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On December 19, 2008, President George W. Bush provided financial assistance to General
Motors (GM) and Chrysler. These two automakers had testified before Congress that if they did
not receive federal financial assistance before the end of the year, they could be forced into
bankruptcy. After Congress did not provide the assistance requested, the Treasury Department
agreed to provide a total of $13.4 billion to GM and $4 billion to Chrysler from the Troubled
Assets Relief Program (TARP), established by the Emergency Economic Stabilization and
Recovery Act (EESA, P.L. 110-343). Ford, the third member of the “Detroit 3,” testified that it
did not need such assistance immediately, though it has said that it could potentially require a line
of credit in 2009. The Bush Administration also loaned a further $6 billion under the TARP for
General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), and $1.5 billion for Chrysler Financial, the
two manufacturers’ respective credit affiliates.
The Detroit 3 have been affected by a long-term decline in their U.S. motor vehicle sales market
share, plus the impact of a general decline in U.S. motor vehicle sales in 2008 resulting from a
severe constriction of credit related to problems in U.S. and global financial markets. The rise in
gasoline prices in mid-2008 caused a sales decline and a structural shift in motor vehicle
consumption patterns. Motor vehicle purchases fell substantially in late 2008 despite the
subsequent decline in gasoline prices.
A bill to provide up to $25 billion in direct loans from the TARP to auto companies (S. 3688) was
introduced in November 2008 by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. The Bush Administration
instead proposed to make general-purpose loans from a program for advanced technology vehicle
production set up under Section 136 of the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA, P.L.
110-140). This bill had become law in December 2007, and was funded under P.L. 110-329. In
December 2008, Representative Barney Frank introduced H.R. 7321, which would have allowed
most of the EISA loan funding to be used to support “bridge loans.” This bill was supported by
the Democratic leadership of both houses, and the Bush Administration. It passed the House on
December 10 by 237-170. The bill was opposed by the Republican leadership in both bodies.
Efforts to invoke cloture in the Senate in an attempt to pass the bill failed.
President Bush then provided loans for GM and Chrysler from the TARP, subject to a number of
oversight conditions. Eligible companies are to establish an approved restructuring plan by March
31, 2009. They are to target debt reduction through conversion of bonded indebtedness and debt
owed for retiree health care to corporate equity. This report analyzes the financial solution
provisions, including bankruptcies as an alternative, and the impact of the loan provisions on
pensions, voluntary employees’ beneficiary associations (VEBAs), protection of taxpayers’
investment, labor contracts, and executive compensation. Hourly workers are required under the
plan to accept contract changes designed to make the companies’ workforces more competitive
with those of Japanese-owned auto manufacturers in the United States. The United Auto Workers
union (UAW) and some Members of Congress have criticized the workforce contract targets as
unfair, and may seek to change them under the new Obama Administration.
Completion of the loan package under TARP was allowed in the 111th Congress when S.J.Res. 5,
a restrictive measure, was defeated 52-42 in the Senate on January 15, 2009. Auto loan provisions
would be modified by a House measure (H.R. 384) approved on January 21, 2009, but this
measure will have no effect without Senate action.
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Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The Detroit 3 in Crisis............................................................................................................... 1
Organization of This Report...................................................................................................... 2
Auto Industry Loan Developments in December 2008 ................................................................... 3
Auto Industry Restructuring Plans ............................................................................................ 3
GM Restructuring ............................................................................................................... 4
Chrysler Restructuring ........................................................................................................ 5
Ford Restructuring .............................................................................................................. 6
Congressional Action in December 2008.................................................................................. 6
Presidential Action to Aid the Auto Industry ............................................................................ 8
Impact on the National Economy .................................................................................................. 10
National Impact of Detroit 3 Failure ....................................................................................... 10
Impact Focused on “Auto Alley” ............................................................................................ 12
The Domestic Motor Vehicle Market ............................................................................................ 13
Loss of Detroit 3 Market Share ............................................................................................... 13
Labor Negotiations in 2007 to Address Competitive Issues ................................................... 18
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA).................................................. 19
Legislative Efforts to Assist Automakers Prior to December 2008......................................... 20
Employment in the Automotive Sector ................................................................................... 22
Financial Issues in the Auto Industry ............................................................................................ 24
Credit Conditions .................................................................................................................... 24
Bush Administration’s Financial Plan to Assist Automakers .................................................. 27
Stakeholders’ Concessions................................................................................................ 27
The Union ......................................................................................................................... 28
Investors............................................................................................................................ 28
Management...................................................................................................................... 28
Dealers/Suppliers .............................................................................................................. 29
Treasury Stock Warrants ................................................................................................... 29
Financial Solutions: Bridge Loans and Restructuring................................................................... 29
Federal Bridge Loans .............................................................................................................. 30
Collateral and Other Protections....................................................................................... 30
Accelerated Repayment Provisions .................................................................................. 32
Restructuring Outside of Bankruptcy ............................................................................... 32
Bankruptcy Procedures in Case Restructuring Fails ............................................................... 33
Chapter 7........................................................................................................................... 33
Chapter 11 ......................................................................................................................... 34
Pension and Health Care Issues..................................................................................................... 35
Pensions and Pension Insurance.............................................................................................. 35
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation...................................................................... 35
Funded Status of Auto Manufacturers Pension Plans ....................................................... 36
Health Care Issues................................................................................................................... 39
Stipulations and Conditions on TARP Loans to the Auto Industry ............................................... 41
Executive Privileges and Compensation ................................................................................. 41
Other Restructuring Plan Conditions ...................................................................................... 47
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Restructuring Plan Requirements ..................................................................................... 47
Restructuring Plan Targets ................................................................................................ 48
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Figure 1. U.S. Motor Vehicle Sales ............................................................................................... 14
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Table 1. Market Shares of U.S. Car and Truck Sales .................................................................... 16
Table 2. U.S. Automotive Employment......................................................................................... 23
Table 3. Funded Status of General Motors and Ford Pension Plans for U.S. Employees,
Year-end 2007 ............................................................................................................................ 37
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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 49
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A decline of sales in motor vehicles, which had been evident since 2004, accelerated sharply in
late 2008, despite falling gasoline prices. For the year, sales were down to 13.2 million units, a
decline of 18%, compared to more than 16 million units sold in 2007 (see section on domestic
auto market later in this report for details). Consumer spending fell during the summer and fall,
with purchases of motor vehicles and parts accounting for most of the decreases in durable goods
in October and September.3 Overall auto sales fell to a 26-year low, although automakers offered
aggressive sales incentives.4 Rapidly declining gas prices failed to boost automotive sales, but,
together with incentives, may have caused a short-term shift in consumer demand from cars back
to light trucks in December 2008.
In the unfavorable economic circumstances of late 2008, the entire U.S. motor vehicle sector
(passenger cars and light trucks, and both domestic and foreign-owned companies) faced difficult
times. Almost every manufacturer reported declines for the year.5 Moreover, the decline
accelerated during the latter part of the year. Sales ran about 30-40% lower than in the same
month in 2007. While year-over-year sales were 13.2 million units, the annual rate of monthly
sales by late 2008 had declined to ten million units or less.
Within an overall down market, the U.S.-owned automakers have been especially hard hit. The
“Detroit 3” consist of General Motors (GM), Ford Motor Company, and Chrysler LLC (owned by
Cerberus Capital Management LP). For each, annual sales fell by more than 20%. The Japanese,
Korean, and European producers, mostly reported lower rates of decline. Toyota, the largest
foreign-owned producer, recorded the worst sales performance among them, down by 15.4%.6
The U.S. market downturn has particularly affected Toyota’s U.S. and global output, sales, and
profitability.
Many argue that the current situation of the U.S. domestically owned auto industry primarily
reflects a structural shift in the Detroit 3’s competitive position, which has declined at an
accelerating rate during this decade.7 That decline has been compounded by the worst U.S.
economic conditions in several decades. The credit crunch that has dampened general consumer
1 This section was written by Stephen Cooney, Resources, Science and Industry Division. He also coordinated the
report.
2 The “Detroit Three” comprise General Motors (GM), Ford Motor Company, and Chrysler LLC.
3 U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. News release, “Personal Income and Outlays,”
October 2008.
4 Detroit News, “Auto Sales Plummet to 26-Year Low” (December 3, 2008); Financial Times, “Incentives Rise as
Carmakers Fight To Get Buyers Behind the Wheel,” January 7, 2009.
5 Subaru (owned by Fuji Heavy Industries of Japan) was the only brand to gain sales in the U.S. market in 2008, about
500 vehicles (+0.3%) ahead of the previous year.
6 Sales data from Automotive News market data website.
7 This is especially the theme of a critical book written about the U.S. auto industry, by Michelene Maynard, The End
of Detroit: How the Big Three Lost Their Grip on the American Car Market, New York: Doubleday, 2003. The issue
has been examined by in its historical context in CRS Report RL32883, U.S. Automotive Industry: Recent History and
Issues, by Stephen Cooney and Brent D. Yacobucci.
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demand for new vehicles has also reduced the ability of the Detroit 3’s “captive” credit
companies to make loans to many consumers and to dealers for their inventories, an issue that the
Treasury Department has also begun to address. The Detroit 3 have much higher pension and
retiree health care costs (frequently called “legacy costs”) than foreign automakers, and also may
be more adversely affected by stricter federal corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards
than foreign-owned producers, because of their history of sales of less fuel-efficient product
fleets.8
The cyclical decline in the market has also combined with a rapid shift in early 2008 by
consumers from trucks and SUVs back to cars, declining overall sales, and accelerating losses of
market shares for the “Detroit Three.” The combined shocks of these adverse factors have placed
the Detroit 3 business model, which includes a collective bargaining relationship between
management and labor, at risk. Congress is facing the possibility that one or more of the
unionized, domestically owned motor vehicle companies could go out of business if its
restructuring plans do not prove successful.9
Legislation was introduced to implement a federal loan program to prevent one or more of the
Detroit 3 from falling into bankruptcy, but no bills were approved. Congress in December 2008
left the decision whether and how to assist the Detroit 3 companies to the Bush Administration.
On December 19, 2008, President George W. Bush announced a plan to loan $17.4 billion from
the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), established by the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act (P.L. 110-343),10 to GM and Chrysler LLC to prevent any near-term bankruptcy
and to help them to restructure as more viable and competitive companies over the longer term.
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This report focuses on the current situation faced by the Detroit 3, key aspects of their current
crisis, including possible consequences of a failure of one or more companies, and some aspects
of legislative actions that have been considered to bridge their financial conditions to a more
stable situation. The subjects covered are:
• The impact of the automotive industry on the broader U.S. economy and of
potential failure of the Detroit 3 companies;
• Financial issues, including the present conditions affecting credit for automotive
consumers and dealers, and legal and financial aspects of government-offered
loans to the industry;
• The current situation in the U.S. automotive market, including efforts in 2007 by
the Detroit 3 and the United Auto Workers union (UAW) to address problems of
long-term competitiveness;
8 On this point, see also CRS Report RL34743, Federal Loans to the Auto Industry Under the Energy Independence
and Security Act, by Stephen Cooney and Brent D. Yacobucci, pp. 2-4.
9 While cars may have outsold trucks over the course of 2008, it is not yet clear whether the decline in fuel prices at the
end of the year will cause a longer term swing of consumer sentiment back from cars to SUVs and other truck-type
vehicles; Business Week, “The SUV Is Rising from the Dead,” December 8, 2008, p. 63.
10 The basics of this legislation are discussed in CRS Report RS22963, Financial Market Intervention, by Edward V.
Murphy and Baird Webel.
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• Issues related to government assistance, and various forms of bankruptcy, should
this assistance fail to lead to longer term recovery;
• Legacy issues, specifically pension and health care responsibilities of the
Detroit 3; and
• Stipulations that have been imposed on auto manufacturers as conditions of
assisting in their restructuring.
Before reviewing these aspects of the situation and specific policy questions, the report will
summarize the developments of December 2008. During the month, Congress considered aiding
the Detroit 3, but was unable to agree on a plan to assist the companies. Deciding it was necessary
to avoid a “disorderly collapse” of the Detroit 3, President Bush announced on December 18,
2008, a plan to aid the two companies closest to immediate bankruptcy, GM and Chrysler, using
TARP funds already appropriated by Congress.
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Legislation to provide emergency “bridge loans” to the domestically owned Detroit 3 auto
manufacturers (“original equipment manufacturers,” OEMs) was introduced on November 17,
2008, by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (S. 3688). It would have provided loans to the
Detroit 3 by using funds available in the TARP. The industry’s need for these loans and their
current situation was discussed in a hearing before the Senate Banking Committee on November
18, 2008, with the chief executive officers of the Detroit 3 and UAW president Ronald W.
Gettelfinger. The next day, the same witnesses also appeared before the House Financial Services
Committee.
Use of TARP funds by the Detroit 3 was opposed by the Bush Administration, as well as by many
Members of Congress, including the Republican leadership.12 The Administration suggested
instead using funds already appropriated for the auto industry under a direct loan program
operated by the Energy Department (DOE) under the Energy Independence and Security Act
(EISA, P.L. 110-140, funded under P.L. 110-329, §129, as discussed in a previous CRS report13).
A bipartisan group of senators, led by Senators George Voinovich of Ohio, Christopher Bond of
Missouri, and Carl Levin and Debbie Stabenow, both of Michigan, subsequently drafted a
compromise proposal, which would have shifted funding to EISA. But the House and Senate
11 This section was written by Stephen Cooney of the Resources, Science, and Industry Division.
12 Opposition was expressed on and off the floor of Congress by, among others, John Kyl (Senate Minority Whip),
Senate Banking Ranking Member Richard Shelby, Senator Lamar Alexander, House Majority Leader John Boehner,
House Financial Services Ranking Member Spencer Bachus, and Representative Jim Cooper; all quoted variously in
Detroit News, “Auto Aid Debate Heats Up,” and “Congress Starts Talks on Auto Loans,” November 17, 2008; “Blitz
Starts for Big 3 Aid as Reid Introduces Bill to Tap $700B Bailout;” and, “Political Titans Clash in Auto Loan War,”
November 18, 2008.
13 See CRS Report RL34743, Federal Loans to the Auto Industry Under the Energy Independence and Security Act, by
Stephen Cooney and Brent D. Yacobucci, for the analysis, history, and funding of this legislation.
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leadership on November 21, 2008, demurred on this approach, and suggested that the auto
companies instead needed to provide more detailed plans, including how they would use bridge
loan funding from the federal government and how they would restructure themselves to insure
their long-term competitiveness and viability.
The companies presented their plans to Congress on December 2, 2008. Although each of the
Detroit 3 faces serious economic difficulties, financial conditions among the three differ
markedly. The following reviews the plans, as summarized in company documents and discussed
in Senate Banking and House Financial Services Committee hearings that resumed on December
4-5, 2008. More detailed plans, including confidential corporate information, were provided to
the committee leadership and staff, and not made available to the public.
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GM’s leadership has taken the position that the company is already on the right track to achieve
long-term competitiveness and viability. This includes “a major transformation of its business
model,” while “accelerating its plans to produce more fuel-efficient vehicles.” However, already
that “transformation has consumed a substantial amount of resources and accounts for a major
portion of GM’s” debt – a total of $62 billion, according to data in the plan. Nevertheless, GM
claimed, “the company would not require Government assistance were it not for the dramatic
collapse of the U.S. economy, which has devastated the company’s current revenues and
liquidity.”14
In its December 2008 congressional testimony GM stated that the company was so close to
running low on operating capital that the company had to escalate its request for emergency
“bridge loan” lending and credit. This included an immediate $4 billion loan from the
government to ensure that the company would remain solvent through the end of 2008. It would
need a further $6 billion for the same purpose for the first quarter in 2009. Furthermore, assuming
a relatively pessimistic scenario of a U.S. light motor vehicle sales market of 12 million units for
2009, the company requested a total loan facility of $12 billion, plus a backup $6 billion line of
government credit, in case things were worse than expected. This made a total government
commitment of $18 billion requested by GM through the end of 2009.15
GM’s restructuring plan includes a substantial future downsizing of the labor force, even in view
of large numbers of buyouts that have already occurred. GM has already reduced its total U.S.
workforce from 191,000 in 2000 to 96,500 in 2008, a loss of 95,000 jobs. As part of its
restructuring plans, it indicated a further elimination of 20,000 to 30,000 more positions by 2012,
to include both hourly and salaried employees. A total of nine plants would be closed, from 47
down to 38 U.S. powertrain, stamping, and assembly plants by 2012 – most of these closures
have already been announced.16 GM’s plans also include sale or downsizing of four out of their
eight current brands, with Hummer, Saab, Saturn, and Pontiac not being considered as “core”
future brands.
14 General Motors Corporation. Restructuring Plan for Long-Term Viability, December 2, 2008, p. 2; debt level based
on Table 4.
15 GM Restructuring Plan, p. 2.
16 These data are from GM Restructuring Plan, Table 6, labeled “Manufacturing Improvements” – indicating that the
proportional difference between number of plant closures versus personnel reductions is to be accounted for through
technology and efficiency improvements.
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In its restructuring plan, Chrysler requested $7 billion in a “working capital bridge loan” by
December 31, 2008. The Chrysler plan stated that its available cash had shrunk from $9.4 billion
after the first half of 2008 to an estimated year-end level of $2.5 billion. The company would
spend an estimated $11.6 billion in the first quarter of 2009, principally because of $8.0 billion in
payments to suppliers and $1.2 billion to “other vendors.” Yet, “the first three months of the year
are the months with the lowest sales volumes and, hence, the lowest cash flows.”17 In testimony,
CEO Robert Nardelli stated that Chrysler’s private-equity majority holding company, Cerberus
Capital Management LP, had contributed a fresh capital injection of $2 billion in mid-2008, but
that it had rejected further capital assistance later in the year.18
Chrysler stressed that since acquisition of a majority share by Cerberus in mid-2007, it had taken
major steps to reduce costs, streamline operations, and reduce its reliance on truck-based vehicles
with low fuel economy ratings (Chrysler has been the most dependent of the Detroit 3 on light
truck sales – see Table 1 in a later section of this report). CEO Nardelli had been recruited from
outside the auto industry to inject a fresh approach into corporate management. “Four
unprofitable vehicle models were discontinued and over $1 billion in unprofitable assets were
identified for sale, with more than 70% of those assets disposed of ... [the company] eliminated
1.2 million units of capacity ... [and] separated over 32,000 employees ...”19 This left the company
with 55,000 employees worldwide in 2008, virtually all in North America . According to the
company, virtually all of those jobs would be at risk if Chrysler were to go bankrupt, and could
not obtain “debtor-in-possession” financing, which the company did not believe would be
available.20
The Chrysler paper and CEO Nardelli both insisted that Chrysler has a long-term plan for
viability as a stand-alone OEM. This included a proposal to bring out electric vehicles, supported
by an $8.5 billion request for loans from the DOE loan program established under EISA. It also
included some efforts to share manufacturing under joint ventures with such foreign-owned
companies as Volkswagen and Nissan-Renault.21 Many are skeptical of Chrysler’s claim that it
can continue to operate as an independent manufacturer, as exemplified by an exchange between
Senator Robert Corker and Nardelli at the Senate hearing on December 4, 2008.22 Subsequently,
Chrysler and its parent, Cerberus Capital Management, signed a “non-binding” agreement with
Italian auto manufacturer Fiat to establish a “global strategic alliance.” In exchange, Chrysler
gave Fiat “an initial 35% equity interest in Chrysler.”23
17 Chrysler LLC. Chrysler’s Plan for Short-Term and Long-Term Viability, December 2, 2008, pp. 3-4.
18 U.S. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Hearing, December 4, 2008, The State of the
Domestic Automobile Industry: Part II. Testimony of Robert Nardelli. For press coverage, see Detroit Free Press,
“Help from Cerberus Unlikely,” December 6, 2008.
19 Chrysler’s Plan, pp. 2-3.
20 Chrysler’s Plan, pp. 11-12. On “debtor-in-possession” financing, see the section below that explains bankruptcy
rules.
21 Chrysler’s Plan, pp. 6-7. A planned joint venture with China’s Chery auto manufacturing firm has been cancelled,
however.
22 Senate Banking Committee hearing, December 4, 2008.
23 Chrysler LLC, “Fiat Group, Chrysler LLC, and Cerberus Capital Management LP Announce Plans for a Global
Strategic Alliance,” news release, January 20, 2009.
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Alone among the Detroit 3, Ford in late 2008 was not applying for immediate government
assistance. In part, this was because Ford had already gone to “more receptive capital markets in
December 2006 to raise $23.5 billion in liquidity ...” through borrowing secured by virtually all
of the company’s assets. The company, as part of its restructuring and market repositioning plan
under new CEO Alan Mulally, had also sold its Aston Martin, Jaguar, and Land Rover brands and
operations, all based in the United Kingdom. It had in late 2008 sold most of its controlling
interest in Mazda, an OEM based in Japan, and was considering the “strategic” future of its
Swedish subsidiary, Volvo. The focus of CEO Mulally’s strategy has been to integrate disparate
North American and overseas operations, enabling the company to more readily manufacture for
the U.S. market the types of higher fuel economy vehicles that it already designs, produces, and
sells overseas (called the “One Ford” strategy by the company).24 Ford also is counting on $5
billion from the DOE loan program to support a $14 billion plan to reorient its lineup toward
more fuel-efficient vehicles.25
Nevertheless, Ford was fully supportive of a program of federal assistance for the Detroit 3. Part
of the reason that Ford had gone to credit markets earlier was that, “at the time, Ford was viewed
as the Detroit automaker most likely to go under.”26 The company reports that it closed 17 plants
and “downsized by 12,000 salaried employees and 45,000 hourly employees in North America”
since 2005.27 Ford’s own plan stressed that its ability to survive a recession and return to
profitability was not only contingent on how well the total market performs, but also on the short-
term survival of its domestic competitors, because “Our industry is an interdependent one. We
have 80% overlap in supplier networks,” plus many dealers also have operations selling GM or
Chrysler products. Accordingly, Ford requested a “stand-by” line of credit of up to $9 billion as
“a back-stop to be used only if conditions worsen further and only to the extent needed.”28
On January 29, 2009, Ford announced its 2008 annual and fourth quarter financial results. The
company lost a total of $14.6 billion for the year. The net fourth quarter loss was $5.9 billion,
with a pre-tax operating loss of $3.6 billion. Nevertheless, while the company announced that it
would draw on an outstanding $10 billion line of credit to back up its cash holdings in the first
quarter of 2009, Ford continued to state that, “it does not need a bridge loan from the U.S.
government.” It stated that it had achieved cost and inventory reduction targets, and had stopped
the loss of market shares in the United States and Europe.29
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Following these appeals by the Detroit 3, Congress considered legislation to assist the industry.
Initially plans to assist the industry were reportedly blocked by differences between the Bush
Administration and many Members of Congress, including Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi,
24 This approach is summarized in its Ford Motor Company Business Plan, December 2, 2008, pp. 7-8.
25 Ford Business Plan, p. 30.
26 Sholnn Freeman, “A Temporary Reprieve: Ford, Others Must Still Negotiate Rough Road,” Washington Post,
December 20, 2008, p. D3.
27 Ford Business Plan, p. 9.
28 Ford Business Plan, p. 2.
29 Ford Motor Co. News release,” “Ford Reports 4th Quarter Net Loss of $5.9 Billion ...,” January 29, 2009.
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over whether funding for short-term loans to the Detroit 3 should come from the TARP or from
the EISA DOE loan program set up for production of advanced technology vehicles.30 But this
gridlock was soon broken in view of the automakers’ urgent needs. The Speaker and Senate
Democratic leaders agreed effectively to reprogram the DOE loan money for one or more short-
term loans, with a plan to replenish the EISA loan funding after the 111th Congress convened in
January 2009. With the likelihood of default by the companies continuing to rise, the amount of
budget outlays for the EISA loans ($7.5 billion) was now estimated by the Congressional Budget
Office to support $15 billion in direct loans, as opposed to $25 billion authorized under EISA,
and $34 billion as requested in early December by the Detroit 3 (including the $9 billion in
standby credit requested by Ford).31
Chairman Barney Frank of the House Financial Services Committee introduced a bill reflecting
this compromise on December 10, 2008 (H.R. 7321). The bill was reportedly supported by the
Bush Administration.32 The legislation passed the House 237-170 on the same day. The
legislation as approved authorized a total of $14 billion in direct loans, subject to a number of
conditions, funded by $7 billion in budgetary support from the EISA program. The measure also
set up a presidential designee (popularly known as a “car czar,” although the bill allowed for
multiple designees) to oversee compliance by borrowing companies with the terms of the
program, including adequate compliance with requirements for meeting commitments to achieve
long-term viability and competitiveness. The loans were limited to $14 billion, because the
Congressional Budget Office increased the “subsidy cost” (based on the likelihood of default) to
50%, which was higher than its estimate for the EISA loans in September 2008. $500 million of
the original EISA budgetary support was reserved for the original purpose of that program,
support for advanced vehicle technology production.
Despite the urging of the Bush Administration, H.R. 7321 faced further opposition in getting
through the Senate.33 On December 11, 2008, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell indicated to the
Senate that the Republican caucus had studied the House-passed bill, and that they were unable to
support it.34 Efforts were made to craft a new compromise proposal, including conditions that
would specify concessions by unions on behalf of the hourly workforce and by bondholders, but
were unsuccessful. Majority Leader Reid moved to close debate, for the purpose of achieving a
final vote on the House-passed bill. The vote in favor of cloture was 52-35, which was an
insufficient majority, and the Senate abandoned further action on the issue.35
30 Bloomberg.com, “Bush, Pelosi Deadlocked over Bailout for Automakers,” December 4, 2008.
31 Detroit Free Press, “Pelosi Drops Opposition to Tapping Plant Aid,” (December 6, 2008).
32 Detroit News, “Dems, White House Agree to $15B Auto Bailout,” December 10, 2008.
33 See advocacy for the bill by Secretary of Commerce Carlos M. Gutierrez, “A Bridge Detroit Needs,” Washington
Post, December 11, 2008, p. A25; Republican opposition, particularly from Banking Committee Ranking Member
Richard Shelby is noted in ibid., “Auto Bailout Clears House, but Faces Hurdles in Senate,” p. A1.
34 Congressional Record (December 11, 2008), pp. S10895-96.
35 Floor action on the measure was summarized by the Majority Leader in Congressional Record, December 11, 2008,
pp. S10922-31. He credited Sens. Robert Corker and Christopher Dodd with leading the effort to produce a
compromise. The move to close debate was made on an unrelated legislative item, H.R. 7005. The Chairman and
Ranking Member of the Finance Committee, Sens. Max Baucus and Charles Grassley, respectively, announced their
joint opposition to H.R. 7321 because of inclusion of a provision unrelated to the auto industry, which would have
required the U.S. government to act as guarantor for “sale-in, lease-out” transactions engaged in by some public
transportation authorities; see ibid., pp. S10909-11.
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Following the Senate cloture vote, the White House indicated that, after all, it would consider
making loans from the TARP in support of the auto industry. White House Press Secretary Dana
Perino stated:
Under normal economic conditions, we would prefer that markets determine the ultimate fate
of private firms. However, given the current weakened state of the U.S. economy, we will
consider other options if necessary -- including use of the TARP program to prevent a
collapse of troubled automakers. A precipitous collapse of this industry would have a severe
impact on our economy, and it would be irresponsible to further weaken and destabilize our
economy at this time.36
Over the course of the following week, the Bush Administration determined how, and under what
conditions, it would provide industry assistance. On December 19, 2008, speaking from the
White House, President Bush announced his plan to assist the auto industry. He stated that, while
“government has a responsibility not to undermine the private enterprise system ... If we were to
allow the free market to take its course now, it would almost certainly lead to disorderly
bankruptcy and liquidation for the automakers.”37
The specific Administration plan was contained in two “term sheets,” drawn up by the Treasury
Department for GM and Chrysler, the companies in need of immediate assistance. The terms
sheets are identical, except for the appendices, which spell out the specific loans provided for
each of the two companies.38 The automakers would be provided with $13.4 billion in loans in
December 2008 and January 2009, divided as follows. GM and Chrysler received $4 billion each
when the loans closed on December 29, 2008. On January 16, 2009, GM received an additional
$5.4 billion. These three loan installments used what remained of the $350 billion first “tranche”
of TARP under EESA. Beyond that, the Administration could make no more outlays without
seeking approval from Congress to open the second tranche of TARP funds. Thus, a third
projected loan of $4 billion to GM, planned by the Bush Administration for February 2009, was
made “contingent on Congressional action.”39 This contingency was met on January 15, 2009,
when the Senate voted 52-42 to release the second tranche without further conditions.40 The
Chrysler term sheet further specifies that Chrysler’s parent holding company must guarantee the
first $2 billion of the loan amount. The term sheets for both companies also establish a loan
interest rate of 5%, with an additional 5% interest rate penalty on any amount in default.41
The Treasury Department made the loans available to Chrysler and GM only under certain “terms
and conditions.” The overriding condition is that each firm must become “financially viable”; that
36 White House. Press Briefing, December 12, 2008, p. 1.
37 White House. Office of the Press Secretary. “President Bush Discusses Administration’s Plan to Assist Automakers,”
December 19, 2008.
38 The term sheets are available on Treasury’s website: http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1333.htm. For a general
discussion of rules TARP rules under EESA, see CRS Report RL34730, The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
and Current Financial Turmoil: Issues and Analysis, by Baird Webel and Edward V. Murphy.
39 GM term sheet, Appendix A.
40 Resolution of disapproval, S.J.Res. 5, introduced by Sen. David Vitter and nine cosponsors, defeated by 52-42
(January 15, 2009).
41 U.S. Department of the Treasury. Indicative Summary of Terms for Secured Term Loan Facility, December 19, 2008,
“Appendix A” in both GM and Chrysler term sheets.
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is, it must have a “positive net value, taking into account all current and future costs, and can fully
repay the government loan.” “Binding terms and conditions ... mirror those that were supported
by a majority of both Houses of Congress ...” They establish oversight rules and security to be
obtained by the government in exchange for providing loans. “Additional targets ... were the
subject of Congressional negotiations,” but were never voted on. These include a requirement to
reduce corporate debt by two-thirds, transfer of half of cash contributions promised by companies
for an independent hourly employee retiree health care fund to corporate equity, elimination of
“jobs bank” rules that were the subject of much congressional discussion, and acceptance by
unions of “competitive” wages and work rules.42
With respect to Chrysler’s deal with Fiat, Chrysler CEO Robert Nardelli stated that, “The
potential ... alliance is consistent both with our strategic plan and with the long-term viability plan
required under the U.S. Treasury loan.” The agreement would be designed to gain for Chrysler
access to “all Fiat small-vehicle platforms,” as well as to Fiat’s international distribution network
(Chrysler at present has only limited sales outside of North America). Nardelli further stated that,
“It is important to note that no U.S. taxpayer funds would go to Fiat.” He also said that Chrysler
would continue to seek the remainder of the $7 billion in federal financial support that it had
requested.43
The companies must submit to a “President’s Designee” (the Treasury Department, under the
Bush Administration) by March 31, 2009, a detailed restructuring plan indicating the extent to
which they have met both financial and competitive labor restructuring targets. Subject to one
brief extension allowed, the “Designee” must decide whether to certify that the plan meets all
standards set in the term sheet, and, if not, may recall the outstanding loan balance.44
These terms and conditions will be discussed in more detail later in this report. Overall, they have
been the focus of much discussion and debate since the presidential announcement. Some argue
that requirements, though unilaterally set by the Bush Administration, are actually weaker than
the legislation proposed by it and the Democratic majority, and approved in the House. Although
H.R. 7321 did not mandate specific changes in labor contracts, it did provide (Section 8) that if
the parties did not reach agreement on a restructuring plan by March 31, 2009, the presidential
designee “shall call the loan ... within 30 days ...” In effect, unions, bondholders, and other
interests had that window to negotiate a restructuring plan, or, in effect, by statutory law the
company would be forced into bankruptcy. Since the Bush plan is set by executive order, it can be
subsequently modified by President Obama without further action by Congress.
The UAW believes that plan’s conditions for labor contract changes are too prescriptive.
President Ron Gettelfinger said that he was “pleased the Bush Administration acted to provide
urgently needed bridge loans” to the auto companies, and “to pursue a process for restructuring
outside of bankruptcy.” But he was “disappointed that [President Bush] has added unfair
conditions singling out workers ... We will work with the Obama Administration and the new
42 White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Fact Sheet: Financing Assistance to Facilitate the Restructuring of Auto
Manufacturers to Attain Financial Viability, December 19, 2008. Emphases in original.
43 Letter of Chrysler CEO Robert Nardelli “to all Chrysler employees, dealers, suppliers, and other stakeholders,”
January 23, 2009.
44 Treasury, Summary of Terms, p. 7.
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Congress to ensure these unfair conditions are removed,” he said.45 Senator Debbie Stabenow in a
press release said that
[T]he White House has been characterizing the bridge-loan package as simply having goals
for worker concessions ... [but] ... These provisions raise serious concerns regarding unfair,
punitive conditions being placed on the backs of workers.46
On January 21, 2009, the House addressed the auto loans specifically, in Title III of H.R. 384, a
bill to release the second tranche of TARP funds. This bill would have required that a
restructuring plan must be agreed by all stakeholders, without reference to specific targets and
requirements established in December 2008 term sheets for GM and Chrysler. The measure
passed 260-166. However, as the Senate had already defeated a resolution to withhold TARP
funds, the House action had no direct legal effect, without any further Senate action.47
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The question of rescuing one or more of the Detroit 3 automakers comes up at a time of
considerable weakness in the overall economy. In the third quarter of 2008, real gross domestic
product (GDP) fell by 0.5%, and the Commerce Department advanced estimate for the fourth
quarter was a decline of 3.8%.49 Most economists are not very sanguine about short run prospects
either. The Blue Chip Economic Indicators consensus forecast was for real GDP to decline by
1.6% for all of 2009 and for the unemployment rate to be above 8% by the end of 2009.50 Many
believe that the consequences of a Detroit 3 company’s failure for the national economy would be
serious.
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The White House Fact Sheet on the loan program for GM and Chrysler estimated that, “the direct
costs of American automakers failing and laying off their workers in the near term would result in
a more than 1% reduction in real GDP growth and about 1.1 million workers losing their jobs,
including workers for auto suppliers and dealers.” Economists generally assess that economic
growth of at least 2% is required to accommodate a growing labor force and keep the rate of
unemployment from rising.
45 International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). Press
release, “UAW Applauds Auto Loans, But Says Workers Must Not Be Singled Out for Unfair Conditions,” December
19, 2008.
46 Office of Sen. Stabenow. Press release, “Stabenow Statement on Provisions in Auto Rescue Package,” Dec. 19,
2008.
47 See comments to the press by House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank, quoted in Washington
Post, “House Urges Tighter Rules for Bailout Beneficiaries,” January 22, 2009.
48 This section was written by Stephen Cooney, Resources, Science, and Industry Division.
49 U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. News release on “Gross Domestic product,” January
30, 2009.
50 Blue Chip Economic Indicators, Aspen Publishers, January 10, 2008. The Blue Chip forecast is an average of about
50 separate forecasts.
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In the third quarter of 2008, the annual-rate value of motor vehicle output was $331.3 billion out
of a total annual-rate gross domestic product (GDP) of $14.4 trillion.51 Motor vehicle production
thus represents 2.3% of total output. The total number of workers employed in the manufacture of
U.S. autos in 2007, measured on an annual basis, was 859,000. Of those, 186,000 worked in light
vehicle assembly, and 673,000 were employed in the manufacture of parts.52
Estimates vary of job loss resulting from a failure of one or more Detroit 3 companies and their
production. They depend on different models and assumptions. But in every case, the impact on
employment is serious.
• The Inforum model at the University of Maryland produced estimates of “peak
year” (2011) job loss ranging from 826,000 jobs in event of “retirement” of 20%
of Detroit 3 production (a shutdown of Chrysler, for example) to more than 2.2
million peak-year job losses in the event of a 60% Detroit 3 shutdown. However,
the study also notes that the higher shutdown level is unlikely over the long term
and that the practical worst-case scenario would be a restructuring and
downsizing, with a 40% production loss. This would be estimated to result in 1.5
million jobs lost in the peak year, and a net average loss of just under one million
jobs per year through 2014, against what employment would otherwise be.53
• Anderson Economic Group/BBK, an international business advisory firm with
customers in the automotive industry, produced a separate set of estimates with a
different methodology. AEG/BBK’s worst-case scenario was bankruptcy and
eventual liquidation of two of the Detroit 3. In this case, they estimated that more
than 1.2 million jobs would be lost in the first year, and nearly 600,000 in the
second year. Netting out a small number of persons gaining alternative
employment, the AEG/BBK estimate was 1.8 million jobs lost over two years
among the OEMs, their suppliers and dealers, and others “indirectly” linked to
the industry.54
• The Center for Automotive Research (CAR), a research organization with some
support from industry, did an economic simulation of a failure of domestic
automakers based on two separate sets of assumptions.55 In the first case it was
assumed that the problems of the Detroit 3 automakers led to a permanent 100%
decline in the production of domestic automakers in the first year (2009). It was
also assumed that the effect of that shock would result in such a large drop in the
demand for parts that suppliers would be forced to either liquidate or restructure.
It was assumed that the disruption to the parts suppliers would cause domestic
production of foreign-owned auto manufacturers to also drop to zero in the first
year. In this scenario, the total number of jobs lost in the United States in the first
51 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
52 Thomas H. Klier and James M. Rubenstein, “Who Really Made Your Car?,” Chicago Fed Letter, Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, October 2008. See also Table 2 below in this report.
53 University of Maryland. Inforum Economic Summary, Potential Job Losses from Restructuring the U.S. Auto
Industry, December 16, 2008.
54 Anderson Economic Group/BBK. Automaker Bankruptcy Would Cost Taxpayers Four Times More Than Amount of
Federal Bridge Loans, December 8, 2008.
55 David Cole, et al., CAR Research Memorandum: The Impact on the U.S. Economy of a Major Contraction of the
Detroit Three Automakers, Center for Automotive Research, November 4, 2008.
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year was estimated to be 2.95 million.56 That figure includes jobs lost at auto
manufacturers, parts suppliers, as well as in the rest of the economy, because of
the drop in consumer spending resulting from the direct job losses. In the second
year (2010), production at the foreign-owned firms begins to pick up and
employment recovers somewhat with the number of jobs lost falling to 2.46
million.
• The second CAR scenario assumes that although in the first year (2009) domestic
production of the Detroit 3 automakers drops to zero, auto production recovers to
50% of its former output in the second year and continues at that level. In this
scenario, the estimated U.S. job loss in the first year is 2.46 million, falling to
1.50 million in the second year.
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Any loss of output due to the difficulties with U.S. automakers will likely be felt nationwide, but
because of the geographic concentration of those firms it will be much greater in some regions
than in others. According to Klier and Rubenstein, Michigan accounts for one-quarter of all auto
parts.57 They also point out that there is a corridor between the Great Lakes and the Gulf of
Mexico that has become known as “auto alley.” In 2008, 43 of 50 auto assembly plants were
located in auto alley. Those geographic areas where automakers are concentrated would
experience the greatest economic difficulties resulting from any loss of U.S. auto output. Klier
and Rubenstein also estimate that three-quarters of all auto parts suppliers are located within a
one day’s drive (truck delivery) of Detroit, including those located within the Canadian province
of Ontario.58
Howard Wial of the Brookings Institution, a Washington, DC-based think tank, has done an
analysis of how different U.S. metropolitan areas would be affected if the Detroit 3 companies
were to go out of business.59 Wial’s analysis suggests that 50 metropolitan areas rely heavily on
Detroit 3-related jobs, measured as the OEMs and suppliers accounting for 1% or more of the
area workforce. Though this may seem a small share of total employment, he cites studies to
claim that up to twice as many jobs in metro areas are supported by jobs directly in the auto and
auto parts industry. These metro areas are almost all clustered in the “auto alley” region noted
above, stretching as far south as Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and as far to the northeast as western New
York. The only metro area west of St. Louis is Ogden, Utah, and no cities are included on either
coast, or in the South, beyond Kentucky, Tennessee, and Alabama. Among the metro areas with
56 Jeffrey Werling in the Maryland Inforum study (p. 3) stated, regarding the CAR top number, “It seems implausible
that 100% of U.S. auto production would be idled. Yet the most widely cited total job loss figure, ‘up to 3 million,’ is
based on such an unrealistic assumption.” Toyota and Honda, for example, are already reportedly planning
modifications to their “just-in-time” supply chain models in order to ameliorate the effects of supplier bankruptcies;
see, Detroit News, “Toyota May Modify Supply Chain,” December 30, 2008. The figure of 3 million could be taken,
however, as an estimate of the total number of jobs that could be at risk.
57 Klier and Rubenstein, “Who Really Made Your Car?,” (October 2008 article). Also discussed more fully in their
book, Who Really Made Your Car? Restructuring and Geographic Change in the Auto Industry (Kalamazoo, MI:
Upjohn Institute, 2008).
58 Klier and Rubenstein, Who Really Made Your Car?, chapters 5-6. For a state-by-state analysis of automotive
manufacturing jobs, see CRS Report RL34297, Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Employment: National and State Trends
and Issues, by Stephen Cooney, especially Figure 5 and Table 1.
59 Howard Wial, “How a Metro Nation Would Feel the Loss of the Detroit Three Automakers,” Metropolitan Policy
Program at Brookings, December 12, 2008.
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the most Detroit 3-related jobs, only the Detroit area itself has more than 100,000 jobs in total
that meet this description. The Chicago area is next with about 20,000 jobs. Some smaller cities
figure among the top 20 metro areas in Detroit 3-related employment, such as Kokomo, Indiana,
where 22% of all jobs are in autos and auto parts. But, Wial says
There are also many auto and auto parts jobs in Los Angeles, Dallas, and Cincinnati, large
metropolitan areas where these industries account for a smaller share of employment.
Closures of Detroit 3- related plants in those areas would harm the workers who were laid off
but would have less effect on metropolitan area economies.60
Conversely, he found that, “In addition, there are 21 metropolitan areas, mainly in the South
where at least 1% of total employment is in autos and/or auto parts, but where little or none of
that employment is attributable to the Detroit 3 or their suppliers.” These metro areas are almost
all in the southern states north of Florida and east of the Mississippi River. However, Wial
concludes, “If the Detroit 3 disappear then some of [these] metropolitan areas may gain jobs, but
they will not gain all of the jobs lost by the Detroit 3.”61
In conclusion to this section, the consequences of a failure and liquidation of one or more Detroit
3 companies, would be large, and possibly far-reaching in extent.
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Foreign brands, both imported and produced at U.S. plants, have been gaining market share for
decades. 63 As illustrated in Figure 1, the Detroit 3’s decline relative to the total U.S. market has
continued since 2000. From two-thirds of the total U.S. market for passenger cars and light trucks
in 2000, the Detroit 3 share declined gradually to 58.2% in 2005. Some of this decline
represented aggressive U.S. manufacturing and expansion plans by foreign-owned companies:
Toyota, Honda, Nissan, and Hyundai have all opened new assembly plants in the United States
since 2000, and more are on the way. While, as noted below in this report, some planned foreign-
owned plants may be delayed, Toyota is still planning to open a new plant in Mississippi, Kia is
building its first plant in Georgia, and Volkswagen, which had closed a U.S. plant in the 1980s,
has said that it will continue to build an announced plant in Tennessee. Additionally, a number of
the foreign-owned plants have significantly expanded existing facilities.64
60 Wial, “Loss of Detroit Three,” p. 3.
61 Wial, “Loss of Detroit Three,” p. 4.
62 This section was written by Stephen Cooney, Resources, Science, and Industry Division.
63 CRS Report RL32883, U.S. Automotive Industry: Recent History and Issues, by Stephen Cooney and Brent D.
Yacobucci, esp. Figure 9 and Table 3.
64 Automotive News, “Transplant Expansions: Onward Ho!” December 1, 2008, p. 3.
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Figure 1. U.S. Motor Vehicle Sales
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks
20
ts 15
Uni
of
ns
llio
Mi 10
5
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Detroit 3
U.S. Total
Source: Automotive News Market Data Center (2008 data); Ward’s Automotive Yearbook (2001-2008).
However, after losing eight points of market share in 2000-2005, the Detroit 3 saw their losses
accelerate by an additional 10 points between then and the first three quarters of 2008, to a 48%
market share. This loss of market share occurred at the same time as the total market was in
decline. Although the U.S. automotive market is cyclical, the decline in sales starting in mid-2008
appears to have been especially abrupt because of the crisis in global credit markets.65 Figure 1
indicates that the total domestic light motor vehicle market stabilized at around 17 million sales
per year through 2005 (passenger cars and light trucks, which include sport utility vehicles,
minivans, and pickup trucks). It dropped about a half-million units in 2006 to 16.5 million,
another half-million to just more than 16 million in 2007, then plunged to just 13.2 million in
2008.66 Car and light truck unit sales by the Detroit 3 fell to just 6.4 million, compared to 11.5
million in 2000, and almost 10 million as late as 2005. More detailed data show that each of the
Detroit 3 saw sales decline by nearly one million vehicles or more just since 2005, and each
suffered significant market share losses.
Automotive data is usually figured in “units,” which means, for example, that an expensive
Cadillac Escalade counts the same as an inexpensive Kia Rio. But for the entire industry, average
65 Ray Windecker, former research and analysis manager for Ford Motor Co., has pointed out that in past cycles, sales
declines at the trough were 30% or higher, and between 1978 and 1982 the net decline in annual vehicle sales was 4.5
million units; “A Rough Ride Is Nothing New for Autos,” Automotive News, November 10, 2008, p. 14. By
comparison, the fall in total light motor vehicle sales from a peak of about 17.0 million units in 2005 to 13.2 million
units in 2008, represents a decline of 3.8 million units or 22% (data from Ward’s Motor Vehicle Facts & Figures, 2008,
and unpublished data provided by Ward’s). However, the fall in monthly sales in late 2008 to an annual rate of about
10.0 million units indicates that we may not yet have seen the trough of this cycle.
66 For the third quarter, the annual rate of sales was even lower, and, owing to lower-than-average income and credit
ratings among their customers, Detroit 3 companies only commanded 42% of the domestic retail market; Detroit Free
Press, “Credit Crunch Hits Buyers of Detroit 3” (October 26, 2008).
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new vehicle transaction prices, after rising from 2004 through 2007, fell steadily in 2008,
meaning less “top line” revenue per unit sold.67 Moreover, Table 1 illustrates that part of the
Detroit 3’s problems relate to the continued reliance on truck sales, when light trucks are
declining as an overall share of the market. Having become more specialized in larger vehicles,
the Detroit 3 have been especially adversely affected by the sharper decline in the sales of such
vehicles.
In 2001, “light truck” sales, which include smaller SUVs known as “crossover” utility vehicles
(CUVs), were higher than U.S. passenger car sales for the first time. Trucks’ lead over cars
continued to expand through 2005—9.3 million units to 7.7 million units in that year, for a net
margin of 1.6 million. But 2004-2005 saw Hurricanes Ivan, Katrina, and Rita, which temporarily
disrupted oil and gas production in the Gulf of Mexico and exacerbated a period of rising fuel
prices and volatility that continued through 2008.68 In 2008 U.S. car and truck sales both fell: car
sales by 800,000 versus a two million unit decline in light truck sales. Truck sales were also more
than three million units less than the all-time 2005 annual peak. While most foreign-owned
manufacturers had also expanded their truck offerings (including SUVs and minivans) in the U.S.
market, they have not been as reliant as the Detroit 3 on truck products. By 2008, each of the
Detroit 3 still counted on light trucks for a majority of sales (55% for GM, higher levels for Ford
and Chrysler), while no foreign-owned competitor did so. Only about a third of foreign-brand
companies’ sales overall were classified as light trucks.
67 Detroit Free Press, “Vehicle Transaction Prices Continue Falling” (October 28, 2008).
68 On recent trends, see CRS Report RL34625, Gasoline and Oil Prices, by Robert Pirog.
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Table 1. Market Shares of U.S. Car and Truck Sales
2008
2001
2005
Sales (millions of units)
Sales (millions of units)
Sales (millions of units)
Light
Market
Light
Market
Light
Market
Manufacturers
Cars
Trucks
Total
Share (%)
Cars
Trucks
Total
Share (%)
Cars
Trucks
Total
Share (%)
GM
2.3 2.6 4.9 28.3 1.8 2.7 4.5 26.3 1.4 1.6 3.0 22.3
Ford
1.5 2.4 3.9 22.9 1.0 2.1 3.1 18.3 0.7 1.3 2.0 15.1
Chrysler
0.6 1.7 2.3 13.3 0.5 1.8 2.3 13.6 0.5 1.0 1.5 11.0
Detroit 3
4.4 6.7 11.0 64.5 3.3 6.6 9.
9 58.2 2.5 3.9 6.4 48.4
(total)
Asian
Brands 3.3 1.9 5.2 30.4 3.6 2.6 6.2 36.6 3.8 2.1 5.9 44.6
German
0.8 0.1 0.9 5.0 0.7 0.1 0.8 5.0 0.7 0.2 0.9 6.5
Brands
Total U.S.
8.4 8.7 17.1
100.0 7.7 9.3 16.9
100.0 7.2 6.3 13.5
100.0
Salesa
Source: Automotive News Market Data Center (2008 data); Ward’s Automotive Yearbook (2001-2008).
a. U.S. total includes other specialty manufacturers.
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During the present decade, both market forces and federal regulation have begun to push fuel
economy levels upward, leading to a move away from larger, less fuel-efficient vehicles, a market
that the Detroit 3 have generally dominated. While the CAFE standard set by the Department of
Transportation’s National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) for cars has
held steady at 27.5 mpg throughout the decade, the actual average of model-year vehicles sold, as
measured on a different basis by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has increased from
22.9 mpg to 24.1 mpg, with most of the gain coming in model year (MY) 2007-2008.69 While the
light truck standard held steady at 20.7 mpg through 2004, actual average truck mpg, as measured
by EPA, remained less than 17.0 mpg. Both the federal standard and the actual average declined
in 2005 for light trucks. The actual average mpg was 18.1 by MY2008.70
While the first half of 2008 was characterized by a market shift to more fuel-efficient vehicles in
the U.S. market under the influence of high fuel prices, the latter half of the year saw all almost
OEMs suffer from declining sales, in the United States and globally. IHS Global Insight estimated
that global vehicle production fell by 16% in the fourth quarter of 2008. CSM, an automotive
consulting group, estimated that there is now enough worldwide capacity to build 90 million cars
a year, but only 66 million will be produced in 2009.71 Not just the Detroit 3 are affected by this
slump. Toyota announced that it would probably record its first annual operating loss in more
than 70 years in the fiscal year to March 31, 2009. Honda similarly projected negative results for
the second half of its fiscal year. Both companies cited strengthening of the yen against the U.S.
dollar to the highest level in 13 years as a major factor in worsening their results. According to
the Financial Times:
“I would like the government and the Bank of Japan to move a bit more swiftly in ensuring
the stability of the exchange rate,” [said Honda CEO Takeo Fukui], code for intervening in
the market to weaken the currency.72
Reaction among Japanese companies in their U.S. plants included temporary production cutbacks,
and Toyota’s announced delay in completing its new plant in Mississippi to build the Prius hybrid
model. Toyota also consolidated production of its full-size Tundra pickup at the San Antonio
plant, and temporarily closed one line there. Production cutback and temporary production
shutdown announcements in were widespread among Asian OEMs in the United States.73 On
January 6, 2009, Toyota in Japan also announced that it would suspend “production at all 12 of its
directly operated domestic plants, which include 4 vehicle assembly plants and also factories that
make transmissions, engines and other parts.” Another three-day shutdown had already been
69 EPA’s numbers, which are used on the window stickers of new cars and trucks, are downgraded from the CAFE test
to better reflect in-use fuel economy. For example, the CAFE test is limited to 55 miles per hour, and does not include
the use of air conditioning or other accessories.
70 For more details, see CRS Report RL34743, Federal Loans to the Auto Industry Under the Energy Independence and
Security Act, by Stephen Cooney and Brent D. Yacobucci.
71 Sources quoted in New York Times, “Car Slump Jolts Toyota, Halting 70 Years of Gain,” December 23, 2008, p. 1.
72 Quoted by Jonathan Soble, “Honda Cuts Expenses Amid Further Downturn,” Financial Times, December 18,2008;
see also Wall St. Journal, “Corporate News: Honda Slashes Outlook for Full-Year Sales, Profit,” December 18, 2008,
p. B3; Associated Press, “Toyota Projects First Loss in 70 Years,” December 22, 2008. While Japanese domestic auto
sales fell to the lowest levels in 20 years in 2007-08, a cheap yen level of about 120 to the dollar and strong exports
allowed Japanese production to reach an all-time high in early 2008. But the dollar’s fall to less then 90 yen and a
global growth slowdown has led to falling auto company profits, production and exports; Business Week, “How the
Strong Yen Has Weakened Japan,” January 19, 2009, pp. 50-51.
73 Automotive News, “Honda, Toyota, Others Whack N.A. Output,” December 15, 2008, p. 8.
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scheduled for January 2009.74 Nissan, meanwhile, has converted its truck and SUV line in
Mississippi to produce a commercial type of vehicle.75 Among German-owned manufacturers,
Mercedes Benz has offered buyouts to all 4,000 of its production workers in Alabama.76
Nor are the Detroit 3 unaffected by negative trends abroad. The German government is reported
to have responded to a GM request by offering as much as $2.5 billion in “conditional credit
guarantees” to GM’s subsidiary Opel, which has manufacturing plants in four German states.77
The Swedish government is proposing a $3.4 billion emergency aid package for Volvo and Saab,
respectively the Swedish-based subsidiaries of Ford and GM.78 And Canada followed up on
President Bush’s TARP loan actions with a package of $3.29 billion in emergency loans to GM
and Chrysler, including more than $1 billion from the provincial government of Ontario.79
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Many analysts have commented that, in competing with foreign-owned auto manufacturers, the
Detroit 3 are hampered by outdated labor contracts, negotiated with the UAW through decades of
collective bargaining.80 In 2007, each of the Detroit 3 negotiated new collective bargaining
agreements with their principal union, the UAW.81 These agreements provided for transfer of
retiree health care in 2010 from the companies to a separate trust, with some board members
appointed by the UAW. The trusts are to be established with financial support initially from each
of the Detroit 3. The agreements also provided the companies with other flexibility in managing
and reducing labor costs, so that they could compete on a footing perceived to be more equal to
foreign-owned companies, which are generally non-union in the United States. This included
union acceptance of a second, and lower, tier of wages and benefits for new hires by the Detroit 3,
under specified circumstances.82
But with the auto market declining, there has been little new hiring at the lower wage rate.83 Even
so, wage rate gaps between the Detroit 3 and the international companies may be exaggerated.
CAR data quoted in a Wall Street Journal article compare standard UAW hourly assembly line
worker pay of $26 per hour with $26 per hour at Toyota, $24 at Honda, and $21 at Hyundai.
Honda and Kia are starting production line workers at their new plants in Indiana and Georgia,
74New York Times, “Toyota to Shut Factories for 11 Days,” January 6, 2009.
75 Automotive News, “Nissan to Sell Small Commercial Vehicles in U.S.,” December 15, 2008, p. 24.
76 Tuscaloosa News, “Mercedes Offers Buyouts to Vance Plant Employees,” October 31, 2008.
77 Bloomberg.com, “Germany Offers GM’s Opel As Much As $2.5 Billion,” January 9, 2009.
78 Detroit Free Press, “Sweden Gives Volvo, Saab Billions in Aid,” December 11, 2008.
79 Detroit Free Press, “Canada Takes Steps To Aid Auto Industry,” December 21, 2008.
80 This issue was reviewed in CRS Report RL32883, U.S. Automotive Industry: Recent History and Issues, by Stephen
Cooney and Brent D. Yacobucci, pp. 37-43; and, CRS Report RL33169, Comparing Automotive and Steel Industry
Legacy Cost Issues, by Stephen Cooney.
81 This included Chrysler, which had become newly independent from German parent Daimler after Cerberus, a hedge
fund, bought an 80% share of the company.
82 These agreements are described in CRS Report RL34297, Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Employment: National and
State Trends and Issues, by Stephen Cooney, pp. 25-32.
83 Washington Post, “Bankruptcy Could Offer GM More Flexibility” (November 29, 2008), p. D1.
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respectively, at a wage of just less than $15 per hour, but this compares with a similar starting
“Tier 2” wage for new UAW hires at Ford and GM.84
The principal gap remains in the legacy cost burden that the 2007 Detroit 3 contract agreements
with the UAW attempted to address. CAR is quoted as calculating that Toyota’s hourly total labor
cost, including all benefits, is $44 per hour versus $73 at GM.85 In its December 2008
restructuring plan presented to Congress, Ford attached a table showing that wages and wage-
related costs in 2008 were $43 per hour, versus an average of $35 per hour at foreign-owned U.S.
auto manufacturers. But Ford’s total hourly labor cost was $71, against $49 for the foreign-owned
companies. The principal difference was a “legacy cost” – principally projected health care costs
for retirees – of $16 per hour, versus comparable foreign companies’ costs of $3 per hour. The
new UAW contract, by transferring this cost off Ford’s books to the VEBA in 2010, would bring
the hourly cost burden down to $58 per hour. And, if Ford could replace 20% of its projected
workforce with new, entry-level employees, as allowed by contract, they would bring the hourly
cost level down to $53.86
Another issue addressed in the 2007 contracts and in congressional hearings was pay for laid-off
autoworkers and the “jobs bank.” Laid-off Detroit 3 production workers receive unemployment
compensation from state governments, plus supplementary compensation from company funds
that brings their pay close to the base level for one year.87 After that, if they are still unemployed,
they may be eligible to enter the jobs bank, where they may continue to receive almost their full
base salary, even if no jobs are available. The terms are now more restrictive under the new
contract, and two years is the maximum stay. The jobs bank was declared suspended by the UAW
as of December 2008, in an effort to assist the Detroit 3. Elimination of the jobs bank was made
an explicit target of the federal loans term sheets signed by GM and Chrysler in December 2008.
In January 2009, on the occasion of announcing its annual 2008 financial results, with a large
corporate loss, Ford indicated that it and the UAW had agreed to end the jobs bank program at
Ford.88
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The new collective bargaining agreements were negotiated and ratified by the time Congress
approved, and President Bush signed, a substantial increase in mandated fuel economy in EISA
(P.L. 110-140) in December 2007. Although the Detroit 3 were losing money, the new labor
agreements, combined with an EISA direct loan program for manufacturing advanced technology
vehicles and components, appeared to provide new resources for a transition that would aid the
Detroit 3 in achieving improved fuel economy.89
84 Wall St. Journal, “America’s Other Auto Industry,” December 1, 2008, p. A22; Automotive News, “Transplant
Wages Are a Moving Target,” December 15, 2008, p. 3.
85 Wall St. Journal, “America’s Other Auto Industry.”
86 Ford Business Plan, Appendix 2.
87 Communication to CRS from UAW, December 17, 2008.
88 Ford Motor Co. news release, January 29, 2009.
89 Details of the direct loan program are discussed in CRS Report RL34743, Federal Loans to the Auto Industry Under
the Energy Independence and Security Act, by Stephen Cooney and Brent D. Yacobucci, pp. 14-24.
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By the time Congress considered funding this program in September 2008, the economic climate
for the auto sector as a whole, and for the Detroit 3 in particular, had worsened markedly. The
downturn in the broader domestic economy reduced sales for virtually all manufacturers in the
middle of the year, as consumer confidence declined and credit became harder to obtain. While
neither Ford nor GM has been profitable since 2006, the operating losses turned much worse in
2008. After total GM losses of $18.7 billion for the first two quarters, the company reported an
adjusted third-quarter loss of $4.2 billion. Ford reported a small net profit in early 2008, but that
was offset by an $8.7 billion loss in the second quarter. It had only a small reported net overall
loss in the third quarter, but its after-tax operating loss was $3 billion. “Cash burn” (net operating
cash loss) for the two companies accelerated to about $7 billion each for the quarter.90 In
testimony before the Senate Banking Committee on November 18, 2008, CEO Robert Nardelli of
privately held Chrysler acknowledged that, after losing money in the first half of the year, his
company’s “cash burn” increased to $3 billion in the latest quarter. At the same hearing, UAW
president Ron Gettelfinger testified that of the three companies, GM was in most immediate
danger of failure, and Chrysler was next; Ford, having arranged credit during a more favorable
period two years earlier, was in less immediate danger.91
Representatives of the Detroit 3 reportedly attempted to increase the scale of loans available
during legislative consideration of appropriations to fund the EISA direct loan program, as well as
to reduce restriction of the EISA loans to production of advanced technology vehicles. But these
efforts were unavailing, as Congress maintained the same program rules, when it approved the
appropriations in September 2008.92
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Following the November 2008 elections, the Bush Administration was asked to consider making
funds available to the auto industry from the $700 billion appropriated for relief of the financial
sector in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA, P.L. 110-343).93 Secretary of the
Treasury Henry Paulson and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell instead urged Congress to
assist the automakers by diverting funds from the EISA loan program.94
On November 17, 2008, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid introduced S. 3688, which, in Title
II, included a provision allowing $25 billion from the EESA funding to be used as loans to
automakers in the United States under certain conditions. On November 18-19, hearings were
held before the Senate Banking Committee and the House Financial Services Committee, in
which the chief executive officers of the Detroit 3, as well as UAW President Gettelfinger, made
the case for immediate assistance to the industry. They were supported by some Members of
Congress. Critics of such assistance were also heard.
90 Automotive News, “Cash Burn Rates Threaten GM, Ford” (November 10, 2008).
91 See hearing citation below.
92 See CRS Report RL34743, Federal Loans to the Auto Industry Under the Energy Independence and Security Act, by
Stephen Cooney and Brent D. Yacobucci, pp. 10-11, 17.
93 Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, Letter to Secretary of the Treasury
Henry M. Paulson (November 8, 2008).
94 Financial Times (FT.com), “Paulson Rejects TARP Aid for US Carmakers” (November 12, 2008); Bloomberg.com,
“Paulson Urges Congress to Approve Automaker Funding” (November 13, 2008); and “Democrats, Bush Deadlocked
over Expanding Aid to U.S. Carmakers” (November 19, 2008).
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The industry CEOs stated that they were asking for “bridge loans” to tide them over, during a
market decline of unanticipated severity, which had affected all automakers, and an equally
unanticipated unavailability of credit from financial markets. The bridge loans would provide
time for cost-saving measures, including the transfer of retiree health care responsibilities, to
work. That, plus a hoped-for recovery of the domestic auto market by 2010, could allow the
Detroit 3 to return to financial stability. As GM CEO G. Richard Wagoner testified:
[We, in cooperation with the UAW] have taken actions designed to improve GM’s liquidity
by $20 billion by the end of 2009, and they obviously affect every employee, retiree, dealer,
supplier, and investor involved in our company ... I do not agree with those who say we are
not doing enough to position GM for success. What exposes us to failure now is not our
product lineup, is not our business plan, is not our employees and their willingness to work
hard, it is not our long-term strategy. What exposes us to failure now is the global financial
crisis, which has severely restricted credit availability and reduced industry sales to the
lowest per capita level since World War II.
Our industry, which represents America’s real economy, Main Street, needs a bridge to span
the financial chasm that has opened before us. We’ll use this bridge and we’ll use it
effectively to pay for essential operations, new vehicles and power trains, parts from our
suppliers, wages and benefits for our workers and suppliers, and taxes for state and local
governments that help deliver essential services to millions of Americans.95
In the hearings, the CEOs revealed how the $25 billion in loans would be divided among their
three companies. CEO Wagoner of GM stated that his company would need $10-12 billion to
bridge the present period of financial insecurity, while Robert Nardelli of Chrysler said that his
company would require $7 billion. CEO Alan Mulally of Ford stated that Ford currently did not
have an operating capital shortfall, but would request that $7 billion to $8 billion be reserved in
case of eventual cash needs.96
Congressional critics of the industry’s requests included Senator Richard Shelby, Ranking
Member of the Banking Committee, and Representative Spencer Bachus, who holds the same
position on the House Financial Services Committee. They argued that to a large extent, the
problems of the Detroit 3 were due to the long-term consequences of poor management and labor
decisions, which would not be fixed with short-term financial assistance, and that the industry
would soon be requesting additional federal support. Moreover, assistance to the auto industry, it
was stated, would encourage other industries to also importune the federal government for aid
during the present economic downturn.97
No action was taken in the Senate on S. 3688 in November 2008. Further developments were
deferred until December 2008, after full reports had been presented by the Detroit 3 on their
financial condition and restructuring plans.
95 U.S. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Hearing. Examining the State of the Domestic
Auto Industry (November 18, 2008), Testimony of G. Richard Wagoner.
96 Senate Banking Committee hearing, November 18. The total level of requests was raised to $34 billion in subsequent
business plans formally submitted by the three companies to Congress on December 2, 2008 (as summarized in
Washington Post, “Auto Giants Ratchet Up Pleas for Aid” (December 3, 2008), p. A1.
97 See their respective statements in the Senate Banking Committee hearing (December 4, 2008) and the House
Financial Services Committee hearing (December 5, 2008), on the domestic auto industry.
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Employment in the automotive sector of the U.S. economy includes both manufacturing and
services activities, but the latter actually employ more than in manufacturing. As seen in Table 2,
in September 2008 the Current Employment Survey of the Department of Labor’s Bureau of
Labor Statistics estimated that there were about 857,000 persons employed altogether in motor
vehicle manufacturing (including heavy trucks, trailers and other vehicles), compared to more
than 3.7 million in various service activities.
Since the era of Henry Ford, automotive employment has been a mainstay of U.S. manufacturing
employment. But its relative significance has declined in recent years, despite the opening or
expansion of foreign-owned assembly and parts facilities. Table 2 examines levels of and
changes in automotive employment by both manufacturing and services categories.98 It presents
the latest published data, from September 2008, compared to September 2001, on a seasonally
adjusted basis, to measure against a comparable point in the business cycle. Motor vehicle
manufacturing employment in 2008 was down about 82,000 jobs, a drop of 30%. However, as
pointed out by Thomas Klier and James Rubenstein, as well as in earlier CRS analyses, by far
more people are employed in parts manufacturing than in motor vehicle assembly.99 In September
2008, total employment in all categories of automotive manufacturing was 857,000, down about
30% from 1.2 million in 2001.
98 The table uses the Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Employment Survey, in order to estimate the most recent data
available.
99 Thomas Klier and James Rubenstein, Who Really Made Your Car? (Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute, 2008).
A detailed CRS analysis of U.S. automotive manufacturing employment trends, nationally and by state, is in CRS
Report RL34297, Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Employment: National and State Trends and Issues, by Stephen
Cooney, pp. 1-20.
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Table 2. U.S. Automotive Employment
All Employees (’000s)
NAICS
Code
Sept. 2001
Sept. 2008
Change
Manufacturing:
Motor Vehicle Mfg.
3361
277.8
196.0
-81.8
Motor Vehicle Bodies and Trailers
3362
155.7
128.7
-27.0
Motor Vehicle Parts
3363
767.6
531.9
-235.7
Total Motor Vehicle Mfg.
1,201.1 856.6 -344.5
Services:
Wholesale Distribution
4231
348.6
340.1
-8.5
Auto Dealers
4411
1,227.8
1,180.3
-47.5
Auto Pts., Accessories & Tires
4413
496.9
504.5
7.6
Gasoline Stations
4470
921.2
833.9
-87.3
Auto Repair & Maintenance
8111
902.2
864.1
-38.1
Total Services
3,896.7 3,722.9 -173.8
Total Automotive Employment
5,097.8 4,579.5 -518.3
Source: Dept. of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Current Employment Survey (November 22, 2008).
Note: Monthly survey data may differ from annual figures cited earlier. “Services” total does not necessarily
include all NAICS auto-related categories.
Service activities employment directly related to the automotive industry has also declined, but
not nearly as significantly as manufacturing employment in the sector. Wholesale distribution of
vehicles and parts fell by about 8,500 jobs. Employment at dealers—the largest single North
American Industry Classification System category in the sector, with more than one million
jobs—fell by 47,500 jobs, or 4%. Employment in retail outlets for automotive parts, accessories,
and tires actually grew by 7,600 jobs. The largest decline in automotive services employment
since September 2001 has been at gasoline stations, where jobs fell by 87,000, or almost 10%.
Both Ford and GM are consolidating their dealer networks, so that their unit sales per dealer will
better approximate the levels recorded, for example, by Toyota and Honda. Each of those
companies has roughly 1,000 U.S. dealers, compared to 3,790 dealers for Ford as of 2008, and
6,450 for GM. Yet in terms of market share, GM in 2008 was just over 22%, Toyota just under
17%, Ford about 15%, and Honda nearly even with Chrysler at around 11%. Thus there is no
proportionality between numbers of dealers and leading companies’ market shares. GM and Ford
have already begun to consolidate dealers and reduce their numbers. GM has eliminated more
than 1,000 dealers since 2005, and their restructuring plan calls for eliminating 1,800 more, down
to a total level of 4,700 by 2012. Ford has eliminated 600 dealers since 2005, but did not indicate
a target number for the future.100
Paul Taylor, chief economist of the National Automobile Dealers Association, has forecast that,
because of economic conditions, there will be a total net loss of about 1,600 dealers in 2008-09.
About two-thirds of those closing have been Detroit 3 dealers, he estimated. If this forecast holds,
100 GM Restructuring Plan, pp. 18-19; Ford Business Plan, p. 11.
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there will be fewer than 20,000 new car dealers in the United States at the end of 2009, compared
to 28,000 in 1980.101 Even if the Detroit 3 succeed in consolidating franchises into larger
operations, the implication is that the total number of dealership employees will decline, perhaps
dramatically.
Automotive manufacturing employment has also fallen as a share of total employment in
manufacturing. While total manufacturing employment has fallen by more than three million jobs
since September 2001, employment in motor vehicle manufacturing dropped at an even faster
rate, with its share of total manufacturing employment falling from 7.4% to 6.4%. During this
period, total automotive sector employment, including services, as shown in Table 2, fell from
5.1 million to 4.6 million, while total U.S. employment grew by six million. As a result,
automotive employment, including both manufacturing and services, as a share of total U.S.
employment, fell from 3.9% to 3.3%.
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Credit is the lifeblood of the U.S. auto industry. Credit conditions govern the industry’s ability to
invest, the ability of its dealers to finance their inventory (“floorplan”), and the ability of dealers,
in turn, to sell to individual consumers. The systemic crisis in the U.S. and global financial
markets in 2008 has had a severely negative impact on all these aspects of automotive credit.
An auto dealer’s floorplan is the financing dealers must have to finance their inventory. A new
vehicle dealer will generally buy cars from the OEM, most often in the past on credit provided by
the OEM’s “captive” financial organization. The dealer will then sell vehicles to customers at a
negotiated transaction price. The dealer will be paid, alternatively:
• in cash by the customer;
• through a financial transaction by the OEM captive credit organization; or
• through a third party loan to a customer from a bank, credit union, or finance
company.
Each of the Detroit 3 has traditionally operated with a captive credit organization for both
floorplan financing and consumer credit: General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), Ford
Motor Credit and Chrysler Financial, respectively. Floorplan financing has generally been
provided for dealers by these credit organizations at favorable (better than prime) interest rates.103
Dealers have also been financially encouraged to refer customers to the captive finance
organizations. For much of the period since 2000, a very large share of each of these OEM’s
corporate profits has been accounted for by its captive financial organization.
101 Automotive News, “Economy Decimates Dealerships,” December 15, 2008, p. 1.
102 This subsection was written by Stephen Cooney, Resources, Science, and Industry Division.
103 For example, “As recently as September 30, [2008,] GMAC provided dealer inventory financing for 80% of GM
vehicles worldwide.” Automotive News , “A GMAC Failure Could Doom Dealers,” December 15, 2008, p. 31.
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But the financial performance of the three credit organizations has progressively deteriorated.
According to Automotive News:
Standard & Poor’s has assigned subinvestment-grade ratings to all three finance arms. Ford
Credit and GMAC are rated B- with a credit watch of negative. Chrysler Financial has an
S&P rating of CCC+ with a negative outlook ...104
This means that the financial arms have found it much more difficult to raise capital to lend to
dealers or customers. GMAC, in particular, had virtually ceased lending except to customers with
the highest credit scores, and stopped supporting domestic leasing altogether. All three companies
have had to raise interest rates on floorplan financing, in many cases forcing dealers or customers
to use third-party lending.105
Two of the three captive credit organizations are now controlled by the private equity hedge fund
Cerberus Capital Management. Cerberus acquired Chrysler’s credit arm with its acquisition of a
controlling share (80.1%) of the auto manufacturing operation in 2007. Earlier, it had bought a
51% stake in GMAC. GMAC has been particularly affected by the global credit squeeze and
subprime lending, as it had become a major player in mortgage lending through its Residential
Capital (ResCap) division. The latter has been primarily responsible for GMAC’s multibillion-
dollar losses in 2008.106 However, unlike the situation in subprime home mortgages, Detroit 3
CEOs at the November 18, 2008, Senate Banking Committee hearing on the domestic auto
industry said that there had not been a major rise in delinquencies among their automotive credit
borrowers.107
Ford Motor Credit remains 100% owned by Ford Motor Company. It has sought to offset
negative reports on credit availability by widely advertising that Ford consumer credit is still
available. It has raised floorplan financing rates by 0.5% in view of higher borrowing costs, but
has also waived the increase for dealers that meet overall sales targets.108 CEO Alan Mulally
testified before the House Financial Services Committee on December 5, 2008, that Ford Motor
Credit still supported “77% of all wholesale financing.109”
The Japanese OEMs are also affected by the financial crisis. Traditionally weaker than the U.S.
companies’ financial arms and more reliant on third-party consumer lending by banks, they have
become much more competitive in recent years. Notably, Toyota has inaugurated an aggressive
“Saved by Zero” consumer lending campaign that features 0% loans for qualified buyers on most
models. Nissan has followed suit.110 Even so, the Japan-based car companies saw monthly sales
declines in late 2008 of about 30% or more, compared to sales one year earlier.
104 Automotive News, “Advantage, Ford: Mulally Likes Owning Ford Credit” (November 3, 2008) p. 8.
105 Automotive News, “The Scramble for Credit” (Oct 27, 2008); CRS interview with Patrick Calpin, National
Automobile Dealers Association (November 10, 2008).
106 Financial Times, “GMAC Losses Add to GM Woes;” Detroit News, “GMAC Posts $2.52 Quarterly Loss” (both
stories November 5, 2008).
107 Comments at the hearing from G. Richard Wagoner (GM) and Robert Nardelli (Chrysler).
108 Automotive News, “Advantage, Ford”.
109 U.S. House. Committee on Financial Services. Hearing, Auto Industry Stabilization Plans (December 5, 2008),
discussion between Alan Mulally and Rep. Paul Hodes.
110 Automotive News, “To Match Toyota, Nissan Offers 0% Loans” (November 3, 2008), p. 43.
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Customers and dealers have alternatively sought to finance deals through banks, but the banks
have also reduced their consumer lending.111 Dealers have sought alternative inventory funding
sources from community banks, which generally have funds to loan, and which have not been as
severely affected by the subprime mortgage crisis as the money center banks. The local banks
may offer more attractive financing rates than the OEMs, but for many dealers, they do not have
the scale to cover a dealer’s floorplan.112 On the other hand, GM and Ford have told Congress that
they have explicitly planned to consolidate and reduce their numbers of dealers.
Credit has thus been more difficult for the Detroit 3, their dealers, and their customers. Former
U.S. Senator from Michigan and Bush Administration cabinet member Spencer Abraham has
written that an estimated $700 billion to $800 billion in auto loan exposure “is currently thrashing
around our financial system.” He has further stated that securities tied to auto loans account for
more than 25% of all asset-backed securities, with large holdings by insurance companies, mutual
funds, and pension funds, as well as banks.113
GMAC on November 20, 2008, applied to become a bank holding company, in order to make
itself eligible to obtain new capital from the EESA financial relief package described in a section
above.114 With some difficulty, GMAC achieved this transition on December 24, 2008.115 On
December 29, 2008, the Treasury Department announced that it was making a $5 billion
investment in GMAC, through a purchase of “senior preferred equity.” These funds also came
from the TARP program. In addition, the agency also loaned $1 billion to GM itself, with the
funds to be used to increase its investment in GMAC. These funds increased GMAC’s liquidity,
allowing it to continue to support dealer floorplans and to liberalize significantly its credit
requirements for consumers.116 On January 16, 2009, the Treasury announced that it had agreed to
make a $1.5 billion loan to Chrysler Financial.117 Meanwhile, earlier in December 2008, the
Federal Reserve Board announced that auto dealers could participate in a new $200 billion “term
asset-backed securities loan facility” to finance inventory.118
Aside from consumer and dealer credit, another issue has been the unavailability of capital for
major Detroit 3 investment projects. Delphi is GM’s former parts-making subsidiary, now an
independent company, but still linked to GM by a supplier relationship and labor contracts
through the UAW and other unions. It has been operating in bankruptcy since 2005, and was
unable to exit as planned in 2008 because a private investor group backed out of a deal to buy its
111 Detroit News, “Big Banks Back Off Consumer Car Loans” (November 10, 2008).
112 “Scramble for Credit;” NADA interview.
113 Spencer Abraham, “A Cure for the Coming Crisis in Auto Finance,” Financial Times (November 3, 2008).
114 Detroit News, “GMAC Files with Fed for Bank Holding Status” (November 20, 2008).
115 Associated Press (Durham [NC] Herald-Sun), “Fed: GMAC OK to Seek Bailout Money,” December 25, 2008, p. 1.
116 U.S. Department of the Treasury. Press release, “Treasury Announces TARP Investment in GMAC,” December 29,
2008. See also attached term sheet and GM commitment letter. The easing of GMAC’s credit requirements for
consumers is discussed in Detroit Free Press, “GMAC To Offer More Loans in Wake of Aid,” December 30, 2008;
and Washington Post, “GM Aims To Drive Sales with Incentives,” December 31, 2008. According to press analysis,
because investors’ bonded indebtedness has been converted to equity, GM and Cerberus may lose financial control of
GMAC; see Detroit News, “Feds Invest $6B in GMAC;” Detroit Free Press, “$6B for GMAC; Aid Planned for Other
Auto Finance Companies,;” and, Washington Post, “GMAC To Get $6 Billion Lifeline,” all December 30, 2008.
117 U.S. Department of the Treasury. Press release, “Treasury Announces TARP Investments in Chrysler Financial,”
January 16, 2009.
118 National Automobile Dealers Association. Press release, “Federal Reserve Approves NADA-Backed Initiative
Aimed at Increasing Inventory Financing,” December 22, 2008.
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securities for $2.5 billion.119 GM’s plan to acquire Chrysler and merge the two companies, which
was widely reported in October 2008, was similarly withdrawn when the companies could not
find sufficient funds, including proposed federal financial support, for the deal.120
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On December 19, 2009, President George W. Bush announced his plan to provide credit
assistance to U.S. automobile manufacturers. He stated that “In the midst of a financial crisis and
a recession, allowing the U.S. auto industry to collapse is not a responsible course of action.”122
His plan would provide General Motors and Chrysler with loans for a three month window
allowing them to develop plans to restructure into viable companies.123 “This restructuring will
require meaningful concessions from all involved in the auto industry – management, labor
unions, creditors, bondholders, dealers, and suppliers.”124
GM received up to $13.40 billion in subsidized loans: $4.0 billion on December 29, 2008, $5.4
billion on January 16, 2009, and $4.0 billion on February 17, 2009 (contingent of congressional
action).125 Chrysler received $4 billion on December 29, 2008.126 The loans were issued by
Treasury through authority provided for the TARP under EESA.
By February 17, 2009, top executives at General Motors and Chrysler would be required to
submit restructuring plans to achieve and sustain their long-term viability, international
competitiveness and energy efficiency of the companies and their subsidiaries.127 On or before
March 31, 2009, each company must submit a report detailing the progress it has made in
implementing its restructuring plan.128
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Each major stakeholder would be required to make concessions in order for General Motors and
Chrysler to receive financial assistance.129
119 Detroit Free Press, “Delphi’s Fate Still Tied to GM’s” (November 14, 2008).
120 Detroit Free Press, “GM’s Efforts to Merge with Chrysler Put on Hold for Now” (November 8, 2008).
121 This subsection was written by James Bickley of the Government and Finance Division. More detail on pensions,
health care, executive and labor compensation, and some other issues is provided in subsequent sections of the report.
122 “President Bush Discusses Administration’s Plan to Assist Automakers,” White House Press Release, Dec. 19,
2008, p. 1. Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2008/12/20081219.html], visited Dec. 19, 2008.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 U.S. Treasury, “Indicative Summary of Terms for Secured Term Loan Facility” [for General Motors], Dec. 19,
2008, p. 14 [Appendix A]. Available at [http://www.ustrea.gov/press/releases/hp1333.htm], visited Dec. 19, 2008.
126 U.S. Treasury, “Indicative Summary of Terms for Secured Term Loan Facility” [for Chrysler], Dec. 19, 2008, p. 14
[Appendix A]. Available at [http://www.ustrea.gov/press/releases/hp1333.htm], visited Dec. 19, 2008.
127 Ibid., p. 5.
128 Ibid., p. 6.
129 This section on concessions is based on “Indicative Summary of Terms for Secured Term Loan Facility” [for
General Motors and Chrysler]; and Daniel Dombey and Bernard Simon, “Bush Bails Out Detroit with $17 Billion
Package,” Financial Times, December 19, 2008, pp. 1-2.
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The Bush plan is similar to the plan in H.R. 7321, the Auto Industry Financing and Restructuring
Act, which was passed by the House.130 The primary difference is the requirement that U.S.
employees of General Motors and Chrysler accept reductions in their compensation to an
equivalent level of employees in foreign transplants in the United States. The president of the
UAW opposes these additional union concessions.
Union Concessions
• “Compensation Reductions”: The corporations’ restructuring plans will include a
reduction in compensation of their U.S. employees to an equivalent level paid by
foreign transplants in the United States by no later than December 31, 2009.
• “Severance Rationalization”: Payment to idled U.S. employees of the
corporations or their subsidies, other than customary severance pay, would be
eliminated.
• “Work Rule Modifications”: Work rules would be changed in a manner that is
competitive with foreign transplants in the United States.
• “VEBA Modifications”: Not less than one-half of companies contributions to a
new union-administrated healthcare fund will be paid in shares of the respective
corporation. VEBA is an abbreviation for “voluntary employees beneficiary
association.”
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• “Bond Exchange”: Outstanding unsecured public indebtedness (other than
pension and employee benefits obligations) must be reduced by not less than
two-thirds through a debt-for-equity exchange.
• No dividends permitted while government loans remain unpaid.
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• Benefits plans must be modified or terminated (including golden parachute
agreements).
• Limits are imposed on the annual executive compensation of the CEO and the
four highest compensated officers (other than the CEO), which are deductible as
a business expense. These limits are one-half of the amount (or $500,000 per
year) stated in Section 162(m)(5) of the IRS Code.
• The 25 most highly compensated employees (the “Senior Employees”) cannot
receive or accrue any bonus or executive compensation except as approved by
the President’s Designee.
130 “President Bush Discusses Administration’s Plan to Assist Automakers,” p. 2.
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• Management of Chrysler and General Motors must report “material transactions”
(any asset sale, investment, contract, or commitment) of more than $100 million
to the President’s Designee for review and approval.
• Private passenger aircraft will be divested.
• Chrysler and General Motors shall maintain and implement a comprehensive
written policy on corporate expenses (“Expense Policy”). Any material
deviations for the expense policy shall promptly be reported to the President’s
Designee.
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• New agreements to lower costs.
• New agreements to reduce capacity.
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In return for providing loans to General Motors and Chrysler, the U.S. Treasury receives warrants
to purchase common shares of each company. The exercise price per share is the 15 day trailing
average price determined as of December 2, 2008. The total number of warrants equals to 20% of
the maximum loan amount divided by the exercise price per share. A “warrant limit” is set,
however, at 20% of the issued and outstanding common shares. The warrants have a perpetual
term and are immediately exercisable, in whole or in part, at 100% of their issue price plus all
accrued and unpaid dividends.131
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In late 2008, when the Detroit 3 executives requested federal financial assistance, they dismissed
the possibility of filing for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code. They asserted that such a
filing would inevitably lead to liquidation rather than reorganization because consumers would
not purchase a car from a company in bankruptcy. A survey by CNW Marketing Research
reportedly indicated that 80% of consumers said that concerns about warranty coverage and
replacement parts would make them unlikely to buy a car from a company operating in
bankruptcy reorganization. However, two later surveys—including another by CNW—indicated
that this reluctance could be reduced or neutralized if the government were backing the
reorganization.133 Currently, none of the Detroit 3 has filed a bankruptcy petition, but both GM
and Chrysler each recently received some immediate financial assistance from the federal
government. GM received additional federal assistance in January 2009 and is scheduled to
receive another loan in February 2009. Repayment of the loans is due December 29, 2011, but
131 U.S. Treasury, “Indicative Summary of Terms for Secured Term Loan Facility,” pp. 11-13.
132 This section was written by Carol A. Pettit of the American Law Division.
133 John D. Stoll, “Chapter 11 May Not Deter Some Car Buyers,” Wall Street Journal, December 17, 2008, p. B3. He
reports that a Merrill Lynch study indicated 90% of car buyers might buy a car from an automaker in bankruptcy, while
a CNW Marketing Research survey indicated 48% would consider it.
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would be accelerated if certain conditions are not met within the first four months of 2009.134 If
one of the loans is accelerated, the affected automaker might have no option other than filing for
bankruptcy. This section will look at the terms for the loans as they involve protection of the loan
amounts, the restructuring plan, and the restructuring targets. It will also outline basic options
available under the Bankruptcy Code if the companies are not able to successfully restructure
outside of Chapter 11 reorganization.
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On January 21, 2009, the House passed H.R. 384. Title III of that bill proposed adding a new title
(as Title IV) to EESA. Some of the bill’s provisions could allow additional financial assistance to
the automakers currently or potentially receiving federal loans. The terms and protections
provided in this assistance differ in some ways from those discussed below. As this bill will have
no legal effect , unless it is taken up by the Senate, analysis of the changes are beyond the scope
of this report.
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On December 29, 2008, GM and Chrysler each received a loan of $4 billion. Under the terms of
the loans, the federal government receives collateral for the loans in the form of first-priority liens
on all unencumbered assets and junior liens on all encumbered assets. This provision appears to
provide greater protection for the taxpayer dollars that were loaned to the automakers than would
otherwise exist in the event of a bankruptcy filing. Additional protections include: (1) Mandatory
prepayments of the net cash proceeds from certain transactions, such as sales of any collateral
outside the normal course of business;135 (2) Warrants to purchase common shares of the
automaker;136 (3) Additional guarantors and pledges of collateral from subsidiaries, etc.;137 and
(4) Conversion of the loan to debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing if the automaker is in
bankruptcy. In addition to restrictions on executive compensation discussed later in this report,
the terms of the loans also restrict expenses and “material transactions.”138
Although the terms of the loans are intended to provide protection for taxpayer funds, the
protection provided by these terms may not be sufficient to ensure repayment of the loan amount.
A lien provides protection only to the extent that the property that is subject to that lien has
sufficient value to cover the lien. Likewise, the mandatory prepayment requirement will result in
early repayments only when the collateral sold outside the ordinary course of business has
sufficient value to equal or exceed all liens against it. Warrants to purchase stock provide
protection only to the extent that there is either a market for the warrant or value to the stock that
exceeds the warrant price; however, if the automakers are able to successfully restructure, the
134 The companies’ Restructuring Plan Reports must be reviewed by the President’s Designee and certified no later than
April 30, 2009 to avoid automatic acceleration of the loans’ maturity. GM and Chrysler term sheets, p. 7.
135 See Term Sheets, pp. 2-3.
136 See Term Sheets, pp. 11-12.
137 See Chrysler Term Sheet, App. A (requiring consent by majority of holders of Chrysler LLC first lien and second
lien indebtedness to pledge MOPAR Parts Inventory and some real estate collateral to the government as Lender); GM
Term Sheet, App. A (requiring consent by the common holders of Class A and Class C Membership Interests of
GMAC LLC to pledge Class B Membership Interests as well as Preferred Membership Interests to the government as
Lender).
138See Term Sheets, pp. 4-5.
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warrants may allow the government, and thus the taxpayers, to benefit financially from the loan
agreements.
The terms of the loan impose first-priority liens only against otherwise unencumbered assets. For
other assets, the terms grant the United States only a junior lien. A junior lien provides protection
only to the extent that the asset has sufficient value to cover the junior lien and all liens that are
senior to it. The extent to which either GM or Chrysler has any significant assets that are not
encumbered has been questioned.139 There is also some question about the value of any of the
collateral, encumbered or unencumbered, to anyone other than the automaker who currently owns
it or to a party who wanted to buy the entire operation as a going concern. Thus, the liens may not
fully secure the money that has been loaned to GM and Chrysler.
The warrants to buy common stock may be exercised at a relatively low cost. The number of
warrants is determined by dividing 20% of the maximum loan value by the exercise price of the
warrants. However, the warrants exercised cannot be higher than 20% of the issued and
outstanding common equity interests before the warrants are exercised. The ability to either buy
common stock or sell warrants (as with Chrysler warrants in 1983) has value only if the
automakers remain in business and their stock value increases above the warrant price.
Each of the loans requires guarantors. For the Chrysler loan, CarCo Intermediate HoldCo I and all
direct and indirect domestic subsidiaries are guarantors of the loan on a joint and several basis,
meaning that any one of them may be responsible for the entire loan. Additionally, half of the
Chrysler loan amount must be guaranteed by FinCo Intermediate HoldCo LC and DaimlerChysler
Financial Services Americas LLC. GM’s domestic subsidiaries are guarantors of the GM loans,
again on a joint and several basis. Additionally, the terms specify that any successor entity of GM
would also be a guarantor of the loan, thus preventing sale of GM free and clear of the debt
obligation.
The loans also have conditions precedent that are specific to each automaker and involve pledges
of inventory, real estate, or membership interests to the U.S. government to provide another layer
of protection for the loans.140
One protective provision of the loans anticipates the possibility of an automaker’s bankruptcy. If a
bankruptcy petition is filed, the terms of the loan allow the government to convert the existing
loans to “DIP” financing. “DIP” financing provides the debtor-in-possession (or the trustee in a
Chapter 7 case) with sufficient funds to meet continuing expenses while the business is either
reorganized or liquidated. Generally, DIP financing is a post-petition obligation that enjoys a high
priority for being repaid from the bankruptcy estate or under the reorganization plan. In contrast,
the government loans are being made while the companies are still operating outside of
bankruptcy protection, and the loans are pre-petition debts.141 One of the purposes of bankruptcy
protection is to provide debtors relief from pre-petition debts. This provision in the terms of the
139 See Adam Levitin, “More on the Auto Bailouts,” Credit Slips, December 20, 2008, at
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/12/more-on-the-auto-bailouts.html; Adam Levitin, “Auto Bailout,” Credit
Slips, December 19, 2008, at http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/12/auto-bailout.html.
140 Term Sheets, App. A.
141 Whether a court would honor the pre-petition contract provision to convert the government loans to DIP financing
following a bankruptcy filing is beyond the scope of this report. If a court were to honor the provision, the debtor might
encounter more difficulty arranging additional DIP financing to carry it through its reorganization.
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loans seems to go against that purpose as well as the purpose for DIP financing. It may also make
it more difficult to arrange true DIP financing to use during reorganization.
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Although the expiration date for the loans is December, 29, 2011, the loans made to GM and
Chrysler could become due early in the second quarter of 2009 or possibly even earlier. Under the
terms of the loans, the entire outstanding amount of the loans could become due upon an “event
of default,” as defined in the term sheets.142 Additionally, if the restructuring plan report
submitted by the automakers fails to meet the required standards and is not approved by the
President’s Designee, the loan would automatically be accelerated and amounts not “invested in
or loaned to the Borrower’s principal financial subsidiaries”143 would become due within 30 days.
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As a condition of the financial assistance, GM and Chrysler must each submit a restructuring plan
designed to achieve certain goals. Additionally, they must “use their best efforts to achieve ...
[restructuring] targets.”144 The goals involve financial viability and vehicle production. The
targets involve a “Bond Exchange,”145 “Labor Modifications,”146 and “VEBA Modifications.”147
For these restructuring targets, each company must submit to the President’s Designee
agreements that have been signed by company representatives and applicable representatives of
the affected groups.148
One of the advantages of reorganizing under the Bankruptcy Code is the ability to modify
creditors’ claims without the agreement of all of the affected creditors. Outside of bankruptcy, the
automakers will not have this advantage as they attempt to design a restructuring plan and
achieve sufficient cooperation from creditors to allow the plan to succeed. An additional
advantage to reorganization in Chapter 11 is the ability to reject most executory contracts and
leases. Without §365 of the Bankruptcy Code, automakers may be unable to terminate franchise
arrangements with their dealerships without a significantly greater cost than they would incur if
reorganizing in Chapter 11.
Among the restructuring targets are several modifications to existing collective bargaining
agreements (CBAs) that govern wages, work rules, and benefits, including retiree health benefits.
The targets may or may not involve terms that union members will be willing to accept. Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code includes two code sections that allow the Bankruptcy Court to
approve a debtor’s request to reject or modify CBAs when the debtor and union have been unable
to reach a negotiated agreement and the Court finds that the debtor’s proposals have been rejected
without good cause.149 This provision does not exist outside of bankruptcy. Presumably, the union
142 Term Sheets, p. 10.
143 Term Sheets, p. 7.
144 Term Sheets, p. 5.
145 Term Sheets p. 5.
146 Term Sheets, p. 6.
147 Term Sheets, p. 6.
148 Term Sheets p. 6.
149 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113, 1114.
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workers are concerned with the continued survival of the automakers and will be willing to
negotiate with the automakers if they believe that the CBA must be changed to ensure the
company’s survival. However, in the non-bankruptcy environment there is no judge to evaluate
the balance of equities to determine whether the union members are being asked to make
disproportionate sacrifices to aid the company’s survival. Further, there appears to be no
provision for transparency that would allow all creditors to evaluate the restructuring plan as a
whole and their place in it.
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Most domestic corporations have two choices when filing bankruptcy: Chapter 7150 or Chapter
11.151 Chapter 7 involves liquidation, effectively ending the corporation’s existence. Chapter 11
involves reorganization, generally allowing the company to modify contract obligations and debts
so it can be financially viable and continue its operations long-term. However, some cases filed
under Chapter 11 result in liquidation.
Under the Bankruptcy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,152 Congress may create sections of the
Bankruptcy Code (shortened in this part of the report to simply “the Code”) to address issues of a
particular type of industry or entity so long as the laws are uniform rather than for a specific,
named debtor. In the past, during times of financial turmoil, Congress has modified the existing
bankruptcy law. Examples include Chapter 9: municipalities (11 U.S.C. § 901 et seq); Subchapter
IV of Chapter 11: railroads (11 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1174), and Chapter 12: farmers and fishermen (11
U.S.C. § 1201 et seq). Congress has the power to modify the Code to customize reorganization
for the automotive industry.153 Therefore, the following discussion of Chapters 7 and 11 generally
describes the characteristics of these two chapters of the existing Code, but should not be
interpreted as constraining Congress’s ability to enact laws that would modify the provisions of
these chapters as they apply to the automotive industry or to create an additional chapter of the
Code that is applicable to the automotive industry.
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In Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code,154 a trustee is chosen to represent and administer the
bankruptcy estate.155 The trustee takes over the company’s assets, sells them, and distributes the
proceeds to the creditors who have presented valid claims. There is a hierarchy to the distribution
of the proceeds.156 Secured creditors generally will receive payment up to the amount of their
secured interest. Unsecured creditors include those with priority claims and those with non-
priority claims. Priority claims are paid in the order of priority so long as there are funds
150 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.
151 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.
152 Art. I, sec. 8, cl.4.
153 Since the Bankruptcy Clause empowers Congress to enact “uniform laws,” modifications could be industry-specific,
but not company-specific.
154 The Bankruptcy Code is 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
155 The “trustee” of the bankruptcy estate is different from the U.S. Trustee, who is a member of the U.S. Trustee
Program and appointed by the U.S. Attorney General. A private trustee, who represents a bankruptcy estate, is either
appointed by the U.S. Trustee or elected by the creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-703.
156 See 11 U.S.C. § 726.
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available.157 When the funds are depleted, no more claims are paid even if they are priority
claims. After all priority claims are paid, remaining funds are distributed on a pro rata basis to the
remaining unsecured creditors.
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Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code provides companies with a way to continue in business while
at the same time receiving protection from creditors. It also provides them with opportunities to
modify debts and contracts158 in a way that enhances the company’s possibilities of recovering
from financial troubles. It is generally believed that a business is worth more as a going concern
than as an assortment of assets that are sold separately. Survival of the company benefits
creditors, employees, and the community in which the business is located. In most cases, the
company retains its management. Generally, a trustee is appointed only when management is
removed “for cause.”159 However, even when a trustee is not appointed, the company may decide
to turn operation of the business over to a “turnaround specialist” who has experience in guiding
companies through Chapter 11 and into solvency.160
The reorganization plan is the key to a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The plan is a proposal, generally
by the debtor-in-possession (DIP), as to how the valid claims of each class of creditors are going
to be resolved.161 To be confirmed, the plan must be agreed to by at least one impaired class of
claims. Additionally, each holder of a claim in an impaired class must accept the plan unless the
amount received under the plan is no less than the amount that would have been received under
Chapter 7.162 In a standard Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the plan proposal and negotiation with the
creditors takes place after the company has filed for bankruptcy. In a prepackaged Chapter 11, the
company does not file for bankruptcy until negotiations with creditors have resulted in a
confirmable plan that is presented when filing the bankruptcy case. This may have the effect of
reducing uncertainty about the company’s future. Negotiating a prepackaged Chapter 11 does take
some time, so it is unclear to what extent a “prepack” would benefit the automakers. In their
requests for government financial assistance the automakers said they were rapidly running out of
operating capital. The assistance they received was less than requested. It is possible that
conditioning receipt of additional government assistance on a prepackaged agreement among the
creditors might encourage creditors to quickly reach negotiated modifications with debtor
companies. An additional benefit to a prepack is the elimination, in some cases, of the need for
arranging “DIP financing.”
DIP financing involves agreements to provide funds to a debtor-in-possession (DIP) to allow it to
meet expenses incurred during reorganization. If suppliers have refused to continue shipments
157 See 11 U.S.C. § 507.
158 Most executory contracts can be accepted or rejected, with the court’s approval, under 11 U.S.C. § 365.
Modification of collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) is subject to greater limitation under 11 U.S.C. § 1113.
Similarly limited is modification of retiree health benefits under 11 U.S.C. § 1114.
159 “Cause” generally involves fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or mismanagement. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104. Note,
however, that under the Railroad Reorganization Act, a trustee must be appointed. 11 U.S.C. § 1163.
160 An example of such a specialist in the automotive industry is Robert S. Miller, who has been leading parts-maker
Delphi through its bankruptcy since 2005. He earlier led Bethlehem Steel through its Chapter 11 bankruptcy and its
sale to the International Steel Group (eventually, the company was acquired by ArcelorMittal Steel).
161 See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (Contents of Plan).
162 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (Confirmation of Plan).
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without prepayment, DIP financing can provide the means of making the prepayment. In some
cases, simply having the loan agreements is sufficient to restore supplier’s confidence and
willingness to ship without prepayment. If one or more of the Detroit 3 filed under Chapter 11, it
is possible that government loans could provide the DIP financing. The DIP financing lender can
enjoy the highest protection available in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. When used for current
operating expenses, the financing is an administrative expense under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) and
would be a priority claim under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2).163
Section 507 priorities are important in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy and must be addressed in the
reorganization plan, but Chapter 11 provides greater flexibility in the payment of these claims
than does Chapter 7. The holders may agree either to modify their claims or to accept alternative
payment arrangements rather than receiving full payment before other unsecured claims are paid.
If there is no such agreement, the Code prescribes treatment for each priority claim that must be
met for the plan to be confirmed. However, some of the statutory treatments allow deferred
payments or installment payments of amounts due.164 This added flexibility for resolving priority
claims may increase the amounts available to pay other unsecured claims. It may also make it
possible for the company to meet its operations expenses both short-term and long-term.
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Pension benefits provided under qualified defined benefit plans are insured up to certain limits by
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a government corporation established by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA, P.L. 93-406). In 2008, the PBGC
insured the pensions of approximately 44 million workers and retirees in more than 29,000
private-sector defined benefit pension plans. The PBGC does not insure pension benefits
provided by state and local governments or benefits under defined contribution plans, such as
401(k) plans. The maximum pension benefit guaranteed by the PBGC is set by law and adjusted
annually. For plans that terminate in 2009, workers who retire at age 65 can receive up to $4,500
a month ($54,000 a year). The guarantee is lower for those who retire early or when there is a
benefit for a survivor. The guarantee is higher for those who retire after age 65.
The PBGC receives no funds from general tax revenues. The PBGC collects insurance premiums
from employers that sponsor insured pension plans, earns money from investments, and receives
funds from pension plans it takes over. When the PBGC takes over a pension plan, it assumes
responsibility for future benefit payments to the plan’s participants, up to the limits set in law. In
general, the PBGC takes over only plans that are underfunded and that the employer is not
expected to be able to fully fund because it has filed for bankruptcy or is experiencing serious
financial difficulties that put its ability to fund its pension obligations at risk. Consequently, in
163 Greater protection may be available to DIP lenders if credit cannot be obtained without such protection. See 11
U.S.C. § 364(c), (d).
164 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9).
165 This subsection was written by Patrick Purcell of the Domestic Social Policy Division.
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most cases in which the PBGC takes over a pension plan, it assumes pension liabilities that are
greater than the assets held by the pension plan it has taken over. In recent years, the PBGC has
taken over several large pension plans that were significantly underfunded. As a result, the
PBGC’s liabilities exceed its assets.
According to the most recent annual report of the PBGC, its insurance program for single-
employer plans had assets of $61.6 billion against liabilities of $72.3 billion on September 30,
2008. If the current economic downturn were to result in the termination of several large defined
benefit plans with significant underfunding, the PBGC’s deficit could grow rapidly. Although
ERISA does not provide for supplementing the PBGC’s income with general tax revenues, it is
likely that if the PBGC were unable to meet its financial obligations to the participants whose
pensions it has taken over, there would be considerable political pressure on Congress to provide
the PBGC with the financial resources necessary for it to continue to pay benefits to retirees and
their surviving dependents.
In order to qualify for the tax exemptions and deferrals that Congress has authorized for
employer-sponsored retirement plans, defined benefit plans must meet certain requirements
established under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). One requirement is that the plans
must be “fully funded,” i.e., the plan’s assets must equal or exceed its liabilities. In most cases,
the sponsor of a plan that is underfunded is required to make additional contributions to the plan
that would amortize the underfunding in seven years or less.166 In addition to meeting the funding
requirements of ERISA and the IRC, companies that sponsor defined benefit plans must report
certain information about the plans annually to the Internal Revenue Service. This information is
available to the public, but the financial data is often out of date by the time it is released to the
public. Publicly traded companies must report information about their pension plans to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These reports are generally available to the public
immediately.
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GM, Ford, and Chrysler each maintain one or more defined benefit pension plans for workers
employed in the United States.167 The companies have separate plans for union members and
nonunion workers. According to the information filed by GM and Ford with the SEC in February
2008, both companies’ plans for U.S. employees had assets in excess of plan liabilities at year-
end 2007. GM reported a pension surplus of $18.8 billion and Ford reported a pension surplus of
$1.3 billion (see Table 3). GM’s pension surplus was equal to about 22% of its pension plan
liabilities, while Ford’s surplus was much smaller, amounting to 2.8% of its pension liabilities. As
a privately-held company, Chrysler is not subject to the same SEC reporting requirements as are
GM and Ford. Current information about Chrysler’s pension plans was not available at the time
this CRS report was written.168
166 For a more detailed description of the funding requirements for defined benefit plans, see CRS Report RL34443,
Summary of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), by Patrick Purcell and Jennifer Staman.
167 ERISA governs only pensions provided to workers employed in the United States.
168 According to information filed by Chrysler on the IRS Form 5500 for 2005, its pension liabilities at that time totaled
approximately $15.8 billion and its assets were valued at about $15.0 billion.
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Table 3. Funded Status of General Motors and Ford Pension Plans for
U.S. Employees, Year-end 2007
(amounts in millions of dollars)
General Motors Ford Motor Co.
Benefit obligation (plan liabilities)
$85,277
$44,493
Fair value of plan assets
104,070
45,759
Surplus or (Deficit)
18,793
1,266
Surplus (Deficit) as a percentage of liabilities
22.0%
2.8%
Estimated allocation of plan assets
Equity securities
26%
51%
Debt securities
52%
46%
Real estate, private equity, and other assets
22%
3%
Source: Company filings of Form 10-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Feb. 2008.
Several factors have affected the funding status of the automakers’ pension plans going forward.
Among the most important of these factors are:
• Stock prices fell sharply in 2008, depressing the value of pension fund assets.
This would tend to reduce pension surpluses and increase pension deficits.
• Long-term interest rates rose during 2008, reducing pension plan liabilities. This
would tend to increase pension surpluses and reduce pension deficits.
• Plan participants have accrued an additional year of pension benefits.
• Plan sponsors have, in some cases, made contributions to their pension plans.
• Certain one-time events may have occurred including plan amendments to raise
or lower future benefit accruals, the sale or acquisition of businesses with
pension liabilities, and the expiration or initiation of collective bargaining
agreements.
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In its most recent quarterly filing with the SEC, GM noted several factors that reduced its pension
surplus, including
• investment losses of $6.3 billion in its pension plan asset portfolio;
• recording a $2.7 billion liability related to a settlement agreement with the United
Auto Workers (UAW) related to retiree medical care;
• recording a $2.7 billion liability due to the increase in the monthly pension
benefit paid to salaried employees as compensation for the elimination of post-65
healthcare benefits;
• the transfer of $2.1 billion of Delphi Corporation pension liabilities to GM; and
• recording a $2.0 billion cost due to special workforce attrition programs for
union members.
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GM reported in November 2008 that its plan for hourly workers was underfunded by $500
million as of September 30 and that its plan for salaried employees was overfunded as of June 30.
The plans were overfunded on a combined basis. GM stated that it did not expect to have to make
any contributions to its defined benefit plans for 2008.169
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The two most significant factors affecting the funding status of Ford’s pension plans since year-
end 2007 are the decline in the stock market and in the increase in long-term interest rates. Based
on the estimated percentage of Ford’s pension plan assets invested in stocks, if its pension fund
assets performed as the major market indices did in 2008, Ford’s pension assets invested in
equities would have lost $8.2 billion to $9.4 billion in value through the first eleven months of
2008. This would represent 18% to 20% of the value of assets held by Ford’s U.S. pension plans
at year-end 2007. The effect of the decline in asset prices was offset to some extent by the rise in
long-term interest rates in 2008.170 Rising interest rates reduce the present value of pension
liabilities. In its most recent 10-K filing with the SEC, Ford estimated that an increase of 0.25%
in interest rates would reduce its pension liabilities by 2.3%. Ford estimated that with an increase
in the discount rate of 1.0% in 2008, its pension liabilities would have fallen by $4.1 billion. This
would represent a 9.2% decline in Ford’s year-end 2007 pension liabilities.
In its SEC filing for the third quarter of 2008, Ford stated that during the first nine months of
2008, it “contributed $1.9 billion to our worldwide pension plans,” and that the company
expected to contribute an additional $300 million in 2008. Although the statement did not specify
how much of this contribution was made to its U.S. plans, less than 10% of Ford’s pension
contributions in 2007 and less than 15% of its contributions in 2006 were made to its U.S. defined
benefit plans.
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In a November 2008 interview with The Wall Street Journal, PBGC Director Charles Millard
characterized the current funding of the automakers’ plans as “OK,” but he said that the agency is
concerned that the cost of funding early retirement incentives could cause financial difficulties for
their pension plans in future years.171 During the week of November 24, the PBGC sent letters to
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler stating the agency’s concern that early retirement incentives
offered to employees could adversely affect the funding of their pension plans, and asking the
companies to inform the PBGC of the costs of their buyout and early retirement programs.172 The
PBGC is concerned that buyout and early retirement programs were not fully accounted for when
169 “General Motors Corp. does not expect to have to make any pension contributions to meet minimum funding
requirements in the next three to four years, even though its funded status declined in the first nine months of 2008
because of negative investment returns and recent employee-related cutbacks, according to its third-quarter financial
report Friday, November 7.” “GM Doesn’t Foresee Required Pension Contributions,” Workforce Management,
November 11, 2008.
170 Watson Wyatt reported that as of September 30, discount rates had increased by about 1 percentage point since year-
end 2007, and that yields on AA rated corporate bonds had risen by almost 80 basis points from the end of September
to mid-November.
171 Early retirement programs could result in pensions being paid earlier than was originally forecast, creating an
unfunded liability for the plans.
172 Detroit Free Press, “Agency Concerned about Detroit 3 Buyout Costs” (November 29, 2008).
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the automakers estimated their pension liabilities, and that these programs could “undermine the
state of the plans.”173
PBGC Director Millard added, in a separate November 2008 statement, that if an automaker were
to initiate a termination of a pension plan while in bankruptcy, the agency would oppose the
termination.174 According to Mr. Millard’s public statements, the PBGC would argue in federal
court that the companies’ should maintain their defined benefit pension plans.175
In January 2009, the PBGC clarified and somewhat altered the tenor of its earlier comments on
the pension plans of GM, Ford, and Chrysler. While they are “well funded” according to the
accounting procedures of the Securities and Exchange Commission, their pensions were
collectively underfunded by as much as $41 billion according to the accounting rules followed by
the PBGC when a plan terminates.176 The PBGC estimates that if all three automakers were to
declare bankruptcy and terminate their pension plans, the agency would pay out $13 billion of the
$41 billion shortfall to plan participants and beneficiaries. The remainder represents benefits that
PBGC could not pay because of legal limits on the benefits that are insured by the PBGC.
The PBGC has estimated that GM’s plans are underfunded by $20 billion (20%) on a termination
basis. Chrysler’s plans would be $9.3 billion (34%) underfunded if they were terminated. Ford’s
plans are estimated to have an $11.7 billion (27%) deficit under the under termination accounting
rules. Outgoing PBGC Director Millard noted that if the companies were financially healthy and
were able to meet all of their future funding obligations, the current underfunded status of their
pension plans would not necessarily pose a risk to the PBGC. However, the possibility that one or
more of the companies will file for bankruptcy protection and terminate their pension plans poses
a financial risk for the PBGC. Millard stated that as of January 2009, the risk to the PBGC “is
significantly greater than it was six or seven months ago.”177
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If an automaker files for bankruptcy, health care coverage for both active and retired workers and
their families could be at risk. The risk differs depending on whether the bankruptcy is a
liquidation under Chapter 7 or a bankruptcy reorganization under Chapter 11, whether individuals
are still working or retired, and whether they are covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
Individuals’ options for obtaining alternative coverage, either private or public, also differ; factors
such as age or Medicare eligibility, income, and family circumstances could be important. The
111th Congress might consider broad health care reforms that could provide further options at
some point in the future.
The future funding status for retiree health insurance for workers covered by the UAW’s
collective bargaining agreement may be uncertain. During the 2007 contract negotiations, each of
173 Wall St. Journal, “Pension Agency Sounds Alarm on Big Three,” (November 28, 2008).
174 “Federal Pension Agency Asks Automakers for Details on Buyouts,” Bloomberg News, November 28, 2008.
175 New York Times, “GM’s Pension Fund Stays Afloat, Against the Odds” (November 25, 2008).
176This is known as the “termination liability,” for which the PBGC may ultimately become responsible. “Agency
Raises Concerns About Car Makers’ Pensions,” Wall St. Journal, January 9, 2009.
177Detroit News, “Big 3 Pension Gap Grows,” January 10, 2009.
178 This subsection was written by Carol Rapaport, Janemarie Mulvey, and Hinda Chaikind of the Domestic Social
Policy Division.
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the three firms reached separate agreements with the UAW to contribute a percentage of their
projected retiree health liabilities to a Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary Association. Following
their initial VEBA contributions in 2007, the firms agreed to make additional contributions to the
VEBA trust beginning in 2008. In total, the Detroit 3 contributions are projected to fund 64% of
their future retiree health obligations.179 Before January 1, 2010, the automakers remain
responsible for funding retiree health. By 2010, the VEBA will be managed by an independent
board of trustees appointed by the UAW and the court.180 The automakers will have no funding
responsibilities after this point.
However, the size of the actual 2008 to 2010 contribution to the VEBA could depend on the
financial conditions of the Detroit 3. For example, under Chapter 11, the Detroit 3 and the UAW
may renegotiate health insurance benefits during the reorganization process. In addition,
increasing the share of funding of the VEBA from stock could affect the value of its funds.
Bankruptcy filing could also threaten health plans for union workers and nonunion workers and
retirees.181 Under a liquidation, there would presumably be no health plans remaining for any
former workers or retirees. In the event of a bankruptcy reorganization under Chapter 11, if a firm
continues to provide health benefits to its workers, certain individuals would be entitled to
purchase health benefits through COBRA (Title X of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985, P.L. 99-272).
Under COBRA, employers who offer health insurance must offer the option of continued health
insurance coverage at group rates to qualified employees and their families who are faced with
loss of coverage due termination of employment, a reduction in hours, or certain other events.
Employers are permitted to charge the covered beneficiary 100% of the premium (both the
portion paid by the employee and the portion paid by the employer, if any), plus an additional 2%
administrative fee. The continued coverage for the employee and the employee’s spouse and
dependent children must continue for 18 months.
A retiree may have access to COBRA coverage in the event that a former employer terminates the
retiree health plan as a result of a bankruptcy reorganization under Chapter 11.182 This option
would only be available to those retirees who are receiving retiree health insurance. In this case,
the COBRA coverage can continue until the death of the retiree. The retiree’s spouse and
dependent children may purchase COBRA coverage from the former employer for 36 months
after the retiree’s death. However, beginning on January 1, 2009, GM was to follow the lead of
Ford and Chrysler, and stop providing non-union retirees with health benefits once they become
eligible for Medicare at age 65. Instead, retirees will receive additional funds which they may
179 GM and Ford Investor Presentations, UAW. Chrysler Report, 2007.
180 There is pending litigation including possible appeals or court challenges that could potentially affect the VEBA
terms and conditions.
181 One option for subsidizing the purchase of health insurance, that could be available although is unlikely at this time
for the Detroit 3 workers, is the Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC) for certain categories of affected workers. The
HCTC covers 65% of the premium for qualified health insurance purchased by an eligible taxpayer. For further
information on the HCTC see CRS Report RL32620, Health Coverage Tax Credit Authorized by the Trade Act of 2002,
by Bernadette Fernandez.
182 If the retiree coverage is eliminated and it differs from coverage offered to active employees, “presumably the
obligation can be satisfied if the affected retirees are offered coverage similar to that provided to active employees,”
according to the American Bar association, Joint Committee of Employee Benefits (Employee Benefits in Bankruptcy:
COBRA Health Continuation Coverage Rules. Teleconference/Live Audio Webcast, May 12, 2004).
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choose to use to purchase Medicare supplemental policies. These individuals would not qualify
for COBRA, as they will no longer be receiving health insurance.
The 111th Congress may consider broad health care reforms that could help some autoworkers,
either active or retired, and their family members to obtain and pay for health care coverage.
While it is unclear when specific broad health care reform proposals will be developed, let alone
whether they will be adopted, the possibility of reforms might be taken into account as policy
makers consider the financial future of the auto industry and its workers. Additionally, the
stimulus bills currently being considered by Congress offer assistance for health care coverage to
certain individuals who lose their jobs.
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Most supporters and advocates of assistance to the Detroit 3 through a program of federal direct
loans have acknowledged that such assistance may be accompanied by conditions placed by
Congress on the Detroit 3 and their management. In the 110th Congress, S. 3688 and H.R. 7321
both addressed this issue, and in similar ways. In the 111th Congress, the House also addressed
these conditions in H.R. 384: in §409 specifically for the auto industry, and in §102 for all
recipients of TARP funds more generally. But none of these measures has been enacted into law.
The present report has already included an outline of the Bush Administration’s conditions and
stipulations placed on the loans planned for GM and Chrysler, especially relating to loan
repayment and financial oversight. The following section concludes the report by reviewing in
more detail:
• Restrictions on executive privileges and compensation;
• Requirements in company restructuring plans;
• Restructuring targets required of the companies, including competitive pay and
benefits for the hourly workforce.
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Until the facility is repaid in full and the U.S. Treasury no longer owns any of their equity
securities, the following restrictions on executive privileges and compensation will apply to GM
and Chrysler. Such standards generally apply to the treatment of the chief executive officer, chief
financial officer, and the next three most highly compensated executive officers. A number of the
requirement derive from Section 111(b) of the EESA and subsequent Treasury Department
interpretive guidelines, while others do not.
Required Compliance with the Overall Executive Compensation Requirements in Section
111(b) of the EESA. Both companies are subject to the overarching executive compensation and
corporate governance requirements established in Section 111(b) of the EESA and the Treasury
183 This subsection was written by Gary Shorter, Government and Finance Division.
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Department guidelines for companies involved in the TARP’s Systematically Significant Failing
Institutions’ (SSFI) program.184 Briefly, the section in the EESA requires participating
institutions to ensure that their five most senior executive officers, including the CEO: 1) do not
take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the company; 2) are subject to
provisions that allow for the company’s recovery or the clawback of any bonus or incentive
compensation paid to them that is based on financial statements of such things such as earnings
that are later proven to be materially inaccurate; and 3) are not allowed to receive golden
parachute payment from the company during the time in which the Secretary of the Treasury
holds an equity stake in the company.
Strictures on the Provision of Golden Parachutes. Both companies are required to modify or
change the benefit plans, arrangements and agreements, including golden parachute agreements
for all senior officials to the extent necessary to be in compliance with the aforementioned
Section 111(b) of the EESA and applicable guidelines.
Golden parachutes are defined in the relevant Treasury Department interpretation as payments of
more than three times an executive’s average base compensation from a firm over the five most
recent years in the event of the official’s involuntary termination, or bankruptcy or receivership of
a financial institution. It is the definition of a golden parachute that the department has used for
tax purposes for many years, and it is the applicable definition for the financial firms that are
participating in the EESA’s TARP Capital Purchase Program.185 Explaining the rationale for the
proscription in the EESA, a Treasury Department official observed that “ ... our key focus is that
we do not want to reward poor performance ... ”186
However, there are some concerns that the provision sets too high a level of reward to have much
impact. Some executive compensation consultants stress that it is uncommon for executive
severance payments to reach the size that would trigger the provision’s parameters. They note that
such relatively large payments do not normally occur unless an executive is released without
cause immediately after a “change in control” situation, usually involving a corporate takeover.187
Echoing that view, in a letter of October 29, 2008, to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said “... [G]iven the level of public
outrage over these compensation schemes.... We would urge you, in particular, to consider the
possibility of further restrictions on the use of ‘golden parachutes’ at such [participating]
institutions ... ”188
Under the compensation strictures outlined in Treasury guidelines for participants in the EESA’s
SSFI program, GM and Chrysler are subject to more restrictive criteria on golden parachute
payments: any compensation that is paid by reason of an involuntary termination from
employment or in connection with bankruptcy, insolvency, or receivership is subject to golden
parachute treatment even if the total amount of such compensation is less than three times an
executive’s average taxable compensation during the five most recent years.
184 U.S. Department of the Treasury Notice 2008-PSSFI.
185 This definition is much broader than the popular definition of a golden parachute, which is severance payment to an
executive in the event that a company undergoes a change in control.
186 Chris Isidore, “Golden Parachutes Here to Stay,” CNNMoney.com, (September 29, 2008).
187 Theo Francis, “Bank Rescue: Making Wall Street Pay?,” Business Week, October 15, 2008.
188 “Letter from Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson (October 29, 2008).
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Required Compliance with Executive Compensation Corporate Limits on Tax Deduction.
Both companies must comply with the limits on annual executive compensation tax deductions
imposed by Section 162(m)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
In 1993, in response to outrage at executive pay levels, P.L. 103-66 added section 162(m), titled
“Certain Excessive Employee Remuneration,” to the Internal Revenue Code. It imposes a $1
million cap on the corporate tax deductibility of compensation that applies to the CEO and the
four next highest-paid officers of publicly-traded firms. (Pay itself is not capped, only the
deduction of pay from corporate income.) Key compensation categories excluded by the law from
the $1 million deduction limit include: 1) commission-based remuneration; 2) performance-based
compensation that meet outside director and majority shareholder approval; 3) payments to tax-
qualified retirement plans (including salary reduction contributions); and 4) amounts excludable
from the employee’s gross income.
The EESA amended Section 162(m) to provide for Section 162(m)(5), which generally requires
firms participating in the EESA’s Capital Purchase Program (CPP) to agree to senior executive pay
deduction limitations of $500,000, a halving of Section 162(m)’s $1 million deduction limit. Unlike
Section 162(m), it also applies to firms that are not publicly traded. Under the terms of the loan
agreements, GM and Chrysler would also be subject to such terms.
Limitations on the Executive Pay Arrangements that Would Encourage the Taking of
Unnecessary and Excessive Risks. This provision elaborates on the overarching proscription on
both companies making compensation arrangements for their senior executives that would
encourage them “to take unnecessary and excessive risks” found in Section 111 (b) of the EESA.
To comply, the principal executive officer of GM and Chrysler are required to certify in writing,
under penalty of perjury, to the Treasury Department’s Chief Compliance Officer that their
compensation committees have consulted with their senior risk officials and determined that such
senior executive pay schemes would not encourage the taking of unnecessary and excessive risks
that would pose a threat to their companies’ values.
An argument could be made that the provision’s operative phrase, “... take unnecessary and
excessive risks.... ” is quite vague, potentially resulting in considerable interpretative leeway.
There is a widely held view that one of the contributing causes of the financial crisis that led to
the enactment of the EESA was the managerial compensation structure at Wall Street firms: many
think that their pay packages overly emphasized short-term incentives such as bonuses, helping to
encourage often reckless and harmful behavior driven by the pursuit of short term corporate
profits.189 Concerns over the relationship between managerial incentive compensation and
exceptional risk taking appears, however, to be largely confined to specific parts of the financial
sector such as the investment banking sector and hedge funds. In addition, a number of
compensation consultants have observed that while the use of uncapped annual incentive pay has
been a significant feature of many financial service firms, the practice is said to be generally
atypical outside of the sector.190
To the extent that legitimate concerns over excessive risk taking do exist, there is a vigorous
debate over the extent to which members of corporate boards, are able to act independently of
189 For example, see Robert Samuelson, “Wall Street Ignored Risk to Gain Short-Term Riches, Washington Post,
September 18, 2008.
190 “Bank Rescue: Making Wall Street Pay?,” Business Week, October 16, 2008.
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senior management’s influence.191 Similar concerns could be raised about the ability of senior risk
managers to maintain their detachment from top management as they also help to arbitrate on top
executive pay arrangements under the terms of the agreements. Such concerns might be
especially germane to Chrysler, which is owned by a private equity firm. Some research on the
quality of corporate board governance at private equity firms found that such boards tend to be
heavily influenced by and at times controlled by the principal investors of the equity firm.192
Within the motor vehicle industry, the provision also raises a fundamental policy question: to
what extent would the discouragement of risk-taking behavior also result in the discouragement
of potentially beneficial, innovative, and entrepreneurial behavior? For example, in late 2007,
General Motors announced that it hoped to start selling cars powered by hydrogen fuel-cells by
2011.193 If an automaker began embarking on the development of such technology, under the
“excessive risk” provision should such undertakings be seen as excessive risk taking or
potentially beneficial and innovative entrepreneurship?
A Ban on the Provision of Incentive Compensation to the 25 Highest Paid Officials. Neither
company can provide bonuses or incentive compensation packages to the 25 most highly
compensated employees (including the senior executive officers) except as authorized by the
President’s Designee.
Studies on corporate compensation describe executive bonuses as a popular type of variable
incentive pay normally given as a once-a-year payment tied to some short-term performance
goals. These can range from judgments on executive performance by a corporate board, to levels
of company profits or company sectoral market share. After the EESA’s enactment, there was
concern expressed both in and out of Congress over reports that executives at financial firms
participating in the EESA were receiving what many perceived to be excessively large bonuses,
an issue not specifically addressed in the law’s restrictions on executive pay. A central concern
was that participating companies were using EESA funding to pay for bonuses, a charge that firm
executives denied. Among those in Congress expressing concerns was Representative Henry
Waxman, then Chairman of the House Oversight Committee, who indicated the funds “might be
used for extravagant pensions or bonuses or dividends or any other purpose, inconsistent with
what the Congress intended.”194
Some executives in recent years have received substantial bonuses in the automobile industry. In
2007, Ford reported that CEO Allan Mulally received $2 million in base salary, and $4 million in
bonuses (he had also received $18.5 million in bonuses in 2006). Ford also reported that the next
four highest paid officials received between $1 million and $780,000 in base salary and between
$708,000 and $439,000 in bonuses. However, in response to the industry crisis at the end of 2008,
Ford eliminated merit increases and bonuses for all salaried workers in 2009. Its senior executives
will receive no salary increases at all. The company has suspended its 401(k) match program, and
eliminated or restricted other benefits for salaried employees.195
191 USA Today, “GM Pushes the Pedal on Hydrogen Fuel-Cell Power” (November 5, 2007).
192 John England, Vickie Williams, “Private Equity: Redrawing the Rules of Executive Compensation,”
Towers Perrin online, (July 7, 2008).
193 USA Today, “GM Pushes the Pedal on Hydrogen Fuel-Cell Power.”
194 “Frank Warns Banks Against Misuse of Bailout Funds,” NPR’s All Things Considered (October 31, 2008).
195 Ford Business Plan, pp. 12 and 27, and Appendix 1.
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General Motors reported that the 2007 base salary paid to its top five officials ranged from CEO
G. Richard Wagoner’s $1.56 million down to $825,000, but none of the GM officials received
bonuses in 2007. According to the data presented in its restructuring plan, CEO Wagoner and
president and chief operating officer (COO) F.A. Henderson each received total compensation of
just less than $2 million in 2007, as stock options for the company have been “under water” (less
than the target price) since 1999. Top-level salaries were reduced as much as 50% in 2007. GM’s
401(k) matching contribution was eliminated in 2008 for all salaried employees, and there was a
reduction or elimination of other benefits.196 As of January 1, 2009, the salary of GM’s CEO was
reduced to a nominal $1 per year, as was the annual retainer for all board members. The company
president’s salary was reduced by 30%, and the other three top officers, including executive vice-
chairman Robert Lutz, took 20% salary cuts.197
There are news reports that Chrysler, which as a privately owned company is not required to
disclose data on executive compensation, has contractual agreements to pay what originally
totaled $30 million in retention bonuses (reportedly reduced because some of the officials left) to
about 50 executives, to be paid out in August 2009. The retention bonuses were crafted by
Chrysler’s former parent, DaimlerChrysler, as it was preparing to sell Chrysler to Cerberus
Capital Management, its current owner. Three of Chrysler’s top paid executives, CEO Robert
Nardelli, president James Press, and vice-chairman Tom LaSorda, are reportedly not participating
in the plan. However, according to Daimler filings, in 2007, Mr. LaSorda received a $15.7 million
bonus for his help in Chrysler’s sale to Cerberus.198
A Chrysler official justified the bonuses because of the need to ensure potential buyers that key
company executives would remain in place after the sale, while acknowledging that they had
become a source of controversy.199 Nonetheless, the official also emphasized that it was important
to keep in mind that the bonuses had been crafted by DaimlerChrysler, the company’s former
owner, and that they appear to have been effective in keeping its executive talent in place.200
Subsequently, as stated in testimony before Congress , CEO Nardelli has agreed to a salary of $1
for both 2008 and 2009.201
An argument could be made that the provision’s proscription on incentive pay could significantly
narrow the types of compensation arrangements that would generally be available for the top five
executives. It could thus potentially remove significant parts of executive pay package features
from compensation committee consideration as they carry out the earlier provision requiring them
to ensure that the pay packages do not encourage excessive and unnecessary risk taking.
A Ban on Compensation Plans that Would Encourage Earnings Manipulation. Neither
company can adopt or maintain compensation plans that would encourage manipulation of their
reported earnings to enhance the compensation of any of their employees.
196 GM Restructuring Plan, p. 31.
197 Senate banking Committee hearing, December 4, 2008, testimony of G. Richard Wagoner, and additional
information provided to CRS by GM on January 22, 2009.
198 Tom Walsh and Tim Higgins, “Chrysler Leaders Get Millions,” Detroit Free Press, November 13, 2008.
199 Ibid.
200 See the debate discussed in Gene J. Puskar, “Chrysler Leaders Get Millions,” USA Today (November 14, 2008).
201 Confirmed to CRS in communication from Chrysler LLC, January 23, 2009.
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This provision is not part of Section 111 (b) of the EESA. Earnings manipulation, often referred
to as earnings management, is an umbrella term that is used to encompass everything from
earnings “smoothing” to outright accounting fraud. Investors, analysts, and auditors disapprove of
such actions, because it makes reported corporate earnings less reliable as a measure of firm
performance. A perceived epidemic of earnings management was a significant impetus behind the
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX, P.L. 107-204), which contained a broad
range of corporate governance and accounting reforms.
Publicly traded companies have a long history of using stock options as a major component of
executive compensation; the strategy’s central objective is aligning an executives’ personal
interests with those of shareholders. In 2007, Ford reported that its stock option awards to its top
five senior executives ranged between $2.49 million and $7.51 million. General Motors reported
that its option awards to its top five executives ranged from $534,000 to $3.77 million.
There is a growing body of research that has found that executive stock options can have negative
consequences with respect to encouraging a greater tendency toward earnings manipulation. For
example, one empirical study found statistical evidence that earnings manipulation is more likely
where stock options play a larger role in CEO compensation.202 Another study concluded that
CEOs were more apt to manipulate firm earnings when they had more out-of-the-money stock
options203 and lower holdings of conventional company stock.204 Jack Dolmat-Connell, president
of Dolmat-Connell & Partners, an executive-compensation consulting firm, reportedly observed,
“While I think that options are an extremely good driver of performance, there’s no downside to
them from the executive’s standpoint... [Y]ou have to have someone with unethical standards who
gets lots of stock options for misrepresentation and fraud to occur. If you give someone with
strong ethical standards lots of options, nothing is likely to happen.”205
Thus, it could be argued that to faithfully implement the provision’s “prohibition on any
compensation plan that could encourage manipulation of the reported earnings” of a recipient
firm, companies would have to ensure that executive stock option packages were tailored
properly to balance their positive incentive attributes with their potential for encouraging
inappropriate behavior. This may assume that the process is conducted with a minimum of
executive influence and bias, which, as noted earlier, could be questioned.
A Prohibition on Altering Previously Imposed Restrictions on Executive Benefit Plans. Both
companies must not alter the suspensions and the restrictions on company contributions to senior
executive benefit plans that were either in place by, or that had been initiated by, the closing date
of the agreement.
Clawbacks of Executive Bonuses, Etc. The Treasury Department reserves the right at any time
during the period of the loans to require either company to clawback any bonuses or other
202 Gary K. Meek, Ramesh P. Rao, and Christopher J. Skousen, “Evidence on Factors Affecting the Relationship
Between CEO Stock Option Compensation and Earnings Management,” Review of Accounting & Finance, Vol. 6,
Issue 3, 2007, p. 304.
203 This is a stock option that would be worthless if it expired today due to the fallen current market price of the
underlying stock.
204 Xiaomeng Zhang, Kathryn M Bartol, Ken G Smith, Michael D Pfarrer, and Dmitry M Khanin, “CEOS on the Edge:
Earnings Manipulation and Stock-Based Incentive Misalignment,” Academy of Management Journal, April 2008, p.
241.
205 David Shadovitz, “The Risks of Stock Options,” Human Resource Executive Online (July 25, 2007).
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compensation, including golden parachutes, paid to any of their senior executives that are in
violation of any of the aforementioned requirements.
The provision appears to be an expansion of the executive clawback provision in Section 111(b)
of the EESA. That provision approaches the recoupment of executive bonuses and incentives in a
somewhat different fashion than does an earlier provision in SOX. SOX and its clawback
provision were collective responses to the widespread corporate misstatements of corporate
earnings that were widely observed in the preceding years. SOX’s clawback provision only
applies to the CEO and the chief financial officer (CFO) of publicly traded companies. The
clawback provision in the GM and Chrysler agreements would also apply to privately held firms
(like Chrysler) and the top five senior officers, including the CEO and the CFO. And unlike the
provision in SOX, it would not limit the recovery period and covers not only material
inaccuracies related to financial reporting, but also material inaccuracies related to other
performance metrics used to award bonuses and incentive compensation. Reports indicate that the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has rarely prosecuted violations of Sarbanes-Oxley’s
clawback provision. Possibly, this is because executives often settle financial misstatement cases
without admitting wrongdoing, thus avoiding the triggering the provision, and because of how the
pivotal concept of “misconduct” is interpreted.206
The expanded clawback provisions in the GM and Chrysler agreements also appear to provide for
the broad-based punitive threat of Department of Treasury-initiated clawbacks of top executive
bonuses or other forms of compensation in the event that there are violations of any of the
agreements’ aforementioned requirements on executive pay.
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The term sheets for GM and Chrysler require them to submit by February 17, 2009, a plan to
“achieve and sustain ... long-term viability, international competitiveness and energy efficiency
...” This must include “specific actions to ensure:
• Federal loan repayment under applicable terms and conditions;
• Ability of the company both to meet all applicable federal fuel economy and
emission requirements, and to begin manufacturing advanced technology
vehicles, as specified in the EISA direct loan program;208
• Achievement by the companies of a positive net value;
• Rationalization of “costs, capitalization, and capacity” with respect to workforce,
suppliers, and dealer networks; and,
• Competitive “product mix and cost structure.”
206 Peter Galuszka, “What Are Compensation ‘Clawbacks’?,” Bnet Briefing, 2008.
207 This subsection was written by Stephen Cooney, Resources, Science, and Industry Division.
208 Requirements for eligibility under this program are described in CRS Report RL34743, Federal Loans to the Auto
Industry Under the Energy Independence and Security Act, by Stephen Cooney and Brent D. Yacobucci.
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The companies will be required to produce monthly and annual statements on meeting these
restructuring requirements. In addition, the term sheets required the companies to use their best
efforts to achieve the following “targets:”
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Reduction of unsecured debt by two-thirds (excluding pension and employee benefit obligations)
by conversion of debt into equity or by other means.
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• “Compensation Reduction.” Reduce total compensation, including wages and
benefits, by the end of 2009 to an average equivalent to those of Toyota, Honda,
and Nissan in the United States, as certified by the Secretary of Labor.
• “Severance Rationalization.” Eliminate payment of any compensation or benefits
to fired, furloughed, laid off, or idled employees, beyond “customary” severance
pay;
• “Work Rule Modification.” By the end of 2009 apply work rules “in a manner
competitive” with the three Japanese-owned companies in the United States
named above.
With respect to labor contract modifications and other provisions under collective
bargaining agreements covering the hourly workforce, “if any labor union or collective
bargaining unit shall engage in a strike or other work stoppage,” it has been defined as an
“event of default” in the “loan and security agreements” signed by the recipient
companies as a condition of receiving the loans from the Treasury Department.209
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Convert one-half of the value of each future corporate contribution to the planned VEBA for
retiree health care, due by January 1, 2010, to company stock holdings.
Each company is required by February 17, 2009, to submit term sheets signed by representatives
of the company and, respectively, bondholders, unions, and VEBA representatives. That is to be
followed up by full approval of the terms by the respective groups, and certification by the
President’s designee, with such variation as may be allowed. Failing completion of this process,
the designee could require full loan repayment in 30 days.210
209 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Form 8-K filed by General Motors Corporation, December 31, 2008, p.
60. A similar provision is reportedly in the loan agreement signed by Chrysler LLC, a privately held company. This
provision was first noted by the press: Wall St. Journal, “Bailout Pact of GM, U.S. Would Block a UAW Strike;”
Detroit News, “Strikes Would Imperil Bailout Funding,;” Detroit Free Press, “UAW Strike Would Kill Auto Loans,”
all January 9, 2009. Commentators quoted in the stories noted that strikes were in any case highly unlikely in view of
the financial conditions of the automakers.
210 These conditions are summarized from Treasury, GM and Chrysler Term Sheets, pp. 5-7.
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By contrast with the prescriptive requirements and targets in President Bush’s loan term sheets,
the House in H.R. 384 gave only a general assignment to the “President’s designee” to achieve a
plan negotiated by “interested parties” (including employees and retirees of the manufacturer,
trade unions, suppliers, dealers, and shareholders). This plan should address: repayment of federal
loans; statutory fuel economy and emissions requirements and targets; achievement of positive
company net value; rationalization of cost and capacity with respect to workforce, suppliers, and
dealers; debt restructuring; and, a “competitive” product mix and cost structure.
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Stephen Cooney, Coordinator
Patrick Purcell
Specialist in Industrial Organization and Business
Specialist in Income Security
scooney@crs.loc.gov, 7-4887
ppurcell@crs.loc.gov, 7-7571
James M. Bickley
Carol Rapaport
Specialist in Public Finance
Analyst in Health Care Financing
jbickley@crs.loc.gov, 7-7794
crapaport@crs.loc.gov, 7-7329
Hinda Chaikind
Gary Shorter
Specialist in Health Care Financing
Specialist in Financial Economics
hchaikind@crs.loc.gov, 7-7569
gshorter@crs.loc.gov, 7-7772
Carol A. Pettit
Legislative Attorney
cpettit@crs.loc.gov, 7-9496
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