ȱ
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˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
•’œ˜—ȱǯȱ–’‘ȱ
ÂŽÂ’œ•ŠÂ’ŸŽȱ˜›—Ž¢ȱ
Ž‹›žŠ›¢ȱŘǰȱŘŖŖşȱ
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ÅȬśÅŖŖȱ
   ǯŒ›œǯ˜Ÿȱ
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Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
ž––Š›¢ȱ
Under the United States Constitution, Congress has little direct authority to legislate in the field
of domestic relations. The primary authority and responsibility to legislate in the domestic
relations arena lies with the individual states. The rationale behind this approach is the lack of
overriding national considerations in the family law area. However, states’ freedom to legislate
has led to substantial variation between the individual states on many topics including incidents
of marriage, divorce and child welfare. As such, Congress continues to utilize a number of
indirect approaches to enact numerous federal laws which impact on family law questions. This
report discusses the extent to which Congress is constitutionally authorized to legislate on family
law questions, and includes examples of present laws utilizing the various approaches available in
this area.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
˜—ÂŽ—Âœȱ
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
General Constitutional Principles.................................................................................................... 3
Due Process............................................................................................................................... 3
Equal Protection ........................................................................................................................ 5
Enumerated Powers................................................................................................................... 6
Overview of Federal Domestic Relations Legislation..................................................................... 7
Areas in Which Congress Has Direct Authority to Legislate.................................................... 7
Federal Benefits .................................................................................................................. 7
Taxation............................................................................................................................... 9
Bankruptcy.......................................................................................................................... 9
Indians............................................................................................................................... 10
Indirect Approaches .................................................................................................................11
The Commerce Clause.......................................................................................................11
Funding Nexus.................................................................................................................. 13
Uniform State Laws .......................................................................................................... 14
“Sense of the Congress†Resolutions................................................................................ 17
Implementation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause......................................................... 18
Proposed Constitutional Amendments .......................................................................................... 23
Conclusion..................................................................................................................................... 23
˜—ŠŒÂœȱ
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 24
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
—›˜ÂžŒÂ’˜—ȱ
Under the United States Constitution,1 Congress has little direct authority to legislate in the field
of domestic relations. Generally, state policy guides these decisions. Despite the lack of direct
authority to legislate domestic relations issues, Congress continues to utilize a number of indirect
approaches to enact numerous federal laws which impact on family law questions.
The Constitution’s framers felt that states, rather than the federal government, should maintain
jurisdiction over most family law questions. Thus, the final document reflects that view. As
summarized by the Supreme Court in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo:2
Insofar as marriage is within temporal control, the States lay on the guiding hand. “The
whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the
laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.†In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-
94 (1890).... On the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict with a federal
statute, this Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination
whether Congress has “positively required by direct enactment†that state law shall be
preempted. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904).
Thus, the individual states have the primary authority and responsibility to legislate in the
domestic relations arena, which includes incidents of marriage, divorce, and child welfare. The
rationale behind this approach is the lack of overriding national considerations in the family law
area. Therefore, states generally have the freedom to legislate as they see fit on these questions.
However, states’ freedom to legislate has led to substantial variation between the individual states
on many of these topics, although more uniformity now exists than at any time in the past.3 Thus,
similarly situated spouses, parents and children may have different legal options depending on
where they reside. For example, the community property concept of marital property adopted by
nine states4 is quite different from the common law property system in the other forty-one states.
While all states have some form of no-fault divorce, based either on grounds such as
“irreconcilable differences†or some period of separation, many authorize divorces based on fault
or consider marital fault as a factor when awarding spousal support or dividing marital property.
In addition, states have varying rules regarding the “who, what, when and where†of marriages
and/or divorces.
Adoption is another area in which states have diverse regulations. For example, state statutes
concerning the eligibility of homosexuals to adopt range from Florida’s statutory prohibition5 to
1 U.S. Const. art. VI, § , cl. 2 states “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.†However, this language encompasses
only those areas where Congress has authority to legislate; see discussion of the enumerated powers clause, infra.
2 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979).
3 For example, all states adopted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) under which states treat valid
child support orders entered in another state as having been entered in their own state. States’ adoption of uniformed
laws such as UIFSA, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) have aided in fostering consistency and efficiency in the enforcement of interstate
child support and custody orders.
4 Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin (due to statutory
changes initiated in 1986).
5 Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 63.042. On January 28, 2004, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals found that the statute does not violate
(continued...)
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
Mississippi’s statute barring adoption by same-sex couples6 to Utah’s prohibition on unmarried
couples, heterosexual or homosexual, from adopting.7 In addition, states have different statutes
regarding the rights of adopted adults, birth parents, adoptive parents, birth siblings and birth
relatives to gain access to identifying8 and non-identifying9 information about the adoptee or birth
relatives. For example, a few states permit adoptees to gain access to their birth and/or adoption
records,10 but most require a court order issued for “good cause†(usually a medical crisis or some
comparably serious situation) before unsealing such information. Although many states use
similar procedures, the laws and processes surrounding access in any one state are unique.
During the first half of the twentieth century, numerous constitutional amendments were proposed
which, if adopted would have authorized Congress to enact uniform national marriage and
divorce laws. However, none of these proposals received the requisite two-thirds vote of each
House of Congress necessitating submission to the states for ratification.11 This approach now
appears disfavored12, in part due to a continuing view that the federal government should refrain
from intervening in most family matters and in part because other approaches (all discussed infra)
have led, or have the potential of leading, toward the same result in those areas where uniformity
is thought desirable.
For example, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), a
non-governmental entity, has proposed uniform laws on a number of family law topics, many of
which have been widely adopted by the states. A more expansive view of congressional power to
(...continued)
the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lofton v. Sec. of the Dept. of Children and
Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 816 (11th Cir. 2004). However, on August 29, 2008, a state court found this statute
facially invalid under the state’s constitution. Specifically, the court held that the statutory ban violated constitutional
provisions pertaining to adoption, prohibiting bills of attainder and separation of powers. In re Adoption of John Doe,
2008 WL 5070056 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008).
6 Miss. Ann. Code. § 93-17-3(2).
7 Utah Stat. § 78B-6-117. This statute does not expressly prohibit adoption by single people, nor does it ban same-sex
couples from adopting from private agencies. On November 4, 2008, voters in Arkansas approved a similar citizen-
initiated statute prohibiting unmarried sexual partners (both opposite-sex and same-sex couples) from adopting or
serving as foster parents. For more information on same-sex adoptions, refer to CRS Report RS21191, Same-Sex
Adoptions, by Alison M. Smith.
8 Identifying information encompasses data which may lead to positively identifying an adopted adult, birth mother, or
birth father such as names, addresses, and dates contained in court records or submitted to the State Department of
Vital Statistics.
9 Non-identifying information is generally restricted to details about the adopted adult and the adopted adult’s birth
relatives. Information can include any of the following: date and place of adopted adult’s birth; age of the birth parents
and a description of their general physical appearances; the race, ethnicity, religion, and medical history of the birth
parents; type of termination; facts and circumstances relating to the adoptive placement; age and sex of children of the
birth parents at the time of adoption; educational levels of the birth parents and their occupations, interests, skills; any
supplemental information about the medical or social conditions of members of the birth family provided since the
adoption’s completion.
10 Adopted adults 18 or older have automatic access to their original birth certificates only in Alaska, Kansas, and, in
some cases Ohio, Tennessee, and Montana, depending upon which year the adoption was finalized.
11 Article V of the U.S. Constitution provides two ways to propose amendments to the document and two ways to ratify
them. Amendments may be proposed either by the Congress, by two-thirds vote of the House and the Senate (of those
present and voting, provided a quorum is present), or by a convention called by Congress in response to applications
from the legislatures of two-thirds (34) or more of the states.
12 However, beginning in the 107th Congress, legislation proposing a constitutional amendment defining as or limiting
marriage to the “union of a man and a woman.†See, H.J.Res. 93, 107th Cong.; H.J.Res. 56, S.J.Res. 26, and S.J.Res.
30, 108th Cong.; S.J.Res. 1, S.J.Res. 13; H.J.Res. 39, 109th Cong. and H.J.Res. 22, 110th Cong.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Řȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
legislate under its commerce clause authority has led to federal legislation such as the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), which authorizes federal intervention into certain custodial
interference cases where applicable state law classifies such action as a felony. Also, Congress
has enacted legislation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Legislation under this clause
directs sister states to give full faith and credit to child custody, child support and protection
orders of other states. Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act, which permits sister states to
give no effect to the law of other states with respect to governing same-sex marriages. Congress
has also established a number of funding programs whereby states must comply with detailed
requirements in such areas as child abuse and the adoption of hard-to-place children before they
can receive federal money to help deal with these problems.
This report discusses the extent to which Congress is constitutionally authorized to legislate on
family law questions, and includes examples of present laws utilizing the various approaches
available in this area.
Ž—Ž›Š•ȱ˜—œÂ’ž’˜—Š•ȱ›’—Œ’™•Žœȱ
There are generally applicable constitutional principles which limit the authority of all
governmental entities (federal, state, and local) to legislate on family law questions.
žŽȱ›˜ŒŽœœȱ
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause13 has a substantive component which
“provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights
and liberty interests,â€14 including parents’ fundamental rights to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of their children.15 Although the Constitution does not specifically
mention a fundamental right to privacy, courts recognize this right to encompass contraception,
abortion, marriage, procreation, education (elementary level) and interpersonal relations.16 These
aspects broadly termed “private family life†are constitutionally protected against government
interference. As such, a governmental entity must demonstrate a compelling interest to regulate or
infringe on an individual’s fundamental right. As summarized by the Supreme Court in Moore v.
City of East Cleveland:17
“This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
13 The Fourteenth Amendment forbids any State to “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law,†or to “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.â€
14 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
15 Id.; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993).
16 In addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the “liberty†specially protected by the Due
Process Clause includes the rights to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); to have children, Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); to marital privacy, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); to use contraception, ibid.; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); to bodily
integrity, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), and to abortion, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
17 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
řȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
Amendment.†Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974). A
host of cases, tracing their lineage to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 300, 399-401 (1923), and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925), have consistently acknowledged a
“private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.†Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944).
The LaFleur decision struck down various local maternity leave rules which required pregnant
teachers to begin leave at specified stages of their pregnancies and not to return to work until
some specified point in the school year after their children were born or attained a certain age.
Meyer and Pierce invalidated statutes which were held to interfere with parents’ right to educate
their children as they see fit; the Meyer statute prohibited instruction in foreign languages before
the eighth grade,18 while the statute in Pierce required children to attend public schools.19 Moore
stuck down a local ordinance that specified which members of extended families could reside
together in common households—in the particular household which formed the basis for the suit,
two grandchildren could have legally resided with their grandmother under the ordinance were
they siblings, but were prohibited from doing so because they were first cousins.20 The Court
noted that while the family is not beyond regulation, “when government intrudes [into family
matters], this Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests
advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulations.â€21
In Griswold v. Connecticut,22 the Supreme Court recognized an additional tenet of privacy: the
right of married couples to use contraceptives. The Court extended this right to minors, married
or unmarried, in Carey v. Population Services International.23 Also, In Roe v. Wade,24 the
Supreme Court substantially limited governmental authority to regulate abortions, holding that a
mother’s personal privacy right prevented a state from intervening at the first trimester of
pregnancy, and permitted intervention during the second trimester only as needed to protect the
mother’s health. The Court reasoned that a state’s interest fails to become compelling enough to
justify extensive regulation until a fetus becomes viable, at approximately the end of the second
trimester. This ruling was clarified, but retained in three companion cases decided in 1983: Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron25; Planned Parenthood Association of
Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft;26 and Simopoulous v. Virginia.27 In 1992, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed Roe’s essential holding that before viability of the fetus, a woman has the right
to choose to have an abortion and has the right to obtain an abortion without undue interference
from the state.28 In Planned Parenthood of S.E. PA v. Casey, the Court held that a statute requiring
spousal notification before a woman could have an abortion constituted an undue burden, thus
violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.29 However, the remaining four
18 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 300, 399-401 (1923).
19 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
20 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
21 Id.
22 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
23 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
24 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
26 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
27 462 U.S. 506 (1983).
28 Planned Parenthood of S.E. PA v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
29 Id.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Śȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
challenged aspects of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 were found to be
constitutional and not undue burdens. The Court held valid: (1) the act’s definition of a “medical
emergency,†a condition warranting exemption from the act’s other limitations; (2) record keeping
and reporting requirements imposed on facilities that perform abortions; (3) an informed consent
and 24-hour waiting period requirement; and (4) a parental consent requirement, with the
possibility for a judicial bypass.30
A right to marry has also been judicially accepted as a guarantee of due process. Thus, the Court
struck down miscegenation statutes in Loving v. Virginia,31 finding that the state lacked a
compelling interest in prohibiting persons from marrying based solely on their race.
šžŠ•ȱ›˜ÂŽŒ’˜—ȱ
The Equal Protection Clause32 is another constitutional limitation on governmental entities’
authority to legislate on domestic relations issues. When legislation or government policy
discriminates between classes or deprives a group of a particular right, the level of scrutiny
applied under an equal protection challenge turns on the nature of the group allegedly
discriminated against. As a general rule, courts will uphold the challenged governmental action if
the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.33 For
example, states can legislate to protect minors, prevent close relatives from marrying, require
blood tests before marriage and impose other marriage restrictions so long as the restrictions are
reasonably related to a valid state interest.
Where the statute targets a quasi-suspect class, namely those based upon gender or illegitimacy, a
heightened level of scrutiny applies. Under this intermediate scrutiny test, the statute is presumed
invalid unless it is substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest.34 For
example, in Orr v. Orr,35 the Supreme Court applied this standard and found a statute which
imposed alimony obligations on husbands, but not on wives unconstitutional as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause. However, where a statute targets a suspect class, including race,
alienage, or national origin or burdens a fundamental right, the statute in question will only be
sustained if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Under this standard, the
Court has stuck down statutes in Eisenstadt v. Baird36 and Skinner v. Oklahoma37 as violative of
30 Id.
31 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
32 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.†While there is no corresponding provision applicable to
the federal government, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applies the same limitation to the federal
government.
33 See e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (applying the rational basis test in analyzing the equal protection
challenge to the state constitutional amendment which prohibited all governmental action designed to protect
homosexuals from discrimination).
34 See generally, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (stating that if gender-based governmental
discrimination is to pass judicial muster, the state must demonstrate the existence of an “exceeding persuasive
justification.â€).
35 440 U.S. 268 (1979); see also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)(finding unconstitutional a statute which
imposed a one-half support requirement on widowers, but not on widows, in establishing surviving spouse benefits’
entitlements).
36 405 U.S. 438 (1972)(finding unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried persons).
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
śȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
the Equal Protection Clause. Conversely, in Nguyen v. INS,38 the Supreme Court found a statute
which provided different rules for attainment of citizenship depending upon whether the one
citizen parent was the father or mother, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.39
One instance where these arguments have been unsuccessful involves adult adoptees seeking to
obtain information on their birth parents. Such adoptees have advanced both personal privacy and
equal protection claims when challenging closed records statutes. However, courts consistently
ruled that the privacy rights of the birth parents, as well as the state’s interest in maintaining a
smoothly-functioning adoption system (parents might become reluctant to place children for
adoption if they thought the children would later seek them out), justify these laws.40 However,
the Supreme Court has yet to rule on this question so the issue of closed records statutes remains
unsettled.
—ž–Ž›ŠÂÂŽÂȱ˜ Ž›œȱ
As opposed to the general constitutional restraints discussed above, Article I, Section 8, of the
Constitution, the enumerated powers clause, limits congressional authority to act by specifying
general subject categories where federal action is permissible. These categories encompass those
topics the Constitution’s framers thought could best be handled on the national level, such as war-
making and defense, interstate and foreign commerce, coinage and currency, the post office,
bankruptcies, copyrights, and the judicial system. Under this clause and the Tenth Amendment,41
categories other than those enumerated are reserved for state action.
These enumerated powers do not readily encompass most family law questions. As such, federal
legislation in this area is usually hinged on some other federal interest. For example, while states
have the primary authority to legislate on adoption, alien children less than sixteen years of age
adopted by unmarried United States citizens have been granted immigrant status.42 Legislation
such as the Indian Child Welfare Act43 is based on congressional authority over Indian questions.
States retain general authority over child pornography, but the federal government can regulate
that portion which moves in interstate or foreign commerce, and/or which is shipped through the
mail.44
(...continued)
37 316 U.S. 535 (1942)(holding a law requiring sterilization of certain criminals violative of equal protection; but
emphasizing the importance of marriage and procreation).
38 533 U.S. 52 (2001).
39 Id. The Court found that two important governmental interests justified Congress’s decision to impose different
requirements: (1) the importance of assuring a biological parent-child relationship exists; and (2) the determination
ensuring that the child and citizen parent have some demonstrated “opportunity to develop a relationship that consists
of real, everyday ties providing a connection between child and citizen parent.†Id.
40 See, e.g. ALMA Society v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1125 (2d Cir. 1979); Yesterday’s Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431 (7th
Cir. 1979).
41 The Tenth Amendment states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.â€
42 8 U.S.C. § 1101.
43 P.L. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.
44 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2259,2423; 19 U.S.C. § 1305; See also, CRS Report 95-406, Child Pornography: Constitutional
Principles and Federal Statutes, by Henry Cohen.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Ŝȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
Where Congress has authority to act in a given area, it can exercise one of three options:
Congress can (1) supersede all state action on the question; (2) defer entirely to individual state
judgments; or (3) legislate somewhere between these two extremes. Congress’s options can best
be illustrated by looking at its handling of former spouses’ entitlements to pensions paid under a
federal retirement program. Under Social Security and the Railroad Retirement System,45 a
former spouse who meets specified conditions is entitled to 50% of the covered spouse’s
benefit,46 while federal civil service and military pensions are divisible at the option of the
individual state hearing the matter (i.e., states are authorized to treat civil service47 and military
retirement48 payments the same way they treat other pensions for this purpose). The acts
governing foreign service and Central Intelligence Agency pension division49 are hybrids between
these two approaches, as they suggest a pro rata division formula predicated on length of
marriage/length of service, but permit deviation from this formula by court order or if the parties
agree to some other arrangement.
Where congressional intent is unclear or ambiguous, as was the case pertaining to the possible
division of military pensions in divorce cases for some time,50 or where Congress fails to act in a
certain area when it has the authority to do so, individual states are free to act and/or interpret the
applicable federal statutes as they see fit, subject to the constitutional considerations discussed
above. However, once Congress acts to clarify its intent, states are bound by this interpretation
and are no longer free to vary their approaches.
ŸŽ›Ÿ’Ž ȱ˜ÂȱŽÂŽ›Š•ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂ’˜—ȱ
›ŽŠœȱ’—ȱ‘’Œ‘ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
Šœȱ’›ŽŒÂȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ
ÂŽÂŽ›Š•ȱŽ—ŽÂÂ’Âœȱ
Congress has plenary legislative authority over federal salaries, pensions, and other benefits,
including those aspects which touch on family law questions. The State of California advanced a
strong argument in McCarty v. McCarty,51 that its interest in its residents’ well-being, along with
general state authority over divorce law, was sufficient to confer upon its courts the authority to
grant a divorced wife a share of her husband’s military pension. The Supreme Court disagreed,
45 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (Social Security); 45 U.S.C. § 231a (Railroad Retirement). These payments do not reduce the
retired spouses’ entitlements.
46 Many of the laws cited in this report have exceptions or technicalities not covered by these general summaries. The
texts of the particular statutes should be consulted if additional information is required.
47 5 U.S.C § 8345(j)(1).
48 10 U.S.C. § 1408.
49 22 U.S.C. § 4044 (foreign service); § 222 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act, (CIARA) codified as a
note following 50 U.S.C. § 403.
50 Although there is no federal statute directly on point, the Supreme Court examined a number of related statutes and
congressional documents before deciding in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), that Congress had not intended
that military pensions be divisible in this context. At the time of this decision, all of the community property states and
a number of equitable distribution states were dividing military pensions, but they could no longer do so after it was
issued. The McCarty decision and subsequent legislative action to authorize such division is discussed in the next
“Federal Benefits“.
51 453 U.S. 210 (1981)(holding that federal law prevented state divisions of military pensions in divorce cases).
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Åȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
citing congressional power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the Constitution “[t]o make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.†The military system was
enacted pursuant to this grant of constitutional authority, and the Court found that the application
of state community property law as envisioned by the lower court McCarty rulings (which
divided the pension) could potentially frustrate the congressional objectives of providing for
retired personnel and meeting the management needs of the active forces. However, the McCarty
court recognized the serious plight of an ex-spouse of a retired service member,52 and invited
Congress to change the situation legislatively if so desired. Congress shortly thereafter enacted
the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (FSPA),53 which authorized states to
divide, or not divide, these pensions in accordance with applicable state laws and precedents.
As discussed in the preceding section, Congress has for the most part deferred to state judgments
in those divorce cases which involve pensions paid to federal employees. Of the pertinent
statutes, only the Foreign Service Act and the CIA retirement Act contain suggested division
formulas. These optional formulas take into account the particularly disadvantageous economic
position of many of the wives whose husbands served in the Foreign Service or with the CIA.
Under the Social Security Program, a former spouse who was married to an annuitant spouse with
ten or more years of covered service54 is entitled to 50% of the annuitant’s pension at the time he
or she reaches age 62, provided the former spouse has not remarried prior to that time.55 This is a
separate entitlement which does not reduce or affect the annuitant spouse’s payment. Even in the
absence of these statutes, voluntary division of annuities was possible if the parties so agreed.
However, as might be imagined, such action occurred infrequently.56
Certain former spouses of Social Security,57 Civil Service,58 military,59 railroad,60 CIA,61 and
Foreign Service62 annuitants are entitled to survivor annuities (annuities which continue after the
annuitant spouse’s death). Moreover, federal payments, including wages, pensions, tax refunds,
and most other benefits, can be garnished for alimony and child support payments.63
52 453 U.S. at 253.
53 10 U.S.C. § 1408.
54 Periods of employment where the annuitant spouse paid into the Social Security System.
55 42 U.S.C. § 402(b).
56 In the vast majority of divorce cases, the parties work out their financial arrangement without court assistance, and
the court routinely incorporates this agreement as part of the final decree unless it is on its face grossly unfair to either
party. Thus, there is no reason why an annuitant spouse cannot voluntarily agree to divide his or her annuity with the
other spouse, presumably in return for some other consideration; and such agreements, once finalized by court order,
are binding on the parties. However, the rationale behind legislatively sanctioning such division is that it is unlikely
many annuitants will voluntarily agree to split a pension when there is no legal requirement to do so.
57 42 U.S.C. § 402(e), (f).
58 5 U.S.C. § 8341(h)(1).
59 10 U.S.C. § 1447.
60 45 U.S.C. § 231a.
61 CIARA, § 204, codified as a note following 50 U.S.C. § 403.
62 22 U.S.C. § 4054.
63 42 U.S.C. §§ 659-662, 664
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Şȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
Š¡ŠÂ’˜—ȱ
Nearly every tax imposed by Congress has at least a tangential impact on family life, if only
because it determines how much money the family might have available to it under specified
circumstances. This topic is much too complex to provide more than a brief overview of possibly
relevant provisions and approaches.
Congress frequently uses its taxing power to establish social policies, as shown in its
determinations that people should be encouraged to adopt,64 to contribute to charitable
organizations,65 or purchase their own homes.66 To promote marriage neutrality,67 Congress
passed the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001.68 Another tax provision
frequently thought to have major social policy implication involves tax deductions for certain
child care expenditures.69 However, these deductions may show congressional recognition that
both parents often must work for financial reasons, or there is only one parent to support the
family, rather than a congressional belief that both parents should necessarily be encouraged to
work outside the home.
Furthermore, there are numerous tax provisions which become operable when couples divorce.
Frequently those negotiating a financial settlement can choose among several options which can
have a substantial impact on the amount of money available to each spouse following the divorce.
Tax laws treat child support and alimony differently. For example, alimony or separate
maintenance payments from one spouse to another are deductible by the person making the
payments and treated as taxable income to the recipient, while child support payments are neither
taxable income to the recipient nor deductible by the payer.70
There are also a number of tax laws which reference adoption. For the most part, these statutes
provide that adopted children are to be treated the same as natural born children for whatever
purpose is involved.71
Š—”›ž™ÂŒ¢ȱ
Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to establish “uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.†As with taxation, the entire
64 P.L. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 extends permanently the adoption credit for children other than special needs children. In
addition, the act increases the maximum credit to $10,000 per eligible child, including special needs children. The act
also extends permanently the exclusion from income for employer provided adoption assistance.
65 26 U.S.C. § 170 (deductions to qualified organizations tax exempt).
66 26 U.S.C. § 163 (mortgage interest tax exempt).
67 Marriage neutrality means that the tax system should not influence the choice of individuals with regard to their
marital status. For a discussion on the marriage tax penalty relief provisions of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001, see CRS Report RS21000, Marriage Tax Penalty Relief Provisions of the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, by Gregg A. Esenwein.
68 P.L. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38. This act contains three marriage tax penalty relief provisions: (1) increases the standard
deduction for joint returns to twice the amount of the standard deduction for single returns; (2) increase the width of the
15% marginal income tax bracket for joint returns to twice the width of the 15% tax bracket for single returns; and (3)
increases the earned income credit phaseout start and end points for joint returns.
69 26 U.S.C. § 44.
70 26 U.S.C. §§ 71(a), 215.
71 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 318 (constructive stock ownership); § 2613 (tax on generation skipping transfers).
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
şȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
Bankruptcy Code, codified as Title 11 of the United States Code, can have an effect on the family
lives of those involved in personal or business-related bankruptcies. However, for family law
purposes, the most important provision prohibits individuals from discharging alimony and/or
child support payments.72 Other provisions may affect such situations as the timing of a
bankruptcy petition vis a vis the filing of a divorce suit, or interspousal transfers prior to the filing
of a bankruptcy petition or while such a petition is pending.
—Â’Š—œȱ
Generally, Indian tribes have extensive power to regulate domestic relations among tribal
members. As summarized in the authoritative text on this subject:
Indian tribes have been accorded the widest possible latitude in regulating the domestic
relations of their members. Indian custom marriage has been specifically recognized by
federal statute, so far as such recognition is necessary for purposes of inheritance. Indian
custom marriage and divorce has been generally recognized by state and federal courts for all
other purpose.... No law of the state controls the domestic relations of Indians living in tribal
relationship, even though the Indians concerned are citizens of the state.... Property relations
of husband and wife, or parent and child, are likewise governed by tribal law and custom.73
However, some tribes specifically defer to state authority in this area,74 recognizing as valid
marriages and divorces where pertinent state statutes have been followed. Federal law75 permits
states to assume jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are
parties, and which arise in Indian country, as long as the tribe occupying the particular Indian
country specifically consents to the exercise of jurisdiction.76 Once the tribe consents, this
authority encompasses such civil actions as marriage, divorce, and adoption.77
These various approaches are recognized under 25 U.S.C. § 372a which states that “heirs by
adoption†for purposes of certain probate matters shall include adoptions entered by a state court
or an Indian court; those approved by the superintendent of the agency having jurisdiction over
the tribe of either the adoptee or the adoptive parent; and adoptions handled in accordance with
procedures established by the tribal authority of the tribe of either the adoptee or the adoptive
parent. Rights of parties to marriages between Indians and non-Indians are set forth at 25 U.S.C. §
181-184.
The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)78 is a comprehensive measure designed to “protect the best
interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
72 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).
73 Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 137 (4th ed. 1954), (footnotes and citations omitted).
74 E.g. State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court of Fifteenth Judicial District in and for Roosevelt County, 162 Mont.
335, 512 P.2d 1292 (1972) (Assiniboine-Sioux Tribes); Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893 (1974)
(Cheyenne Tribe).
75 25 U.S.C. § 1322.
76 Id.; Kennerly v. District court of Ninth Judicial District of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1972); Poitra v. Demarrias, 502
F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974).
77 E.g., Nononka v. Hoskins, 645 P.2d 507 (Okla. 1982); United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.
1974).
78 P.L. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŖȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
families.â€79 Establishment of minimal federal standards for the removal of Indian children from
their homes and procedures for their foster or adoptive placement, and funding a variety of Indian
child and family welfare programs help facilitate the act’s goals. Indian tribes retain jurisdiction
over custody proceedings involving Indian children unless they specifically decline to exercise
it.80
Upon attaining age 18, Indian adoptees are entitled to receive information as to their birth parents’
tribal affiliation and other information necessary to protect rights flowing from their tribal
relations.81 This is the only federal statute dealing with the confidentiality of adoption records.
—Â’›ŽŒÂȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘Žœȱ
Congress utilizes indirect approaches in instances where it lacks direct authority to legislate in the
domestic relations field. These indirect approaches include (1) the Commerce Clause; (2) a
funding nexus or spending power; (3) Uniform State laws; (4) “Sense of Congress†resolutions;
and (5) the Full, Faith & Credit Clause of the Constitution.
‘Žȱ˜––Ž›ŒŽȱ•ŠžœŽȱ
Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution authorizes Congress “to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States.†There are three categories of activities subject to
congressional regulation under the commerce clause. Congress may regulate the use of the
channels of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, although the threat
may come only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress may regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce.82 Thus, Congress can regulate interstate aspects of
certain family law matters even in the absence of direct legislative authority in the area.
For example, the Federal Parent Locator Service, an office in the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) helps states locate non-custodial parents who fail to make court-ordered
child support payments, once states have exhausted their own efforts to locate these individuals.83
Under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA),84 this office also acts on requests
from authorized persons to locate non-custodial parents who have abducted their children from
custodial parents in violation of valid court orders.85
The PKPA also makes the Federal Fugitive Felon Act86 applicable to cases involving parental
kidnapping and interstate or international flight to avoid prosecution under applicable state felony
statutes. This provision again defers to state judgments inasmuch as the provision fails to become
operable unless the state where the violation occurred has classified such action as a felony.
79 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
80 25 U.S.C. § 1911.
81 25 U.S.C. § 1917.
82 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-559 (1995) (citations omitted).
83 42 U.S.C. § 653.
84 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.
85 18 U.S.C. § 663.
86 18 U.S.C. § 1073.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŗȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
A parent whose child has been taken out of the country has greater difficulty in locating the child
and arranging for his or her return than if the child remains in this country.87 However, if the
taking is classified as a felony, extradition treaties can sometimes be used to effectuate this result.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law completed work on a Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, which the Senate consented to October 9, 1986.
Congress adopted legislation to clarify how the Convention would be implemented in this
country.88
The Commerce Clause also serves as the basis for federal regulation of child pornography that
moves in interstate or foreign commerce.89
In 1992, Congress passed the Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA)90 which created a federal
criminal offense for any willful91 failure to pay past child support obligations to a child who
resides in a different state than the parent.92 Appellate courts that have thus far heard appeals of
the CSRA decisions have unanimously declared the CSRA a constitutional exercise of
congressional authority, pursuant to the Commerce Clause.93 The Second Circuit pointed to the
fact that various state courts attempted to make the defendant pay his child support, but failed.94
Because the Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to pass legislation which aids the
states in matters that are beyond their “limited territorial jurisdiction,â€95 the court concluded that
87 See generally Westbrook, “LAW AND TREATY RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS,†20 Va. J. of Int’l
L. 149 (1981).
88 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11607. The Hague Convention fails to provide for the recognition and/or enforcement of foreign
custody decrees; rather, it requires restoration of the custody status quo that existed before the abduction. Thus, it
denies the abductor any legal advantage in the country to which the child has been taken as courts in that country are
under a treaty obligation to return the child to the country from which the child was abducted without conducting any
proceedings on the merits of the underlying custody claim(s). For a discussion and analysis of the Convention, see
“AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS,†16 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 415
(1984).
89 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2259; See also CRS Report 95-406, Child Pornography: Constitutional Principles and Federal
Statutes, by Henry Cohen.
90 P.L. 102-521, 106 Stat. 3403 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 228).
91 The original bill created a presumption that any nonpayment of child support was intentional. See 138 Cong. Rec. S
17131 (daily ed. October 7, 1992)(statement of Sen. Kohl). The bill which was actually enacted provided that the
government must prove a willful failure to pay. See id. At least two lower courts have found the rebuttable mandatory
presumption that the existence of a court support order indicated a defendant’s ability to pay violated due process by
shifting to the defendant the burden of persuasion of the crime’s willfulness element. See, United States v. Morrow, 368
F.Supp.2d 863 (C.D. Ill. May 6, 2005); United States v. Pillor, 387 F.Supp.2d 1053 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2005). While
these courts found that the presumption (18 U.S.C. § 228(b)) violates due process, both found the section severable.
92 See 18 U.S.C. § 228(a).
93 See United States v. Kukafka, 478 F.3d 531 (3rd Cir. N.J. 2007); United States v. Klinzing, 315 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. Wis.
2003); United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. Mich. 2001)(finding that the CRSA did not usurp state
enforcement, as the act merely reinforced state laws which states were unable to enforce on an interstate basis); United
States v. Lewko, 269 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. N.H. 2001); United States v. Benton, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17385 (4th Cir. S.C.
August 3, 2001); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Parker, 108 F.3d 28 (3rd Cir.
1997)(finding that CSRA falls within the cope of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause as a valid
regulation of activity having a substantial effect upon interstate commerce); United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027
(1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999 (10th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996)(holding that Congress possesses the power, under the
Commerce Clause, to punish willful violations of child support orders); United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir.
1996).
94 See Sage, 92 F.3d at 103.
95 Id. at 105.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŘȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
Congress has the authority to intervene and help the states.96 Further, it held that if Congress can
use the Commerce Clause to promote interstate commerce, then “it surely has power to prevent
the frustration of an obligation to engage in commerce.â€97 Merely because the obligation comes
from a court order, and not a contract, does not alter the outcome; the obligation is, nevertheless,
a result of interstate economic activity among the states.98 The Supreme Court has yet to rule on
this question.
ž—Â’—ÂȱŽ¡žœȱ
The public child welfare system is society’s mechanism for protecting children whose families
are unsafe or unable to care for them. States have the primary responsibility for administering
child welfare services and establishing policy. However, the federal government plays a
significant role in child welfare, by providing funds to states and attaching conditions to these
funds. Provision of these funds is a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power as Article 1,
Section 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to use federal monies to provide for the
common defense and the general welfare. These programs have been judged not to violate the
Constitution due to the voluntary nature of states’ participation. States and localities remain free
to reject the federal monies; but if accepted, they are taken subject to the conditions imposed by
Congress.
Most federal funds specifically targeted toward child welfare activities flow to the states through
the Social Security Act, which authorizes capped grants for various child welfare services
(Subparts 1 and 2 of Title IV-B), and open-ended entitlement funding for foster care maintenance
and adoption assistance on behalf of children removed from their biological homes (Title IV-E).
In addition, the freestanding Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) authorizes
formula grants to help states support their child protective services systems.99 As such, the
Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act100 imposes detailed requirements on state
participants, including, inter alia, implementation of state programs which mandate the reporting
of known or suspected instances of child abuse or neglect; investigation of such reports by
properly constituted authorities; the provision of protective and treatment services to endangered
children; immunity provisions for persons making good-faith reports of suspected instances of
abuse and neglect; confidentiality of records, with criminal sanctions for those who illegally
disseminate protected information; cooperation between agencies dealing with child abuse and
neglect cases;101 and other topics which would assist in identifying, preventing and treating child
96 Id.
97 Id. at 105-106.
98 Id. at 106.
99 Child protective services include investigation of child abuse and neglect reports and removal of children from home
if necessary for their protection. Child welfare services include various home-based services to strengthen and improve
family functioning, other supportive services to maintain children in their own homes, financial support and services
for children while they are in foster care, services to reunite children with their families if possible, and adoption
assistance or other permanency planning services for children if family reunification is not feasible.
100 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115.
101 This situation can pose a particular problem due to the interests of law enforcement personnel who wish to prosecute
offenders may run counter to those of social workers, who want to minimize the child’s traumatic experience, and if
possible, return him or her to the household at an early date. These goals are made more difficult if a member of the
household is charged with abuse and/or the child is called upon to discuss the abuse with law enforcement officers or in
court.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗřȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
abuse and neglect.102 This law is not aimed at those guilty of the abuse; but, rather is intended to
help discover, treat and prevent as many child abuse cases as possible.
In the case of the Federal Child Support Enforcement Program (CSE),103 the federal nexuses are
the federal matching funds obtained by the states. All fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands operate CSE programs and they are entitled to the matching
federal funds. This program provides seven major services on behalf of children: (1) parent
location, (2) paternity establishment, (3) establishment of child support orders, (4) review and
modifications of support orders, (5) collection of support payments, (6) distribution of support
payments and establishment and enforcement of medical support.
To provide these services to children, requirements are put upon the states and participants alike.
State requirements include automated registries of child support orders along with a centralized
automated state collection and disbursement unit. Likewise, applicants and recipients are required
to cooperate in establishing paternity or obtaining support payments or risk penalties for
noncompliance. If a determination is made that an individual is uncooperative without any good
cause or other exception, then the state must reduce the family’s benefit by at least 25% and may
even remove the family from the program.
Collection methods used by CSE agencies include income withholding, intercepts of federal and
state income tax refunds, intercepts of unemployment compensation, liens against property,
security bonds, and reporting child support obligations to credit bureaus. Moreover, all
jurisdictions have civil or criminal contempt-of-court procedures and criminal non-support laws.
P.L. 105-187, the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, established two new federal criminal
offenses (subject to a two-year maximum prison term) with respect to non- custodial parents who
repeatedly fail to financially support children who reside with custodial parents in another state or
who flee across state lines to avoid supporting them.104 Furthermore, P.L. 104-193, officially
known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996, required states to
implement expedited procedures to allow them to secure assets to satisfy arrearages by
intercepting or seizing periodic or lump sum payments (such as unemployment and worker’s
compensation), lottery winning, awards, judgments, or settlements, and assets of the debtor parent
held by public or private retirement funds, and financial institutions.105 In addition, the law
required states to implement procedures under which the state would have authority to withhold,
suspend or restrict use of driver’s licenses, professional and occupational licenses, and
recreational and sporting licenses of persons who owe past-due support or who fail to comply
with subpoenas or warrants relating to paternity or child support proceedings.106
—’˜›–ȱŠŽȱŠ œȱ
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is a non-governmental entity
formed in 1982 “to promote uniformity in state laws on all subjects where uniformity is deemed
102 See CRS Report RL31082, Child Welfare Financing: Issues and Options, by Karen Spar and Christine M. Devere.
103 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-66.
104 P.L. 105-187, 112 Stat. 618 amending 18 U.S.C. § 228.
105 P.L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
106 Also, passports may be denied, revoked or restricted for individuals certified by a state agency as owing more than
$2,500 in past due support. 42 U.S.C. 652(k) and 22 C.F.R §§ 51.70(a)(8), 51.72(a) and 51.80(a)(2). The Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171) reduced the arrearage amount from $5,000 to $2,500.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŚȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
desirable and practical.â€107 Since the entity’s inception, it has drafted and approved several
uniform acts, which have met with varying degrees of success in terms of enactment by state
legislatures. Three uniform domestic relations acts which have gained widespread acceptance
deal with the enforcement of child support orders (UIFSA) and recognition of child custody
decrees (UCCJEA and UCCJA) entered in other states. All states adopted the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act (UIFSA) under which state courts basically treat valid child support orders
entered in another state as having been entered in their own state (the state which has jurisdiction
over the person required to pay the support) for enforcement purposes.108 The states’ adoption of
the UIFSA was due to Congress’s enactment of welfare reform, officially known as the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.109 In this act, Congress
mandated enactment of UIFSA for a state to remain eligible for the federal funding of child
support enforcement.110
UIFSA provides procedural and jurisdictional rules for essentially three types of interstate111 child
support proceedings: (1) a proceeding to establish a child support order; (2) a proceeding to
enforce a child support order and (3) a proceeding to modify a child support order. UIFSA
implements the “one-order system.†This means that only one state’s order governs, at any given
time, an obligor’s support obligation to any child. Further, only one state has continuing
jurisdiction to modify a child support order. This requires all other states to recognize the order
and to refrain from modifying it unless the first state has lost jurisdiction.
UIFSA only governs jurisdiction to hear interstate child support proceedings. The Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)112 (or the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act [UCCJEA])113 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)114 govern
jurisdiction to hear custody proceedings. Thus, the forwarding of a UIFSA proceeding to a state
that would not normally have jurisdiction over custody issues115 does not subject the petitioner to
custody claims the respondent might make. Further, a court properly hearing a UIFSA proceeding
“may not condition the payment of a support order issued under (UIFSA) upon compliance by a
party with provisions for visitation.â€116
107 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws’ Constitution, § 1.2.
108 Unif. Interstate Family Support Act, 9 (pt. IB) U.L.A. 306 (1999). See also discussion of the Federal Child Support
Enforcement Act infra at 148.
109 42 U.S.C. § 666.
110 42 U.S.C. § 666(f). See Kansas v. United States, 24 F.Supp.2d 1192 (D. Kan. 1998)(upholding Title III of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 and its requirement of states to pass UIFSA
against the Spending Clause and Tenth Amendment challenges).
111 The word “interstate†is used here to mean that one or both parents have left the state in which they were married or
maintained a relationship.
112 9 (pt IB) U.L.A. 261 (1999). Before the adoption of the UCCJEA in 1997, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia had adopted the UCCJA.
113 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the UCCJEA in 1997 as a replacement
for the UCCJA.
114 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
115 Under the PKPA, the UCCJEA, and, to a lesser extent, the UCCJA, the child’s home state is favored for jurisdiction
over custody issue.
116 UIFSA § 305(d), 9 (pt. IB) U.L.A. 306 (1999). See id. Prefatory Note, 9 (pt.IB) U.L.A. 241, Part II.B.2.b (1999)
(“Visitation issues cannot be raised in child support proceedings.â€). See, e.g., Office of Child Support Enforcement v.
Clemmons, 984 S.W.2d 837 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999).
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ȱ
One would think that a final domestic relations decree entered in one state should be uniformly
recognized and enforced throughout the other states. However, this was frequently not the case,
because in many instances a second state would assert its own jurisdiction to modify the original
decree or enter a new decree which in its view supersedes the original one.117 That is why, for
example, the UCCJA, as discussed above, failed, despite its widespread adoption by the states, to
result in the broad national recognition of child custody decrees its sponsors anticipated and
desired. Rather, non-custodial parents would take the child to another state, and that state, by
virtue of its jurisdiction over the party seeking the modification, would enter a new decree
changing the custody arrangement because circumstances changed since the entering of the
original decree.118 This meant that the child’s mother could have a valid decree in one state,
granting her custody, while the father had an equally valid decree in another state, granting him
custody—with concomitant frustration and expenditures of time and/or money by both parents,
yielding unfortunate results to the child. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980
(PKPA)119 has now largely taken care of the problem.
However, it must be noted that the PKPA does not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts. This
act merely delineates which jurisdiction may modify child support and custody orders. As such,
the PKPA is inapplicable to instate disputes and only relevant in interstate disputes when the
jurisdictions have conflicting laws. Under the Supremacy Clause, the jurisdictional guidelines set
forth in the PKPA supersede any conflicting state law. As such, parents are bound by state court
decisions regarding custody, visitation and support.
“Uniform acts†such as UIFSA, UCCJA, UCCJEA fail to specify what court orders must contain
or what courts must consider when drafting them, but deal exclusively with their enforcement
once finalized. Other proposals, such as the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) and the
Uniform Adoption Act, include specific guidelines for courts to follow in drafting these various
orders.
Even when domestic relations laws are drafted with great specificity, they fail to yield
comparable results in seemingly comparable cases. Each domestic relations case presents a
unique fact pattern which gives judges and hearing examiners wide discretion in determining an
equitable ruling in each case. Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible to talk in terms of “averageâ€
alimony awards or predict with any degree of accuracy what custodial arrangement a judge will
order in a particular divorce case. Generally, a party who receives an adverse ruling can only
appeal on an “abuse of discretion†ground, an extremely difficult standard to meet. For this
reason, reported domestic relations cases120 have little precedential value except when cited for
general policy considerations. However, courts can modify alimony, child support and/or child
custody (not marital property division)121 provisions, upon a showing of changed circumstances.
117 In addition, most custody decrees are not final for purposes of the full faith and credit clause, as the issuing state
may modify. Thus, the doctrine of res judicata, which holds that upon a finally adjudication a matter cannot be
reopened or collaterally attacked in the original state or elsewhere, fails to apply in child custody decrees. See, e.g.
Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
118 In many instances the only change was the fact that the child was not living with the other parent and sufficient time
elapsed so that the court in the new state felt the best decision was to assure this new continuity of care for the child.
119 P.L. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3566,3567; codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.
120 The only cases available for research purposes are those appealed. The appeal results in a written decision reprinted
in various court reporting services.
121 Marital property settlements are usually only modified upon a showing of fraud or coercion at the time the
settlement was approved by the parties or imposed by the court.
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ȱ
Adoption of uniformed laws such as UIFSA, UCCJEA and UCCJA has aided in fostering
consistency and efficiency in the enforcement of interstate child support and custody orders.
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Another indirect approach which Congress utilizes to obtain desired results are “Sense of the
Congress†resolutions. These resolutions lack any legally binding force or effect, but are
introduced in the hope that if Congress goes on record as favoring a certain policy, the individual
states will be encouraged to adopt legislation advancing that policy.
For example, H.Con.Res. 67 expressed the sense of the Congress that:
[A] uniform State act should be developed and adopted which provides grandparents with
adequate rights to petition State courts for privileges to visit their grandchildren following
the dissolution because of divorce, separation, or death of the marriage of such
grandchildren’s parents, and for other purposes.
This resolution passed the House of Representatives on April 22, 1985, and passed the Senate on
September 29, 1986.122 Consequently, some states have enacted specific grandparent visitation
statutes, while others include grandparents within a broader third-party visitation statute.
The content of these visitation laws varies greatly.123 Several states limit visitation to cases
involving deceased parents.124 Others specifically extend the right to cases of divorce, annulment
or separation. A few states allow grandparent visitation even over the objections of both parents in
122 132 Cong. Rec. S26904 (daily ed. September 29, 1986).
123 The following is a list of state statutes governing third-party visitation. Alabama (Ala. Code § 30-3-4); Alaska
(Alaska Stat. §§25.20.060, 25.20.065); Arizona (Ariz Rev. Stat.Ann. §25-409); Arkansas (Ark.Stat. Ann. §§9-13-102
and 9-13-103); California (Cal. Fam. Code §§ 3102-3104); Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 19-1-117 and 19-1-117.5);
Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-56(a), 46b-57, 46b-59 and 46b-129); Delaware (Del. Code. Ann. Tit. 10 §
1031(7)); Florida (Fla. Stat. § 752.01); Georgia (Ga. Code § 19-7-3); Hawaii (Hawaii Rev. Stat §§ 571-46(7) and
571.46.3); Idaho (Idaho Code § 32-719); Illinois (Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 750 and 5/607); Indiana (Ind. Code §§ 31-17-5-1
thru 31-17-5-2); Iowa (Iowa Code § 598.35); Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-1616 and 38-129); Kentucky (Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 405.021); Louisiana (La. Rev. Stat. Civ Code Ancillaries § 9:344 and Children’s Code § 1264); Maine (Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. Title 19-A §§ 1653(2)(B) and 1801 through 1805); Maryland (Md. Fam. Law Code § 9-102);
Massachusetts (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. § 119-39D); Michigan (Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 722.27(b), 722.27b and 722.26c);
Minnesota (Minn. Stat. §§ 257.022, 257c.08 and 518.1752); Mississippi (Miss. Code. Ann. §§ 93-16-1 and 93-16-7);
Missouri (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.402); Montana (Mont. Code Ann. § 40-9-102); Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-1801
thru 43-1803); Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 125A.330 and 125A.340); New Hampshire (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
458:17d); New Jersey (N.J. Rev. Stat. § 9:2-7.1); New Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-9-1 thru 40-9-4); New York
(N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 71 thru 72 and 240(1)); North Carolina (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40-13.2); North Dakota (N.D. Cent.
Code § 14-09-05.1; Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3109.051); Oklahoma (Okla. Stat. Tit. 10 § 5); Oregon (Or. Rev.
Stat. § 109.119); Pennsylvania (Pa. Cons. Stat. Tit. 23 §§ 5311 thru 5314); Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 15-5-24.1
thru 15-5-24.4); South Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-420(33)); South Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 25-4-52
thru 25-4-54, and 25-5-29 thru 25-5-34); Tennessee (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-302 thru 36-6-303); Texas (Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. §§ 154.432 thru 153.434); Utah (Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-5-5(a) and 30-5-2); Vermont (Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit.
15 §§ 1011 thru 1016); Virginia (Va. Code §§ 20-124.1 thru 20-124.2); Washington (Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
26.09.240); West Virginia (W. Va. Code Chapter 48, article 10); Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.245); Wyoming
(Wyo. Stat. § 20-7-101).
124 See e.g. Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875 (PA 2006)(holding that application of state statute allowing visitation or
partial custody to grandparents upon the death of a child’s parent did not violate the father’s due process right to direct
the care, custody, and control of his child); see also, In re estate of Thurgood, No. 20040796, 2006 WL 2457822 (Utah
August 26, 2006)(finding that grandparent visitation statute did not unconstitutionally infringe upon a parent’s right to
the care, custody, and control of his or her children).
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ȱ
an ongoing family,125 and even against the argument that parents have the constitutional right to
raise their child as they see fit.126 Most states, however, hold by statute or court decision that the
ongoing family is not subject to enforced intrusion by grandparents, if both parents are fit and
object.127
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Article, Section 1 of the Constitution, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, states:
“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the
manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the effect
thereof.â€
This clause applies principally to the interstate recognition and enforcement of judgments. It is
settled law that final judgments are entitled to full faith and credit, regardless of other states’
public policies,128 provided the issuing state had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter.129 Judgments subject to future modification, such as child support and child custody
orders, are not considered final. Therefore, they are not entitled to full faith and credit.130 As
discussed below, however, Congress enacted the PKPA and the Full Faith and Credit for Child
Support Act to accord full faith and credit to child custody and support orders.131 The Full Faith
and Credit Clause has rarely been used by courts to validate marriages because marriages are not
“legal judgments.†However, courts routinely recognize out-of-state-marriages.
Questions concerning the validity of an out-of-state marriage are generally resolved without
reference to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. As previously discussed, marriages are not regarded
as judgments. In the legal sense, marriage is a “civil contract†created by the States which
125 State ex rel. Brandon L. v. Moats, 551 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 2001)(finding Grandparent Visitation Act does not
violate parents’ substantive due process right of liberty in connection with the care, custody, and control of children
without undue interference from the state because the act requires an affirmative determination that visitation would not
substantially interfere with the parent-child relationship and places the burden of proof on grandparents to show that
visitation is in the child’s best interest); but see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)(finding unconstitutional a
Washington statute allowing “any person†to petition a court “at any time†to obtain visitation rights whenever
visitation “may serve the best interests†of a child as applied to an order requiring a fit parent to allow her child’s
grandparents more extensive visitation than the parent wished).
126 Id.;Lily v. Lily, 43 S.W.3d 703 (Tex. App. 2001)(finding Grandparent visitation statute did not violate due process
on its face, as statute allowed only grandparents under particular circumstance to petition for visitation, and provided
that it was in child’s best interests).
127 See e.g. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57; see also, Linder v. Linder, No. 01-380, 2002 WL 723898, *1 (Ark. April
25, 2002) (holding state’s grandparent visitation law invalid as applied to an otherwise fit mother who rebuffed the
visitation requests of her deceased husband’s parents); Wickham v. Byrne, No. 92048, 2002 WL 595036, *1 (Ill. April
4, 2002) (finding Illinois grandparent visitation law facially invalid because it places a fit parent on equal footing with
the parent seeking visitation); State ex rel. Brandon L. v. Moats, 551 S.E. 2d 674 (W. Va. 2001).
128 In Fauntelroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) the Supreme Court required Mississippi to give full faith and credit to a
Missouri judgment, even though the judgment was based upon a “futures†contract, a transaction which Mississippi had
outlawed as against its public policy.
129 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 107.
130 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 109.
131 28 U.S.C. 1738A.
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establishes certain duties and confers certain benefits.132 Validly entering the contract creates the
marital status; the duties and benefits attached by a State are incidents of that status.133
The general rule of validation for marriage is to look to the law of the place where the marriage
was celebrated, lex celebrationis. A marriage satisfying the contracting state’s requirements will
usually be held valid everywhere.134 Many states provide by statute that a marriage validly
contracted elsewhere is valid within the state. At least twenty-three states have adopted language
substantially similar to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA),135 which states: “All
marriages contracted ... outside this State, that were valid at the time of the contract or
subsequently validated by the laws of the place in which they were contracted ... are valid in this
State.â€136 Several states provide an exception to this general rule by declaring out-of-state
marriages void if against the state’s public policy or if entered into with the intent to evade the
law of the state. As such, eleven states have passed legislation prohibiting recognition of out-of-
state same-sex marriage.137 Moreover, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),138
which prohibits the federal recognition of same-sex marriages and allows individual states to
refuse to recognize such marriages performed or recognized in other states.139
The Full Faith & Credit clause is applicable to divorces. In two related cases known as Williams I
140 and Williams II, 141 the Supreme Court articulated the extent to which the Full Faith and Credit
Clause applies in divorce cases. Both cases arose out of the following scenario: a man and a
woman, both domiciliaries (permanent residents) of North Carolina and married to other people,
moved to Nevada. They lived there for six weeks to satisfy the Nevada durational residency
requirement for divorce, at which time they obtained divorces upon substituted service (i.e. their
spouses were notified by publication only and failed to participate in the proceedings), married
each other, and returned to North Carolina. North Carolina then began prosecution under its
bigamous cohabitation statute.
132 On the state level, common examples of nonnegotiable marital rights and obligations include distinct income tax
filing status; public assistance such as health and welfare benefits; default rules concerning community property
distribution and control; dower, curtesy and inheritance rights; child custody, support agreements; name change rights;
spouse and marital communications privileges in legal proceedings; and the right to bring wrongful death, and certain
other, legal actions.
133 On the federal level, marriage results in: distinct housing entitlements; federal income tax rates; Medicare,
Medicaid, and veterans’ benefits; and immigration and citizenship rights.
134 See, Annotation, 71 A.L.R. 687 (1960).
135 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Utah, Virginia, Wyoming.
136 Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act § 210, 9A U.L.A. 147.
137 Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah. For a
discussion of same-sex marriages, refer to CRS Report RL31994, Same-Sex Marriages: Legal Issues, by Alison M.
Smith.
138 P.L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
139 Id. Legislation was introduced in the 108th Congress to repeal the provisions of DOMA codified in Title 1. H.R.
2677, the “State Regulation of Marriage is Appropriate Act,†was introduced by Congressman Barney Frank on July 9,
2003. The bill was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on July 9, 2003 and was referred to the
Subcommittee on the Constitution on September 4, 2003. No further action has been taken on this bill.
140 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
141 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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In Williams I, the Supreme Court held that in granting the divorce, Nevada was justified in
assuming that the parties were bona fide Nevada domiciliaries (a jurisdictional requirement).
Thus, the divorce was valid and warranted recognition as such by the other states including North
Carolina. However, in Williams II, the Court held that a divorce decree issued in one state could
be collaterally impeached in another by proof that the court which tendered the decree lacked
jurisdiction. In this particular case, the fact that the new Mr. and Mrs. Williams returned to North
Carolina immediately following their marriage was sufficient to justify the North Carolina court’s
conclusion that the couple was not domiciled in Nevada at the time their divorce was granted. As
such, the divorce was void because the issuing court lacked proper jurisdiction.
In Williams II, the rule remains in effect today, as modified by the Supreme Court’s holding in
Sherrer v. Sherrer142 that a divorce cannot be subsequently attacked by a spouse for lack of
jurisdiction if the spouse participated in the divorce proceeding and the divorce court specifically
ruled that it had jurisdiction.143 Under this ruling, if both parties participate in a divorce
proceeding and/or consent to the court’s jurisdiction (i.e., obtain a “bilateral†divorce, neither
party can attack the decree for lack of jurisdiction).144
Due to the increased uniformity of divorce laws, states’ adoption of no-fault divorce statutes and
shorter durational residency requirements situations such as the ones mentioned above continue to
decrease. These reasons reduce a party’s need to seek out what may be viewed as a more
favorable divorce jurisdiction. While the situation has minimized with domestic divorce decrees,
a comparable situation now exists regarding certain foreign divorce decrees (e.g., those where
only one party appears briefly in the issuing jurisdiction).145
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not govern the domestic validity of divorce judgments
from foreign countries. The rule of comity, which generally provides for recognition of foreign
decrees issued by courts of competent jurisdiction, governs. However, the jurisdictional tests
applied are usually those of the United States,146 rather than the divorcing country. As such, a
divorce obtained in a foreign country will be invalid in the United States if neither spouse was
domiciled in that country, even if domicile is not required for jurisdiction under its law. New York
is the only state which recognizes bilateral foreign divorces (where both parties participate) even
where its own jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied.147 No state recognizes such unilateral
divorces (where only one party appears).
Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion in Williams I, noted that Congress had the authority
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to require national recognition of divorce decrees, but had
not yet chosen to exercise such authority:
142 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
143 When “[i]t is clear that respondent was afforded his day in court with respect to every issue involved in the litigation
... there is nothing in the concept of due process which demands that a defendant be afforded a second opportunity to
litigate the existence of jurisdictional fact.†334 U.S. at 348 (citations omitted).
144 The Court further held in Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581(1951), that a child could not collaterally attack her
parents’ divorce where both parties participated in the proceeding.
145 Such divorces are commonly known as “Mexican divorces,†even though Mexico tightened its residency
requirements in 1971 so that few American now qualify for a divorce in that country. However, several Caribbean
countries continue this practice.
146 State jurisdictional requirements ordinarily include some formal residency requirement (usually six months or a
year) and proper notice to the opposing party.
147 Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E.2d 709 (1965).
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
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...[I]t is clearly settled that if a judgment is binding in the state where it was rendered, it is
equally binding in every state. This rule of law was not created by the federal courts. It
comes from the Constitution and the Act of May 26, 1790, c. 11, 1 Stat. 122. Congress has
not exercised its power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to meet the special problems
raised by divorce decrees. There will be time enough to consider the scope of its power in
this regard when Congress chooses to exercise it. 317 U.S. at 306.
In response to this dicta, Senator Pat McCarran introduced bills in the 80th through the 83rd
Congresses148 which, if enacted would have required all states to recognize divorce decrees
where: (1) the decree was final as to the issue of divorce; (2) the decree was valid in the state
where rendered; (3) the decree stated that the jurisdictional prerequisites of the issuing stated had
been met; and (4) the issuing state was the last state where the spouses were domiciled together as
husband and wife; or the defendant was personally subject to jurisdiction in that state, or appeared
generally in the divorce proceedings. The only exceptions included fraud of the successful party
which misled the defeated party. Two of these bills passed the Senate, in 1952 and 1953,149 but
neither became law and no such measure is presently pending.
Congressional action under the Full Faith and Credit Clause has been minimal, “[i]ndeed, there
are few clauses of the Constitution, the merely literal possibilities of which have been so little
developed as the full faith and credit clause.â€150 Only on five occasions has Congress enacted
legislation to require States to give full faith and credit to certain types of acts, records and
proceedings. Three of the enactments pertain to family law concerns.
To date, the major legislative initiative in this area is 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, a provision of the PKPA
which requires states to give full faith and credit to child custody decrees entered in other states
unless the state asked to modify the original order has jurisdiction to do so, and the state which
issued the original order lacks jurisdiction to modify the order or declines to exercise its
jurisdiction.151 In addition, under 42 U.S.C. § 666(a), states must grant full faith and credit to each
other’s child support orders, to the extent of not modifying them retroactively.152
In 1994, the 103rd Congress passed the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act,153
requiring each state to enforce child support orders issued by the child’s home state if done in
compliance with the act’s provisions. The law was designed so that a person with a valid child
support order in one state would not have to obtain a second order in another state should the
debtor parent move from the issuing court’s jurisdiction. Rather, the second state must recognize
the first state’s order as valid, but can modify it only when the child and the custodial parent have
moved to the state where the modification is sought or have agreed to the modification.
148 S. 1960, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); S. 3, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1940); S. 1331, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); and S.
39,83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
149 S. 1331, 82d Cong., passed the Senate on June 21, 1952, 98 Cong. Rec. 7773; S. 39, 83d Cong., passed the Senate
on May 6, 1953, 99 Cong. Rec. 4575.
150 Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation 970 (1992).
151 For specific jurisdictional requirements, see 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c). Under this language, a state court retains
jurisdiction over a child for six months after the child leaves the state, as long as the custodial parent continues to reside
in that state.
152 This provision was added as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, P.L. 99-509, Title X, §
9103(a), 100 Stat. 1973.
153 P.L. 103-383, 108 Stat. 4064, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738B.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Řŗȱ
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ȱ
Retroactive modification is prohibited, and prospective modification is authorized if the court
finds that circumstances exist which justify a change.154
Also in 1994, Congress passed the Safe Homes for Women Act of 1994,155 requiring states to
recognize domestic violence protection orders issued by sister states. Any protection order issued
by one state or tribe shall be treated and enforced as if it were an order of the enforcing state. The
act extends to permanent, temporary, and ex parte protection orders. Full faith and credit is
afforded during the period of time in which the order remains valid in the issuing state. Protection
orders are only afforded full faith and credit if the due process requirements of the issuing state
were met.
In the previous instances, Congress’s exercise of its full faith and credit enforcement power was
necessitated by the failure of sister state courts to give full faith and credit to orders not regarded
as final judgments. Congress directed sister states to give full faith and credit to child custody,
child support, and protection orders from other states. In effect, Congress required each state to
give the child custody, child support, and protection orders of other states the same faith and
credit it gives its own such orders.
Conversely, in 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).156 This act differs in
one critical aspect from the other legislative enactments passed by Congress under its full faith
and credit power: the DOMA permits sister states to give no effect to the law of other states.157
Congress enacted DOMA in response to claims by advocates of same-sex marriage that, if any
state legalizes same-sex marriage, all states and federal agencies will have to recognize as valid
all same-sex marriages performed in that same-sex-marriage-permitting state.158 Congress
recognized that the legalization of same-sex marriage in any jurisdiction would have far-reaching
potential effects upon all people and upon a wide spectrum of laws in the jurisdiction, ranging
from marriage law to public school curricula, from custody law to public finances, from adoption
to insurance issues, from alimony and property division to employment regulations.159 Moreover,
154 42 U.S.C. § 666(a).
155 P.L. 103-322, title IV, § 40221(a), 108 Stat. 1930, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2265.
156 P.L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
157 28 U.S.C. § 1738C states: “No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to
give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.â€
158 The first step in this direction was taken by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Levin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
The Baehr court held that while there is no fundamental right for same-sex couples to marry, the state statute restricting
marriage to opposite-sex couples established a sex-based classification subject to strict scrutiny for the purposes of an
equal protection challenge. The court held that the statute amounted to sex discrimination when analyzed under this
standard. Following this decision, the Hawaii state legislature amended the state constitution in 1998 to bar recognition
of same-sex marriages and the state supreme court found that “the marriage amendment validated†the statute in
question in Baehr.
159 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 10-11 (1996)(discussing the interstate and federal implications of the legalization of
same-sex marriages in any jurisdiction). In Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), the Vermont Supreme Court
held that it was a violation of the state constitution to deny same-sex couples the benefits and protections afforded
opposite-sex married couples. The plaintiffs in Baker were three same-sex couples in committed relationships ranging
from four to twenty-five years; two of the couples had children they had raised as a family. The couples applied for
marriage licenses and were rejected, and brought suit challenging the validity of the statute under which they were
denied licenses. The trial court found in favor of the defendants, finding that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples
“rationally furthered the State’s interest in promoting ‘the link between procreation and child rearing.â€â€˜
Recharacterizing the issue as one of equal protection, the Vermont Supreme Court held that same-sex couples must be
(continued...)
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŘŘȱ
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these potential effects involved a policy issue of great importance to the people of each
jurisdiction warranting decision by each jurisdiction.
›˜™˜œŽÂȱ˜—œÂ’ž’˜—Š•ȱ–Ž—–Ž—Âœȱ
Between 1917 and 2001, 33 constitutional amendments were proposed to give Congress authority
to legislate on marriage and divorce questions.160 In addition, 12 bills were introduced during this
period to provide for uniform marriage and divorce laws throughout the United States,
presumably in anticipation that such a constitutional amendment would be ratified.161
Eleven of the proposed constitutional amendments162 and all of the implementing bills introduced
in the Senate were sponsored by Senator Arthur Caper. The text of his proposed amendments
uniformly stated:
The Congress shall have power to make laws, which shall be uniform throughout the United
States, on marriage and divorce, the legitimization of children, and the care and custody of
children affected by annulment of marriage or by divorce.
However, none of these proposed amendments ever received congressional action. Beginning in
the 107th Congress, legislation has been introduced proposing a constitutional amendment to
define marriage as the “union of a man and a woman.â€163
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In the absence of a constitutional amendment providing general authority for Congress to
legislate in the field of domestic relations, its direct authority is limited to those areas specifically
reserved for congressional action under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution. However, various
indirect approaches, most notably those tied to congressional authority under the commerce
clause and Congress’s appropriations powers, have resulted in significant federal impact on a
myriad of family law questions.
(...continued)
afforded privileges and responsibilities under state law equal to those enjoyed by opposite-sex couples that are married.
The holding does not mandate that same-sex couples be allowed to marry; instead, the Court left the exact procedure
for effecting the change to the legislature. The Vermont state senate passed the mandated bill in April 2000, allowing
same-sex couples to form civil unions. While not labeled “marriages,†these unions entitle the couples to all the state
benefits of marriage.
160 S.J.Res. 34, H.J.Res. 55, and H.J.Res. 187, 65th Cong., S.J.Res. 55, H.J.Res. 75, and H.J.Res. 108, 66th Cong.;
S.J.Res. 31, S.J.Res. 273, H.J.Res. 83, and H.J.Res. 426, 67th Cong., S.J.Res. 5, S.J.Res. 53, H.J.Res. 6, H.J.Res. 9,
H.J.Res. 40, and H.J.Res. 109, 68th Cong., S.J.Res. 31, H.J.Res. 30, H.J.Res. 58, and H.J.Res. 110, 69th Cong.; S.J.Res.
40, H.J.Res. 35, and H.J.Res. 162, 70th Cong.; S.J.Res. 123, 71st Cong.; S.J.Res. 234 and H.J.Res. 558, 7th Cong.; and
S.J.Res. 28, 80th Cong.
161 S. 4394 and H.R. 13976, 67th Cong.; S. 1751, 69th Cong.; S. 1707, 70th Cong.; S. 3147, 71st Cong.; S. 3098 and H.R.
8908, 75th Cong.; S. 791, 76th Cong.; S. 810, 77th Cong.; S. 460, 78th Cong.; S. 726, 79th Cong.; S. 198, 80th Cong.
162 S.J.Res. 273, 67th Cong.; S.J. Res.5, 68th Cong.; S.J. Res.31, 69th Cong.; S.J.Res. 40, 70th Cong.; S.J.Res. 123, 71st
Cong.; S.J.Res. 234, 75th Cong.; S.J.Res. 44, 76th Cong.; S.J.Res. 36, 77th Cong., S.J.Res. 24, 78th Cong.; S. J. Res. 47,
79th Cong.; and S.J.Res. 28, 80th Cong.
163 H.J.Res. 93, 107th Cong.; H.J.Res. 56, S.J.Res. 26, and S.J.Res. 30, 108th Cong.; S.J.Res. 1, S.J.Res. 13, H.J.Res. 39,
H.J.Res. 88; H.J.Res. 91, 109th Cong. and H.J.Res. 22, 110th Cong.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Řřȱ
Š–’•¢ȱŠ DZȱ˜—›ŽœœȂœȱžÂ‘˜›’¢ȱ˜ȱŽÂ’œ•ŠÂŽȱ˜—ȱ˜–ŽœÂ’ŒȱŽ•ŠÂ’˜—œȱžŽœÂ’˜—œȱ
ȱ
Currently, there appears to be little sentiment in favor of a national marriage and divorce law, at
least one which would be imposed involuntarily by Congress on the states. However, it is
probable that federal involvement will continue or be forthcoming in those areas where it is
argued that federal resources can be utilized more efficiently and effectively than those available
at the state or local level, such as tracking down parental kidnappers or establishing and enforcing
child support orders. The spending power can be used to shape state approaches to a given
situation, although this option involves expenditures of federal funds; the higher the funding
level, the more likely a state is to comply with the federal directive.
The nature of family law cases is such that an individualized approach to each particular case will
undoubtedly continue. However, state domestic relations laws have become more uniform in
recent years, and even without federal intervention this trend is likely to continue. Thus, it is
possible that some of the national uniformity envisioned by proponents of adopting a
constitutional amendment for this purpose will be realized, although states retain primary
authority to legislate in this area.
žÂ‘˜›ȱ˜—ŠŒÂȱ —˜›–ŠÂ’˜—ȱ
Alison M. Smith
Legislative Attorney
amsmith@crs.loc.gov, 7-6054
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ŘŚȱ