered defense” against the leakage
of weapons, materials, and knowhow. However, in an era of constrained budgets, they might also
compete for funding and political support. Furthermore, many analysts believe that the most
ȱȱȱ
śŖȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
effective approach to keeping nuclear materials away from terrorists is to protect them at their
source, at facilities in Russia’s nuclear complex.122 The Bush Administration’s budget request
reduces or holds steady funding for MPC&A programs, while increasing funding for other types
of projects. Consequently, Congress may address the issue of focus and priorities in its debate
over U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance.
£ȱȱ ȱȱ
There is near-universal agreement, both within the U.S. government and among analysts outside
the U.S. government, that the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue
nations or terrorist groups presents a global problem that requires an international response.
While the legacy of the Soviet Union’s weapons programs may create the most immediate and
largest threat, other nations also possess materials, weapons, or knowledge that could leak out
beyond their borders to those seeking their own nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.123 In
addition, although the United States has spent more than a decade trying to help Russia and the
other former Soviet states secure their weapons, materials, and knowledge, other nations can
contribute to this effort with funding and cooperative programs. The following section addresses
three characteristics of the proposals for the “globalization” of threat reduction and
nonproliferation assistance. The first, the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons
and Materials of Mass Destruction, is an initiative to expand the list of countries contributing to
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in Russia. The second is an initiative to extend
U.S. threat reduction assistance to nations outside the former Soviet Union. The third is a more
general approach to encourage all nations to better account for and secure their weapons of mass
destruction and materials that might become attractive targets for terrorists seeking their own
weapons of mass destruction.
ȱ ȬŞȱ ȱȱ
During the G-8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada, in July 2002, the United States, Russia, and other
G-8 leaders agreed to establish a long-term program—the G-8 Global Partnership Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction—to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction and related
materials and technology. Under this program, known as 10+10 over 10, the United States has
pledged to provide $10 billion over 10 years to sustain ongoing threat reduction programs in
Russia; this amount of $1 billion per year is equal to current U.S. spending on threat reduction
and nonproliferation programs in Russia, so the U.S. commitment would not necessarily signal an
increase in the U.S. commitment. The other G-7 nations have also agreed that they will provide,
together, up to $10 billion over 10 years. Russia has agreed to contribute $2 billion of its own
money. It has also agreed to adopt a set of guidelines that will allow it to receive assistance.
Specifically it has agreed that it will provide for “effective monitoring, auditing, and transparency
122 “The most effective approach to reducing the risk is a multi-layered defense designed to block each step on the
terrorist pathway to the a bomb. But securing nuclear weapons and materials at their source is the single most critical
layer of this defense, where actions that can be taken now will do the most to reduce the risk of terrorist acquiring
nuclear weapons and materials, at least cost.” Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action
Plan, by Matthew Bunn et al. Project on Managing the Atom. March 2003.
123 According to former Senator Sam Nunn, “some 20 tons of civilian HEU (highly enriched uranium) exists at 345
civilian research facilities in 58 countries, yet there are no international standards for securing these nuclear materials
within a country.” Sam Nunn, Co-Chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Reducing the Threats from Weapons of
Mass Destruction and Building a Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism. Moscow, Russia. May 27, 2002.
ȱȱȱ
śŗȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
measures” and that it will “provide for adequate access for donor representatives at work sites.” It
has also agreed that the assistance will be free from taxes and other charges and that it will ensure
adequate liability protections for donor countries and their personnel.124 Each of these issues
continue to hinder nonproliferation assistance to Russia, and all potential donors have emphasized
the need for their resolution before they provide additional assistance.
The G-8 leaders agreed that this new program would initially focus on threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs in Russia but could eventually extend to other nations if they adopt the
Partnership’s guidelines. The United States considers its assistance to the other former Soviet
states to be a part of its commitment under the Global Partnership. Ukraine has also expressed an
interest in receiving assistance under this program. The United States would also like the Global
Partnership to contribute to programs designed to redirect scientists in Iraq and Libya. During
their 2004 meeting at Sea Island, Georgia, the participants agreed to consider this proposal.
The G-8 leaders also invited other nations or organizations, such as the European Union, to
contribute to the program. Norway and others in Europe have already outlined cooperative
programs with Russia. At the G-8 summit in Evian, France, in 2003, six other nations in Europe
(Sweden, Finland, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, and the Netherlands) joined the partnership.
Seven additional nations (Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and
the Czech Republic) joined during the 2004 summit in Sea Island, Georgia. President Bush, in a
speech on February 11, specifically emphasized that the G-8 Global Partnership should expand its
list of both donors and recipient nations.125
Some analysts have questioned how successful the Global Partnership will be in providing
significant new funding for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. The Partnership had
received pledges for more nearly $17 billion (including the $10 billion from the United States) by
May 2004. However, pledges of support received since Kananaskis may not necessarily extend
into sustained funding over the next 10 years. As Senator Richard Lugar has noted, “many of our
international partners will find it difficult to establish nonproliferation programs during a period
of stagnating domestic economic growth.”126
Some have also questioned how the allies will set priorities and divide up responsibilities over
different types of nonproliferation projects. In the statement released after the Kananaskis
summit, they listed several projects, including the destruction of chemical weapons,
dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, disposition of fissile materials, and
employment of former weapons scientists as high-priority projects.127 Most analysts agree that
added funding would help to expand and accelerate each of these project areas. At the same time
though, the Global Partnership will not rely on a single coordinating body to either identify new
projects or set priorities among competing projects. Each nation will allocate its own funds to
those programs that it views as high-priority endeavors. With no central authority, this process
could leave some programs with too little funding and others with too much funding.
124 “The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.” Statement by the
Group of Eight Leaders. Kananaskis, Canada. June 27, 2002.
125 The White House. “President announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD.” Fort Lesley J. McNair.
February 11, 2004.
126 Senator Richard Lugar has noted that “The G-8 initiative is not assured. “See Lugar, Richard G. “The Next Steps in
U.S. Nonproliferation Policy.” Arms Control Today. December 2002.
127 “The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.” Statement by the
Group of Eight Leaders. Kananaskis, Canada. June 27, 2002.
ȱȱȱ
śŘȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
¡ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ
In the debate over the FY2003 Defense Authorization Bill, the Senate approved an amendment,
proposed by Senator Richard Lugar, that would allow DOD to use up to $50 million in FY2003
CTR funds “outside the states of the former Soviet Union” to resolve “critical emerging
proliferation threats and to take advantage of opportunities to achieve long-standing United States
nonproliferation goals.”128 Senator Lugar argued that this type of effort could provide assistance
to nations “seeking help in securing or destroying weapons or dangerous materials” and could
also “create international standards of accountability for protecting and handling nuclear material
and deadly pathogens.” This legislation would also allow the United States to “undertake
missions to secure dangerous materials or weapons that were at risk of falling into the wrong
hands.”129
The Senate and the Bush Administration supported Senator Lugar’s proposal. The House,
however, objected to this expansion of CTR, and the language was removed in conference. The
Bush Administration requested a similar authorization in its Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Bill for FY2003. The Senate again approved the request and the House again
rejected it; it was removed from the final version of the Bill.
The Bush Administration again requested the authorization to spend up to $50 million in CTR
funds outside the former Soviet Union in the FY2004 Defense Authorization Bill. The Senate
again offered its unqualified support for this measure. The House, in contrast, argued that these
types of programs would be better managed by the State Department than the Defense
Department. It authorized the transfer of up to $78 million in CTR funds to the State Department
Nonproliferation and Disarmament fund for use in threat reduction efforts outside the former
Soviet Union. The Conference Committee, in its report on the FY2004 Defense Authorization
Bill (P.L. 108-136), approved the President’s request and permits the use of up to $50 million in
CTR funds outside the former Soviet Union. However, in deference to the House concerns, the
committee language indicates that this funding could be used only for short-term projects; it also
states that the President should determine whether DOD is the agency that is most capable of
implementing the planned project. The conferees stated that they would expect the President to
assign the project to the most appropriate agency. The Bush Administration exercised this
authority for the first time in mid-2004, when it provided assistance to Albania for the elimination
of chemical weapons.130
In its version of the FY2006 Defense Authorization Bill, the Senate sought to alter the provision,
so that the Secretary of Defense, rather than the President, could approve expenditures outside the
former Soviet Union. The Senate argued that this change would streamline the procedure and
make it easier for the United States to respond to sudden and emerging proliferation problems.
The House, however, objected, and the Conference Committee did not accept the Senate
provision.
The 110th Congress addressed this issue again, both expanding the authority to spend CTR funds
outside the former Soviet Union and to streamline the process of identifying and approving
potential projects. As was noted above, Congress added $10 million to the CTR authorization to
128 S. 2026, H.R. 4546, Sec. 1203.
129 Lugar, Richard G. “The Next Steps in U.S. Nonproliferation Policy.” Arms Control Today. December 2002.
130 Warrick, Joby. Albania’s Chemical Cache Raises Fears About Others. Washington Post. January 10, 2005. p. A1.
ȱȱȱ
śřȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
fund these programs, Further, it eliminated the requirement included in the FY2004 Authorization
Act (P.L. 108-136) that limited the program to short-term projects that addressed sudden,
emergency proliferation concerns. Instead, the Conference Report (H.Rept. 110-477, Sec. 1303),
specifies that CTR programs outside the former Soviet Union are defined in a similar way to
those inside the former Soviet Union. They would be programs designed to:
• Facilitate the elimination, and the safe and secure transportation and storage, of
chemical or biological weapons, weapons components, weapons-related
materials, and their delivery vehicles.
• Facilitate safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear weapons,
weapons components, and their delivery vehicles.
• Prevent the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, weapons components,
and weapons-related military technology and expertise.
• Prevent the proliferation of biological weapons, weapons components, and
weapons-related military technology and expertise, which may include activities
that facilitate detection and reporting of highly pathogenic diseases or other
diseases that are associated with or that could be utilized as an early warning
mechanism for disease outbreaks that could impact the Armed Forces of the
United States or allies of the United States; and
• Expand military-to-military and defense contacts.
Those who support the expansion of CTR beyond the former Soviet Union argue that the United
States could apply the model of threat reduction assistance that it has developed during the past
12 years to help other nations secure and eliminate weapons or materials that might be attractive
to terrorists. They point to nations such as Pakistan, where insecure nuclear materials might be at
risk of theft or diversion by government officials or representatives of terrorist organizations.131
Others, however, question whether a program like CTR can be applied successfully to nations
outside the former Soviet Union. They note that these nations might not be willing to allow the
United States access to facilities that house nuclear materials or weapons; that they might prefer
to enhance, rather than reduce, the threat posed by their weapons of mass destruction; and that
U.S. assistance in securing weapons might actually make it easier for the recipient nations to
deploy and use the weapons. Some have also questioned whether the United States can legally
provide assistance, under U.S. and international law, to nations that are not parties to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty.132
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
One of the key themes in recent reviews of the proliferation threat and the potential link to
terrorism is the recognition that nuclear, chemical, and biological materials reside in many nations
around the world. Nations with research facilities for these materials often lack the basic
accounting, security, export, and border control systems that the United States has spent more
than 10 years trying to bring to Russia. Although few of these materials would be useful to those
131 See, for example, Gottemoeller, Rose and Rebecca Longsworth. Enhancing Nuclear Security in the Counter-
terrorism Struggle: India and Pakistan as a New Region for Cooperation. Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. Working Papers. Number 29. August 2002.
132 See CRS Report RL31589, Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan, by Sharon Squassoni.
ȱȱȱ
śŚȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
seeking to build nuclear weapons, they could be of use to those seeking a radiological dispersal
device (dirty bomb) or a chemical or biological weapon. There is a growing consensus that the
international community and individual nations should take steps to address problems with these
materials, beyond those already in place under the International Atomic Energy Agency.133
The United States would not necessarily need to adopt new programs and appropriate new funds
to address this problem. Some believe, as was noted above, that efforts to expand CTR programs
beyond the former Soviet Union could help address the problem. But many believe that the
IAEA, with the support of the United States, could take steps in this direction through its existing
programs that help countries secure and account for radiological materials. The Chemical
Weapons Convention also provides a mechanism that might help nations secure and account for
chemical agents and materials. Consequently, at least initially, the effort to address this global
problem could be more diplomatic and political than technical, with the United States and others
using the “bully pulpit” to encourage other nations to recognize the problem and take steps within
their own systems to address their own vulnerabilities.
In essence, this new global focus may serve to shape the second decade of U.S. threat reduction
and nonproliferation assistance. During the first decade, the problem was dominated by concerns
over the potential for the loss of control over nuclear materials and weapons in the former Soviet
Union, and the solutions were dominated by U.S. programs to bring technical assistance to the
former Soviet states. In the second decade, the problem is likely to be dominated by concerns
about the potential acquisition of nuclear, chemical, and biological materials by terrorist
organizations. The solutions may be dominated by a growing sense of global cooperation in
identifying and addressing weaknesses in a greater number of countries. U.S. funding and
technical assistance may still play a dominant role, but other nations may also step in to offer
their experience, expertise, and financial resources.
ȱȱ ȱ
Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
awoolf@crs.loc.gov, 7-2379
133 Senator Sam Nunn, in outlining his proposal for a Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism, has stated that
“our goal must be to see that all nations come under a system of international standards and inspection for the
protection of dangerous nuclear materials.” Remarks by Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman, Nuclear Threat
Initiative. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. International Nonproliferation Conference. November 14,
2002.
ȱȱȱ
śśȱ