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The central government’s limited writ and perceived corruption are helping sustain a Taliban
insurgency, and feeding pessimism about the Afghanistan stabilization effort. However, ethnic
disputes remain confined largely to political debate and competition, enabling President Karzai to
try to focus on accepting U.S. and international advice on how to improve governance, reversing
security deterioration, and on winning re-election in presidential elections slated for August 20,
2009. Karzai is running for re-election, but he faces substantial loss of public confidence and
fluid coalitions of potentially strong election opponents. Despite the government’s widely noted
shortcomings, few dispute that the country has made substantial progress on personal and
political freedoms since the fall of the Taliban regime.
At the same time, over the past year U.S. officials have been shifting away from reliance on
building the central government and toward promoting local governing bodies and security
initiatives as a complement to efforts to build central government capabilities. That trend is likely
to continue, based on press reports of pending reviews of U.S. strategy being conducted by the
Obama Administration. See CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security,
and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.

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Post-Taliban Political Transition and Political Landscape .............................................................. 1
Government Performance................................................................................................................ 3
Official Corruption.................................................................................................................... 4
Increasing Focus on Local Solutions and Governance ............................................................. 5
Overall Human Rights Issues.................................................................................................... 6
Funding Issues........................................................................................................................... 6
2009 Elections ................................................................................................................................. 7
Outlines of the Contest.............................................................................................................. 7

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Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process ........................................................................... 9

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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 10

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U.S. policy during 2001—2008 has been to extend the authority and encourage reform of
Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai and his central government, predicated on the observation
that weak and corrupt governance is causing some Afghans to acquiesce to Taliban insurgents as
providers of security and credible justice. Karzai’s is the first fully elected government in Afghan
history, although there were parliamentary elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah (the last
were in 1969). Presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections, and adoption of a constitution
were part of a post-Taliban transition roadmap established by a United Nations-sponsored
agreement of major Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany on December 5, 2001, (“Bonn
Agreement”),1 after the Taliban had fallen. The political transition process is depicted in the table
below. The United States provides about 22,000 forces to a 51,000 troop NATO-led peacekeeping
coalition there; another 14,000 U.S. troops continue the original post-September 11 counter-
terrorism mission in Afghanistan.
Since its formation in late 2001, Karzai’s government has come to be progressively dominated by
ethnic Pashtuns, who are about 42% of the population and traditionally have governed
Afghanistan. However, the Intelligence Directorate continues to be headed by a non-Pashtun
(Amrollah Saleh, a Tajik), and, adhering to a tacit consensus, the other security ministries
(Defense, Interior) tend to have non-Pashtuns in key deputy or subordinate positions. One
prominent example is the defense ministry, in which the chief of staff is a Tajik (Bismillah Khan),
who reports to a Pashtun Defense Minister (Abdul Rahim Wardak).
Still, it is the National Assembly (parliament), particularly the 249 seat elected lower house
(Wolesi Jirga), that is the key institution for the ethnic minorities to exert influence. Many seats in
the lower house are held by personalities and factions prominent in Afghanistan’s recent wars.
The lower house is divided into (mainly Pashtun) pro-Karzai, (mainly minority) opposition
figures, and “independents” of varied ethnicities, not strictly organized according to
Afghanistan’s 90 registered political parties. Karzai has not formed his own party, but his core
support in the Wolesi Jirga consists of former members of the hardline conservative Pashtun-
based Hizb-e-Islam party; and supporters of Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf—a prominent Islamic
conservative mujahedin party leader.
Another base of support for him in the lower house is the contingent from Qandahar (Karzai’s
home province), including several Karzai clan members, and, to a lesser extent, Helmand
province. One clan member in the body is his cousin Jamil Karzai, and another is relative by
marriage Aref Nurzai. Karzai’s elder brother, Qayyum, was in the lower house representing
Qandahar until his October 2008 resignation due to health reasons, although Qayyum continues to
travel abroad and represent his brother informally. Also pro-Karzai are former Pashtun militia and
Taliban leaders, including Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who had gained fame for leading the
Afghan component of the failed assault on Osama bin Laden’s purported redoubt at Tora Bora in
December 2001; Pacha Khan Zadran (Paktia) who, by some accounts, helped Osama bin Laden
escape Tora Bora; and Mullah Abdul Salam (“Mullah Rocketi”), from Zabol.

1 For text, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
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The “opposition,” led by ethnic minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara) of the anti-Taliban
“Northern Alliance,” view as a betrayal Karzai’s firing of many of the non-Pashtuns from the
cabinet—such as former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, dismissed in 2006. However,
the bloc says its disputes with Karzai will remain political and peaceful. In April 2007, Wolesi
Jirga Speaker Yunus Qanooni and former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani, both
prominent Northern Alliance figures (the 1994-2001 anti-Taliban alliance of ethnic minorities),
organized a broader opposition bloc called the “United Front” (UF), which includes both of
Karzai’s vice presidents, and some Pashtuns prominent in the Soviet-occupation era such as
Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi (Khost Province) and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, who chairs parliament’s
defense committee. The UF advocates amending the constitution to give more power to
parliament and to empower the elected provincial councils (instead of the President) to select
governors and mayors. Fearing Pashtun consolidation, the UF has been generally opposed to
Karzai’s overtures to Taliban fighters to end their fight and join government—an initiative that
has begun to draw some backing from the U.S. and British governments as a means of ending or
reducing the Taliban insurgency.
Even before the formation of the UF, the lower house opposition first showed its strength in
March 2006, following the December 19, 2005 inauguration of parliament, by requiring Karzai’s
cabinet to be approved individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition leverage. However,
Karzai rallied his support and all but 5 of the 25 nominees were confirmed. One of those defeated
was a female nominee for Minister of Women’s Affairs, leaving Afghanistan without any women
ministers. The post was held by a female since it was established in 2002. In May 2006, the
opposition compelled Karzai to change the nine-member Supreme Court, the highest judicial
body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as chief justice.
Parliament approved his new Court choices in July 2006, all of whom are trained in modern
jurisprudence.
In May 2007, the UF achieved a majority in parliament to oust Karzai ally Rangin Spanta as
Foreign Minister. However, Karzai refused to replace him, instead seeking a Supreme Court
ruling that Spanta should remain, on the grounds that his ouster was related to a refugee issue
(Iran’s expulsion of 100,000 Afghan refugees), not a foreign policy issue. The Court has, to date,
supported Karzai, and Spanta remains Foreign Minister.
Karzai and the UF often battle for the support of the many “independents” in the lower house.
Among them are several outspoken women, intellectuals, and business leaders, such as the 38
year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), a leading critic of war-era faction leaders. In May 2007
the lower house voted to suspend her for this criticism for the duration of her term, but she
continues to legally challenge the expulsion. Others in this camp include Ms. Fauzia Gailani
(Herat Province); Ms. Shukria Barekzai, editor of Woman Mirror magazine; and Mr. Ramazan
Bashardost, a former Karzai minister who champions parliamentary powers. U.S.-based
International Republican Institute (IRI) has helped train the independents; the National
Democratic Institute (NDI) has assisted the more established factions.
Karzai has fewer critics in the Meshrano Jirga, partly because of his 34 appointments (one-third
of that body). He engineered the appointment as Speaker an ally, Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, a noted
Islamic scholar who headed the post-Communist mujahedin government for one month (May
1992) and who has since 2003 headed an effort to reconcile with Taliban figures (Peace and
Reconciliation Commission, or “PTSD” program). Karzai also appointed Northern Alliance
military leader Muhammad Fahim, perhaps to compensate for his removal as Defense Minister,
although he resigned after a few months and later joined the UF. There is one Hindu, and 23
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women; 17 are Karzai appointees and 6 were selected in their own right. This body tends to be
more Islamist conservative than the lower house, advocating a legal system that accords with
Islamic law, and restrictions on press and Westernized media broadcasts. In late 2008, the body
approved a law opposing a U.S.-Afghan plan to establish tribal militias to help keep Taliban
infiltrators out of Afghan communities. The plan is being reworked and tested (“Community
Guard Program”) in some provinces as of early 2009 (see below).
On less contentious issues, the executive and the legislature have worked well. During 2008,
parliament passed a labor law, a mines law, a law on economic cooperatives, and a convention on
tobacco control. It also confirmed several Karzai nominees, including the final justice to fill out
the Supreme Court. Both houses of parliament, whose budgets are controlled by the Ministry of
Finance, are staffed by about 275 Afghans, reporting to a “secretariat.” There are 18 oversight
committees, a research unit and a library.
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U.S. policy has been to help expand Afghan institutions and to urge reforms such as merit-based
performance criteria and weeding out of the rampant official corruption. Afghan ministries are
growing their staffs and technologically capabilities, although still suffering from a low resource
and skill base. During the Bush Administration, U.S. officials generally refrained from publicly
criticizing Karzai when, in the interests of political harmony, he has indulged faction leaders with
appointments and tolerated corruption. However, President Obama and his senior aides, including
the new envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, have been
somewhat more publicly critical of Karzai’s shortcomings than were Bush Administration
officials.
Karzai has marginalized several major regional strongmen but has been hesitant to confront them
to the point where their followers go into armed rebellion. Karzai argues that compromises with
faction leaders and tribes are needed to keep the government intact as he focuses on fighting
“unrepentant” Taliban insurgents. In 2008, some observers cited Karzai’s handling of prominent
Uzbek leader Abdurrashid Dostam as evidence of political weakness. Dostam is often referred to
as a “warlord” because of his command of partisans in his redoubt in northern Afghanistan
(Jowzjan and Balkh provinces), and he is widely accused of human rights abuses of political
opponents in the north. To try to separate him from his militia, in 2005 Karzai appointed him to
the post of chief of staff of the armed forces. On February 4, 2008, Afghan police surrounded
Dostam’s villa in Kabul in response to reports that his followers attacked and beat an ethnic
Turkmen rival, but Karzai did not order his arrest for fear of stirring unrest among Dostam’s
followers. To try to resolve the issue without stirring unrest, in early December 2008 Karzai
purportedly reached an agreement with Dostam under which he resigned as chief of staff and
went into exile in Turkey in exchange for the dropping any case against him.3

2 Some information in this section is from the State Department reports on human rights in Afghanistan for 2007.
March 11, 2008 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100611.htm; the International Religious Freedom Report,
released September 19, 2008. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/2007/90225.htm; and Defense Department “Report on
Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” June 2008
3 CRS e-mail conversation with National Security aide to President Karzai. December 2008.
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Karzai also has curbed prominent Tajik political leader, former Herat governor Ismail Khan, by
appointing him Minister of Energy and Water. In February 2007, both houses passed a law giving
amnesty to so-called “warlords”; Karzai altered the draft to give victims the right to seek justice
for any abuses; Karzai did not sign a modified version in May 2007, leaving the status unclear.
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Partly as a result of what many Afghans view as a “predatory” central government, some Afghans
are said to be losing faith in the government and in Karzai’s leadership, to the point where his re-
election appears increasingly uncertain. The issue of official corruption has become a key U.S.
agenda item as Karzai’s leadership image fades. Some observers, such as former Coordinator for
Counter-Narcotics and Justice Reform Thomas Schweich, in a July 27, 2008 New York Times
article, have gone so far as to assert that Karzai, to build political support, is deliberately
tolerating officials in his government who are allegedly involved in the narcotics trade. The New
York Times reported allegations (October 5, 2008) that another Karzai brother, Qandahar
provincial council chief Ahmad Wali Karzai, is involved in narcotics trafficking. Press reports in
January 2009 allege that government positions and mundane functions such as government
processing of drivers licenses are “for sale” or routinely require bribes in exchange for action.4
Several high officials, despite very low official government salaries, have acquired ornate
properties in west Kabul since 2002. Other observers who have served in Afghanistan say that
Karzai has appointed some provincial governors to “reward them” and that these appointments
have gone on to “prey” economically on the populations of that province. Transparency
International, a German organization that assesses governmental corruption worldwide, ranked
Afghanistan in 2008 as 176th out of 180 countries ranked in terms of government corruption.
To try to address the criticism, in August 2008 Karzai, with reported U.S. prodding, set up the
“High Office of Oversight for the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy” with the power to
investigate the police, courts, and the attorney general’s office, and to catalogue the overseas
assets of Afghan officials. Karzai said publicly in December 2008 that he believes that many high
officials have bank accounts overseas, such as in Dubai. In October 2008, Karzai replaced the
ministers of Interior, of Education, and of Agriculture with officials, particularly the new Interior
Minister (former Soviet-era official Muhammad Hanif Atmar) believed to be dedicated to reform
of their ministries and weeding out of official corruption. However, Atmar’s appointment incurred
further UF concern because Atmar, a Pashtun, replaced a Tajik (Zarrar Moqbel) in that post. In
December 2008, the lower house voted Commerce Minister Amin Farhang out of office (nearly
unanimous vote) for failing to bring down energy prices. In July 2008, Karzai fired Sabit on July
16, 2008, after Sabit declared his intention to run against Karzai in 2009, although some Afghans
say Sabit himself owned property abroad and was corrupt. Some of these anti-corruption steps
have been recommended in studies within the State Department, the Afghan government, and the
U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime which is responsible for assisting Afghanistan on counter-
narcotics.
Karzai’s popularity also is being undermined by civilian casualties resulting from U.S./NATO
operations. Following an August 21, 2008, airstrike that some Afghans said killed 90 civilians
(the incident is in dispute) near Herat city, the Afghan cabinet called for bringing foreign forces
under Afghan law, replacing an 2001 interim “status of forces agreement” with the coalition.

4 Filkins, Dexter. “Bribes Corrode Afghan’s Trust in Government.” New York Times, January 2, 2009.
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Afghanistan and the United States conducted a joint investigation of the incident. However,
several similar but smaller incidents have occurred since, and Karzai has sharpened his criticism
of the use of air strikes, and in January 2009 he demanded an Afghan role in operational decisions
such as whether and when to use airpower.
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In part to address the flaws of the Afghan government, U.S. policy is in the process of shifting
away from empowering the central government and instead promoting local security and
governance solutions. The Afghan government asserts that it itself is promoting local governance
as the next stage in Afghanistan’s political and economic development. A key indicator of this
shift came in August 2007 when Karzai placed the selection process for local leaders (provincial
governors and down) in a new Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)—and out
of the Interior Ministry. The IDLG, with advice from India and other donors, has also developed
plans to empower localities to decide on development priorities.
In March 2008 Karzai replaced the weak and ineffective governor of Helmand - Asadullah Wafa -
with Gulab Mangal, who is from Laghman Province and who the U.N. Office of Drugs and
Crime said in an August 2008 report is taking relatively effective action to convince farmers not
to grow crops other than poppy. Some observers say that the central government has not given
Mangal the support he is requesting, such as delivery of seeds and other goods to encourage
Helmand farmers to grow legitimate crops, and there are reports Karzai wants to replace him with
the former governor, Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh, who is accused of human rights abuses
when he was governor during 2002-2005 but who remains powerful in the province. The
UNODC report said that improving governance in some provinces had contributed to the increase
to 18 “poppy free” provinces (out of 34), from 13 in the same report in 2007.
The governor of Qandahar was changed (to former General Rahmatullah Raufi, replacing
Asadullah Khalid) after the August 7, 2008 Taliban assault on the Qandahar prison that led to the
freeing of several hundred Taliban fighters incarcerated there. Karzai changed that governorship
again in December 2008, naming Canadian-Afghan academic Tooryalai Wesa as governor,
perhaps hoping that his ties to Canada would assuage Canadian reticence to continuing its
mission in Qandahar beyond 2011. The IDLG also has replaced the governor of Ghazni Province,
and several other governors are slated to be changed.
The IDLG is also the chief implementer of the recently-launched “Social Outreach Program”
which provides financial support (about $125 per month) and other benefits to tribal and local
leaders in exchange for their cooperation with U.S./NATO led forces against the Taliban
insurgency. The civilian aspects of the program are funded partly by USAID. A more
controversial security aspect of the program, still in its formative stage, is called the “Community
Guard program”—a partial resurrection of the traditional tribal militias (“arbokai”) that provided
local security before Afghanistan’s recent wars. U.S. commanders say U.S. weapons will not be
provided to the militias, only training, but some weapons may come from the Afghan
government. The security components of the program are partially funded with DoD funds (the
Commanders Emergency Response Program or CERP). The program has been launched in
Wardak province and will also be implemented in Kapisa, Ghazni, and Lowgar in early 2009
Some see the shift toward new local militias as a reversal of the 2001-2007 programs to disarm
militias nationwide, although U.S. commanders say they will be able to control the new militias.
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On human rights issues, the overall State Department judgment is that the country’s human rights
record remains poor, but primarily because of the weakness of the central government. The
security forces are widely cited for abuses and corruption, including torture and abuse of
detainees. There has been some backsliding in recent years on media freedoms. In debate over a
press law, both houses of parliament approved a joint version, but Karzai has vetoed it on the
grounds that it gives the government too much control over private media. In the absence of a
new law, Afghanistan’s conservative Council of Ulema (Islamic scholars) has been ascendant.
With the Council’s backing, in April 2008 the Ministry of Information and Culture banned five
Indian-produced soap operas on the grounds that they are too risque, although the programs were
restored in August 2008 under a compromise that also brought in some Islamic-oriented programs
from Turkey. At the same time, press reports say that there are growing numbers of arrests or
intimidation of journalists who criticize the central government or local leaders. On the other
hand, many women are now in parliament (numbers in the table below), and there is one female
governor (Bamiyan Province), 67 female judges, and almost 500 female journalists working
nationwide.
The September 2008 International Religious Freedom report says the Afghan government took
limited steps during the year to increase religious freedom. Still, members of minority religions,
including Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and Baha’i’s, often face discrimination; the Supreme Court
declared the Baha’i faith to be a form of blasphemy in May 2007. In October 2007, Afghanistan
resumed enforcing the death penalty after a four-year moratorium, executing 15 criminals. One
major case incurring international criticism has been the January 2008 death sentence, imposed in
a quick trial, against 23 year old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing material
critical of Islam. On October 21, 2008, a Kabul appeals court changed his sentence to 20 years in
prison; he remains in jail but has several avenues of appeal remaining. Afghanistan was again
placed in Tier 2 in the State Department’s June 4, 2008, Trafficking in Persons report for 2008 on
the grounds that it does not fully comply with minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking in persons. However, the report says it is making significant efforts to do so, including
by establishing anti-trafficking offices in the offices of the Attorney General in all 34 provinces.
One positive development is that Afghanistan’s Shiite minority, mostly from the Hazara tribes of
central Afghanistan (Bamiyan and Dai Kundi provinces) can celebrate their holidays openly, a
development unknown before the fall of the Taliban. Some Afghan Shiites follow Iran’s clerical
leaders politically, but Afghan Shiites tend to be less religious and more socially open than their
co-religionists in Iran. The Minister of Justice is a Shiite, the first of that sect to hold that post.
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USAID has spent about $440 million (FY2002-2007) to build democracy and rule of law, and
assist the elections. A FY2008 supplemental funding request included $100 million to assist with
the presidential elections in 2009. For FY2009, $707 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF)
was requested which will be used in part to enable the Karzai government to “extend the reach of
good governance....” Some of the aid for FY2009 is being extended to the IDLG for its operations
and to support the Social Outreach Program discussed above. In FY 2009, according to a
September 25, 2008 State Department fact sheet, USAID is providing $8.5 million to support the
IDLG and to fund the Social Outreach Program and a separate “Governor’s Performance Fund”
intended to promote good governance. Another $95 million is going to the IDLG to help it
construct new district centers and rehabilitate fifty provincial and district offices. For
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comprehensive tables on U.S. aid to Afghanistan, by fiscal year and by category and type of aid,
see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman.
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The next major political milestone in Afghanistan is the 2009 presidential and provincial
elections. Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC) that will run the elections, has
set August 20, 2009 as the election date. This has caused the UF, which had wanted the elections
by May 22, 2009 in accordance with a strict interpretation of the constitution, has protested the
decision and said it would not “recognize” Karzai’s presidency after May 22. The IEC, which
issued a statement on its election date determination on February 3, 2009, says that the
constitution allows for a later date than May 22 if security and other conditions preclude the
holding of “universal, fair, and transparent” elections by the May 22 date. The IEC, in its
statement, gave several justifications for its decision to move the elections to late August,
including the difficulties in registering voters, printing ballots, training staff, making the public
aware of the elections, and the dependence on international donations to fund the elections, in
addition to the security questions.5 It is also possible that the grave security situation could still
derail the elections entirely, in which case a loya jirga would convene to select a president.
Politically, Karzai had preferred the August 2009 date because it gives him more time to restore
his popularity and gives more time for the infusion of U.S. troops (about 30,000 additional due by
August 2009) to secure the Pashtun areas which will be the source of many Karzai votes. The UF
sensed vulnerability on the part of Karzai and the May 2009 date appeared to suit that faction
politically.
Despite the political dispute between Karzai and the UF, enthusiasm among the public appears to
be high, and pre-election maneuvering is advancing, according to observers. Registration
(updating of 2005 voter rolls) began in October 2008 and is expected to be completed by later in
February 2009. However, there are also reports of some registration fraud, with some voters
registering on behalf of women who do not, by custom, show up at registration sites. U.S./NATO
military operations in some areas, including in Helmand in January 2009, were conducted to
secure registration centers. Still, registration percentages in restive areas are lower than in more
secure areas.
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In the election-related political jockeying,6 Karzai said in August 2008 that he is seeking re-
election. The conventional wisdom among observers is that the two-round election virtually
assures victory by a Pashtun. Anti-Karzai Pashtuns at first attempted, unsuccessfully, to coalesce
around one challenger, possibly former Interior Minister Ali Jalali (who resigned in 2005 over
Karzai’s compromises with faction leaders), or former Finance Minister (2002-2004) and Karzai
critic Ashraf Ghani. In December 2008, Ghani, a member of the prominent Ahmedzai clan,

5 Statement of the Independent Election Commission Secretariat. February 3, 2009, provided to CRS by a Karzai
national security aide.
6 Some of the information in this paragraph obtained in CRS interviews with a Karzai national security aide. December
2008.
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returned to Afghanistan to a welcoming ceremony in which he was “nominated” for president by
“32 political parties,” according to Afghan media. He has since appeared on U.S. media
broadcasts saying Karzai has failed to establish legitimate and successful governance.
Some observers say that there is discussion of an agreement under which a Pashtun might head a
UF ticket—a move that would be intended to win votes from both Pashtuns and minorities.
Observers at first said that talks were under way for Jalali to head the UF slate, but accounts
circulating in January 2009 say the ticket might be headed by Pir Gaylani, a Pashtun leader of a
moderate, pro-monarchy mujahedin faction during the anti-Soviet war. The Gaylani familiy is
prominent in Afghanistan including several family members serving in both houses of the
National Assembly. Under this scenario, former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah (a Tajik) might
run as a vice presidential candidate on the UF ticket, and neither he nor former President
Burhanuddin Rabbani (a Tajik, and president during 1992-1996), would head the UF slate. Others
say Rabbani, as the elder statesman of the UF bloc, is insisting on heading the ticket himself – an
insistence that purportedly is holding up a deal for Gaylani or Jalali to head the UF slate.
Some observers say that Karzai’s main opponents, many of whom spend most of their time
outside Afghanistan, are basing their election strategy on creating the impression that the Obama
Administration prefers that Karzai not be re-elected. It is not certain that, even if this impression
took hold, that Afghan voters would cast their ballots on this basis.
Other potential contenders include Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqqeq; Ramazan Bashardost
(another Hazara); Sabit (Pashtun, mentioned above); and Pashtun figure Hedayat Arsala Amin.
Bashardost is running on an avowed “anti-corruption” platform based on his public role as a
whistle-blower against specific alleged government abuses. Rumors have recently abated that
Bush Administration U.S. Ambassador to U.N., Afghan-born Zalmay Khalilzad, might himself
run.
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Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process
Interim Administration
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key
security positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai
reaffirmed as leader by June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional
Afghan assembly).
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong
presidency, a rebuke to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance
presidential power, but gave parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men
and women equal rights under the law, allows for political parties as long as they are
not “un-Islamic”; allows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter
7, Article 15). Set out electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential,
provincial, and district elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-
hereditary position of “Father of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential Election
Elections for President and two vice presidents, for five year term, held October 9,
2004. Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad
Zia Masud, a Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah
Masud, who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the September 11
attacks, and Karim Khalili, a Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents. Second
highest vote getter, Northern Alliance figure (and Education Minister) Yunus
Qanooni (16%). One female ran, got about 1%. Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq
got 11.7%; and Dostam won 10%. Funded with $90 million in international aid,
including $40 million from U.S. (FY2004 supplemental, P.L. 108-106).
Parliamentary Elections
Elections held September 18, 2005 on Single Non-Transferable Vote” System;
candidates stood as individuals, not part of party list. Parliament consists of a 249
elected lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat
upper house (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elder). Voting was for one candidate only,
although number of representatives varied by province, ranging from 2 (Panjshir
Province) to 33 (Kabul Province). Herat has 17; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and
Ghazni, 11 seats each. The body is 28% female (68 persons), in line with the legal
minimum of 68 women - two per each of the 34 provinces. Upper house appointed
by Karzai (34 seats, half of which are to be women), by the provincial councils (34
seats), and district councils (remaining 34 seats). There are 23 women in it, above
the 17 required by the constitution. Because district elections (400 district councils)
were not held, provincial councils selected 68 on interim basis. 2,815 candidates for
Wolesi Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was 57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5
million registered. Funded by $160 million in international aid, including $45 million
from U.S. (FY2005 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 109-13).
Provincial Elections/
Provincial elections held September 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary
District Elections
elections. Exact powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction
Provincial councils size range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council.
Total seats are 420, of which 121 held by women. l3,185 candidates, including 279
women. Some criticize the provincial election system as disproportionately weighted
toward large districts within each province. District elections not held due to
complexity and potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Cabinet
Full-term 27 seat cabinet named by Karzai in December 2004. Heavily weighted
toward Pashtuns, and created new Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. Rahim Wardak
named Defense Minister, replacing Northern Alliance military leader Mohammad
Fahim. Qanooni not in cabinet, subsequently was selected Wolesi Jirga Speaker.
Northern Alliance figure Dr. Abdullah replaced as Foreign Minister in March 2006.
Cabinet reshuffle in October 2008 including appointment of Atmar as Interior
Minister.
Next Elections
Presidential and provincial elections to be held in August 2009; parliamentary,
district, and municipal elections in 2010. Each election to cost $100 million. Elections
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also to be held for 23,000 “Community Development Councils” (CDC’s) nationwide
that decide development priorities.

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Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612

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