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Global trade in illegal wildlife is a growing illicit economy, estimated to be worth at least $5
billion and potentially in excess of $20 billion annually. Some of the most lucrative illicit wildlife
commodities include tiger parts, caviar, elephant ivory, rhino horn, and exotic birds and reptiles.
Demand for illegally obtained wildlife is ubiquitous, and some suspect that illicit demand may be
growing.
International wildlife smuggling may be of interest to Congress as it presents several potential
environmental and national security threats to the United States. Threats to the environment
include the potential loss of biodiversity, introduction of invasive species into U.S. ecosystems,
and transmission of disease through illegal wildlife trade, including through illegal bushmeat
trade. National security threats include links between wildlife trafficking and organized crime and
drug trafficking. Some terrorist groups may also be seeking to finance their activities through
illegal wildlife trade, according to experts. Wildlife source and transit countries may be especially
prone to exploitation if known to have weak state capacity, poor law enforcement, corrupt
governments, and porous borders.
The U.S. government addresses illegal wildlife trade through several national and international
venues. Congress has passed numerous laws that regulate and restrict certain types of wildlife
imports and exports, including the Endangered Species Act of 1973, the Lacey Act and Lacey Act
Amendments of 1981, and several species-specific conservation laws. These laws and others
establish authorities and guidelines for wildlife trade inspection at ports of entry, and wildlife
crime law enforcement and prosecution. Internationally, the United States is party to several
wildlife conservation treaties, including the United Nations Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which serves as the primary vehicle for
regulating wildlife trade. Foreign training and assistance programs to combat illegal wildlife trade
are also conducted by some federal agencies, including the U.S. Department of State, which leads
an international initiative against wildlife trafficking.
The role of Congress in evaluating U.S. policy to combat wildlife trafficking is broad. Potential
issues for Congress include (1) determining funding levels for U.S. wildlife trade inspection and
investigation; (2) evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. foreign aid to combat wildlife trafficking;
(3) developing ways to encourage private-sector involvement in regulating the wildlife trade; (4)
using trade sanctions to penalize foreign countries with weak enforcement of wildlife laws; (5)
incorporating wildlife trade provisions into free trade agreements; and (6) addressing the
domestic and international demand for illegal wildlife through public awareness campaigns and
non-governmental organization partnerships. This report focuses on the international trade in
terrestrial fauna, largely excluding trade in illegal plants, including timber, and fish.
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Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Demand ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Global Demand ................................................................................................................... 2
Quantifying U.S. Demand................................................................................................... 3
Supply ....................................................................................................................................... 4
Causes ................................................................................................................................. 5
Pathways ............................................................................................................................. 6
Case Study: Tracing the African Ivory Trade............................................................................ 8
Threats ............................................................................................................................................. 9
Environmental Implications ...................................................................................................... 9
Threats to Biodiversity...................................................................................................... 10
Invasive Species................................................................................................................ 10
Disease ...............................................................................................................................11
Case Study: Illegal Bushmeat Trade ................................................................................. 13
Security Implications .............................................................................................................. 15
Links to Organized Crime................................................................................................. 15
Links to Drug Trafficking ................................................................................................. 16
Links to Terrorism............................................................................................................. 16
Links to Weak States and Political Instability................................................................... 19
U.S. Policy..................................................................................................................................... 20
Law Enforcement and Trade Inspection.................................................................................. 20
Fish and Wildlife Service.................................................................................................. 20
Customs and Border Control ............................................................................................ 22
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service .................................................................... 22
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.......................................................... 23
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ..................................................................... 23
Wildlife Crime Prosecution..................................................................................................... 23
International Assistance and Cooperation ............................................................................... 24
CITES ............................................................................................................................... 25
Coalition Against Wildlife Trafficking ............................................................................. 26
ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network........................................................................... 26
Issues for Congress........................................................................................................................ 27
Funding for Domestic and International Wildlife Trade Inspection and Investigation ........... 27
Foreign Assistance for Combating Wildlife Trafficking ......................................................... 28
Private-Sector Cooperation ..................................................................................................... 29
Trade Sanctions ....................................................................................................................... 30
Free Trade Agreements ........................................................................................................... 31
Public Awareness and Government-NGO Cooperation .......................................................... 32
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Figure 1. Regions of Biodiversity and Selected Terrorist Safe Havens......................................... 18
Figure 2. Map of FWS Designated Ports and Number of Inspectors ............................................ 21
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Table 1. Value of Legal Wildlife Imports and Refused Shipments into the United States,
2000-2007..................................................................................................................................... 4
Table 2. Top 10 Countries from which Wildlife Imports were Refused Entry into the
United States, 2000-2004 ............................................................................................................. 5
Table 3. Selected Illicit Wildlife Trade and Estimated Retail Value................................................ 6
Table 4. Statistics on the Activities of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Office of Law
Enforcement ............................................................................................................................... 21
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Appendix A. Selected Laws Related to the Wildlife Trade ........................................................... 34
Appendix B. Additional International Efforts to Combat Wildlife Crime..................................... 39
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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 41
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Illegal wildlife trade involves the illicit procurement, transport, and distribution—internationally
and domestically—of animals, and animal parts and derivatives thereof, in contravention of laws,
foreign and domestic, and treaties. Illegal wildlife trade ranges in scale from single-item, local
bartering to multi-ton, commercial-sized consignments shipped all over the world. Wildlife
contraband may include live pets, hunting trophies, fashion accessories, cultural artifacts,
ingredients for traditional medicines, wild meat for human consumption (or bushmeat), and other
products.
Numerous reasons exist for wildlife trade regulation. Current international and domestic laws
often seek to prevent (1) the decline of species threatened or potentially threatened with
extinction; (2) the import of non-native species, which could harm the receiving habitats; (3) the
import of species that could transmit diseases harmful to humans, animals, or plants; (4) the
inhumane transport of wildlife; and (5) the distortion of trade in otherwise legitimate wildlife
products, through unfair foreign pricing, government subsidies, and forms of illegal trade
protectionism.
Congress has sought to regulate wildlife trade for more than a century, enacting the first wildlife
trade prohibitions under the Lacey Act in 1900.1 Congress also regulates wildlife trade under
freestanding provisions in the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, the Endangered Species Act of
1973, and other laws that prohibit the trade in specific threatened species or specific animals that
pose potential health and disease risks.2 (See Appendix A.) Internationally, wildlife trade is
regulated to safeguard certain species threatened by over-exploitation and extinction. The primary
international treaty governing wildlife trade is the United Nations Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which imposes an import- and
export-control licensing system that restricts certain species from international trade.3
The primary motivation to engage in illegal wildlife trade appears to be economic gain.
Continued demand in many parts of the world for illegal wildlife provides opportunities for
criminals to turn profits along the supply chain. According to international law enforcement
officials, some of the most lucrative illicit wildlife commodities include tiger parts, caviar,
elephant ivory, rhino horn, and exotic birds and reptiles. Due to its clandestine nature, the illegal
trade is difficult to quantify with any accuracy. Nevertheless, some estimate that it is worth at
least $5 billion, and may potentially total in excess of $20 billion annually.4 This would rank the
1 16 U.S.C. §701, as amended.
2 Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (P.L. 97-79, as amended); Endangered Species Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-205, as
amended).
3 Congress implemented CITES under the Endangered Species Act of 1973. P.L. 96-159 designates the Secretary of the
Interior, acting through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), as both the CITES Management and Scientific
Authority. See CRS Report RL32751, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (CITES): Background and Issues, by Pervaze A. Sheikh and M. Lynne Corn.
4 Attempts to quantify the value of illegal wildlife trade have resulted in many estimates that vary in size and scope. For
a range of estimates on the size of the illegal wildlife trade see U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime
Threat Assessment Report (December 2000); U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International
Environment and Scientific Affairs, “Announcing the Formation of the Coalition Against Wildlife Trafficking,”
September 22, 2005; United Kingdom National Wildlife Crime Unit, “Wildlife Crime,” at http://www.nwcu.police.uk/
pages/wildlifecrime/crime.asp; and Interpol, “Wildlife Crime,” at http://www.interpol.int/Public/EnvironmentalCrime/
Wildlife/Default.asp.
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illegal wildlife trade as among the most lucrative illicit economies in the world, behind illegal
drugs and possibly human trafficking and arms trafficking.5
The 111th Congress might address illegal wildlife crime through oversight hearings and
legislation. Potential issues for Congress include (1) determining funding levels for U.S. wildlife
trade inspection and investigation; (2) evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. foreign aid to combat
wildlife trafficking; (3) developing ways to encourage private-sector involvement in regulating
the wildlife trade; (4) using trade sanctions to penalize foreign countries with weak enforcement
of wildlife laws; (5) incorporating wildlife trade provisions into free trade agreements; and (6)
addressing the domestic and international demand for illegal wildlife through public awareness
campaigns and non-governmental organization partnerships. This report focuses on the
international trade in terrestrial fauna, largely excluding trade in illegal plants, including timber,
and fish.
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Demand for illegally obtained wildlife is ubiquitous. Some estimate that countries and regions
with the highest demand for legally obtained wildlife include the United States, the People’s
Republic of China, and the European Union. Globally, demand for illegal wildlife is also
increasing according to several observers. Some attribute this partly to increasing numbers of
wildlife species regulated by CITES and other international and domestic wildlife protection
laws.6 Others caution that estimates of demand may be increasing because of greater public and
governmental awareness of the issue in recent years, which has led to more investigations into the
scope and magnitude of wildlife crime.7 As a result, some analysts question whether demand for
illegal wildlife is necessarily growing, or whether new data is simply capturing more information
about a potentially stagnant or declining source of demand.
Reasons behind the current demand for illegal wildlife and related products appear to vary
according to regions and cultures. In Asia, where analysts claim that a substantial portion—
possibly the largest in the world—of the global trade of illegal wildlife takes place, demand is
driven by the need for specific animal parts to practice traditional Asian medicine, for human
consumption, and as symbols of wealth.8 Demand for illegal wildlife is reportedly increasing in
Southeast Asia due in part to the region’s economic boom and resulting affluence.9 In Africa,
demand for illegal wildlife is driven by bushmeat consumption in rural and urban areas. In other
regions, such as Europe and North America, analysts find that demand for illegal wildlife includes
5 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network,” undated brochure,
at http://usaid.eco-asia.org/files/fact_sheets/ASEAN_WEN.pdf.
6 CITES covers approximately 5,000 species of animals and 28,000 species of plants.
7 Duncan Brack, “Combating International Environmental Crime,” Global Environmental Change, vol. 12, no. 2 (July
2002), pp. 143-147.
8 Jolene Lin, “Tackling Southeast Asia’s Illegal Wildlife Trade,” Singapore Year Book of International Law and
Contributors, vol. 9 (2005), pp. 191-208.
9 Richard T. Corlett, “The Impact of Hunting on the Mammalian Fauna of Tropical Asian Forests,” Biotropica, vol. 39,
no. 3 (2007), pp. 292-303.
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a wide variety of products, such as luxury fashion items, tourist souvenirs purchased abroad, and
exotic pets, as well as traditional medicines and wildlife meats for human consumption.10
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While no reliable estimates of U.S. demand for illegal wildlife are publicly available, many
analysts agree that demand for illegal wildlife in the United States is likely to parallel U.S.
demand for legal wildlife. If this is the case, the United States may be a significant destination for
illegal wildlife, and the magnitude of the illegal trade may be increasing. The United States is
estimated to purchase nearly 20% of all legal wildlife and wildlife products on the market.11
Further, the value of U.S. legal wildlife trade has grown significantly in recent years—from $1.2
billion in FY2000 to $2.8 billion in FY2007.12 (See Table 1.) In the same time period, the number
of declared wildlife shipments has also grown—from 111,296 declared shipments in FY2000 to
179,323 in FY2007.13 According to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), which is the lead
U.S. agency for wildlife trade law enforcement, illicit U.S. demand stems primarily from two
sources: (1) wildlife items for personal use, such as tourist souvenirs or exotic pets, and (2)
products for commercial use and products related to hunting (e.g., trophies).14
The globalization of trade and internationalization of the U.S. population and culture have
apparently exacerbated the illegal wildlife trade. For example, immigrants from Central America
have reportedly created a demand for sea turtle eggs and meat that cannot be met legally.15
Further, reports indicate that demand for traditional Asian medicines, once confined to parts of
Asia, has gained new users in the United States.16
10 Maylynn Engler and Rob Perry-Jones, Opportunity or Threat: The Role of the European Union in the Global
Wildlife Trade (Brussels, Belgium: TRAFFIC Europe, 2007).
11 Randi Alacron, “The Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species: The Difficulty in Enforcing
CITES and the United States Solution to Hindering the Trade in Endangered Species,” N.Y. International Law Review,
vol. 14, no. 2 (2001), pp. 105-108.
12 U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), Office of Law Enforcement, Annual Reports,
FY2000-FY2006, at http://www.fws.gov/le/AboutLE/annual.htm; and personal communication with FWS officials,
February 20, 2008. Figures are in constant FY2008 U.S. dollars.
13 Ibid.
14 This analysis is based on the types and quantities of wildlife shipments refused entry at the U.S. border. Although the
data may reflect the categories of illegal wildlife in demand by consumers, the data may not accurately reflect the full
magnitude of the illegal trade in the United States. See U.S. Department of the Interior, FWS, Office of Law
Enforcement, Intelligence Unit, U.S. Illegal Wildlife Trade: LEMIS Data Analysis and Risk Assessment, November
2005.
15 U.S. Department of the Interior, FWS, Office of Law Enforcement, Strategic Plan, 2006-2010, at
http://www.fws.gov/le/AboutLE/OLEStrategicPlanDec2005.pdf.
16 Richard Ellis, Tiger Bone and Rhino Horn: The Destruction of Wildlife for Traditional Chinese Medicine
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 2005).
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Table 1. Value of Legal Wildlife Imports and Refused Shipments into the United
States, 2000-2007
Year
Value of Legal Tradea
Value of Refused Importsa Percentage
Illegal
2000 $1,200
$13.1
0.8%
2001 $1,800
$8.5
0.4%
2002 $1,500
$5.3
0.3%
2003 $1,700
$5.1
0.2%
2004 $1,900
$4.6
0.2%
2005 $2,300
n/a
n/a
2006 $2,200
n/a
n/a
2007 $2,800
n/a
n/a
Source: U.S. Department of the Interior, FWS, Office of Law Enforcement, Intelligence Unit, U.S. Illegal Wildlife
Trade: LEMIS Data Analysis and Risk Assessment, November 2005.
Note: n/a = not available.
a. In constant FY2008 U.S. millions. The value of illegal trade in wildlife given in this table reflects declared
shipments that were refused entry at the U.S. border. It does not reflect the value of undetected wildlife
shipments entering the United States, which may differ considerably from the values given in the table.
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Source countries of wildlife exports, both legal and illegal, tend to include countries across the
developing world with rich biological diversity. Although definitive data are unavailable, many
analysts argue that biologically rich countries with weak governance and poor law enforcement
capacity may be especially vulnerable as sources for illegal wildlife trade.17 While the United
States is a source country for some wildlife including bears, predatory birds, and reptiles, most
analysts indicate that U.S. wildlife is unlikely to play a large role in the illegal international
market. The United States, however, is a destination country for illegal wildlife products.
According to a report published by FWS, the top three suppliers to the United States from which
wildlife shipments were refused between 2000 and 2004, included Mexico, Canada, and the
People’s Republic of China.18 (See Table 2.) These statistics, however, might be skewed because
they are based only on shipments refused at the border and ignore undetected shipments.
17 Dee Cook, Martin Roberts, and Jason Lowther, The International Wildlife Trade and Organised Crime: A Review of
the Evidence and the Role of the UK (United Kingdom: World Wildlife Fund, 2002), p. 18.
18 FWS, U.S. Illegal Wildlife Trade: LEMIS Data Analysis and Risk Assessment.
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Table 2. Top 10 Countries from which Wildlife Imports were Refused Entry
into the United States, 2000-2004
Country
Shipments Refused Entrya
Mexico 3,772
Canada 1,560
People’s Republic of China
1,138
Philippines 728
Hong Kong
591
Russia 562
Unknownb 524
Thailand 473
Italy 406
South Africa
341
Source: U.S. Department of Interior, FWS, Office of Law Enforcement, Intelligence Unit, U.S. Illegal Wildlife
Trade: LEMIS Data Analysis and Risk Assessment, November 2005.
a. Total refused shipments does not refer to the number of individual items to be shipped. As a result, the
actual number of wildlife items shipped is substantially higher than indicated in this table.
b. “Unknown” includes shipments found by FWS officials without packaging, labels, or supporting
documentation showing the country of export.
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Numerous factors explain the persistence of the international black market in wildlife. Observers
suggest that one such factor is the high profits associated with wildlife trafficking. Driven by a
demand for wildlife products that exceeds what the market can legally supply, the value of illegal
wildlife products continues to increase as consumers are willing to pay greater amounts. (See
Table 3.) Thus, as a certain type of animal or wildlife product becomes more endangered and
rare, its price increases, along with the financial rewards for smugglers.19
In many developing countries, however, the income derived from illegal wildlife poaching and
trading is often vital for sustaining the livelihoods of impoverished hunters and traders. Some
observers say small-scale hunters and traders have few alternatives for generating subsistence-
level incomes.20 Additionally, some indigenous peoples may consider hunting certain animals a
fundamental part of their culture, religion, or traditions. These considerations may differentiate
poor hunters and traders from international criminal syndicates involved in the trade, who engage
in the trade purely for profit.
19 Gavin Hayman and Duncan Brack, “International Environmental Crime: The Nature and Control of Environmental
Black Markets,” The Royal Institute of International Affairs (2002), p. 114. See also Cook, Roberts, and Lowther, The
International Wildlife Trade and Organised Crime, p. 10.
20 See, for example, Emily Wax, “Poaching and Population Threatens India’s Tigers,” Washington Post, October 16,
2007; “Trade in Wildlife: Just Let Them Get on with It,” The Economist, May 29, 2008.
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Table 3. Selected Illicit Wildlife Trade and Estimated Retail Value
Illegally Traded Wildlife
Estimated Retail Value
Elephants
$121-$900 per kilogram of ivory
Rhinos
$945-$50,000 per kilogram of rhino horn
Tibetan Antelopes
$1,200-$20,000 per shatoosh shawl
Big Cats
$1,300-$20,000 per tiger, snow leopard, or jaguar skin; $3,300-$7,000 per set of
tiger bones
Bears
$250-$8,500 per gallbladder
Sturgeon $4,450-$6,000 per kilogram of caviar
Reptiles and Insects (often live)
$30,000 per oenpelli python; $30,000 per komodo dragon; $5,000-$30,000 per
plowshare tortoise; $15,000 per Chinese alligator; $20,000 per monitor lizard;
$20,000 per shingleback skink; $8,500 per pair of birdwing butterflies
Exotic Birds (often live)
$10,000 per black palm cockatoo egg ($25,000-$80,000 per mature breeding
pair); $5,000-$12,000 per hyacinth macaw; $60,000-$90,000 per lear macaw;
$20,000 per Mongolian falcon
Great Apes (often live)
$50,000 per Orangutan
Sources: Compiled from U.S. government agencies, international organizations, non-governmental
organizations, and media sources.
Another factor is the perceived low risk of capture or penalties associated with wildlife
trafficking.21 Such a perception can be the consequence of limited enforcement capabilities or
willingness to punish such illegal behavior, due to a lack of resources, infrastructure, expertise, or
political corruption. Additionally, the wildlife trade may be considered less risky than other high-
value black markets, including the drug trade, as the penalties associated with wildlife crime tend
to be substantially less severe than with other trafficking crimes. According to a series of United
Nations reports, powdered rhinoceros horn can be worth more than the equivalent weight of
cocaine or gold. Combined with the “low level of vigilance” and “modest level of penalties”
applied to wildlife crime cases, criminal entrepreneurs are attracted by the prospect of high profits
and low risks.22
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Illicit wildlife trade uses complex distribution networks connecting raw material from source
states and producers of wildlife products to customers.23 Observers have yet to identify a distinct
21 Hayman and Brack, “International Environmental Crime,” p. 144.
22 Report of the U.N. Secretary-General, “Progress Made in the Implementation of Economic and Social Council
Resolution 2001/12 on Illicit Trafficking in Protected Species of Wild Flora and Fauna,” U.N. Economic and Social
Council, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 11th session, Vienna, Austria, February 26, 2002, p. 6;
Report of the U.N. Secretary-General, “Illicit Trafficking in Protected Species of Wild Flora and Fauna and Illicit
Access to Genetic Resources,” U.N. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice, 12th session, Vienna, Austria, March 4, 2003, p. 9.
23 See, for example, Greg Warchol, Linda Zupan, and Willie Clack, “Transnational Criminality: An Analysis of the
Illegal Wildlife Market in Southern Africa,” International Criminal Justice Review, vol. 13, no. 1 (2003), p. 7; Lin,
“Tackling Southeast Asia’s Illegal Wildlife Trade,” p. 198; and Hayman and Brack, “International Environmental
Crime.”
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criminal profile that describes wildlife poachers and traffickers.24 Illicit wildlife trade networks
can involve a combination of any of the following: (1) village hunters, who trade small wildlife as
a source of subsistence cash income or who kill some wildlife to protect their people and crops
from attacks; (2) wildlife experts; (3) criminal entities, sometimes including terrorists, rebels,
drug traffickers, and others, able to evade detection, and transport and secure the products, as well
as launder the proceeds; (4) legitimate businesses serving as a front for the trade; (5) corrupt
government officials to facilitate import and export; and (6) consumers willing to pay for the
contraband.
Various combinations of these actors conspire to exploit a variety of trafficking pathways, which
appear to be growing as globalization has improved the ease of travel, transport, transactions, and
other cross-border barriers that previously limited wildlife trade. The magnitude of highly
organized criminal syndicates’ role in wildlife trafficking is subject to debate. Although little is
certain about wildlife traffickers, anecdotal evidence indicates that suppliers have historically
tended to work in small, but well-organized groups.25 Organized criminal syndicates, by contrast,
while likely to be participating in the trade of certain, high-value wildlife commodities—
including caviar, traditional Asian medicine, ivory, and reptile skins—are not necessarily
operating in all segments of the illegal wildlife trade.26
Some observers, including officials from FWS and Interpol, have identified a growth in the
scope, sophistication, and organization of wildlife crime in recent years. According to one FWS
report, investigations increasingly involve “multiple suspects in multiple locations committing
multiple felonies.”27 Traffickers are reportedly connected globally to suppliers of exotic animals
in developing countries; consumers at upscale art galleries; safari operators guiding hunters to
illegal animal trophies; and international and interstate networks of wildlife exporters,
taxidermists, and wildlife retailers.
In the process of trafficking live animals and wildlife products, contents are often smuggled
through three primary methods: (1) hidden in secret compartments of luggage, shipping
containers, or clothing; (2) mis-declared on customs forms and trade permits by fraudulently
identifying look-alike, non-protected species, changing the declared number of items shipped,
changing the declared value of items, or declaring wild species as captive-bred species; or (3)
trafficked using forged or stolen trade permits to give the false impression that the contents are
being legitimately traded.28 In other cases, observers have also found live animals and wildlife
products trafficked using common delivery services (e.g. postal services, Fedex, DHL, and
others) as well as diplomatic luggage not subject to scrutiny. Additional potential areas of market
growth include the Internet, where traders are reportedly using chat rooms and auction websites,
such as eBay, to engage in illicit wildlife sales.29
24 Warchol, Zupan, and Clack, ibid, p. 24; Hayman and Brack, “International Environmental Crime,” p. 7.
25 See, for example, Warchol, Zupan, and Clack, ibid.
26 Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (2003), p. 10; and U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime
Threat Assessment.
27 FWS, Office of Law Enforcement, Strategic Plan, 2006-2010, p. 7.
28 Cook, Roberts, and Lowther, The International Wildlife Trade and Organised Crime, pp. 19-20; Report of the U.N.
Secretary-General (2002), pp. 5-6.
29 International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), “Caught in the Web: Wildlife Trade on the Internet,” 2005, at
http://www.ifaw.org/ifaw/dfiles/file_562.pdf.
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The African elephant population has dwindled from roughly 1.2 million in the 1970s to less than
500,000 today.30 In 1989, CITES effectively banned international, commercial elephant ivory
trade; most trade in elephant ivory today remains illegal.31 Widely hailed as a success by many
observers, the 1989 ban resulted in a near-disappearance of the illegal elephant ivory market. In
the past several years, however, many analysts are concerned that the trade has rekindled—
primarily driven by a surging demand for ivory jewelry, or other symbols of wealth in Japan, the
People’s Republic of China, and several other countries in Asia. Between August 2005 and
August 2006, authorities across the world seized more than 26 metric tons of illegally trafficked
elephant ivory.32
The price of wholesale elephant ivory has reportedly skyrocketed from approximately $100 per
kilogram in the late 1990s, to $200 per kilogram by 2004, to as much as $900 per kilogram
today.33 Based on a TRAFFIC study of 12,400 elephant ivory tusk seizures since the ivory ban,
seizures are growing in both frequency and size.34 On average, there are reportedly three seizures
of ivory tusks each day worldwide, which can range in scale from a few tourist trinkets to six-ton,
commercial consignments. Many observers suggest that the larger, commercial-sized shipments
often use sophisticated means to evade law enforcement authorities.
Experts generally contend that elephants from central Africa are the primary targets of poachers
today, with additional poaching hotspots surfacing around Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Zambia.35
Based on an analysis of elephant product seizure data from 1998 to 2006, the most heavily
implicated ivory trading countries include Cameroon, the People’s Republic of China, the
30 International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), African Elephant Status Report
2007: An Update from the African Elephant Database, Occasional Paper Series of the IUCN Species Survival
Commission, no. 33 (2007). According to the IUCN, primary reasons for the elephant population’s decline include
habitat loss and fragmentation, human-elephant conflict, and poaching for elephant meat and ivory. International trade
in Asian elephant ivory is also illegal under CITES.
31 Under CITES, ivory from southern African elephants from Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa is
allowed to be traded. Most recently, in 2007, CITES approved a second auction of 60 tons of government-stockpiled
elephant ivory from Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa; CITES has yet to decide when this second auction will take
place and to which countries it will be sold.
32“CITES Permits 60 Tons of Elephant Ivory to Be Sold,” Environmental News Service, June 4, 2007.
33 The price of ivory may vary significantly, depending on its size, quality, and type. Additionally, experts highlight
distinctions between forest elephant tusks and savannah elephant tusks; the forest elephant tusk is known to be more
desirable for its pinkish hue and density, which makes it preferable for carving. See, for example, Esmond Martin and
Daniel Stiles, “U.S. Exposed as Leading Ivory Market,” Report prepared for Care for the Wild International, June 5,
2007.
34 TRAFFIC, “Monitoring of Illegal Trade in Ivory and Other Elephant Specimens,” Fourteenth Meeting of the
Conference of the Parties, June 3, 2007, at http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/14/doc/E14-53-2.pdf. The study reports that
the number of “big seizures,” defined as seizures involving more than 1 metric ton of ivory, grew from 17, between
1989 through 1997, to 32, between 1998 through 2006. In 2002, Singapore officials confiscated a single shipment of
more than 6 tons of illicit ivory—the largest seizure since the 1989 ban.
35 According to IUCN, the distribution of African elephants vary across western, central, southern, and eastern Africa.
Southern Africa accounts for approximately 39% of the total species’ known population, Central Africa accounts for
29%, East Africa accounts for 26%, and West Africa accounts for 5%. The accuracy of the population estimates also
varies across the continent, with estimates in conflict zones or countries emerging from conflict being especially
limited. See Nigel Hunter, Esmond Martin, and Tom Milliken, “Determining The Number of Elephants Required to
Supply Current Unregulated Ivory Markets in Africa and Asia,” Pachyderm, no. 36 (January-June 2004), pp. 116-128;
and IUCN, African Elephant Status Report 2007.
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Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria.36 U.S. and international law enforcement officials
also indicate that highly organized cross-border poachers from Sudan and Somalia are poaching
elephant populations in Chad and Kenya.37 Analysts suspect that large-scale ivory trafficking
involves transnational crime syndicates, which are located in African source countries and along
transit routes through countries that include Tanzania, Djibouti, United Arab Emirates, Hong
Kong, Macao, Philippines, and Singapore.38
Due to the clandestine nature of the activity, analysts have difficulty identifying specific pathways
of illicit wildlife trade. However, one documented case of elephant ivory trafficking, which law
enforcement officials clandestinely monitored, provides some insight into how the illicit trade in
African elephant ivory operates. This case also highlights the often circuitous pathways that illicit
shipments travel to avoid detection: In 2006, Taiwanese authorities confiscated more than five
metric tons of elephant ivory over a three-day period, concealed in shipping cargo. Shipping
documents indicated that the illegal consignment originated in Tanzania and was destined for the
Philippines. After departing from Tanzania, the ivory transited through Malaysia and into
Singapore, where the cargo remained for some time. The shipment then departed for the
Philippines but was re-routed to Taiwan. From Taiwan, the consignment arrived in the
Philippines, but, without being offloaded, returned to Taiwan. As the ivory was about to return to
the Philippines—with shipping documents identifying a different importer than when the
shipment was originally sent to the Philippines—Taiwanese authorities confiscated the
contraband. Shortly after the seizure, however, the five tons of ivory disappeared from a storage
warehouse contracted by Philippine customs authorities while the case remained under further
investigation.39
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The illegal wildlife trade can affect the natural resources and environment of importing and
exporting countries. The potential environmental harm of the illegal wildlife trade include (1)
reducing biodiversity, (2) disrupting ecosystems by introducing non-native species, and (3) and
transmitting disease.
36 TRAFFIC, “Monitoring of Illegal Trade in Ivory and Other Elephant Specimens.” Thailand is also a heavily-
implicated elephant ivory trading country, but some of its ivory trade includes Asian elephant ivory as well.
37 See, for example, “Sudan is ‘Centre of Ivory Trade,’” BBC News, March 14, 2005; and Esmond Martin, “Large
Quantities of Illegal Ivory for Sale in Sudan,” Report for Care for the Wild International, March 14, 2005. Some 75%
of the ivory is reportedly bought by Chinese customers, many of whom are working in Sudan in the oil industry.
38 Martin, “Large Quantities of Illegal Ivory for Sale in Sudan”; and “Illegal Ivory Seized in Taiwan,” World Wildlife
Fund, July 7, 2006; also based on CRS discussions with Interpol law enforcement officials familiar with the case in
2007.
39 Samuel Wasser et al., “Using DNA to Track the Origin of the Largest Ivory Seizure Since the 1989 Trade Ban,”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America vol. 104, no. 10 (March 6, 2007), at
http://depts.washington.edu/conserv/web-content/Press/Wasser%20et%20al%202007.pdf.
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Observers report that the illegal wildlife trade may directly contribute to the decline of some
species. In addition, others report that the illegal wildlife trade combines with habitat loss or
alteration to contribute to species decline. The actual extinction of species as a result solely of
trade is not widely documented in the literature,40 although exploitation combined with habitat
loss and alteration, is linked to significant declines in several species.41 Some observers, for
example, claim that while great apes make up less than 1% of the bushmeat trade in West and
Central Africa, this rate of harvest, combined with habitat loss and alteration, has led to very
severe population declines; if this trend is unchecked, extinction is likely.42 Species that are
currently in decline due primarily to exploitation for trade are species that are rare or have
historically low population levels. For example, some have attributed sharp declines in three rare
species of tropical Asian bears to the illegal trade in bear parts, especially bear gallbladders, for
use in traditional Asian medicine.43
Insufficient data and a lack of understanding of how the trade affects wildlife populations limit
current knowledge of the impact of illegal wildlife trade on biodiversity. A study seeking to
measure the impact of the trade on wild populations of amphibians and reptiles, for example, was
inconclusive because the authors were unable to obtain comprehensive data on the actual amount
of wildlife traded through licit and illicit channels, as well as the sustainable harvest rate of
species in the wild.44 Further, research remains incomplete in understanding how illegal wildlife
trade could indirectly affect ecosystems, when species important to the functioning of the
ecosystem are depleted. Some analysts suggest that the illegal harvesting of wildlife could
indirectly affect ecosystems when species important to the functioning of the ecosystem are
reduced.45
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Illegal wildlife trade may introduce harmful, non-native species that could disrupt ecosystems.
Non-native species can affect human, animal, and plant health, causing considerable economic
and environmental damage.47 Many non-native species that were introduced to the United States
40 One possible explanation might be that as a species becomes depleted and rare, the costs of finding and harvesting
individuals becomes prohibitive; species are likely to become extinct economically before they become extinct
biologically.
41 Steven Broad et al., The Nature and Extent of Legal and Illegal Trade in Wildlife.
42 See Evan Bowen-Jones and Stephanie Pendry, “The Threats to Primates and Other Mammals from the Bushmeat
Trade in Africa and How This Could Be Diminished,” Oryx, vol. 33, no. 3 (1999), pp. 233-247.
43 Ellis, Tiger Bone and Rhino Horn.
44 Martin Schlaepfer et al., “Challenges in Evaluating the Impact of the Trade in Amphibians and Reptiles on Wild
Populations,” BioScience, vol. 55, no. 3 (2005), pp. 256-264.
45 In some tropical forests in Africa and Asia, for example, the loss of some mammals may slow vegetation recovery
because of the dependence on mammals as seed dispersers and pollenators. See Richard T. Corlett, “Frugivory and
Seed Dispersal in Degraded Tropical East Asian Landscapes,” in D.J. Levey et al., eds., Seed Dispersal and Frugivory:
Ecology, Evolution, and Conservation (Wallingford, UK: CABI Publishing, 2002), pp. 451-465.
46 For more on harmful non-native species, see CRS Report RL30123, Invasive Non-Native Species: Background and
Issues for Congress, by M. Lynne Corn et al.
47 One study estimates the annual economic damage of non-native species in the United States to be approximately
$123 billion. See David Pimentel, Lori Lach, Rodolfo Zuniga, and Doug Morrison, “Environmental and Economic
Costs of Nonindigenous Species in the United States,” BioScience, vol. 50 (January 2000), pp. 53-65.
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came initially through legal channels, some of them through the pet trade.48 Such species are
often banned from import only after government officials find documented evidence of a non-
native species’ threat to humans, agriculture, or ecosystems.49 Some banned species, however,
still enter the country illegally through trade. Chinese mitten crabs, for example, banned under the
Lacey Act, continue to be smuggled into the United States and Europe for consumption. Chinese
mitten crabs are harmful to the environment if released; they damage riverbanks by their
burrowing and clog drainage systems.
The impact of non-native species is also considered a contributing factor for listing indigenous
species as endangered or threatened. Congress identified non-native species as the second-leading
contributing factor, after habitat loss and alteration, for listings under the Endangered Species Act
of 1973, affecting nearly half of all threatened and endangered native species.50 Non-native
species may out-compete native species for prey, transmit diseases to native species, and alter
native ecosystems. For example, the Burmese python is a non-native species brought illegally
from Southeast Asia to parts of the United States as a pet.51 These pythons consume large
quantities of native prey and compete with alligators at the top of the food chain.52 The entry of
non-native species is reportedly increasing in the United States and globally. In San Francisco
Bay, a new non-native species now enters the ecosystem every 14 weeks, on average, compared
to an average of one every 55 weeks from 1851 to 1960.53
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Another concern includes the potential entry and spread of animal-borne diseases through the
illegal trade in wildlife.54 According to some, the ability of human and other diseases to spread
throughout the world is becoming increasingly linked to the global nature of wildlife trade,
coupled with the expansion of regional and international transportation routes.55 Diseases
transmitted through wildlife may affect not only humans and result in outbreaks that cause social
and economic harm, but also threaten native wildlife and ecosystems.56 Indeed, some have stated
48 Of 212 non-native vertebrate species that established wild populations in the United States, 48 species (23%) were
originally imported as cage birds or other pets. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology and Assessment, Harmful Non-
Indigenous Species in the United States, OTA-F-565 (Washington: GPO, 1993).
49See discussion on the Lacey Act and the injurious species provisions in Appendix A .
50 David Wilcove et al., “Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in the United States,” BioScience, vol. 48 (1998),
pp. 607-615.
51 Burmese pythons are illegal in some states (e.g., Illinois). In other states, it is illegal to release them into the wild
(e.g., Florida, where over 1,000 are estimated to be in the wild). See Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation
Commission, Notice of New Florida Rules and Regulations Concerning Possession of Captive Wildlife, at
http://myfwc.com/permits/Docs/SynopsisCaptiveWLRuleChanges.pdf.
52 Defenders of Wildlife, “Broken Screens: The Regulations of Live Animal Imports into the United States,” 2007, at
http://www.defenders.org/resources/publications/programs_and_policy/international_conservation/broken_screens/
broken_screens_report.pdf.
53 FWS, Office of Law Enforcement, Strategic Plan, 2006-2010.
54 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Importation of Exotic Species and their Impact
on Public Health and Safety, hearing, 108th Cong., 1st sess., July 17, 2003, at http://epw.senate.gov/
hearing_statements.cfm?id=212889.
55 William B. Karesh, “Wildlife Trade and Global Disease Emergence,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 11, no. 7
(2005), pp. 1000-1002.
56 William B. Karesh et al., “Implications of Wildlife Trade on the Movement of Avian Influenza and other Infectious
Diseases,” Journal of Wildlife Diseases, vol. 43, no. 3 (2007), pp. 55-59.
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that the most dangerous emerging infectious diseases, in terms of total fatalities and fatality rates,
have come from wildlife.57 According to the General Accounting Office (now Government
Accountability Office), nearly 75% of emerging diseases reach humans through animals.58 The
link between the illegal wildlife trade and disease, however, remains contested by some analysts
as being mostly an unrealized threat. Indeed, little is known about the extent to which illegally
imported wildlife may carry harmful diseases.59
Several countries have reported disease outbreaks caused by wildlife trade. However, most
documented disease outbreaks linked to wildlife trade involve imports and exports of legal
wildlife. After an outbreak, the suspected wildlife might be banned from import, effectively
making its trade illegal in the affected country. In the United States, diseases from imported
wildlife have infected or threaten native species, livestock, and humans. Some examples include
the following:
• Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): The SARS virus can infect
wildlife and humans. Experts suspect that SARS originated in the People’s
Republic of China, where SARS-infected civets, a variety of wild cat common in
the Chinese wildlife trade, came in contact with humans.60 Although civets
remain legally traded in China, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) banned civet imports into the United States.
• Heartwater Disease: Heartwater is a disease of cattle, sheep, and goats, and can
cause mortality rates of 60% in cattle and up to 100% in sheep.61 African tortoise
ticks that reside on some imported snakes and tortoises carry this disease. The
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) banned the import and interstate
commerce of three types of African tortoises because African ticks carrying
heartwater were found on them.
• Avian Influenza: Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N1) can infect
humans through poultry-human interactions. Its natural reservoir is wild birds,
but it can be transmitted through poultry as well. Avian flu has been common in
live bird markets and can be disseminated through wildlife trade.62 CDC has
banned poultry and poultry products from bird flu source countries.
• Monkeypox: Monkeypox infects wildlife commonly found in Africa, and can
spread to wildlife native to the United States and humans. Monkeypox was
introduced to the United States by legally imported African rodents. The rodents
transmitted the disease to prairie dogs in a pet store. The prairie dogs were, in
57 Peter Daszak, “Risky Behavior in the Ebola Zone,” Animal Conservation, vol. 9 (2006), pp. 366-367.
58 U.S. General Accounting Office, “West Nile Virus Outbreak, Lessons for Public Health Preparedness,” September
2000, GAO/HEHS-00-180, p. 68.
59 Some examples include a psittacosis infection in custom officers in Belgium after being exposed to illegally
imported parakeets, and an avian influenza virus carried by crested hawk eagles smuggled into Europe. Bruno B.
Chomel, “Wildlife, Exotic Pets, and Emerging Zoonoses,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 13, no. 1 (2007), pp. 6-
11.
60 Y. Guan et al., “Isolation and Characterization of Viruses Related to the SARS Coronavirus from Animals in
Southern China,” Science, vol. 302, no. 5643 (2003), pp. 276-278.
61 Center for Food Security and Public Health, Iowa State University, Heartwater, at http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/
Factsheets/pdfs/heartwater.pdf.
62 See CRS Report RL33795, Avian Influenza in Poultry and Wild Birds, by Jim Monke and M. Lynne Corn.
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turn, the source for transmitting the disease to humans.63 CDC has banned all
African rodents from entering the United States, except under certain
circumstances.
Some have suggested that since many diseases are zoonotic (diseases that can be passed from
animals to humans), the wildlife trade might have bio-terrorism implications. For example,
imports of lightly regulated wildlife might be used to carry a disease that could be transmitted to
other animals or agricultural crops. Another possibility might be intentionally importing and
releasing ill animals to spread a disease to humans. Zoonotic diseases, included plague, tularemia,
and hantavirus, have been used in weapons programs.64 The Japanese during the 1930s, for
example, used fleas to cause plague in China.65 Some have suggested that a terrorist group with
access to pathogens, but lacking dissemination technology, could conceivably use animal vectors
to transmit the disease.66 However, no open source evidence is currently available to suggests that
terrorists are planning attacks involving the transmission of disease through illegal wildlife trade.
Congress is addressing zoonotic disease transmission through proposed legislation that would add
non-human primates (e.g., chimpanzees and apes) to the list of prohibited wildlife species under
the Lacey Act (H.R. 80).67 This legislation is directed toward the non-human primate pet trade
and would make it illegal to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase (in
interstate or foreign commerce) non-human primates with exceptions (e.g., for science and zoos).
It would not make it illegal to possess a non-human primate. Some who support this legislation
cite the propensity of non-human primates to transmit disease to, and inflict injury on humans and
animals.68 Some others who oppose this legislation contend that non-human primates kept as pets
in the United States generally do not carry disease and should not be considered a threat to the
safety of others.69
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Illegal bushmeat trade refers to the harvesting of wildlife for consumption and its subsequent
trafficking within or outside source countries.70 Although many cultures around the world
consume wildlife meat, the term bushmeat commonly refers to wildlife hunted in African forests.
63 In response to the outbreak, CDC banned the import of all African rodents into the United States and prohibited the
transportation, sale, distribution or release of prairie dogs and African rodents that might have been carrying the
disease. For more information on monkeypox, see CRS Report RS21557, Monkeypox: Technical Background and
Outbreak Implications for Bioterrorism Preparedness, by Dana A. Shea, Frank Gottron, and Holly Harvey.
64 Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, “Chemical and Biological Weapons
Resource Page,” at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm.
65 Ibid.
66 See CRS Report RS21557, Monkeypox: Technical Background and Outbreak Implications for Bioterrorism
Preparedness, by Dana A. Shea, Frank Gottron, and Holly Harvey.
67 This bill has been referred to the Committee on Natural Resources.
68 Testimony of Gail Golab, Director of Animal Welfare Division, American Veterinary Medical Association, House
Natural Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans, Legislative Hearing on H.R. 2964
and H.R. 5534, hearing, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., March, 11, 2008.
69 Testimony of Sian Evans, Director of the DuMond Conservancy for Primates and Tropical Forests, House Natural
Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans, Legislative Hearing on H.R. 2964 and H.R.
5534, hearing, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., March, 11, 2008.
70 See Elizabeth L. Bennett et al., “Hunting for Consensus: Reconciling Bushmeat Harvest, Conservation, and
Development Policy in West and Central Africa,” Conservation Biology, vol. 21, no. 3 (2006), pp. 884-887.
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Bushmeat trade is considered illegal when imports occur in contravention of CITES, national
quarantine laws, and other laws than ban the trade of specific animals.71 In Africa, this illegal
trade is considered a threat to the diversity and abundance of endangered and threatened animal
species, and the ecosystems in which they reside. Some are also concerned that illegal bushmeat
trade could facilitate the transmission of exotic diseases throughout the world.
Illegal bushmeat trade in Africa is driven primarily by economic gain and subsistence, and is
greatest in areas of West and Central Africa. The illegal bushmeat trade is reportedly a significant,
and sometimes primary, source of income in Africa, generating an estimated $50 million
annually.72 The bushmeat trade is a significant source of protein for many communities in Africa,
especially among the rural poor. Bushmeat provides an affordable source of animal protein as
well as income-generating opportunities.73 In some cases, bushmeat is preferred over domestic
sources of meat by Africans. It is estimated that between 1 and 3.4 million tons of bushmeat are
consumed annually in Africa, of which 60% is consumed in urban centers, where demand is
highest.74 Further, illegal bushmeat is sold primarily in urban markets in some parts of Africa,
where they generate greater profits than legal bushmeat.75 The illegal bushmeat trade also satisfies
a global demand, which includes certain communities in the United States.
Entry of bushmeat into the United States is a concern because of its potential to carry disease.76
This concern is exacerbated because the health of the animal from which the bushmeat is derived
is not documented and the meat is generally not screened for diseases at the border.77 Bushmeat is
associated with several diseases that affect humans. The United States has experienced outbreaks
from diseases such as HIV/AIDS, which some suggest emerged in Africa through consuming
primates that carry the Simian Immunodeficiency Viruses (SIV);78 and monkeypox, which
originated from African rodents, commonly consumed as bushmeat and traded globally. Other
diseases that affect humans and are linked to bushmeat include the Ebola hemorrhagic fever,
which has been transmitted to bushmeat hunters who were in contact with infected great apes;
and the SARS coronavirus, which has been associated with the international trade in small
carnivores.79
71 Bushmeat Crisis Taskforce, Global Human Health Fact Sheet, October 2003.
72 Ibid.
73Evan Bowen-Jones, “Bushmeat: Traditional Regulation or Adaptation to Market Forces,” in Oldfield, ed., The Trade
in Wildlife.
74 Zinta Zommers and David Macdonald, Wildlife Trade and Global Disease Emergence, Office of Science and
Innovation, Trade and Industry Division, 2006.
75 Emmanuel De Merode and Guy Cowlishaw, “Species Protection, the Changing Informal Economy, and the Politics
of Access to the Bushmeat Trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Conservation Biology, vol. 20, no. 4 (2006),
pp. 1262-1271.
76 Testimony of Marshall Jones, Deputy Director, FWS, in Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Importation of Exotic Species and Their Impact on Public Health and Safety.
77 Declared bushmeat shipments might be checked by FWS at the border, but there is no requirements for quarantine to
check bushmeat for disease. FWS inspectors are not trained in disease detection. However, the USDA’s Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) may confiscate illegal bushmeat detected at the border, if suspected of
carrying disease that might affect livestock. If the bushmeat is suspected carrying a disease harmful to humans, CDC is
contacted.
78 Gao Feng et al., “Origin of HIV-1 in the Chimpanzee Pan Troglodytes Troglodytes,” Nature, vol. 397 (1999), pp.
436-441.
79 Karesh, “Wildlife Trade and Global Disease Emergence,” pp. 1000-1002.
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CDC bans imports of certain animals, including African rodents, known to be prominent in
bushmeat trade and vectors of disease.80 In response to avian influenza, CDC and USDA banned
imports of birds and unprocessed bird products from countries with the avian flu virus in
domestic poultry. Other species that are known to carry diseases (e.g., non-human primates and
live bats) may require a permit from CDC and other agencies for import into the United States.
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The impact of wildlife smuggling has the potential to reach beyond environmental threats.
Numerous sources indicate that organized criminal syndicates, insurgency groups, and military
units are among the primary actors involved in large-scale, commercial-sized wildlife trafficking.
Limited anecdotal evidence also indicates that some terrorist groups may be engaged in the
wildlife smuggling trade for monetary gain. Some observers claim that the participation of such
actors in wildlife trafficking can threaten the stability of countries, foster corruption, and
encourage the use of violence to protect the trade.81
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According to a series of U.N. studies on the illicit traffic of wildlife, wildlife experts claim that
Chinese, Japanese, Italian, and Russian organized crime syndicates are “heavily involved in
illegal wildlife trade.”82 While such claims do not suggest that organized crime syndicates are
involved in all forms of wildlife trafficking, the United Nations reports that syndicates are
“strongly present” in some sectors. Further, even when criminal syndicates are not controlling the
trade, much of the trafficking is commonly described as “highly organized.”83
East Asian Triad societies, such as the Wo Shing Wo group and 14K, as well as the Japanese
Yakuza, have reportedly smuggled elephant ivory, rhino horn, tigers, shark fin, abalone, and
whale meat.84 The United Nations also reports that “no sector of the illegal fauna and flora trade
has been criminalized to the extent of that of sturgeon and caviar.” Most of the caviar business is
reportedly controlled by Russian organized crime, which several analysts also claim is engaged in
the poaching of tigers and bears.85 According to FWS, recent investigations into U.S. caviar trade
revealed that seven of the ten major importers on the East Coast had been illegally importing
millions of dollars worth of caviar annually.86 Members of the Italian Mafia, the former Medellin
drug cartel in Colombia, and possibly additional groups in Central Asia and Brazil reportedly
80 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, visited at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/monkeypox/animals.htm, February
23, 2008.
81 See, for example, Mara Zimmerman, “The Black Market for Wildlife: Combating Transnational Organized Crime in
the Illegal Wildlife Trade,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 36 (2003), pp. 1672-1673; and Greg
Warchol, “The Transnational Illegal Wildlife Trade,” Criminal Justice Studies, vol. 17, no. 1 (March 2004), p. 58.
82 Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (2002), p. 6; Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (2003), pp. 9-12. See also
Jonathan Kazmar, “The International Illegal Plant and Wildlife Trade: Biological Suicide,” U.C. Davis Journal of
International Law and Policy, vol. 6, no. 105 (Winter 2000).
83 Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (2003), p. 9.
84 Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (2002), p. 6; Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (2003) p. 11; Kazmar, “The
International Illegal Plant and Wildlife Trade”; and Cook, Roberts, and Lowther, The International Wildlife Trade and
Organised Crime, p. 15.
85 Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (2002), p. 6; and Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (2003), p. 11.
86 FWS, Office of Law Enforcement, Strategic Plan, 2006-2010, p. 7.
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have been involved in the illicit trafficking of rare parrots or falcons.87 Anecdotal accounts also
indicate that some organized groups are involved in both illegal wildlife and human trafficking.88
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A 2002 British study, commissioned by the World Wildlife Fund and the World Conservation
Union, found that key illicit drug production and distribution countries that coincide with major
source states for endangered wildlife are areas where illicit wildlife trafficking has likely taken
place.89 Anecdotal evidence indicates that illicit wildlife has been found to be smuggled along the
same routes as narcotics as a subsidiary trade for drug traffickers, especially in Latin America.
The United Nations reports that members of the former Cali drug cartel in Colombia and Mexican
drug dealers have also allegedly smuggled mixed shipments of drugs and wildlife products into
the United States.90 According to the Brazilian National Network Against the Trafficking of Wild
Animals (RENCTAS), 40% of an estimated 400 criminal rings smuggling animals were also
involved in other criminal activities, especially drug trafficking.91 The CITES Secretariat has also
reported that combinations of parrots and drugs have been smuggled together from Cote d’Ivoire
to Israel.92
Wildlife, both legal and illegal, are also used as the means to conceal illegal drugs. In one famous
case, U.S. Customs Service inspectors in Miami recovered 86 pounds of cocaine-filled condoms
from Colombia, which had been inserted into 225 boa constrictor snakes.93 More recently,
international law enforcement officials say they have confiscated mixes of narcotics and illicit
wildlife that range from elephant tusks with hashish stuffed inside to exotic birds smuggled with
methamphetamine pills.94 Wildlife products are reportedly also used as a currency in exchange for
drugs. According to FWS officials, smugglers often trade illegal drugs for endangered animals in
cashless transfers that serve as a special form of money laundering. In South Africa, street gangs
reportedly provide highly prized, but illegal, catches of abalone to Asian crime syndicates for
methamphetamine.95
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There is limited publicly available evidence of terrorist groups involved in wildlife trafficking.
According to U.N. reports and Interpol officials, some insurgent groups and possibly terrorist
groups are reportedly engaged in illegal poaching for profit in several areas of Asia and Africa.96
87 Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (2002), p. 6; Kazmar, “The International Illegal Plant and Wildlife Trade”; and
Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (2003), p. 12.
88 Testimony of Steven R. Galster, House Natural Resources Committee, “Poaching American Security,” Hearing,
March 5, 2008.
89 Cook, Roberts, and Lowther, The International Wildlife Trade and Organised Crime, p. 23.
90 Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (2002), pp. 6-7.
91 “First National Report on the Traffic of Wild Animals,” RENCTAS, 2001, p. 53.
92 Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (2002), pp. 6-7.
93 “Organized Criminal Gangs Deal Wildlife and Drugs,” Environment News Service, June 18, 2002.
94 Based on discussions with several Interpol law enforcement officials in 2007.
95 Mark Schoofs, “Traffic Jam: As Meth Trade Goes Global, South Africa Becomes a Hub—Cape Town Gangs Barter
Rare Shellfish for Drugs; Chinese, Russian Ties,” Wall Street Journal, May 21, 2007.
96 Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (2002), p. 6.
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The limited anecdotal evidence indicates that terrorist groups may be engaged in illegal wildlife
smuggling for monetary gain, if sources of rich biodiversity are near their operating arenas.
Figure 1 shows noted regions of high biodiversity and their proximity to selected zones of
possible terrorist safe havens.97 Although not necessarily indicative of an existing relationship
between terrorists and wildlife trafficking, the map highlights the possibility of terrorist groups or
other criminal entities in regions of high biodiversity taking advantage of porous borders, weak
states, and criminal sympathizers.
Some experts caution that terrorist involvement may be more of an exception to the overall scope
of wildlife trafficking, rather than indicative of an emerging trend or pervasive characteristic of
illegal wildlife trade. Other experts suggest that terrorist groups may look to organized crime
groups, some of which are known to traffic in illegal wildlife, as models for financing terrorist
activities.98 Both types of groups benefit from generating clandestine sources of income in non-
legal markets. Al Qaeda, for example, has been allegedly involved in several forms of organized
crime, such as money laundering and credit card fraud, to fund its activities.99 Some experts also
suggest that the loosely-connected, cellular structure of some international terrorist organizations
today may lend itself to increased links between terrorism and organized crime. Experts argue
that as loosely connected terrorist cells are expected to secure their own funding, organized crime
may present itself as an attractive funding option.100
Some law enforcement officials indicate that Somali elephant and rhino poachers are now linked
to at least one Somali warlord, who has provided safe haven and other forms of protection to
known Al Qaeda operatives.101 In Kaziranga, India, two Islamic extremist groups with ties to Al
Qaeda, Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) and Jamaatul Mujahedin Bangladesh
(JMB), are reportedly sponsoring elephant and rhino poaching for profit, according to several
news articles.102
97 Notably, the map is not indicative of zones where terrorist activity is necessarily occurring and where organized
wildlife smugglers are necessarily operating.
98 See Louise I. Shelly and John T. Picarelli, “Methods Not Motives: Implications of the Convergence of International
Organized Crime and Terrorism,” Policy Practice and Research, vol. 3, no. 4 (2002).
99 See Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
100 Lin, “Tackling Southeast Asia’s Illegal Wildlife Trade.”
101 Somali warlords are generally not considered international terrorists. Interpol officials, however, say wildlife
poaching is linked to at least one known Somali warlord, allegedly known to have protected Al Qaeda operatives
allegedly involved in the 1998 Kenya and Tanzania U.S. Embassy bombings and the 2002 Kenya hotel bombing. For a
description of terrorism activity linked to Somalis, see U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, Country Report on Terrorism, April 30, 2007. Some Interpol officials speculate that the poached
wildlife could be used to finance Somali warlord activities, or possibly even Al Qaeda terrorism activities; CRS has yet
to find public evidence to support these speculations. There remains some debate among analysts, however, regarding
the level of sufficient evidence linking Somali warlords to the terrorist suspects involved in the bombings described
above. For more of this debate, see CRS Report RL33911, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting
Peace, by Ted Dagne.
102 “Poaching for Bin Laden,” The Guardian, May 5, 2007; Sharon Begley, “Extinction Trade,” Newsweek, March 1,
2008. HUJI-B and JMB are designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the U.S. Department of State.
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Figure 1. Regions of Biodiversity and Selected Terrorist Safe Havens
Sources: For “Potential Terrorist Safe Haven”: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Terrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism, Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe
Havens, April 2007; and Angel Rabasa et al., Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007). For “Biodiversity
Level”: Brian Groombridge and Martin D. Jenkins, World Atlas of Biodiversity (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002). For “Biodiversity Hotspot”: Conservation
International, Biodiversity Hotspots, at http://www.biodiversityhotspots.org, accessed February 19, 2008.
Note: This map does not imply that terrorists are necessarily involved in wildlife trafficking where zones of high biodiversity and potential safe havens overlap. Additionally,
it should be noted that the State Department and the Rand Corporation data differs on which regions are potential safe havens. Actual and potential locations identified by
the State Department include Somalia; the Trans-Sahara, including Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, and Chad; the Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral, including the southern
Philippines and Indonesia; Iraq, including northern Iraq; Lebanon; Yemen; Afghanistan and Pakistan, including the Afghanistan-Pakistan border; the Colombia border region;
and the Tri-Border area, including Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. Locations identified by Rand include the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the Arabian Peninsula, the Sulawesi-
Mindano arc, East Africa, West Africa, the Northern Caucasus, the Colombia-Venezuela border, and the Guatemala-Chiapas border.
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Wildlife criminals may seek to exploit countries with a weak capacity to govern, poor law
enforcement, high government corruption, and porous borders.103 These country characteristics,
common to weak states in the developing world, are not only frequently linked to drug
trafficking, organized crime, and, on occasion, terrorism, but are also reportedly linked to the
illegal trade in wildlife. Analysts contend that weak states at any point along wildlife trafficking
routes—source countries, transit countries, and destination countries—are especially attractive to
wildlife criminals, who hope to operate in these countries with impunity.
For example, several reports indicate that weak law enforcement and uncontrolled borders in
Southeast Asia—especially the border region between Burma, Thailand, China, and Laos, which
is also known as a significant drug production and trafficking region—are contributing to the
problem.104 Sun bears, clouded leopards, Burmese pythons, monitor lizards, and other protected
species are reportedly available for sale in numerous markets and trading posts throughout
Southeast Asia. According to some observers, the lack of law enforcement along these borders is
contributing to the local extinction of several wildlife species.105
In rare instances, extensive cross-border, commercial poaching and trafficking operations have
reportedly been associated with political instability in certain regions. This has been documented
in several cases in Africa, where some conflicts have been reportedly financed, in part, by the
elephant ivory trade. As local elephant populations decline, Sudanese and Somalis have also been
known to stage heavily-armed ivory raids across their borders into Kenya, Chad, and the Central
African Republic—using machine guns, rocket launchers, and other sophisticated weapons not
only to poach wildlife but to fight park rangers and other border guards they may encounter.
Rebel groups from Sudan, for example, would reportedly trade elephant ivory, sometimes dubbed
“conflict ivory,” for military weapons, and Somali troops were once reportedly encouraged to
poach ivory in lieu of receiving salaries.106 According to discussions with law enforcement
officials and media reports, members of the Sudanese Janjaweed militia are also poaching
elephants in and around Chad’s Zakouma National Park.107 Other militia or insurgent groups that
were allegedly involved in wildlife trafficking for profit include Mozambique’s Mozambican
National Resistance (RENAMO) and Angola’s National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA).108
103 See, for example, R. Thomas Naylor, “The Underworld of Ivory,” Crime, Law, and Social Change, vol. 42, no. 4-5
(January 2005), p. 261.
104 Chris R. Shepherd and Vincent Nijman, “The Trade in Bear Parts from Myanmar: An Illustration of the
Ineffectiveness of Enforcement of International Wildlife Trade Regulations,” Biodiversity Conservation, vol. 17, no. 1
(January 2008), p. 35.
105 “Southeast Asia’s Illegal Wildlife Trade,” National Public Radio, November 3-5, 2003, at http://www.npr.org/
programs/re/archivesdate/2003/nov/wildlife/index.html.
106 Naylor, “The Underworld of Ivory,” pp. 261-277; Warchol, “The Transnational Illegal Wildlife Trade,” p. 58;
Warchol, Zupan, and Clack, “Transnational Criminality: An Analysis of the Illegal Wildlife Market in Southern
Africa,” p. 5; and John Nielsen, “Confronting Central Africa’s Poaching Crisis,” National Public Radio, January 12,
2003, at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=912962.
107 See also “DNA Test Pinpoints Elephant Poaching, Aiding Conservation: Genetic Evidence Could Prove Key in
Halting the Illegal Slaughter of Africa’s Elephants for their Ivory Tusks,” Scientific American, February 26, 2007; and
“War and Politics Threaten Congo’s Endangered Rhinos,” The New York Times, March 28, 2005.
108 In addition to ivory, RENAMO reportedly ran rackets in rhino horn, rare hardwoods, stolen gemstones, and
counterfeit currency. See Naylor, “The Underworld of Ivory,” p. 278.
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Several agencies are responsible for law enforcement and trade inspection involving wildlife
trade, including the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and
the Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). CBP maintains the primary
authority to inspect goods imported into the United States and vessels carrying goods into U.S.
ports of entry. If wildlife goods are declared they are generally referred to FWS, which is the
primary agency responsible for inspecting wildlife shipments. Other agencies also have some
authorities to inspect wildlife trade, including the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and the Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Inspectors from these agencies may not be trained to
handle all types of wildlife imports; as a result, when inspectors from one agency need guidance
or clarification on a shipment, other relevant agencies are contacted.
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FWS is responsible for monitoring and detecting illegal trade in endangered species, invasive
species, and other statutorily regulated wildlife. Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and
the Lacey Act and Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, FWS has the authority to detain and inspect
any international shipment of wildlife, including items in baggage, parcels, or vehicles. In 2007,
FWS posted 114 uniformed wildlife inspectors at 38 ports of entry across the country—at 18
designated ports, through which most wildlife traffic is required to pass, border ports, and a
handful of other ports.109 (See Figure 2.) Ports are designated for importing and exporting
wildlife to consolidate shipments for inspectors. Under certain circumstances, some wildlife
shipments may travel through non-designated ports.110 A designated port, however, must be used
for importing wildlife that requires a permit under certain federal regulations that cover
threatened and endangered species, marine mammals, and CITES listed species, among others.
See Table 4 for changes in the quantity and activity of FWS inspectors from 2000 to 2006.
FWS reportedly inspects approximately 25% of declared wildlife shipments at the U.S. border.111
FWS does not inspect undeclared shipments except during planned investigations or seasonal
periods when certain illegally obtained wildlife have a higher probability of being imported into
the United States. Undeclared shipments may also be targeted for inspection if FWS has reason to
suspect that the shipment could be contraband. Shipments containing wildlife that are in transit
through the United States are generally not required to be declared to FWS. However, in-transit
shipments must comply with foreign and domestic wildlife laws, including the humane transport
of live animals. Certain species listed on endangered or threatened species lists under the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, migratory birds, marine mammals, or injurious species listed
under the Lacey Act and Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, among others, may not transit within
the United States.
109 Most of the posted wildlife inspectors are located at the Los Angeles, New York, New Jersey, and Miami ports of
entry. FWS, U.S. Illegal Wildlife Trade: LEMIS Data Analysis and Risk Assessment.
110 FWS, Importing and Exporting Your Commercial Wildlife Shipment, at http://www.fws.gov/le/ImpExp/
CommWildlifeImportExport.htm.
111 Interview with Tom Tidwell, Senior Special Agent, FWS, November 2007.
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Figure 2. Map of FWS Designated Ports and Number of Inspectors
Source: Adapted from FWS information provided to CRS, February 21, 2008.
Table 4. Statistics on the Activities of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Office of Law
Enforcement
FWS Office of
Law Enforcement
Number of
Enacted Budget Number of Number of
Number of
Staffed
(in constant U.S.
Special
Wildlife
Investigative
Declared
Ports of
Year
millions)
Agentsa
Inspectorsa
Caseload
Shipmentsb
Entry
FY2000 $48.1 201
90 9,105
111,296
29
FY2001 $59.2 224
90 8,681
120,004
30
FY2002 $39.2 238
88 8,412
123,720
30
FY2003 $59.4 229
94
10,369
139,541
31
FY2004 $60.1 231
95
10,536
157,617
31
FY2005 $60.4 218
105
13,980
172,404
35
FY2006 $58.7 202
112
15,128
183,247
38
FY2007 $57.3 199
114
12,177
187,670
37
Avg. annual
5.3% 0.1%
3.5% 5.6%c 7.8% 4.4%
% change,
FY2000-
FY2006
Source: FWS, Office of Law Enforcement, Annual Reports, FY2000-FY2007, at http://www.fws.gov/le/AboutLE/
annual.htm, visited February 2, 2009.
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a. Number lists end-of-year size of forces.
b. The number of declared shipments does not reflect the actual number of individual items traded. For
example, a shipment with 1,000 geckos or 10 geckos would be counted as one shipment. In addition, this
statistic does not take into account the amount of wildlife trade that is not declared to U.S. officials. As a
result, the number of wildlife items shipped per year is likely to be higher than indicated in this table.
c. Note that from 2000 to 2006 there was nearly a 10% average annual increase per year in caseloads. It is
unclear what caused the nearly 20% caseload reduction from 2006 to 2007.
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CBP’s mission is to protect U.S. borders from terrorism, human and drug smuggling, illegal
migration, and agricultural pests while facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade. CBP
addresses the illegal wildlife trade directly by preventing the entry of exotic plant and animal
pests, and any other emerging threats in agro- and bio-terrorism from entering the country. CBP
collaborates with other agencies, including FWS, when they find suspicious wildlife shipments.
CBP is also considered by U.S. officials as the first line of defense against import of undeclared
illegal wildlife shipments.
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The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s APHIS regulates the imports of some animal and animal
products that could harm agriculture or livestock. Among its responsibilities, APHIS serves to
facilitate safe international trade, monitor the health of animals presented at the border, and
regulate the import and export of animals and animal products. APHIS enforces provisions of the
Animal Health Protection Act,112 which give APHIS the authority to prohibit or restrict the
importation of any animal if it will prevent a pest or disease from affecting agriculture or
livestock. Further, APHIS has the authority to prosecute individuals who smuggle any animals or
animal products into the country. APHIS works with FWS and CBP to monitor agricultural
imports at the border and has a dedicated team for investigating the illegal wildlife trade.113
In response to the growing volume of smuggled and improperly imported agricultural products
entering the United States, APHIS created the Smuggling Intervention and Trade Compliance unit
(SITC), a special anti-smuggling unit to prevent the unlawful entry and distribution of prohibited
agricultural commodities, and products that may harbor harmful wildlife, including animal pests,
diseases, and invasive species.114 The unit routinely works with CBP agents during agricultural
anti-smuggling and cooperative interdiction efforts at air, land, and sea ports of entry.
112 P.L. 100-478, as amended.
113 Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), some of APHIS’ border security responsibilities were
transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. These duties include border inspection of shipments and baggage
containing plant, animal, and agricultural products that could harbor pests and diseases. APHIS retains the
responsibility to create inspection policies and train inspection agents. The specific functions that were transferred from
APHIS to DHS are included in an agreement at [http://www.aphis.usda.gov/plant_health/moa_dhs/index.shtml].
114 See U.S. Department of Agriculture, APHIS, “Smuggling Intervention and Trade Compliance Program,” at
http://is.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/pub_smuggling.html.
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NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) enforces laws that protect and regulate the
marine resources of the United States. Some of these laws, such as the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act, regulate the trade and catch of marine organisms.115 NOAA
Fisheries Service also enforces trade in CITES-regulated marine species. NOAA’s Office of Law
Enforcement uses special agents to patrol the sea, conduct investigations, monitor fishing
practices, inspect fish processing plants, and review sales of wildlife products on the Internet.
Some agents are also stationed at the border to assist in the inspection of imports.
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The Department of Health and Human Services’ CDC takes the lead in protection against
communicable human diseases at the border. In recent years, CDC has banned certain wildlife
imports to prevent the introduction, transmission, and spread into the United States of specific
diseases from animals to humans, including monkeypox (African rodents), SARS (civets), and
the highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 (birds and bird products from source countries).116
Under its delegated authority, CDC’s Division of Global Migration and Quarantine is empowered
to detain, medically examine, or conditionally release individuals and wildlife suspected of
carrying a communicable disease. Not all diseases are quarantinable; zoonotic diseases that are,
however, include SARS and influenza, such as bird flu, that is causing or has the potential to
cause a pandemic.117 CDC officials are not present at the border on a day-to-day basis, but
maintain quarantine stations located in Anchorage, Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, El
Paso, Honolulu, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, New York, Newark, Philadelphia,
San Diego, San Francisco, San Juan, Seattle, and Washington, D.C.
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The Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutes individuals and organizations charged with wildlife
trafficking. The Environment and Natural Resources Division (ENRD), within DOJ, is
responsible for all environmental and natural resources-related litigation, including wildlife
crimes, filed on behalf of or against the United States in federal courts.118 Investigations initiated
by law enforcement agents from FWS, NOAA, and other agencies related to the illegal wildlife
trade are referred to ENRD for prosecution.
Wildlife traffickers face charges from traditional wildlife trafficking statutes such as the Lacey
Act and the Endangered Species Act, but also from other statutes that prohibit money laundering,
115 16 U.S.C. §§1801-1882, as amended; P.L. 94-265, as amended.
116 CDC has the authority to prevent the spread of communicable diseases under the Public Health Service Act (42
U.S.C. §201 et seq.).
117 For full list of quarantinable diseases, see Executive Order 13295, “Revised List of Quarantinable Communicable
Diseases,”April 4, 2003; and “Executive Order: Amendment to E.O. 13295 Relating to Certain Influenza Viruses and
Quarantinable Communicable Diseases,” April 1, 2005.
118 As of 2004, ENRD employed more than 400 attorneys to handle more than 10,000 cases per year in all federal
jurisdictions. Approximately 30 ENRD attorneys specialize in prosecuting environmental crime cases. See Jim Rubin
and Shata Stucky, “Fighting Black Markets and Oily Water: The Department of Justice’s National Initiatives to
Combat Transnational Environmental Crime,” Sustainable Development Law and Policy, vol. 4 (2004), pp. 21-26.
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smuggling, and conspiracy.119 One of the primary statutes for prosecuting wildlife traffickers is
the Lacey Act and Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, which prohibits the (1) import, export,
transport, selling, receiving, acquiring, or purchase of any fish or wildlife already taken,
possessed, transported, or sold (2) in violation of state, federal, American Indian tribal, or foreign
laws or regulations that are fish- or wildlife-related.120 Violation of foreign laws with respect to
only fish and wildlife (the act does not include foreign plants) can trigger Lacey Act offenses.
Under the Lacey Act, a defendant may be prosecuted if they did not violate the law in question,
but knowingly, or in the exercise of due care, should know, about the illegal nature of the wildlife
or wildlife products.
Wildlife traffickers can also be penalized under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 which makes
it unlawful for any person, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to import, export, offer,
sell in interstate or foreign commerce, or to receive, carry, transport, or ship in interstate or
foreign commerce in the course of a commercial activity, any endangered or threatened species.
This law also implements CITES into law, and prescribes penalties for violations of CITES.
Violations under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 can occur without the defendant knowing
which species are listed under this law and without intending to violate the law.121
Other laws not directly related to wildlife can be used to prosecute wildlife traffickers. For
example, wildlife traffickers can be prosecuted as smugglers under Title 18 of the U.S. Code.
Violations such as a concealing contraband (e.g., illegal wildlife) upon import, or knowingly
receiving, concealing, buying, or selling contraband, or facilitating these actions, might be
prosecuted under the smuggling statutes.122
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The U.S. government participates in several international venues to enhance the visibility of
wildlife crime issues and coordinate with other countries and entities to halt wildlife trafficking.
In recent years, the United States has provided funding to three primary international
conservation programs that address wildlife trafficking: CITES, the Coalition Against Wildlife
Trafficking (CAWT), and the ASEAN Wildlife Law Enforcement Network. U.S. contributions
fund efforts to facilitate policy approaches and technical expertise to assist developing countries
in building their capacity to combat the illegal wildlife trade.
The United States also participates in several other relevant international venues, including the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Interpol, World Customs
Organization, Group of Eight, and additional U.N. bodies. In addition to these organizations,
119 Because illegal wildlife traffickers are often caught before violating the Lacey Act, conspiracy is a way to charge the
wrongdoers for committing a crime. The crime of conspiracy occurs when “two or more persons conspire” to violate
the Lacey Act. The conspiracy offense can act as further arsenal against wildlife violators. In fact, charging an
individual with conspiracy may be considered a graver offense than the contemplated crime and can lead to harsher
penalties.
120 Some address the categories labeled above for violating the Lacey Act as the two steps necessary for prosecution.
See Testimony of Eileen Sobeck, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, in U.S. Congress, House Natural Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Fisheries,
Wildlife, and Oceans, Illegally Harvested Plants, hearing, 110th Cong., 1st sess., October 16, 2007.
121 John T. Webb and Robert S. Anderson, “Prosecuting Wildlife Traffickers: Important Cases, Many Tools, Good
Results,” United States Attorneys’ Bulletin (December 1999), pp. 4-10.
122 For example, see 18 U.S.C. §545.
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several additional, regional anti-trafficking organizations exist, in which the United States does
not play an active role. These include the South Asia Wildlife Trade Initiative, established in
February 2008; the European Union’s E.U. Enforcement Action Plan to Combat Illegal Wildlife
Trade, established in June 2007; and the Lusaka Agreement Task Force, established in 1994. (See
Appendix B for descriptions.)
The United States does not participate in international efforts to regulate international wildlife
trade to prevent disease transmission or invasive species, as no such international organization
currently exists. However, some international organizations, of which the United States is a
member, are involved in efforts to track major animal diseases and emerging diseases that can be
passed from animals to humans. One such effort launched in 2006, the Global Early Warning
System for Major Animal Diseases, involves collaboration between the World Health
Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health, and the U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization.123
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The CITES Secretariat is the primary multilateral organization that regulates trade in wildlife.
The United States is one of 172 parties to CITES, which entered into force in March 1973 and
established legal guidelines for the international trade of certain wild animals, plants, and
derivatives thereof. These animals, plants, and parts are subject to varying degrees of trade
regulation, based on their being listed in the appendices of the Convention. Appendix I lists
animals and plants that are threatened with extinction and trade in these species is only authorized
in exceptional circumstances. Appendix II lists species not immediately threatened with
extinction but may become so if trade is not regulated. Appendix III lists species that are
regulated within the jurisdiction of at least one CITES party. Trade in Appendix-listed animals
and plants is based on a system of government-issued permits and certificates that must be
presented before consignments can leave or enter a country.
Many analysts observe, however, that CITES is limited in its ability to monitor illegal wildlife
trade and enforce member states’ compliance with the provisions of the treaty.124 CITES, on its
own, does not make illegal wildlife trading a crime or prescribe criminal penalties against
violators. Instead, the treaty relies on member states to execute national legislation that enforces
CITES commitments and to report to the CITES Secretariat cases of noncompliance. A 2003 U.N.
report on wildlife crime and CITES, for example, claims that many member states suffer from an
inability to enforce wildlife trade laws, and the penalties associated with the laws are so low that
they are unlikely to deter potential wildlife criminals.125 To address flagrant violators of the treaty,
the CITES Secretariat does, on occasion, issue notifications informing member states to suspend
trade in CITES-listed species with noncompliant countries. Currently, CITES has active
suspension notifications against Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda,
123 World Health Organization, “Launch of Global Early Warning System for Animal Diseases Transmissible to
Humans,” Press Release, at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/new/2006/nw02/en/index.html.
124 Hayman and Brack, “International Environmental Crime,” p. 22.
125 Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (2003).
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and Somalia.126 It remains unclear, however, to what extent these suspensions are carried out by
member states.127
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Initiated in 2005, the Coalition Against Wildlife Trafficking (CAWT) is a voluntary partnership
among governments and non-governmental entities that seeks to raise the political profile of
international wildlife crime. CAWT maintains three goals: (1) improve wildlife law enforcement
by expanding training, information sharing, and strengthening regional cooperative networks; (2)
reduce consumer demand for illegally traded wildlife by raising awareness of its consequences;
and (3) broaden support for combating wildlife trafficking at the highest political levels. As the
sole founder of this initiative, the United States is serving as the first two-year chair.
Since its inception, CAWT has been active in holding several international training courses about
wildlife law enforcement and related topics and conducting awareness activities. Although some
observers welcome this relatively new initiative to help raise the profile of wildlife trafficking
issues, others perceive that some countries may be hesitant to commit financially to CAWT. As
one expert explained in congressional testimony in 2007, CAWT has suffered from a “slow
response from other foreign governments.”128 Currently, there are five other countries, besides the
United States, involved in CAWT: Australia, Canada, Chile, India, and the United Kingdom.
Furthermore, some observers question whether CAWT has been able to define and differentiate
its role among U.S. agencies that have responsibilities to combat illegal wildlife trafficking.
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In December 2005, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)129 launched the ASEAN
Wildlife Law Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN) as a regional effort to improve cooperation
in combating wildlife crime in Southeast Asia. In the ASEAN statement for its launch, member
states noted the “need to strengthen enforcement of CITES and other legislation for wildlife
protection” and to “address the serious problem caused by illegal domestic and international trade
in wild fauna and flora” given that the “available resources for enforcement are inadequate.”130
Although not a member of ASEAN, the United States provides foreign aid for ASEAN-WEN
through USAID’s ECO-Asia ASEAN-WEN Support Project. Under this USAID program, the
United States is assisting ASEAN-WEN to provide development and capacity building for
national wildlife crime task forces, regional cooperation and interaction among task forces, and
collaboration with the global law enforcement community.131
126 CITES Notification to the Parties, No. 2003/027 (May 6, 2003); No. 2004/055 (July 30, 2004); No. 2005/038 (July
19, 2005); No. 2006/073 (December 14, 2006); No. 2006/074 (December 14, 2006).
127 Rosalind Reeve, “Wildlife Trade, Sanctions, and Compliance: Lessons from the CITES Regime,” International
Affairs, vol. 82, no. 5 (2006), pp. 881-897; and Zimmerman, “The Black Market for Wildlife,” p. 1666.
128 Testimony Crawford Allan, World Wildlife Fund, in U.S. Congress, House Natural Resources Committee,
Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans, Endangered Species Treaty Meeting, hearing, 109th Cong., 2nd sess.,
May 3, 2007.
129 The ten members of ASEAN are Burma, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, and Vietnam.
130 “ASEAN Statement on Launching of the ASEAN Wildlife Law Enforcement Network at the Special Meeting of the
ASEAN Ministers Responsible for the Implementation of CITES,” Bangkok, Thailand, December 1, 2005.
131 USAID, “Environmental Cooperation-Asia (ECO-Asia) ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network.”
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Other regional efforts to combat the illegal wildlife trade similar to ASEAN-WEN have grown in
popularity in recent years, though the United States is not as heavily involved in them at this time.
These regional efforts are generally perceived by observers as a positive development, as they
bolster regional commitments to solve a criminal activity that is inherently transboundary in
nature. Some, however, question whether these new initiatives will be sufficient in curtailing the
illegal wildlife trade.
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The role of Congress in evaluating U.S. policy to combat wildlife trafficking is broad. This
section analyzes some issues Congress may choose to consider, which include (1) funding levels
for U.S. wildlife trade inspection and investigation capacity; (2) assessing the role of U.S. foreign
aid to combat wildlife trafficking; (3) supplementing legislative provisions to encourage private-
sector involvement in controlling wildlife trade; (4) evaluating trade sanction laws relative to
foreign countries with weak enforcement of wildlife laws; (5) incorporating wildlife trade
provisions into free trade agreements (FTAs); and (6) addressing the domestic and international
demand for illegal wildlife through public awareness campaigns and non-governmental
organization partnerships.
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Some observers suggest that improving U.S. capacity to prevent illegal wildlife from entering the
border and combat transnational wildlife crime syndicates may require Congress to fund and
authorize additional inspectors at the border. According to FWS, approximately 75% of declared
wildlife shipments are not inspected at the border. There are few inspectors in undesignated ports
of entry, where undeclared wildlife shipments are rarely checked.132 Some have suggested that
FWS should increase its inspection of declared and undeclared shipments of wildlife in both
designated and undesignated ports of entry in the United States. One possibility would be to
increase the number of wildlife inspectors, in proportion to the increase in wildlife shipments
entering the United States. In recent years, this has not occurred. Since 2000, the number of
wildlife inspectors has increased at an annual average of 3.5%, while the number of shipments
has increased at an annual average of approximately 7.8%. (See Table 4.) The cost of
implementing this proposal, however, would likely involve Congress increasing appropriations
for FWS, or increasing user fees for inspecting wildlife at the border.133
Others suggest increasing the investigative capacity of FWS to address the illegal wildlife trade
controlled by organized crime. From 2000 to 2006, the number of special agents for FWS has
increased an average of 0.01% annually, while the investigative caseload has increased an
average of 9.7% annually. More special agents might result in a greater number of arrests and
prosecutions of wildlife smugglers. Further, more agents may increase the FWS capacity to target
specific wildlife smuggling rings or to monitor wildlife smuggling in developing countries where
132 CBP checks a percentage of all shipments and contacts FWS if wildlife shipments are intercepted.
133 FWS finalized a rule to gradually increase inspection fees and update license and fee requirements for importing and
exporting wildlife in December 2008. Fees have not been increased since 1996. Raising fees is intended to recover
some costs of inspecting shipments.
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it is thought to be most prevalent. The cost of adding more special agents to the FWS may also
involve an increase in appropriations by Congress. Some have argued that this cost might be
partially offset by fines paid to the government from more prosecutions of wildlife criminals.
Many observers have highlighted the value of recent international law enforcement initiatives to
combat illegal wildlife crime.134 To this end, some suggest that FWS receive additional authorities
from Congress to expand its reach beyond the U.S. border. Proponents argue that such a policy
could help FWS, in conjunction with foreign counterparts, target more high-value transnational
smuggling syndicates. In testimony to the House Natural Resources Committee in 2008, one
analyst indicated that such an expansion if FWS authorities could be modeled on U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration authorities, which permit federal drug law enforcement agents to
conduct operations internationally as well as to staff numerous country offices worldwide.135
Critics of this option, however, argue that wildlife crime is not sufficiently a priority policy issue
to warrant the attendant budgetary costs that would be associated with such an expansion of FWS
authorities.
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The majority of endangered species in the world are found in developing countries, where there is
need for assistance in protecting species and habitats.136 Some contend that one opportunity to
stem the illegal trade in wildlife is to improve the enforcement capacity of developing countries
to control the illegal harvest and export of species. Congress could further this option by
appropriating new funds or directing funds in pre-existing conservation programs to train and
assist foreign wildlife trade officials in monitoring, detecting, and investigating wildlife
trafficking.
FWS and other observers have identified building of wildlife law enforcement infrastructure in
source countries as a priority for stemming the illegal trade.137 Options for achieving this include
increasing U.S. efforts to train wildlife inspectors and special agents in developing countries
where the illegal wildlife trade is flourishing. The justification of such a proposal is based on
three premises: (1) direct training of inspectors and special agents in developing countries will
increase their capacity to monitor, investigate, and reduce illegal wildlife trade; (2) interaction
between FWS agents and agents in developing countries will improve the coordination and
communication among agencies when addressing transnational wildlife crimes; and (3) training
programs may give some FWS agents the opportunity to assist their foreign counterparts in
foreign countries. Currently, FWS has conducted training programs in Africa, Southeast Asia,
Mongolia, and other countries and regions. Training for judges and prosecutors is also being done
in foreign countries by DOJ. In collaboration with ASEAN-WEN, U.S. officials are training
foreign nationals on methods of prosecuting crimes involving trade in illegally taken wildlife and
wildlife parts. This training is conducted in conjunction with the ASEAN-WEN Support Group,
FWS and several non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
134 See for example, testimony by Claudia A. McMurray, House Natural Resources Committee, “Poaching American
Security: Impact of Illegal Wildlife Trade,” March 5, 2008.
135 Testimony of Steven R. Galster, House Natural Resources Committee, “Poaching American Security: Impact of
Illegal Wildlife Trade,” March 5, 2008.
136 Alacron, “The Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species.”
137 FWS, Office of Law Enforcement, Strategic Plan, 2006-2010, p. 5.
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The benefits associated with this proposal would have to be weighed against the costs of
increasing training overseas by FWS. To offset these costs, some contend that Congress could
direct funds in some conservation programs toward increasing the law enforcement capacity in
countries with high wildlife crime. For example, the Tropical Forest Conservation Act138
authorizes the use of debt-for-nature swaps to create funds that can given as grants to local
organizations to improve the security of nature reserves. Species-specific programs under the
Multinational Species Conservation Fund address various components of the illegal wildlife trade
and conservation, including law enforcement. Some argue for Congress to appropriate more funds
for these programs to address training and monitoring needs. Further, some programs
administered by USAID under their Environment and Biodiversity programs address the illegal
wildlife trade. For example, in FY2005, USAID supported the training of wildlife law
enforcement officials in Cambodia to investigate the illegal wildlife trade..139
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To prevail against wildlife trafficking, many analysts claim that there is a need for more
information on international trafficking routes and a need for that information, if or when
collected, to be shared among interested parties. Today, national intelligence on environmental
crimes is reportedly not collated and disseminated effectively across countries and law
enforcement jurisdictions.140 As a FWS report explains, combating wildlife trafficking today
requires “stepped-up intelligence sharing” and “the pursuit of complex, cooperative investigations
that stretch across continents.”141 However, the sharing of intelligence with other countries
remains a politically sensitive subject. According to another report, “Actionable information is
often withheld in order to avoid embarrassing the countries involved or because of the perceived
confidentiality of national enforcement processes.”142
Intelligence sharing may not necessarily require divulging potentially sensitive political
information. Some analysts have suggested introducing heightened industry requirements for
tracking commercial wildlife shipments.143 A broad array of trade-tracking technologies could be
applied to wildlife products, including satellite monitoring and the use of barcodes, chemical
tracers, and radio-frequency ID tags and transponders. These technologies are already used in
tracking a wide variety of products, ranging from narcotics to high-value fashion merchandise.
Furthermore, recent scientific findings indicate that ivory products can be traced through DNA
analysis with significant accuracy, although this technology is not ready for commercial use.144
Not all source countries, however, especially in the developing world, have the financial
resources to commit to potentially costly tracking technologies. Other questions include whether
such tracking technologies are reliable, consistent, or feasible for a market, such as the illegal
138 22 U.S.C. §2431
139 USAID, USAID Biodiversity and Forestry Conservation Programs, FY2005, 2007, at http://www.usaid.gov/
our_work/environment/biodiversity/pubs/biodiversity_conservation_forestry_2005_508_ready_102507.pdf.
140 Hayman and Brack, “International Environmental Crime,” p. 24; FWS, Office of Law Enforcement, Strategic Plan,
2006-2010, p. 5.
141 FWS, Office of Law Enforcement, Strategic Plan, 2006-2010, p. 5.
142 Hayman and Brack, “International Environmental Crime,” p. 24.
143 Ibid., pp. 26-27.
144 Samuel Wasser et al., “Using DNA to Track the Origin of the Largest Ivory Seizure Since the 1989 Trade Ban.”
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wildlife market, that includes such a wide variety of products. Indeed, such trade tracking options
are unlikely to be applicable for regulating small-scale wildlife shipments.
Another option could involve further expansion of partnerships with the private sector and
development of models of corporate social responsibility for “soft” regulatory regimes.145 Such
regimes could involve industry certification schemes for manufacturers of traditional Asian
medicine products, Internet-based companies that sell wildlife products, the fashion industry, wild
game hunting and tour guide operations, and many other businesses that may involve illegal
wildlife. In some cases, as with the labeling of traditional Asian medicines, some pilot programs
are underway in other countries, such as the United Kingdom. The non-profit organization,
International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), has also sought to promote legislation in
California to establish a state-wide labeling program for traditional Asian medicines—and
Congress may choose to consider establishing similar, national programs.146 Potential limitations
to this option include the possibility that some wildlife commodities may be so valuable, that
profits would trump voluntary commitments. This has been seen in the U.S. illegal caviar trade,
where companies fraudulently mislabeled tins of illegal caviar.147
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Some environment analysts have argued that U.S. trade sanctions can be used as a diplomatic tool
to encourage other countries to improve their efforts in combating illegal wildlife trafficking.148
One such tool, which has been used on a bilateral basis, is the 1971 Pelly Amendment to the
Fishermen’s Protective Act of 1967.149 This provision involves a two-step sanctioning process,
first requiring the Secretary of Commerce or of the Interior to issue a certification notice to the
President when “nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are engaging in trade or
taking which diminishes the effectiveness of any international program for endangered or
threatened species.”150 The President, in turn, may choose to direct the Secretary of the Treasury
to impose sanctions on imports of any products from the offending country for any duration,
provided that the sanction is not prohibited by the World Trade Organization.
A total of 23 countries or territories have been certified a total of 36 times under the Pelly
Amendment.151 The majority of certifications were due to commercial whaling and unsustainable
fishing practices. The remaining cases involved other endangered wildlife, including Japan in
145 Hayman and Brack, “International Environmental Crime,” p. 32.
146 International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), “Traditional Medicine: A Major Threat That Few Suspect,” at
http://www.ifaw.org/ifaw/general/default.aspx?oid=180459.
147 Andrew C. Revkin, “Vast Caviar Smuggling Case Brings Guilty Pleas,” The New York Times, July 22, 2000.
148 Theodora Greanias, “A Tool of Persuasion: International Wildlife Conservation,” Endangered Species Bulletin (July
1998); and Andrew F. Upton, “The Big Green Stick: Reducing International Environmental Degradation through U.S.
Trade Sanctions,” Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, vol. 22 (1994-1995), pp. 671-692.
149 22 U.S.C. §1978, as amended.
150 Additionally, this law requires the Secretaries to issue a certification notice to the President when foreign countries
are allowing fishing operations to occur that diminish the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program
151 These countries include (dates of certification in parentheses): Japan (1974, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1995, 2000); the
former Soviet Union (1974, 1985); Chile (1978); Peru (1978); South Korea (1978); Norway (1986, 1990, 1992, 1993);
Taiwan (1989, 1991, 1993); Mexico (1991); Colombia (1992); Canada (1992, 1996); Malaysia (1992); Netherlands
Antilles (1992); Singapore (1992); Spain (1992); United Kingdom (1992); Venezuela (1993); Vanuatu (1992); Costa
Rica (1992); France (1992); Italy (1992); Panama (1992, 1993); China (1993); and Iceland (2004).
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1991 for trade in sea turtles; and China and Taiwan in 1993 for trade in rhino horn and tiger bone.
On only one occasion—Taiwan for trade in rhino and tiger parts and products—has the President
imposed sanctions pursuant to the Pelly Amendment. The sanctions temporarily banned the
import of certain fish and wildlife products from Taiwan into the United States. After a few years
of improvements in Taiwanese wildlife trade controls, including cooperative law enforcement
training between FWS and the Taiwanese authorities, the United States terminated its certification
of Taiwan in 1997.152
The certification status listing and the threat of American sanctions under the Pelly Amendment,
however, remains a source of controversy over its effectiveness and legality. On the one hand, it
has been credited for pressuring Japan in the 1990s into addressing its illegal trade in sea
turtles.153 In other cases, however, analysts report that the Pelly certification process has had no,
or limited, effect on offending nations.154 Additionally, some analysts argue that its sporadic use
since the early 1990s, including no further use of sanctions since Taiwan in 1994, may be a
reflection of its ineffectiveness. Other analysts suggest that the U.S. government may have a
political disinclination to impose sanctions against countries for wildlife trafficking. As noted
earlier, the CITES Secretariat currently identifies seven countries in non-compliance with CITES
provisions, none of which are currently certified or sanctioned for their non-compliance. It also
remains unclear how the United States monitors and evaluates foreign country compliance with
international programs for endangered or threatened species—and how or when such evaluations
trigger the certification process.
There also appears to remain some debate surrounding whether the Pelly Amendment sanction
violates World Trade Organization (WTO) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
guidelines. Although Article XX of GATT allows for certain environmental trade measures to
trump the international free trade regime, GATT and WTO have often ruled against unilateral
trade restrictions based on environmental conservation statutes. During the one instance in which
the United States applied a Pelly sanction, it was against a country that was not a member of
GATT or WTO. As a result, it remains to be seen whether a Pelly Amendment sanction would
hold up in a WTO dispute challenge.155 In the meantime, Congress could move to re-evaluate the
effectiveness of the Pelly Amendment as a sanctioning tool and conduct oversight on agencies
involved in the certification and sanctioning process.
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The increasing globalization of trade, interconnectedness of markets and supply routes, and
emergence of transnational businesses has increased the potential for the illegal trade in wildlife.
Indeed, some contend that free trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) may facilitate the illegal trade in wildlife because of fewer trade
152 “Termination of the Pelly Amendment Certification of Taiwan,” Federal Register, vol. 62, no. 83 (April 30, 1997);
and Greanias, “A Tool of Persuasion.”
153 Peter H. Sand, “Whither CITES? The Evolution of a Treaty Regime in the Borderland of Trade and Environment,”
European Journal of International Law, vol. 8 (1997), p. 39.
154 See, for example, Steve Charnovitz, “Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An Analysis of the Pelly
Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices,” American University Journal of International Law and Policy, vol.
9 (1993-1994), pp. 751-807.
155 For a discussion of this, see Scott C. Owen, “Might a Future Tuna Embargo Withstand a WTO Challenge in Light of
the Recent Shrimp-Turtle Ruling?,” Houston Journal of International Law (Fall 2000).
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restrictions, generally. For example, some argue that a free trade agreement (FTA) with Singapore
increased U.S. imports of illegally obtained timber and wildlife from Singapore and other
countries that transport products through Singapore.156 Others argue that a trade agreement with
Peru would have led to an increase in exports of illegally logged timber and wildlife to the United
States from Peru. To address these environmental concerns and others, some have proposed that
FTAs should include specific provisions that direct countries to implement and enforce CITES,
and adhere to existing laws regarding the wildlife trade. Congress is responsible for implementing
legislation for FTAs, and might consider FTAs with Columbia, Panama, and South Korea in the
111th Congress.
Some of these concerns were addressed in U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA).157 The
TPA requires that Parties adopt laws and measures to fulfill its obligations under multilateral
environmental agreements, such as CITES. Further, the TPA would require Parties to enforce
their own environmental laws and would establish a policy mechanism to address public
complaints that a Party is not effectively enforcing its environmental laws whether or not the
failure is trade related. Complaints could be filed by individuals and firms of each Party to the
agreement and would be addressed according to a set of procedures outlined in the TPA.158 An
annex on forest sector governance in the TPA specifically addresses the Parties commitment to
combat trade associated with illegal logging and illegal trade of wildlife.159
The framework for the environmental section in U.S.-Peru TPA could be modified to address the
illegal wildlife trade in future agreements with countries that have a significant illegal wildlife
trade. Proponents of this view see several benefits to including environmental provisions to deter
the illegal wildlife trade in free trade agreements. The FTA may increase the awareness of the
illegal wildlife trade and create additional enforcement mechanisms to address trade violations
(e.g., dispute mechanisms within the agreement). Further, agreements can provide a layer of
assurances that Parties comply with international treaties and enforce their environmental laws. If
there is a mechanism for third parties (e.g., outside groups, such as NGOs) to verify compliance
and report violations to a committee, supporters assert that it might uncover more wildlife crimes.
A potential drawback of this proposal is that requirements for compliance might require
additional funding. If funding is not available, resources might be allocated away from other
enforcement and monitoring activities to meet the conditions of the agreement. If the agreement
allows outside parties to monitor and conduct investigations into possible violations, some within
the country might view this as an infringement on national sovereignty.
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One potential strategy to combat the illegal trade in wildlife is to reduce demand for wildlife.
Supporters of this view suggest raising public awareness through public service announcements
156 Environmental Investigation Agency, “America’s Free Trade for Illegal Timber,” 2006.
157 United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Chapter 18, Environment, at http://www.ustr.gov/
Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html.
158 Ibid.
159 This annex requires Peru to: (1) increase the number and effectiveness of personnel to enforce laws; (2) provide
criminal and civil liability at adequate deterrent levels for actions that undermine the sustainable management of forests
and violate laws pertaining to the harvest and trade of timber; (3) verify that timber products are harvested in
compliance with all laws; and (4) monitor the timber trade within the country, among other things.
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and campaigns to educate consumers, retailers, and importers of wildlife products. In some cases,
as with many tourists, consumers are simply unaware of laws prohibiting the import of products
made of protected wildlife. Retail shop-keepers, manufacturers, as well as import-export suppliers
may also benefit from learning about the availability of sustainable alternatives and the potential
consequences of illegal wildlife trade.
U.S. government and non-governmental organization (NGO) campaigns aimed at demand
reduction, domestically and internationally, are ongoing. In October 2007, for example the State
Department identified Bo Derek as a “Special Envoy of the Secretary of State for Wildlife
Trafficking Issues.” Together with Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, Environment and
Science, Claudia McMurray, Derek conducted a series of outreach events to raise public
awareness about the illegal global trade in wildlife in Southern Florida, which is one of the major
points of entry for legal and illegal wildlife. In Afghanistan, there has been some concern that
U.S. personnel may be attempting to bring back to the United States furs and other wildlife
artifacts that are protected under CITES, Afghanistan law, and U.S. and miliary laws. To address
this the Department of Defense, in concert with officials from the State Department,
Environmental Protection Agency, and the non-profit Wildlife Conservation Society, organized
information sessions to educate U.S. personnel about illegal wildlife and the consequences of
fostering demand for such wildlife products.160
Some reports indicate that these public awareness campaigns may show results. The wildlife
protection NGO WildAid, for example, launched a reportedly successful series of public
advertisements and short films to create awareness about the impacts of the sharkfin trade among
consumers in Asia; the campaign reported a 50-70% decrease in demand in some markets.161
However, it remains to be seen whether future campaigns can show similar results and if these
campaigns can effect long-term changes in consumer culture. Congress might play a role in the
use and evaluation of demand-side strategies in several ways. For example, Congress could
conduct oversight of existing demand-side reduction programs, evaluating the effectiveness of
demand-side programs and assessing what policy options may exist to enhance the cost-
effectiveness of demand-side anti-trafficking initiatives. Additionally, Congress could direct funds
or require U.S. agencies to include demand-side reduction programs in their anti-wildlife
trafficking efforts.
160 “Environmental Education for Afghans Essential, U.S. Officials Say,” Armed Forces Press Service, August 15,
2007.
161 Hayman and Brack, “International Environmental Crime,” p. 31.
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This act establishes as U.S. policy the goals of assisting in conservation and protection of the
African elephant. This law directs the Secretary of the Interior to review export controls of raw
African elephant ivory in producing states and import controls in raw ivory destination countries.
If source or transit countries are found lacking in adequate management of ivory trade, the
Secretary of the Interior can issue a moratorium on the import of raw and worked African
elephant ivory into the United States. The law also makes illegal the (1) import of raw African
elephant ivory from any country other than ivory producing states; (2) the export of raw ivory
from the United States; (3) the import of raw or worked ivory from other countries in violation of
their laws or of CITES regulations; (4) the import of worked ivory from other countries unless
that country certifies that the ivory was derived from legal sources; (5) the import of raw or
worked ivory from a country under moratorium; and (6) the sale of raw or worked ivory in the
United States from importers or exporters that have not obtained permission to do so by the
Secretary of the Interior.
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This act defines what types of plants and animals are “nonmailable,” or prohibited from being
sent to Hawaii using postal services. Specifically, nonmailable animals include injurious animals
prohibited under 18 U.S.C. §42 and illegally taken wildlife prohibited under 16 U.S.C. §3372, are
nonmailable.
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This act aims to regulate interstate and foreign commerce to prevent, detect, control, and
eradicate animal diseases and pests that can affect the livestock industry. Under this act, the
Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to prohibit or restrict the import, entry, export, and
movement in interstate commerce of any animal, article, or means of conveyance, or use of any
means of conveyance or facility if determined to be necessary to prevent the introduction or
dissemination within the United States of any pest or disease of livestock.
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This act regulates interstate and foreign trade, traffic, transport, or other commerce of animals to
(1) insure that animals intended for use in research facilities, for exhibition purposes, or for use as
162 16 U.S.C. §§4201 et seq.; P.L. 100-478, as amended. Congress also enacted another elephant conservation law, the
Asian Elephant Conservation Act of 1997 (16 U.S.C. §§4261-4266; P.L. 105-96, as amended). This law, however, does
not include any provisions that restrict the trade in Asian elephant ivory.
163 39 U.S.C. §3015 note; P.L. 102-393.
164 7 U.S.C. §8301 et seq.; P.L. 107-171.
165 7 U.S.C. §§2131 et seq.; P.L. 89-544, as amended.
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pets are provided humane care and treatment; and (2) assure the humane treatment of animals
during transport in commerce. Among other stipulations, this law requires that animals in
commerce must be marked or identified in a humane manner, and includes standards for handing,
housing, feeding, watering, sanitation, ventilation, shelter from extremes of weather and
temperature, and other guidelines. Further, this law prohibits buying, selling, delivering, or
transporting animals for participation in animal fighting ventures.
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This act provides for the conservation of wildlife and plants of Antarctica, consistent with the
Antarctic Treaty and Protocol. The act makes it unlawful for any U.S. citizen to knowingly
receive, acquire, transport, offer for sale, sell, purchase, import, export, or have custody, control,
or possession of any native bird, mammal, plant, or invertebrate from Antarctica.
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This act makes it unlawful to ship, transport, offer for sale, sell, purchase, import, export, or have
custody, control or possession of any Antarctic marine living resource, or part or product thereof,
known to have been harvested in violation of U.S. laws consistent with the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. Antarctic marine living resources include
finfish, mollusks, crustaceans, and all other species of living organisms, including birds, found
south of the Antarctic convergence.
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This act prohibits the taking, possession, selling, purchasing, bartering, offering to sell, purchase
or barter, transporting, exporting, or importing of any bald or golden eagle, alive or dead, or any
part, nest, or egg thereof. Under certain instances, the Secretary of the Interior may permit
exceptions to this law. Exceptions include instances that are compatible with the preservation of
the bald or golden eagle. Additionally, specimens may be permitted for scientific or exhibition
purposes of public museums, scientific societies, zoos, for religious purposes of Native American
tribes, and if necessary for the protection of certain interests in a particular locality.
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This law prohibits imports, exports, sale, manufacture, offer for sale, transport, and distribution in
the United States of dog and cat fur products. The purpose of this law is to ensure that U.S.
market demand does not provide an incentive to slaughter dogs or cats for their fur.
166 16 U.S.C. §§2401 et seq.; P.L. 95-541, as amended.
167 16 U.S.C. §§2431 et seq.; P.L. 98-623.
168 16 U.S.C. §§668 et seq.; P.L. 86-70, as amended.
169 19 U.S.C. §1308; P.L. 106-476.
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This act establishes a U.S. program for the conservation of endangered and threatened species,
consistent with CITES and other international agreements. The law prohibits any person subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States to engage in any trade in any specimens contrary to the
provisions of CITES, or to possess any specimens traded contrary to the provisions of CITES.
Further, if the Secretaries of the Interior and of Commerce determines a species to be endangered
or threatened, this law prohibits any such species from being imported, exported, taken,
possessed, sold, delivered, carried, transported, shipped by any means, sold or offered for sale in
interstate or foreign commerce. Under certain circumstances, some U.S. persons may be
permitted to take or import listed species.
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This act establishes provisions to protect U.S. vessels on the high seas and in the territorial waters
of foreign countries. Located within this law is the so-called Pelly Amendment,172 which
establishes restrictions on imports of fishery and wildlife products from countries that violate
international fishery or endangered or threatened species programs. Specifically, the law directs
the Secretary of Commerce and/or of the Interior to certify to the President when nationals of a
foreign country directly or indirectly conduct operations in a manner or under circumstances that
diminish the effectiveness of conservation programs for fish and endangered or threatened
species. Once certified, the President may direct the Secretary of Treasury to prohibit the import
of any products from the offending country for any duration, as the President determines is
appropriate and to the extent that such prohibitions are sanctioned by the World Trade
Organization and other multilateral trade agreements.
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This act prohibits any person to transport, import, offer for sale, or possess at any port or place or
on any vessel, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, fur seals or the parts thereof,
including, but not limited to, raw, dressed, or dyed fur seal skins, except under certain
circumstances.
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This act seeks to aid in restoring U.S. birds that have become scare or extinct and to regulate the
introduction of American or foreign birds or animals in localities where they are not native. All
but the first section of the law has since been repealed. In the original, however, this act
prohibited any person or persons to import into the United States any foreign wild animal or bird
except under special permit from the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
170 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544; P.L. 93-205, as amended.
171 22 U.S.C. §§1971 et seq.; P.L. 90-482, as amended.
172 22 U.S.C. §1978; P.L. 92-219, as amended.
173 16 U.S.C. §§1151 et seq.; P.L. 89-702, as amended.
174 16 U.S.C. §701; 31 Stat. 187, as amended.
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This act makes it unlawful to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any fish
or wildlife already taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of state, federal, tribal, or
foreign wildlife laws or regulations. The Lacey Act also requires that all shipments of wildlife or
wildlife products be accurately marked or labeled on shipping containers; it is a violation to
transport wildlife and wildlife products under falsely marked containers. The Lacey Act contains
provisions that restrict the import or transport of species deemed injurious or potentially injurious
to human beings, agriculture, horticulture, forestry, and fish and wildlife resources of the United
States. The statute applies only to wild mammals, birds, fish, amphibians, reptiles, mollusks, and
crustaceans. It does not apply, for example, to insects, plants, and fungi.176
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This act establishes a moratorium on the taking and import of marine mammals and marine
mammal products. It is unlawful to use any port, harbor, or other place under jurisdiction of the
United States to take or import marine mammals and marine mammal products. Further, it is
unlawful to transport, purchase, sell, export, or offer to purchase, sell, or export such animals
taken on the high seas or in waters or land under the jurisdiction of the United States. Some
exceptions to this moratorium are allowed, such as the taking of marine mammals and marine
mammal products for scientific research and other purposes.
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This act seeks to assist in conserving marine turtles and in nesting habitats in foreign countries by
supporting and providing financial resources for projects to conserve the nesting habitats, and
marine turtles in those habitats, and to address other threats to the survival of marine turtles. With
regard to the trade in marine turtles, this law states that it will use conservation projects to prevent
the illegal trade in marine turtles, among other goals. There are no specific prohibitions on trade
of marine turtles in this law.
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The act was enacted in 1918 to implement the International Convention for the Protection of
Migratory Birds signed by the United States and Great Britain (acting for Canada). With
exceptions listed in this act, it shall be unlawful “at any time, by any means, or in any manner, to
pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to do these acts, [or] possess ... any migratory bird, [or]
any part, nest, or eggs of any such bird.... ” Specifically in relation to trade, it is unlawful to sell
or transport migratory birds as defined in the act and associated products contrary to the laws of
the State, Territory, or district in which it was captured, killed, or taken. These conditions also
175 16 U.S.C. §§3371 et seq.; P.L. 97-79, as amended.
176 There are currently 26 individual species, genera, or families listed as injurious species.
177 16 U.S.C. §§1361 et seq.; P.L. 92-522, as amended.
178 16 U.S.C. §§6601 et seq.; P.L. 108-266.
179 16 U.S.C. §§703 et seq.; 40 Stat. 755, as amended.
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apply to the import of birds and associated materials from any Province in Canada. This applies
to migratory species native to the United States and its Territories.
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This act provides grants to conserve the hundreds of bird species that migrate between North and
South America and the Caribbean. Conservation also includes law enforcement under this act.
Further, the act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to support and coordinate existing efforts
to conserve neotropical birds.
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This act addresses the importation of wildlife that might be carrying communicable diseases to
humans. Specifically, §264(a) authorizes the Surgeon General to enforce regulations that “are
necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from
foreign countries into the States or possessions.... ” The Surgeon General is authorized to inspect,
fumigate, disinfect, sanitize, and destroy animals or articles found to be infected or contaminated
“as to be sources of dangerous infection to human beings.182“
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This act seeks to assist in the conservation of all species of rhinos and tigers, including those
already listed as protected species from trade under CITES and U.S. regulations. The law
specifically prohibits the sale, import, and export of products intended for human consumption or
application that contain or are labeled or advertised as containing, any substance derived from
any species of rhino or tiger.
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This act limits or prohibits imports of exotic birds when necessary to ensure that wild exotic bird
populations are not harmed by removal of exotic birds from the wild for trade and that exotic
birds in trade are not subject to inhumane treatment. The law includes provisions to limit or
prohibit U.S. imports of exotic bird species covered by CITES and authorizes moratoria on the
import of species not necessarily covered by CITES.
180 16 U.S.C. §§6101 et seq.; P.L. 106-247, as amended.
181 42 U.S.C. §264(a); 58 Stat. 703, as amended.
182 A list of embargos on specific species can be found at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/animal.htm.
183 16 U.S.C. §§5301 et seq.; P.L. 103-391, as amended.
184 16 U.S.C. §§4901 et seq.; P.L. 102-440.
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In conjunction with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Canada, Mexico, and
the United States also signed the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation and
created the Commission for Environmental Cooperation in 1993. This international organization
was established to address regional environmental concerns, help prevent potential trade and
environmental conflicts, and promote the effective enforcement of environmental law, including
those protecting wildlife. Through its North American Working Group on Environmental
Enforcement and Compliance Cooperation, this organization provides senior wildlife
enforcement officials from NAFTA countries a forum for regional cooperation, expertise
exchange, and enforcement capacity building. One component of this working group is the North
American Wildlife Enforcement Group (NAWEG), created in 1995.
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As parts of its efforts to address environmental crimes, Interpol established a Working Group on
Wildlife Crime in 1994. The wildlife working group’s primary goals are to coordinate information
sharing related to wildlife crime on an international scale and to facilitate and coordinate
operational enforcement activity. To achieve this, Interpol maintains an international network for
the exchange of information, enhances domestic operations in member countries through
cooperation and coordination activities, and assists in training wildlife enforcement officers in
developing countries. In 1996, a full-time officer was appointed to manage Interpol’s wildlife
crime programs.
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With its specialty in international trade and customs administration and 171-country membership,
including the United States, the World Customs Organization works with other international
organizations and member countries on wildlife trafficking and other issues. Since July 1996, the
World Customs Organization and the CITES Secretariat have maintained a legal framework for
international cooperation to exchange information related to wildlife crime and promote
awareness and training for customs and management authorities at the national level.
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During the March 2007 Group of Eight (G-8) meeting of environmental ministers in Postdam,
Germany, the attendees committed to the “Postdam Initiative—Biological Diversity 2010.”185
This agreement aims to strengthen international efforts to combat the illegal trade in wildlife,
among other concerns, by 2010.
185 Countries represented at the meeting included the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the
United Kingdom.
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Acknowledging that the trafficking of forest products, including wildlife, is often linked to
organized crime and can involve the same actors who traffic drugs, arms, and persons, the United
States, in conjunction with Indonesia, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, sponsored a
resolution that urges countries to fight forest and wildlife crime by strengthening law enforcement
cooperation, combating criminal groups operating within their borders, and cooperating through
the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the U.N. Convention Against
Corruption. The resolution, first presented for adoption in 2006, was adopted on April 25 at the
2007 commission meeting in Vienna.186
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The Lusaka Agreement on Co-operative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in
Wild Fauna and Flora is a formal intergovernmental organization, which entered into force in
1996, under the auspices of the U.N. Environment Programme. The group aims to improve
wildlife crime law enforcement cooperation and capacity-building. As part of the Lusaka
Agreement, the member states launched the Lusaka Task Force as a permanent law enforcement
institution to facilitate international cooperation in carrying out wildlife crime investigations in
Africa. The Task Force, which includes as parties to the agreement the governments of the
Republic of Congo, Kenya, Lesotho, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia, is sometimes referred to as
the “African Interpol for Wildlife.”
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Unveiled in 2007, the E.U. Enforcement Action Plan to Combat Illegal Wildlife Trade seeks to
improve wildlife trade enforcement across the E.U. as well as in wildlife source countries. In the
source countries, the E.U. aims to provide law enforcement capacity building as well as increase
awareness of illegal wildlife trade.
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Established in February 2008 under the South Asia Cooperative Environmental Programme, the
South Asia Wildlife Trade Initiative includes country representatives from Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. During the initiative’s
first regional workshop from January 31 to February 1, 2008, senior wildlife officials from these
countries agreed to increased cooperation in regulating their wildlife trade. The country
representatives established two efforts to realize this goal: the South Asia Experts Group on
Wildlife Trade and the South Asia Regional Strategic Plan on Wildlife for 2008 through 2013.
186 U.N. Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, “International Cooperation in Preventing and
Combating Illicit International Trafficking in Forest Products, Including Timber, Wildlife and Other Forest Biological
Resources,” Australia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and United States of America: revised draft resolution, April
25, 2007.
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Liana Sun Wyler
Pervaze A. Sheikh
Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy
lwyler@crs.loc.gov, 7-6177
psheikh@crs.loc.gov, 7-6070
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