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Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

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This report provides an overview of U.S. international drug control policy. It describes major
international counternarcotics initiatives and evaluates the broad array of U.S. drug control policy
tools currently in use. The report also considers alternative counterdrug policy approaches to
current initiatives and raises several counterdrug policy issues and considerations for policy
makers.
Illegal drugs refer to narcotic, psychotropic, and related substances whose production, sale, and
use are restricted by domestic law and international drug control agreements. Common illegal
drugs include cannabis, cocaine, opiates, and synthetic drugs. International trade in these drugs
represents a lucrative and what at times seems to be an intractable criminal enterprise, affecting
countries worldwide and generating between $100 billion and $1 trillion in illicit profits per year.
Revenue from the illegal drug industry provides international drug trafficking organizations with
the resources to evade and compete with law enforcement officials; penetrate legitimate economic
structures through money laundering; and, in some instances, challenge the authority of national
governments.
Despite apparent national resolve to address international narcotics trafficking, tensions appear at
times between U.S. international drug control policy and other U.S. foreign policy goals and
concerns. Pursuit of international drug control policies can sometimes negatively affect national
interests by exacerbating political instability and economic dislocation in countries where
narcotics production is entrenched economically and socially. Drug supply interdiction programs
and U.S. systems to facilitate the international movement of legitimate goods, people, and wealth
also are often at odds. The high priority of terrorism in U.S. foreign policy has resulted in
increased attention to links between drug and terror groups; a challenge facing policy makers,
however, is how to avoid diverting counterdrug resources for anti-terror ends in areas of
potentially low payoff.
Congress is involved in all aspects of U.S. international drug control policy, regularly
appropriating funds for counterdrug initiatives, conducting oversight activities on federal
counterdrug programs, and legislating changes to agency authorities and other counterdrug
policies. Major U.S. programs to combat drug production and trafficking exist in the Andean
region of South America, Afghanistan, and Mexico. Combined, these three programs represent
more than 90% of the Administration’s FY2009 U.S. international counterdrug budget. In the
FY2008 Supplemental Act (P.L. 100-252), Congress appropriated $465 million of the proposed,
multiyear $1.4 billion security assistance package, called the Mérida Initiative, to enhance
existing U.S. efforts to combat drug trafficking and related criminal activity in Mexico and
Central America. Through its appropriations and federal oversight responsibilities, the 111th
Congress may chose to tackle several emerging policy issues concerning U.S. international drug
control policy, including whether to appropriate more funding for the Mérida Initiative, how to
address the growing use of West Africa as a drug transit point to Europe and other destinations,
and the role of the Department of Defense in counterdrug foreign assistance.

˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
˜—Ž—œȱ
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
U.S. National Drug Control Strategy............................................................................................... 3
Funding ..................................................................................................................................... 4
Agency Roles ............................................................................................................................ 4
International Drug Control Tools .................................................................................................... 6
Multilateral Cooperation ........................................................................................................... 6
Foreign Assistance Sanctions .................................................................................................... 7
“Drug Majors” and the Certification Process ..................................................................... 7
Methamphetamine Precursor Chemicals ............................................................................ 9
Crop Eradication ....................................................................................................................... 9
Alternative Development .........................................................................................................11
Interdiction .............................................................................................................................. 12
Anti-Money Laundering Efforts.............................................................................................. 14
Extradition............................................................................................................................... 16
Institutional Capacity Building ............................................................................................... 16
Legislative Issues for the 111th Congress ...................................................................................... 17
Mérida Initiative...................................................................................................................... 17
Plan Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Program ........................................................... 21
Afghanistan Counterdrug Programs........................................................................................ 24
Alternative Policy Approaches ...................................................................................................... 26
Rebalance Current Drug Policy Tools..................................................................................... 26
Emphasize “Hard-Side” of Counternarcotics Policy ........................................................ 26
Emphasize “Soft-Side” of Counternarcotics Policy.......................................................... 27
Emphasize Drug Demand Reduction................................................................................ 28
Reevaluate Prohibitionist Drug Regime.................................................................................. 29
Legalize Illegal Drugs....................................................................................................... 29
Decriminalize Illegal Drugs.............................................................................................. 31
Allow Government-Supervised Drug Use for Addicts ..................................................... 32
Expand International Criminal Court Jurisdiction .................................................................. 32

’ž›Žœȱ
Figure 1. Map of World Drug Majors in FY2009 ........................................................................... 8
Figure 2. Major Money Laundering Countries and Jurisdictions of Primary Money
Laundering Concern in 2008...................................................................................................... 15

Š‹•Žœȱ
Table 1. U.S. Drug Control Funding ............................................................................................... 4
Table 2. U.S. Assistance for Crop Eradication .............................................................................. 10
Table 3. U.S. Illegal Drug Seizures Along the Southwest Border ................................................. 12
Table 4. Requested Mérida Initiative Funding, by Country .......................................................... 18
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
Table 5. Proposed Counternarcotics Budget for Mexico under P.L. 110-252
Appropriations............................................................................................................................ 19
Table 6. Estimated Plan Colombia/ACP Funding, by Country ..................................................... 21
Table 7. Estimated U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance for Afghanistan, by Agency ...................... 25

˜—ŠŒœȱ
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 33

˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ

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—›˜žŒ’˜—ȱ
Illegal drugs refer to narcotic, psychotropic, and related substances produced, traded, or used in
contravention to domestic law or international drug control agreements.1 Narcotic drugs include
cannabis, cannabis resin, coca leaf, cocaine, heroin, and opium. Psychotropic substances include
ecstasy,2 LSD,3 amphetamine, and methamphetamine. Examples of other related substances
include precursor chemicals used to make narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances—such as
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine—which are used to make methamphetamine, and potassium
permanganate, which is used to make cocaine. With few exceptions, production and sale of
controlled substances is legally permitted only if used for medical and scientific purposes.
Illegal drug use generates a lucrative illegal drug trade that affects countries worldwide. Estimates
of the global proceeds from illegal drugs vary significantly, ranging from $100 billion to more
than $1 trillion per year.4 A substantial portion of profits generated by illegal drug trade—as much
as 70%—are laundered and invested through foreign banks and institutions.5 This transnational
illegal drug industry also provides international drug trafficking organizations with resources to
evade and compete with law enforcement agencies; penetrate legitimate economic structures; and,
in some instances, challenge the authority of national governments.
Although international drug trafficking has been an issue of foreign policy concern for more than
a century and a subject of longstanding multilateral policy commitment, tensions appear at times
between U.S. foreign drug policy and policy approaches advocated by independent observers and
some foreign countries. Illegal drugs first emerged in U.S. policy debates as a national security
threat in the late 1960s—and has been perceived mainly through a security and law enforcement
lens, among successive Administrations as well as Congresses, ever since. In a 1971 press
conference, then-President Richard Nixon identified illicit drugs as America’s “public enemy
number one.”6 That same year, Congress enacted a chapter into the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 to define U.S. policies and authorities relating to international narcotics control.7 In 1986,
President Ronald Reagan declared narcotics trafficking a threat to U.S. national security.8 That

1 This report expands and replaces CRS Report RL33582, International Drug Trade and U.S. Foreign Policy, by
Raphael F. Perl.
2 Ecstasy is the street name for MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxy-N-methylamphetamine).
3 LSD is the street name for lysergic acid diethylamide.
4 The most recent international effort to estimate the value of the illicit drug market was undertaken by the U.N. Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which estimated that for CY2003, the international drug market was valued at $322
billion at the retail level. Subsequent UNODC reports do not give global estimates on proceeds. Debate continues to
surround methodological limitations to drug market estimates. See UNODC, 2005 World Drug Report, “Estimating the
Value of Illicit Drug Markets,” at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2005/volume_1_chap2.pdf. See Francisco E.
Thoumi, “The Numbers Game: Let’s All Guess the Size of the Illegal Drug Industry!” Journal of Drug Issues, Vol. 35,
No. 1, Winter 2005, pp. 185-200.
5 U.N. International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), “Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and
Illicit Trafficking,” Technical Series No. 6, 1998, at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/technical_series_1998-01-01_1.pdf.
6 Richard Nixon, “Remarks about an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control,” June 17, 1971.
Briefing transcript at John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/WS/?pid=3047.
7 P.L. 92-226, Section 109, added Ch. 8, International Narcotics Control, to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L.
87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2291 et seq.).
8 Ronald Reagan, National Security Decision Directive 221, “Narcotics and National Security,” April 8, 1986, partially
declassified on November 7, 1995, redacted version available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-221.htm.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
same year, Congress expanded drug interdiction authorities and criminal penalties for drug
trafficking.9 Successive administrations have continued to feature combating the illicit drug trade
prominently among U.S. national security objectives. At the same time, Congress continues to
exercise its oversight responsibilities on U.S. counternarcotics policy and appropriate funds for
international counternarcotics programs.
Several factors contribute to the argument that international drug trade continues to be best
addressed as a security and law enforcement policy issue, while other considerations support
claims that illicit drugs are better approached through methods of public health harm reduction
and economic and social development. On the one hand, many major hot spots of drug trafficking
around the world are mired by one or a combination of related and often interlinked security
concerns, including regional conflict, transnational crime, international terrorism, and violence.
At the most extreme, drug trafficking organizations may essentially compete with a state
government for power in the region, whether by force or through extensive official corruption. In
this manner, some observers have questioned whether drug trafficking has rendered countries,
such as Afghanistan, Guatemala, and Guinea-Bissau, into narco-states.10 The confluence of
political and security threats surrounding international drug trafficking, many analysts argue,
necessitates a policy posture that emphasizes the disruption and dismantlement of the criminal
actors involved in all aspects of the drug trade.
At the same time, however, other observers argue that security and law enforcement approaches
to international drug control have failed to achieve notable successes in “eliminating or reducing
significantly” the supply of illicit drugs—a goal the United Nations committed in 1998 to achieve
by 2008.11 Supporting this position in its most recent annual report of the world drug situation,
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) argues that international concern with “public
security” during the past decade has overshadowed other key tenets of drug control policy,
including public health and drug demand reduction.12 Numerous international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) also argue that greater emphasis should be placed on policies that
emphasize harm reduction efforts to address and prevent the adverse health and social
consequences; programs to promote treatment, rehabilitation, and social re-integration for drug
users; as well as sustainable and comprehensive alternative development projects.13
These competing viewpoints and related issues may be addressed at the 52nd session of the UN’s
Commission on Narcotic Drugs and its high-level political segment in March 2009, when country
delegates will convene to assess the status of the illicit drug trade and evaluate options to modify
or reaffirm the current international drug control regime. In 2009, the 111th Congress may also
choose to assess existing U.S. international drug policy. In this process, several questions may
emerge:

9 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-570) U.S.C. 801 note.
10 See for example: Thomas Schweich, “Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?” The New York Times, July 27, 2008; Frank
Smyth, “The Untouchable Narco-State,” The Texas Observer, November 18, 2005; and Ed Vulliamy, “How a Tiny
West African Country became the World’s First Narco State,” The Observer, March 9, 2008.
11 p. 215, UNODC, 2008 World Drug Report, June 2008,available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/
775/09/PDF/N9877509.pdf?OpenElement.
12 Ibid, p. 217.
13 See for example Vienna NGO Committee on Narcotic Drugs, “Beyond 2008 Declaration,” July 9, 2008; available at
http://www.vngoc.org/images/uploads/file/BEYOND%202008%
20DECLARATION%20AND%20RESOLUTIONS%20FINAL(1).pdf.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Řȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
• How do counternarcotics policies interact with counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency, and anti-money laundering priorities, particularly in countries
such as Afghanistan, where the U.S. government may have an interest in all three
issues?
• What role should the U.S. military play in providing foreign counternarcotics
assistance, particularly as the U.S. government develops plans to expand its
counternarcotics assistance footprint in West Africa and as the Pentagon
considers alternatives to its current counternarcotics forward operating location
in Ecuador, where the ten-year arrangement between the U.S. military and the
government of Ecuador is set to expire in 2009?
• How should U.S. policymakers weigh the benefits of aerial eradication as a
counternarcotics policy tool with the social, financial, and political costs it may
incur?
• To what extent should U.S. counternarcotics policy take into account economic
development, social development, and health and harm reduction programs and
are such efforts sufficiently coordinated with international and bilateral partners?
• How do counternarcotics policies interact with related foreign policy goals of
anti-corruption, justice sector reform, and improving the rule of law?
• How might international regulatory and legal constraints limit the reach of U.S.
counternarcotics policy and potentially offer drug syndicates foreign safe havens?
And what legislative options might be available to prevent such legal safe havens
from existing?
This report provides an overview of U.S. international drug control policy and is divided into four
main parts. First, it outlines and evaluates major U.S. drug control policy initiatives; second, it
assesses major international drug control tools used by the United States; third, it considers
alternative counterdrug policy approaches; and finally, it raises several policy issues and
considerations for drug control policy makers.
ǯǯȱŠ’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ›ŠŽ¢ȱ
U.S. involvement in international counterdrug policy rests on the central premise that helping
foreign governments combat the illegal drug trade abroad will ultimately curb illegal drug
availability and use in the United States. To this end, the Bush Administration maintains the goal
of reducing, and ultimately cutting off, the international flow of illegal drugs into the United
States.
Since 1999, the Administration has developed an annual National Drug Control Strategy, which
describes the total budget for drug control programs and outlines U.S. strategic goals for
stemming drug supply and demand.14 The Administration’s 2008 National Drug Control Strategy
centers on five major goals: (1) reduce the flow of drugs into the United States; (2) disrupt and

14 Congress requires that the White House submit to Congress a National Drug Control Strategy report each year. This
requirement was first established by Section 706 of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of
1998 (Division C, Title VII, P.L. 105-277; 21 U.S.C. 1705) and has been subsequently amended. The current National
Drug Control Strategy is available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs08/index.html.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
řȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
dismantle major drug trafficking organizations; (3) focus on the nexus between the drug trade and
other potential transnational threats to the United States, including terrorism; (4) deny drug
traffickers, narco-terrorists, and their criminal associates their illicit profits and money laundering
activities; and (5) assist foreign countries threatened by illegal drugs in strengthening their
governance and law enforcement institutions.
ž—’—ȱ
For FY2009, the Administration has requested a total of $14.1 billion for federal drug control
programs (see Table 1).15 Of this, 38.6%, or $5.4 billion, is requested for international and
interdiction programs.
Table 1. U.S. Drug Control Funding
(in historical U.S. $ millions)
FY2008 FY2009
Activitiesa
FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 Est.b
Req.
International 1,084.5 1,105.1 1,159.3 1,393.3 1,434.5 2,016.6 2,043.2 1,610.4
Interdiction 1,913.7 2,147.5 2,534.1 2,928.7 3,287.0 3,175.9 3,214.2 3,830.9
Domestic
7,783.2 7,967.5 8,312.2 8,462.3 8,422.6 8,651.5 8,783.1 8,673.1
Total
10,781.4 11,220.1 12,005.6 12,784.3 13,144.1 13,844.0 14,040.5 14,114.4
Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), National Drug Control Strategy, FY2009 Budget
Summary, February 2008.
a. “International” refers to activities primarily focused on or conducted in areas outside the United States,
including a wide range of drug control programs to eradicate crops, seize drugs (except air and riverine
interdiction seizures), arrest and prosecute major traffickers, destroy processing capabilities, develop and
promote alternative crops to replace drug crops, reduce demand, investigate money laundering and financial
crime activities, and promote the involvement of other nations in efforts to control the supply of and
demand for drugs. “Interdiction” refers to activities designed to intercept and disrupt shipments of illegal
drugs and their precursors en route to the United States from abroad. “Domestic” refers to activities
related to domestic demand reduction, including federal drug treatment and drug prevention programs, as
well as domestic law enforcement.
b. These estimates include $385.1 million that the Administration is requesting in FY2008 supplemental
appropriations.
Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜•Žœȱ
Several U.S. agencies are involved in implementing U.S. international counternarcotics activities
in support of the Administration’s 2008 National Drug Control Strategy. These agencies include
the following:
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).16 Located within the
Executive Office of the President, ONDCP establishes U.S. counterdrug policies

15 Office on National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), National Drug Control Strategy, FY2009 Budget Summary,
February 2008, p. 11, at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/09budget/tbl_1.pdf.
16 Congress established ONDCP in 1988 in the National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988 (Title I, Subtitle A of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P.L. 100-690), which has since been amended. For additional information on ONDCP,
(continued...)
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Śȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
and goals, and coordinates the federal budget to combat drugs both domestically
and internationally. Every February, ONDCP’s director, sometimes referred to as
the U.S. drug czar, produces the National Drug Control Strategy and the federal
counterdrug budget summary.
U.S. Department of State.17 The Secretary of State is responsible for
coordinating all international counterdrug programs implemented by the U.S.
government, including foreign counternarcotics assistance. The State Department
identifies fighting the production, transportation, and sale of illegal narcotics
among its primary goals.18 Every March, the State Department’s Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) produces the
International Narcotics Strategy Report (INCSR), which describes the efforts of
key countries to attack all aspects of the international drug trade, including anti-
money laundering during the previous calendar year.
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID provides
assistance for long-term economic and social development. The USAID
Administrator serves concurrently as the State Department’s Director of U.S.
Foreign Assistance, with a rank equivalent to Deputy Secretary of State. USAID
plays a role in counternarcotics development assistance, especially regarding
alternative livelihood programs, which are designed to offer alternatives to
farmers that will enable and encourage them to discontinue planting poppy and
other illicit crops.
Department of Defense (DOD). DOD maintains the lead role in detecting and
monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States19 and
plays a key role in collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence on illegal drugs
with U.S. law enforcement and international security counterparts. In addition,
DOD provides counternarcotics foreign assistance to train, equip, and improve
the counternarcotics capacity and capabilities of relevant agencies of foreign
governments with its Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account
appropriations.20
Department of Justice (DOJ). The Attorney General is responsible for federal
law enforcement and to ensure public safety against foreign and domestic threats,
including illegal drug trafficking. This translates into an array of responsibilities
that include law enforcement operations, drug-related intelligence analysis,
prosecution and criminal justice activities, as well as police and justice sector
training. Primary agencies under DOJ that focus on international drug control
include the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of

(...continued)
see CRS Report RL32352, War on Drugs: Reauthorization and Oversight of the Office of National Drug Control
Policy
, by Mark Eddy.
17 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; Sec. 481(b)(1); 22 U.S.C. 2291(b)(1)), as amended by Section 4(c) of
the International Narcotics Control Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-583).
18 U.S. Department of State, Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2007-2012, p. 15, at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/86291.pdf.
19 10 U.S.C. 124, as added by Section 1202(a) of P.L. 101-189.
20 Congress provides the Department of Defense (DOD) with these authorities under Section 1004 of P.L. 101-510, as
amended (10 U.S.C. 374 note), and Section 1033 of P.L. 105-85, as amended.
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Investigation (FBI), the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), the
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF), and the El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC).
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Secretary of Homeland
Security is responsible for U.S. policies related to interdiction of illegal drugs
entering the United States from abroad. The Strategic Plan for DHS identifies
securing the U.S. border against illegal drugs as one of its primary objectives.21
Key offices within DHS that participate in counterdrug activities include the
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Coast Guard, and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE).
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA’s Crime and Narcotics Center
collects intelligence information and develops intelligence analyses to support or
conduct operations countering illicit drug activities, including trends in illegal
drug crop cultivation and production.
Department of the Treasury. The Treasury Department participates in
counterdrug efforts as they pertain to targeting the illicit financial proceeds that
result from drug trafficking. Key offices that participate in combating drug-
related money laundering include the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
and the Financial Crime Enforcement Network (FinCEN).22
—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜˜•œȱ
Over the years, U.S. counterdrug efforts have expanded to include a broad array of tools to attack
the drug trade using several approaches. The following sections describe and analyze U.S. use of
eight major drug control tools: (1) multilateral cooperation, (2) foreign assistance restrictions, (3)
crop eradication, (4) alternative development, (5) interdiction, (6) extradition, (7) anti-money
laundering, and (8) institutional capacity building.
ž•’•ŠŽ›Š•ȱ˜˜™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ
For nearly a century, the United States has been involved in multilateral international drug control
efforts, beginning with the International Opium Commission of 1909. This 1909 Commission led
to the development of the first ever international drug control treaty, the Hague Opium
Convention of 1912.23 Since the early 1900s, the U.S. government has been a primary advocate
for broadening and deepening the scope of international drug control, especially through the
United Nations’ three active multilateral drug control treaties: the 1961 Single Convention on

21 See p. 14 of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Strategic Plan at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
DHS_StratPlan_FINAL_spread.pdf.
22 For additional information, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “What You Need
to Know about U.S. Sanctions Against Drug Traffickers,” at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/
programs/narco/drugs.pdf; see also p. 10 of FinCEN’s Strategic Plan, at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/
strategic_plan_2008.pdf.
23 Article 44 of the 1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961 Single Convention) provides that
the Hague Opium Convention of 1912 would be succeeded by the 1961 Single Convention when it entered into force.
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Ŝȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
Narcotic Drugs, as amended; the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances; and the 1988
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.24
Today, more than 95% of U.N. member states, including the United States, are parties to these
three international drug control treaties.25 In total, these international agreements limit
international production and trade of a defined set of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and
the precursor chemicals used to make these substances for primarily medical and scientific
purposes. The treaties also establish international mechanisms to monitor treaty adherence and for
the collection of data related to the illicit cultivation, production, or manufacture of proscribed
drugs.
The United States also participates in multilateral assistance programs to control illegal drug
production and trafficking through the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Inter-
American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD). UNODC was established in 1997 to
provide field-based technical assistance on counternarcotics projects, as well as research and
analysis on illegal drug market trends.26 As the drug control arm of the Organization of American
States (OAS), CICAD serves as a regional policy forum for all aspects of Western Hemisphere
illegal drug issues.27 In FY2007, the United States provided UNODC with an estimated $4
million and OAS/CICAD with $1.4 million. In FY2008, the United States provided UNODC with
approximately $2.1 million and OAS/CICAD with $1.4 million.28
˜›Ž’—ȱœœ’œŠ—ŒŽȱŠ—Œ’˜—œȱ
ȃ›žȱŠ“˜›œȄȱŠ—ȱ‘ŽȱŽ›’’ŒŠ’˜—ȱ›˜ŒŽœœȱ
In an effort to deter foreign governments from aiding or participating in illicit drug production or
trafficking, the President may suspend U.S. foreign assistance appropriations to countries that are
major illegal drug producers or major transit countries for illegal drugs, known as “drug
majors.”29 For FY2009, the President has identified 20 drug majors (see Figure 1). Of these,
Congress requires that the President identify those drug majors that have “failed demonstrably” to

24 A copy of the 1961 Single Convention, as amended, is at http://www.incb.org/incb/convention_1961.html; the 1971
Convention is at http://www.incb.org/incb/en/convention _1971.html; and the 1988 Convention is at
http://www.incb.org/incb/en/convention_1988.html.
25 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), 2007 Report, 2008, at http://www.incb.org/incb/en/annual-report-
2007.html.
26 The UNODC website is available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/index.html. UNODC’s budget in the 2006-2007
biennium totaled $283 million, $120.2 million of which was devoted for drug control assistance projects.
27 The CICAD website is available at http://www.cicad.oas.org/.
28 U.S. Department of State response to CRS request, February 5, 2009.
29 Since 1992, Congress has required that the President submit annual reports, which identify major drug transit and
major drug producing countries, known as the “drug majors.” Major illicit drug producing countries are defined by
section 481(e)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291(e)(2)) as a country in which (1) 1,000 hectares
or more of illicit opium poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year, (2) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca is
cultivated or harvested during a year, or (3) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis is cultivated or harvested during a
year, unless the President determines that such illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the United
States. Major drug-transit countries are defined by section 481(e)(5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2291(e)(5)) as a country (1) that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled
substances significantly affecting the United States, or (2) through which are transported such drugs or substances.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŝȱ


—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
make at least “substantial efforts” to adhere to their obligations during the previous year under
international counternarcotics agreements.
Failure to receive a presidential certification of substantial counternarcotics efforts results in
foreign assistance prohibitions against those drug majors. There are two exceptions to the
requirement.30 Drug majors that “failed demonstrably” to make “substantial efforts” to adhere to
their obligations during the previous year under international counternarcotics agreements may be
allowed to continue receiving U.S. foreign assistance if the President determines that assistance is
“vital” to U.S. national interests. Further, foreign assistance may be withheld by Congress,
despite a presidential certification, if Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving of the
presidential certification.
For FY2009, the President did not certify three drug majors—Burma, Burma and Venezuela—and
U.S. assistance to these countries is limited to “programs to aid Venezuela’s democratic
institutions” and for “continued support for bilateral programs in Bolivia” (see Figure 1).31
Figure 1. Map of World Drug Majors in FY2009

Source: George W. Bush, Presidential Determination No. 2008-28, “Memorandum to the Secretary of State:
Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2009,” September 16, 2008, at
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/prsrl/ps/109777.htm.
Since its creation, the drug majors designation process has garnered significant controversy.
Supporters of the process argue that it is an “effective diplomatic instrument” to enforce
international drug control commitments because it holds foreign governments “publicly

30 See 22 U.S.C. 2291j-1.
31 George W. Bush, Presidential Determination No. 2008-28, “Memorandum to the Secretary of State: Major Drug
Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2009,” September 16, 2008, at http://www.state.gov/
p/inl/rls/prsrl/ps/109777.htm.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Şȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
responsible for their actions before their international peers.”32 Observers from many countries
criticize the unilateral and non-cooperative nature of the drug certification requirements; such
critics recommend moving toward multilateral and regional fora for evaluating governments’
counterdrug efforts. Others question the extent to which the process reduces the scope of the
illegal drug trade, when many of the world’s drug producers and transit areas are located in
countries that are not designated as drug majors or decertified by the President.
Ž‘Š–™‘ŽŠ–’—Žȱ›ŽŒž›œ˜›ȱ‘Ž–’ŒŠ•œȱ
A second certification process was enacted by Congress as part of the Combat Methamphetamine
Epidemic Act of 2005.33 This law amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to require the State
Department to report the five largest importing and exporting countries of two precursor drugs,
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, commonly used to produce methamphetamine, and certify
whether these countries are fully cooperating with the United States on methamphetamine
chemical precursor control (see Table 2). Nations deemed not to be fully cooperating face a loss
of U.S. bilateral assistance and U.S. opposition to multilateral assistance in the multilateral
development banks.34 For 2008, the State Department identified 15 major precursor chemical
source countries: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Germany, India, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. So far, the President has not decertified any country for its efforts to control
methamphetamine precursor chemicals.
›˜™ȱ›Š’ŒŠ’˜—ȱ
Eradication programs seek to combat the flow of cocaine, opium, heroin, and marijuana at the
root of the supply chain—in the fields. Illicit drug crop eradication can take several forms,
including (1) aerial fumigation, which involves the spraying of fields with herbicide; (2) manual
removal, which involves the physical up-rooting and destruction of crops; and (3) mechanical
removal, which involves the use of tractors and all-terrain vehicles to harrow the fields. The
United States supports programs to eradicate coca, opium, and marijuana in a number of
countries, including primarily Colombia and Afghanistan (see Table 2). These efforts are
conducted by a number of U.S. government agencies and contractors that administer U.S.
eradication programs providing producer countries with chemical herbicides, technical assistance
and specialized equipment, and spray aircraft. In FY2007, the State Department spent
approximately $452 million on international eradication programs.35

32 See for example U.S. Department of State, 1996 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), 2007, at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1996_narc_report/exesum96.html.
33 Section 722 of Title VII of USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-177; 21 U.S.C.
801 note) amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 at Sections 489 and 490; for further explanation, see also
H.Rept. 109-133.
34 As with the drug majors certification process, the President can waive the foreign assistance restrictions if he
determines that providing aid to the country is vital to U.S. national interest.
35 State Department response to CRS request, May 23, 2008.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
şȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
Table 2. U.S. Assistance for Crop Eradication
(in current U.S. $ millions)
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009

Actuala
Estimatea
Request
Afghanistanb 166.7
178.3
187.0
Bolivia 8.5
7.3
7.5
Colombiac 170.7
140.4
165.9
Guatemala 0.1
0.3
0.3
Mexico 0.2
0.0
0.1
Pakistan 2.3
1.0
3.0
Peru 32.5
20.5
14.4
INLd 86.2
47.2
49.3
Total 467.2
395.0
427.5
Source: U.S. Department of State response to CRS request, February 5, 2009. Funds are rounded to the first
decimal.
a. Final implementation numbers are based on additional post reporting requirements to update their
operational plans.
b. Funds listed for Afghanistan in FY2007 include $20 million in FY2007 emergency supplemental
appropriations.
c. For FY2008 and FY2009, the Critical Flight Safety is included in the Colombia subtotals.
d. For FY2007, Colombia’s Critical Flight Safety was a separate budget line item and therefore included in the
INL subtotal.
Eradication is a long-standing U.S. policy regarding international drug control. The State
Department considers crop control the “most cost-effective means of cutting supply,” because
drugs cannot enter the illegal trade if the crops were never planted, destroyed, or left
unharvested.36 Without drug cultivation, the State Department’s rationale continues, “there would
be no need for costly enforcement and interdiction operations.” Proponents of eradication further
argue that it is easier to locate and destroy crops in the field than to locate subsequently processed
drugs on smuggling routes or on the streets of U.S. cities. Put differently, a kilogram of powder
cocaine is far more difficult to detect than the 300 to 500 kilograms of coca leaf that are required
to make that same kilogram. Also, because crops constitute the cheapest link in the narcotics
chain, producers may devote fewer economic resources to prevent their detection than to conceal
more expensive and refined forms of the drug product.
Opponents of expanded supply reduction policy generally question whether reduction of the
foreign supply of narcotic drugs is achievable and whether it would have a meaningful impact on
levels of illicit drug use in the United States. Manual eradication requires significant time and
human resources, reportedly involving upward of 20 work-hours of effort to pull up and destroy
one hectare of coca plants.37 Aerial application of herbicide is not legal or feasible in many

36 U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR, at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/.
37 Kevin J. Riley, Snow Job? The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 1996), p. 112.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŖȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
countries and is expensive to implement where it is permitted.38 Aerial fumigation in Colombia
has also raised allegations that the herbicide chemical used has caused negative human, animal,
and environmental consequences.39
Others question whether a global policy of simultaneous crop control is politically feasible
because eradication efforts may also potentially result in negative political, economic, and social
consequences for the producing country, especially in conflict or post-conflict environments.40
Further, aerial eradication remains a high-risk activity, as spray planes and their crew are targeted
by drug traffickers. In 2003, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which the
State Department lists as a foreign terrorist organization, shot down a U.S. government plane in
the Colombian jungle, killing the American pilot and a Colombian air force sergeant and taking
three other crew members, all U.S. defense contractors, hostage.41 They remained FARC hostages
until July 2008.42
•Ž›—Š’ŸŽȱŽŸŽ•˜™–Ž—ȱ
U.S. counterdrug policy also includes foreign assistance to encourage illicit drug crop farmers to
abandon drug crop cultivation by providing alternative income opportunities. U.S. alternative
development programs, funded and run mainly by the State Department and U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping
countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production, expand legal employment
opportunities, and offer other incentives to farmers to discontinue planting illicit drug crops. In
theory, this approach is designed to complement law enforcement and eradication efforts to
provide both a “carrot and stick” strategy.
For several decades, alternative development has been implemented in various forms and with
varying success.43 Since the late 1960s, when alternative development policies were initially
conceived as simply crop substitution projects, efforts have somewhat expanded to include a
broader concept of alternative development. Current U.S. programs include not only crop
substitution projects but also the development of and assistance for roads, infrastructure, and
health care.
Some observers, however, claim that while current U.S. efforts often aim to achieve this
broadened concept of alternative development, they may not always achieve it in practice. Some
indicate that a relationship between alternative development projects and a reduction in illicit

38 Colombia is currently the only country that conducts regular aerial spraying of coca and opium poppy.
39 For further discussion of eradication policy in Colombia, see CRS Report RL33163, Drug Crop Eradication and
Alternative Development in the Andes
, by Connie Veillette and Carolina Navarrete-Frias.
40 Barnett R. Rubin and Alexandra Guaqueta, Fighting Drugs and Building Peace: Towards Policy Coherence between
Counter-Narcotics and Peace Building
, Dialogue on Globalization, Occasional Paper No. 37, November 2007.
41 For further discussion see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by Clare Ribando Seelke and June
S. Beittel, and CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan.
42 “Colombia: U.S. Hostages Spotted,” New York Times, June 10, 2008; “Betancourt, U.S. Contractors Rescued from
FARC,” CNN.com, July 3, 2008.
43 See for example UNODC, Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation, Final Synthesis Report, 2005,
at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Alternative_Development_Evaluation_Dec-05.pdf.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŗȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
drug production may be tenuous, as policy coordination between alternative development projects
and eradication and interdiction efforts remains limited in some cases.44
For Colombia, Congress and the Bush Administration have been at odds over the amount of
counternarcotics assistance to Colombia that should be allocated for alternative development and
the amount that should be allocated for military and police-led eradication and interdiction
programs. The House Appropriations Committee, in reporting out the FY2008 appropriations bill
for State and Foreign Operations (H.Rept. 110-197, P.L. 110-161), expressed its preference for a
“more balanced strategy” in which aid funds would be realigned from 76% for military and police
assistance and 24% for alternative development to a 55%-45% split. The Administration’s
FY2009 budget request, however, reverts that ratio of Colombia counternarcotics programs back
to a roughly 74%-26% split.45
—Ž›’Œ’˜—ȱ
Interdiction efforts seek to combat the drug trade as traffickers begin moving drug products from
source countries to their final destinations. Several U.S. federal agencies are involved in
coordinating operations with foreign government interdiction forces and providing law
enforcement training and other forms of assistance to foreign countries in order to deny drug
traffickers the use of transit routes. Within the so-called “transit zone”—a 42 million square-mile
area between Central and South America and the U.S. southern borders, which covers the
Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean—a DOD-led interagency group
called the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South (JIATF-South) coordinates interdiction operations
across federal agency participants, as well as international liaisons from Great Britain, France, the
Netherlands, and several Latin American countries. The U.S.-Mexican border is the primary point
of entry for cocaine shipments and other drugs smuggled into the United States (see Table 3).46
Table 3. U.S. Illegal Drug Seizures Along the Southwest Border
(in metric tons)

CY2003 CY2004 CY2005 CY2006 CY2007
Heroin
0.3 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.4
Cocaine
16.3 22.0 22.7 28.2 20.9
Cannabis
1,201.0 1,106.6 1,025.7 1,132.0 1,367.8
Methamphetamine 1.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 1.7
Source: U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) response to CRS request, March 27, 2008.

44 See, for example, “A Failed Balance: Alternative Development and Eradication,” Transnational Institute, Drugs and
Conflict Debate Paper 4, March 2002.
45 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2009, p. 668, at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/101444.pdf. Under “Peace and Security” for Colombia, the
Administration requests $317,707,000 for the Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP) (74%), which would go to mainly
to hard-side activities, including military and police assistance, and $83,360,000 in ESF (26%), which would go to soft-
side activities, including alternative development and other economic aid. Some small portion of ACP would likely go
to judicial reform, demand reduction, rule of law, and anti-money laundering programs, which would be considered
soft-side activities. Further details for proposed FY2009 funding allocations, however, are not yet publicly available.
46 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), National Drug Threat Assessment
2008, October 2007, Product No. 2007-Q0317-003, at http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs25/25921/index.htm#Top.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŘȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
Note: Seizure events occurred at ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexican border and up to 150 miles inside the
United States where the drugs are believed to have crossed the border by land conveyance.
Outside the transit zone, other international interdiction operations involving U.S. agencies,
mainly DEA, include Operation Containment, Project Cohesion, and Project Prism. Operation
Containment, a multinational law enforcement effort established in 2002 and led by DEA, aims to
place a “security belt” around Afghanistan to prevent processing chemicals for converting opium
poppy to heroin from entering the country and opium and heroin from leaving.47 Project
Cohesion, an international precursor chemical control initiative established in 2005 and led by the
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB),48 tracks precursor chemicals involved in the
production of cocaine and heroin. Project Prism, a U.N.-sponsored initiative, monitors and
controls illicit trade in precursor chemicals used in the production of amphetamine-type synthetic
drugs.
Several U.S. agencies also provide foreign law enforcement training and assistance in order to
enhance interdiction efforts abroad. The Department of State, the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, and DEA are involved in providing anti-narcotics law
enforcement training, technical assistance, and equipment for foreign personnel. In addition, the
United States regularly contributes funding and expertise to law enforcement assistance activities
of the United Nations and other international organizations.
U.S. interdiction activities are sometimes considered among the bright spots of U.S. counterdrug
efforts. The State Department reports that its interdiction activities in the Caribbean, including
Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos (OPBAT), contributed to a drop in illegal drug flows from
70% in the 1980s to less than 10% in recent years.49 A 2005 report released by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), for example, highlighted the role of improved interagency
coordination and international cooperation for improvements in transit zone interdiction
operations.50 Drug trafficking organizations, however, are reportedly growing increasingly
sophisticated in their evasion techniques, and some observers are concerned that current
interdiction capabilities may not be sufficient for long-term reductions in drug supplies.
Proponents of strong drug interdiction policies, for example, have long been concerned that the
nation’s focus on anti-terror objectives will detract from resources and political will needed to
combat foreign illicit drug production and trafficking. Supporting such concerns, the 2005 GAO
report states that the commitment of U.S. military assets to Iraq and Afghanistan may hamper the
ability of U.S. law enforcement to intercept drug shipments in the future. Some observers also
caution that interdiction efforts can raise the retail price of illegal drugs, potentially resulting in a
perverse incentive that actually increases the economic rewards to drug traffickers.

47 Statement of the Honorable Michele M. Leonhart, Acting Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, March 12,
2008, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct031208.html.
48 The INCB is an independent and quasi-judicial control organ monitoring the implementation of the United Nations
drug control conventions.
49 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Program and Budget
Guide, Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, Publication No. 11453, September 2007, p. 92.
50 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Decline in Drug
Interdiction Assets and Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations
, GAO-06-200, November
2005.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗřȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
—’Ȭ˜—Ž¢ȱŠž—Ž›’—ȱ˜›œȱ
To reap the financial benefits of the illegal drug trade, traffickers must launder their illicit profits
into the licit economy. As a result, the United States and other members of the international
community have sought to use anti-money laundering efforts as a tool to combat this upstream
activity in the illegal drug market. Currently, several U.S. agencies are involved in international
anti-money laundering efforts designed to enhance financial transaction transparency and
regulation, improve cooperation and coordination with foreign governments and private financial
institutions, and provide foreign countries with law enforcement training and support.
Congress has been active in pursuing anti-money laundering regulations and program oversight.
In 1999, Congress passed the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act to authorize the
President to target the financial profits that significant foreign narcotics traffickers and their
organizations (known as “Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker Kingpins,” or SDNTKs)
have accumulated from their illicit activities.51 This tool seeks to deny SDNTKs and their related
businesses access to the U.S. financial system and all trade transactions involving U.S. companies
and individuals.52 Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress further
strengthened U.S. measures to combat money laundering by providing the Secretary of the
Treasury with new authorities to impose a set of regulatory restrictions, or “special measures,”
against foreign jurisdictions, foreign financial institutions, and certain classes of financial
transactions involving foreign jurisdictions, if deemed by the Treasury Secretary to be “of
primary money laundering concern.”53 These anti-money laundering tools are designed not only
to address drug trafficking, but also combat other forms of related criminal activity, including
terrorist financing.
In addition, Congress requires that the State Department include in its annual International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) a separate volume devoted to the state of
international money laundering and financial crimes in each country. Among the report’s
congressionally mandated requirements, the State Department annually identifies the world’s
“major money laundering countries,” defined as those countries “whose financial institutions
engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international
narcotics trafficking” and other serious crimes (see Figure 2).

51 Title VIII, International Narcotics Trafficking, of P.L. 106-120, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000 (21 U.S.C. 1901-1908; 8 U.S.C. 1182).
52 The law was reportedly modeled on Treasury’s sanctions program pursuant to Executive Order 12978 (October
1995) against Colombia drug cartels under authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (Title II of
P.L. 95-223; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and the National Emergencies Act (P.L. 94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.).
53 Section 311 of the International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 (Title III,
Subtitle A of P.L. 107-56, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001) amends the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 at 31 U.S.C. 5318A.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŚȱ


—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
Figure 2. Major Money Laundering Countries and Jurisdictions of Primary Money
Laundering Concern in 2008

Source: U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR; U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network, Section 311 Special Measures, at http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/section311.html.
U.S. officials and some observers have highlighted the value of anti-money laundering efforts in
combating drug trafficking. In 2007, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) reported that anti-money laundering efforts against Colombian drug cartels have been
effective in isolating and incapacitating designated supporters, businesses, and front companies
linked to the Cali Cartel and Norte del Valle Cartel.54 Some observers also describe the Treasury
Secretary’s additional authorities to designate jurisdictions of primary money laundering concern
and apply “special measures” against these jurisdictions as having “potentially profound effects
on the financial services industry.”55 Treasury’s designation of Banco Delta Asia, for example,
successfully resulted in the freezing of some $25 million in North Korean assets—funds that
reportedly included counterfeit U.S. currency and profits from other North Korean criminal
activity, including drug trafficking.56
Skeptics of the use of anti-money laundering efforts to combat drug trafficking argue that tracking
illicit financial transactions may be more difficult and may yield less success than other
counterdrug tools.57 As the State Department’s 2008 money laundering and financial crimes
report reveals, major challenges in tracking and disrupting international money laundering
activities remain.58 The same types of money laundering methods—bulk cash smuggling, trade-

54 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Impact Report: Economic Sanctions against
Colombian Drug Cartels
, March 2007.
55 See for example Douglas N. Greenburg, John Roth, and Katherine A. Sawyer, “Special Measures under Section 311
of the USA PATRIOT Act,” The Review of Banking and Financial Services, Vol. 23, No. 6, June 2007.
56 See also CRS Report RL33885, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, by Liana Sun Wyler and Dick K. Nanto.
57 See for example R. T. Naylor, “Wash-Out: A Critique of Follow-the-Money Methods in Crime Control Policy,”
Crime, Law, and Social Change, Vol. 32, 1999, pp. 1-57.
58 U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR, Vol. 2, at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/vol2/.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗśȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
based money laundering, and others—that the State Department identified as issues of concern
more than a decade ago remain among the most utilized forms of money laundering today.
Further, emerging challenges include the growing volume of financial transactions, especially the
volume of international electronic transfers, and the movement of illegal money laundering
outside formal banking channels, including through “hawala”-type chains of transnational money
brokers.
¡›Š’’˜—ȱ
The U.S. government regularly uses extradition as an important judicial tool against suspected
drug traffickers located abroad. Extradition refers to the formal surrender of a person by a state to
another state for prosecution. Proponents of extradition to the United States argue that suspected
criminals are more likely to receive a fair trial in U.S. courts than in countries where the local
judicial process may be corrupt and where suspects can use bribes and intimidation to manipulate
the outcome of a trial.
Some anecdotal evidence appears to suggest that the threat of extradition has affected the
behavior of foreign drug trafficking organizations. For example, some Colombian drug traffickers
are reportedly distancing themselves from overt drug distribution activities, which could be used
as evidence to trigger extradition. Nevertheless, this counterdrug tool remains controversial and is
not universally supported. Many countries simply refuse to extradite drug traffickers, citing
concerns about the potential use of the death penalty in the United States against its citizens and
state sovereignty rights. Burma is one such country, which continues to refuse to extradite four
suspected drug traffickers under indictment in the United States. Some observers claim that
suspected traffickers often take advantage of such limitations in the extradition system and seek
safe haven in countries that are unwilling to extradite.
Recently, U.S. bilateral judicial cooperation with Mexico and Colombia has improved, yielding
record numbers of extradited traffickers.59 Mexico extradited 83 fugitives to the United States in
2007, up from 63 in 2006. Colombia extradited 164 to the United States in 2007, yielding a total
of more than 600 individuals since 1997, when Colombia’s legislature enacted a non-retroactive
law to formalize U.S.-Colombian extradition cooperation. In addition, although the United States
does not have a formal extradition agreement with Afghanistan, the country voluntarily
transferred to the United States two alleged traffickers in 2007 for prosecution.
—œ’ž’˜—Š•ȱŠ™ŠŒ’¢ȱž’•’—ȱ
Another element of U.S. international narcotics control increasingly involves institutional
development, such as strengthening judicial and law enforcement institutions, boosting governing
capacity, and assisting in developing host nation administrative infrastructures to combat the
illicit drug trade. Institutional development programs focus mainly on fighting corruption and
training to support criminal justice system reforms and the rule of law.
According to the State Department, drug trafficking organizations often seek to subvert or coopt
governments in order to guarantee a secure operating environment and essentially “buy their way

59 U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR; see also CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress,
by Mark P. Sullivan and June S. Beittel.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŜȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
into power.”60 Anti-corruption efforts thus seek to prevent traffickers from undermining the
legitimacy and effectiveness of foreign government institutions. Some observers, however, argue
that counterdrug policies are placing too little emphasis on projects that help foreign countries
develop a culture supportive of the rule of law. One expert explained in congressional testimony
in 2007, “unless foreign police organizations recognize and internalize what the rule of law
means, what its key characteristics are, and why the rule of law is necessary to accomplish their
mission, no amount of aid will get the job done.”61
Ž’œ•Š’ŸŽȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ‘Žȱŗŗŗ‘ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
The following section describes counternarcotics issues that the 111th Congress may choose to
address, including the three largest U.S.-led international counterdrug initiatives to date: (1) the
Mérida Initiative targeting Mexico and Central America, (2) the Andean Counterdrug Program
(ACP) and related assistance to the region, and (3) Afghanistan counterdrug programs.
Combined, these three programs represent more than 90% of the Administration’s FY2009 U.S.
international counterdrug budget.62
·›’Šȱ —’’Š’ŸŽȱ
The United States and Mexico announced on October 22, 2007, the start of a multiyear, bilateral
security agreement called the Mérida Initiative.63 This Initiative aims to combat drug trafficking
and other criminal activity along the U.S.-Mexican border, as well as in Central America.64 The
U.S.-Mexican border is viewed as especially important for U.S. counternarcotics efforts because
Mexico is currently the primary point of entry for cocaine and other drug shipments smuggled
into the United States. Proposed U.S. bilateral assistance to Mexico and Central America under
the Initiative consists of a $1.4 billion, three-year security package that would provide two main
forms of assistance: (1) equipment, including helicopters and surveillance aircraft, and technical
resources to combat drug trafficking, and (2) training and technical advice for Mexican and
Central American military, judicial, and law enforcement officials.65 Thus far, the Administration

60 U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR.
61 Statement of Dr. Roy S. Godson, Emeritus Professor, Government, Georgetown University, President, National
Strategy Information Center, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, “Violence
in Central America,” June 26, 2007.
62 As defined by ONDCP, international counterdrug programs refer to activities primarily focused on or conducted in
areas outside the United States, including a wide range of drug control programs to eradicate crops, seize drugs (except
air and riverine interdiction seizures), arrest and prosecute major traffickers, destroy processing capabilities, develop
and promote alternative crops to replace drug crops, reduce the demand for drugs, investigate money laundering and
financial crime activities, and promote the involvement of other nations in efforts to control the supply of and demand
for drugs.
63 The Mérida Initiative is named for the city where it was first conceived by Presidents George W. Bush and Felipe
Calderon in March 2007.
64 See CRS Report RS22837, Merida Initiative: U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central
America
, by Colleen W. Cook and Clare Ribando Seelke, and CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for
Congress
, by Mark P. Sullivan and June S. Beittel.
65 U.S. domestic commitments will be or have already been implemented under the National Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy
, the National Drug Control Strategy, the Security Cooperation Initiative, and the Southwest
Border Initiative
. See CRS Report RL33106, Border Security and the Southwest Border: Background, Legislation, and
Issues
, by Lisa M. Seghetti et al.
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ŗŝȱ

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ȱ
has requested $1.1 billion for the Mérida Initiative in FY2008 emergency supplemental and
FY2009 appropriations, $950 million of which would be allocated to Mexico and the remainder
to Central America (see Table 4).66 According to ONDCP, $817.3 million of the requested $1.1
billion would be devoted to counternarcotics efforts.67 P.L. 110-252 appropriates $465 million for
the Mérida Initiative, $400 of which is devoted to Mexico. See Table 5 for the State Department’s
proposed breakdown of counternarcotics programming for Mexico with existing Mérida Initiative
appropriations.
Table 4. Requested Mérida Initiative Funding, by Country
(in current U.S. $ millions)
FY2008
FY2008
Emergency
Supplemental
Supplemental
FY2009
Act
Country
Request
Request
(P.L. 110-252)
Mexico 500.0
450.0
400.0a
Belize 1.9
5.8
N/A
Costa Rica
4.3
9.5
N/A
El Salvador
7.1
17.3
N/A
Guatemala 11.1
17.7
N/A
Honduras 10.8
12.4
N/A
Nicaragua 3.7
6.7
N/A
Panama 3.9
8.9
N/A
Central America
(Regional) 7.2
21.7
60.0
Haiti 0.0
0.0
2.5
Dominican Republic
0.0
0.0
2.5
Total 550.0
550.0
465.0
Portion of Total for
Counterdrug Activities
Only 385.1
432.2
N/A
Source: U.S. Department of State briefing papers provided to Congressional offices; U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2009; and ONDCP, FY2009 Budget Summary.
a. This $400 million is divided between $352 million for FY2008 emergency supplemental assistance and $48
million for FY2009 bridge fund supplemental assistance.

66 On June 10, 2008, the House passed the Mérida Initiative to Combat Illicit Narcotics and Reduce Organized Crime
Authorization Act of 2008 (H.R. 6028), to authorize the President to provide a total of $1.6 billion dollars of assistance
to Mexico and Central America from FY2008 through FY2010. Both houses are also considering appropriations for
Mérida Initiative. The House approved the emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (H.R. 2642), on May
15, 2008, with $461.5 million for the Mérida Initiative. The Senate version of H.R. 2642, as amended on May 22, 2008,
would provide $450 million for the Initiative. The bill is now in conference.
67 ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy, FY2009 Budget Summary, February 2008.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
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ȱ
Table 5. Proposed Counternarcotics Budget for Mexico under P.L. 110-252
Appropriations
(in current U.S. $ millions)
Mérida Strategy
P.L. 110-252
Objective
Activity
Recipient
Agencya
Appropriations
Citation Aircraft Refurbishment
PGR
2.8
Break Power/Impunity of
Criminal Organizations
Mobile Gamma Ray, Non-Intrusive
Inspection Equipment (NIIE)
SEDENA 2.0
NIIE and Canine Inspection
SSP
44.0
National Security Investigation
Modernize and Enhance
Center
CISEN 8.1
Law Enforcement and
Intelligence
National Police Registry
SSP
4.0
Security Equipment for Law
Enforcement
PGR/SSP 6.0
Operational Control of
National Migration Institute
INAMI
22.0
Borders/Ports
NIIE and Canine Inspection
Customs
30.0
Secure Communication/
Communication and
Shipping
Transportation Secretariat
SCT 25.2
Improve Justice System
Data Analysis and Maintenance
12.0
Efficiency/ Effectiveness
PGR
Forensics Laboratories
5.0
Reduce Demand for
Drugs
Drug Demand Reduction
CONADIC
11.0
TOTAL
172.0
Source: U.S. Department of State response to CRS request, February 5, 2009, “Mérida Initiative - Mexico,
FY2008 Supplemental and FY2009 Bridge Illustrative Budget,” dated September 4, 2008. Funds are rounded to
the first decimal.
a. Acronyms stand for the following Mexican recipient agencies: Office of the Attorney General (PGR),
Army/Air Force (SEDENA), Secretariat of Public Security (SSP) Federal Police, National Security and
Investigation Center (CISEN), Communication and Transportation Secretariat (SCT), and National Council
against Addiction (CONADIC).
Despite apparent initial frustration expressed by some Members of Congress about not having
been notified of the Mérida Initiative as it was being developed, observers report that the
Initiative carries bipartisan support for its goals.68 Many observers and policy makers welcome
this effort to address the increasingly violent illegal drug trade along the U.S-Mexico border.
Some Members of Congress and others continue to raise several issues for concern with regard to
the implementation and monitoring of the Initiative’s programs. Some Mexican observers, for
example, are reportedly concerned about potential strings that may be attached to the final
program, which could be perceived by some as the United States infringing upon Mexico’s state
sovereignty.69 Some are especially concerned about the possibility that U.S. military personnel

68 See, for example, comments by Eliot Engel, Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere, quoted in Lourdes Heredia, “Doubts over Bush Plan on Mexico Drugs,” BBC News, October 22,
2007.
69 See Oscar Avila, “U.S. Strings Could Snarl Drug Pact; Mexico Says Aid Deal Shouldn’t Meddle in Rights,” Chicago
Tribune
, June 6, 2008; James C. McKinley, Jr., “Conditions on U.S. Aid in Drug Fight Anger Mexico,” June 7, 2008;
(continued...)
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ŗşȱ

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ȱ
might be deployed into Mexico, despite U.S. pledges not to do so, and that the United States is
not doing enough domestically to cut demand for illicit drugs from abroad. On the U.S. side,
some observers raise concerns about how to ensure that U.S. assistance funds are not illicitly
diverted by corrupt Mexican officials. Others raise concerns that the Initiative, as currently
conceived, might not have a long-term effect on stemming the flow of drugs into the United
States and reducing the drug economy’s negative societal effects in both the United States and
Mexico.
As the 111th Congress considers funding the remaining portion of the proposed Mérida Initiative,
some of the long-term policy issues of concern include how to ensure that the drug trade does not
simply shift to other countries and move through different pathways to reach drug consumer
destinations. Many analysts compare international counternarcotics efforts to squeezing a
balloon: squeeze it in one place and it bulges out elsewhere.70 Some experts caution that as the
United States and other countries place pressure on a certain major drug source or trafficking
zones, traffickers will likely adapt by changing routes and exploiting other paths of less
resistance.71
Most recently, some observers are claiming that successful pressure against Colombia cartels in
the 1990s, which was expected to reduce the movement of cocaine into the United States, has
instead caused the unintended consequence of strengthening Mexican drug trafficking
organizations along the U.S. Southwest border without affecting the overall availability of
cocaine in the United States.72 During the 1990s, two of the primary Colombian cocaine cartels,
the Medellin and Cali Cartels, controlled or influenced as much as 70% of cocaine shipped into
North America; now Mexican cartels control approximately 90%.73 Following their successful
disruption, remnants of these two Colombian cartels retreated from the drug trafficking business
to focus on cocaine production, while handing over much of the responsibility for trafficking
cocaine and other drugs into the United States to Mexican cartels.
Some now say that recent U.S. and Mexican pressure against the Mexican cartels is sparking turf
rivalries between several major Mexican drug trafficking organizations.74 These battles for
control are reportedly the source of huge spikes in violence and murder along the U.S. Southwest
border. As international pressure continues to target Mexican cartels, observers are already
questioning where the drug trade “balloon” will bulge out next. Some suggest that drug flows to

(...continued)
Adriana Garcia, “U.S. Drug Czar Urges Funds for War on Mexico Cartels,” Reuters News, June 3, 2008.
70 See for example, “Troublesome Boomerang: Illicit Drug Policy and Security,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 28, No. 3,
1997, p. 294.
71 For a discussion of another example, the displacement of the illegal drug industry from Peru to Colombia in the late
1980s and early 1990s, see Cornelius Friesendorf, “Squeezing the Balloon?” Crime, Law, and Social Change, Vol. 44,
2005, pp. 35-78.
72 Antonio Nicaso and Lee Lamothe, Angels, Mobsters, and Narco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace of Global Criminal
Empires
(Ontario, Canada: John Wiley and Sons, 2005), p. 196; Adam Isacson, “The U.S. Military in the War on
Drugs,” in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America, edited by Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), p. 45. Isacson further describes another consequences of the successful disruption of
the Medellin and Cali cartels: the emergence of more than 100 “cartelitos” or baby cartels and new, dispersed networks
of drug traffickers that arose in place of the large criminal organizations and which are arguably more difficult to target
by law enforcement officials.
73 Nicaso and Lamothe, p. 197.
74 For background, see CRS Report RL34215, Mexico’s Drug Cartels, by Colleen W. Cook.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
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ȱ
the United States will shift eastward toward the Carribean, with Venezuela playing a larger role as
a transit point.75 Already, the State Department finds that drug smuggling flights from Venezuela
to the Dominican Republic and Haiti, presumably in transit to the United States, increased 167%
in 2006 and 38% in 2007.76 Some also suggest that cocaine flows may also further shift toward
Europe, with West Africa as a transit point.77
•Š—ȱ˜•˜–‹’ŠȱŠ—ȱ‘Žȱ—ŽŠ—ȱ˜ž—Ž››žȱ›˜›Š–ȱ
Plan Colombia was developed by the government of Colombia in 1999 as a six-year plan,
concluding in 2005, to end the country’s decades-long armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking,
and promote economic and social development. The plan aimed to curb trafficking activity and
reduce coca cultivation in Colombia by 50% over five years. Congress approved legislation in
support of Plan Colombia in 2000, appropriating foreign assistance funds under the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) account each year ever since.78 ACI has not only provided
counternarcotics assistance for Colombia, but also for other countries in the Andean region,
including Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.79 Beginning in FY2008,
Congress renamed ACI the “Andean Counterdrug Program,” or ACP. Since its inception in
FY2000 and through FY2008, Congress has appropriated to the State Department more than $6
billion for Plan Colombia, ACI, and ACP (see Table 6). For FY2009, the State Department
requests $406.8 million for ACP. DOD has provided additional counterdrug assistance for training
and equipping foreign counternarcotics personnel to the region; in FY2007, this amounted to
approximately $20 million for Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.80
Table 6. Estimated Plan Colombia/ACP Funding, by Country
(in historical U.S. $ millions)
FY2008 FY09
Country FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 Est.
Req.
Bolivia 158.0 52.0 87.6 90.7 91.0 90.3 79.2 66.0 29.8
31.0
Colombiaa 894.4 48.0 373.9 580.2b 473.9 462.8 508.7 526.0 244.6
329.6
Ecuador 21.2 2.2 25.0 30.9 35.0 25.8 19.8 17.3 6.9 7.2
Peru
80.0 48.0 142.5 128.1 116.0 115.4 106.9 103.2 36.5 37.0
Brazil
5.0 2.0 6.0 6.0 10.2 8.9 5.9 4.0 1.0
1.0
Panama 5.0 1.4 5.0 4.5 6.5 6.0 4.5 4.0 1.0
1.0

75 Juan Forero, “Venezuela Steps Up Efforts to Thwart Cocaine Traffic,” Washington Post, April 7, 2008.
76 Tom Brown, “Dominican Republic Sees Surge in Drug Smuggling,” Reuters News, May 1, 2008; U.S. Department
of State, 2008 INCSR.
77 See for example, UNODC, Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability and Development (with
special reference to Guinea Bissau)
, December 2007, available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/
west_africa_cocaine_report_2007-12_en.pdf.
78 The first appropriations legislation for Plan Colombia was located in the Military Construction Appropriations Act,
2001 (P.L. 106-246, Title III, Chapters 1 and 2).
79 In FY2005 ACI funds were also used for counternarcotics assistance in Guatemala and Nicaragua. Currently, ACI
funds are no longer used for counternarcotics assistance in Venezuela.
80 DOD report to Congress, FY2007 DOD Foreign Counterdrug Activity Report, February 2008.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Řŗȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
FY2008 FY09
Country FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 Est.
Req.
Venezuela 4.2 1.2 5.0 2.1 5.0 3.0 2.2 1.0 —

Totalc 1,167.8d 154.8 645.0 842.5 737.6 712.2e 727.2 721.5 319.8f 406.8f
Source: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Years 2002-2009, at
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/.
a. Funding listed under Colombia includes the Flight Safety and the Air Bridge Denial programs. In FY2006 and
FY2007, these programs were listed separately in the congressional budget justifications—specifically, $30.0
million for the Flight Safety Program and $13.9 million for the Air Bridge Denial Program in FY2006, and
$61.0 million for the Flight Safety Program in FY2007.
b. Funding listed for Colombia in FY2003 includes $54.0 million in emergency supplemental appropriations.
c. Totals do not include counternarcotics assistance funds to the region that are not part of ACP. Some
additional counternarcotics-related funds are provided to Colombia through two other State Department
accounts, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET), as well
as DOD’s Central Transfer Account.
d. ACI did not exist until FY2001. Total for FY2000 includes $1.0 billion emergency supplemental
appropriations for Plan Colombia and counternarcotics funds allocated under the International Narcotics
Control (INC) account.
e. Total ACI funds for FY2005 include $1.0 million each for Guatemala and Nicaragua.
f. At the request of Congress, the Administration has begun to provide alternative development and other
soft-side counternarcotics assistance through non-ACP accounts since FY2008. In FY2008, non-ACP
counternarcotics assistance to the region totaled $192.5 million. In FY2009, requested non-ACP
counternarcotics assistance to the region totaled $104 million ($15.2 million to Bolivia, $50.7 million to
Colombia, $6.2 million to Ecuador, and $31.9 million to Peru).
Since ACI and ACP were first implemented, U.S. assistance has focused mainly on four strategic
pillars: (1) eradication of coca and opium poppy crops, (2) illegal drug interdiction, (3) alternative
development to provide coca and opium poppy farmers other sources of income, and (4)
institution-building to train security forces and to strengthen democratic governance capacity.
Supporters of the program argue that U.S. assistance has been vital to building foreign
government counternarcotics capacities. Critics of ACI and ACP often question the program’s
effectiveness to reduce the amount of cocaine and heroin entering the United States, because the
Andean region still accounts for the production of virtually all of the world’s cocaine and
increasing amounts of high-quality heroin. Some also criticize the program for excessively
emphasizing supply-side eradication and interdiction, especially in Colombia, without sufficient
focus on economic development, institution-building, and public and private sector reform.81
Others warn of a so-called “spillover” effect of counternarcotics activity in Colombia on
neighboring countries such as Ecuador, where narco-linked insurgents and paramilitaries
reportedly operate, and Venezuela, from where the flow of drugs destined for the United States
has reportedly increased substantially in recent years.82

81 See, for example, Daniel W. Christman and John G. Heimann, Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of
Colombia and the Region
, report of an independent commission sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Center
for Preventive Action, 2004, p. 19, at http://www.cfr.org/publication/6640/andes_2020.html.
82 See for example U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŘŘȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
In FY2008, funding for ACP declined 55.7% as compared with FY2007 levels.83 This decline can
be attributed to three notable changes. First, counternarcotics aid to the region is increasingly
disbursed in several other foreign aid accounts, including Economic Support Fund (ESF) and
Development Assistance (DA). For FY2008, this transfer from ACP to ESF amounts to $192.5
million. Some say this programming move will allow more flexibility in the use of economic aid
to the Andean countries. At the same time, this programming move will also cause ACP to be
even more focused on supply-side eradication and interdiction, which has been a criticism of the
program. Second, as of FY2008, Venezuela is no longer receiving ACP assistance. The
Administration’s FY2009 request also does not include a request for any ACP funding to be
allocated to Venezuela. Third, the U.S.-supported Air Bridge Denial program, which the U.S.
government has spent at least $80 million on from FY2002 through FY2006, will soon be entirely
funded by Colombia.84
As the 111th Congress evaluates the current status of ACP, policymakers may choose also to
reevaluate several ongoing related issues of interest, including the use of aerial eradication in
Colombia, as well as the future of U.S. counternarcotics engagement with Bolivia and Venezuela.
Efforts to reduce production of illicit narcotics at the source are sometimes met by active and
violent opposition from a combination of trafficker, political, and economic groups. In the case of
Colombia, some traffickers have aligned themselves with terrorist and insurgent groups, and have
reportedly funded political candidates and parties, pro-narcotic peasant workers and trade union
groups, and high-visibility, popular public works projects to cultivate support through a “Robin
Hood” image. Critics have consequently argued that counternarcotics efforts, especially aerial
eradication campaigns, can have the unintended effect of aggravating the country’s ongoing civil
conflict. Although many argue that the use of aerial eradication in Colombia is an important
counternarcotics tool, extending the reach of drug crop reduction operations into otherwise
dangerous or inaccessible regions, others argue that aerial eradication increases the likelihood that
farmers will align with insurgent groups rather than support government policies. Because
Colombia’s guerrilla groups pose as advocates of growers, spraying may broaden support for such
groups, thereby contradicting the objectives of the government’s counterinsurgency efforts in the
affected zones.
Alternatives do exist, including shifting to manual eradication or targeting the drug trade at later
points in the production chain by expanding interdiction operations. One alternative, which some
analysts favor, is to shift counternarcotics priorities to targeting critical nodes in transportation
and refining and, to the extent possible, sealing off traffic routes to and from the main coca
producing zones. The argument is made that interdiction can disrupt internal markets for coca
derivatives and that, compared to eradication, it imposes fewer direct costs on peasant producers
and generates less political unrest. A decision to support the discontinuation of aerial eradication
or the reduction in U.S. assistance for aerial eradication operations in Colombia, however, could
involve a careful weighing of the political and social costs that current counternarcotics policies
might be causing against the relative effectiveness of counternarcotics policy alternatives.

83 The FY2009 request represents a 43.6% decline from FY2007.
84 The Air Bridge Denial program aims to target drug traffickers through the air by forcing down suspicious aircraft,
using lethal force if necessary. Historically, this Air Bridge Denial program, which was originally developed in the late
1980s to interdict cocaine from Peru, has been the subject of controversy. From 2001 to 2003, the United States
suspended operation of the program because operators shot down a legitimate civilian aircraft in Peru and two U.S.
citizens were killed. Nevertheless, many observers highlight this program as having been one of the main contributors
to the decline in Peruvian cocaine production.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Řřȱ

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ȱ
Another counternarcotics policy challenge that the 111th Congress confronts is how to address
Bolivia and Venezuela, two countries that have in previous years been recipients of ACP funding.
The President decertified both Bolivia and Venezuela for FY2009 for having “failed
demonstrably” at making substantial efforts to combat the drug trade. This development raises
numerous counternarcotics policy questions that the 111th Congress might face, particularly as
Bolivia is the third largest coca producer in the world and, though Venezuela does not produce
illicit drugs, it is a key transit point for drugs from Colombia.
The decertification label will not affect Bolivia and Venezuela’s ability to receive certain types of
U.S. aid in FY2009; however, the deterioration in U.S.-Bolivian and U.S.-Venezuelan relations
with regard to counternarcotics policy will affect U.S. efforts to assist these countries to combat
illicit drugs.85 Already in 2008, President of Bolivia Evo Morales expelled USAID workers and
DEA agents from coca producing regions in Bolivia and the government of Venezuela has refused
to sign counternarcotics cooperation letters of agreement with the United States to make funds
available for cooperative programs to fight the trafficking of drugs from and through Venezuela to
the United States. Among the questions that analysts are now asking include: how will the
reduction of USAID and DEA personnel in Bolivia affect cocaine production and trafficking?
Should the United States reevaluate Bolivia’s arguments for legalizing the production and sale of
coca leaf, which is currently an internationally controlled narcotic substance? And how can the
United States attempt to stem the flow of drugs emanating from Venezuela, particularly those
traveling via one of the new drug transit hot spots, West Africa, to Europe, in the face of limited
bilateral relations?
‘Š—’œŠ—ȱ˜ž—Ž››žȱ›˜›Š–œȱ
The U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan consists of five key elements, or pillars, that
mirror Afghan initiatives and call for increased interagency and international cooperation.86 The
five pillars of the U.S. initiative are (1) public information, (2) alternative development, (3)
eradication, (4) interdiction, and (5) law enforcement and justice reform. The State Department
and DOD are the two main providers of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan and the
region, with additional law enforcement and training support from DEA, DHS, and other
agencies. For the State Department and DOD alone, the Administration spent approximately $547
million in FY2007 funds, which represents a 38.2% increase from FY2006 (see Table 7). Western
European countries are a large consumer of Afghanistan source opium, and increasingly other
nations, notably the United Kingdom, are playing a prominent role in supporting Afghan
counternarcotics efforts.

85 According to the State Department, Venezuela will continue to receive assistance for civil society and small
community development programs and Bolivia will continue to receive assistance for agriculture development,
exchange programs, small enterprise development, police training, among other programs. See David T. Johnson,
“Remarks on Release of the Annual Report on the Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2008,”
September 16, 2008.
86 See CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard. See also David
Shelby, “United States to Help Afghanistan Attack Narcotics Industry,” Washington File, U.S. Department of State,
November 17, 2004.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŘŚȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
Table 7. Estimated U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance for Afghanistan, by Agency
(in current U.S. $ millions)
FY2009
Emerg.
FY2008 FY2009 Supp.
Agency FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 Estimate Request Request
State
Dept.a
39.4 0.0 50.0 499.8 287.6 425.7 315.7 312.6 181.0
DOD
— — 71.8 224.5 108.1 291.1 257.6b 24.1 150.6
Total
39.4 0.0 121.8 724.3 395.7 716.8 573.3 336.7 161.6
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2007-2009 at
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/; unclassified report to Congress on DOD counternarcotics assistance to
Afghanistan and Central Asia, FY2004-FY2007, dated January 16, 2007; DOD response to CRS request, August
14, 2008; and State Department response to CRS request, May 14, 2008.
Notes: N/A = not available. Listed funds per fiscal year include supplemental appropriations.
a. FY2002-FY2006 funding numbers were provided to CRS by the State Department. Other listed assistance
refers to funds provided to Afghanistan for “counter-narcotics” program area under the “Peace and
Security” objective.
b. DOD requested $257.6 million for FY2008. As of May 2008, $192.6 million has been appropriated.
The opium drug industry is a significant factor in Afghanistan’s fragile political and economic
order—and many argue that the United States can play an important role in combating its growth.
According to the 2007 Afghanistan Opium Survey conducted by UNODC and the Afghan
Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN), Afghanistan remained the source of 93% of the world’s
illicit opium in 2007. In 2007, the potential export value of Afghanistan’s opiates, at border prices
in neighboring regions, was $4 billion.87 This record production occurred in spite of ongoing
efforts by the Afghan government, the United States, and their international partners to combat
poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. Observers remain concerned about how to break the links
between the illegal narcotics industry and political instability, as conflict and regional instability
have reportedly accompanied efforts to expand existing counternarcotics efforts.
As the 111th Congress considers Afghanistan counternarcotics policy objectives and assistance,
policymakers remain challenged by evaluating how the pursuit of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency objectives might hinder or support counternarcotics goals. Some observers
explain that U.S. and allied counterinsurgency actors are placed in a dilemma when their
informants also happen to be known drug traffickers. Difficulty thus remains in balancing
between developing “tactical coalition allies” in militia and other irregular forces who could help
with counterterrorism and counterinsurgency objectives, when these same individuals have ties to
the drug trade. If U.S. counterterrorism and counterinsurgency objectives are a higher priority
than counternarcotics objectives, such issues could affect the feasibility and success of
counternarcotics policy goals in Afghanistan.

87 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008, November 2008.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Řśȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
•Ž›—Š’ŸŽȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘Žœȱ
Several approaches have been proposed to reshape U.S. international narcotics control policy.
This section explores alternative international drug control policy approaches and identifies U.S.
participation and positions, if any, in the debates.
Ž‹Š•Š—ŒŽȱž››Ž—ȱ›žȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ˜˜•œȱ
–™‘Šœ’£Žȱȃ Š›Ȭ’ŽȄȱ˜ȱ˜ž—Ž›—Š›Œ˜’Œœȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
Some argue that the United States should intensify military and law enforcement activities,
including activities funded by foreign assistance, designed to disrupt the transit of illicit drugs
into the United States. Such so-called “hard-side” activities include interdiction, forced
eradication, and training, equipping, and supporting other law enforcement and military activities
geared toward directly targeting drug trafficking organizations and related traffickers. For
FY2007, hard-side counternarcotics activities constituted roughly 33% of the total domestic and
international U.S. counterdrug budget—$3.2 billion for interdiction, $468 million for eradication,
and $946 million for other international hard-side activities.88 Policy makers justify the continued
emphasis on hard-side activities because they directly disrupt the flow of foreign drugs. These
tasks are also conceded to require disproportionately more funding to implement than soft-side
activities. The cost of a helicopter to combat drug traffickers, for example, is substantially more
than the cost of providing seeds and agricultural training for alternative crop development
projects. Further, some argue that the U.S. emphasis on hard-side counternarcotics activities is
necessary to carry the burden of other international participants in counterdrug efforts and foreign
aid donors, who reportedly tend to shy away from hard-side projects.89
Among those who agree that hard-side activities are a vital component of international
counternarcotics strategy, some support expanding U.S. eradication efforts and recommend that
the United States assume a greater role in counternarcotics activities. Some U.S. policy makers
have advocated the expansion of crop eradication programs. The Administration’s August 2007
U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, for example, argues that “eradication is essential
to controlling the narcotics industry in Afghanistan” and that a “critical improvement” to current
efforts would involve the expansion of forced eradication. The Strategy further recommends the
consideration of aerial spraying as a method for implementing expanded forced eradication.
Expanded eradication activities, especially those involving aerial spraying of herbicides, remain a
source of controversy. Proponents argue that swift, widespread eradication is necessary to
establish a credible deterrent against cultivating illicit crops. Critics, however, argue that
eradication may have public health and environmental safety implications, may encourage local
villagers to align with anti-government insurgents, and, in the absence of alternative livelihood
options, may deepen peasant impoverishment. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has expressed

88 U.S. Department of State, INL, Program and Budget Guide, Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, and discussions with State
Department representatives.
89 For example, European countries reportedly provided Colombia with approximately $131.4 million of foreign
assistance in CY2006, which mainly supported alternative development, human rights, humanitarian assistance, and
good governance projects. Based on CRS discussions with State Department consultant, April 8, 2008.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŘŜȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
categorical opposition to the use of aerial eradication, and U.S. officials state that the
Administration will defer to the government of Afghanistan regarding its future use.90
Some analysts also suggest that the U.S. military should assume a greater role in counternarcotics
activities. Since the 1980s, the U.S. military’s role in counternarcotics efforts has gradually
become more focused on training and equipping foreign counternarcotics officials. Outside the
United States, U.S. military personnel have been involved in training and transporting foreign
anti-narcotics personnel since 1983. Periodically, there have also been calls for multilateral
military strikes against trafficking operations, as well as increased use of U.S. military forces in
preemptive strikes against drug fields and trafficker enclaves overseas. DOD’s role in
counternarcotics activity first became institutionalized in 1986 when President Ronald Reagan
issued National Security Decision Directive-221 (NSDD-221), which directed U.S. military
forces to “support counter-narcotics efforts more actively.”91 DOD’s role further expanded under
President George H. Bush in 1989, who issued National Security Directive-18 (NSD-18) to
explicitly direct the Secretary of Defense to redefine the Pentagon’s mission to include
counternarcotics as one of its main priorities.92 Over the years, Congress has continued to expand
DOD’s international counternarcotics authorities to provide counternarcotics training and
operational support to an increasing number of foreign governments, as well as to provide
counterterrorism support to foreign law enforcement personnel who are also conducting
counternarcotics activities.
Despite the military’s ability to support drug law enforcement organizations, questions remain as
to the overall effectiveness of a major military role in narcotics interdiction. Proponents of
substantially increasing the military’s role in supporting civilian law enforcement narcotics
interdiction activity argue that narcotics trafficking poses a national security threat to the United
States, that only the military is equipped and has the resources to counter powerful trafficking
organizations, and that counterdrug support provides the military with beneficial, realistic
training. In contrast, opponents argue that drug interdiction is a law enforcement mission rather
than a military mission, that drug enforcement is an unconventional war that the military is ill-
equipped to fight, that a drug enforcement role detracts from readiness for future combat
operations, and exposes the military to corruption, and that the use of the military may have
serious political and diplomatic repercussions overseas. Moreover, some personnel in the military
remain concerned about an expanded role, seeing themselves as possible scapegoats for policies
that have failed, or might fail.
–™‘Šœ’£Žȱȃ˜Ȭ’ŽȄȱ˜ȱ˜ž—Ž›—Š›Œ˜’Œœȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
Those promoting expansion of efforts to reduce production at the source face the challenge of
instituting programs that effectively reduce production of narcotic crops and production of refined
narcotics without creating unmanageable economic and political crises for target countries. A
major area of concern of such policy makers is to achieve an effective balance between the

90 See for example Kirk Semple and Tim Golden, “U.S. Presses Again to Eradicate Afghan Opium Poppies,”
International Herald Tribune, October 7, 2007.
91 Ronald Reagan, National Security Decision Directive 221 (NSDD-221), “Narcotics and National Security,” April 8,
1986, partially declassified on November 7, 1995, redacted version available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/
nsdd-221.htm.
92 George Bush, National Security Directive 18, “International Counternarcotics Strategy,” August 21, 1989, released
in full on August 23, 2001, unclassified version available at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/nsd/nsd18.pdf.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Řŝȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
“carrot” and the “stick” approaches in U.S. relations with major illicit narcotics-producing and
transit countries. As a result, some analysts have suggested increasingly linking hard-side
activities with so-called “soft-side” activities, such as alternative livelihood development,
economic development, and institutional reform efforts.
Proponents of soft-side activities argue that long-term success in halting drug production involves
motivating producers to refrain permanently from growing illicit crops. Many observe that
because short-term economic stability of nations supplying illegal drugs may depend on the
production and sale of illicit substances, it is unrealistic to expect such nations to limit their drug-
related activities meaningfully without an alternative source of income. It has been suggested by
some analysts that a massive foreign aid effort—a so-called “mini-Marshall Plan”—is the only
feasible method of persuading developing nations to curb their production of illicit drugs.93 Such
a plan would involve a multilateral effort, including participation of the United States and other
industrialized donor nations susceptible to the drug problem. The thrust of such a plan would be
to promote economic development, replacing illicit cash crops with other marketable alternatives.
Critics have concerns regarding positive incentive concepts. They warn of the open-ended cost of
agricultural development programs, economic development projects, and institutional capacity
building efforts. Programs would likely be coupled with rigid domestic law enforcement and
penalties for non-compliance, which could require a U.S. commitment of further foreign
assistance that aids a country to strengthen its institutional capacity to implement the rule of law.
Sometimes, marketable alternatives are more difficult to develop than simply substituting illicit
crops with licit crops. Drug crop zones are often located in geographically remote areas, with
marginal soil quality and extreme insecurity that tend to limit prospects for legal commercial
agriculture. In some parts of Colombia, for example, observers claim that the most promising
strategy to stem drug crop production is to improve educational opportunities and foster the
development of new economies in other locales, including urban settings, that former farmers
could transition into with their new skill sets. In the view of these analyses, the best substitute
crop for coca or opium could well be an assembly plant producing electronic goods or
automobiles for the international market. Developing such new economies, however, could
involve potentially costly commitments in foreign assistance.
–™‘Šœ’£Žȱ›žȱŽ–Š—ȱŽžŒ’˜—ȱ
According to the ONDCP’s National Drug Control Strategy budget, roughly 35% of the total drug
control budget in FY2007 was allocated for demand reduction activities, including treatment and
prevention, while 65% was allocated for domestic and international supply-side reduction
activities.94 In FY2002, roughly 46% of the total drug control budget was for demand reduction
activities, and 54% was for supply-side activities. Some observers point to this gradual shift in
resources toward supply-side activities to claim that U.S. counternarcotics policy focuses
primarily on combating the supply of illegal drugs, to the detriment of focusing on domestic drug
demand reduction. Such arguments are especially voiced by observers in drug producing
countries and drug transit countries, who view U.S. consumption of illegal drugs as the source of
the problem.95 Supporters of stronger drug demand reduction programs also argue that it could be

93 See for example comments by former Colombian President Andres Pastrana in NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, transcript
of interview on October 6, 1998, at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/july-dec98/pastrana_10-6.html.
94 ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy, FY2009 Budget Summary, February 2008.
95 See for example International Crisis Group, “Latin American Drugs II: Improving Policy and Reducing Harm,” Latin
(continued...)
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŘŞȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
more cost effective to combat illegal drug use and trafficking domestically than in drug source
and transit countries in the developing world, where resources and government capacity to
combat drugs may be limited.96 As a result, such critics urge the Administration to rebalance the
drug control budget to include more funding for drug demand reduction and less for drug supply
reduction.97
The Administration, however, posits that issues related to the balance between counternarcotics
resources for drug demand reduction and supply reduction have already been adequately
addressed. According to ONDCP’s 2008 National Drug Control Strategy, for example, two of the
three drug policy goals are demand reduction-oriented: to prevent domestic drug use before it
begins and to rehabilitate current domestic drug users. At the same time, others argue that further
emphasis on supply-side drug control activities is warranted, as transnational drug trafficking
organizations continue to pose threats to U.S. and international security.
ŽŽŸŠ•žŠŽȱ›˜‘’‹’’˜—’œȱ›žȱŽ’–Žȱ
ŽŠ•’£Žȱ ••ŽŠ•ȱ›žœȱ
For decades, many critics of the current international drug control regime have argued for
legalizing drugs. Drug legalization proposals take several forms, which differ in the extent to
which the legalized drug trade would be regulated by the government. At one end of the spectrum
are those who call for a wholesale deregulation of the drug industry. Such laissez faire advocates
argue that individuals should be able to exert their own free will in deciding whether to engage in
an activity, including potentially dangerous ones. Few proponents of drug legalization, however,
endorse wholesale deregulation. Instead, some support modified legalization schemes that involve
various amounts of government regulation. These proposals, for example, recommend legalizing
some, but not all, types of currently banned drugs; restricting the sale of drugs to minors, similar
to those currently placed on tobacco products and alcohol in many countries; or restricting the
locations and types of vendors that would be allowed to sell drugs.
Proponents of drug legalization suggest that removing current sanctions against the drug trade
could improve the political and social stability of producer countries. The Economist argues that
legalizing drugs could undercut powerful drug traffickers who threaten state stability and corrupt
political institutions, as it reportedly has in countries such as Mexico and Colombia, and could
eliminate use of the illicit drug trade as a source of revenue for certain regimes, including North
Korea.98 In addition, some argue that legalizing drugs would allow the United States and others to
reduce the amount of resources devoted to eliminating the illicit drug supply through eradication,
interdiction, and other law enforcement efforts.99

(...continued)
America Report No. 26, March 14, 2008; “Africa: New Front in Drugs War,” BBC News, July 9, 2007; “West Africa:
More Funds Needed to Tackle Drug Use, NGOs Say,” IRIN News, November 5, 2007.
96 http://domesticpolicy.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080324124013.pdf.
97 See also CRS Report RL32352, War on Drugs: Reauthorization and Oversight of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy
, by Mark Eddy.
98 “The Case for Legalising Drugs: Time for a Puff of Sanity,” The Economist, July 28, 2001.
99 See, for example, Paul Stares, “Drug Legalization: Time for a Real Debate,” Brookings Review, March 1996, Vol.
14, No. 2.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Řşȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
Legalizing the trade in substances currently proscribed by the international drug control regime
would involve removing them from the U.N. lists of controlled substances. One such effort is
currently led by the Bolivian government with regard to coca leaf, which is listed as a controlled
narcotic drug by the United Nations, along with heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and others that are
considered to be “liable to abuse” and “productive of ill effects.”100 Proponents of this move
argue that coca leaf has been an integral part of Bolivian culture, especially for many of the
country’s indigenous people, for generations and the option of exporting coca leaf internationally
could provide a new, licit source of income to Bolivian peasants. The leaves are often chewed or
consumed in teas and reportedly serve as a mild stimulant, an appetite suppressant, and an herbal
remedy to altitude sickness, among other uses.101 International debate continues to surround the
justifications for including coca leaf as a narcotic drug.102 Proponents argue that consumption of
coca leaf is not addictive or harmful to public health. They also claim that the original decision to
list coca leaf may have been politically motivated and the consequence of ethnic discrimination.
Others, including the Administration, argue that coca leaf should remain on the U.N. list of
banned substances.103 As early as 1952, the World Health Organization (WHO) Expert Committee
on Drug Dependence concluded that coca chewing “must be defined and treated as an addiction,
in spite of the occasional absence of some of those characteristics.”104 In 1993, the WHO Expert
Committee revisited coca leaf and reported that it should remain internationally controlled
because cocaine is “readily extractable” from coca leaf.105 In 2006, the Bolivian government
requested another review of coca leaf by the WHO Expert Committee, which has not yet been
completed. In the meantime, the INCB’s 2007 annual report calls for Bolivia and Peru to abolish
and prohibit coca leaf chewing and the manufacture of coca tea (mate de coca) and other products
containing coca alkaloids for domestic use and export.106
Successive U.S. administrations have remained steadfast against such legalization policy
proposals. According to DEA, legalization could lead to several negative consequences that may
outweigh many of the positive effects.107 These include the possibility that legalization could
increase the demand, abuse, and addiction stemming from an increased availability and access to
potentially harmful drugs. Further, legalization may reduce the perception of the social and health
risks and costs associated with drug abuse. Others have also raised concerns about the potentially
complex array of regulatory questions and legislative challenges that may arise from a decision to
legalize drugs.108 Such concerns may be especially relevant to less-developed countries with

100 Article 49 of the 1961 Convention gave countries practicing coca leaf chewing 25 years following the Convention’s
entry into force to abolish coca leaf chewing.
101 See, for example, “Bolivia Could Put Coca Leaves on Coat of Arms,” Reuters, March 14, 2007.
102 For a short summary, see Francisco E. Thoumi, “A Modest Proposal to Clarify the Status of Coca in the United
Nations Conventions,” Crime, Law, and Social Change, Vol. 42, 2004, pp. 297-307.
103 U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR.
104 World Health Organization, WHO Expert Committee on Drugs Liable to Produce Addiction, Third Report,
Technical Series Report No. 57, at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/trs/WHO_TRS_57.pdf.
105 World Health Organization, WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence, Twenty-Eight Report, Technical Series
Report No. 836, at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/trs/WHO_TRS_836.pdf.
106 INCB, Report for 2007, pp. 37-38.
107 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), FY2008 Performance Budget,
Congressional Budget Submission, p. 22, at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2008justification/pdf/35_dea.pdf.
108 Among the most basic questions are those about which types of drugs would be legalized, where they would be
allowed to be sold, and whether drug production and sales would be under government or private control. Regulatory
questions also arise, including what types of quality control and drug safety precautions on use would be implemented,
(continued...)
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
řŖȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
limited institutional capabilities, which would likely face significant challenges and resource
constraints with regulating a legalized drug trade. No current legislative proposals have been
introduced to advocate the legalization of controlled substances both domestically and
internationally. Some Members of Congress, however, have at various times expressed interest in
exploring legalization options.109 Congress has occasionally played a role in evaluating such
considerations through oversight of agencies involved in carrying out international drug control
policy and hearings.110
ŽŒ›’–’—Š•’£Žȱ ••ŽŠ•ȱ›žœȱ
Several countries in Europe, including the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal, have supported
efforts to decriminalize drugs.111 In contrast to drug legalization schemes, drugs remain illegal
while criminal penalties associated with drug use and sale are reduced or removed in certain
circumstances. The 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances
obligates signatory parties to criminalize the production, sale, transport, and
cultivation of these substances, including the profits from drug-related activity. However, the
Convention also allows for states to use their own discretion in dealing with lower-level offenses.
Specifically, it states that in “appropriate cases of a minor nature” it is left to the discretion of
member states to provide “as alternatives to conviction or punishment” measures such as
education, rehabilitation, social reintegration, drug treatment, and aftercare. Further, none of the
U.N. drug control agreements prevent a state from applying more strict or severe measures if it
considers them desirable or necessary.
Proponents of decriminalization argue that it is a novel policy solution that should be considered
as an alternative to what many consider strictly prohibitionist policies. Some proponents also
argue that decriminalization of small-scale and less-severe drug trafficking or drug use cases is a
logical cost-benefit decision that can help countries with limited resources to concentrate on
combating higher-level offenders and traffickers. Critics remain concerned that decriminalization
could provide welcome loopholes for traffickers who could avoid penalties for possession and
distribution of illegal drugs if caught. Countries that have experimented with decriminalization
policies, however, reveal mixed results.112 Further, the wide variance in criminalization policies
across countries has reportedly been a source of tension and confusion between countries and
could hamper international cooperation for drug control.113

(...continued)
how would quality and safety standards be monitored and enforced, whether production and sale of drugs would be
taxed, and what types of penalties would follow in cases of regulatory violations.
109 See, for example, statements by Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN) and Janice Schakowsky (D-IL) in House Government
Reform Committee Hearing on Heroin Crisis, December 12, 2002.
110 The most recent hearing on drug legalization policy options occurred in 1999. See House Government Reform
Criminal Justice Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Drug Policy, June 16, 1999. More recently, Members occasionally
ask questions related to drug legalization during other hearings on subjects related to drug control policy. See, for
example, House Government Reform Committee Hearing on Heroin Crisis, December 12, 2002.
111 In the United States, some state and local governments have also chosen to decriminalize some types of illegal drug
activities. For such a discussion related to marijuana, see CRS Report RL33211, Medical Marijuana: Review and
Analysis of Federal and State Policies
, by Mark Eddy.
112 Robert J. MacCoun and Peter Reuter, “Does Europe Do It Better?” in Drug War Deadlock: The Policy Battle
Continues
, Laura E. Huggins, ed. (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 2005).
113 INCB and Caroline Chatwin, “Drug Policy Developments within the European Union: The Destabilizing Effects of
Dutch and Swedish Drug Policies,” The British Journal of Criminology, Summer 2003, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 567-582.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
řŗȱ

—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ›žȱ˜—›˜•ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
••˜ ȱ ˜ŸŽ›—–Ž—Ȭž™Ž›Ÿ’œŽȱ›žȱœŽȱ˜›ȱ’Œœȱ
Some analysts urge policy makers to shift drug policy efforts toward a focus on public health and
harm reduction and less of a focus on law enforcement. Such efforts focus on reducing the public
health consequences of drug use and include needle exchange programs and government-
sponsored injection rooms. Drug injection rooms, or “maintenance clinics,” have existed in
several countries, including Canada, Germany, and Australia; in November 2008, Switzerland
voted to make permanent its heroin supervised injection, which began in 1994.114 They have
provided certain addicts with drugs or clean needles on a regular basis. Some of the same
countries also provide free testing of drugs for purity and potentially deadly contaminants.
A major impetus for such a policy approach began with concerns about the spread of HIV/AIDS
among intravenous drug users in the 1980s, which raised attention to the health issues related to
drug use. According to advocates of this approach, complete eradication of drugs from society is
unrealistic and a better approach would be to focus on containing the damage caused by drugs.
Nevertheless, government-supervised drug use programs exist in contravention to U.N.
international drug control agreements, which obligates parties to ensure that drug use and trade
are limited to scientific and medical purposes only. The INCB regularly urges those countries that
maintain drug injection facilities to discontinue their operation.115 Others remain concerned that
these facilities could encourage increased levels of drug use and potentially make drug use more
socially acceptable. Some studies on the effects of drug injection facilities, however, offer some
tentative, but promising indications of positive results.116 According to one drug injection clinic
trial study in Switzerland, for example, researchers reported that the crime rate and the
unemployment rate among its patients dropped over the course of treatment.117
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Some observers argue that the International Criminal Court (ICC) should expand its jurisdiction
to include drug trafficking crimes.118 Currently, ICC jurisdiction is limited to the “most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole” and encompasses four areas: (1)
genocide, (2) crimes against humanity, (3) war crimes, and (4) crimes of aggression. Proponents
of expanding the ICC’s jurisdiction argue that the current international narcotics control regime is
evidence to the claim that a unified, international response to drug trafficking is required, and that
establishing an international venue where transnational drug crimes can be prosecuted is a logical
extension of international drug control policy. Currently, prosecution of international drug
trafficking charges is negotiated between countries through bilateral and multilateral agreements,

114 Alexander Higgins, “Swiss Approve Heroin Program, Reject Decriminalization of Marijuana,” Associated Press,
November 30, 2008.
115 INCB, 2007 Report.
116 See, for example, European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction, European Report on Drug
Consumption Rooms, 2004, at http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/
att_2944_EN_consumption_rooms_report.pdf.
117 Cited in MacCoun and Reuter, who also note that this study reportedly garnered some criticism for methodological
weaknesses.
118 Notably, the United States is not party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Although President
Bill Clinton signed the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000, no administration has submitted the treaty to the Senate
for its advice and consent for ratification. See also CRS Report RL31437, International Criminal Court: Overview and
Selected Legal Issues
, by Jennifer Elsea.
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including extradition treaties. Some argue that these agreements leave many legal loopholes and
opportunities for sophisticated traffickers to shift their trafficking routes and seek shelter in
countries with weak law enforcement and an unwillingness to extradite.119
Debate over the appropriateness of including drug trafficking as part of the ICC jurisdiction dates
back to the ICC’s origins. Though drug trafficking is not included in the ICC’s current
jurisdiction, trafficking was included in the original draft statute.120 The Senate, in the 100th
Congress, expressed support of the possibility of “establishing an international criminal court to
expedite cases regarding the prosecution of persons accused of having engaged in international
drug trafficking.”121 Since then, various Members of Congress have sponsored failed efforts to
both support and criticize the ICC.122 Critics of the inclusion of drug trafficking as part of the
ICC’s jurisdiction argue that the current system of bilateral and multilateral agreements is
adequate for prosecuting international drug trafficking cases and that it would be inappropriate
for the ICC to take jurisdiction because drug trafficking is not universally considered a serious
crime of international concern. Further, critics argue that the potentially large number of
transnational drug violations could overwhelm the ICC’s capacity to prosecute effectively. The
issue of including or excluding drug trafficking as part of the ICC may be revisited in 2009. As
required by the Rome Statute that established the ICC, a review conference to consider
amendments to the treaty is to take place in 2009.

ž‘˜›ȱ˜—ŠŒȱ —˜›–Š’˜—ȱ

Liana Sun Wyler

Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics
lwyler@crs.loc.gov, 7-6177





119 Molly McConville, “A Global War on Drugs: Why the United States Should Support the Prosecution of Drug
Traffickers in the International Criminal Court,” American Criminal Law Review, Vol. 37, 2000, p. 81.
120 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, April
14, 1998, p. 29.
121 Section 4108 of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1988 (Title IV of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988; P.L.
100-690), repealed in Section 6(e) of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-582).
122 See, for example H.J.Res. 89 in the 105th Congress, H.R. 2381 in the 106th Congress, and H.Con.Res. 23 in the 107th
Congress.
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