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The 111th Congress will face a number of issues regarding the development of civilian capabilities
to carry out stabilization and reconstruction activities. In September 2008, Congress passed the
Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act, 2008, as Title XVI of the Duncan
Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (S. 3001, P.L. 110-417, signed
into law October 14, 2008). This legislation codified the existence and functions of the State
Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and
authorized new operational capabilities within the State Department, a Civilian Response Corps
of government employees with an active and a standby component, and a Civilian Reserve Corps.
S/CRS was established in 2004 to address longstanding concerns, both within Congress and the
broader foreign policy community, over the perceived lack of the appropriate capabilities and
processes to deal with transitions from conflict to stability. These capabilities and procedures
include adequate planning mechanisms for stabilization and reconstruction operations, efficient
interagency coordination structures and procedures in carrying out such tasks, and appropriate
civilian personnel for many of the non-military tasks required. Effectively distributing resources
among the various executive branch actors, maintaining clear lines of authority and jurisdiction,
and balancing short- and long-term objectives are major challenges for designing, planning, and
conducting post-conflict operations, as is fielding the appropriate civilian personnel.
Since July 2004, S/CRS has worked to establish the basic concepts, mechanisms, and capabilities
necessary to carry out such operations. Working with a staff that has slowly grown from a few
dozen to 112 individuals from the State Department, other executive branch agencies, and on
contract as of January 30, 2009, S/CRS has taken steps to monitor and plan for potential conflicts,
to develop a rapid-response crisis management “surge” capability, to improve interagency and
international coordination, to develop interagency training exercises, and to help State
Department regional bureaus develop concepts and proposals for preventive action.
In June 2008, Congress specifically provided $75 million for S/CRS and USAID S&R activities,
including the establishment and implementation of the civilian response capabilities, in the
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (H.R. 4642, P.L. 110-252). This funding expires on
September 30, 2009.
As of January 30, 2009, according to S/CRS officials, it is unclear how much funding S/CRS will
receive in regular FY2009 appropriations.
Among the issues that the Congress will face regarding the development of civilian capabilities
are the level of staffing and funding for S/CRS, and the means to develop, support, maintain, and
deploy the civilian response and reserve corps.
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Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Evolving Perceptions of Post-Conflict Needs........................................................................... 3
Calls for Change........................................................................................................................ 5
Proposals for New Civilian Forces ..................................................................................... 6
Critics Respond ......................................................................................................................... 8
Creating Civilian Reconstruction and Stabilization Capabilities: Congressional and
Executive Actions, 2004-2007 ............................................................................................... 9
The “Lugar-Biden” Legislation .......................................................................................... 9
S/CRS Start-Up and Early Congressional Mandate.......................................................... 10
S/CRS Role in Interagency Coordination ..........................................................................11
Codifying Civilian Reconstruction and Stabilization Assistance and State Department
Capabilities: Title XVI, P.L. 110-417, October 14, 2008..................................................... 12
Authorizes Assistance for Reconstruction and Stabilization Crises.................................. 12
Makes S/CRS a Permanent State Department Office and Assigns Specific
Functions........................................................................................................................ 12
Authorizes a Civilian Readiness Response Corps and a Civilian Reserve Corps............. 13
Development of the S/CRS Office, Responsibilities, and Capabilities................................... 14
Monitoring and Planning for Potential Conflicts.............................................................. 14
Developing and Carrying Out Conflict Response Activities ............................................ 15
Establishing and Deploying the Response Corps Components ........................................ 15
Planning for a Civilian Reserve Capability....................................................................... 16
Other Activities ................................................................................................................. 17
Issues for Congress........................................................................................................................ 17
Enhance S/CRS Capacity and Status ...................................................................................... 17
Further Authority and Funding for the Civilian Reserve Corps........................................ 20
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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 21
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For well over a decade, there has been widespread concern that the U.S. government lacks
appropriate civilian “tools” to carry out state-building tasks in post-conflict situations. This
concern grew from U.S. military operations in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere, where
military forces were tasked with a variety of state-building tasks, such as creating justice systems,
assisting police, and promoting governance. With the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, consensus
increased that the United States must develop adequate civilian organizational structures,
procedures, and personnel to response effectively to post-conflict and other “stabilization and
reconstruction” (S&R) situations.
The George W. Bush Administration launched several initiatives to do just that. The centerpiece
of its efforts was the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS) in the Office of the Secretary of State. Created in mid-2004, S/CRS was
tasked with designing, and in some cases establishing, the new structures within the State
Department and elsewhere that would allow civilian agencies to develop effective policies,
processes, and personnel to build stable and democratic states. Among other tasks, S/CRS
developed plans for the creation of a civilian “surge” capability that could respond rapidly to
S&R emergencies.
The Obama Administration has not made explicit its plans to support the development of civilian
capabilities that could respond to S&R crises, but members of the Obama Administration have
signaled their support for civilian S&R capabilities. In her January 2009 confirmation hearings
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton mentioned
the State Department’s new S&R responsibilities, citing a Department need to demonstrate
competence and secure funding to carry them out. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, while
serving in that position under former President George Bush, urged the development of civilian
capabilities in major speeches.1 As Senator, Vice President Joseph Biden was the co-sponsor, with
Senator Lugar, of legislation, first introduced in 2004, to create an office within the State
Department that would coordinate U.S. government S&R operations and deploy civilian
government employees and private citizens to carry out state-building activities in crises abroad.
In its second session, the 110th Congress enacted legislation that “operationalizes” the Department
of State and other federal agencies for S&R efforts by authorizing the creation of federal civilian
“response” units, as well as the creation of a volunteer S&R civilian reserve force, akin to the
military reserve force. This legislation advances the work of previous Congresses regarding Bush
Administration initiatives to improve the conduct of (S&R) efforts. With the passage in
September 2008 of Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009 (S. 3001/P.L. 110-417 ), signed into law October 14, 2008, Congress took two
important steps:
• It established S/CRS as part of permanent law.
1 U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates delivered at Kansas State University,
Manhattan, KA (the “Landon Lecture”), November 26, 2007, and U.S. Department of Defense, Speech by Secretary of
Defense Robert M. Gates, at the AFRICOM Activation Ceremony, Washington, D.C., October 1, 2008. Accessed
through http:://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/secdef.aspx; last accessed February 3, 2009.
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• It formally “operationalized” certain units in civilian federal agencies, most
particularly the State Department,, transforming it from an institution devoted to
diplomacy to one that also would effect change through “on-the-ground”
personnel and programs dedicated to promoting security and stability in
transitions from conflict and post-conflict situations. This was accomplished by
authorizing the creation of a two component “readiness response” corps
consisting of a small active unit of federal employees drawn from several
agencies and a federal standby unit, and a large civilian reserve corps, analogous
to the military reserve.
The 111th Congress is faced with several remaining tasks. One is whether to create a mechanism,
such as envisioned in early legislation, to create a flexible, no-year, discretionary Conflict
Response Fund to be drawn upon by civilian agencies for S&R efforts. The other is the
appropriate level of staffing and funding S/CRS, and the means to develop, maintain, support and
deploy the Civilian Response Corps and Civilian Reserve Corps, as well as for S/CRS.
This report provides background on these issues. It also discusses proposals and tracks related
legislative action. It will be updated as warranted.
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President Bush’s pledge, articulated in his February 2, 2005, State of the Union address, “to build
and preserve a community of free and independent nations, with governments that answer to their
citizens, and reflect their own cultures” cast the once-discredited concept of building or
rebuilding government institutions, economies, and civic cultures in a new light. During the
1990s, many policymakers considered the establishment of new institutions in troubled countries
to be an overly expensive, if not futile exercise. The use of U.S. military forces for such activities,
particularly in the first half of the decade, was troubling to many Members. In the past few years,
however, the Bush Administration, in response to concerns about the threats posed by weak and
fragile states, reframed both U.S. security and international development policy and initiated
dramatic corresponding changes in U.S. governmental structures and practices. These changes,
the Bush Administration argued, would enable the United States to perform such tasks more
efficiently and at a lesser cost, particularly in transitions from conflict and in post-conflict
situations.
A key component of these changes was the establishment and reinforcement of new civilian
structures and forces, in particular S/CRS and the civilian response/reserve corps. The Bush
Administration made these new civilian entities a prominent feature in two initiatives: the
National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) of December 2005 on the management of
interagency reconstruction and stabilization operations and the “transformational diplomacy”
reorganization of State Department personnel and practices announced in January 2006.
These initiatives were intended to enhance the United States’ ability to function effectively on the
world scene in the environment. created by the terrorist attacks on the United States of September
11, 2001 (9/11). In that environment, many analysts perceive that the greatest threats to U.S.
security often will emerge within states that are either too weak to police their territory or lack the
political will or capacity to do so. To deal with that environment, in 2006 Secretary of State
Condeleezza Rice outlined a new U.S. foreign policy strategy focusing on the “intersections of
diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction and military security” and involving
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extensive changes in government to carry that strategy out.2 State-building (or nation-building as
it is often called) was at the center of this strategy. Both initiatives reinforced the important role
that the Bush Administration gave S/CRS in policymaking and implementation dealing with
conflict transitions and weak and fragile states.
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The creation of S/CRS in July 2004 responded to increasing calls for the improvement of U.S.
civilian capabilities to plan and carry out post-conflict state-building operations. Several factors
combined after 9/11 to lead many analysts to conclude that such operations are vital to U.S.
security and that the United States must reorganize itself to conduct them effectively, in particular
by creating new and improving existing civilian institutions to carry them out. Foremost among
these factors, for many analysts, was the widespread perception since 9/11 that global instability
directly threatens U.S. security and that it is a vital U.S. interest to transform weak and failing
states into stable, democratic ones. Related to this was the expectation that responding to the
threat of instability will require the United States and the international community to intervene
periodically in foreign conflicts with “peacekeeping”4 and “stabilization” forces at about the same
intensive pace as it had done since the early 1990s. Because that pace stressed the U.S. military,
many policymakers believed that the United States must create and enhance civilian capabilities
to carry out the peacebuilding tasks that are widely viewed as necessary for stability and
reconstruction in fragile, conflict-prone, and post-conflict states. Finally, numerous analyses
distilling the past decade and a half of experience with multifaceted peacekeeeping and
peacebuilding operations raised hopes that rapid, comprehensive, and improved peacebuilding
efforts could significantly raise the possibilities of achieving sustainable peace.
Post-conflict operations are complex undertakings, usually involving the participation of several
United Nations departments and U.N. system agencies, the international financial institutions and
a plethora of non-governmental humanitarian and development organizations, as well as the
military and other departments or ministries of the United States and other nations.5 The United
2 Taken from a speech delivered by then-Secretary of State Condeleeza Rice. Remarks at Georgetown School of
Foreign Service, January 18, 2006. Available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm. This theme was
reiterated by Stephen Krasner, director of Policy Planning at the State Department. Remarks at the Center for Global
Development, January 20, 2006. Available at http://www.cgdev.org/doc/event%20docs/Krasner%20Transcript.pdf.
3 Parts of this Background section and the following section on S/CRS are drawn from a now archived CRS Report
RS22031, Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department’s Office for Reconstruction and
Stabilization, by Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss.
4 “Peacekeeping” is a broad, generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many activities that the United Nations
and other international organizations, and sometimes ad hoc coalitions of nations or individual nations, undertake to
promote, maintain, enforce, or enhance the possibilities for peace. These activities range from providing election
observers, recreating police or civil defense forces for the new governments of those countries, organizing and
providing security for humanitarian relief efforts, and monitoring and enforcing cease-fires and other arrangements
designed to separate parties recently in conflict. (Many of these activities are often also referred to as “nation-building”;
a better term, some analysts suggest, is “state-building.”) As used here, the term encompasses both “peace
enforcement” operations, sent to enforce an international mandate to establish peace, and “peacebuilding” activities.
Peacebuilding activities, usually undertaken in a post-conflict environment, are designed to strengthen peace and
prevent the resumption or spread of conflict, including disarmament and demobilization of warring parties, repatriation
of refugees, reform and strengthening of government institutions, election-monitoring, and promotion of political
participation and human rights.
5 The term “post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction” is broad but is usually understood to encompass tasks and
missions to promote security and encourage stable, democratic governance and economic growth following major
hostilities. In the past, many of the “stabilization” activities were loosely labeled “peacekeeping.” Reconstruction
(continued...)
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States developed its contributions to the earliest international “peacekeeping” operations of the
1990s on an ad hoc basis, with little interagency planning and coordination, and often with the
U.S. military in the lead. The military was called upon to perform such missions not only for its
extensive resources but also because no other U.S. government agency could match the military’s
superior planning and organizational capabilities. In addition, because of its manpower, the
military carried out most of the U.S. humanitarian and nation-building contribution, even though
some believed that civilians might be better suited to carry out such tasks, especially those tasks
involving cooperation with humanitarian NGOs.
During the 1990s, many analysts began to perceive the need to improve and increase civilian
contributions to peacekeeping operations, especially for those activities related to planning and
conducting operations and to establishing a secure environment. An important Clinton
Administration initiative was the May 1997 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, entitled
The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations. According
to the white paper explaining it, PDD 56 sought to address interagency planning and coordination
problems through new planning and implementing mechanisms.6 Due to what some analysts
describe as internal bureaucratic resistance, PDD 56’s provisions were never formally
implemented, although some of its practices were informally adopted. (In December 2005,
President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, which replaced PDD-
56. For more information, see below.) The Clinton Administration also attempted to remedy the
shortage of one critical nation-building tool, international civilian police forces, through PDD 71,
which a white paper describes as outlining policy guidelines for strengthening criminal justice
systems in support of peace operations.7 While never implemented by the Clinton Administration,
PDD 71 has been partially put into force by the Bush Administration.8
Improvements in the provision of social and economic assistance were also viewed as crucial to
successful outcomes. Post-conflict populations need “safety net” and poverty alleviation
programs, as well as technical assistance and advice on monetary and fiscal policy and debt
management in order to create an environment conducive to democratization and economic
growth.9 While the popular image of U.S. post-conflict assistance is the post-World War II
Marshall Plan, through which the United States provided the foreign assistance needed for
Europe’s post-conflict reconstruction, the United States is no longer the sole, and often not the
dominant, donor in post-conflict situations. Multilateral institutions became increasingly
(...continued)
involves repairing (in some cases creating) the infrastructure necessary to support long-term economic growth and
development. This infrastructure can be physical (e.g., roads and schools), or institutional (e.g., legal and tax systems)
For additional background on various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and assistance, see CRS Report RL33557,
Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, by Nina M. Serafino; and CRS
Report RL33700, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by Marjorie Ann Browne.
6 The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision
Directive. May 1997. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm.
7 U.S. Text: The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations. February 24, 2000 http://www.fas.org/irp/
offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-4.htm, hereafter referred to as PDD-71 White Paper; and U.S. Text: Summary of Presidential
Decision Directive 71, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-1.htm.
8 See CRS Report RL32321, Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed
Solutions, by Nina M. Serafino.
9 Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies,” World Bank Working Paper,
October 2002.
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important during the 1990s, when small, regional conflicts proliferated following the collapse of
the Soviet Union.
International organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund now
play crucial roles, working with the U.S. government to provide economic assistance and
technical advice on rebuilding post-conflict economies. (Nevertheless, although the United States
has provided some funding for economic reconstruction multilaterally for the recent Afghanistan
and Iraq operations, most U.S. funding for post-conflict operations is provided bilaterally.) Many
analysts now judge that multilateral assistance is more effective for the recipient country than
bilateral aid for two reasons.10 First, disbursing funds multilaterally through U.N. agencies or
international organizations gives greater assurance that it will reach recipients than providing aid
bilaterally with direct payments to individual governments or non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). In addition, analysts find that bilateral aid is more likely to be apportioned according to
the donor’s foreign policy priorities rather than the economic needs of the recipient country.11
For many analysts and policymakers, the ongoing Iraq operation has illustrated a U.S.
government need for new planning and coordination arrangements that would provide a
leadership role for civilians in post-conflict phases of military operations and new civilian
capabilities to augment and relieve the military as soon as possible, and greater international
coordination. The perception of a continued need for such operations, and the perceived
inefficiencies of the still largely ad hoc U.S. responses have reinvigorated calls for planning and
coordination reform. The extreme stresses placed on the U.S. military by combat roles in Iraq and
Afghanistan have pushed those calls in a new direction, to the development of adequate civilian
capabilities to perform those tasks.
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The perception that international terrorism can exploit weak, unstable states convinced many
policymakers and analysts of the need to strengthen U.S. and international capabilities to foster
security, good governance and economic development, especially in post-conflict situations. The
9/11 Commission and the Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security found that
weak states, as well as unsuccessful post-conflict transitions, pose a threat to U.S. security.12
These groups argued that such states often experience economic strife and political instability that
make them vulnerable to drug trafficking, human trafficking and other criminal enterprises, and to
linkage with non-state terrorist groups (such as the links between the previous Taliban
government in Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda terrorist network). Weak states also are unprepared
to handle major public health issues, such as HIV/AIDS, that can generate political and economic
instability.13 These commissions, and other analysts, argued for assistance to the governments of
10 Milner, Helen, “Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal Agent Problems,” available at
http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/seminars/pegroup/milner.pdf, and Schiavo-Campo, S., “Financing and Aid
Arrangements In Post-Conflict Situations,” World Bank Working Paper, May 2003.
11 Alesina, Alberto and Dollar, David, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” NBER Working Paper No.
w6612, June 1998.
12 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,
New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004, and On the Brink: A Report of the Commission on Weak States and US
National Security, sponsored by the Center for Global Development, May 2004. Also see CRS Report RL34253, Weak
and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler.
13 Prins, Gwyn, “AIDS and Global Security,” International Affairs, vol. 80, Issue 5, 2004.
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weak states and of post-conflict transitions regimes to help them control their territories, meet
their citizens’ basic needs, and create legitimate governments based on effective, transparent
institutions.
These and other studies recognized a need to enhance U.S. government structures and capabilities
for conducting post-conflict operations.14 Although differing in several respects, the studies
largely agreed on five points: (1) the ad hoc system needs to be replaced with a permanent
mechanism for developing contingency plans and procedures for joint civil-military operations
led by civilians; (2) mechanisms to rapidly deploy U.S. civilian government and government-
contracted personnel need to be put in place; (3) preventive action needs to be considered; (4) the
U.S. government needs to enhance multinational capabilities to carry out post-conflict security
tasks and to better coordinate international aid; and (5) flexible funding arrangements are needed
to deal with such situations. In addition, some urged substantial amounts of funding for flexible
U.S. and international accounts.15
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A prominent feature of several of the reports on stabilization and reconstruction operations was a
recommendation to develop rapidly-deployable civilian forces to undertake state-building
functions, particularly those related to rule of law, even before hostilities had ceased. Many
analysts view the early deployment of rule of law personnel as essential to providing security
from the outset of an operation, which they argue will enhance the possibilities for long-term
stability and democracy in an intervened or post-conflict country. Many view the development of
civilian groups to do so as permitting the earlier withdrawal of military personnel than would
otherwise be possible.
The concept of a cohesive, rapidly deployable unit of civilian experts for stabilization and
reconstruction operations dates back at least to the Clinton Administration. In PDD-71, which
dealt with strengthening criminal justice systems in peace operations, the Clinton Administration
identified such an initiative as a high priority, according to the PDD-71 White Paper.16 Six studies
14 The reports are (1) Play to Win: The Final Report of the Bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction,
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA), 2003 (a book-
length version was published in mid-2004, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,
Robert C. Orr, ed.); (2) Clark A. Murdock, Michèle A. Flournoy, Christopher A. Williams, and Kurt M. Campbell,
principal authors. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era Phase I Report, CSIS, March
2004; (3) Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds. Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,
National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, April 2004, (4) On the Brink: Weak
States and US National Security, Center for Global Development, May 2004; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and From
Hostilities, December 2004; and In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, Washington, D.C.:
Council on Foreign Relations, Report of an Independent Task Force, July 2005.
15 The July 2005 Council on Foreign Relations report recommends the establishment of a conflict response fund of
$500 million, a five-fold increase over the amount requested by the Bush Administration for FY2006. In addition, the
report recommends establishing a new $1 billion standing multilateral reconstruction trust fund under the auspices of
the Group of Eight industrialized nations. This trust fund would be modeled on existing post-conflict trust funds located
at the United Nations and the World Bank.
16 That white paper states that PDD 71 instructed that “programs must be developed that enable the U.S. to respond
quickly to help establish rudimentary judicial and penal capacity during peace operations and complex contingencies.”
PDD-71 White Paper, op.cit., p. 6.
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between 2003 and 2005 endorsed the creation of cohesive, rapidly deployable units of civilian
experts for stabilization and reconstruction operations.
• The November 2003 report of the National Defense University (NDU)
recommended the concurrent deployment of civilian “stabilization and
reconstruction” personnel with combat forces, in order to expedite the transfer of
nation-building responsibilities to civilians. The report recommended the creation
of a standing interagency stabilization and reconstruction team within the
government, and the development of an “on-call” civilian crisis management
corps of medical, legal, language, and law enforcement personnel from state and
local governments and the private sector.17
• The March 2004 report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) recommended the establishment of an Agency for Stability Operations
reporting directly to the Secretary of State. The agency would be responsible for
preparing for such operations, as well as the management and deployment of
Civilian Stability Operations Corps of 200-300 U.S. government civilians, who
are organized, trained and equipped for conducting such operations, and of a
Civilian Stability Operations Reserve of an unspecified number of non-
government civilians with related expertise who would be on-call for rapid
deployment.18
• The April 2004 report of the U.S. Institute of Peace on the rule of law component
of building civilian capacity recommended the creation of a reserve corps as well
as of a separate office in the Office of the Secretary of State that would have
authority to recruit, deploy, and manage constabulary police units, judges,
attorneys, and other legal professionals.19
• A U.S. Institute of Peace analyst recommended the creation of a “U.S. Stability
Force” comprised of (1) robust military forces, (2) civilian constabulary units, (3)
civilian police, and (4) rule of law professionals (lawyers, judges, and corrections
experts) that would deploy concurrently in order to provide the needed security
from the outset.20
• The Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on transitions from hostilities
recommended that the Department of State “develop and maintain a portfolio of
detailed and adaptable plans and capabilities for the civilian roles in
reconstruction operations” and that it “prepare, deploy, and lead the civil
components of the reconstruction missions.... ” The study finds that the civilian
police, judges, civil administrators, and technical advisors are needed to help
build new institutions after a military intervention.21
17 Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, op.cit.
18 Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report, op.cit. See pp. 64-65.
19 Robert M. Perito, Michael Dziedzic and Beth C. DeGrasse, Building Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability Operations.
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 118, April 2004.
20 Robert M. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability
Force. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004. See pp 323-337 for an extensive discussion of
this proposal.
21 Transition to and From Hostilities, op.cit., p 58.
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The establishment and deployment of such a corps, now in its initial stages (see below), would
mark a substantial change from current practices. The United States deploys Civilian Police
(contracted separately for each operation) to international peacekeeping and stabilization
operations through the State Department’s CivPol program, run by the Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). The United States currently deploys other rule of law
personnel, with experience in justice and corrections systems, through Department of Justice
contracts, funded by INL. (The State Department’s civilian police program requests contractors to
identify such personnel in an effort to create a capability within the CivPol to deploy them.)
To many analysts, even these recommendations do not provide for the full range of personnel
needed in a timely manner. According to some experts, if the role of the military is to shift at the
end of major combat operations from combat to providing perimeter security, then the United
States must create constabulary units—either military or civilian—which would take
responsibility for internal security. Some also argue the need for improvements in the U.S.
Civilian Police system, regardless of whether a civilian reserve is established.22
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Some analysts have questioned the utility of S/CRS and of the rationale that underlines its
creation and the adoption of the transformational diplomacy strategy more broadly. Two think-
tank studies published in January 2006 dispute the concept that weak and failed states are per se
among the most significant threats to the United States. They point out that weak states are not
the only locations where terrorists have found recruits or sought safe-haven as they have
exploited discontent and operated in developed countries as well. A report of the Center for
Global Development states that many factors beyond the weakness or lack of government
institutions—demographic, political, religious, cultural, and geographic—contribute to the
development of terrorism.23 As a result, an emphasis on weak and failed states can lead the United
States to give short shrift to more tangible threats and to areas of greater U.S. interest. The CATO
Institute study worries that former Secretary Rice’s focus on promoting “responsible sovereignty”
as an underpinning of transformational diplomacy may provide potential justification for eroding
the current international norm of respect for national sovereignty, leading the United States into
fruitless interventions.24
In addition, some analysts are skeptical that the problems of weak and failed states can be most
dealt with through military and political interventions aimed at creating viable government
institutions. The effectiveness of past efforts is a subject of debate, with differing views on the
22 For more discussion on issues regarding CivPols, constabulary police, and rule of law personnel, see CRS Report
RL32321, Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions, by Nina M.
Serafino.
23 Patrick Stewart. Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of “Spillovers.” Working Paper No. 73, Center
for Global Development, January 2006.
24 Justin Logan and Christopher Preble. Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing Nation-Building
Office. CATO Policy Analysis Paper No. 560, Cato Institute, January 11, 2006. The authors make substantial reference
to a Fall 2004 paper by Stephen Krasner, State Department Director of Policy Planning, that challenged the
conventional sovereignty norms. Krasner argues that these norms are outmoded and an obstacle to dealing with the
international threats caused by weak and unstable states. He argues for granting international acceptance to new norms
of shared-sovereignty (more than one country) or international trusteeships following successful interventions, Stephen
Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4, Spring 2004, pp. 5-43.
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criteria for and the number of successes, draws, and failures, as is the best means to achieve
success.
There is some skepticism that state-building efforts will result in success in most instances. In the
words of one scholar, “barring exceptional circumstances (the war against the Taliban after 9/11),
we had best steer clear of missions that deploy forces (of whatever kind) into countries to remake
them anew.... The success stories (Germany, Japan) are the exceptions and were possible because
of several helpful conditions that will not be replicated elsewhere.”25 Others, however, point to
cases such as Mozambique and El Salvador as examples that state building efforts can promote
peace after civil strife.
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On February 25, 2004, Senators Lugar and Biden introduced the Stabilization and Reconstruction
Civilian Management Act of 2004 “to build operational readiness in civilian agencies.... ” (At the
time, these senators were respectively the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee [SFRC].) The bill provided concrete proposals for establishing and funding
the two new “operational” entities that had been recommended in think tank reports. This
legislation contained three main proposals: (1) establish in law and fund a State Department
Office for Stabilization and Reconstruction, (2) create an Emergency Response Readiness Force,
and (3) create and fund an annually replenishable emergency response fund similar to that used
for refugee and migration funds.26 The SFRC reported S. 2127 on March 18, 2004, but it was not
considered by the full Senate; its companion bill (H.R. 3996, 108th Congress, introduced by
Representative Schiff) was not considered by the House International Relations Committee. In
subsequent years, similar legislation was introduced,27 but until 2008 the only bill to pass either
25 Rajan Menon, “Low Intensity Conflict in the Emerging Strategic Environment,” as reproduced in U.S. Army
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. Strategic Requirements for Stability Operations and Reconstruction:
Final Report. pp. 80-81. This report summarizes the result of a conference held April 19-20, 2006, and three preceding
workshops, conducted under the aegis of the Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series. It also reproduces several
papers presented at one workshop. The final report was distributed by e-mail in late 2006, but as of January 18, 2007,
does not appear on either the PKSOI or Eisenhower Series website.
26 The emergency response fund would have been subject to limited conditions, but requiring extensive consultation
with Congress, similar to spending authority provisions of Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended. FAA Section 614(a)(3) requires the President to consult with and provide a written policy justification to the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs (now International Relations), the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and
the Appropriations committee of each chamber. CBO estimated that implementing the bill would cost some $50 million
in 2005 and $550 million from 2005 through 2009.
27 These include two similar versions of the original Lugar-Biden bill with same name: the Stabilization and
Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2005 (S. 209/109th Congress, by Senators Lugar, Biden, and Hagel), and
of 2006 (S. 3322/109th Congress by Senators Lugar, Biden, Hagel, Alexander and Warner, and H.R. 6104/109th
Congress by Representatives Farr, Blumenaurer and Saxton). Similar provisions were included in Title VII of the
Senate version of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2006 and FY2007 (S. 600/109th Congress). A related
bill was the International Security Enhancement Act of 2005 (H.R. 1361/109th Congress, introduced by Representative
Dreier), which also would provide authority for preventive action not included in the other bills. (H.R. 1361 would
have allowed the president, acting through S/CRS, to authorize the deployment to a country likely to enter into conflict
or civil strife in addition to countries emerging from conflict.) Related bills were: The Winning the Peace Act of 2003
(H.R. 2616/108th Congress, introduced by Representative Farr); the International Security Enhancement Act of 2004
(continued...)
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chamber was a subsequent Lugar-Biden measure, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian
Management Act of 2006 (S. 3322/109th Congress). S. 3322 was introduced in the Senate May
26, 2006, and approved without amendment by unanimous consent the same day. It was received
by the House on June 6, 2006, and referred to the House International Relations Committee. No
further action occurred until the 110th Congress until the House passage of on March 5, 2008, of a
House bill with almost the same title, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management
Act of 2008 (H.R. 1084) , and the incorporation of a version of that bill into the conference
version of the FY2009 NDAA, (S. 3001, P.L. 110-417, see below.)
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S/CRS began operations in July 2004 on a somewhat more tentative status than that envisioned
by the Lugar-Biden bill. The office was created by then Secretary of State Colin Powell without
statutory authority and the Coordinator, appointed by the Secretary, was not given the rank of
“Ambassador-at-Large.” By the beginning of 2005, S/CRS had a staff of 37 individuals from the
State Department, USAID, and several other U.S. government agencies, including the
Departments of Defense, Commerce, and the Treasury.
The U.S. military supported S/CRS’ creation and its mission. In prepared statement for testimony
before the Armed Services committees in February 2005, General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cited the creation of S/CRS as “an important step” in helping “post-
conflict nations achieve peace, democracy, and a sustainable market economy.” “In the future,
provided this office is given appropriate resources, it will synchronize military and civilian efforts
and ensure an integrated national approach is applied to post-combat peacekeeping,
reconstruction and stability operations,” according to General Myers.28
S/CRS also received an endorsement from a task force headed by two former Members. The June
2005 report of the Congressionally-mandated Task Force on the United Nations, chaired by
former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority
Leader George Mitchell, recommended that the United States strengthen S/CRS and that
Congress provide it with the necessary resources to coordinate with the United Nations.29
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Congress first endorsed the creation of S/CRS in 2004 as part of the Consolidated Appropriations
Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447), signed into law December 8, 2004. Section 408,
Division D, defined six responsibilities for the office, the first five of which respond to the first
need—to create a readily deployable crisis response mechanism—stated above. As legislated by
P.L. 108-447, S/CRS’ functions are (1) to catalogue and monitor the non-military resources and
capabilities of executive branch agencies, state and local governments, and private and non-profit
(...continued)
(H.R. 4185/108th Congress, introduced by Representative Dreier); and the United States Assistance for Civilians
Affected by Conflict Act of 2004 (H.R. 4058/108th Congress, introduced by Representative Hyde).
28 Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the 109th
Congress. Senate Armed Services Committee, February 17, 2005, p. 31, as posted on the Senate Armed Services
Committee website.
29 American Interests and U.N. Reform: Report of the Task Force on the United Nations. Washington, DC: United
States Institute of Peace, June 2005, p. 25.
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organizations “that are available to address crises in countries or regions that are in, or are in
transition from, conflict or civil strife”; (2) to determine the appropriate non-military U.S.
response to those crises, “including but not limited to demobilization, policy, human rights
monitoring, and public information efforts”; (3) to plan that response; (4) to coordinate the
development of interagency contingency plans for that response; (5) to coordinate the training of
civilian personnel to perform stabilization and reconstruction activities in response to crises in
such countries or regions”; and (6) to monitor political and economic instability worldwide to
anticipate the need for U.S. and international assistance. In subsequent legislation (S. 3001, P.L.
110-417, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009), Congress
expanded this list of functions. (See below.)
Congress funds S/CRS under the State Department’s Diplomatic and Consular Affairs budget.
S/CRS has received funding through annual appropriations and supplemental appropriations.
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The S/CRS role in interagency coordination was formalized under NSPD-44, issued by former
President Bush on December 7, 2005, to improve conflict-response coordination among executive
branch agencies. NSPD-44 assigns the Secretary of State the lead responsibility for developing
the civilian response for conflict situations and related S&R activities; the Secretary may direct
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to assist with those tasks. Under NSPD-44,
the Secretary of State is also responsible for, and may delegate to the Coordinator, coordination of
the interagency processes to identify states at risk, the leadership of interagency planning to
prevent or mitigate conflict, and the development of detailed contingency plans for stabilization
and reconstruction operations, as well as for identifying appropriate issues for resolution or action
through the National Security Council (NSC) interagency process as outlined in President Bush’s
first National Security Policy Directive (NSPD-1, “Organization of the National Security Council
System,” signed February 1, 200130). NSPD-44,, entitled “Management of Interagency Efforts
Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” expanded S/CRS activities beyond those conferred
by the Congressional mandate (see above). (NSPD-44 supersedes PDD-56, referred to above.)
S/CRS developed the mechanism for interagency cooperation in actual operations, drafting the
January 22, 2007, Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization,
which was approved by a National Security Council (NSC) deputies meeting.This document lays
out a plan for interagency coordination in responding to highly complex reconstruction and
stabilization crises.. Under the IMS, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is one
of three co-chairs of the central coordinating body for the U.S. government response to a crisis.
(The others are the appropriate regional Assistant Secretary of State and the relevant NSC
Director.) Under the plan, S/CRS is charged with providing support to a civilian planning cell
integrated with relevant military entities (a geographic combatant command or an equivalent
multinational headquarters).
30 NSPD-1 established 17 NSC/PPCs to “be the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security
policy,” providing policy analysis for more senior committees (the NSC Principals Committee and the NSC Deputies
Committee) and ensuring timely responses to presidential decisions. Membership on the NSC/PCC is to consist of
representatives from the departments of State, Defense, Justice and the Treasury, and the Office of Management and
Budget, the offices of the President and Vice President, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the NSC. Representatives from the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, and the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, are to participate when issues pertain to their responsibilities.
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The effort to expand civilian capabilities to perform stabilization and reconstruction tasks reached
an important benchmark in October 2008. Through Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (P.L. 110-417), Congress amended the basic
foreign assistance and State Department statutes to (1) authorize the President to provide
assistance for a reconstruction and stabilization crisis, (2) formally establish S/CRS and assign it
specific functions, and (3) authorize a Response Readiness Corps (RRC) and a Civilian Reserve
Corps (CRC). The authority to provide assistance for a reconstruction and stabilization crisis was
created by amending chapter 1 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended
(FAA, 22 U.S.C. 2351 et. seq.) by inserting a new section. This authority is, however, subject to a
time limitation: it may be exercised only during FY2009-FY2011. The new authority for S/CRS,
the RRC and the CRC was created by amending Title I of the State Department Basic Authorities
Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C..2651a et. seq.). These authorities are permanent.
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Under the heading Authority to Provide Assistance for Reconstruction and Stabilization Crises,
Section 1604 of P.L. 110-417 adds a new section to the FAA. Section 681 provides authority for
the President to use U.S. civilian agencies or non-Federal employees to furnish assistance for
reconstruction and stabilization in order to prevent conflict and to secure peace. The specific
authority permits the President to “to assist in reconstructing and stabilizing a country or region
that is at risk of, in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife... .” As passed in P.L. 110-417,
this authority may be exercised for three fiscal years (FY2009-FY2011).
To provide such assistance, the President must determine that U.S. national security interests are
served by using such personnel. The President may use funds made available under any other
provision of the FAA that are transferred or reprogrammed for the purposes of this section,
subject to the 15-day prior notification to congress required by section 634A, FAA. The President
must also consult with and provide a written policy justification to Congress’ foreign affairs and
appropriations committees (under Section 614(a)(3), FAA) prior to its use. The assistance may be
provided notwithstanding any other provision of law, and on such terms and conditions as the
President may determine. The section does not provided authority “to transfer funds between
accounts or between Federal departments or agencies.”
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A major objective of proponents of improving the civilian capacity to perform stabilization and
reconstruction operations was to provide S/CRS with a permanent authorization and specified
functions mandated by law. Such an authorization was a key feature of the initial and subsequent
versions of the Lugar-Biden legislation. P.L. 110-417, Section 1605, codifies the existence of
S/CRS by amending Title 1 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C.
2651 et seq.), which, among other functions, provides for the establishment of the higher level
positions within the Department of State. This codification prevents the dismantling of the office
without the legislative consent of Congress. It also assigns nine specific functions to S/CRS,
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largely mirroring the functions assigned by Congress in its original legislation on S/CRS, as cited
above. In general, these functions convey on the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
an overall responsibility for monitoring and assessing political and economic instability, and
planning an appropriate U.S. response. Some of these functions are to be undertaken in
coordination or conjunction with USAID and other relevant executive branch agencies.31
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Civilian personnel available through the U.S. government to perform S&R activities are scarce,
decentralized in organization, and difficult to call up. Many analysts viewed the remedy to this
situation as the creation of a corps of “on-the-ground” civilian personnel which could develop and
implement state-building activities and interact with U.S. military personnel at all levels in order
to foster security and stability in troubled situations. From the beginning, Luger\Biden legislation
sought to authorize the establishment of such a corps. The Bush Administration began creating a
small response cadre of government employees in its FY2006 and FY2007 budget submissions,
and proposed a full-scale corps in its February 2008 Civilian Stabilization Initiative.32
P.L. 110-417 establishes the Response Readiness Corps and the Civilian Reserve Corps “to
provide assistance in support of stabilization and reconstruction activities in foreign countries or
regions that are at risk of, in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife.”
This civilian capability consists of two components:
• The Response Readiness Corps (RRC) of federal employees composed of active
and standby components consisting of U.S. government personnel, including
employees of the Department of State, USAID, and other agencies who are
31 The specific functions, as detailed in xxxxxx, are: (1) “Monitoring, in coordination with relevant bureaus within the
Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), political and economic
instability worldwide to anticipate the need for mobilizing United States and international assistance for the
stabilization and reconstruction of a country or region that is at risk of, in, or ... in transition from, conflict or civil
strife”; (2) “Assessing the various types of stabilization and reconstruction crises that could occur and cataloging and
monitoring the non-military resources and capabilities of agencies ... that are available to address such crises”; (3)
“Planning, in conjunction with USAID, to address requirements, such as demobilization, rebuilding of civil society,
policing, human rights monitoring, and public information, that commonly arise in stabilization and reconstruction
crises”; (4) “Coordinating with relevant agencies to develop interagency contingency plans to mobilize and deploy
civilian personnel to address the various types of such crises”; (5) “Entering into appropriate arrangements with
agencies to carry out activities under this section and the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of
2008”; (6) “Identifying personnel in State and local governments and in the private sector who are available to
participate in the Civilian Reserve Corps ... or to otherwise participate in or contribute to reconstruction and
stabilization activities”; (7) “Taking steps to ensure that training of civilian personnel to perform such reconstruction
and stabilization activities is adequate and, is carried out, as appropriate, with other agencies involved with stabilization
operations”; (8) “Taking steps to ensure that plans for United States reconstruction and stabilization operations are
coordinated with and complementary to reconstruction and stabilization activities of other governments and
international and nongovernmental organizations, to improve effectiveness and avoid duplication”; and (9)
“Maintaining the capacity to field on short notice an evaluation team to undertake on-site needs assessment.”
32 In its FY2006 and FY2007 budget requests, the Bush Administration’s budget proposed funding for S/CRS to
establish a 100-person ready-response cadre of government employees. Congress has not yet provided funds for
establishing such a cadre or a civilian reserve corps: although in 2007, Congress approved $50 million in supplemental
funds (available through FY2008) to establish and maintain a civilian reserve corps, the release of these funds was
made contingent on a subsequent authorization of the corps. (Section 3810, [U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care,
Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, H.R. 2206, P.L. 110-28, signed into law May 25,
2007.)
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recruited and trained to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance when
deployed to do so by the Secretary of State. No specific number is provided for
members of these components. The legislation notes that members of the active
component would be specifically employed to serve in the Corps. The Secretary
of State is authorized to establish and maintain the SRC, in consultation with the
Administrator of USAID and the heads of other appropriate U.S. government
agencies. The Secretary of State alone is authorized to deploy its members.
• The Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) of individuals with “the skills necessary for
carrying out reconstruction and stabilization activities, and who have volunteered
for that purpose.” The Secretary is authorized to establish the Corps in
consultation with the Administrator of USAID, and is authorized to employ and
train its members, as well as to deploy them subject to a presidential
determination under the proposed Section 618 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended. No size was specified for the Civilian Reserve Corp. For the
Corps to deploy, the President must issue a determination that U.S. national
security interests would be served by providing assistance for a reconstruction
and stabilization crisis (see above).
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Since 2004, S/CRS has worked to develop the knowledge, capacity, procedures to ably respond to
the needs of countries at risk of conflict, in transitions from conflict, and in the early stages of
recovery from conflict. S/CRS has grown from a few dozen to a staff of 112, as of January 30,
2009. Of that current staff, a little over half are State Department personnel: 36 Foreign Service
officers on one-year tours, 22 State Department permanent civil service employees, and an
additional three State Department personnel on detail. Another nine are on detail from other
executive branch agencies: Commerce (1); Justice (1); Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (1); USAID (2); and DOD (4). (Of the four from DOD, one is from the Joint Staff,
one from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, one from the Army Corps of Engineers, and one
from the Air Force.) In addition, 36 contractors work for S/CRS, as do six fellows and interns.
S/CRS carries out a range of activities: monitoring potential conflict, planning for U.S. responses
to conflict,, and evaluating and initiating programs to prevent conflict or the spread of conflict.,
among others.
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To monitor potential crises, S/CRS asked the National Intelligence Council (NIC) to provide it
twice a year with a list of weak states most susceptible to crisis, from which S/CRS chooses one
or more as test cases to prepare contingency plans for possible interventions. S/CRS also has
worked with the USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, which develops
techniques for preparing highly detailed assessments of current and impending conflicts. In
addition, S/CRS has worked with the U.S. military’s Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to develop
a common civilian-military planning model for stabilization and reconstruction operations.
S/CRS also assists U.S. embassies abroad in assessing the potential for conflict in individual
countries.
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S/CRS takes a lead in planning, developing, and implementing most of the small conflict
response programs that are carried out with funds and other assistance provided under DOD’s
“Section 1207” authority.33 Since FY2006, “Section 1207” authority has been used to carry out
conflict prevention and response efforts in 11 individual countries and two regions.34 These
targeted programs to address specific problems range from $4 million to help provide basic
health, education and infrastructure in areas recently reclaimed from insurgents in Colombia, to a
$5 million to improve the Lebanese Internal Security Force communications capacity, to $30
million to assist internally displaced persons in Georgia.
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Well before Congress authorized the creation of a Civilian Response Corps (see above), S/CRS
took the first steps in the lengthy process of creating integrated and coherent groups of crisis-
response personnel from executive branch agencies. This “surge capacity” enables the U.S.
government to deploy rapidly civilians to address emergency stabilization needs. It consists of an
active and stand-by component. On July 16, 2008, then Secretary of State Rice formally launched
the Civilian Response Corps with a speech thanking Congress for the passage of funding in the
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, H.R. 4642, P.L. 110-252 to establish and implement a
coordinated response capability at the State Department and USAID.
In 2006, S/CRS created a small nucleus of active and retired government employees to deploy to
operations. S/CRS began deploying members of the Active Response Corps (ARC) during the
last half of 2006. In 2006, ARC members were deployed to Darfur, Lebanon, Chad, and Nepal.
About ten other deployments have followed, some with standby component members and other
members of the S/CRS staff.35
As of January 30, 2009, the ARC is comprised of eleven members of the S/CRS staff:, two
foreign service officers and two civil service personnel. As contemplated by the Bush
Administration’s 2008 Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI), submitted with its February 2008
budget request for FY2009, the ARC would ultimately consist of 250 members from various
executive branch agencies. To date, seven executive agencies have signed Memoranda of
Agreement with the State Department regarding their contributions to the ARC (the departments
of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Transportation,
33 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense "Section 1207" Security and
Stabilization Assistance: A Fact Sheet, by Nina M. Serafino.
34 Afghanistan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Haiti, Lebanon, Nepal, Somalia, Sri Lanka,
Tajikistan, Yemen, Southeast Asia region and Trans-Sahara region.
35 The first ARC member was deployed to Lebanon, to assist with efforts to train and equip additional Lebanese
Internal Security (LIS) forces. (The purpose of this effort is to enhance LIS ability to replace the Lebanese Army
Forces which had been maintaining law and order in conflictive areas such as the Bekaa Valley before being deployed
to southern Lebanon.) Several SRC members also deployed to post-conflict situations in 2006. The first person from
this group was deployed to Eastern Chad and two more began working in Nepal on demobilizing and reintegrating
Maoist rebels. In the course of early 2007, several ARC members deployed to Kosovo to help prepare for the status
settlement process, one deployed to Beirut to help coordinate reconstruction assistance, and one to Chad to monitor
activities on the Chad side of the border with Sudan. Other response corps deployments were to Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Cuba, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, and Sri Lanka, as well as to work
with the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).
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and USAID). In P.L. 110-252), Congress provided FY2008 supplemental appropriations and
FY2009 bridge funding that would pay for 100 ARC slots, according to S/CRS.36 (See below for
details on CSI funding.)
The Stand-by Response Corp (SRC) of active and retired foreign service officers numbers some
365 members, of which six are Foreign Service officers currently serving on “active” duty with
the ARC. All of the federal agencies, except Homeland Security, which signed MOAs for the
ARC have also signed MOAs for the SRC, as of January 30, 2008. As of that date, most of the
stand-by reserve was comprised of State Department personnel (252 members). Others are
employed by USAID (76), Justice (32) HHS (3), and Commerce (2). No members have joined
from Agriculture, Homeland Security, or the Treasury, as of January 30, 2009. Funding provided
through the 2008 supplemental appropriations act would maintain 500 standby unit members for
the year. The CSI contemplated expanding the SRC to 2,000.
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S/CRS has developed a general concept for an S&R Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) component of
retired government personnel, personnel from state and local governments, private for-profit
companies and non-profit NGOs, to carry out rule of law, civil administration, and reconstruction
activities. Two outside studies forming the basis for planning for the reserve were completed in
2006.37
In his January 23, 2007 State of the Union address, the President pointed to the need for a civilian
reserve corps as a tool in the generational struggle against terrorism. “Such a corps would
function much like our military reserve,” he said. “It would ease the burden on the armed forces
by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America
needs them. It would give people across America who do not wear the uniform a chance to serve
in the defining struggle of our time.”38
The Bush Administration’s 2008 CSI called for a Civilian Reserve Corps of 2,000. In the CSI
budget request, the Administration requested $86.768 million for S/CRS to support recruiting,
hiring, and training, as well as to acquire and preposition vehicles and equipment needed to
support the deployment of up to 500 reservists per year. Under the CSI plan, the CRC would
include personnel capable of performing the full spectrum of activities needed for stabilization
and reconstruction operations, including policing, other rule of law (judicial and prison)
functions, public administration, and infrastructure assistance. S/CRS anticipates beginning
recruitment soon. Each civilian agency would conduct its own recruitment for reservists in its
area of expertise.
According to S/CRS, no action has been taken to standup the reserve corps, as S/CRS attention to
date has focused on standing up the response corps components. The Obama Administration has
not announced its own plans for a civilian reserve capacity.
36 Original plans had called for the ARC to number 30 by the end of 2006. U.S. Department of State. Fact Sheet: State
Department Stands Up Active Response Corps. August 23, 2006. http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/71038.htm.
37 BearingPoint, Inc. Management Study for Establishing and Managing a Civilian Reserve. Prepared for the U.S.
Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. May 30, 2006.
38 According to the 2006 National Security Strategy, the civilian reserve would also be used for both post-conflict
reconstruction and international disaster assistance, p. 45.
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To address the need for greater interagency, particularly civil-military, planning and coordination,
S/CRS worked with the military entities to develop civilian-military training exercises for
stabilization and reconstruction operations. It has entered into an agreement with the U.S. Army
to train civilian planners. And, among other activities, it has developed ties with other
international participants to coordinate and enhance civilian capabilities for stabilization and
reconstruction activities. .....
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Some observers argue that the magnitude of the S/CRS mission requires improved capabilities
within the office and enhanced status, if it is to provide adequate direction and personnel for an
interagency response to stabilization and reconstruction crises. “It is not clear that S/CRS is large
enough, well enough funded, or sufficiently high in rank to pull an interagency effort together,”
according to a 2008 MIT Security Studies Program report.39
Such reservations persist about the office’s ability and capacity to carry out its mission, despite
widespread support for S/CRS. Especially in the early years, some observers argued that S/CRS
had not moved expeditiously in carrying out its functions. This perceived lack of initiative has
often been blamed on an “anti-operational” social culture of the State Department and a lack of
support from top State Department leadership. Given that perspective, some observers question
whether all of the functions assigned S/CRS are appropriate for that office. For instance, some
contend that an office with the mission of mobilizing civilian personnel for stabilization and
reconstruction missions would be better placed in USAID,40 which fields disaster response units
(the Disaster Assistance Response Teams), or even as a new unit within the Department of
Defense. Others, however, fault a lack of adequate resources for any S/CRS shortcomings.
Some urge firm support for S/CRS.41 With the passage of the Civilian Stabilization and
Reconstruction Assistance Management Act of 2008, see above, Congress appears to have
mooted the debate on which agency is best suited to accomplish the S/CRS mission, although the
issue may resurface within the context of a larger debate on interagency reform.
For the moment, the most salient question seems how best to enhance S/CRS capabilities to carry
out assigned functions. Some proponents of S/CRS argue that the office’s ability to perform its
39 Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams. Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource
Allocation. MIT Security Studies Program Occasional Paper, June 2008, p. 89.
40 Gordon Adams, Obama’s test: Bringing order to the national security process. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, web
version, posted January 26, 2009. Accessed through http://www.thebulletin.org. Lat accessed February 4, 2009.
41 The HELP Commission, established by Congress in January 2004 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, P.L. 108-
199, Section 637) to study U.S. foreign assistance programs, recommended in its report of December 2007 that
Congress “strengthen and fund the capacities of the State Department Office S/CRS and assign it responsibility for
coordinating Sate and Defense Department programs for security-related aspects of addressing crises and weak and
failing states.” Recommendation 2.2.2., at http://www.helpcommission.gov/portals/0/recommendations_final.pdf; last
accessed February 3, 2009.
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functions could be enhanced through changes in funding and budgeting practices that would
provide the stability and transparency, needed for long-term planning and the implementation of
current plans. In particular, some argue that S/CRS should have its own account in the annual
budget. (According to S/CRS, the Bush Administration’s February 2008 budget submission for
FY2009 contemplated the creation of a separate S/CRS account in the State Department budget.)
S/CRS funding for office operations is currently included under the State Department’s
Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) budget account. If that practice continues, and
Congress does not provide the full amount requested for the D&CP account, the S/CRS allocation
may be affected. Because much of the funding for S/CRS and its operations has come through
supplemental appropriations, S/CRS officials argue that they have not been able to fully staff
permanent positions in the Civilian Response Corps. Stable funding through the annual budget
would allow S/CRS to hire permanent career civil servants for the Civilian Response Corps active
component, according to S/CRS officials. In addition, a dedicated S/CRS account would allow
S/CRS to track systematically the funding that DOD transfers to the State Department for
“Section 1207” S&R programs. Currently, according to S/CRS officials, Section 1207 funds are
deposited in various State Department accounts, hampering S/CRS oversight.
In June 2008, Congress specifically provided $75 million for S/CRS and USAID S&R activities
in supplemental appropriations (the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, H.R. 4642, P.L. 110-
252).42 This is less than the $248.6 million that the Bush Administration requested in February
2008, for its “Civilian Stabilization Initiative” (CSI), which rolled into one its request for funds
for continued operations of S/CRS, funds for a 250-member interagency Active Response Corps
and a 2,000-member Standby Response Corps, and a 2,000-member Civilian Reserve Corps, and
money for deployment of experts. The P..L. 11-252 funding expires on September 30, 2009.
As of January 30, 2009, according to S/CRS officials, it is unclear how much funding S/CRS will
receive in regular FY2009 appropriations, whether these funds will be appropriated to the D&CP
account or to a new S/CRS-dedicated account, and if these funds will continue to be split between
the State Department and USAID.
Another improvement suggested would be to extend the period of Foreign Service officer (FSOs)
tours with S/CRS. FSOs now serve on one-year rotations with S/CRS, rather than the two to three
year rotations standard for other assignments.
To provide the head of S/CRS with greater clout within the State Department and in dealing with
other departments and agencies, some suggest that rank of that official or the Status of the Office
itself, be upgraded. Some suggest that the Coordinator’s functions be assigned to an Under
42 Of that amount, $30 million was a FY2008 supplemental appropriation for the State Department and $25 million was
a FY2008 supplemental appropriation for USAID. The remaining $20 million was part of FY2009 supplemental bridge
fund appropriations for the State Department, More specifically, this sum included up to $30 million in FY2008
supplemental appropriations “to establish and implement a coordinated civilian response capacity the United States
Department of State” under State Department Diplomatic and Consular Programs, up to $25 million “to establish and
implement a coordinated civilian response capacity at the United States Agency for International Development” under
Operating Expenses of the United States Agency for International Development. (122 Stat.2328-2329.) The $20 million
in FY2009 bridge fund supplemental appropriations for the State Department was provided as part of a lump sum for
State Department diplomatic and consular programs. The conference report on the amended bill to provide
supplemental appropriations for FY2008 and FY2009 specifies that $40 million of those funds is for new positions in
the diplomatic corps and for “civilian post-conflict stabilization initiatives.” According to S/CRS, the funding is
intended to be split evenly between the two purposes.
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Secretary, or that S/CRS become a State Department bureau headed by an Assistant Secretary.
(The “Coordinator” position is the equivalent of an Assistant Secretary, according to an S/CRS
official.)
Some also urge the expansion of the active response corps and the standby response corps if the
performance of S/CRS and the response corps in FY2009 justifies robust funding in FY2010 and
beyond. “Positive results from a review of 2008 and 2009 performance and further clarification of
the purposes to be served by the surge teams could justify enactment of a 2010 program similar to
that requested in 2009 [i.e., the Bush Administrations Civilian Stabilization Initiative], ”
according to a study co-sponsored by the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson
Center. “The magnitude of growth beyond FY2010 will depend largely on the experience gained
based on deployments in that year. For the purposes of projection, we propose that the active
response team would grow to 500 by FY2014, the standby response corps would remain at
2,0000, and the civilian reserve [see below] would grow to 4,000.”43
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For many years, proponents of “operational” civilian capabilities for S&R operations have urged
Congress to provide the State Department with a flexible conflict response fund that would allow
U.S. government civilian agencies to respond rapidly to S&R emergencies. The Bush
Administration repeatedly requested such a fund, and proposals for a flexible, replenishable fund
were including in early versions of the Lugar-Biden legislation and subsequent related
legislation.44 But Congress, which has long resisted the provision of “blank check” pots of money
as an abdication of constitutional appropriation and oversight powers, turned down several
Administration requests for more flexible S&R funding mechanisms in the State Department
budget.45
Proponents of a flexible conflict response fund argue that it is needed because many crises that
demand a U.S. rapid response cannot be foreseen and thus planned for in annual budget
submissions. In addition, they argue, the existing mechanisms for transferring funds to an
emergency situation are too time-consuming to provide an immediate response. Some Proponents
have argued for a mechanism like the automatically replenishable Emergency Refugee and
Migration Assistance (ERMA) emergency relief account, funded through foreign operations
appropriations. Many proponents suggest that ERMA provides a model for a conflict response
fund. Several bills were introduced that would, among other provisions, permanently establish a
conflict response fund, but none passed Congress.
43Ambassador Thomas Boyatt, et.al., A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic
Readiness, American Academicy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center, October 2008, p. 21. Accessed
through http://www.stimson.org. Last accessed February 4, 2009.
44 A provision for a flexible, replenishable fund was included in early versions of the Lugar-Biden legislation. Most
recently, some legislation in the 110th Congress contained provisions for a $75 million replenishable fund that could be
used by the President to respond to crises in countries or regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil
strife. Of that, some $25 million could be used for expenses related to the development, training, and operations of the
Response Readiness Corps.
45 These requests were contained in both annual and supplemental appropriations measures) for no-year funds to be
used for conflict emergencies in foreign countries or regions, and proposals in previous iterations of the Lugar/Biden
legislation to establish a replenishable conflict response for a conflict response fund.
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(In December 2007, the HELP Commission recommended the establishment of two rapid-
response crisis funds. One would be a permanent humanitarian crisis response fund to meet the
needs of natural disasters. The other would be a foreign crisis fund to meet security challenges.
No recommendation was made regarding the agency responsible for these funds.46)
Since 2006, the funding that Congress has made available through the DOD budget for conflict
response has served as a de facto response fund for small S&R projects. Section 1207 of the
conference version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163,
H.R. 1815/S. 1042; signed into law January 6, 2006 and subsequently amended) authorizes the
Secretary of Defense to provide the Secretary of State with up to $100 million in services,
defense articles and funding for reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign
country per fiscal year. This authority expires in FY2009.
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The 2008 authorization of a Civilian Reserve Corps (P..L. 110-417, see above) may provide
impetus for the development of a reserve that could substitute for military troops in a wide variety
of state-building activities. Although S/CRS developed plans for a reserve (and the Bush
Administration’s CSI plan contemplated a size of 2,000 members) no steps implementing those
plans have been taken, according to S/CRS. President Obama’s campaign information spoke of a
25,000 civilian reserve, but this number is much larger than previous Bush Administration plans,
and no concrete Obama plan has been advanced. (The legislation contains no details on the
desired size or composition of the force.)
Proponents of the creation of a civilian reserve corps foresee a variety of advantages from the
creation of such a corps. DOD promoted the concept on the grounds that it would free military
personnel from state-building tasks during military operations, thus increasing the personnel
available for combat and other more strictly military tasks.47 Proponents also view such a corps as
a means to enhance prospects for success in S&R operations as the personnel who would be sent
to perform such tasks would in general have a much higher level of expertise and depth of
experience than soldiers and could, unlike many military personnel assigned to such tasks,
perform at peak efficiency from the outset. Many view this as particularly true at the national
level, where extensive experience with developing national-level structures is desirable over the
long run. (Although military Civil Affairs officers are largely reservists whose civilian jobs are
relevant to state-building tasks, many analysts state that there are too few civil affairs personnel to
46 http://www.helpcommission.gov/portals/0/recommendations_final.pdf. Recommendation 3.5. Last accessed
February 3, 2009.
47 However, DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSR)
Operations, issued November 28, 2005, states that many stability operations tasks “are best performed by indigenous,
foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals,” but nonetheless “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks
necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.” Among the tasks listed are the rebuilding of
various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems, the revival or building of the private sector,
and the development of representative governmental institutions. (Points 4.3, 4.3.1-4.3.3. Access through
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/300005.htm.)
Some military analysts argue that at the beginning of an operation or in extremely volatile situations the use of U.S.
troops to perform nation-building efforts may be considered highly desirable as they can “multi-task,” performing
combat missions in one area while switching quickly to state-building efforts in another. In addition, some believe that
it will always be desirable to have trained military civil affairs officers who can deal with civilian leaders and
populations involved in state-building efforts at the local level, as a means of demonstrating goodwill toward such
populations and enhancing the image of soldiers, especially in counterinsurgency operations.
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provide the depth needed to deploy the appropriate person in most circumstances.) Many argue
that civilian personnel are also preferable for symbolic reasons, as they may signal a greater
commitment to the construction of a democratic state.
Skeptics look at the concept of a civilian reserve as untested and potentially unfeasible. Some
wonder whether qualified experts would sign up in sufficient quantities to make the corps an
effective replacement for military troops in S&R operations.48 Some question whether the
existence of such a corps would provide an incentive to interventions of various types that the
United States otherwise would not have undertaken.
Cost is likely to be a major issue. In 2008, the Congressional Budget Office assembled a cost
estimate for the Bush Administration’s CSI. Its estimate for the recruiting, screening, enrolling,
training, and equipping the 2,000 members contemplated by the CSI would be $87 million in
FY2009 and $47 million in 2010.49 While some may view the potential cost of the civilian corps
as high, some proponents argue that the costs of deploying civilian personnel would result in a net
savings to the military. (It is likely, however, that any possible savings would depend on the
circumstances in which such civilian personnel were deployed and the effect of their deployment
on the number of military personnel needed.) Proponents also maintain that even if high, the
monetary cost to maintain and deploy civilian reservists would still be relatively inexpensive
when compared to the multiple costs, both tangible (such as money and lives) and intangible
(such as domestic and international political support and loss of strategic leverage) of prolonged
or failed military interventions.
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Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
nserafino@crs.loc.gov, 7-7667
48 For information on the experiences of the Germany, Canada, and the United Nations in recruiting personnel for state-
building rosters and deployments to other countries see CRS Report RL33647, A Civilian Reserve for Stabilization and
Reconstruction Abroad: Summary of a Workshop on U.S. Proposals and International Experiences and Related Issues
for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
49 The Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of implementing the Civilian Reconstruction and Stabilization
Management Act, H.R. 1084 (110th Congress),49 if “employed in a manner consistent with the [President’s] Civilian
Stabilization Initiative.” (The estimate is included in H.Rept. 110-537., 110th Congress.)
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