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Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

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This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan, or Republic of
China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. Congress has oversight of the
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, which has governed arms sales to Taiwan since 1979,
when the United States recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC.
Two other relevant parts of the “one China” policy are the August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint
Communique and the “Six Assurances” to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been
significant. The United States also has expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC’s missile
firings in 1995-1996. However, there is no defense treaty with Taiwan.
At the U.S.-Taiwan arms sales talks on April 24, 2001, President George W. Bush approved for
possible sale diesel-electric submarines, P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the
submarine sale), four decommissioned U.S. Kidd-class destroyers, and other items. Bush also
deferred decisions on Aegis-equipped destroyers and other items, while denying other requests.
Since then, attention has turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian officials, and legislators
from competing political parties have debated contentious issues about how much to spend on
defense and which U.S. weapons systems to acquire, despite the increasing threat (including a
missile buildup) from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as described in the Pentagon’s reports
to Congress on PRC military power. In February 2003, the Administration pointed Taiwan to
three priorities for defense: command and control, missile defense, and ASW. Some in the United
States have questioned Taiwan’s seriousness about its self-defense, level of defense spending, and
protection of secrets. The Pentagon has broadened its focus from Taiwan’s arms purchases to its
regular defense budget, readiness for self-defense, and critical infrastructure protection. Blocked
by the opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan (LY), the Special Budget (not passed) for
submarines, P-3C ASW aircraft, and PAC-3 missile defense systems was cut from $18 billion in
2004 to $9 billion (for submarines only) in 2005. In March 2006, Taiwan’s defense minister
requested a 2006 Supplemental Defense Budget (not passed) in part for submarine procurement,
P-3Cs, and PAC-2 upgrades (not new PAC-3 missiles). In June 2007, the LY passed Taiwan’s
2007 defense budget with funds for P-3C planes, PAC-2 upgrades, and F-16C/D fighters. While
the LY did not commit to buy subs, in December 2007, it approved $62 million to start the design
phase. Taiwan cut its defense budget for 2009.
In 2008, congressional concerns mounted about a suspected “freeze” in President Bush’s
notifications to Congress on eight pending arms sales as well as his refusal to accept Taiwan’s
request for F-16C/D fighters. On October 3, 2008, Bush finally notified Congress. However, he
submitted only six of the eight pending sales for a value of $6.5 billion, or half of the total. The
Administration did not submit for congressional review the pending programs for Black Hawk
helicopters or the submarine design. Moreover, the sale of PAC-3 missile defense systems was
broken up into two parts. The 111th Congress might further reassert the legislated role in
determinations of Taiwan’s needs and oversee President Obama’s adherence to the TRA. There
could be congressional oversight of any U.S. policy review and clarification of any objective
process to consider Taiwan’s requests for weapons.

˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ

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ȱ
˜—Ž—œȱ
U.S. Policy....................................................................................................................................... 1
Role of Congress ....................................................................................................................... 1
Broad Indicators of Arms Transfers .......................................................................................... 1
Military Relationship ................................................................................................................ 2
“Software Initiative” ........................................................................................................... 2
Assessments ........................................................................................................................ 3
Normalized Relationship .................................................................................................... 4
Senior-Level Exchanges and Exercises .............................................................................. 5
April 2001 Arms Requests and Status of Arms Sales ............................................................... 6
April 2001 Decisions .......................................................................................................... 6
Taiwan’s Decisions ............................................................................................................. 7
Amphibious Assault Vehicles.............................................................................................. 7
Attack and Utility Helicopters ............................................................................................ 7
Kidd-Class Destroyers ........................................................................................................ 8
Aegis-Equipped Destroyers ................................................................................................ 8
Submarines.......................................................................................................................... 9
P-3C ASW Aircraft ........................................................................................................... 13
Patriot Missile Defense ..................................................................................................... 13
Early Warning Radars ....................................................................................................... 15
C4ISR................................................................................................................................ 15
AMRAAM and SLAMRAAM ......................................................................................... 16
F-16C/D Fighters .............................................................................................................. 16
Other Possible Future Sales .............................................................................................. 19
Policy Issues for Congress ...................................................................................................... 20
Extent of U.S. Commitment on Defense........................................................................... 20
Changes in PLA Missile Deployments ............................................................................. 22
Taiwan’s Commitment to Self-Defense and Budgets ....................................................... 23
Visits by Generals/Admirals to Taiwan............................................................................. 35
Taiwan’s Missile Program................................................................................................. 36
President Bush’s “Freeze” on Arms Sales Notifications................................................... 37
Strategic Policy Review .................................................................................................... 39
Major Congressional Action ................................................................................................... 42
105th Congress................................................................................................................... 42
106th Congress................................................................................................................... 42
107th Congress................................................................................................................... 43
108th Congress................................................................................................................... 46
109th Congress................................................................................................................... 47
110th Congress................................................................................................................... 49
Major U.S. Arms Sales as Notified to Congress............................................................................ 50

Š‹•Žœȱ
Table 1. Taiwan’s Defense Budgets............................................................................................... 26
Table 2. Major U.S. Arms Sales as Notified to Congress.............................................................. 51

˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ

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ȱ
˜—ŠŒœȱ
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 55

˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ

Š’ Š—DZȱŠ“˜›ȱǯǯȱ›–œȱŠ•Žœȱ’—ŒŽȱŗşşŖȱ
ȱ
ǯǯȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
This CRS Report discusses U.S. security assistance for Taiwan, formally called the Republic of
China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress. It also lists sales of major defense articles and
services to Taiwan, as approved by the President and notified to Congress since 1990. This
discussion uses a variety of unclassified consultations in the United States and Taiwan, as well as
open source citations.
˜•Žȱ˜ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
Congress passed and exercises oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, the law
that has governed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. The TRA specifies that it is U.S. policy,
among the stipulations: to consider any nonpeaceful means to determine Taiwan’s future “a
threat” to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of “grave concern” to the United
States; “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;” and “to maintain the capacity of
the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” jeopardizing the security,
or social or economic system of Taiwan’s people. Section 3(a) states that “the United States will
make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” The TRA also
specifies a congressional role in decision-making on security assistance for Taiwan. Section 3(b)
stipulates that both the President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such
defense articles and services “based solely” upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. Section
3(b) also says that “such determination of Taiwan’s defense needs shall include review by United
States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the
Congress.” The TRA set up the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a nonprofit corporation, to
handle the relationship with Taiwan. AIT implements policy as directed by the Departments of
Defense and State, and the National Security Council (NSC) of the White House. They have
controlled notifications to Congress of pending major arms sales, as required by the Arms Export
Control Act, P.L. 90-629.
Congress also oversees the President’s implementation of policies decided in 1982. President
Ronald Reagan agreed with the PRC on the August 17, 1982 Joint Communique on reducing
arms sales to Taiwan, but he also clarified that arms sales will continue in accordance with the
TRA and with the full expectation that the PRC’s approach to the resolution of the Taiwan issue
will be peaceful. At the same time, Reagan extended “Six Assurances” to Taipei, including
assurances that Washington had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan nor to
consult with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan. (See CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan:
Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei
, by
Shirley A. Kan.)
›˜Šȱ —’ŒŠ˜›œȱ˜ȱ›–œȱ›Š—œŽ›œȱ
As for U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan, they have been significant despite the absence of a
diplomatic relationship or a treaty alliance. The value of deliveries of U.S. defense articles and
services to Taiwan totaled $5.8 billion in the 1999-2002 period and $4.1 billion in 2003-2006.
Among worldwide customers, Taiwan ranked 2nd (behind Saudi Arabia) in 1999-2002 and 4th
(behind Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia) in 2003-2006. In 2006 alone, Taiwan ranked 5th among
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗȱ

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ȱ
worldwide recipients, receiving $970 million in U.S. defense articles and services. Values for
U.S. agreements with and deliveries to Taiwan are summarized below.1

1999-2002 period
2003-2006 period
U.S. Agreements
$1.1 billion
$1.1 billion
U.S. Deliveries
$5.8 billion
$4.1 billion
From worldwide sources, including the United States, Taiwan received arms deliveries valued at
$8.4 billion in the eight-year period from 2000 to 2007. Taiwan ranked 7th among leading arms
recipients that are developing countries. (The PRC ranked 2nd and received arms deliveries worth
double that value, totaling $17 billion.) In 2007 alone, Taiwan ranked 9th and received $800
million in arms deliveries. However, as an indication of future arms acquisitions, Taiwan’s arms
agreements in 2000-2007 did not place it among the top 10 recipients among developing
countries. (The PRC ranked 3rd with total arms agreements worth $16 billion.)2
’•’Š›¢ȱŽ•Š’˜—œ‘’™ȱ
ȃ˜ Š›Žȱ —’’Š’ŸŽȄȱ
In addition to transfers of hardware, beginning after the crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-1996
during which President Clinton deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups near Taiwan in March
1996, the Pentagon quietly expanded the sensitive military relationship with Taiwan to levels
unprecedented since 1979.3 The broader exchanges have increased attention to “software,”
including discussions over strategy, training, logistics, command and control, etc.
Also, Taiwan’s F-16 fighter pilots have trained at Luke Air Force Base, AZ, since 1997. However,
in 2004, Taiwan’s Minister of Defense Lee Jye surprisingly wanted to withdraw the pilots and
fighters.4 In response, the Defense Department stressed the value of continuing the training
program to develop “mission ready and experienced pilots” with improved tactical proficiency
shown by graduated pilots who have “performed brilliantly,” as explicitly notified to Congress.5
In July 2001, after U.S. and Taiwan media reported on the “Monterey Talks,” a U.S.-Taiwan
national security meeting that was originally held in Monterey, CA, the Pentagon revealed it was
the seventh meeting (since 1997) held with Taiwan’s national security authorities “to discuss
issues of interaction and means by which to provide for the defense of Taiwan.”6 Another round

1 CRS Report RL34291, U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients, 1999-2006, by Richard F.
Grimmett; compiled with U.S. official, unclassified data as reported by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA).
2 CRS Report RL34723, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2000-2007, by Richard F. Grimmett, (an
annual report compiled from DSCA data).
3 Mann, Jim, “U.S. Has Secretly Expanded Military Ties with Taiwan,” LA Times, July 24, 1999; Kurt M. Campbell
(former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs) and Derek J. Mitchell, “Crisis in the
Taiwan Strait?,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2001.
4 Jane’s Defense Weekly, October 9, 2004 and June 29, 2005; and author’s consultations.
5 DSCA, notification to Congress, October 25, 2005 (see list at end of this CRS Report).
6 China Times (Taiwan), July 18, 2001; Washington Times, July 18, 2001; Department of Defense News Briefing, July
19, 2001.
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Řȱ

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of such strategic talks took place in July 2002.7 The 11th round of the talks took place in late
September 2005, after the Bush Administration postponed the meeting by a couple of weeks to
accommodate PRC ruler Hu Jintao’s scheduled visit to Washington on September 7 (which was
then postponed because of President Bush’s response to Hurricane Katrina).8
These exchanges were prompted by increasing U.S. concerns about Taiwan’s self-defense
capabilities. At a conference on Taiwan’s defense in March 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz said that the United States wanted to help Taiwan’s military to strengthen civilian
control, enhance jointness, and rationalize arms acquisitions.9 In April 2004, Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman told Congress that the Pentagon
believed Taiwan’s military needed to improve readiness, planning, and interoperability among its
services.10
œœŽœœ–Ž—œȱ
The Pentagon has also conducted its own assessments of Taiwan’s defense needs, with over a
dozen studies from 1997 to early 2004.11 Congress could inquire about these assessments and any
other reports. In September 1999, to enhance cooperation, a Pentagon team was said to have
visited Taiwan to assess its air defense capability.12 The Pentagon reportedly completed its
classified assessment in January 2000, finding a number of problems in the Taiwan military’s
ability to defend against aircraft, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, and those problems
included international isolation, inadequate security, and sharp inter-service rivalries.13 In
September 2000, the Pentagon reportedly conducted a classified assessment of Taiwan’s naval
defense needs—as the Clinton Administration had promised in April 2000 while deferring a sale
of Aegis-equipped destroyers. The report, “Taiwan Naval Modernization,” was said to have found
that Taiwan’s navy needed the Aegis radar system, Kidd-class destroyers, submarines, an anti-
submarine underwater sonar array, and P-3 anti-submarine aircraft.14 In January 2001, a Pentagon
team reportedly examined Taiwan’s command and control, air force equipment, and air defense
against a first strike.15 In September 2001, a Defense Department team reportedly visited Taiwan
to assess its army, as the Bush Administration promised in the April 2001 round of arms sales
talks.16 In August 2002, a U.S. military team studied Taiwan’s Po Sheng command, control,
communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) program.17 In
November 2002, another U.S. team visited Taiwan to assess its marine corps and security at ports

7 Central News Agency, Taipei, July 17, 2002.
8 Project for a New American Century, August 26, 2005; Taipei Times, September 15, 2005.
9 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, “Remarks to the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council,” March 11, 2002.
10 Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, hearing on “The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next 25
Years,” April 21, 2004.
11 Statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman at a hearing on “The
Taiwan Relations Act: The Next 25 Years” held by the House International Relations Committee on April 21, 2004.
12 “U.S. Military Team Arrives in Taiwan for Visit,” Lien-ho Pao [United Daily News], September 19, 1999, in FBIS.
13 Ricks, Thomas, “Taiwan Seen as Vulnerable to Attack,” Washington Post, March 31, 2000.
14 Tsao, Nadia, “Pentagon Report Says Taiwan Can Handle AEGIS,” Taipei Times, September 27, 2000; Michael
Gordon, “Secret U.S. Study Concludes Taiwan Needs New Arms,” New York Times, April 1, 2001.
15 China Times (Taiwan), January 14, 2001; Taipei Times, January 15, 2001.
16 Taipei Times (Taiwan), September 10, 2001.
17 Taiwan Defense Review (Taiwan), August 27, 2002.
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řȱ

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ȱ
and harbors, and reported positive findings.18 In November 2003, a U.S. defense team visited
Taiwan to assess its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability and rated the overall capability as
poor.19 In late 2007, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry launched a Joint Defense Capabilities Assessment
(JDCA) with U.S. cooperation, to determine requirements for joint self-defense.20
˜›–Š•’£ŽȱŽ•Š’˜—œ‘’™ȱ
The George W. Bush Administration continued the Clinton Administration’s initiative and
expanded the closer military ties at different levels. In April 2001, President Bush announced he
would drop the 20-year-old annual arms talks process used to discuss arms sales to Taiwan’s
military in favor of normal, routine considerations of Taiwan’s requests on an as-needed basis—
similar to interactions with other foreign governments.21
U.S. military officers observed Taiwan’s Hankuang-17 annual military exercise in 2001, the first
time since 1979.22 The Pacific Command’s Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies accepted
fellows from Taiwan in its Executive Course for the first time in the summer of 2002.23 By the
summer of 2002, the U.S. and Taiwan militaries reportedly discussed setting up an undersea ASW
link to monitor the PLA Navy’s submarines.24 The U.S. and Taiwan militaries set up a hotline in
2002 to deal with possible crises.25
In addition, in 2002, the Administration asked Congress to pass legislation to authorize the
assignment of personnel from U.S. departments (including the Defense Department) to AIT,
allowing the assignment of active-duty military personnel to Taiwan for the first time since 1979.
The objective was to select from a wider range of personnel, without excluding those on active
duty. The first active-duty defense attache since 1979, an Army Colonel began his duty in Taipei
in August 2005 with civilian clothes and a status similar to military attaches assigned to Hong
Kong, except that military personnel in Hong Kong may wear uniforms at some occasions.26
Also, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Michael
Wynne, submitted a letter to Congress on August 29, 2003, that designated Taiwan as a “major
non-NATO ally.” (See “107th Congress” below.)

18 Taipei Times, November 21, 2002; January 1, 2003; Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao [Liberty Times] (Taipei), April 14, 2003;
Taipei Times, August 22, 2003.
19 Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 3, 2003; Taiwan Defense Review, January 12, 2004; Jane’s Defense Weekly, June
30, 2004.
20 Fu Mei, briefing at the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, September 29, 2008.
21 On the annual arms talks, see CRS Report RS20365, Taiwan: Annual Arms Sales Process, by Shirley A. Kan.
22 Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times], Taipei, July 18, 2001. The China Times (May 27, 2004) quotes Defense
Minister Lee Jye confirming that U.S. military personnel observed Hankuang-17, Hankuang-18, and Hankuang-19
exercises to evaluate Taiwan’s military.
23 CNN.com, March 18, 2002; Author’s discussions in Hawaii in July 2002.
24 Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao [Liberty Times], Taipei, July 20, 2002.
25 Jane’s Defense Weekly, October 29, 2003.
26 In addition to Colonel Al Willner, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) assigned Army Colonel Peter
Notarianni to oversee security assistance programs at AIT in Taipei. A notice was released: Department of Defense,
DSCA contract awarded to AIT to support DSCA active-duty military and civil service personnel, September 24, 2005.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Śȱ

Š’ Š—DZȱŠ“˜›ȱǯǯȱ›–œȱŠ•Žœȱ’—ŒŽȱŗşşŖȱ
ȱ
Ž—’˜›ȬŽŸŽ•ȱ¡Œ‘Š—ŽœȱŠ—ȱ¡Ž›Œ’œŽœȱ
The United States and Taiwan have held high-level defense-related meetings in the United States.
The Bush Administration granted a visa for Defense Minister Tang Yiau-ming to visit the United
States to attend an industry conference held by the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council on March 10-
12, 2002 (in St. Petersburg, FL), making him the first ROC defense minister to come to the
United States on a nontransit purpose since 1979.27 Tang met with Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz at the conference.28
However, after that policy change in 2002, Taiwan’s defense minister declined to visit the United
States through 2007. In September 2002, a deputy defense minister, Kang Ning-hsiang, visited
Washington and was the first senior Taiwan defense official to have meetings inside the Pentagon
since U.S.-ROC diplomatic ties severed in 1979, although a meeting with Wolfowitz took place
outside the Pentagon.29 In January 2003, a Taiwanese newspaper leaked information that a U.S.
military team planned to participate in—beyond observe—the Hankuang-19 military exercise and
be present at Taiwan’s Hengshan Command Center for the first time since 1979.30 On the same
day, General Chen Chao-min, a deputy defense minister, confirmed to Taiwan’s legislature a U.S.
plan for a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO). However, the leak and confirmation
reportedly prompted annoyance in Washington and contributed to a U.S. decision to limit General
Chen’s visit to the United States in February 2003 to attendance at a private sector conference on
Taiwan’s defense (in San Antonio, TX), without a visit to Washington.31 Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randall Schriver
met with General Chen. In October 2004, Taiwan’s Deputy Minister for Armaments, General
Huoh Shoou-yeh, attended a U.S.-Taiwan defense industry conference (in Scottsdale, AZ),
instead of Defense Minister Lee Jye. In May 2005, the Chief of General Staff, General Lee Tien-
yu, visited the United States, but he was the first Chief of General Staff from Taiwan willing to
make the biennial visit since General Tang Fei’s visit in 1998.32 In September 2005, Deputy
Minister Huoh again attended a U.S.-Taiwan defense industry conference (in San Diego, CA).
Deputy Defense Minister Ko Chen-heng attended the next conference in September 2006 (in
Denver, CO). At the conference in September 2007 (in Annapolis, MD), Deputy Minister Ko
again represented Taiwan, as Defense Minister Lee Tien-yu declined to visit the United States. In
only the second visit by a defense minister from Taiwan since 1979, Minister Chen Chao-min
visited the United States on September 28-October 5, 2008, attending the U.S.-Taiwan Defense
Industry Conference in Jacksonville, FL, and visiting Luke Air Force Base, Naval Warfare
Systems Command in San Diego, and the Pacific Command in Honolulu.33
As mentioned above, U.S. military observation of Taiwan’s Hankuang military exercises resumed
in 2001. The Hankuang-19 exercise took place in April-May 2003, with participation by about 20
U.S. military personnel and retired Admiral Dennis Blair, who just resigned as the Commander of
the Pacific Command (PACOM). (Blair led U.S. observers through the Hankuang-24 exercise in

27 In December 2001, the previous ROC Defense Minister, Wu Shih-wen, made a U.S. transit on his way to the
Dominican Republic.
28 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, “Remarks to the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council,” March 11, 2002.
29 Reuters, September 10, 2002.
30 Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times], January 2, 2003.
31 Taiwan Defense Review, January 18, 2003; Straits Times (Singapore), January 21, 2003.
32 Lien-Ho Pao [United Daily News] (Taipei), May 26, 2005.
33 Speech by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Sedney, in Jacksonville, FL, September 29, 2008.
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śȱ

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ȱ
June 2008. In 2009, he became the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).) The 2003 exercise
reportedly raised questions about the military’s will to fight and ability to sustain defense before
possible U.S. support.34 Deputy Defense Minister Lin Chong-pin visited Washington in June 2003
to respond to concerns about Taiwan’s commitment to self-defense. The Hankuang-20 exercise
reportedly included a U.S.-provided computer simulation in August 2004 that resulted in the PLA
invading and capturing the capital, Taipei, within six days.35 In April 2006, Taiwan’s president
and other officials held a Yushan civilian exercise to improve crisis-management and homeland
security to counter a PLA “decapitation” attack, with no U.S. participation.36 Then, in April 2008,
AIT Director Stephen Young and other U.S. officials observed the Yushan exercise for the first
time, but some KMT politicians criticized the inclusion of U.S. observers. In December 2008,
Defense Minister Chen Chao-min announced a reduction in the frequency of the Hankuang live-
fire field exercises to change them from annual to biennial exercises (only once in two years),
raising questions about readiness as well as contacts with the U.S. military.
™›’•ȱŘŖŖŗȱ›–œȱŽšžŽœœȱŠ—ȱŠžœȱ˜ȱ›–œȱŠ•Žœȱ
™›’•ȱŘŖŖŗȱŽŒ’œ’˜—œȱ
In 2001, arms sales talks took place on April 24 in Washington, DC, and Taiwan was represented
by its Vice Chief of General Staff, General Huoh Shou-yeh. According to the Administration and
news reports,37 President Bush approved Taiwan’s request for: 8 diesel-electric submarines; 12 P-
3C Orion anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the submarine sale); 54 Mark-48
ASW torpedoes; 44 Harpoon submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missiles; 144 M109A6 Paladin
self-propelled howitzers; 54 AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles; AN/ALE-50 electronic
countermeasure (ECM) systems for F-16s; and 12 MH-53 mine-sweeping helicopters. President
Bush approved four decommissioned Kidd-class destroyers for sale as Excess Defense Articles
(EDA), not a program of Foreign Military Sale (FMS). The Administration also decided to brief
Taiwan’s military on the PAC-3 missile defense missile.38
President Bush deferred decisions on destroyers equipped with the Aegis combat system. Bush
also deferred decisions on M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks and AH-64D Apache Longbow attack
helicopters, pending a U.S. assessment of Taiwan’s army. (The request for Abrams tanks was
approved later in 2001.)39
President Bush denied Taiwan’s requests for Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and High-
speed Anti-radiation Missiles (HARM) that target radar-equipped air defense systems. (At the

34 Lien-Ho Pao [United Daily News] (Taipei), April 16, 2003; China Times (Taipei), April 19, 2003; Taipei Times,
April 25, 2003; Central News Agency (Taipei), May 9, 2003.
35 AFP, August 11, 2004; Taiwan News, August 12, 2004.
36 Liberty Times (Taipei), April 13 and 16, 2006; and author’s interviews in Taipei.
37 White House, press briefing, April 24, 2001; Department of Defense, news briefing, April 24, 2001;David Sanger,
“Bush is Offering Taiwanese Some Arms, But Not the Best,” New York Times, April 24, 2001; Steven Mufson and
Dana Milbank, “Taiwan to Get Variety of Arms,” Washington Post, April 24, 2001; Neil King Jr., “Bush Defers Sale
of Aegis to Taiwan, Will Offer Four Kidd-Class Destroyers,” Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2001; “U.S. Refuses
Taiwan Request for JDAM, HARM, and PAC-3 Missiles,” Aerospace Daily, April 25, 2001; and “U.S. Formally
Informs ROC of Arms Sales Decision,” Central News Agency (Taiwan), April 25, 2001.
38 Taiwan Defense Review, January 18, 2003, reported the briefing took place in late 2001.
39 Mark Stokes, “Taiwan’s Security: Beyond the Special Budget,” AEI, March 27, 2006.
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U.S.-Taiwan Business Council’s conference in February 2003, however, Deputy Under Secretary
of the Air Force Willard Mitchell indicated that these requests were under review. A possible basis
for reviewing any renewed requests from Taiwan was found in the Pentagon’s report on PRC
Military Power submitted in July 2003 to Congress, which confirmed that the PLA procured from
Israel “a significant number of HARPY anti-radiation systems.” The press first reported on the
PLA’s acquisition of the HARPY drones in 2002.40 By the second half of 2004, the
Administration reportedly considered a new request for HARM missiles (submitted in August
2004), while a decision on JDAM guidance kits also remained pending.41 However, in 2005, the
Administration denied these requests.42)
Š’ Š—ȂœȱŽŒ’œ’˜—œȱ
After the U.S. response to Taiwan’s requests in 2001, attention turned to Taiwan, where the
military, civilian officials, and competing political parties in a newly assertive legislature
(Legislative Yuan, or LY) have debated contentious issues. These issues include the urgency of a
possible PLA attack, how much to spend on defense, which U.S. weapons systems to buy,
whether to respond to perceived U.S. pressure, and what the defense strategy should be. The
debate has taken place as the Pentagon has warned of the PLA’s accelerated buildup in a coercive
strategy targeting Taiwan. In early 2003, the Bush Administration stressed to Taiwan the
imperatives of missile defense, C4ISR, and anti-submarine defenses. In March 2003, Taiwan’s
Defense Ministry issued a new procurement plan emphasizing those priorities.43 However, setting
priorities for its national security, forging a national consensus, and funding defense programs
have remained contentious in Taiwan’s politicized debate over national security.
–™‘’‹’˜žœȱœœŠž•ȱŽ‘’Œ•Žœȱ
Taiwan agreed to purchase the AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles, under a program
administered by the U.S. Marine Corps. The Administration notified Congress in September
2002. United Defense Industries obtained a contract in June 2003, and deliveries began in March
2005.44
ŠŒ”ȱŠ—ȱ’•’¢ȱ Ž•’Œ˜™Ž›œȱ
After deferring a decision on Taiwan’s request for attack helicopters, the Bush Administration, in
May 2002, approved the request, and Taiwan began negotiations on 30 AH-64D Apache
Longbow helicopters sold by Boeing.45 Afterwards, Taiwan also considered the AH-1Z Cobra
helicopters sold by Bell.46 In April 2007, Taiwan’s military decided to procure 30 Apaches.47

40 Washington Times, July 2, 2002; Guangzhou Daily (via FBIS), July 4, 2002; Ha’aretz, Tel Aviv, July 25, 2002;
Flight International, November 5-11, 2002.
41 Taiwan News, October 6, 2004; Washington Times, October 8, 2004; Taiwan Defense Review, November 26, 2004.
42 Wendell Minnick, “U.S. Rejects Taiwan Request for HARM and JDAM Kits,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 18,
2006.
43 Taiwan Defense Review, March 12, 2003.
44 Jane’s International Defense Review, September 2003; Taiwan Defense Review, March 4, 2005.
45 Taipei Times, May 26, 2002; Jane’s Defense Weekly, June 5, 2002.
46 Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 10 and 24, 2004.
47 AFP, April 12, 2007; Lien-Ho Pao, July 9, 2007; Defense News, July 16, 2007.
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Also, Taiwan requested price and availability data for acquisition of 60 utility helicopters.48 In
2005, Bell proposed its UH-1Y Huey utility helicopter, and Sikorsky proposed its UH-60 Black
Hawk helicopters as replacement for Taiwan’s UH-1H Huey utility helicopters. In the LY in
December 2007, inter-party negotiations and the final decision approved about $203 million but
froze two-thirds, or $135 million, for 60 UH-60M Black Hawk utility helicopters (total cost of
about $2.2 billion). Also in the 2008 defense budget, the LY approved $228 million for 30 Apache
helicopters (total cost of about $1.8 billion).
On October 3, 2008, President Bush finally notified Congress of the proposed Foreign Military
Sale (FMS) program of 30 Apache helicopters for a total value of $2.532 billion. However, in
what observers note was an apparent arbitrary decision, the President did not notify Congress of
the pending sale of Black Hawk helicopters, which would require a notification at a later time.
’Ȭ•ŠœœȱŽœ›˜¢Ž›œȱ
In October 2002, the Defense Committee of Taiwan’s legislature engaged in a sharp partisan
debate over whether to approve funding (about $800 million) to buy the U.S. Navy’s four
available Kidd-class destroyers, ending with 18 lawmakers from the ruling Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) voting in favor, against 16
legislators from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and People’s First Party (PFP).49 In
November 2002, the Bush Administration notified Congress of the proposed sale of four Kidd-
class destroyers for about $875 million. Then, on May 30, 2003, Taiwan’s legislature finally
voted to release the funding, after they conditioned funding on bargaining with the U.S. Navy on
a 15% price reduction. The U.S. Navy began reactivation and upgrade of the Kidds in July 200350
for delivery of the 9,600-ton destroyers ahead of schedule from October 2005 to 2006. Taiwan’s
Naval Commander-in-Chief, Marine General Chen Pang-chih, attended the transfer ceremony in
Charleston, SC, for the first two destroyers on October 29, 2005, in the presence of
Representative Henry Brown. The destroyers, the largest warships in Taiwan’s navy, are equipped
with SM-2 air-defense missiles and a joint combat management system. The transfer ceremony
for the final two Kidds took place in Charleston, SC, on August 25, 2006.
Ž’œȬšž’™™ŽȱŽœ›˜¢Ž›œȱ
The Department of Defense considered the Kidds as platforms to provide Taiwan’s navy with the
necessary operational experience before any possible acquisition of more advanced Aegis-
equipped ships.51 The U.S. Navy deploys the Aegis combat system (e.g., on the Arleigh Burke-
class destroyer) for air defense and applies it in development of a future Navy missile defense
system (using SM-3 missiles). An alternative to the Arleigh Burke that retains the Aegis Spy-1D
radar, called the Evolved Advanced Combat System (EACS) has been considered. The Aegis
combat system has the capability to track over 100 targets and to conduct simultaneous anti-air,
anti-surface, and anti-submarine operations. During the U.S. war in Iraq in 2003, the Aegis

48 Jane’s Defense Weekly, August 24, 2005; Defense News, July 16, 2007.
49 Author’s visit to Taiwan; and Taipei Times and China Post (Taipei), November 1, 2002.
50 Taipei Times, September 5, 2003; Taiwan Defense Review, March 10, 2004; Taipei Times, September 15, 2004;
Jane’s Defense Weekly, November 10, 2004.
51 Consultations; and Wendell Minnick, “What Those Systems are All About,” Topics, November 2004.
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combat system helped the Patriot missile defense system to detect and intercept Iraqi missiles.52
In 2002, Taiwan requested four Arleigh Burke-class, Aegis-equipped destroyers, for delivery in
2010 and at a cost of about $4.8 billion, but got no U.S. response.53
ž‹–Š›’—Žœȱ
Despite initial skepticism about the Bush Administration’s April 2001 agreement to sell Taiwan
submarines (since the United States no longer manufactures diesel-electric submarines), the
Department of Defense has discussed options for a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program for
eight boats with U.S. and foreign companies and Taiwan. In addition to the military and political
implications of selling submarines to Taiwan’s navy, issues for Congress include potential
technology transfers to Taiwan and European countries, and leaks of secrets from Taiwan to the
PRC, that could involve U.S. submarine secrets and implications for the U.S. military.54 In a
report to Congress, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FYs 1992-1993, the
Secretary of the Navy reported in May 1992 that “to the extent that a potential diesel submarine
construction project would draw on U.S. resources, it has the potential to tap into the state-of-the-
art technology used in U.S. nuclear powered submarines.” The report also noted “the fact that the
diesel submarine is not a viable asset in the U.S. Navy” and that “construction of diesel
submarines for export in U.S. shipyards would not support the U.S. submarine shipbuilding base
and could encourage future development and operation of diesel submarines to the detriment of
our own forces.” The report also said that “it may be possible to control the release of the most
important information and specific technologies of concern, but an effective system would also
have significant costs. The problem will be more difficult, however, if a foreign entity is present
in the shipyards during submarine construction.”
In November 2001, seven companies submitted bids and concept papers to the Department of the
Navy. Companies interested in the contract reportedly include U.S. manufacturers, Northrop
Grumman (with its Ingalls Shipbuilding shipyard) and General Dynamics (with its Electric Boat
shipyard); Germany’s HDW; the Netherlands’ RDM (which sold its Zwaardvis-class submarine
design to Taiwan in the 1980s for two Hai Lung [Sea Dragon]-class submarines); France’s DCN;
and Spain’s IZAR (now Navantia). Although the Administration promised to help Taiwan buy
submarines, not build them, Taiwan’s China Shipbuilding Corporation also became interested in a
part of the contract, with support from some of Taiwan’s legislators. The U.S. Navy discussed
options with Taiwan’s Navy in July 2002 and initially planned to select the manufacturer(s) to
design and build the submarines in the latter half of 2003.55 On December 6, 2002, Secretary of
the Navy Gordon England informed Congress in a Determination and Findings memo that
bidding would be limited to four U.S. companies and the diesel subs would be of U.S. origin.56
The U.S. Navy held a second Industry Day on December 17, 2002, with General Dynamics,
Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon interested in being the prime contractor.57

52 Discussion with Lockheed Martin executive, June 10, 2004; and U.S. Army, 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense
Command, Fort Bliss, TX, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Theater Air and Missile Defense,” September 2003.
53 Lien-Ho Pao, September 1, 2004; Taiwan Defense Review, December 19, 2004; author’s consultations.
54 As for U.S. counter-espionage concerns, the FBI sent agents to Taipei to investigate alleged compromises of security
on the PRC’s behalf at Taiwan military’s Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology, reported the Central News
Agency
, August 13, 2003.
55 Central News Agency (Taiwan), July 30, 2002; Taipei Times, July 31, 2002; Defense Daily, September 16, 2002.
56 Gordon England, Memorandum to Congress with Determination and Findings, December 6, 2002.
57 Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, December 17, 2002.
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The U.S. Navy provided the Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) on January 17, 2003.58 The ICE put
the sub program at about $10.5 billion, but private sector estimates have been said to be lower
(perhaps $6-7 billion). Greater risks and costs were factored into the ICE because of uncertainty
about funding by Taiwan and the availability of European designs.
However, by April 2003, the sale became at risk, when the United States and Taiwan reached an
impasse over the program start-up costs estimated by the U.S. Navy at $333 million, but offered
at $28.5 million by Taiwan. On May 20-23, 2003, Taiwan’s Navy sent a delegation led by Vice
Admiral Kao Yang to Washington to discuss the issue, but the differences reportedly remained
unresolved.59 Facing the delays in Taiwan’s commitment of funds (although it first requested
submarines in 1995) and a long acquisition process, the Administration then viewed the program
as a long-term solution for Taiwan that would not meet the near-term blockade and submarine
threats posed by the PLA Navy.60 Defense Minister Tang Yiau-ming told visiting AIT
Chairwoman Therese Shaheen on October 16, 2003, that Taiwan still placed a high priority on
acquiring the submarines.61 Meanwhile, in 2003, the Bush Administration inquired with Italy
about buying eight decommissioning Sauro-class diesel-electric submarines for the estimated cost
of about $2 billion for delivery starting in 2006, but Taiwan’s military opted for newly built
submarines.62
A team from the U.S. Navy’s International Program Office arrived in Taipei in October 2003, for
further talks on whether Taiwan will procure submarines.63 The U.S. team also met with some of
Taiwan’s legislators, including Lin Yu-fang of the opposition People First Party.64 Lin was one of
the sponsors of legislation passed in May 2002, requiring Taiwan’s navy to arrange for six of the
eight submarines to be built in Taiwan using technology transfers.65 The total cost of new
submarines could reach $9-12 billion,66 leading Taiwan’s political leaders to consider a
controversial Special Budget.67 (See “Taiwan’s Commitment to Self-Defense and Budgets”
below.)
Taiwan’s new demand for domestic industrial participation had added another issue and greater
potential costs to the program (about $2.5 billion to the total), which U.S. Navy officials
discussed with potential prime contractors at the third Industry Day meeting on December 15,
2003, in Washington.68 However, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz told Taiwan’s visiting
legislative delegation on June 21, 2004, that the Bush Administration approved Taiwan’s request
for assistance in purchasing submarines but is opposed to Taiwan’s new proposal to build them in

58 Tung-sen Hsin-wen Pao, Taipei, September 28, 2005.
59 United Daily News (Taipei), April 21, 2003 and April 22, 2003; Taiwan Defense Review, May 17, 2003 and May 30,
2003.
60 U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, Defense and Aerospace Report, Second Quarter 2003; Bloomberg, July 10, 2003;
Defense Daily, July 11, 2003; TDReview, September 19, 2003.
61 Central News Agency, Taipei, October 16, 2003.
62 Wendell Minnick, “Submarine Decisions Show Lack of Creativity,” Taipei Times, October 16, 2004.
63 Lien-ho Pao [United Daily News], Taipei, October 23, 2003; Central News Agency, Taipei, October 26, 2003.
64 Taipei Times, October 31, 2003; Central News Agency, November 2, 2003.
65 Author’s discussion with Lin Yu-fang in Taipei in December 2003.
66 Lien-ho Pao [United Daily News], August 25, 2003; Taipei Times, October 31, 2003.
67 Taiwan Defense Review, April 30, 2004.
68 Ibid., February 6, 2004 and April 30, 2004.
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Taiwan.69 With U.S. opposition to Taiwan’s domestic production of submarines conveyed in
official letters from the Defense Department in May and July 2004, Minister of Defense Lee Jye
estimated that the cost of the submarines could be reduced.70 Depending on the funds ultimately
approved in Taiwan, the scope of a program could be restricted to fewer than eight boats.
Thus, with delays in Taiwan’s decision-making after 2001, Taiwan’s request for and the Bush
Administration’s approval of a sale of submarines have met with mixed opinions in Taipei and
Washington. In early 2003, senior officials in the Bush Administration stressed ASW surveillance
as one priority for Taiwan’s military to consider, with the focus on static arrays and patrol aircraft
to track submarines. The Administration approved submarines but did not consider them a
priority.71
In early 2006, articles appeared alleging that the U.S. Navy failed to effectively implement the
diesel sub program for Taiwan, in part to protect the nuclear-powered submarine capability.72 The
Defense Department and the Navy have repeated that they support President Bush’s 2001 policy
decision on arms sales to Taiwan, but that Taiwan has to commit to fund the program. In February
2006, Representative Rob Simmons visited Taiwan, saying that he represented his district in
Connecticut, home to General Dynamics’ Electric Boat shipyard. In a speech at the American
Chamber of Commerce in Taipei, Simmons suggested that the subs could cost less, perhaps
around $8 billion, and proposed an interim step to break the impasse whereby Taiwan could
procure a sub design first, costing perhaps $225 million.73 The Navy and DSCA said that Taiwan
could first submit a request for a sub design phase.74
On April 3, 2006, Taiwan’s military submitted a request for U.S. assessment of the feasibility of
using two phases (design then perhaps construction). Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard
Lawless conveyed the U.S. policy response to Taiwan’s defense minister in an official letter on
June 27, 2006, stating that a two-phased approach was “legally permissible and administratively
feasible.” However, Lawless warned that such a program likely would increase costs and risks,
making foreign design firms and their governments less willing to participate. The Defense
Department estimated the design phase to cost $360 million, if Taiwan requests it.75 Following
Lawless’ letter, Representative Rob Simmons wrote a letter to Defense Minister Lee Jye on July
17, noting that the next step was for Taiwan to request a letter of offer or acceptance for a phased
approach to the design and acquisition of subs.76 In answer to a question posed by Representative
Rob Simmons at a meeting of the Congressional Shipbuilding Caucus on September 27, 2006,

69 United Daily News (Taipei), June 23, 2004.
70 Lien-Ho Pao, September 8, 2004; Central News Agency, October 19, 2004. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Richard Lawless referred to his previous letters of May 20 and July 7, 2004, in a letter to Defense Minister Lee Jye on
June 27, 2006.
71 U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, Defense and Security Report, 2nd Quarter 2005.
72 Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan Claims U.S. Navy is Sabotaging SSK Plans,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, February 15, 2006;
“Come Clean on Subs,” editorial, Defense News, February 13, 2006.
73 News from Rob Simmons, February 17, 2006; Central News Agency, February 22, 2006; Taipei Times, February 23,
2006; Defense News, February 27, 2006; and AmCham’s Taiwan Business Topics, March 2006.
74 Interviews with Navy and DSCA officials, including consultations in Taipei in April 2006.
75 Letter from Richard Lawless to Taiwan’s Defense Minister Lee Jye, June 27, 2006; Jim Wolf, “U.S. Clears Two-
Stage Path to Taiwan Submarine Deal,” Reuters, July 14, 2006.
76 Letter from Rob Simmons to Defense Minister Lee Jye, July 17, 2006.
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Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England wrote that his department stood ready to support
the U.S. effort to help Taiwan acquire submarines, if Taiwan provided the necessary funds.77
Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy has requested funds from Taiwan to keep an office to manage the sub
program and reportedly warned Taiwan in August 2005 that the “pre-selection” process would
stop without such funds. Through March 2006, Taiwan paid $7.5 million to keep the office
open.78
On June 15, 2007, Taiwan’s legislature passed the 2007 defense budget with $6 million to fund a
“feasibility study” (with LY participation) and did not commit to the design phase or full
procurement of submarines (the two U.S.-approved options). Representative James Langevin
expressed concerns in a letter to the Secretary of Defense and asked for a review of the U.S.
proposal to Taiwan.79 For the study, a LY delegation met with companies and officials in the
United States in August 2007. The LY delegation was positive about its visit but did not reach a
conclusion about the sub procurement. In September 2007, the stance of the KMT’s presidential
candidate, Ma Ying-yeou, was to support the sub purchase, but a KMT legislator who was in the
LY delegation of August suggested a possible “new list” of arms requests depending on the
outcome of the presidential election in March 2008.80
Taiwan’s Defense Ministry requested in the 2008 defense budget about US$169 million as the
first of three annual installments for the design phase (total of US$360 million). The LY’s defense
committee kept the requested amount in the defense budget that it approved in October 2007, but
the question of procurement was left for inter-party negotiations and the full LY to address. In
December 2007, the LY approved the 2008 defense budget with the funds for the sub program cut
to US$61.5 million. With only one-sixth of the required amount, questions remained about
Taiwan’s full funding for the design phase and how the U.S. Navy would be able to execute the
first phase as approved by the Defense Department in June 2006. Nevertheless, in January 2008,
Navy Secretary Donald Winter assured Representative Joe Courtney that Taiwan was required to
commit to fully fund phase one, but incremental payments would be acceptable.81 Later in
January 2008, the Navy accepted Taiwan’s Letter of Request (LOR) for the design phase.82 Then,
a Navy team visited Taiwan in March 2008 to discuss details of the program.83
However, on October 3, 2008, the Bush Administration did not submit for congressional review
the pending submarine design program, while notifying Congress of six other proposed arms
sales to Taiwan. Representative Joe Courtney wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on
October 6, 2008, to inquire about the status of the submarine design program given the failure to
notify Congress.

77 Gordon England, letter to Rob Simmons, October 24, 2006.
78 National Journal, April 6, 2006; and author’s interviews in Taipei in April 2006.
79 James Langevin, letter to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, July 20, 2007.
80 Su Chi’s remarks at U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, Defense Industry Conference, Annapolis, September 10-11,
2007; author’s consultations in Taipei in November 2007.
81 Assistant Secretary of the Navy John Thackrah, letter of response, January 18, 2008.
82 Consultations with TECRO, January and February 2008.
83 Wendell Minnick, “Hurdles Await Taiwan Efforts to Move Forward on Submarines,” Defense News, March 17,
2008.
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Š’ Š—DZȱŠ“˜›ȱǯǯȱ›–œȱŠ•Žœȱ’—ŒŽȱŗşşŖȱ
ȱ
Ȭřȱȱ’›Œ›Šȱ
After the United States approved Taiwan’s request for 12 P-3C planes, the two sides have
negotiated the proposed sale. But Taiwan questioned the estimated cost of $300 million per new
plane (in part due to Lockheed Martin’s need to reopen the production line) for a total cost of $4.1
billion (including parts and training) and sought alternatives in 2003, such as refurbished P-3Bs
or surplus P-3Cs retired from the U.S. Navy’s fleet. A longer-term option is the Multi-Mission
Maritime Aircraft (MMA) under development by Boeing’s subsidiary, McDonnell Douglas, for
the U.S. Navy. In 2004, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense sought approval from the Legislative Yuan
(LY) of a Special Budget to include funds (about $1.6 billion) for 12 refurbished P-3C ASW
planes (sold as Excess Defense Articles) with possible delivery in 2008-2011.84 The sale became
more complicated in 2006, when L-3 Communications wanted to compete.85 The LY committed
to the procurement of the P-3C planes by budgeting about $188 million in the 2007 defense
budget passed on June 15, 2007 (with a total program cost of $1.4 billion). About three months
later in September 2007, the Bush Administration notified Congress of the proposed sale of 12
excess P-3C aircraft (and related support) worth $1.96 billion. Upon this notification, China’s
military showed its displeasure by refusing to carry out U.S.-PLA military exchanges for about a
month.
Š›’˜ȱ’œœ’•ŽȱŽŽ—œŽȱ
After U.S. approval in 1992, Taiwan in 1997 acquired three Patriot missile defense fire units with
PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missiles. After the Bush Administration in 2001 decided to brief
Taiwan on the advanced PAC-3 hit-to-kill missile, Taiwan has considered buying the PAC-3
system. (The U.S. Army completed developmental testing of the PAC-3 in October 2001 and
conducted operational tests in 2002. The PAC-3 has been deployed with the U.S. Army, as seen in
Operation Iraqi Freedom during March-April 2003. Raytheon describes its Patriot system as the
world’s most advanced ground-based system for defense against aircraft, theater ballistic missiles,
and cruise missiles.)
In late 2002, the Pentagon reportedly was disappointed with Taiwan’s delay in requesting the
PAC-3 missiles.86 At a private sector conference on Taiwan’s defense in February 2003, Bush
Administration officials openly stressed to Taiwan’s visiting Deputy Defense Minister Chen
Chao-min the imperative of acquiring advanced missile defense systems. (See “Policy Issues for
Congress” below.) In March 2003, Mary Tighe, the Director of Asian and Pacific Affairs, led a
Defense Department delegation to Taiwan to urge its acquisition of missile defense systems,
including the PAC-3.87 After Chen criticized the Patriot’s performance in Operation Iraqi
Freedom in 2003, a Pentagon spokesperson, Jeff Davis, publicly corrected Chen to Taiwan’s
media on March 27, 2003.88 According to the U.S. Army, the Patriot missile defense system (with
Guidance Enhanced Missiles and PAC-3 missiles) intercepted nine Iraqi missiles out of nine
engagements.89 In April 2003, Taiwan submitted to the United States a request for price and

84 Taiwan Defense Review, April 30, 2004.
85 China Times, Taipei, September 4, 2006; Jane’s Defense Weekly, October 18, 2006.
86 Taiwan Defense Review, December 6, 2002.
87 Central News Agency (Taiwan), March 11, 2003.
88 Taipei Times, March 29, 2003.
89 U.S. Army, 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, Fort Bliss, TX, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Theater Air
and Missile Defense,” September 2003. For a skeptical view, see Randy Barrett, “Pentagon Releases Candid Glimpse
(continued...)
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availability data in a step towards a contract, and in May 2004, Defense Minister Lee Jye
requested six PAC-3 units and upgrade of three PAC-2 Plus units (around Taipei) to the PAC-3
standard for about $4.3 billion.90
Complicated by the failure of a referendum to pass in March 2004, Taiwan’s military reportedly
has looked to buy PAC-3 units, originally seeking funds out of a Special Budget submitted in
May 2004.91 Acquisition of missile defense systems has been controversial in Taiwan, with some
supporting the development of domestic long-range missiles instead and some preferring short-
range missile defense systems. (See discussions on Taiwan’s defense budgets and missile program
below.) Missile defense also became politicized, when President Chen Shui-bian pushed for a
referendum on buying more missile defense systems that was held on the presidential election day
on March 20, 2004. That referendum became invalid when only 45% of eligible voters cast
ballots (with 50% needed). (Out of the valid ballots cast, 92% agreed with the proposal.) The
opposition KMT and PFP parties objected to acquiring PAC-3 missiles for three years, based on
their claim that the referendum “vetoed” the question.92
In 2006, Taiwan’s military and lawmakers debated whether to upgrade Taiwan’s PAC-2 missile
defense units, if PAC-3 missiles were not purchased. Legislative Yuan President Wang Jin-pyng
promoted PAC-2 upgrades, but other KMT lawmakers did not support additional purchases of
Patriot missile defense. KMT Legislator Shuai Hua-ming, a retired army lieutenant general,
preferred more “cost-effective” weapons and “offensive” missile systems as “deterrence.”93 At the
time, Taiwan had not upgraded its Patriot missile defense systems (to the latest configuration for
radars and command and control with new training and hardware). The cheaper option to first
upgrade the ground systems for Taiwan’s three PAC-2 units was estimated at $600 million. In
April 2006, after first rejecting Patriot upgrades, Taiwan’s defense ministry requested U.S. price
and availability data for PAC-2 upgrades and requested a supplemental budget for Patriot
upgrades in 2006 (not passed).94 In the end, Taiwan’s LY deleted the defense ministry’s request of
about $347 million (out of a total program cost of $3.6 billion) to procure PAC-3 missiles in the
2007 defense budget passed on June 15, 2007, and opted to fund about $110 million for PAC-2
upgrades (out of a total program cost of $603 million). The President notified Congress in
November 2007 of the proposed Patriot ground systems upgrade program, valued at $939 million.
In late 2007, Taiwan’s LY partially resolved whether to procure PAC-3 missiles. In October 2007,
the LY’s defense committee retained a requested budget of about US$539 million in the 2008
defense budget to begin to procure PAC-3 missiles. However, the question was left for inter-party
negotiations and the full LY to address in December 2007, which decided to fund four sets but
freeze the funds for two more, freezing NT$5.8 billion (US$179 million) out of NT$17.5 billion
(US$539 million). By the second quarter of 2008, the LY’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense
Committee released frozen funds, for the total program of six PAC-3 missile batteries with 384

(...continued)
of Missile Defense During Iraq War,” Space News, November 10, 2003.
90 Far Eastern Economic Review, May 15, 2003; Jane’s, July 23, 2003; Taiwan Defense Review, June 15, 2004.
91 Central News Agency, March 3, 2004; China Times, April 13, 2004; Taiwan Defense Review, April 30, 2004.
92 A KMT lawmaker, Su Chi, voiced his objections to missile defense based on the referendum’s result during the
author’s visit to Taiwan in October 2004, before his election.
93 Taipei Times, April 10, 2006; and author’s interview with Shuai Hua-min in April 2006.
94 Central News Agency, February 21, 2006; Taipei Times, February 22, 2006; author’s interview with Raytheon in
March 2006; and author’s interviews in Taipei in April 2006.
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missiles.95 On October 3, 2008, President Bush notified Congress of a proposed sale of 330 PAC-
3 missiles for the estimated value of $3.1 billion. However, the sale of PAC-3 missile defense
systems was broken up, excluding three of seven firing units (including one training unit) and
about 50 missiles which would require another notification to Congress to proceed, in an apparent
arbitrary decision.
Š›•¢ȱŠ›—’—ȱŠŠ›œȱ
In 1999, some in Congress encouraged the Clinton Administration to approve a sale of early
warning radars (see “106th Congress” below), approval that was given in 2000. The Pentagon has
stressed the importance of long-range early warning and tracking of ballistic and cruise missile
attacks against Taiwan. Taiwan reportedly considered two options: a radar similar to AN/FPS-115
Pave Paws sold by Raytheon and the LM Digital UHF Radar proposed by Lockheed Martin.96
Despite divided opinions among lawmakers, in November 2003, Taiwan’s legislature approved
the Defense Ministry’s request for about $800 million to fund one radar site (rather than an option
for two).97 Nonetheless, on March 30, 2004, the Defense Department notified Congress of the
proposed sale of two ultra high frequency long range early warning radars, with the potential
value of $1.8 billion, that would enhance Taiwan’s ability to identify and detect ballistic missiles
as well as cruise missiles, and other threats from the air, and improve the early warning capability
of Taiwan’s C4ISR architecture. The formal notification pointed out that U.S. personnel will not
be assigned to the radar(s). By early 2005, Taiwan had not contracted for the controversial
program, and Lockheed Martin withdrew its bid.98 In June 2005, Raytheon concluded a contract
worth $752 million to provide one Early Warning Surveillance Radar System to Taiwan by
September 2009.99 By early 2007, Taiwan decided not to procure a second radar.100
Ś ȱ
In addition, after approval in 1999, the United States reportedly has assisted Taiwan’s C4ISR
program (named Po Sheng program), involving sales of datalink systems and integration of the
services into a joint command and control system.101 In July 2001, the Bush Administration
notified Congress of a proposed sale of Joint Tactical Information Distribution Systems
(JTIDS)/Link 16 terminals, a basis for an expanded program. In early 2003, the Administration
signaled to Taiwan that this FMS program (managed by the U.S. Navy’s SPAWAR command)
should be given top priority. Taiwan opted for a program costing a total of about $1.4 billion,
rather than a more comprehensive option costing about $3.9 billion.102 In September 2003,

95 U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, “Defense & Security Report,” Second Quarter 2008.
96 Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 26, 2003 and February 11, 2004.
97 Taiwan Defense Review, November 26, 2003; Jane’s Defense Review, December 3, 2003.
98 Jane’s Defense Weekly, February 9, 2005.
99 Raytheon, June 23, 2005; Department of Defense, Air Force Contract for Raytheon, June 23, 2005; Wall Street
Journal
, June 24, 2005; CNA, June 25, 2005.
100 Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan’s Military Grapples with a Major C4ISR Upgrade,” C4ISR Journal, March 2, 2007.
101 Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times] (Taiwan), July 18, 2001; Defense and Aerospace (U.S.-Taiwan Business
Council), 2001; Taiwan Defense Review, August 27, 2002.
102 SPAWAR briefing at U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, February 12-14, 2003; Taiwan Defense Review,
July 17, 2003; Tzu-Yu Shih Pao [Liberty Times], July 14, 2003.
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Lockheed Martin obtained a contract with the initial value of $27.6 million.103 The notification to
Congress submitted on September 24, 2003, indicated that the total value could reach $775
million. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry also decided not to integrate U.S. communications security
(COMSEC) equipment that could facilitate crisis-management and interoperability.104 Full
Operational Capability of the Po Sheng C4ISR program is expected at the end of 2009.105
ȱŠ—ȱȱ
In April 2000, the Clinton Administration approved the sale of AIM-120 Advanced Medium-
Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) to Taiwan, with the understanding that the missiles
would be kept in storage on U.S. territory and transferred later to Taiwan, if/when the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) acquires a similar Russian missile, like the R-77 (AA-12) air-to-air
missile, or threatens to attack Taiwan. In September 2000, the Administration notified Congress
of a potential sale of 200 AMRAAMs.
On July 1, 2002, the Washington Times reported that, in June, two SU-30 fighters of the PLA Air
Force test-fired AA-12 medium-range air-to-air missiles acquired from Russia. The report raised
questions as to whether the PLA already deployed the missiles. According to Reuters (July 10,
2002), Raytheon planned to finalize production of the AMRAAMs for Taiwan by the fall of 2003.
Some in Congress urged the Bush Administration to transfer the AMRAAMs to Taiwan after
production. (See “107th Congress” below.)
By the end of 2002, the Bush Administration authorized delivery of the AMRAAMs to Taiwan
and briefed its air force on ground-launched AMRAAMs.106 (The U.S. Army has developed the
Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile, or SLAMRAAM, for cruise
missile defense.) By November 2003, Taiwan received its first delivery of AMRAAMs, and a
pilot of Taiwan’s air force test-fired an AMRAAM at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida on
November 10, 2003.107 However, although the Clinton Administration agreed to Taiwan’s request
for 200 AMRAAMs for Taiwan’s 150 F-16 fighters, Taiwan’s Air Force actually purchased only
120 AMRAAMs (although some U.S. observers think Taiwan needs at least 350 AMRAAMs).108
By April 2004, the Defense Department reportedly encouraged Taiwan to acquire the
SLAMRAAM to help counter the PLA’s expected deployment of land attack cruise missiles.109
ȬŗŜȦȱ’‘Ž›œȱ
In 2006, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry requested initial funding from the LY to acquire 66 F-16C/D
fighters and to boost the defense budget in 2007 (an attempt to reach 2.85% of GDP).110 On

103 Taiwan Defense Review, September 17, 2003; Jane’s Defense Weekly, October 1, 2003.
104 U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, “Defense & Security Report,” Third Quarter 2004.
105 U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, defense conference, San Diego, CA, September 19, 2005.
106 Lien-Ho Pao [United Daily News], Taipei, January 5, 2003; Remarks of Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force
Willard Mitchell at the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council’s conference in February 2003.
107 Taiwan Defense Review, November 15, 2003; Central News Agency, November 18, 2003.
108 Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan’s Military will Fire Blanks,” Taipei Times, May 25, 2005.
109 Jane’s Defense Weekly, April 7, 2004.
110 In spring of 2006, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry considered asking to purchase new F-16C/D (not F-15) fighters
(author’s interviews in Taipei in April 2006). Also: Wendell Minnick, “Airplane Race in Taiwan Straits,” Defense
News
, May 15, 2006; Jim Wolf, “Taiwan Seeks 66 F-16 Fighters,” Reuters, July 27, 2006; Minnick, “U.S. Debates
(continued...)
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November 6, 2006, the LY’s defense and budget committees jointly passed an amended 2007
defense budget, which froze the requested budget for F-16C/D fighters for five months (ending
on May 31, 2007), pending U.S. provision of price and availability data. When the LY passed the
final 2007 defense budget on June 15, 2007, the deadline for releasing the funds (about $488
million) for F-16C/Ds was extended until October 31. The total program cost was estimated at
$4.9 billion. In the LY, there was broad political support for procurement of new fighters, but
there was uncertainty about next steps if President Bush did not approve the release of pricing
data (a potential sale).
The Bush Administration refused even to accept a formal Letter of Request (LOR) for F-16C/D
fighters, after Taiwan tried to submit one in July 2006, February 2007, and June 2007.111
Nonetheless, in October 2007, the LY’s defense committee passed a 2008 defense budget that
retained the requested F-16 procurement program. In December 2007, inter-party negotiations
and the final decision in the LY deleted NT$2.2 billion from NT$22.2 billion leaving NT$20
billion (US$615 million). But the whole amount was frozen pending U.S. price and availability
data. On September 22, 2008, Defense Minister Chen Chao-min reported to the LY that the
military needed to acquire the F-16 fighters. The Defense Ministry had to return the unspent
funds in the 2007 defense budget and needs to return the funds in the 2008 budget. NT$15 billion
(US$484 million) was included in the 2009 budget.112
In 2006, President Bush reportedly was reluctant to consider a formal request for new F-16
fighters without Taiwan’s resolution of pending arms sales and without a 2007 defense budget
that included funds for the fighters, given questions about Taiwan’s credibility on arms purchases.
Moreover, the Administration expressed disapproval in April 2007 about Taiwan’s domestic
development of land-attack cruise missiles for an “offensive” capability (see below). Then, within
days after the LY’s passage of the 2007 defense budget in mid-June 2007, Taiwan President Chen
proposed a referendum on membership in the U.N. under the name “Taiwan” to be held on the
day of the next presidential election (scheduled for March 22, 2008). At a U.S.-Taiwan defense
industry conference on September 10-11, 2007, at which there was concern about the persisting
status of “no decision” on whether to consider Taiwan’s interest in F-16s, the Administration
issued a policy address that stressed U.S. opposition to this referendum while linking strength and
moderation as two requirements for the broader and longer-term security of Taiwan.113 President
Bush has looked to Beijing to cooperate in nuclear nonproliferation efforts targeting North Korea
and Iran. After the last sale of fighters to Taiwan, when President George H. W. Bush approved
the sale of 150 F-16A/B fighters to Taiwan in September 1992, the PRC ended its participation in
the “Arms Control in the Middle East” talks. Some critics argued that the sale in 1992 of F-16
fighters violated the 1982 Communique on reducing arms sales to Taiwan.114 In addition to
concerns about the political context of cross-strait stability and not undermining the tough
message to Taipei, there are issues about whether Taiwan’s limited defense dollars might be better

(...continued)
Taiwan Request for 66 F-16s,” Defense News, August 28, 2006; author’s consultations in September 2006; and Central
News Agency
, Taipei, October 2, 2006 (quoting Minister Lee Jye).
111 Liberty Times, Taipei, November 2, 2007; information from TECRO, February 29, 2008; and U.S.-Taiwan Business
Council, “Defense & Security Report,” Second Quarter 2008.
112 Youth Daily News, Taipei, September 23, 2008; author’s consultations, September 2008.
113 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Christensen, “A Strong and Moderate Taiwan,” U.S.-Taiwan Defense
Industry Conference, Annapolis, MD, September 11, 2007.
114 Chas. Freeman, Jr., “Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 1998.
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spent on other defensive requirements, such as munitions, logistics, training, professional
personnel, etc. Another question concerns the impact of only 66 fighters on the military balance
in the Taiwan Strait.
Advocates say that Taiwan’s legitimate request for F-16C/D fighters needed to maintain air-
superiority should not be linked to other pending procurement or political considerations.115
Taiwan is showing commitment to self-defense, a U.S. goal for cross-strait stability. Section 3(b)
of the TRA stipulates that the President and Congress shall determine arms sales “based solely
upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan.” In 1994, Congress passed the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act for FY1994-FY1995 (P.L. 103-236), with language to affirm that Sec. 3 of the
TRA (on arms sales) takes primacy over policy statements (1982 Joint Communique). Moreover,
in issuing the August 17, 1982 Joint Communique, President Reagan wrote in a memo that “it is
essential that the quantity and quality of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the
threat posed by the PRC. Both in quantitative and qualitative terms, Taiwan’s defense capability
relative to that of the PRC will be maintained.”116 According to Lockheed Martin, a sale to
Taiwan would provide about 8,000 U.S. jobs. Moreover, supporters argue that the United States
should consider Taiwan’s request when Taiwan has shown a commitment to increasing its defense
budget and defense capabilities (long-sought U.S. goals), and the less provocative KMT Party’s
Ma Ying-jeou became Taiwan’s president in May 2008. Also, withholding support for this request
undermines another U.S. objective of discouraging Taiwan’s deployment of long-range cruise
missiles. Finally, supporters point out that in April 2001, President Bush dropped the 20-year-old
annual arms talks process used to discuss arms sales to Taiwan in favor of normal, routine
considerations of Taiwan’s requests on an as-needed basis.
In March 2008, in answer to Senators Tim Johnson and James Inhofe of the Senate Taiwan
Caucus, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman promised that the department will
consider carefully any request from Taiwan for defense articles and services, “including
replacement airframes.”117 See discussion on major congressional actions in the section on the
“110th Congress” below.
Nevertheless, some are concerned that the Administration has stressed China’s objections over
U.S. policy consideration of arms sales based solely upon Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs.
Even after Taiwan approved a defense budget in December 2007 and the less provocative Ma
Ying-jeou succeeded Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan’s president in May 2008, President Bush
reportedly has continued to rebuff Taiwan’s efforts to request F-16 fighters, in part because of the
Olympic Games in August.118
The F-16C/D (single-seat/two-seat versions) multi-role (air-to-air and air-to-surface combat)
fighters would not be a new type of weapon sold to Taiwan, as they are the improved versions of
F-16s sold in 1992. In September 1992, the President notified Congress of the sale of 150 F-
16A/B fighters with a value of $5.8 billion. (The first F-16A fighters had entered service in the

115 U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, “Defense & Security Report,” 3rd Quarter 2006; 2nd Quarter 2007; John Tkacik,
“Approve Taiwan Arms Buy,” Defense News, July 30, 2007.
116 James Lilley, China Hands (Public Affairs, 2004); see CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One
China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei
, by Shirley A. Kan.
117 Eric Edelman, letter to Senators Tim Johnson and James Inhofe, March 28, 2008.
118 Washington Times, May 9 and 30, 2008; Rupert Hammond-Chambers, President of the U.S.-Taiwan Business
Council, “Taiwan’s Security on Hold,” op-ed, The Hill, June 6, 2008.
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U.S. Air Force in 1979. In 1980, the Air Force began a program to improve the F-16’s capabilities
for precision strike, night attack, and beyond-visual-range interception, with advanced controls
and fire control radars, etc. The Air Force received the first F-16C fighters in 1984.)119 The
Secretary of Defense’s annual report to Congress on PRC military power warned that the
modernizing PLA has been shifting the military balance in its favor. The Pentagon reported that
the PLA Air Force has 490 aircraft (330 fighters and 160 bombers) within range of Taiwan
(without need to refuel), while Taiwan has 390 fighters.120 Since 1990, the PLA Air Force has
bought Russian Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, and in late 2006, received the first J-10 fighters
(developed in China based on the Israeli Lavi program of the 1980s). The PLA Air Force also
acquired Russian S-300PMU2 surface-to-air missiles with a range that extends over Taiwan’s
airspace. Taiwan’s advanced fighters include 146 F-16A/Bs, 56 Mirages, and 128 IDFs
(Indigenous Defense Fighters). Taiwan has a requirement to replace aging F-5 fighters but also
needs to replace the IDFs.
‘Ž›ȱ˜œœ’‹•Žȱžž›ŽȱŠ•Žœȱ
In addition to the major weapon systems discussed above, possible future arms sales to Taiwan’s
military include:121
• signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft (perhaps sold by Gulfstream, Raytheon, or
Cessna) for which Taiwan reportedly requested price and availability data in
2002;
• C-27J Spartan medium transport aircraft (sold by Lockheed Martin);
• F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF), particularly the short take-off/vertical landing
(STOVL) version, under development by Lockheed Martin and foreign partners
(including Singapore);
• Stryker armored wheeled vehicles (sold by General Dynamics);
• upgraded engines for F-16s (Pratt & Whitney or General Electric);
• CH-53X minesweeping helicopters (developed by Sikorsky)
• search-and-rescue helicopters (Sikorsky or Bell)
• trainer aircraft
• KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refueling aircraft;
• Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS) (sold by Raytheon).

119 Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1986-1987; U.S. Air Force fact sheet, June 2006.
120 Defense Department, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2008,” March 3, 2008.
121 Flight International, November 25-December 1, 2003; Jane’s Defense Review, January 14, 2004; U.S.-Taiwan
Business Council, Defense and Aerospace Report, First Quarter 2004; Taiwan Defense Review, May 7, 2004; Central
News Agency
, June 21, 2004; Flight International, July 13-19, 2004; Flight International, September 7-13, 2004;
Flight International, December 7-13, 2004; Taiwan Defense Review, December 30, 2004; AFP, Hong Kong, March 8,
2005; Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 4, 2005; Defense News, May 7, 2007; Taipei Times, June 24, 2007; Lien-ho Pao,
July 9, 2007; and author’s consultations.
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Since the early 1990s, and accelerated after the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996, the PLA has
modernized with a missile buildup and foreign arms acquisitions, primarily from Russia.122 As a
result of the PLA’s provocative exercises and missile test-firings in 1995 and 1996 that were
directed against Taiwan, Congress has increasingly asserted its role vis-a-vis the Administration
in determining security assistance for Taiwan, as stipulated by Section 3(b) of the TRA, as well as
in exercising its oversight of Section 2(b)(6) of the TRA on the U.S. capacity to resist any resort
to force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan. Congress increasingly asserted its role in
determining arms sales to Taiwan before sales were decided.
Moreover, Section 3(c) of the TRA requires the President to inform Congress “promptly” of any
threat to “the security or the social or economic system” of the people on Taiwan and any danger
to U.S. interests, so that the President together with the Congress shall determine the appropriate
U.S. response. (In March 1996, during the Taiwan Strait Crisis when President Clinton deployed
two aircraft carrier battle groups near Taiwan, the State Department nonetheless testified that the
situation did not constitute a “threat to the security or the social or economic system” of Taiwan
and therefore did not invoke Section 3(c) for a congressional role.123) Policy issues center on how
effectively the Administration is helping Taiwan’s self-defense, the role of Congress in
determining security assistance to Taiwan, and whether aspects of U.S. security assistance are
stabilizing or destabilizing and should be adjusted based on changing conditions. Overall, the
question for policy is whether to disengage from or increase engagement with Taiwan in a
number of specific areas.
¡Ž—ȱ˜ȱǯǯȱ˜––’–Ž—ȱ˜—ȱŽŽ—œŽȱ
The persistent question for U.S. decision-makers in the military, Administration, and Congress is
whether the United States would go to war with the PRC over Taiwan and the purpose of any
conflict. The TRA did not replace the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 that ended in 1979.
Nonetheless, some have called for a clear commitment (to shore up deterrence and help Taiwan’s
self-defense), advanced arms sales, interoperability with Taiwan’s military, combined operational
training and planning, high-level meetings, and visits by U.S. flag and general officers to Taiwan.
Others have argued that the United States should avoid a war with China and needs a cooperative
China in a number of global problems, that trends in the Taiwan Strait are destabilizing, and that
the United States should limit security assistance as leverage to prevent provocative moves by
Taiwan’s leaders. The question of U.S. assistance for Taiwan’s defense involves two aspects:
intention (willingness) and capability to assist Taiwan’s self-defense.
In March 1996, President Clinton deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups near Taiwan in
response to the PLA’s provocative missile test-firings and exercises. Another question arose in
April 2001 when President Bush initially said that he would do “whatever it took to help Taiwan
defend herself” if China attacked.

122 See the Defense Department’s annual reports to Congress on PRC Military Power.
123 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord, before the House International
Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, hearing on “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait: Implications for U.S. Foreign
Policy,” March 14, 1996, 104th Congress.
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Supporters have viewed such clarity as needed to prevent miscalculations in Beijing and deter
attacks against Taiwan. However, critics have argued that Bush encouraged provocations from
Taipei, even if the message was not meant for Taiwan, and weakened willingness in Taiwan to
strengthen its own defense. Later, when Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian advocated
referendums and a new constitution, President Bush said that “the comments and actions made by
the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the
status quo, which we oppose,” in appearing with PRC Premier Wen Jiabao in the Oval Office on
December 9, 2003.
At a hearing in April 2004, in answer to Representative Gary Ackerman’s questions about
whether President Bush’s phrase on “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself” means that
the United States would go to war with China if Taiwan makes unilateral moves toward
independence, Assistant Secretary James Kelly stated that what the president said has a meaning
“at the time he says it to those listeners,” we intend to fulfill the defense responsibilities under the
TRA “to the extent necessary,” “we oppose actions that would unilaterally alter Taiwan’s status,”
leaders in Taiwan “misunderstood” if they believe that President Bush supports whatever they do,
and “decisions of war and peace are made by the president with consultation with Congress.”
Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman replied that President Bush’s phrase was a
reaffirmation of the TRA, which leaves a certain “ambiguity.” Rodman also warned Beijing that
its use of force would “inevitably” involve the United States.124
In December 2004, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage also clarified the U.S. defense
commitment by saying, “we have the requirement with the Taiwan Relations Act to keep
sufficient force in the Pacific to be able to deter attack. We are not required to defend. And these
are questions that actually reside with the U.S. Congress, who has to declare an act of war.”125
On June 8, 2005, President Bush qualified U.S. assistance for Taiwan’s self-defense if it is
invaded by saying that “If China were to invade unilaterally, we would rise up in the spirit of the
Taiwan Relations Act. If Taiwan were to declare independence unilaterally, it would be a
unilateral decision, that would then change the U.S. equation, the U.S. look at ... the decision-
making process.”126
In September 2005, the Defense Department further clarified the mutual obligations under the
TRA and limits to U.S. ability to assist Taiwan’s defense. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Richard Lawless issued a speech, stressing the TRA’s focus on Taiwan’s self-defense. He declared
that,
inherent in the intent and logic of the TRA is the expectation that Taiwan will be able to
mount a viable self-defense. For too long, the Taiwan Relations Act has been referenced as
purely a U.S. obligation.... Under the TRA, the U.S. is obligated to “enable” Taiwan to
maintain a sufficient self-defense, but the reality is, it is Taiwan that is obligated to have a
sufficient self-defense. There is an explicit expectation in the TRA that Taiwan is ready,
willing, and able to maintain its self-defense. Taiwan must fulfill its unwritten, but clearly
evident obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act by appropriately providing for its own

124 House International Relations Committee, hearing on “The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next 25 Years,” April 21,
2004.
125 Richard Armitage, Interview with PBS, December 10, 2004.
126 President George W. Bush, “Your World with Neil Cavuto,” Fox News, June 8, 2005.
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defense while not simply relying on the U.S.’s capacity to address a threat in the Strait. The
TRA requires both parties to do their part to deter aggression or coercion vis-a-vis Taiwan.127
A co-chair of the House Taiwan Caucus, Representative Steve Chabot, stated on September 27,
2005, at the Heritage Foundation that Taiwan is only one ally and that it is principally Taiwan’s
responsibility to defend itself. He said that it has been “frustrating” and “disappointing” to many
Members of Congress that Taiwan delayed passage of the Special Budget on arms procurement.
He warned that if Taiwan does not pass the Special Budget, many Members of Congress will “re-
evaluate the extent of support for Taiwan.”
Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian announced on February 27, 2006, that he would “terminate”
the National Unification Council, again raising questions about new tensions. Senator John
Warner, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, told Admiral William Fallon, PACOM
Commander, at a hearing on March 7, 2006, that “if conflict were precipitated by just
inappropriate and wrongful politics generated by the Taiwanese elected officials, I’m not entirely
sure that this nation would come full force to their rescue if they created that problem.” On April
24, 2007, at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee with the new PACOM
commander, Admiral Timothy Keating, Senator Warner said Taiwan should not play the “TRA
card” when the U.S. military is engaged heavily in the world.
‘Š—Žœȱ’—ȱȱ’œœ’•ŽȱŽ™•˜¢–Ž—œȱ
There has been interest among U.S. academic circles and think tanks for Washington to pursue
talks with Beijing on its military buildup and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (instead of simply
enhancing security assistance to Taiwan).128 One catalyst for this debate arose out of the U.S.-
PRC summit in Crawford, TX, on October 25, 2002. As confirmed to Taiwan’s legislature by its
envoy to Washington, C.J. Chen, and reported in Taiwan’s media, then-PRC ruler Jiang Zemin
offered in vague terms a freeze or reduction in China’s deployment of missiles targeted at Taiwan,
in return for restraint in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.129 President Bush reportedly did not respond
directly to Jiang’s linkage. Editorials in Taiwan were divided on whether to pursue Jiang’s offer.
Some argued that confidence building measures, such as a freeze or reduction in PLA missile and
other military deployments, would improve the chances for cross-strait political dialogue and lead
to greater stability. They said that the United States could explore how the PRC might reduce the
threat against Taiwan, such as dismantling missile brigades in a verifiable manner, since sales of
U.S. systems are based on Taiwan’s defense needs. They argued that Jiang’s offer represented the
first time that the PRC offered meaningfully to discuss its forces opposite Taiwan. Others said
that a freeze or redeployment of missiles would not eliminate the PRC’s continuing and broader
military threat against Taiwan (including mobile missiles that can be re-deployed) and that the

127 The speech was read by a DSCA official, Ed Ross, on September 19, 2005, in San Diego, CA, at the Defense
Industry Conference of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, while Lawless was delayed in Beijing at the Six-Party Talks
on North Korea’s nuclear weapons.
128 See David Lampton and Richard Daniel Ewing, “U.S.-China Relations in a Post-September 11th World,” Nixon
Center, August 2002; David Shambaugh’s arguments at conference by Carnegie Endowment, Stanford University,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, and National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, on “Taiwan and U.S.
Policy: Toward Stability or Crisis?,” October 9, 2002; Michael Swaine, “Reverse Course? The Fragile Turnaround in
U.S.-China Relations,” Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief, February 2003; and David Lampton, “The Stealth
Normalization of U.S.-China Relations,” National Interest, fall 2003.
129 Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times], Taipei, November 22, 2002; Taipei Times, November 23, 2002.
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PRC should hold direct talks with leaders in Taipei instead. They argued that Jiang did not seek to
reduce the PLA’s coercive threat but to undermine the relationship between Washington and
Taipei, including sales and deliveries of weapons systems which take years to complete. They
pointed out that the PLA’s missile buildup has continued.
One issue for congressional oversight has concerned whether and how the Administration might
deal with Beijing on the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Policy considerations include the
TRA, the 1982 Joint Communique (which discussed reductions in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan
premised on the PRC’s peaceful unification policy), and the 1982 “Six Assurances” to Taiwan
(including one of not holding prior consultations with the PRC on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan). At
a hearing in March 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell assured Senator Helms that the “Six
Assurances” would remain U.S. policy and that the Administration would not favor consulting the
PRC on arms sales to Taiwan.130 The Bush Administration reportedly did not counter Jiang’s
verbal offer, noting the accelerated missile buildup, continued military threats against Taiwan, the
need for the PRC to talk directly to Taiwan, the TRA, and the “Six Assurances” to Taiwan.
Nonetheless, in April 2004, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly testified that if the PRC
meets its stated obligations to pursue a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and matches its
rhetoric with a military posture that bolsters and supports peaceful approaches to Taiwan, “it
follows logically that Taiwan’s defense requirements will change.”131 In May 2005, an official
PRC newspaper reported that the PLA continued to debate the question of whether to “withdraw”
missiles opposite Taiwan.132
China has continued its buildup of short-range ballistic missiles, whose “adequate precision
guidance” could destroy key leadership facilities, military bases, and communication and
transportation nodes with “minimal advanced warning,” warned the Pentagon’s 2004 report to
Congress on PRC military power. Later, the Secretary of Defense reported to Congress that by
late 2007, the PLA had deployed opposite Taiwan an arsenal of 990-1,070 mobile M-9 and M-11
short-range ballistic missiles, a buildup that has continued to expand by over 100 a year.133
Š’ Š—Ȃœȱ˜––’–Ž—ȱ˜ȱŽ•ȬŽŽ—œŽȱŠ—ȱžŽœȱ
Congress has oversight of the Administration’s dialogue with Taiwan about its self-defense and
military budgets. Congress also has discussed with Taiwan these responsibilities. Since 2002,
some have expressed increasing concerns about Taiwan’s commitment to its self-defense and lack
of national consensus on national security. The Pentagon’s report on PRC Military Power
submitted to Congress in July 2002 said that reforms in Taiwan’s military were needed to achieve
a joint service capability to meet the growing challenge from the PLA’s modernizing air, naval,
and missile forces, but warned that “the defense budget’s steady decline as a percentage of total
government spending will challenge Taiwan’s force modernization.”134 The Pentagon’s report
issued in July 2003 further stressed that the relative decline in Taiwan’s defense budget

130 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on U.S. Foreign Policy, March 8, 2001.
131 House International Relations Committee, Hearing on “The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next 25 Years,” April 21,
2004.
132 Qingnian Cankao [Youth Reference News], Beijing, May 26, 2005.
133 Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” May 29, 2004, and
“Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2008,” March 3, 2008.
134 Department of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” July 12, 2002.
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“increasingly” will challenge its force modernization.135 Starting in 2003, observers have
criticized Taiwan’s civilian and military leaders for not placing more urgent priority on upgrading
their self-defense capability.136
Taiwan’s regular defense budget for 2004 was about US$7.8 billion, which accounted for 2.4% of
GDP and 16.7% of the total government budget, as compared with 3.8% of GDP and 24.3% of
total spending in 1994. (See the table below.) These relative declines took place even as the
Pentagon has warned of an increased threat posed by the PLA to Taiwan, U.S. support for Taiwan
has increased after the 1995-1996 crisis, and the PLA has obtained higher budgets.
Meanwhile, the PRC has significantly increased military budgets, budgets that the Defense
Department has assessed as markedly understating actual defense-related expenditures (by
excluding funds for weapons research, foreign arms purchases, etc.). The Secretary of Defense’s
latest report on PRC military power estimated that China’s total defense spending for 2007 could
be $97-139 billion, about two to three times the announced military budget.137 The PRC’s defense
budget can be used as one indicator of the priority placed on the PLA’s modernization. In March
2008, the PRC announced its military budget for 2008 that totaled $58.8 billion, claiming a
17.6% increase over last year’s military budget. Actually, the announced 2008 budget is an
increase of 19.1% over last year’s announced budget (vs. actual budget). Using the PRC’s own
announced military budgets, the 2008 budget is a doubling of the 2004 budget. This trend of
double-digit percentage increases has continued for years. Nominally, China has raised its
announced military budget by double-digit percentage increases every year since 1989. After the
Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996, China’s announced military budget has increased in real terms
(accounting for inflation) every year, including real double-digit percentage increases every year
since 1998. China’s military budget is the highest in Asia.
Some legislators in Taiwan have argued that Taiwan’s defense spending has been sufficiently
significant, that the legislature in the newly consolidated democracy has the right to scrutinize the
defense budget, that economic challenges constrain defense spending, and that Taiwan does not
need U.S. weapons in an accommodation with the PRC. The U.S. approvals of significant arms
sales in 2001 came in the one year of negative real change in Taiwan’s GDP (-2.2%), according to
Global Insight. Also, Taiwan’s officials and legislators pointed out that Taiwan had funded
defense out of separate Special Budgets in addition to the regular (annual) defense budgets.
Taiwan’s Special Budgets for defense in 1994-2003 totaled US$22.6 billion and funded
procurement of fighter aircraft and military housing construction.138 Since 2003, anti-American
complaints in Taiwan have targeted perceived U.S. “pressure,” “extortion,” “sucker’s arms deals,”
and “arms dealers’ profits.”139

135 Department of Defense, “Report on PRC Military Power,” July 30, 2003.
136 Peter Brookes, “The Challenges and Imperatives in Taiwan’s Defense,” Heritage Lectures, January 9, 2003; John
Tkacik, “Taiwan Must Get Serious About Defense,” Defense News, January 27, 2003; John Tkacik, “Taiwan Must
Grasp on True Defense Needs,” Defense News, December 1, 2003; Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan Procurement in
Shambles,” Defense News, March 19, 2007; Randall Schriver, “Defense: Time to Take Ownership,” Taipei Times,
April 4, 2007; Ted Galen Carpenter, “Taiwan’s Free Ride on U.S. Defense,” Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2007.
137 Secretary of Defense, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2008,” March 3, 2008. The Defense
Department has estimated China’s total military spending at 3.5% to 5% of GDP. Also see Secretary of Defense,
Proliferation: Threat and Response, 2001.
138 Taiwan’s official defense budgets and special budgets were provided by Taiwan’s representative office in
Washington, DC.
139 United Daily News, April 21, 2003; China Times, May 8, 2003 and August 18, 2003.
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In June 2003, Deputy Defense Minister Lin Chong-pin and a Defense Committee delegation led
by Legislative Yuan President Wang Jin-pyng visited Washington to reassure the Bush
Administration and Congress that the government in Taipei remained committed to self-
defense.140 A former official in the Pentagon involved in arms sales decisions wrote in early 2006,
that the impasse over Taiwan’s defense spending does not symbolize a lack of commitment to
self-defense. Mark Stokes contended that the Bush Administration’s policy on arms sales to
Taiwan was right, but it came at the wrong time.141
For 2005, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense requested a defense budget of NT$260.7 billion, a
reduction of NT$3.1 billion from 2004, and the final 2005 defense budget was NT$258.5 billion
(about US$8.0 billion).142
In August 2005, the Defense Ministry requested a budget for 2006 of NT$265.7 billion, an
increase of NT$7.2 billion from 2005. However, that budget included an initial request to buy
PAC-3 missile defense units, after the Ministry lowered the Special Budget by removing funds for
PAC-3. Minister of Defense Lee Jye acknowledged a major “crowding out” impact on the 2006
budget resulting from adding the PAC-3 request to the annual budget. He lamented that he had to
cut out 53 new programs that would have invested in combat strength.143 On January 12, 2006,
the legislature voted to cut NT$11.2 billion (US$348 million) from the annual defense budget for
2006 (funds that would have been supplementary funds to support procurement of PAC-3 missile
defense, P-3C aircraft, and submarines) and did not direct those funds to be used for munitions,
training, or other defense needs. Taiwan’s final 2006 defense budget was NT$252.5 billion (about
US$7.8 billion), a reduction of NT$6 billion from the previous year. Meanwhile, the Minister of
Defense requested a Supplemental Budget for the 2006 defense budget partly to procure U.S.
submarines, P-3C ASW aircraft, and PAC-2 missile defense upgrades, given the lack of
legislative approval for the requested Special Budget. In March 2006, the Defense Ministry
requested a 2006 Supplemental Budget totaling NT$13.7 billion (US$420 million) for 74 defense
programs, including NT$5.6 billion (US$172 million) for the three weapon systems, but the
Cabinet did not agree with it.
With general U.S. support, Taiwan’s leaders stated a goal of reversing the declining spending
trends and increasing the defense budget to 3% of GDP by 2008. In May 2005, Taiwan’s Defense
Minister Lee Jye requested that the defense budget increase from 2.4% of GDP to 3.0% of GDP
in the next five years.144 President Chen Shui-bian announced on September 12, 2005, the goal of
increasing the annual defense budget to 3% of GDP by 2008, and this goal was officially stated in
Taiwan’s first National Security Report issued by President Chen in May 2006. In reaction to the
report, the State Department issued a statement on May 19, 2006, to stress that the United States
encourages “Taiwan to boost its defense spending, concentrating in particular on immediate
challenges of hardening and sustainability.” Taiwan finally reversed the negative trend in defense
spending with an increase in 2007.

140 Meeting at CRS with Lin Chong-pin and congressional staff, June 5, 2003; Luncheon at the Heritage Foundation
with Taiwan’s legislative delegation led by Wang Jin-pyng, June 24, 2003; TECRO, Taipei Update, July 22, 2003.
141 Mark Stokes, “Taiwan’s Security: Beyond the Special Budget,” AEI, March 27, 2006.
142 Consultations in Taipei and Washington; and FBIS report, October 22, 2004.
143 Central News Agency, Taipei, August 30, 2005.
144 Taipei Times, May 24, 2005.
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Table 1. Taiwan’s Defense Budgets
% of total
Military budget
Military budget
government
Fiscal year
(NT$ bil.)
(US$ bil.)
% of GDP
spending
1994 258.5
9.8 3.8
24.3
1995 252.3
9.5 3.5
24.5
1996 258.3
9.5 3.4
22.8
1997 268.8
9.4 3.3
22.5
1998 274.8
8.2 3.2
22.4
1999 284.5
8.8 3.2
21.6
2000 402.9
12.9 2.9
17.4
2001 269.8
8.0 2.9
16.5
2002 260.4
7.5 2.7
16.4
2003 257.2
7.6 2.6
15.5
2004 261.9
7.8 2.4
16.7
2005 258.5
8.0 2.3
16.1
2006 252.5
7.8 2.1
16.1
2007 304.9
9.2 2.4
18.7
2008 341.1
10.5 2.5
20.2
2009 318.7
9.5 2.6
17.6
Notes: This table was compiled using data on the regular, annual defense budgets provided by the ROC’s
Ministry of National Defense, LY and news reports, as well as data on GDP and exchange rates reported by
Global Insight. The currency is the New Taiwan Dollar (NT$). The FY2000 budget covered the 18-month period
from July 1999 to December 2000.
™ŽŒ’Š•ȱžŽȱ›˜™˜œŽȱ’—ȱŘŖŖŚȱ
In 2002, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense said that it needed the legislature to approve
NT$700 billion (about US$21 billion) over the next 10 years for arms procurement.145 Taiwan’s
Defense Ministry has considered a Special Budget of $15 billion-$20 billion to procure the PAC-
3 missile defense system, submarines, and P-3 ASW aircraft over 10-15 years. As discussed
above, in 2003, Taiwan’s military received the U.S. cost estimate for new submarines as well as
price and availability data for PAC-3 missile defense systems and refurbished P-3C planes. In
May 2003, Minister of Defense Tang Yiau-ming sent a letter to U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense
Wolfowitz, saying that Taiwan planned to submit a Special Budget to the legislature to procure
the three weapon systems. However, Tang allegedly doubted the Special Budget would pass,
while looking to the regular defense budget to fund items of priority to the Army.146
As Taiwan considered a Special Budget, the Pentagon encouraged a decision. In April 2004,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman testified to
Congress that “we have made clear to our friends on Taiwan that we expect them to reverse this

145 Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times] (Taipei), May 17, 2002; Taiwan Defense Review, August 30, 2002.
146 U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, “Defense and Security Report,” 3rd Quarter 2005.
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budget decline. Though our commitments to Taiwan are enduring, the American people and both
the Executive Branch and Congress expect the people of Taiwan to make their own appropriate
commitment to their freedom and security.” Rodman also stressed that “we expect Taiwan to go
forward with its plan to pass a Special Budget this summer to fund essential missile defense and
anti-submarine warfare systems and programs” [emphasis added].147 On May 29, 2004, the
Pentagon issued the 2004 report to Congress on PRC Military Power, stressing that “the principal
indicator of Taiwan’s commitment to addressing its shortfalls will be the fate of its annual defense
budget” and that “the island’s apparent lack of political consensus over addressing [its military
challenges] with substantially increased defense spending is undoubtedly seen as an encouraging
trend in Beijing.”
On May 21, 2004, Taiwan’s Defense Minister Lee Jye—a retired Naval Admiral personally
committed to procuring new submarines—submitted to the Executive Yuan (Cabinet) a request
for a Special Budget for defense totaling about US$20 billion.148 On June 2, the Executive Yuan,
controlled by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), then passed a Special Budget of
NT$610.8 billion (about US$18.2 billion), with about $4.3 billion for PAC-3 missile defense
systems, $12.3 billion for submarines, and $1.6 billion for P-3 aircraft.149 Taiwan’s legislators
have had the options of procuring all three systems, procuring one or two items, alternatives, or
none. However, Taiwan’s priorities remained unclear.
Š’ Š—ȂœȱŘŖŖŚȱŽ’œ•Š’ŸŽȱŽ•ŽŠ’˜—ȱ
The Special Budget was not passed in 2004, although the United States urged passage and
welcomed the LY’s president, Wang Jin-pyng of the KMT, who led a multi-party legislative
delegation to the United States on June 17-27, 2004, to gain direct information on the weapons
systems. The LY delegation visited Pearl Harbor Naval Base, HI; Washington, DC; and Fort
Bliss, TX. Under Wang’s leadership, legislators from different political parties reached a
preliminary consensus in support of the Special Budget during their visit to Washington, where
they met with Members of Congress and defense officials. They said they would seek a new cost
estimate for the submarines, with the options of a construction or maintenance role for Taiwan’s
shipbuilding industry and delivery in 10 (not 15) years (after Deputy Secretary of Defense
Wolfowitz personally expressed to the delegation U.S. opposition to Taiwan’s more expensive
proposal to build submarines domestically); and that they would consider splitting up the Special
Budget to approve funds for the P-3C aircraft and PAC-3 missile defense systems, ahead of
considering the subs.150
However, politicians made the Special Budget into a controversial political issue in gearing up for
legislative elections on December 11, 2004. Opposition parties of the “blue coalition,” the
Kuomintang (KMT) and People First Party (PFP), called for drastic cuts in the Special Budget
and retained their majority in the LY.

147 Statement before the House International Relations Committee, hearing on “The Taiwan Relations Act: the Next 25
Years,” April 21, 2004.
148 Central News Agency, Taipei, May 26, 2004; China Times, Taipei, May 27, 2004.
149 Central News Agency, Taipei, June 2, 2004.
150 Discussion with CRS and Congress on June 22, 2004; United Daily News, June 23, 2004.
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ǯǯȱ›žœ›Š’˜—œȱŠ—ȱ‘’œȱ
In April 2004, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman told
Congress that the Pentagon believed Taiwan’s military needed to improve readiness, planning,
and interoperability among its services.151 In a speech in October 2004, Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense Richard Lawless urged Taiwan’s legislature to “vote in favor of Taiwan’s national
security.”152 In a strong tone, he warned that the Special Budget was a “litmus test” of Taiwan’s
commitment to its self-defense and that “inability” to pass the Special Budget would have
“serious long-term consequences” (for foreign support, further intimidation from Beijing, and
perceptions of Taiwan as a “liability”). Shifting the U.S. stress, Lawless called for Taiwan to
expand its efforts from national defense to national security, and to pay attention to countering
coercion, crisis management, and critical infrastructure protection (CIP) (of national command
centers, telecommunications, energy, water, media, computer networks, etc.). Raising frustrations
in the Bush Administration and Congress that Taiwan was not placing priority on self-defense, it
became increasingly doubtful in 2005 that the LY would vote on the Special Budget and fund it at
the full level, even if it would be considered. Meanwhile, the United States had increased
concerns about and shifted focus to the regular defense budget and other questions about
Taiwan’s self-defense.
ž’—ȱ‘Žȱ™ŽŒ’Š•ȱžŽȱ’—ȱŘŖŖśȱ
In January 2005, President Chen Shui-bian told visiting Representative Tom Lantos that PFP
Chairman James Soong changed his position on the Special Budget after visiting Washington
where he met with Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Randy Schriver.153 The following month, Lawless warned that Taiwan’s failure
to approve the Special Budget signaled that it lacked seriousness about its own security, raising
questions about whether U.S. support has been necessary or not.154 In February 2005, the Defense
Ministry announced that the Special Budget’s figure dropped to NT$590 billion (after
appreciation of the NT dollar relative to the U.S. dollar) and that the request would be reduced to
NT$480 billion (US$15.5 billion) (after removing certain costs, including an estimated US$2.3
billion associated with producing submarines domestically in Taiwan).155 The reduced figure also
factored in moving some infrastructure costs to the annual defense budget, but that budget has
faced cuts. The Cabinet approved the new request on March 16 and submitted it to the LY.156 Two
days earlier, the PRC’s National People’s Congress adopted its “Anti-Secession Law,” warning
that the government in Beijing “may” use force against Taiwan.

151 Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, hearing on “The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next
25 Years,” April 21, 2004.
152 Richard Lawless, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, Keynote Address, U.S.-Taiwan
Defense Industry Conference, U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, October 4, 2004, Scottsdale, AZ. One of the ROC’s
Deputy Ministers of Defense, General Huoh Shou-Yeh, attended the conference.
153 Agence France Presse, Hong Kong, January 17, 2005. The author also confirmed Soong’s meeting with Lawless
with the KMT/PFP’s representative in D.C.
154 Taipei Times, February 26, 2005; Lawless gave a speech that was not publicly released, apparently at a meeting in
Washington of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council.
155 Taipei Times, February 16, 2005; February 23, 2005.
156 Ettoday, Taipei, March 16, 2005 (via FBIS).
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However, Chen and Soong issued a “Ten-Point Consensus” on February 24, 2005, that did not
mention the Special Budget. Indeed, the PFP raised another objection, saying that the major items
should be funded out of the annual defense budget instead of a Special Budget.157 The Defense
Ministry began to consider asking for funds for the PAC-3 missile defense systems out of the
annual defense budget, with submarines as the top priority rather than missile defense stressed by
the Bush Administration.158 In April-May 2005, the chairmen of the opposition parties, KMT’s
Lien Chan and PFP’s James Soong, made historic visits of reconciliation to mainland China,
meeting with Hu Jintao, Communist Party General-Secretary, Central Military Commission
Chairman, and PRC President. These visits to the PRC further dampened prospects that the
Special Budget would be passed.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱ™™ŽŠ•œȱ
On May 24, 2005, the LY’s Procedure Committee failed to place the Special Budget on the
legislative calendar, blocking consideration before the session’s end on May 31. On May 27,
Representative Rob Simmons and 32 other House Members wrote to KMT chairman Lien Chan,
urging him to help expedite passage of the Special Budget in May. They warned that “failure to
pass the special budget has raised concerns in the United States about Taiwan’s ability to defend
itself against potential aggression.”159 However, Lien responded in a three-page letter by making
partisan attacks on the DPP and President Chen Shui-bian, and criticisms of the Special Budget
although the KMT used special budgets in the 1990s.160 Moreover, KMT and PFP members of the
LY’s Defense Committee refused to attend a luncheon on June 9 with the top U.S. representative,
AIT’s Director Doug Paal, while his strained relationship with the DPP apparently required
Deputy Director Dave Keegan to host the DPP lawmakers who showed up to discuss the arms
sales.161 There was no special session in the summer as the ruling DPP requested. On July 16,
2005, the KMT overwhelmingly elected Ma Ying-jeou (Taipei’s Mayor) instead of Wang Jin-
pyng (LY’s President) to replace Lien Chan as KMT Chairman, prompting some to ask whether
Ma would show leadership in considering the Special Budget. However, he focused on the city
and county elections on December 3, 2005, when the KMT won 14 out of 23 seats.
On August 1, 2005, three co-chairs of the House Taiwan Caucus wrote to Ma Ying-jeou as the
new KMT chairman. They urged him to “lead efforts in Taipei to ensure that the Legislative Yuan
quickly passes a special arms procurement package or increases its annual defense spending.”
They also invited Ma to visit Washington.162 However, Ma responded as the Mayor of Taipei on
August 18 (one day before becoming KMT Chairman), by blaming the DPP administration for
“procrastinating for three years,” “negligence,” and “lack of leadership,” with no mention of
Wang Jin-pyng’s LY delegation in June 2004. Ma promised to focus his attention on the issue and
to “work closely with the KMT caucus” in the LY after taking over the KMT chairmanship. He
also declined to visit in September, writing that the LY will “address tough bills like the arms
procurement bill.”163 However, after PFP Chairman James Soong met with Ma on September 7,

157 Lien-ho Pao [United Daily News], Taipei, March 21, 2005.
158 Tzu-yu Shih-pao [Liberty Times], Taipei, March 21, 2005; China Post, March 22, 2005.
159 Rep. Rob Simmons, et al., letter to Chairman Lien Chan, Kuomintang, May 27, 2005.
160 Lien Chan, Chairman of the KMT, letter to Rep. Simmons, et al., June 8, 2005.
161 Taipei Times, June 10, 2005.
162 Letter from Representatives Robert Wexler, Steve Chabot, and Sherrod Brown (without Dana Rohrabacher) to Ma
Ying-jeou, KMT Chairman, August 1, 2005.
163 Letter to the Taiwan Caucus from Ma Ying-jeou, Mayor of Taipei, August 18, 2005.
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Š’ Š—DZȱŠ“˜›ȱǯǯȱ›–œȱŠ•Žœȱ’—ŒŽȱŗşşŖȱ
ȱ
he announced that the KMT and PFP party caucuses will continue to “consult each other” on
whether to advance the Special Budget for consideration in the LY.164 Meanwhile, Ma set up a
KMT task force to study the arms issue, and there have been questions about whether the KMT
would support certain arms purchases and incur rising differences with its weakening coalition
partner, the PFP, after the December 2005 elections.
Before the LY’s session began on September 13, 2005, the Defense Ministry submitted a new
Special Budget to cover submarines and P-3C aircraft, moving the request for PAC-3 missile
defense to the regular budget (so that the Special Budget was about half of the original amount).
LY President Wang Jin-pyng of the KMT acknowledged the reduction as a goodwill gesture and
said that “it is time to address the issue.”165 On August 31, 2005, the Executive Yuan approved a
Special Budget of NT$340 billion (US$10.3 billion), after removing NT$140 billion (US$4.2
billion) for PAC-3s. On September 28, 2005, the Defense Ministry issued details on its latest
funding request for 8 submarines: about NT$288 billion in the Special Budget and NT$10.1
billion in the regular budget for a total of about US$9 billion.166
ŽŽ—œŽȱŽ™Š›–Ž—ȱŠ›—œȱ˜ȱ’–’œȱ˜ȱǯǯȱ Ž•™ȱ
When asked about the LY’s delay in deciding to purchase U.S. weapons, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld said in August 2005 that under the TRA, the U.S. obligation is “to work with
Taiwan” on security assistance, but it is up to Taiwan make its own decisions.167 On September
19, 2005, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless issued another strong speech, this
time directed at Taiwan’s people and saying that he was not urging the passage of the Special
Budget because it has become a political “distraction.” Lawless applauded the goal of increasing
the defense budget to 3% of GDP. He warned of the danger that “Taiwan’s steadily declining
defense budgets, and the resulting erosion in its own defense capabilities, also adversely affect the
status quo,” in addition to the PLA build-up. He expressed the U.S. expectation that Taiwan has
the “collective will to invest in a viable defense to address a growing threat and be in a position to
negotiate the future of cross-strait relations from a position of strength.” He criticized the military
for “short-changing itself on reserves of critical munitions” and inadequate “hardening” for
defense. Lawless stressed that, under the TRA, Taiwan also has an obligation for its self-defense.
He warned that
the time of reckoning is upon us.... The U.S. ability to contribute to Taiwan’s defense in a
crisis is going to be measured against Taiwan’s ability to resist, defend, and survive based on
its own capabilities.... As the lone superpower, our interests are plentiful and our attention
short. We cannot help defend you, if you cannot defend yourself.”168
Separately, the Commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM), Admiral William Fallon raised
questions in press articles and interviews about his assessment of whether Taiwan should
prioritize its limited defense resources on “defensive” weapons rather than submarines, given

164 Chung-kuo Shih-pao [China times], Taipei, September 7, 2005.
165 Central News Agency, Taipei, August 24, 2005; Taipei Times, August 25, 2005.
166 Tung-sen Hsin-wen Pao, Taipei, September 28, 2005.
167 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, news briefing, August 23, 2005.
168 Speech issued on September 19, 2005, in San Diego, CA, at the Defense Industry Conference of the U.S.-Taiwan
Business Council, while Richard Lawless was delayed in Beijing at the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear
weapons. Edward Ross, a DSCA official, delivered the speech for Richard Lawless.
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Taiwan’s urgent need to effectively upgrade its self-defense. Admiral Fallon reportedly raised this
question with Taiwan’s Chief of General Staff, General Lee Tien-yu, who recently had visited
Hawaii. Admiral Fallon also told the United Daily News his concern that if he is to be able to
maintain the U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan’s defense, then Taiwan should have a strong self-
defense capability.169 On October 26, 2005, eight Members, led by Representative Simmons,
asked Admiral Fallon to explain his discussions with Taiwan on submarines. Admiral Fallon
responded that he has not tried to discourage this purchase. He added, however, that PACOM has
“strongly and consistently encouraged [Taiwan] to acquire capabilities that would have an
immediate impact on [its] defense,” and “while submarines would provide Taiwan with
significant capabilities, a lengthy period of time would be needed to fulfill this long-term
acquisition program.”170
On October 29, 2005, at the transfer ceremony for the first two Kidd-class destroyers, Marine
Brigadier General John Allen, Principal Director for Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, gave a speech, saying that “it is imperative that the people of Taiwan hold
their leaders of all political parties accountable for reaching a consensus to increase defense
spending,” while it is not appropriate for the United States to tell Taiwan what “budgeting
mechanism” to use. The U.S. role, he said, is to provide the “assistance necessary” to help
Taiwan’s strategy for stability, “but at the end of the day, it is Taiwan that must decide its fate.”
In the first notification to Congress on arms sales to Taiwan since March 2004, the Defense
Department in October 2005 put a new stress on the TRA’s objective, which is to assist Taiwan to
provide for its “own self-defense.”
Like Lawless, the Director of DSCA, Air Force Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Kohler, also highlighted Taiwan’s
inadequate attention to its stocks of air-defense missiles and other munitions as well as pending
decisions on defense spending, in an interview in December 2005.171
At a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on March 9, 2006, in response to
Representative Rob Simmons’ question about the submarine sale to Taiwan, Admiral William
Fallon expressed the dilemma for PACOM regarding Taiwan. Fallon said that he was:
in bit of a box here, because I’m committed to defend this country in the event of any
military aggression should that occur from the PRC, and yet the history is that they have not
been forthcoming in investing in their own defense.... What I’d like to see is some steps
being made, some investment by Taiwan to actually acquire some of these capabilities and to
boost their own readiness and ability to provide for their own defense.
™ŽŒ’Š•ȱžŽȱ•˜Œ”Žȱ’—ȱŽ’œ•Šž›Žȱ
On December 13, 2005, opposition lawmakers in the Procedures Committee voted for the 41st
time to block the statute governing the Special Budget, keeping it from the LY’s agenda since it
was first introduced in 2004. However, at the Procedures Committee meeting on December 20,

169 Japan Times, September 26, 2005 [reprinted in Washington Times, October 8, 2005]; Liberty Times [Chinese-
language newspaper in Taipei], October 12, 2005, which named General Lee Tien-yu; Associated Press, October 14,
2005 [reprinted in Taipei Times, October 16, 2005]; and Lien-Ho Pao [United Daily News in Taipei], October 18, 2005.
170 Letter to Representative Simmons from Admiral William Fallon, November 8, 2005.
171 Jim Wolf, “Pentagon Official Says Taiwan Short on Weapons,” Reuters, December 7, 2005.
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the DPP and its allied lawmakers called a vote at a moment when they had a majority, and the
committee voted 12-5 to report the statute to the LY. On the eve of full LY consideration, the
KMT and PFP chairmen, Ma Ying-jeou and James Soong, met and announced their joint
opposition to a “wealthy fool’s arms deal.” The Ministry of Defense announced it will move the
request for P-3s and reduce the Special Budget to one request of NT$299 billion (US$9 billion),
about half of the original Special Budget, for submarines. Meanwhile, Representatives Rob
Simmons and Tom Tancredo issued statements, saying the Special Budget was “critical for the
defense of Taiwan” and applauded its passage out of the Procedures Committee. Representative
Simmons also said that “blocking this arms package tells the United States—correctly or not—
that Taiwan’s leadership is not serious about the security of its people or its freedom. The
American People have come to the aid of foreign countries in the name of freedom many times in
our history; but Americans will not in good conscience support countries that are unwilling to
defend themselves.”172
When the LY convened on December 23, 2005, to consider the Special Budget, KMT and PFP
lawmakers proposed to end the meeting before debating the bill. Taiwan’s lawmakers voted 113-
100 to end the meeting 20 minutes after it began. This move effectively sent the bill on the
Special Budget back to the Procedures Committee, which then voted as before to block its
progress on December 27, 2005, January 3, and January 10, 2006, the 45th time that opposition
lawmakers in the LY blocked the statute on the Special Defense Budget after its introduction in
2004.
Š’’—ȱ˜›ȱŠȱ’—Ȭ“Ž˜žȂœȱ ȱŽŽ—œŽȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
LY president Wang Jin-pyng (KMT) visited Washington on January 24-25, 2006, and promised a
KMT policy on defense from Ma Ying-jeou, including on arms sales, in February or March.
Unlike his visit in 2004, Wang’s highest-level interlocutors in the Pentagon were Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Mary Beth Long and the Principal Director for Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Brigadier General John Allen. There were no results from this visit.
In February 2006, Representative Rob Simmons visited Taipei and suggested a lower cost for the
submarine sale (perhaps $8 billion) and an interim step for Taiwan to procure a sub design
(perhaps $225 million). Also in February, Representative Henry Hyde, Chairman of the House
International Relations Committee sent a letter to Ma, citing “deep concern” in Congress about
the LY’s failure in the past two years to pass the Special Budget and about significant cuts in
other defense spending that would improve readiness. Hyde also wrote that Americans are left
wondering whether Taiwan’s legislators have the resolve to meet the challenges in providing for
Taiwan’s own defense.173 In a March 7 letter, Ma responded to Representative Hyde by blaming
the DPP administration and promising his own policy in the near future.
While the House Taiwan Caucus, in August 2005, had invited KMT chairman Ma Ying-jeou to
visit, he scheduled a trip to Washington for March 22-23, 2006, while Congress was in recess. Ma
failed on March 14 to gain his party’s approval to issue a long-awaited policy on defense and
arms procurement, despite his upcoming visit to Washington. Ma had no details on his defense
priorities in meetings during his visit (with the private sector and the Bush Administration). While

172 Rep. Rob Simmons, “U.S. Congressman Congratulates Taiwan on Defense Spending Bill Progress,” news release,
December 21, 2005.
173 Letter from Henry Hyde to Ma Ying-jeou, Chairman of the KMT, February 15, 2006.
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campaigning to be president, Ma issued a defense policy in September 2007 with a stance that
supported purchases of U.S. weapons, including submarines.
ŘŖŖŜȱž™™•Ž–Ž—Š•ȱžŽȱ —œŽŠȱ˜ȱ™ŽŒ’Š•ȱžŽȱ
When the LY reconvened on February 21, 2006, the Procedures Committee blocked the statute on
the Special Budget for the 46th time. Thus, in a March 20 special report to the LY, Defense
Minister Lee Jye decided to request procurement of subs and P-3s through supplemental funds in
the regular 2006 defense budget (instead of the Special Budget): NT$200 million (about US$6
million) as “working fees” to study a sub procurement program and NT$1.7 billion (about US$52
million) for P-3C aircraft. The Defense Ministry then decided also to request supplemental funds
of NT$3.7 billion (about US$113 million) for PAC-2 upgrades (not PAC-3 missiles). The
supplemental request for the 2006 budget for these three weapon systems totaled NT$5.6 billion
(about US$172 million). This amount for the three proposed programs was included in the
minister’s broader 2006 Supplemental Budget request of NT$13.7 billion (about US$420 million)
for 74 programs.174
In March 2006, the Defense Ministry submitted its request to the Executive Yuan (EY), or
Cabinet, which then approved on May 24 a Supplemental Budget for the 2006 defense budget of
NT$6.3 billion (about US$194 million) with the three weapons requests plus NT$700 million for
construction of an airstrip on Taiwan-controlled Taiping island (in the Spratly Islands in the South
China Sea). The Supplemental Budget also needed to be approved by the LY, but its session
ended on May 30 and KMT legislators, including Lin Yu-Fang, raised concerns, particularly
about the supplemental budget’s legal basis.175 The LY decided on June 12 to hold a special
session on June 13-30, but consideration of the Supplemental Budget for defense was not on the
agenda that focused on trying to recall President Chen from office. On June 14, the EY approved
a draft bill to govern the Supplemental Budget. The KMT demanded in mid-October 2006 that
the DPP Administration withdraw the original Special Budget if the Supplemental Budget was to
be considered. While the DPP agreed to this compromise, it fell apart when the KMT and PFP
still voted on October 24 to oppose placing the 2006 supplemental request on the LY’s agenda.
This outcome prompted the U.S. Representative in Taipei, Stephen Young, to call a press
conference two days later, at which he strongly urged the LY to “pass a robust defense budget in
this fall’s legislative session.” He pressed the legislators to “permit the supplemental budget to
pass through the procedural committee and be taken to the floor of the legislature so that an open
debate can begin.”176 However, his remarks stirred controversy in Taiwan’s charged domestic
political context. In defiance of this latest U.S. message, the opposition KMT and PFP legislators
voted in the Procedures Committee on October 31 to block the Supplemental Budget. On
December 26, 2006, after some opponents forgot to vote against the supplemental bill, it was
passed out of the Procedures Committee. Three days later, the LY voted (194-162) to allow
committee review of the draft bill governing the supplemental budget but returned the
supplemental budget to the Procedures Committee.

174 CNA, March 20 and April 4, 2006; Special Report of the Ministry of Defense, March 20, 2006; and author’s
interviews in Taipei in April 2006.
175 During consultations in Taipei in April 2006, Lin Yu-fang said that a Supplemental Budget request would be illegal,
that the issue is not the budgeting mechanism but whether the three weapon systems should be procured, and that such
requests could “crowd out” other funding needs of the army and air force or other ministries.
176 AIT Director Stephen Young, press conference, Taipei, October 26, 2006.
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Š’ Š—DZȱŠ“˜›ȱǯǯȱ›–œȱŠ•Žœȱ’—ŒŽȱŗşşŖȱ
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ŘŖŖŝȱŽŽ—œŽȱžŽȱ
Taiwan finally reversed the negative trend in defense spending with an increase in 2007. In
August 2006, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan (Cabinet) approved a proposed 2007 defense budget of
NT$323.5 billion (US$9.8 billion), an increase of NT$71 billion (US$2.2 billion).177 A proposal
to buy F-16C/D fighters made up NT$16.1 billion (US$488 million) of this increase.178 Without a
Special Budget or 2006 Supplemental Budget, the Bush Administration, U.S. industry, and
Congress shifted the focus to whether the LY would approve the 2007 defense budget with a
spending increase during what was considered its critical September 2006 to January 2007
session. At the U.S.-Taiwan defense industry conference on September 10-12, 2006, the Defense
Department declined to even issue a policy address to Taiwan, after making the effort in 2004 and
2005. The State Department’s Director of the Taiwan office warned Taiwan’s political figures
from opposition and ruling parties that “leaders who aspire to represent the Taiwan people” to the
United States should recognize that their decisions “right now on core national security issues”
will have an impact on the future bilateral relationship. He also focused attention on how the LY
will pass the 2007 defense budget “this fall.”179
On November 6, 2006, the LY’s defense and budget committees jointly passed an amended 2007
defense budget. They approved requested funds to procure P-3C ASW planes and PAC-2
upgrades; deleted about US$347 million for PAC-3 missiles; and cut the request for the sub
program from about US$139 million to US$6 million (for the LY’s own “feasibility study” for
subs). They also froze funds for F-16C/D fighters for five months (ending on May 31, 2007),
pending U.S. provision of price and availability data. However, the LY session ended on January
19, 2007, without passing a government budget, including the 2007 defense budget, because of
another political dispute. Finally, on June 15, 2007, the LY passed the 2007 Defense Budget, with
about: $6 million to conduct a “feasibility study” on buying submarines (not a commitment to
either design phase or submarines); $188 million for P-3C planes; $110 million for PAC-2
upgrades (and no funds for PAC-3 missiles); and $488 million for F-16C/D fighters (with funds
frozen until October 31 pending U.S. approval). The final 2007 defense budget totaled NT$304.9
billion (US$9.2 billion), accounting for 2.4% of GDP. However, without U.S. data, the Defense
Ministry lost the funding for F-16C/Ds in the 2007 defense budget.
ŘŖŖŞȱŽŽ—œŽȱžŽȱ
Regarding the 2008 defense budget, the Defense Ministry requested and the Executive Yuan
approved in August 2007 a budget of NT$349.5 billion (US$10.6 billion), an increase of 15%.
However, on December 20, 2007, the LY approved the final 2008 defense budget that totaled
NT$341.1 billion (US$10.5 billion), making up 2.5% of GDP. The budget included funds (but
also froze some of the funds) for procurement of PAC-2 upgrades, PAC-3 missiles, P-3C planes,
sub design phase, F-16C/D fighters, utility helicopters, and attack helicopters.

177 CNA, August 23, 2006.
178 Author’s consultations with MND officials, September 2006.
179 Clifford Hart, speech to the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, September 12, 2006, Denver, CO.
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ŘŖŖşȱŽŽ—œŽȱžŽȱ
The Bush Administration advanced the process for the programs for the P-3C planes and PAC-2
upgrades by formally notifying Congress of the proposed sales in September and November
2007. However, Taiwan’s military had unused budgeted funds to apply to 2009 with no progress
(no presidential notifications to Congress) on several other arms programs and with the U.S.
refusal to accept a request for F-16C/D fighters through August 2008, when Taiwan’s Executive
Yuan submitted the proposed 2009 defense budget to the LY, with a reduction from the previous
year’s defense budget. While Taiwan explained the cut with the unused funds for arms
procurement, Taiwan could have increased its defense budget for the new transition to all-
volunteer personnel, training, and operations and maintenance. The LY failed to pass the
government’s budget by the end of 2008 and held an ad hoc meeting on January 15, 2009. The LY
passed the final 2009 defense budget with NT$318.7 billion (US$9.5 billion), making up 17.6%
of the total budget and 2.6 % of GDP.
’œ’œȱ‹¢ȱ Ž—Ž›Š•œȦ–’›Š•œȱ˜ȱŠ’ Š—ȱ
As for senior-level contacts, the United States and Taiwan have held high-level defense-related
meetings in the United States, as discussed above. U.S. policy previously restricted high-level
military contacts but changed to welcome Taiwan’s senior military officers and defense officials
to visit the United States, shifting the question to their willingness to make the visits. At the same
time, the State Department’s policy has avoided sending to Taiwan U.S. flag and general officers
or officials at or above the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense or State. For a hearing
in 1999, Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth responded to a submitted question on this issue
by writing that “following the 1994 policy review, the Administration authorized travel by high-
level officials, including cabinet officers, from economic and technical agencies. However,
restrictions remained at the same level for visitors from military or national security agencies at
or above the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary and at the rank of one-star flag officer or
above. This policy is based on the determination that visits of such officials would be inconsistent
with maintaining an unofficial relationship.”180
The State Department issued guidelines on relations with Taiwan to continue the policy to ban
official travel to Taiwan for State or Defense Department officials above the level of office
director or for uniformed military personnel above the rank of O-6 (colonel, navy captain).181 The
Pentagon and some in Congress have sought to lift this restriction in order to advance U.S.
interests in boosting Taiwan’s deterrence capability and U.S. leverage in Taiwan. Senior-level
exchanges could help to understand Taiwan’s crisis-management and self-defense capabilities and
limitations.182 The TRA does not specify unofficial or official relations with Taiwan. Some have
cited the NSC’s record of sending senior officials to Taipei for clear and direct talks.183 The NSC,
State Department, and some in Congress have opposed sending senior military officers and

180 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing on “United States-Taiwan Relations: the 20th Anniversary of the
Taiwan Relations Act,” March 25, 1999.
181 Department of State, “Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan,” February 2, 2001, September 5, 2006.
182 Dan Blumenthal and Gary Schmitt, “A Strange Calculus,” Wall Street Journal, August 21, 2006; Therese Shaheen,
“Why is the U.S. Ignoring Taiwan?” Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2007.
183 The NSC has sent the Senior Director for Asian Affairs, including James Moriarty and Michael Green, to Taiwan.
For example: Far Eastern Economic Review, May 20, 2004.
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defense officials to Taiwan as an unnecessary, ineffective change to a sensitive situation. (See
congressional actions, below.)
Š’ Š—Ȃœȱ’œœ’•Žȱ›˜›Š–ȱ
Referencing the TRA’s Section 2(b)(5) “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character,”
policy-makers face a question of how to respond to Taiwan’s increasing interest in counter-strike
missiles (ballistic and cruise missiles). Some politicians in Taiwan and U.S. advocates talk about
missiles as a deterrent.184 Some Americans see Taiwan’s strategy as inherently defensive against
the PRC, with tactical utility for missiles. Others call this desire for long-range weapons
unhelpful for stability and U.S. escalation control.185 Bush Administration officials reportedly
raised objections to Taiwan’s missile programs.186 However, this objection raised an issue of
whether the Administration contradicted its past position and undermined Taiwan’s defense.187
Another issue covered whether the refusal to consider Taiwan’s request for F-16C/Ds undermines
this position. A third issue was whether the U.S. stance should be stronger and clearer.
At a press conference in October 2006, the U.S. Representative in Taipei, Stephen Young, said
that U.S. policy helps Taiwan to have self-defense, “not to attack the mainland, because that was
never in the cards and still isn’t now, but to defend itself.” By April 2007, the Administration
became more concerned about a misperception of U.S. assistance for or approval of Taiwan’s
Hsiung-feng 2E (HF-2E) land-attack cruise missile program. Also, U.S. officials reportedly
linked Taiwan’s planned deployment of such missiles to consideration of a request for F-16C/D
fighters.188 Right after Taiwan’s Han Kuang exercise in April 2007, the new PACOM
Commander, Admiral Timothy Keating, testified to Congress about the situation in the Taiwan
Strait while expecting Dennis Blair’s full briefing on the exercise. Keating stressed “how
emphatically we emphasize to [Taiwan] that [its] actions should be defensive in nature and not
offensive.”189 Finally, because the Han Kuang military exercise included demonstration of the use
of the LACM to Blair, a National Security Council official publicly stated,
We think that developing defensive capabilities is the right thing to do. We think that
offensive capabilities on either side of the Strait are destabilizing and, therefore, not in the
interest of peace and stability. So when you ask me whether I am for offensive missiles, I’m
not for offensive missiles on the Chinese side of the Strait, and I’m not for offensive missiles
on the Taiwan side of the Strait. But appropriate defense capabilities are certainly the right of
the people of Taiwan.190
AIT Director Stephen Young followed up at a press conference in Taipei in early May, stating that
“there were claims that the United States Government approved of the use of long-range

184 John Tkacik, “The Best Defense is a Good Offense,” Taipei Times, February 14, 2007.
185 Michael McDevitt, “For Taiwan, the Best Defense is not a Good Offense,” PacNet Newsletter #9, February 22,
2007.
186 Lien-ho Pao, Taipei, October 21, 2006, quoting unnamed U.S. officials.
187 Rupert Hammond-Chambers, President of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, “Taiwan Goes It Alone,” Defense
News
, and “Special Commentary,” February 25, 2008.
188 Defense News, July 16, 2007.
189 Senate Armed Services Committee’s hearing on April 24, 2007.
190 Dennis Wilder, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for East Asian Affairs, NSC, remarks at a
Foreign Press Center Briefing, April 26, 2007.
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offensive missiles during the [Han Kuang military] exercise and that they even offered a name for
these systems. I want to say categorically here, on behalf of the U.S. Government, that these
stories are inaccurate.” He added that “what we think Taiwan should be placing its emphasis on,
is missile defense,” citing the PAC-3 missile defense system.191 Despite the lack of U.S. support,
in December 2007, Taiwan’s LY approved about $117 million but froze $77 million for the HF-
2E program in the final 2008 defense budget.
›Žœ’Ž—ȱžœ‘Ȃœȱȃ›ŽŽ£ŽȄȱ˜—ȱ›–œȱŠ•Žœȱ˜’’ŒŠ’˜—œȱ
In 2008, congressional concerns and frustrations mounted about the delay in the President’s
notifications and briefings to Congress on eight pending arms sales as well as his refusal to accept
Taiwan’s request for F-16C/D fighters. As discussed above, President Bush changed policy in
April 2001 to consider Taiwan’s arms requests routinely on an as-needed basis, similar to
acceptance of other foreign requests for security assistance. However, the Administration’s refusal
to accept a formal request from Taiwan for F-16C/D fighters since 2006 has raised the issue of
whether the Administration violated or changed its own policy without public discussion. In
October 2007, the House passed H.Res. 676, and Senator Lisa Murkowski wrote a letter to
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley. (See “110th Congress” below.)
In addition to the uncertainty of the Bush Administration’s decision-making, there were also
questions about any changes in the security strategy and defense policy of President Ma Ying-
jeou, particularly given the past ambivalence of the KMT party. There were questions about the
KMT’s review of pending U.S. arms programs, reportedly including whether to pursue the
submarine purchase.192 After the inauguration of Taiwan’s KMT President Ma Ying-jeou on May
20, 2008, he promptly resumed a dialogue with the PRC on June 12-13, resulting in expanded
charter flights and tourism across the Taiwan Strait in July. While the resumption of the dialogue
for the first time in a decade was welcomed, both the Ma and Bush Administrations were
concerned about the timing of announcements on arms sales to Taiwan during the first round of
the resumed dialogue, particularly concerns expressed by Ma’s National Security Advisor Su Chi
in discussion with a visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffer in June.193 Nonetheless,
Taiwan later showed concern about the Bush Administration’s delay in making progress on
pending arms sales. On July 12, 2008, Ma finally clarified publicly that Taiwan still considered
the U.S. arms programs as important and urgent, in spite of the cross-strait talks.194 In the summer
and fall of 2008, President Ma’s military viewpoint reportedly was influenced by one U.S. article
critical of the proposed arms sales programs, causing disarray and disputes between the Defense
Ministry and National Security Council.195 Visiting Washington on July 27-August 1, Wang Jin-
pyng, President of the LY, said that U.S. officials told him that the Administration had not
imposed a “freeze,” continued to adhere to the TRA, and was working on the notifications.
Taiwan’s military was increasingly concerned about the potential loss of unspent budgeted funds
for programs as it neared the end of the 2008 budget year.

191 AIT Director Stephen Young, press conference, Taipei, May 3, 2007.
192 See CRS Report RL34441, Security Implications of Taiwan’s Presidential Election of March 2008, by Shirley A.
Kan.
193 Washington Post, June 12; Defense News, June 16; Taipei Times, June 20, 2008.
194 DPA, July 12, 2008, and Taiwan News, July 13, 2008.
195 William Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2008.
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Members of Congress suspected that the President effectively suspended arms sales to Taiwan in
violation of the TRA and other aspects of U.S. policy. Congress also was concerned about the
lack of timely and complete information requested from the Administration, with disregard for the
Congressional role. They feared that President Bush was deferring to objections in Beijing or
other policy considerations. Even before June, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte
testified to Senator Lisa Murkowski at the Foreign Relations Committee on May 15, 2008, that
after Taiwan’s legislature approved funding of the weapons programs (which was in December
2007), the Administration did not take or plan to take subsequent steps in arms sales. Despite the
lack of notifications to Congress on pending arms sales to Taiwan (since the last notification in
November 2007), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs James
Shinn denied at a hearing that “we made a decision to put things in abeyance” in testimony on
June 25.196
On July 16, 2008, PACOM Commander Admiral Timothy Keating confirmed at a public event at
the Heritage Foundation that the Administration’s policy was to freeze arms sales to Taiwan. He
reportedly confirmed discussions with PRC officials about their objections, raising a question
about the Administration’s violation of the TRA and Six Assurances. Moreover, Keating implied
that arms sales would be “destabilizing” to the situation in the Taiwan Strait and that there was no
pressing need for arms sales to Taiwan at this moment, even as he acknowledged a cross-strait
military imbalance favoring the PRC. In contrast, former PACOM Commander Dennis Blair who
just visited Taiwan in June said that Taiwan’s military and civilian leaders understood the need to
negotiate with the PRC from a position of strength and to maintain Taiwan’s defense.197 Also,
former Bush Administration officials urged President Bush to keep his commitment on Taiwan.198
Some in Congress became concerned that the Administration suspended arms sales, but the
Administration publicly denied a “freeze” or change in policy. The State Department responded
in a letter to Representative Joe Courtney on July 17, 2008, arguing that the Administration was
conducting an “inter-agency process” to consider Taiwan’s requests for eight “highly complex”
weapons packages, even though one program contained simply aircraft spare parts. In any case,
the Administration delayed sending any notifications to Congress on eight approved, pending
arms sales programs with a total value of $12-13 billion (for a submarine design, Patriot PAC-3
missile defense systems, Apache helicopters, Blackhawk helicopters, E2-T airborne early warning
aircraft upgrade, aircraft parts, Harpoon submarine-launched anti-ship missiles, and Javelin anti-
tank missiles).
As late as September 29, 2008, after the originally-scheduled congressional adjournment on
September 26, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs
gave a speech at the U.S.-Taiwan defense industry conference, stating that he had “no news” on
the long-awaited notifications on arms sales and that the Administration’s “internal processes”
were still continuing.199 On October 3, the last day of congressional session that was extended to
pass a bill to bail out banks during the financial crisis, President Bush finally notified Congress. A

196 House Armed Services Committee, hearing on China: Recent Security Developments, June 25, 2008.
197 Wendell Minnick, “China Wields New Diplomatic Skills Against Taiwan,” Defense News, July 7, 2008.
198 Ed Ross, (former DSCA official), “Arming Taiwan,” Wall Street Journal Asia, July 18, 2008; Dan Blumenthal,
Aaron Friedberg, Randall Schriver, Ashley Tellis, “Bush Should Keep His Word on Taiwan,” Wall Street Journal, July
19, 2008.
199 David Sedney, speech at the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference held by the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council,
Jacksonville, FL, September 29, 2008.
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Pentagon spokesman said that the PLA suspended some military meetings and port visits, in
“continued politicization” of contacts. The PRC also suspended bilateral talks to cooperate on
weapons non-proliferation.200
However, President Bush submitted only six of the eight pending sales for a total value of $6.5
billion, or about half of the pending total. The Administration did not submit for congressional
review the pending programs for Black Hawk helicopters or the submarine design. Moreover, the
sale of PAC-3 missile defense systems was broken up, excluding three of seven firing units and
about 50 missiles. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen stated on the day of the formal
notifications that they were in accordance with the TRA but criticized the President for not
following the “letter and spirit” of the law and for keeping Congress “in the dark about U.S. arms
sales policy toward Taiwan.” She noted this “grave breach of Executive Branch cooperation with
Congress.” Also, Senator John McCain pointed out that the arms sales have been “on hold for too
long” and urged the Administration to reconsider its decision not to provide submarines or F-16
fighters.201 Congress might further reassert its legislated role in policy decisions. In addition to
freezing out Congress, the Bush Administration’s long-awaited decision to submit the
notifications raised more questions about arbitrary decision-making in addition to piling up the
notifications for months (that were not programs in a so-called “package”).
In addition, Bush left confusion in the process for Taiwan to make requests for objective U.S.
consideration of its defense needs. One policy option is to resurrect the annual arms sales talks.202
Another is to rectify the policy of 2001 to consider Taiwan’s requests on an as-needed basis.
Other options are to reassess U.S. arms sales in the context of Taiwan’s joint defense
requirements in a strategic approach as well as to hold a serious defense dialogue with Taiwan.
›ŠŽ’Œȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱŽŸ’Ž ȱ
During Taiwan’s politically-motivated impasse over funding for self-defense, a former Pentagon
official warned that if Taiwan did not pass the Special Budget and there were no expected
improvements in defense, the United States would be more hesitant to approve future requests for
weapons and possibly conduct a review of policy toward Taiwan.203 After Taiwan passed arms
procurement funds in 2007, the Bush Administration in 2008 delayed progress on some programs
to sell arms to Taiwan. Taiwan’s uncertainty and lack of consensus about its closer alignment with
China under President Ma since May 2008 also raised the need for a U.S. policy review to some
observers.204 A better defined strategy to set clear objectives and improve mutual consensus might
be needed. For the hearing on January 13, 2009, on Hillary Clinton’s nomination as Secretary of
State, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked a question for the record, about whether the
Obama Administration will hold another Taiwan Policy Review, but she did not answer the
question.

200 VOA and AP, October 6, 2008; Xinhua, October 7, 2008; and author’s consultations.
201 Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Republican, Foreign Affairs Committee, press release, October 3,
2008; and Senator John McCain, press release, October 7, 2008.
202 Mark Stokes, “Taiwan Must Review Security Risks,” Taipei Times, March 12, 2008. See CRS Report RS20365,
Taiwan: Annual Arms Sales Process, by Shirley A. Kan.
203 Interview with Mark Stokes, retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel and Country Director in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, in Taipei Times, April 24, 2005.
204 For example, Robert Sutter’s presentation at a conference at George Washington University on January 29, 2009;
also see report in Taipei Times, January 31, 2009.
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Congress has a role in oversight of any reviews of policy toward Taiwan. In September 1994, the
Clinton Administration explicitly and publicly testified to Congress about a major Taiwan Policy
Review.205 Defense ties would likely be included in any policy reviews of how to enhance
leverage over Taiwan and affect the cross-strait situation, including whether to limit defense ties,
apply conditions, or strengthen ties. Policy promotes the U.S. objectives of assisting Taiwan’s
self-defense capability, preventing conflict, minimizing the chance of U.S. intervention,
dispelling dangerous misperceptions, and promoting cross-strait dialogue. While U.S. objectives
have been consistent, developments in China and Taiwan since the 1970s have required U.S. re-
assessments and responses.
In late 2002, the Pentagon reportedly conducted a policy review of cooperation with Taiwan that
examined whether its leaders have taken defense seriously, whether defense cooperation with
Taiwan has been effective, and whether U.S. policy should change.206 (The NSC, State
Department, and AIT would have input into any review by the Administration of policy toward
Taiwan.)207 At the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council’s conference on Taiwan’s defense in February
2003, in San Antonio, TX, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless told Taiwan’s
Vice Defense Minister Chen Chao-min and others that, while the President said that we will do
whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself, Taiwan “should not view America’s resolute
commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as a substitute for investing the necessary
resources in its own defense.” At the same occasion, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randall
Schriver indicated a new proactive U.S. approach to Taiwan’s defense modernization, pointing
Taiwan to three priorities: missile defense, C4ISR, and ASW.
Taiwan’s election in March 2004 brought the re-election of President Chen Shui-bian and his
advocacy of a new constitution for Taiwan by 2008. In April 2004, the Defense and State
Departments testified to the House International Relations Committee, expressing a readjustment
in the Bush Administration’s policy toward Taiwan.208 Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly
clarified U.S. policy by stating:
• The United States “does not support” independence for Taiwan or unilateral
moves that would change the status quo “as we define it” and opposes statements
or actions from either side that would unilaterally alter Taiwan’s “status.”
• U.S. efforts at deterring PRC coercion “might fail” if Beijing ever becomes
convinced Taiwan is embarked upon a course toward independence and
permanent separation from China, and concludes that Taiwan must be stopped.
• It would be “irresponsible” of us or of Taiwan’s leaders to treat the PRC’s
statements as “empty threats.”

205 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord, “Taiwan Policy
Review,” before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 27, 1994. See CRS Report RL30341,
China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, by
Shirley A. Kan.
206 Taiwan Defense Review, January 18, 2003.
207 The Nelson Report (January 31, 2003) reported there was an interagency East Asia Policy Review.
208 House International Relations Committee, hearing on “The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next 25 Years,” April 21,
2004.
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• The United States looks to President Chen to exercise the kind of responsible,
democratic, and restrained leadership that will be necessary to ensure a peaceful
and prosperous future for Taiwan.
• There are “limitations” with respect to what the United States will support as
Taiwan considers possible changes to its constitution.
• We urge Beijing and Taipei to pursue dialogue “as soon as possible” through any
available channels “without preconditions.”
One policy issue is the relative stress on cross-strait dialogue vs. deterrence. In his testimony,
Assistant Secretary of State Kelly argued that a premise of arms sales to Taiwan has been that “a
secure and self-confident Taiwan is a Taiwan that is more capable of engaging in political
interaction and dialogue with the PRC, and we expect Taiwan will not interpret our support as a
blank check to resist such dialogue.” However, some observers have begun to question the
continued validity of this premise. James Lilley, former ambassador in Beijing and representative
in Taipei, warned in April 2004 that:
The implicit American premise was that a secure and stable Taiwan would be a more willing
and successful partner in dealing with China. Judicious arms sales to Taiwan were part of
this formula and in the past it has worked.... If elements of this broader formula are
disregarded by the current Taiwan authorities, however, then the successful historic pattern
has been broken. U.S. military support and arms sales cannot be used by Taiwan to move
away from China—they were meant to make Taiwan feel secure enough to move toward
accommodation with China. Our support should be conditional on upholding our successful
pattern.209
Any policy review might be coordinated with allies in Asia and Europe. While in Beijing in
August 2004, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer reportedly expressed doubts about
whether any U.S. military help for Taiwan’s defense against China would involve invoking
Australia’s defense treaty with the United States.210 In February 2005, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice with Japan’s Ministers for Defense
and Foreign Affairs issued a Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee
(“2+2 statement”). They declared that a common strategic objective is to “encourage the peaceful
resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.” China objected to the
alliance’s mere mention of Taiwan. In December 2007, the Council of the European Union (EU)
approved “Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia” that expressed
concerns about stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Greater cross-strait integration has raised concerns about the leakage of military technology and
secrets from Taiwan to mainland China. As supporters of Taiwan wrote in October 2006, “there is
little sense in America’s continued support of Taiwan’s defenses if Taiwan has no intention of
using them to deter attack by the Chinese. Washington is increasingly alarmed that Taiwan’s
politicians—wittingly or unwittingly—are shifting responsibility for their island’s defense from
Taipei to Beijing, thus jeopardizing the integrity of U.S. defense technology that has already been
transferred to Taiwan.”211

209 James Lilley, “Strait Talk,” Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2004.
210 Catherine Armitage, “Downer Assures China on Taiwan,” The Australian, August 18, 2004.
211 Michael Needham and John Tkacik, “Grim Future for Taiwan’s Defenses,” Heritage Foundation Web Memo,
October 31, 2006.
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ŗŖś‘ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
In the 105th Congress, the FY1999 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-261) required
the Secretary of Defense to study the U.S. missile defense systems that could protect and could be
transferred to “key regional allies,” defined as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.212 In addition, the
conference report (H.Rept. 105-746 of the FY1999 Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. 105-262)
required a report from the Pentagon on the security situation in the Taiwan Strait, in both
classified and unclassified forms.213
ŗŖŜ‘ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
In the 106th Congress, Representative Ben Gilman, Chairman of the House International Relations
Committee, wrote President Clinton on April 19, 1999, urging approval for the sale of long-range
early warning radars to Taiwan. He also wrote Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on April 22,
1999, saying that if the Administration did not approve the sale, he would introduce legislation to
do so. In the end, the Clinton Administration decided in principle to sell early warning radars to
Taiwan. The State Department spokesperson confirmed that the United States agreed on the
request in principle and acknowledged that under the TRA, “the President and Congress
determined which defense articles and services Taiwan needs.”214 The Pentagon spokesperson
also confirmed that the United States “agreed to work with the Taiwanese to evaluate their early
warning radar needs, and that will take place over the next year or so, but there is no specific
agreement on a specific type of radar, specific sale, or specific terms of sale at this time.”215
In July 1999, after President Clinton reportedly delayed a visit to Taiwan by Pentagon officials
and considered a cutoff of arms sales after President Lee Teng-hui said Taiwan and the PRC have
a “special state-to-state relationship,” Representative Gilman responded by threatening to suspend
all U.S. arms sales. He stated that “I cannot accept undercutting Taiwan’s national security and its
right under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to receive appropriate security assistance from our
nation to meet its legitimate self-defense needs. Accordingly, as a result of my concern, I plan at
this point to withhold my approval for arms transfers notified to the Congress until this matter is
resolved to my satisfaction.”216
Also, Members debated whether the “Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA)” (S. 693,
Helms; H.R. 1838, DeLay) was needed to better assist Taiwan or was unnecessary and
counterproductive in a delicate situation, as the Clinton Administration maintained. The TSEA

212 Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific
Region,” unclassified version, May 1999; CRS Report RL30379, Missile Defense Options for Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan: A Review of the Defense Department Report to Congress
, by Robert D. Shuey, Shirley A. Kan, and Mark
Christofferson.
213 Department of Defense, “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, The Security Situation in
the Taiwan Strait,” unclassified version, February 1, 1999; CRS Report RS20187, Taiwan’s Defense: Assessing The
U.S. Department of Defense Report, “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait”
, by Robert G. Sutter.
214 Shenon, Philip, “U.S. Plans to Sell Radar to Taiwan to Monitor China,” New York Times, April 30, 1999;
Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, April 29, 1999.
215 Defense Department News Briefing, April 30, 1999.
216 Quoted in “Clinton Confirms Rebuke to Taiwan,” Washington Times, July 22, 1999.
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also raised attention to U.S.-Taiwan military exchanges, including that on communication and
training. The Pentagon was said to have supported the spirit of the bill, although not its
passage.217 The TSEA was not enacted, although the House passed H.R. 1838 on February 1,
2000, by 341-70.
Seeking more information from the Pentagon on which to base its considerations, Congress
passed the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-65), requiring annual reports on
PRC military power and the security situation in the Taiwan Strait.218 Also, in consolidated
appropriations legislation for FY2000 (P.L. 106-113), Congress required a report on the
operational planning of the Department of Defense to implement the TRA and any gaps in
knowledge about PRC capabilities and intentions affecting the military balance in the Taiwan
Strait.219
Concerning Congress’s role before the Administration’s decisions on arms sales and formal
notifications, the 106th Congress passed language, introduced by Senator Lott, in the FY2000
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (in Div. B of P.L. 106-113), requiring the Secretary of
State to consult with Congress to devise a mechanism for congressional input in determining arms
sales to Taiwan. Again, in the FY2001 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-429),
Congress passed the Taiwan Reporting Requirement, requiring the President to consult on a
classified basis with Congress 30 days prior to the next round of arms sales talks. (Those required
consultations took place on March 16, 2001.)
ŗŖŝ‘ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
In the 107th Congress, some Members opposed the sale of Aegis-equipped destroyers, because
they could be interpreted as offensive rather than defensive sales and could involve significant
interaction with the U.S. military, as Senators Feinstein and Thomas (chairman of the Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs) wrote in the Washington Times on
March 28, 2001. Other Members—83 in the House (led by Representatives Cox and Wu) and 20
in the Senate (led by Senators Helms and Torricelli)—wrote letters to President Bush on April 3,
2001, urging approval of the sale of those destroyers. A March 2001 staff report to Senator Helms
of the Foreign Relations Committee called for meeting Taiwan’s defense needs, particularly for
submarines and destroyers.220
In addition, some in Congress urged the Administration to deliver AMRAAMs to Taiwan after the
Washington Times on July 1, 2002, reported that, in June, two SU-30 fighters of the PLA Air
Force test-fired AA-12 medium-range air-to-air missiles acquired from Russia. The report raised
questions as to whether the PLA already deployed the missiles, meeting one of the conditions by
which the United States would deliver the AMRAAMs to Taiwan—rather than keep them in

217 Steven M. Goldstein and Randall Schriver (former official in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs), “An Uncertain Relationship: The United States, Taiwan, and the Taiwan Relations
Act,” China Quarterly, March 2001.
218 Department of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” unclassified
version, June 2000 and July 2002.
219 Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act,” unclassified version,
December 2000.
220 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “U.S. Defense Policy Toward Taiwan: In Need of an Overhaul,” a Staff Trip
Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Prt. 107-26, by James Doran, printed April 2001.
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storage—as approved for sale by the Clinton Administration in 2000. On July 16, 2002, Senators
Kyl, Helms, Bob Smith, and Torricelli wrote Secretary of State Colin Powell, urging the Bush
Administration to allow the transfer of AMRAAMS to Taiwan “as soon as they are produced”
rather than “quibble over whether the AA-12 tests mean that China has an ‘operational’
capability.”
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002 (P.L. 107-107), enacted on December 28,
2001, authorized the President to transfer (by sale) the four Kidd-class destroyers to Taiwan
(Section 1011), under Section 21 of the AECA. Also, Section 1221 of the act required a new
section in the annual report on PRC military power (as required by P.L. 106-65) to assess the
PLA’s military acquisitions and any implications for the security of the United States and its
friends and allies. The scope of arms transfers to be covered was not limited to those from Russia
and other former Soviet states, as in the original House language (H.R. 2586).221
The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002 (P.L. 107-115), enacted on January 10,
2002, brought unprecedented close coordination between the Executive and Legislative branches
on arms sales to Taiwan. Section 573 required the Departments of State and Defense to provide
detailed briefings (not specified as classified) to congressional committees (including those on
appropriations) within 90 days of enactment and not later than every 120 days thereafter during
FY2002. The briefings were required to report on U.S.-Taiwan discussions on potential sales of
defense articles or services to Taiwan.
Some Members called for ensuring regular and high-level consultations with Taiwan and a role
for Congress in determining arms sales to Taiwan, after President Bush announced on April 24,
2001 (the day of the last annual arms sales talks), that he would drop the annual arms talks
process with Taiwan in favor of normal, routine considerations on an “as-needed” basis.222 Due to
the absence of diplomatic relations, successive administrations used a process in determining
arms sales to Taiwan that was institutionalized in the early 1980s as annual rounds of talks with
Taiwan defense authorities consisting of several phases leading up to final meetings usually in
April.223 In overseeing the new process, factors or implications to consider included the
following:
• Congress’s role in decision-making and ability to exercise oversight
• role of arms sales talks in the broader long-range and joint defense strategy for
Taiwan (vs. a narrower focus on specific requests)
• role of arms sales in U.S. diplomatic and defense policies (including various
elements of the “one China” policy)
• U.S. objectives for the Taiwan military
• nature of the U.S.-Taiwan military relationship
• extent of high-level U.S.-Taiwan military exchanges

221 Still, the Pentagon’s report, issued on July 12, 2002, discussed China’s military acquisitions from states of the
former Soviet Union, and not other countries (e.g., Israel).
222 Milbank, Dana and Mike Allen, “Bush to Drop Annual Review of Weapons Sales to Taiwan,” Washington Post,
April 25, 2001.
223 See CRS Report RS20365, Taiwan: Annual Arms Sales Process, by Shirley A. Kan.
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• effect of an annual high-profile controversy on U.S. interests
• usefulness to Congress and Taiwan of a deadline for decisions
• influence of various interest groups in a more defused process
• changes in high-level, intensive attention given by the White House and its
coordination of the inter-agency debates
• changes in the Pentagon’s basis for recommendations
• Taiwan’s desire to receive similar treatment given to others
• consultations with allies, including Japan.
The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FYs 2002 and 2003 (H.R. 1646), passed in the
House on May 16, 2001, contained provisions on arms sales to Taiwan. First, H.R. 1646 included
authority (in Section 851) for the President to sell the four Kidd-class destroyers to Taiwan.
Second, as proposed by Representative Brad Sherman in the House International Relations
Committee, Section 813 sought to require that Taiwan be treated as the “equivalent of a major
non-NATO ally” for defense transfers under the AECA or the Foreign Assistance Act, while the
language stopped short of designating Taiwan as a major non-NATO ally. According to the
Member’s office, the provision would show tangible support for Taiwan’s defense, provide it with
status similar to that given to Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina, offer it the “right of first
refusal” for EDA, and treat it with enhanced status for anti-terrorism assistance, cooperative
research and development projects in the defense area, and expedited review in satellite licensing.
Third, Representative Gary Ackerman introduced Section 814 to require the President to consult
annually with Congress and Taiwan about the availability of defense articles and services for
Taiwan. The consultations with Taiwan would occur at a level not lower than that of the Vice
Chief of General Staff and in Washington, DC—as has been the case.
Finally enacted as P.L. 107-228 on September 30, 2002, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
for FY2003 authorized—at the Bush Administration’s request—the Department of State and other
departments or agencies (including the Department of Defense) to detail employees to AIT
(Section 326); required that Taiwan be “treated as though it were designated a major non-NATO
ally” (Section 1206); required consultations with Congress on U.S. security assistance to Taiwan
every 180 days (Section 1263); and authorized the sale to Taiwan of the four Kidd-class
destroyers (Section 1701).224 Section 326, amending the Foreign Service Act of 1980, has
significant implications for the assignment of government officials to AIT, including active-duty
military personnel for the first time since 1979. (Employees have been separated from
government service for a period of time in the name of “unofficial” relations, but personnel issues
have affected AIT and its contractors. Defense Department personnel, including those supporting
security assistance, have been civilian staff and retired or resigned military personnel.)
In signing the bill into law on September 30, 2002, President Bush issued a statement that
included criticism of Section 1206 (“major non-NATO ally”). He said that “Section 1206 could
be misconstrued to imply a change in the ‘one China’ policy of the United States when, in fact,
that U.S. policy remains unchanged. To the extent that this section could be read to purport to

224 For more details on proposed House and Senate language, see “Arms Sales to Taiwan,” in CRS Report RL31046,
Foreign Relations Authorization, FY2003: An Overview, by Susan B. Epstein.
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change United States policy, it impermissibly interferes with the President’s constitutional
authority to conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs.”
Nonetheless, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
Michael Wynne, submitted a letter to Congress on August 29, 2003, that designated Taiwan as a
“major non-NATO ally” under Section 1206. The are implications for defense industrial
cooperation with Taiwan, under Section 65 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629).
The FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act, passed in the House on May 10, 2002,
contained Section 1202 seeking to require the Secretary of Defense to implement a
comprehensive plan to conduct combined training and exchanges of senior officers with Taiwan’s
military and to “enhance interoperability” with Taiwan’s military.225 The language was similar to
that of Section 5(b) in the “Taiwan Security Enhancement Act” proposed in the 106th Congress.
The Senate’s version, passed on June 27, 2002, did not have the language. The Washington Times
reported on August 9, 2002, that the Department of State opposed the language as unnecessary
(given U.S. support under the TRA).
As Members worked out differences in conference, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz
wrote in a letter to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on September 27, 2002,
that “while we welcome Congress’ support for the U.S. commitments under the Taiwan Relations
Act and for the President’s commitment to the defense of Taiwan, we believe that the objectives
of Section 1202 are best achieved by preserving the traditional statutory role of the Secretary to
exercise authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense to conduct such
activities as are needed to support those commitments, including his authority to preserve the
confidentiality of those activities.” The Pentagon “strongly recommends that this provision be
deleted, although we would not object to language that would call upon the Department to brief
the Congress periodically on progress we are making to meet our commitments to Taiwan
security,” Wolfowitz wrote. As enacted on December 2, 2002, the FY2003 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 107-314) contained a revised section (1210), requiring a Presidential
report 180 days after the act’s enactment (due May 31, 2003) on the feasibility and advisability of
conducting combined operational training and exchanges of senior officers with Taiwan’s
military. (U.S. policy has allowed Taiwan’s senior military officers and defense officials to visit
the United States, while not sending U.S. flag and general officers to Taiwan, or senior officials.)
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On May 20, 2004, the House passed H.R. 4200 (FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act)
with Section 1013 to authorize the sale to Taiwan of a dock landing ship (Anchorage) as an
Excess Defense Article and Section 1215 to require the Defense Department to send general or
flag officers and officials at or above the level of deputy assistant secretary of defense to Taiwan
(as proposed by Representative Jim Ryun). After a floor debate about whether his amendment
was necessary or dangerous, the House passed it by 290-132. Supporters cited the Defense
Department’s support for this policy change and challenges in Taiwan’s military in integrating
new acquisitions and prioritizing self-defense needs against the PLA. Opponents cited resistance
by the NSC and State Department, the TRA as existing authority for security assistance, and the

225 For an argument for enhancing interoperability with Taiwan, see Justin Bernier (staffer for the House Armed
Services Committee) and Stuart Gold, “China’s Closing Window of Opportunity,” Naval War College Review, summer
2003.
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need for caution in a tense part of Asia. On May 19, 2004, Senator Sam Brownback submitted for
the record a similar amendment intended to be proposed to the Senate’s bill (S. 2400). However,
on June 23, 2004, the Senate passed S. 2400 without considering or voting on such language.
During conference, the House receded, and the conference report did not contain Section 1215
(H.Rept. 108-767, issued on October 8, 2004). President Bush signed H.R. 4200 into law (P.L.
108-375) on October 29, 2004.
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In January 2005, eight Members led by Representative Rob Simmons wrote to Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice to express concerns that the Bush Administration delayed notifications to
Congress on the three major items until after LY decided on the Special Budget. The State
Department responded that it supports the President’s decision of April 2001 to make available to
Taiwan P-3s, PAC-3s, and submarines, but that it does not believe “notification at this time will
have any influence on the Taiwan Legislature’s decision.”226 At issue were the Bush
Administration’s effectiveness in encouraging Taiwan to boost its self-defense, extent of U.S.
leverage in Taiwan, and risks in relations with Beijing.
On May 20, 2005, the House Armed Services Committee reported its National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2006 (H.R. 1815, H.Rept. 109-89), again proposing language to change
U.S. policy to allow U.S. flag and general officers and senior officials at or above the level of
deputy assistant secretary of defense to visit Taiwan (Section 1203). Such visits would reciprocate
visits by senior military officers and officials from Taiwan that already take place in the United
States. Also, Chairman Duncan Hunter’s press release noted that the Defense Department
exchanged with the PLA over 80 senior-level visits in the 1990s and about 14 in recent years.227
The bill added new language that would ensure that Capstone classes at the National Defense
University (for new general and flag officers) conduct trips to the PRC and Taiwan (Section 528).
The House passed H.R. 1815 on May 25 without debate on the Taiwan-related language. The bill
reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 17, 2005 (S. 1042) did not contain
similar sections. On December 18, 2005, the conference committee filed its report for H.R. 1815
(H.Rept. 109-360), after the House receded on the two Taiwan-related sections. The House passed
the conference report on December 19, and the Senate agreed on December 21. The President
signed it into law (P.L. 109-163) on January 6, 2006.
As mentioned above on the impasse over the Special Budget, on May 27, 2005, Representative
Simmons and 32 other House Members wrote to KMT chairman Lien Chan, urging him to help
expedite passage of the Special Budget in May. They warned that “failure to pass the special
budget has raised concerns in the United States about Taiwan’s ability to defend itself against
potential aggression.”228 On August 1, 2005, three co-chairs of the House Taiwan Caucus wrote to
Ma Ying-jeou as the new KMT chairman. They urged him to “lead efforts in Taipei to ensure that
the Legislative Yuan quickly passes a special arms procurement package or increases its annual
defense spending.” They also invited Ma to visit Washington.229

226 Letters between the State Department and Representatives Rob Simmons, Lane Evans, Roskoe Bartlett, Chris
Smith, John Hostettler, Madeleine Bordallo, Trent Franks, and Jeb Bradley, January 31 and February 15, 2005.
227 CRS Report RL32496, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, by Shirley A. Kan.
228 Rep. Simmons, et al., letter to Chairman Lien Chan, Kuomintang, May 27, 2005.
229 Letter from Representatives Robert Wexler, Steve Chabot, and Sherrod Brown (without Dana Rohrabacher) to Ma
Ying-jeou, KMT Chairman, August 1, 2005.
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On July 27, 2005, Representative Robert Andrews introduced H.Con.Res. 219 to express the
sense of Congress that the President should abolish restrictions on visits by senior U.S. military
officials to Taiwan and should authorize the sale of the Aegis combat system to Taiwan (among
other stipulations).
As mentioned above on Pacific Commander Admiral Fallon’s questions about Taiwan buying
submarines, eight Members of Congress led by Representative Rob Simmons wrote a letter in
October 2005 to ask Admiral Fallon to explain his discussions with Taiwan on submarines.230
Also discussed above, in February 2006, Representative Simmons visited Taiwan and suggested a
lower cost for the subs and an interim design phase to break the impasse over whether to procure
U.S. submarines, and House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde wrote a
letter to KMT Chairman Ma about the defense issues.
On May 3, 2006, the House Armed Services Committee reported H.R. 5122, the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2007, after approving amendments with relevance for Taiwan
and the PRC that were introduced by Representative Simmons. The bill added new language that
would make it U.S. policy to make available to Taiwan plans and options for design work and
construction on future diesel electric submarines and would require the Navy to report to
Congress on its dealings with Taiwan on the submarine sale (Section 1221). Other provisions
would again seek to change policy to require at least one CAPSTONE visit to Taiwan every year
(and one to the PRC) (Section 1205); to authorize general and flag officers to visit Taiwan
(reciprocating Taiwan’s senior-level visits to the United States and balancing exchanges with the
PLA) (Section 1206); and to restrict procurement by the Defense Department from foreign firms
that supply weapons to the PRC (Section 1211). On May 11, the House passed H.R. 5122 with
these sections. On June 22, the Senate passed its version, S. 2766, without similar language, and
incorporated it into H.R. 5122. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld wrote a letter to Congress on July
24, 2006, to oppose a policy change to allow generals/admirals to visit Taiwan, in line with the
views of the State Department and White House.231 So, for the conference report dated September
29, the House receded, and Sections 1205, 1206, 1211, and 1221 were deleted. On October 17,
2006, President Bush signed the bill (P.L. 109-364).
On June 28, 2006, Representative Tom Tancredo introduced an amendment (Section 801) to H.R.
5672, the Science, State, Justice, Commerce Appropriations Act for FY2007, to ban funds from
being used to enforce the State Department’s guidelines restricting contact with Taiwan’s
officials. The House agreed to the amendment by voice vote. On June 29, the House passed H.R.
5672. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 5672 on July 13 without that section.
The Senate did not pass the bill. On September 7, 2006, the Senate passed S. 3722 (Lugar), the
Naval Vessels Transfer Act of 2006, that included authority for the President to sell to Taiwan two
Osprey-class minehunter coastal ships. It was referred to the House as the last action.

230 Letter to Admiral William Fallon, Commander of the Pacific Command, from Representatives Rob Simmons, Dan
Burton, Robert Andrews, Henry Brown, James Langevin, Phil Gingrey, Thomas Tancredo, and Patrick Kennedy,
October 26, 2005.
231 Dan Blumenthal and Gary Schmitt, “A Strange Calculus,” Wall Street Journal, August 21, 2006; and author’s
consultations, September 2006.
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On June 21, 2007, the House passed (by voice vote) Representative Tom Tancredo’s amendment
to H.R. 2764 (State Department appropriations act for FY2008) to ban funds from being used to
enforce the “Guidelines on Relations With Taiwan” (Sec. 699E). (As discussed above, the
guidelines include a ban on official travel by senior Defense officials and general or flag military
officers to Taiwan.) The House passed H.R. 2764 on June 22. The Senate Appropriations
Committee reported the bill (S.Rept. 110-128) without this section. The final version that became
P.L. 110-161 on December 26, 2007, did not have the section.
Also, on July 31, 2007, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported S. 1565, the Naval
Vessel Transfer Act of 2007 introduced by Senator Joseph Biden, which would authorize the sale
to Taiwan of two retiring Osprey-class coastal minehunters as Excess Defense Articles, among
other foreign transfers. On October 23, 2007, the House Foreign Affairs Committee considered a
similar bill, H.R. 3912, introduced by Representative Tom Lantos.
On September 26, 2007, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved H.Res. 676, introduced
by Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, that noted the Bush Administration’s lack of response to
Taiwan’s interest in buying F-16C/D fighters and that urged the President to determine security
assistance “based solely” upon the legitimate defense needs of Taiwan (consistent with Section
3(b) of the TRA). The House passed H.Res. 676 on October 2, 2007.
Also in October 2007, Senator Lisa Murkowski, Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, wrote to National Security Advisor
Stephen Hadley, noting that the Administration refused to accept Taiwan’s request for F-16
fighters and asking if it was subjecting Taiwan to “unequal treatment” in the FMS process. At a
hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee in May 2008, the Senator noted that Hadley failed to
provide any response.232
In January 2008, Representative Joe Courtney wrote to Navy Secretary Donald Winter asking
about the Navy’s understanding of Taiwan’s funding for a submarine design (phase one of the
program).233 Concerning the Administration’s refusal to accept Taiwan’s formal request for F-
16C/D fighters since 2006, Senators Tim Johnson and James Inhofe, Co-chairs of the Senate
Taiwan Caucus, wrote a letter in March 2008 to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, asking if his
department received such a request and offering their “assistance” if he needed it. Gates simply
responded that Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman would answer the Senators.
Edelman promised that the department will consider carefully any request from Taiwan for
defense articles and services, “including replacement airframes.”234
On June 17, 2008, Representatives Joe Courtney and James Langevin wrote to Secretary of State
Rice, requesting an explanation on the reported suspension of arms sales and timeline for
notifications to Congress.235 The State Department responded in a letter on July 17, 2008, arguing

232 Senator Lisa Murkowski, letter to Stephen Hadley, October 12, 2007; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing
on U.S.-China Relations, May 15, 2008.
233 Representative Joe Courtney, letter to Donald Winter, January 3, 2008.
234 Tim Johnson and James Inhofe, letter to Robert Gates, March 19, 2008; response letter from Robert Gates, March
25, 2008; letter to Senators from Eric Edelman, March 28, 2008.
235 Joe Courtney and James Langevin, letter to Condoleezza Rice, June 17, 2008.
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that the Administration was conducting an “inter-agency process” to consider Taiwan’s requests
for eight weapons packages. In late June, Senators Inhofe and Johnson led a total of 14 Senators
in sending a letter to President Bush, noting that a “freeze” on arms sales to Taiwan violates the
spirit of the TRA and that their attempts to clarify the status of Taiwan’s requests have been to no
avail. They requested a briefing on the status of arms sales and urged the Administration to
expeditiously consider Taiwan’s requests. They wrote that upon receipt of Congressional
Notifications, they look forward to the opportunity to work with the Administration in completing
these sales as soon as possible.236 In late July, 25 Members in the House, led by a Co-chair of the
Taiwan Caucus, Representative Shelley Berkley, sent a similar letter to President Bush, warning
against a “freeze,” requesting a briefing on arms sales, and looking forward to the notifications.237
The Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Ros-Lehtinen,
introduced H.R. 6646 on July 29, 2008, to require the Secretaries of State and Defense to provide
detailed briefings to Congress on arms sales to Taiwan not later than 90 days after enactment and
not later than 120 days thereafter. Without the President’s response or notifications on pending
arms sales, on September 23, the House passed H.R. 6646 by voice vote. Members expressed
frustration at the President’s continued refusal to notify and brief Congress. Representative David
Scott who brought up the bill on the floor, said “the White House does not understand the Taiwan
Relations Act.” Mr. Ed Royce stated that the bill would assert the TRA’s authority for the role of
Congress, which has been left out, and the bill would “right that wrong.” Ms. Ros-Lehtinen also
questioned the President’s compliance with the “Six Assurances” policy, suspecting that U.S.
officials have discussed China’s objections and “while Congress has been left in the dark ... the
Chinese leadership has been kept fully abreast of our Nation’s intentions.” A Co-Chair of the
Taiwan Caucus, Ms. Berkley, lamented that “we have written letters, Members of this body have
made statements, and now we’re passing a law just to get simple answers from the President of
the United States.” On the same day, the Departments of State and Justice wrote letters to oppose
H.R. 6646, claiming that it would “infringe” upon the President’s constitutional authority.
However, the TRA explicitly provided for a congressional role, and there were previous laws
enacted to require the Executive Branch to consult or brief Congress on arms sales to Taiwan.
The next day, September 24, 2008, Representative Tom Tancredo introduced H.R. 7059 to require
progress on pending arms sales, notwithstanding notifications to Congress required by Section
36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act. After Bush’s notifications to Congress of six of the eight
pending arms programs, Representative Joe Courtney wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice on October 6, 2008, to inquire about the status of the submarine design program.
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The following table provides information on U.S. sales (not deliveries) of major defense articles
and services to Taiwan, as approved by the President and formally notified to Congress since
1990. Based on unclassified notices and news reports, this list includes the date of notification,
major item or service proposed for sale, and estimated value of the defense package. The list was
compiled based on unclassified notifications to Congress or announcements by the
Administration as well as press reports. These were primarily government-to-government FMS

236 Senators Inhofe, Johnson, Coburn, Vitter, Kyl, Brownback, Sessions, Chambliss, Martinez, Lieberman, Graham,
Bond, Allard, Grassley, letter to President George W. Bush, June 27, 2008.
237 Representative Shelley Berkley, et al, letter to President George Bush, July 31, 2008.
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programs. Before the Defense Department may issue Letters of Offer and Acceptance, the
President must notify major FMS to Congress as required by Section 36(b) of the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA), P.L. 90-629.238 If 30 calendar days pass after the formal notification and
Congress does not pass a joint resolution of disapproval, the Executive Branch is allowed to
proceed with the proposed arms sales to Taiwan. Not all of these approved sales were necessarily
purchased by Taiwan. There have been other transfers of U.S. defense articles and services not
included in this list (that amounted to billions of dollars), including sales and technical assistance
with smaller individual values not required to be notified to Congress, those with classified
notifications, and other direct commercial sales licensed for export by the Department of State
and notified to Congress under Section 36(c) of the AECA (but subject to the confidentiality
requirements of Section 38(e)). There have also been leases of naval vessels and other equipment.
Moreover, each year, hundreds of Taiwan’s military personnel at different levels receive training
and education at U.S. military colleges, academies, and other institutions or units.
Table 2. Major U.S. Arms Sales as Notified to Congress Value of
Date of
Major item or service as proposed
package
notification
(usually part of a package of related support)
($ million)
1990
07/26
Cooperative Logistics Supply Support
$108
09/06
(1) C-130H transport aircraft
$45
1991
01/07
(100) MK-46 torpedoes
$28
07/24
(97) SM-1 Standard air defense missiles
$55
09/13
(110) M60A3 tanks
$119
11/18
Phase III PIP Mod Kits for HAWK air defense systems
$170
1992
05/27
Weapons, ammunition, support for 3 leased ships
$212
05/27
Supply support arrangement
$107
08/04
(207) SM-1 Standard air defense missiles
$126
09/14
(150) F-16A/B fighters
$5,800
09/14
(3) Patriot-derived Modified Air Defense System
$1,300
(MADS) fire units239
09/18
(12) SH-2F LAMPS anti-submarine helicopters
$161
1993
06/17
(12) C-130H transport aircraft
$620

238 As with all U.S. arms sales, months or years after the President’s decisions on Taiwan’s requests and Taiwan’s
subsequent decisions on which sales to pursue, the role of Congress includes informal and formal review of major
proposed FMS deals notified to Congress (during which Congress may enact a joint resolution of disapproval) as
stipulated under Section 36(b) of the AECA. See CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process,
by Richard F. Grimmett.
239 Commercial sale. Opall Barbara and David Silverberg, “Taiwanese May Soon Coproduce Patriot,” Defense News,
February 22-28, 1993; Military Balance 1999-2000.
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Date of
Major item or service as proposed
Value of
notification
(usually part of a package of related support)
package
($ million)
06/25
Supply support arrangement
$156
07/29
(38) Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$68
07/30
Logistics support services for 40 leased T-38 trainers
$70
08/
(4) E-2T Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft240
$700
09/08
Logistics support services for MADS
$175
11/04
(150) MK-46 Mod 5 torpedoes
$54
11/09
Weapons, ammunition, and support
$238
for 3 leased frigates
11/23
MK-41 Mod (short) Vertical Launch Systems
$103
for ship-based air defense missiles
1994
08/01
(80) AN/ALQ-184 electronic counter measure (ECM) pods
$150
09/12
MK-45 Mod 2 gun system
$21
1995
03/24
(6) MK-75 shipboard gun systems,
$75
(6) Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems
06/07
Supply support arrangement
$192
1996
05/10
Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment
$188
communications system
05/10
(30) TH-67 training helicopters,
$53
(30) sets of AN/AVS-6 night vision goggles
05/23
(465) Stinger missiles,
$84
(55) dual-mounted Stinger launcher systems
06/24
(300) M60A3TTS tanks
$223
08/23
(1,299) Stinger surface-to-air missiles,
$420
(74) Avenger vehicle mounted guided missile launchers,
(96) HMMWVs (high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle)
09/05
(110) MK-46 MOD 5 anti-submarine torpedoes
$66
1997
02/14
(54) Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$95
05/23
(1,786) TOW 2A anti-armor guided missiles,
$81
(114) TOW launchers, (100) HMMWVs
07/24
(21) AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters241
$479
09/03
(13) OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Armed Scout helicopters
$172

240 Flight International, September 1-7, 1993.
241 Taiwan reportedly ordered 63 AH-1W helicopters, 42 of which were delivered by early 2000, and Taiwan may order
an additional 24 helicopters (Defense News, March 6, 2000).
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Date of
Major item or service as proposed
Value of
notification
(usually part of a package of related support)
package
($ million)
11/09
Pilot training and logistics support for F-16 fighters
$280
11/09
Spare parts for various aircraft
$140
1998
01/28
(3) Knox-class frigates,242
$300
(1) MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS)
06/01
(28) Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation and targeting
$160
pods for F-16 fighters243
08/27
(58) Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$101
08/27
(61) Dual-mount Stinger surface-to-air missiles
$180
08/27
(131) MK 46 Mod 5(A)S anti-submarine torpedoes
$69
10/09
(9) CH-47SD Chinook helicopters
$486
1999
05/26
(240) AGM-114KS Hellfire II air-to-surface missiles
$23
05/26
(5) AN/VRC-92E SINCGARS radio systems,
$64
(5) Intelligence Electronic Warfare systems, (5) HMMWVs
07/30
Spare parts for F-5E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B,
$150
and Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) aircraft
07/30
(2) E-2T Hawkeye 2000E airborne early warning aircraft244
$400
2000
03/02
Modernization of the TPS-43F air defense radar
$96
to TPS-75V configuration
03/02
(162) HAWK Intercept guided air defense missiles245
$106
06/07
(39) Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation and targeting
$234
pods for F-16 fighters
06/07
(48) AN/ALQ-184 ECM pods for F-16s
$122
09/28
(146) M109A5 howitzers, 152 SINCGARS radio systems
$405
09/28
(200) AIM-120C Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air
$150
Missiles (AMRAAMs) for F-16 fighters
09/28
(71) RGM-84L Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$240
09/28
Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment (IMSE)
$513
communication system

242 In 1992, the Bush Administration submitted legislation that Congress passed to lease three Knox-class frigates to
Taiwan. Reports say that Taiwan leased a total of six (and subsequently bought them in 1999) and purchased two in
1998 (plus one for spares).
243 The sale of the navigation/targeting pods excluded the laser designator feature, but the Pentagon notified Congress
on May 16, 2000, that 20 sets would be upgraded to include the feature.
244 Northrop Grumman delivered the first one on August 10, 2004, at St. Augustine, FL.
245 On June 23, 2000, the Pentagon notified Congress of a sale of 156 excess HAWK air defense missiles to Taiwan for
about $7 million.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
śřȱ

Š’ Š—DZȱŠ“˜›ȱǯǯȱ›–œȱŠ•Žœȱ’—ŒŽȱŗşşŖȱ
ȱ
Date of
Major item or service as proposed
Value of
notification
(usually part of a package of related support)
package
($ million)
2001
07/18
(50) Joint Tactical Information Distribution Systems
$725
(JTIDS) terminals (a version of Link 16) for data links
between aircraft, ships, and ground stations
09/05
(40) AGM-65G Maverick air-to-ground missiles for F-16s
$18
10/26
(40) Javelin anti-tank missile systems
$51
10/30
Logistical support for spare parts for F-5E/F, C-130H,
$288
F-16A/B, and IDF aircraft
2002
06/04
(3) AN/MPN-14 air traffic control radars
$108
09/04
(54) AAV7A1 assault amphibious vehicles
$250
09/04
Maintenance of material and spare parts for aircraft,
$174
radar systems, AMRAAMS, and other systems
09/04
(182) AIM-9M-1/2 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles
$36
09/04
(449) AGM-114M3 Hellfire II anti-armor missiles to
$60
equip AH-1W and OH-58D helicopters246
10/11
(290) TOW-2B anti-tank missiles
$18
11/21
(4) Kidd-class destroyers
$875
2003
09/24
Multi-functional Information Distribution Systems
$775
(for Po Sheng C4ISR data link upgrades)
2004
03/30
(2) Ultra High Frequency Long Range Early
$1,776
Warning Radars
2005
10/25
(10) AIM-9M Sidewinder and (5) AIM-7M Sparrow
$280
air-to-air missiles; continuation of pilot training and
logistics support for F-16 fighters at Luke AFB, AZ
2007
02/28
(218) AMRAAMs and (235) Maverick air-to-ground
$421
missiles for F-16 fighters
08/08
(60) AGM-84L Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles
$125
09/12
(144) SM-2 Block IIIA Standard air-defense missiles
$272
(for Kidd-class destroyers)
09/12
(12) P-3C maritime patrol/ASW aircraft
$1,960
11/09
Patriot configuration 2 ground systems upgrade
$939

246 On January 4, 2005, Lockheed Martin announced a letter of agreement worth about $50 million for more than 400
Hellfire missiles.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
śŚȱ

Š’ Š—DZȱŠ“˜›ȱǯǯȱ›–œȱŠ•Žœȱ’—ŒŽȱŗşşŖȱ
ȱ
Date of
Major item or service as proposed
Value of
notification
(usually part of a package of related support)
package
($ million)
2008
10/3
(330) Patriot PAC-3 missiles
$3,100
10/3
(32) UGM-84L sub-launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$200
10/3
spare parts for F-5E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B, IDF aircraft
$334
10/3
(182) Javelin anti-armor missiles
$47
10/3
upgrade (4) E-2T aircraft (Hawkeye 2000 configuration)
$250
10/3
(30) AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters
$2,532


ž‘˜›ȱ˜—ŠŒȱ —˜›–Š’˜—ȱ

Shirley A. Kan

Specialist in Asian Security Affairs
skan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7606




˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
śśȱ