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Bid protests filed with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have recently received
increased congressional scrutiny due to protests of high-profile awards and reports that the
number of protests is increasing. The delay of contract award or performance triggered by a GAO
protest, coupled with the increasing number of GAO protests, has also prompted concerns about
the potential impact of protests upon government agency operations, especially in the Department
of Defense.

GAO is one of three forums with authority to hear general bid protests against the government.
The GAO’s bid-protest process includes some unique features—most notably, the automatic stay
of contract award or performance during a GAO protest—that make GAO a desirable forum for
many disappointed bidders and offerors.
In recent years, the number of protests filed with GAO has steadily increased. Excluding protests
from expanded jurisdiction, the number of bid protests increased steadily from approximately
1,150 in Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 to over 1,550 in FY2008, an increase of 37%. However, most of
these protests were dismissed, withdrawn by the protester, or settled prior to GAO issuing an
opinion. Since FY2001, on average, GAO issued an opinion on only 22% of bid protests; on
average, GAO opinions sustained the protest approximately 20% of the time.
From FY2001 to FY2008, on average 5% of bid protests were sustained; neither the number—nor
percentage—of protests sustained during the period increased significantly. In FY2001, GAO
sustained 66 protests, or 6% of all protests. In FY2008, GAO sustained 60 protests, or 4% of all
protests filed, despite a 37% increase in the number of bid protests filed over the same period.
According to GAO officials, among the most common grounds for sustaining protests are the
contracting agencies not maintaining adequate documentation, errors in how agency officials
conduct discussions with offerors, flaws in cost evaluations, and contracting agencies not
adhering to established evaluation criteria.
Protesters can obtain relief from a protest when GAO sustains a protest or when agencies
voluntary act to correct the allegation charged in the protest. The percentage of protesters
obtaining relief from an agency is called the effectiveness rate. The effectiveness rate may be a
good way to measure the number of protests that have actual or potential merit. From FY2001 to
FY2008, the effectiveness rate of GAO protests gradually increased from 33% to 42%,
respectively. The increase in the effectiveness rate could indicate that not only are the number of
protests increasing but the number of protests that have merit is increasing.
The number of bid protests filed against the Department of Defense (DOD) consistently
increased, from approximately 600 in FY2001 to approximately 840 in FY2008, an increase of
38%. During the same period, on average, 60% of all bid protests involved DOD contracts even
though DOD accounted for an average of 68% of all federal spending. From FY2001 to FY2008,
neither the number—nor percentage—of bid protests sustained against DOD has consistently
increased. According to data provided by GAO, protests against DOD were not sustained at a
higher rate than the rest of government.
This report contains options for Congress related to minimizing the number of protests filed with
GAO and the delay of award/execution often associated with protests being sustained.

˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
˜—Ž—œȱ
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
GAO Bid Protests............................................................................................................................ 3
Number of Bid Protests Filed With GAO ................................................................................. 4
Are Bid Protests Delaying Contracts?....................................................................................... 8
Bid Protests Trigger an Automatic Stay.............................................................................. 8
GAO and the 100 Day Time Limit ..................................................................................... 9
Number of Bid Protests Sustained by GAO............................................................................ 10
Common Grounds for GAO Sustaining Bid Protests ........................................................11
DOD Contracts and Bid Protests............................................................................................. 12
Options for Congress..................................................................................................................... 14

’ž›Žœȱ
Figure 1. Number of Bid Protests Filed With GAO (FY2001- FY2008) ........................................ 5
Figure 2. Effectiveness Rate of GAO Protests (FY2001 – FY2008) .............................................. 6
Figure 3. Number of Federal Government Contract Actions .......................................................... 7
Figure 4. Federal Contract Spending............................................................................................... 7
Figure 5. Number of Bid Protests Filed With GAO (FY1995 - FY2008) ....................................... 8
Figure 6. Number of Protests Sustained by GAO ......................................................................... 10
Figure 7. Percentage of Protests Sustained by GAO ......................................................................11
Figure 8. Number of Bid Protests Filed Against DOD.................................................................. 13
Figure 9. DOD Contract Spending ................................................................................................ 13
Figure 10. DOD Share of All Federal Contract Spending and Bid Protests.................................. 14

Š‹•Žœȱ
Table A-1. Bid Protests Filed Against DOD.................................................................................. 16
Table A-2. Comparison of Protests Filed Against DOD vs. Civilian Agencies............................. 17

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Appendix A. Bid Protests Filed Against DOD .............................................................................. 16

˜—ŠŒœȱ
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 18

˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
—›˜žŒ’˜—ȱ
Bid protests filed with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), have received increased
congressional scrutiny due to recent protests of high-profile awards reports and reports that the
number of protests is increasing. 1 On December 22, 2008, the GAO notified Congress that it
received 1,652 protests in FY2008, a 17% increase over the number of filings in Fiscal Year (FY)
2007.2 Some of these protests involved high-profile procurements—such as the Air Force’s aerial
refueling tankers, and combat, search, and rescue (CSAR-X) helicopters.3 In one case, the 110th
Congress held hearings on a protested procurement and considered legislation that would have
precluded government agencies from making a contested award.4 Additionally, the increasing
number of protests filed with GAO, and the impact protests have in delaying contract award or
performance, have raised concerns regarding the impact of protests on agency operations,
especially in the Department of Defense (DOD). John J. Young, Jr., then Acting Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, issued a memorandum in August 2007 in
which he described bid protests as “extremely detrimental to the warfighter and taxpayer,” and
said that “[t]he Defense Department must take steps in an effort to avoid these protest
situations.”5 Partly in response to such concerns, the House Armed Services Committee, in
authorizing DOD’s budget for FY2009, requested that GAO investigate and report on the impact
of bid protests on DOD.6
This report is one of two providing Congress with background on the GAO bid-protest process. It
analyzes (1) trends in bid protests filed with GAO, (2) the impact bid protests have in delaying
contracts, (3) the most common grounds for GAO to sustain a protest, and (4) trends in bid
protests filed against DOD. Its companion report, CRS Report R40228, GAO Bid Protests: An
Overview of Timeframes and Procedures
, by Kate M. Manuel and Moshe Schwartz, provides an
overview of the GAO bid protest process, including (1) what issues can be protested, (2) who can
file or be a party to a protest, (3) the procedures for bringing and resolving protests, (4) the
timeframes involved in protests, (5) the automatic stay of contract award or performance
triggered by a protest, as well as the basis for agency overrides of automatic stays and judicial

1 Bid protests are formal, written objections to an agency’s solicitation for bids or offers; cancelation of a solicitation;
or award or proposed award of a contract. See: 31 U.S.C. § 3551(1)(A)-(D).
2 This figure includes 89 requests for reconsideration and 87 bid protests filed as a result of GAO’s expanded
jurisdiction over task orders (49 filings), A-76 protests (30 filings), and Transportation Security Administration protests
(8 filings). See GAO, GAO Bid Protest Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 2008, Dec. 22, 2008, available
at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/bidpro08.pdf. Last visited, January 13, 2009.
3 See, e.g., Dana Hedgepeth & Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Air Force Faulted over Handling of Tanker Deal, Washington
Post
, June 19, 2008, at A1; Michael Fabey, Lockheed Martin Files Another CSAR-X Protest, Aviation Week, June 12,
2007, available at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/CSAR061207.xml&headline=
Lockheed%20Martin%20Files%20Another%20CSAR-X%20Protest&channel=defense.
4 See, Air Force Aerial Refueling Tanker Replacement: Hearing before the House Committee on Armed Services, July
10, 2008; KC-X Tanker Recompete Act, H.R. 6426, 110th Congress, at § 2(a).
5 Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of
Defense, Aug. 24, 2007, available at
http://acquisition.navy.mil/rda/content/download/5263/23838/file/enhancing%20competition%201-18-2008.pdf.
6 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009: Report of the Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives,
110th Congress, on H.R. 5658, at 394-95 (2008).
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
review of agency override determinations, (6) the basis and effects of GAO decisions, and (7)
reconsideration and “appeal” of decisions.7
ŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱ
The foundation of today’s federal procurement system dates back to the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947 and the Federal Property and Administration Act of 1949.8 The two
post World War II acts, as amended, particularly by the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984,
along with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), constitute most of today’s federal
procurement system.9 The FAR, first published in 1984, regulates how the federal government
acquires goods and services by codifying uniform policies and procedures for the entire executive
branch.10 The intent of the FAR is to help guide the Federal Acquisition System to “deliver on a
timely basis the best value product or service to the [government], while maintaining the public’s
trust and fulfilling public policy objectives.”11
One of the guiding principles of the FAR is to promote competition for government contracts.12
Competition has been an integral part of the federal procurement system since 1781, when the
then Superintendent of Finance conducted the first formal open competition by advertising in a
local newspaper for contract proposals to provide food for federal employees in Philadelphia.13
Many of the same principles that held true for the competition in 1781 hold true today.
Today, the federal acquisition process generally begins when an agency determines that it needs a
good or service, and that the appropriate method for procuring the good or service is to contract
with a private company. For contracts valued in excess of $100,000, an agency generally
develops a solicitation identifying what the agency wants to buy, advertises the solicitation,
identifies the method for evaluating offers, and sets a deadline for the submission of bids or
proposals. The agency then evaluates the bids or proposals based on the criteria set forth in the
solicitation and awards a contract to the winning firm.14
In an effort to protect the integrity of the procurement system, the FAR and federal law provide
mechanisms for contractors to object to contract awards. Generally, any interested party15 who

7 For more on GAO generally, see CRS Report RL30349, GAO: Government Accountability Office and General
Accounting Office
, by Frederick M. Kaiser.
8 See Pub.L. 413 and Pub.L. 152, respectively.
9 The FAR was established to codify uniform policies for acquisition of supplies and services by executive agencies. It
is issued and maintained jointly, by the Secretary of Defense, Administrator of General Services, and the
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The official FAR appears in the Code of Federal
Regulations at 48 CFR Chapter 1. For more information, see http://acquisition.gov/far/index.html. Last visited January
22, 2009.
10 For a copy of the FAR, see http://www.arnet.gov/far/. Last visited January 5, 2008.
11 FAR 1.102.
12 Ibid.
13 History of Government Contracting, p. 49.
14 For more information on the federal acquisition process, see CRS Report RS22536, Overview of the Federal
Procurement Process and Resources
, by L. Elaine Halchin
15 An interested party is “an actual or prospective offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the
award of a contract or by the failure to award a contract.” See FAR 33.101.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Řȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
believes that a contract has been awarded unlawfully can seek relief and contest the award by
filing a bid protest.16 The Government Accountability Office has been a forum for resolving bid
protest disputes for more than 80 years. Historically, however, an interested party could file a
protest in a number of forums, including the General Services Board of Contract Appeals and the
U.S. District Court. By 2001, Congress had removed bid protest jurisdiction from the General
Services Board of Contract Appeals and the U.S. District Court, leaving GAO the sole
government-wide forum for hearing administrative protests and the Court of Federal Claims
(COFC) the only judicial forum for hearing such protests.17 Companies can also file a protest with
the agency awarding the contract, and under certain circumstances, with specialized entities, such
as the Small Business Administration or the Bureau of Indian Affairs.18 GAO, however, remains
the primary forum for resolving government contract bid protests.19
ȱ’ȱ›˜Žœœȱȱ
GAO may generally hear protests alleging illegalities or improprieties in solicitations,
cancellations of solicitations, or awards or proposed awards of contracts that are filed by
interested parties. The procedures for bringing and conducting GAO protests are designed to
ensure “the inexpensive and expeditious resolution of [bid] protests” to “the maximum extent
practicable.”20 Protesters need not file formal briefs or technical pleadings,21 can represent
themselves,22 and can have protests decided without hearings.23 All protests are required to be
resolved within 100 calendar days of being filed.24 The filing of a GAO protest often triggers an
automatic stay of contract award or performance that can interrupt agencies’ procurement
initiatives for as long as the protest is pending.25
GAO may deny or sustain bid protests. A denial allows the agency to proceed with the challenged
award. A sustained decision, in contrast, generally disrupts the proposed award because GAO
accompanies sustainments with recommendations to the agency about the challenged award –

16 A protest is a written objection to a contract award by an interested party. See FAR 33.101.
17 See Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-106, 110 Stat. 679 (1996) and Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of
1996, Pub.L. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870 (1996). See also W. Noel Keyes, Government Contracts Under the Federal
Acquisition Regulation
, 3rd ed. (West Publishing, 2003), p. 734. See 31 U.S.C. § 3556 for the authority of the awarding
agency, GAO, and COFC to hear bid protests.
18 See FAR Subpart 19.3
19 GAO was established in 1921 as an independent auditor of government agencies and activities by the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 23). Today, GAO provides a variety of services to Congress that extend beyond its
original functions and duties, including oversight, investigation, review, and evaluation of executive programs,
operations, and activities. For more information on the GAO, see CRS Report RL30349, GAO: Government
Accountability Office and General Accounting Office
, by Frederick M. Kaiser. See also the GAO website at
[http://www.gao.gov].
20 31 U.S.C. § 3554(a)(1).
21 4 C.F.R. § 21.1(f).
22 GAO, Office of General Counsel, Bid Protests at GAO: A Descriptive Guide, 8th ed. (2006), “Background,” ¶1,
available at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/og96024.htm.
23 4 C.F.R. § 21.7(a).
24 31 U.S.C. § 3554(a)(1). The GAO must also resolve timely supplemental or amended protests within this timeframe,
if possible. 4 C.F.R. § 21.9(c).
25 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c)-(d). However, in certain circumstances, a timely protests will not result in an automatic stay.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
řȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
such as re-competing the contract or issuing a new solicitation.26 GAO’s recommendations are
not legally binding upon the agency, but the agency must notify GAO if it does not fully
implement GAO’s recommendations.27 GAO is, in turn, required to inform Congress of any
instances in which agencies do not fully implement GAO recommendations.28 Agencies generally
comply with GAO recommendations on protested procurements.29 Protesters that are
disappointed with GAO’s decision can seek reconsideration from GAO.30 They can also
effectively “appeal” GAO’s decision by filing a new bid protest with the Court of Federal
Claims.31 For more information regarding the GAO bid protest process, please see CRS
companion report GAO Bid-Protests: An Overview of Its Timeframes and Procedures.
ž–‹Ž›ȱ˜ȱ’ȱ›˜Žœœȱ’•Žȱ’‘ȱ ȱ
As previously mentioned, GAO notified Congress that it received 1,652 protests in FY2008, a
17% increase over the number of filings in FY2007.32 However, Congress expanded GAO’s
jurisdiction in FY2007 to include hearing protests on task orders, A-76 contracts, and
Transportation Security Administration contracts.33 The reported number of protests filed in
FY2008 includes 87 bid protests filed as a result of the expanded jurisdiction.34 Excluding
protests from expanded jurisdiction, the number of protest in FY2008 increased 11% over the
number of filings in FY2007. From FY2001 to FY2008, the number of bid protests filed steadily
increased from approximately 1,150 to over 1,550, respectively, an increase of 37% (see Error!
Reference source not found.
). Most protests are dismissed, withdrawn by the protester, or settled
prior to GAO issuing an opinion. Since FY2001, on average, GAO issued an opinion on only
22% of bid protests. Of the opinions issued during this period, on average, GAO sustained the
about 20% of the time. As a result, from FY2001 to FY2008, approximately 5% of all protests
filed were sustained (see Error! Reference source not found.).


26 31 U.S.C. § 3554(b)(1)(A)-(G).
27 31 U.S.C. § 3554(b)(3).
28 Id.
29 Based on CRS Analysis of Comptroller General annual reports to Congress for FY 2001 – FY 2008. See
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidproan.htm for copies of the reports.
30 4 C.F.R. § 21.14(a).
31 31 U.S.C. § 3556.
32 See U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO Bid Protest Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 2008,
December 22, 2008, available at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/bidpro08.pdf. Last visited, January 13, 2009.
33 For more information on GAO’s expanded jurisdiction, see GAO Bid-Protests: An Overview of Its Timeframes and
Procedures
.
34 Ibid.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Śȱ







ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
Figure 1. Number of Bid Protests Filed With GAO (FY2001- FY2008)

Source: CRS Analysis of Comptroller General annual reports to Congress for FY 2001 – FY 2008. See
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidproan.htm for copies of the reports.
Notes: FY 2008 data exclude bid protests filed as a result of GAO’s expanded jurisdiction over task orders (49
filings), A-76 protests (30 filings), and Transportation Security Administration protests (8 filings).
In statistical terms, the R2 value for the linear trend line is 0.6418. R2 is a statistical term used to describe the
goodness of the fit between the trend line and the data points. R2 is a descriptive measure between 0 and 1. The
closer the R2 value is to one, the better the fit of the trend line to the data.
In addition to GAO sustaining a protest, protesters can also obtain relief when a contracting
agency voluntary acts to correct the allegation charged in the protest. Many analysts consider the
increasing willingness of agencies to voluntarily take corrective action as one of the most
significant trends in bid protests. Such voluntary action by an agency could indicate that the
agency believes that a given protest has merit.
The percentage of protesters obtaining relief – either through a protest being sustained or through
voluntary action taken by an agency—is called the effectiveness rate. The effectiveness rate may
be a good way to measure the number of protests that have actual or potential merit. From
FY2001 to FY2008, the effectiveness rate of GAO protests grew from 33% to 42%, respectively
(see Figure 2).35 The increase in the effectiveness rate could indicate that not only are the number
of protests increasing but the number of protests that have merit is also increasing.

35 Some have attributed the increase in the effectiveness rate to the predictable nature of GAO opinions. If GAO
decisions are sufficiently predictable to allow agencies to determine how GAO will rule in a given situation, agencies
are more likely to voluntarily take corrective action than wait for GAO to sustain a protest.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
śȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
Figure 2. Effectiveness Rate of GAO Protests (FY2001 – FY2008)
45.00%
40.00%
35.00%
30.00%
25.00%
20.00%
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Source: CRS Analysis of Comptroller General annual reports to Congress for FY 2001 – FY 2008. See
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidproan.htm for copies of the reports.
Notes: Based on a protester obtaining some form of relief from the agency, as reported to GAO.
Recent media reports discussing the increase in protests have fueled the debate over why the
number of protests is rising.36 Some analysts may take the increase as evidence that the
government’s ability to properly award contracts is getting worse. Others may attribute the trend
to an increasing willingness of companies to file protests. Such analysts might argue that the
increase in value of individual contracts and longer periods of contract performance make
contractors more desperate to win each contract—and more willing to protest an award.
The number—and value—of contract actions signed by the federal government has grown at a
faster rate than the number of protests filed with GAO.37 According to USAspending.gov, between
FY2001 and FY2008, the number of contract actions executed by the federal government
increased by almost 600% and the value of those contracts increased over 100% (see Figures 3 &
4
).38 Even after adjusting for inflation, federal contract spending increased by approximately 80%
between FY2001 and FY2007.39 This compares to a 37% increase in the number of protests filed

36 See Donna Borak, "GAO Says Federal Contract Protests by US Businesses Hit 10-Year High in 2008," Associated
Press Newswires
, December 30, 2008; Robert Brodsky, "Bid Protests Reach 10-Year High," Nextgov.com, January 5,
2009, www.nextgov.com.
37 Contract actions reported by USASpending.gov includes contract modifications and other actions that can not be
protested to GAO. Because the data set for contract actions is more expansive that the pool of actions that can be
protested with GAO, the analyses that follow are used to identify trends.
38 Data is USASpending.gov is updated frequently; data from the website that is used in this report was accessed on
February 10, 2009. FY2008 data may not be complete. OMB established USASpending.gov as required by the Federal
Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 Pub. L. No. 109-282, 120 Stat. 1186 (Sept. 26, 2006), 31 U.S.C.
§ 6101 note. According to GAO, concerns have been raised over the accuracy of the data contained on the website.
Given these reliability concerns, data from USASpending.gov is only used in this report to identify broad trends. See
http://www.gao.gov/transition_2009/agency/omb/ensuring_awards.php#transition_2009. Last visited January 9. 2009.
39 Deflators for converting into constant dollars derived from the National Income and Product Accounts Table, Table
1.1.4. Price Indexes for Gross Domestic Product. Last Revised on December 23, 2008. Data not yet available to convert
FY2008 data into constant dollars.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Ŝȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
with the GAO. Even though the data reported in USASpending.gov does not correlate perfectly
with the GAO data, some could argue that the trend in increased government contracting activity
is clear—the recent rise in protests correlates to an increase in government contracting activity.40
Others can point out that since contract actions and spending have risen at a faster rate than
protests, the proportion of contracts being protested has actually decreased. Put into historical
context, the number of protests filed in FY2008 is still substantially lower than the number filed
from FY1995 to FY1997 (see Figure 5).
Figure 3. Number of Federal Government Contract Actions
FY2001 – FY2008
4,500,000
4,000,000
3,500,000
3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
0
FY 2001
FY 2002
FY 2003
FY 2004
FY 2005
FY 2006
FY 2007
FY 2008

Source: CRS Analysis of Data from USASpending.gov.
Figure 4. Federal Contract Spending
FY2001 – FY2008 (in Billions)
Dollar Value of Contracts
In Billions
$500
$400
$300
$200
$100
$-
FY 2001
FY 2002
FY 2003
FY 2004
FY 2005
FY 2006
FY 2007
FY 2008

Source: CRS Analysis of Data from USASpending.gov.

40 Contract actions reported by USASpending.gov includes contract modifications and other actions that can not be
protested to GAO. Therefore, the data set is more expansive that the pool of actions that can be protested with GAO.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŝȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
Figure 5. Number of Bid Protests Filed With GAO (FY1995 - FY2008)
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
-
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Source: CRS Analysis of Comptroller General annual reports to Congress for FY1996 – FY2008. See
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidproan.htm for copies of the reports.
Notes: FY 2008 data excludes bid protests filed as a result of GAO’s expanded jurisdiction over task orders (49
filings), A-76 protests (30 filings), and Transportation Security Administration protests (8 filings).
›Žȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœȱŽ•Š¢’—ȱ˜—›ŠŒœǵȱ
Many analysts and acquisition professionals are concerned that bid protests can delay contract
awards for weeks and even months, costing millions of dollars and preventing government from
getting the goods and services it needs when it needs them. In an August 2007 memo, John
Young, then Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, wrote
that DOD
has experienced a significant increase in the number of competitive source selection
decisions which are protested by industry. Protests are extremely detrimental to the
warfighter and the taxpayer. These protest actions consume vast amounts of the time of
acquisition, legal, and requirements team members; delay program initiation and the delivery
of capability....
A number of high-profile government acquisitions have experienced extensive delays as a result
of GAO bid protest decisions. For example, on June 18, 2008, GAO sustained Boeing’s protest of
the Air Force’s award of a contract to Northrop Grumman.41 More than seven months later, a new
Request for Proposal has not yet been issued. Identifying which protests tend to experience the
longest delays—and working to minimize such delays—could help the government save
hundreds of millions of dollars and receive the goods and services it needs when it needs them.
’ȱ›˜Žœœȱ›’Ž›ȱŠ—ȱž˜–Š’ŒȱŠ¢ȱ
Under the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), the mere filing of a bid protest with GAO may
trigger an automatic stay, or postponement, of contract award or performance.42 When a protest is

41 U.S. Government Accountability Office, "GAO Sustains Boeing Bid Protest," press release, June 18, 2008,
http://www.gao.gov/press/press-boeing2008jun18_3.pdf.
42 CICA was enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, P.L. 98-369, §§ 2701-2753, 98 Stat. 1175 (1984)
(continued...)
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Şȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
filed prior to award, an agency may not award a contested contract until the protest has been
resolved.43 Similarly, when a protest is filed after award, the agency must withhold authorization
of performance under the contract while the protest is pending.44 If authorization has not been
withheld, the agency must “immediately direct the contractor to cease performance under the
contract” until the protest is resolved.45
If an agency believes that circumstances are such that further delay in contract execution will
have severe consequences, CICA provides grounds for agency overrides of automatic bid-protest
stays.46 According to CICA, agencies may override stays when there are “urgent and compelling
circumstances” that impact the interests of the United States and when performing the contract is
in “the best interests of the United States.”47 According to data provided by GAO, from FY2001
to FY2007 agencies sought to override CICA stays in over 650 contracts, or 7% of all protests
filed during the period.48
ȱŠ—ȱ‘ŽȱŗŖŖȱŠ¢ȱ’–Žȱ’–’ȱ
GAO is required to complete its involvement in a protest within 100 calendar days of their
filing.49 According to GAO officials, GAO has never failed to complete its work within the
required time period. In many cases the protest is resolved much earlier.50 For example, a protest
can have a shortened 65-calendar day deadline if the protest is treated under the “express
option.”51 GAO can also dismiss protests that do not meet filing guidelines within days of filing,
and can issue a summary decision on a protest at any time.52 Since GAO completes its protest
work within 100 days of a protest being filed, generally, any delay in contract award or execution
that results from a GAO protest can be mitigated by starting the contracting process a few weeks
earlier.
In FY2008, approximately 58% of all GAO protests were dismissed, withdrawn by the protester
with no further action, or resolved in the agency’s favor. Generally, for reasons discussed above,
these protests delayed a contract for fewer than 100 days.
In FY2008, approximately 37% of all GAO bid protests were resolved based on the protestor
obtaining some form of relief from the agency subsequent to filing a protest—but prior to GAO

(...continued)
(codified, in part, at 31 U.S.C. § 3556).
43 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1).
44 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(1).
45 31 U.S.C. 3553(c) and (d)
46 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) & (d)(3). See Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corp. of Eng’rs, 607 F. Supp. 962, 974 (D.N.J.
1985) (describing the override as a “built-in safety value to prevent undue harm” to the government).
47 See Companion report, GAO Bid-Protests: An Overview of Its Timeframes and Procedures, etal.
48 See Companion report, GAO Bid-Protests: An Overview of Its Timeframes and Procedures etal.
49 31 U.S.C. § 3554(a)(1). The GAO must also resolve timely supplemental or amended protests within this timeframe,
if possible. 4 C.F.R. § 21.9(c).
50 Based on conversation with GAO officials, December 17, 2008. According to officials, even in those cases where a
supplemental protest is filed, the supplemental protest is generally resolved within 100 days of the filing of the original
bid protest.
51 31 U.S.C. § 3554(a)(2); 4 C.F.R. § 21.10.
52 4 C.F.R. § 21.10(e).
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
şȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
issuing an opinion. For example, an agency may recognize an error in the contracting process and
choose to re-compete the contract. In these cases, protests are usually withdrawn as a result of the
settlement between the parties or dismissed by GAO because the basis for the protest has been
resolved. While the withdrawal or dismissal of these protests occurs within 100 days, it could
take more than 100 days to provide relief. For example, if the agency agrees to re-compete a
contract, the new competition could take more than 100 days. CRS was unable to obtain data on
the extent to which such bid protests delay the award or execution of a contract.
Generally, protests sustained by GAO are most likely to delay contract award or execution.
Developing a mechanism for remedying the problem more quickly may benefit the government.
While on average only 5% of protests are sustained, many of these protests are controversial and
receive significant media attention. For example, a recent article referring to the aerial refueling
tanker (KC-X), Combat Search and Rescue Replacement helicopter (CSAR-X) and HUMVEES,
stated “at least three major Pentagon programs worth a combined $70 billion were delayed this
year due to protests filed by Boeing Co., Lockheed Martin Corp., Northrop Grumman Corp., and
others.”53
ž–‹Ž›ȱ˜ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœȱžœŠ’—Žȱ‹¢ȱ ȱ
In recent years, neither the number—nor percentage—of bid protests sustained by GAO has
increased significantly (see Figures 6 & 7). From FY2001 to FY2008, on average 5% of all
protests filed were sustained. In FY2001, GAO sustained 66 protests, or 6% of all protests. In
FY2008, GAO sustained 60 protests, or 4% of all protests filed, despite a 37% increase in the
number of bid protests filed over the same period.
Figure 6. Number of Protests Sustained by GAO
FY 2001 – FY 2008
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Source: CRS Analysis of Comptroller General annual reports to Congress for FY 2001 – FY 2008.
Note: The R2 value for the linear trend line for the number of protests sustained during the period is 0.2578.

53 Donna Borak, "GAO Says Federal Contract Protests by US Businesses Hit 10-Year High in 2008," Associated Press
Newswires
, December 30, 2008
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŖȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
Figure 7. Percentage of Protests Sustained by GAO
FY 2001 – FY 2008
7.00%
6.00%
5.00%
4.00%
3.00%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Source: CRS Analysis of Comptroller General annual reports to Congress for FY 2001 – FY 2008.
Note: The R2 for the linear trend line for the percentage of protests sustained by GAO is 0.036.
˜––˜—ȱ ›˜ž—œȱ˜›ȱ ȱžœŠ’—’—ȱ’ȱ›˜Žœœȱȱ
Knowing what aspect of the contracting process most often results in bid protests being sustained
could help agencies focus on improving those aspects of contracting. Such improvements could
help reduce the number of protests being filed and/or sustained.
GAO officials stated that they do not formally track the most common reasons protests are
sustained.54 Officials believe, however, that among the most common grounds for sustaining
protests are
1. agencies not maintaining adequate documentation,
2. errors in how agency officials conduct discussions with offerors,
3. flaws in cost evaluations, and
4. agencies not adhering to established evaluation criteria.
For example, many of the common grounds for sustaining protests can be seen in GAO’s
decision to sustain Boeing’s protest of the Air Force’s award to Northrop Grumman for
the aerial refueling tankers (KC-X).55
˜Œž–Ž—Š’˜—ȱ
Officials stated that there are strict statutory requirements for documenting agency decisions.56 In
a number of cases, agencies failed to adhere to statutory requirements, resulting in GAO
sustaining bid protests. For example, in the KC-X decision, GAO sustained the protest because

54 Based on conversation with GAO officials, December 17, 2008.
55 For a copy of the GAO decision, see http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/311344.htm.
56 See 41 U.S.C. 262(b) (written findings), 41 U.S.C. 417 (recording requirements), and FAR Subpart 4.8 (detailed
requirements implementing the regulations).
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŗȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
“the record must contain adequate documentation showing the bases for the evaluation
conclusions and source selection decision... Nevertheless, the record does not establish that the
SSAC (Source Source Selection Advisory Council)Source Selection Authority (SSA) and SSA
(Source Selection Authority), in considering those strengths and weaknesses, applied the relative
weights identified in the RFP (Request for Proposal) for the various SRD (System Requirements
Document) requirements (under which the KPPs [Key Performance Parameters] were most
important). Moreover, the record does not show any consideration by the SSAC or SSA of the
fact that Boeing’s proposal was evaluated as satisfying significantly more SRD requirements than
Northrop Grumman’s.”
˜—žŒȱ˜ȱ’œŒžœœ’˜—œȱ ’‘ȱŽ›˜›œȱȱ
Agencies sometimes conduct discussions with offerors in an unfair manner. For example, in the
KC-X decision, GAO sustained the protest because “[t]he Air Force conducted misleading and
unequal discussions with Boeing, by informing Boeing that it had fully satisfied a key
performance parameter...but later determined that Boeing had only partially met this objective,
without advising Boeing of this change in the agency’s assessment and while continuing to
conduct discussions with Northrop Grumman....” Such unfair discussions are grounds for GAO
sustaining a bid protest.
˜œȱŸŠ•žŠ’˜—œȱ
Flaws in cost evaluation models result in bid protests being sustained. For example, in the KC-X
decision, GAO sustained the protest because the Air Force’s evaluation of construction costs in
calculating Boeing’s costs for their proposed aircraft was unreasonable. The Air Force conceded
that it “made a number of errors in evaluation that, when corrected, result in Boeing displacing
Northrop Grumman as the offeror with the lowest most probable life cycle cost....”
Š’•ž›Žȱ˜ȱ‘Ž›Žȱ˜ȱœŠ‹•’œ‘ŽȱŸŠ•žŠ’˜—ȱ›’Ž›’Šȱȱ
Agencies do not always adhere to the evaluation criteria set forth in the Request for Proposal
(RFP). For example, in the KC-X decision, GAO sustained the protest because “The Air Force, in
making the award decision, did not assess the relative merits of the proposals in accordance with
the evaluation criteria identified in the solicitation, which provided for a relative order of
importance for the various technical requirements.”
ȱ˜—›ŠŒœȱŠ—ȱ’ȱ›˜Žœœȱȱ
The number of bid protests filed against DOD has increased from approximately 600 in FY2001
to approximately 840 in FY2008, an increase of 38% (see Figure 8). Most of the protests filed
against DOD were dismissed, withdrawn by the protester, or settled prior to GAO issuing an
opinion. In FY2008, GAO issued an opinion on 29% of these bid protests.57 Fewer still are
sustained by GAO. From FY2001 to FY2008, on average only 5% of protests filed against DOD
were sustained by GAO (see Table A-1 for number of protests filed and sustained, by service).

57 Data provided by GAO.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŘȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
Figure 8. Number of Bid Protests Filed Against DOD
FY2001 – FY2008
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Source: CRS Analysis of Comptroller General annual reports to Congress for FY 2001 – FY 2008.
The overall dollar value of DOD contracts has increased proportionally more than the number of
protests filed with GAO. According to USAspending.gov, between FY2001 and FY2008, the
value of contracts actions signed by DOD increased by 120% (see Figure 9). Adjusting for
inflation, federal contract spending increased more than 80% between FY2001 and FY2008.58
This compares to a 39% increase in the number of protests filed against DOD in the same
period.59
Figure 9. DOD Contract Spending
FY2001 - FY2008 (in Billions)
$350
$300
$250
$200
$150
$100
$50
$0
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Source: CRS Analysis of Data from USASpending.gov.

58 Deflators for converting into constant dollars derived from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2009, Department of Defense Deflators – TOA
‘Total Non-Pay’, p. 47, March 2009.
59 CRS was unable to ascertain whether the average dollar value of a contract increased, decreased, or remained
constant. Such information would help evaluate more precisely the correlation between the increase in bid protests and
the increase in contract spending.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗřȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
In recent years, neither the number – nor percentage – of bid protests sustained against DOD has
consistently increased (see Table A-2). In FY2001, GAO sustained 40 protests, or 7% of protests
filed against DOD, compared to 30 protests, or 4% of protests filed against DOD in FY2008.
Protests against DOD are not sustained at a higher rate than the rest of government (see Table
A-2
). From FY2001 to FY2008, just under 5% of all protests filed against DOD were sustained
by GAO, compared to 6% of all protests filed against all federal civilian agencies. During the
same period, on average, 60% of all bid protests filed with GAO contested DOD contracts even
though DOD accounted for an average of 69% of all federal contract spending (see Figure 10).
Figure 10. DOD Share of All Federal Contract Spending and Bid Protests
FY 2001 – FY 2008
80%
70%
60%
50%
DOD Protests
40%
DOD Spending
30%
20%
10%
0%
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Source: Spending data obtained from USASpending.gov. Protest data obtained from GAO.
Note: Data based on federal contract awards, by funding agency.
™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
In assessing whether legislative action could help minimize the number of protests filed with
GAO or the delay of award/execution often associated with a protest being sustained, Congress
may consider the options discussed below.
Žšž’›ŽȱŠŽ—Œ’Žœȱ›ŽȬŒ˜–™Ž’—ȱŠȱŒ˜—›ŠŒȱŠœȱŠȱ›Žœž•ȱ˜ȱŠȱ ȱ˜™’—’˜—ȱ˜ȱŠ–Ž—ȱ
˜›ȱ›Ž’œœžŽȱ‘Žȱ›ŽšžŽœȱ˜›ȱ™›˜™˜œŠ•ȱ ’‘’—ȱŠȱœ™ŽŒ’’Žȱ’–Ž›Š–Žȱ˜›ȱ™ž‹•’œ‘ȱ ‘¢ȱ
‘Žȱ’–Ž›Š–ŽȱŒŠ—ȱ—˜ȱ‹Žȱ–Žǯȱ
According to many analysts, the most significant delays in contract award/execution occur when
agencies re-compete an award as a result of a GAO opinion. Requiring agencies to amend of
reissue a request for proposal within a specified timeframe—or publish why they are unable to
meet the requirement—could encourage agencies to re-compete contracts more quickly.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŚȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
Žšž’›Žȱ ȱ˜ȱ’—Œ•žŽȱ’—ȱ’œȱŠ——žŠ•ȱ›Ž™˜›ȱ˜ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ‘Žȱ–˜œȱŒ˜––˜—ȱ
›˜ž—œȱ˜›ȱœžœŠ’—’—ȱ™›˜Žœœǯȱ
GAO is required to submit to Congress an annual report on bid protests. The report, which is
publicly available, includes the number of bid protests filed and instances where agencies did not
implement GAO’s recommendations. Including in the report the most common reasons bid
protests are sustained could help all agencies identify those aspects of contracting that need to be
improved. Such improvements could help reduce the number of protests being filed and
sustained. Such a report could also help Congress get a better understanding of the weaknesses in
the federal acquisition process and consider any legislative action they deem appropriate.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗśȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ
™™Ž—’¡ȱǯ ’ȱ›˜Žœœȱ’•ŽȱŠ’—œȱȱ
Table A-1. Bid Protests Filed Against DOD
Total
Protests
Percent
Total
Protests
Percent

Cases
Sustained
sustained
Cases
Sustained
sustained

Air Force
Army
FY 2001
145
5
3%
224
12
5%
FY 2002
136
4
3%
254
11
4%
FY 2003
154
2
1%
229
20
9%
FY 2004
132
3
2%
324
18
6%
FY 2005
127
13
10%
282
7
2%
FY
2006
148 13 9% 334 12 4%
FY
2007
136 16 12% 323 22 7%
FY
2008
154 9 6% 396 9 2%
Average 142
8
6%
296
14
5%

Marines
Navy
FY 2001
25
6
24%
116
7
6%
FY 2002
16
-
0%
120
5
4%
FY 2003
20
-
0%
148
1
1%
FY 2004
14
3
21%
112
11
10%
FY 2005
12
1
8%
135
5
4%
FY 2006
32
1
3%
101
4
4%
FY 2007
20
-
0%
129
8
6%
FY 2008
22
2
9%
126
9
7%
Average 20
2
8%
123
6
5%

DLA
DOD (Misc)
FY
2001
80 3 4% 13 7 54%
FY 2002
119
0
0%
35
2
6%
FY
2003
107 1 1% 46 8 17%
FY 2004
115
1
1%
34
0
0%
FY 2005
121
0
0%
29
2
7%
FY
2006
70 3 4% 54 5 9%
FY 2007
97
0
0%
70
16
23%
FY
2008
87 1 1% 53 0 0%
Average
100 1 1% 42 5 14%
Source: CRS analysis of data provided by GAO.
Notes: Data is based on cases closed and does not include requests for reconsideration; therefore data may not
reconcile with information contained in GAO’s annual report to Congress.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŜȱ

ȱ
Table A-2. Comparison of Protests Filed Against DOD vs. Civilian Agencies

Civilian
DOD
Civilian + DOD

Percent
Percent
% Cases % Sustain
Decisions
Decisions
Total
Sustained
Sustained
from
from

Total Cases
Sustained Total
Cases Sustained Total
Cases Sustained
Civilian
DOD
DOD
DOD
FY 2001
404
26
603
40
1,007
66
6%
7%
60%
61%
FY 2002
365
19
680
22
1,032
41
5%
3%
65%
54%
FY 2003
435
18
704
32
1,139
50
4%
5%
62%
64%
FY 2004
565
39
731
36
1,296
75
7%
5%
56%
48%
FY 2005
517
43
706
28
1,223
71
8%
4%
58%
39%
FY 2006
483
34
739
38
1,222
72
7%
5%
60%
53%
FY 2007
483
27
775
62
1,258
89
6%
8%
62%
70%
FY 2008
616
30
838
30
1,454
60
5%
4%
58%
50%
Source: CRS Analysis of data provided by GAO.
Notes: Data does not include requests for reconsideration and therefore may not reconcile with information contained in GAO’s annual report to Congress.

Ȭŗŝȱ

ȱ’ȱ›˜ŽœœDZȱ›Ž—œǰȱ—Š•¢œ’œǰȱŠ—ȱ™’˜—œȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ
ȱ


ž‘˜›ȱ˜—ŠŒȱ —˜›–Š’˜—ȱ

Moshe Schwartz
Kate M. Manuel
Analyst in Defense Acquisition
Legislative Attorney
mschwartz@crs.loc.gov, 7-1463
kmanuel@crs.loc.gov, 7-4477




˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŞȱ