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Technological advancement, tax incentives, and policy concerns have driven a global expansion
in the development of renewable energy resources. Wind energy, in particular, is now often cited
as the fastest growing commercial energy source in the world. Currently, all U.S. wind energy
facilities are based on land; however, multiple offshore projects have been proposed and are
moving through the permitting process.
The United States has the authority to permit and regulate offshore wind energy development
within the zones of the oceans under its jurisdiction. The federal government and coastal states
each have roles in the permitting process, the extent of which depends on whether the project is
located in state or federal waters. Currently, no single federal agency has exclusive responsibility
for permitting related to activities on submerged lands in federal waters; authority is allocated
among various agencies based on the nature of the resource to be exploited and the type of
impacts incidental to such exploitation. The same is true for offshore wind energy context, where
several federal agencies have a role to play in permitting development and operation activities.
Congress passed section 388 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) to address previous
uncertainties regarding offshore wind projects. This provision retains a role for the Army Corps of
Engineers in permitting under the Rivers and Harbors Act but grants ultimate authority over
offshore wind energy development to the Secretary of the Interior. The provision also contains
various exemptions from the regulatory regime it establishes for projects that received certain
permits prior to the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Regulations implementing this
grant of statutory authority are forthcoming and could bring additional and significant nuance to
the regulatory process.
This report, which supersedes CRS Report RL32658, will discuss the disputes over Corps
jurisdiction prior to enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 as well as the current law
applicable to siting offshore wind facilities.

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Jurisdiction Over the Ocean ............................................................................................................ 1
State Permitting ............................................................................................................................... 3
Federal Permitting ........................................................................................................................... 4
Early Regulation and Litigation ................................................................................................ 4
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 ................................................................................................. 6
2005 EPACT Exemptions ......................................................................................................... 8
Additional Regulation Under Existing Law.............................................................................. 9
Conclusion..................................................................................................................................... 13

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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 13

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echnological advancements and tax incentives have driven a global expansion in the
development of renewable energy resources. Wind energy, in particular, is now often cited
T as the fastest growing commercial energy source in the world.1 Currently, unlike much of
Europe,2 all wind power facilities in the United States are based on land. However, multiple
offshore projects have been proposed in recent years, including the Cape Wind project off the
coast of Massachusetts; Winergy’s proposals off the coasts of Massachusetts, New York, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia; and a Galveston-Offshore Wind, LLC project in a
portion of the Gulf of Mexico under the jurisdiction of Texas.3
The focus of this report is the current law applicable to siting offshore wind facilities, including
the relationship between state and federal jurisdictional authorities.4 This report also discusses the
court challenges to early federal offshore wind energy permitting authorities and the effect that
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 has had on the regulatory environment.
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The jurisdiction of coastal nations over the world’s oceans extends across various adjoining and
overlapping zones by operation of international conventions and by the domestic laws and
proclamations of individual governments. The United States has varying degrees of authority over
four functional areas: the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ), and state-controlled waters. The federal government has differing levels of authority in
each of these zones vis-a-vis the states and other nations. Even within these zones, all nations
enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight as well as other internationally lawful uses of the sea,
subject to certain regulatory authority reserved to the coastal nation.5 However, it seems relatively
clear that the United States would have sufficient jurisdiction over each of its zones to authorize
the construction and operation of offshore wind projects.
United States authority in the oceans begins at its coast—called the baseline—and extends 200
nautical miles out to sea. The first twelve nautical miles comprise the U.S. territorial sea.6 Under
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea7 (UNCLOS III), a coastal nation may
claim sovereignty over the air space, water, seabed, and subsoil within its territorial sea.8 U.S.

1 See Mass. Tech. Collaborative, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, & General Electric, A Framework for Offshore Wind Energy
Development in the United States at 9 (September 2005); U.S. Dep’t of Energy & U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, White
House Report in Response to the National Energy Policy Recommendations to Increase Renewable Energy Production
on Federal Lands at 6 (August 2002).
2 For an overview of offshore wind farm regulation in the United Kingdom, see Nathanael D. Hartland, The Wind and
the Waves: Regulatory Uncertainty and Offshore Wind Power in the United States and United Kingdom, 24 U. Pa. J.
Int’l Econ. L. 691 (2003).
3 Betsie Blumberg, Wind Farms: An Emerging Dilemma for East Coast National Parks, in National Park Service,
Natural Resource Year in Review—2003 63 (March 2004); see Texas General Land Office, Offshore Wind Energy
(available at [http://www.glo.state.tx.us/news/archive/2005/events/offshorewind.html]).
4 For a discussion of policy and other issues and related to wind energy, see CRS Report RL34546, Wind Power in the
United States: Technology, Economic, and Policy Issues, by Jeffrey Logan and Stan Mark Kaplan.
5 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 514 (1986).
6 Proc. No. 5928 (December 27, 1988).
7 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force November
16, 1994) (hereinafter UNCLOS III).
8 UNCLOS III arts. 2.1, 2.2, 3; see also United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S.
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Supreme Court precedent and international practice indicate that this sovereignty authorizes
coastal nations to permit offshore development within their territorial seas.9
The U.S. contiguous zone extends beyond the territorial sea to twenty-four nautical miles from
the baseline. In this area, a coastal nation may regulate to protect its territorial sea and to enforce
its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws.10 The U.S. EEZ extends 200 nautical miles
from the baseline. In accordance with international law, the United States has claimed sovereign
rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage EEZ natural resources of the seabed, subsoil, and
the superadjacent waters.11 United States jurisdiction also extends over “other activities for the
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the
water, currents and winds”12 and, subject to some limitations, “the establishment and use of
artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research; and the protection and
preservation of the marine environment.”13 In almost all situations, the U.S. EEZ overlaps
geographically with the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), a geologically distinct area of
appurtenant seabed referenced in several federal laws.14
The relative jurisdiction of the federal government with respect to individual states is also of
importance. The Submerged Lands Act of 195315 assured coastal states title to the lands beneath
coastal waters in an area stretching, in general, three geographical miles from the shore.16 Thus,
states may regulate the coastal waters within this area, subject to federal regulation for
“commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs” and the power of the federal
government to preempt state law.17 The remaining outer portions of waters over which the United
States exercises jurisdiction are federal waters.18
It would seem relatively clear that the federal government would have permitting authority for
offshore wind farms, to the outer boundaries of its EEZ, and that this authority would be
supported by international treaty. However, federal authority would be limited by the
internationally recognized right of free passage and by the jurisdiction granted to the states under
the Submerged Lands Act. The rest of this report explores this federal authority in greater detail.

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272, 273-74 (1954).
9 See United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32, 36 (1978); United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 199 (1975); Alabama
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273-74 (1954); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
10 UNCLOS III art. 33.
11 UNCLOS III arts. 56, 58; Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States of America, Proclamation No. 5030, 48
Fed. Reg. 10,605 (March 14, 1983); Territorial Sea of the United States of America, Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed.
Reg. 777 (December 27, 1988); Contiguous Zone of the United States, Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48,701
(August 2, 1999).
12 UNCLOS III art. 56.1 (emphasis added).
13 Id. art. 56.1(b).
14 See U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century: Final Report of the U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy, Primer on Ocean Jurisdictions: Drawing Lines in the Water, Pre-Publication Copy 41-44
(2004), available at [http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/prepub_report/primer.pdf].
15 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311-1315.
16 Id. § 1301(a)(2). State jurisdiction typically extends three nautical miles (approximately 3.3 miles) seaward of the
coast or “baseline.” Texas and the Gulf Coast of Florida have jurisdiction over an area extending 3 “marine leagues” (9
nautical miles) from the baseline. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2).
17 Id. §§ 1314(a), 1311(a)(2).
18 Id. § 1302.
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States may play a regulatory role when a wind energy project is proposed for construction in
federal or state waters. State jurisdiction over projects located in federal areas is substantially
circumscribed; however, under the Coastal Zone Management Act19 (CZMA), states are explicitly
granted some regulatory authority. In general, the CZMA encourages states to enact coastal zone
management plans to coordinate protection of habitats and resources in coastal waters.20 The
CZMA establishes a policy of preservation alongside sustainable use and development
compatible with resource protection.21 State coastal zone management programs that are approved
by the Secretary of Commerce receive federal monetary and technical assistance. State programs
must designate conservation measures and permissible uses for land and water resources22 and
must address various sources of water pollution.23
The CZMA also requires that the federal government and federally-permitted activities comply
with state programs.24 Responding to a Supreme Court decision that excluded OCS oil and gas
leasing from state review under the CZMA, Congress amended the “consistency review”
provision to include the impacts on a state coastal zone from actions in federal waters.25 Thus,
states have some authority to demand that federally-permitted projects in federal waters will not
result in a violation of state coastal zone management regulation.
In addition to consistency review, projects to be constructed in state waters, including any cables
that would be necessary to transmit power back to shore, are subject to all state regulation or
permitting requirements. Coastal zone regulation varies significantly among the states. The
CZMA itself establishes three generally acceptable regulatory frameworks: (1) “State
establishment of criteria and standards for local implementation, subject to administrative review
and enforcement;” (2) “[d]irect State land and water use planning and regulation;” and (3)
regulation development and implementation by local agencies, with state-level review of program
decisions.26
Within these frameworks, several states, such as New Jersey, California, and Rhode Island,
centralize authority for their programs in one agency.27 In New Jersey, for instance, the state
Department of Environmental Protection (through the Coastal Management Office within the
Commissioner’s Office of Policy, Planning, and Science) is the lead agency for coastal zone

19 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464.
20 Coastal U.S. states and territories, including the Great Lakes states, are eligible to receive federal assistance for their
coastal zone management programs. Currently, there are 33 approved state and territorial plans. Of eligible states, only
Illinois does not have an approved program. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Office of Ocean
and Coastal Resource Management, State and Territory Coastal Management Program Summaries, available at
[http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/mystate/welcome.html].
21 Id. § 1452(1), (2).
22 Id. § 1455(d)(2), (9)-(12).
23 Id. § 1455(d)(16).
24 Id. § 1456(c).
25 Id.; Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 315 (1984).
26 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(11).
27 See Rusty Russell, Neither Out Far Nor In Deep: The Prospects for Utility-Scale Wind Power in the Coastal Zone, 31
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 221, 240-41 (2004).
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management under several state laws.28 The majority of states, however, operate coastal zone
management programs under “networks” of parallel agencies, with various roles defined by
policy guidance and memoranda of understanding (MOUs).29 Based on a series of MOUs, each
agency is obligated to issue and apply state regulations and permits consistently with the state’s
coastal zone management program.30 Thus, depending on the state with jurisdiction, offshore
wind energy projects could be subject to comprehensive regulation with permitting authority
spread among multiple state and local agencies.
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Use of federal and federally-controlled lands, including the OCS, requires some form of
permission, such as a right-of-way, easement, or license.31 For onshore wind projects on federal
public lands, the Department of the Interior (DOI), through the Bureau of Land Management, has
created a regulatory program under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act,32 but a federal
statute expressly governing offshore wind energy development was not enacted until August 2005
as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (2005 EPACT). Before enactment of the 2005 EPACT,
some permitting in support of offshore wind energy development had taken place under laws
existing at that time. Use of these authorities proved controversial and was the subject of a
lawsuit challenging preliminary permitting actions. The previous regulatory regime, the conflicts
it engendered, and the 2005 EPACT legal authority are discussed below.
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Prior to enactment of the 2005 EPACT, the Army Corp of Engineers (Corps) took the lead role in
the federal offshore wind energy permitting process, claiming jurisdiction pursuant to section 10
of the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA),33 as amended by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act

28 E.g., Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 13:9B; Flood Hazard Area Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:16A;
Wetlands Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 13:9A; Waterfront Development Act, N.J.S.A. 12:5-3; NJ Water Pollution Control Act,
N.J.S.A. 58:10A; Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA), N.J.S.A. 13:19; Tidelands Act, N.J.S.A. 12:3.
29 Russell, supra note 27, at 241.
30 Id. at App. E.
31 Several federal laws would appear to indicate that Congress intends the OCS to be used only when permission has
been expressly granted. See 43 U.S.C. § 1332(1), (3) (“the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain
to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition.... ”); see also 42 U.S.C. §
9101(a)(1)(stating that the purpose of the Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act is to “authorize and regulate the
construction, location, ownership, and operation of ocean thermal energy conversion facilities.”).
32 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq.
33 33 U.S.C. §§ 407-687. Section 10 was enacted in 1899, and its text has not changed substantively since that time. It
states:
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity
of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it shall not be lawful to build or
commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or
other structures in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or other water of the
United States, outside established harbor lines, or where no harbor lines have been established,
except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the
Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the course,
location, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor or refuge,
or inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or of the channel of any navigable water of the
United States, unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by
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(OCSLA).34 The Corps has jurisdiction under these laws to permit obstructions to navigation
within the “navigable waters of the United States” and on the OCS.35
In addition to reviewing offshore construction for potential obstructions to navigation, the Corps
examined wind energy-related development pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), which generally requires analysis of the environmental impacts of federal actions.36
Thus, pursuant to the RHA and NEPA, the Corps may have examined many of the salient issues
present in an offshore wind energy proposal. Controversy arose, however, with respect to two
primary issues that were litigated in Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound v. United States
Department of the Army.37 First, it was unclear whether Corps jurisdiction pursuant to the RHA
and the OCSLA extended to all offshore structures or only to those otherwise permitted for
energy or mineral development pursuant to other OCSLA provisions. On the basis of the
language of the statutes at issue, their legislative history, and Corps regulations and guidance, a
federal district court and the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Corps was authorized to
exercise RHA section 10 authority for any offshore structure, regardless of purpose, in state or
federal waters.38
The second issue in the Alliance case was whether a section 10 RHA permit was sufficient to
authorize the siting, construction, and operation of an offshore wind energy facility. Because any
wind turbines would be attached to the seabed of the OCS, some authorization to occupy the
submerged lands of the OCS would be required before construction could legally take place.39
Use or occupancy of the OCS without such authorization arguably may constitute common law
trespass.40 Questions over the type of authorization a section 10 permit encompasses spring, in
part, from Corps regulations, which state:
A DA [Department of the Army] permit does not convey any property rights, either in real
estate or material, or any exclusive privileges. Furthermore, a DA permit does not authorize

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the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same. 33 U.S.C. § 403.
34 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356a.
35 33 U.S.C. § 403. Corps regulations define the “navigable waters of the United States” as “those waters that are
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have been used in the past, or may be susceptible
for use to transport interstate or foreign commerce.” 33 C.F.R. § 329.4. Under the RHA, navigable waters “includes
only those ocean and coastal waters that can be found up to three geographic miles seaward of the coast.” Alliance To
Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Army, 288 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.Mass. 2003) (hereinafter Alliance I),
aff’d, 398 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2005) (hereinafter Alliance II); see also 33 C.F.R. § 329.12(a). On the OCS, however, the
Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction extends beyond that three-mile limit for, at least, certain purposes. 43 U.S.C. §
1333(a)(1), (e).
36 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.
37 Alliance I, 288 F.Supp.2d at 64.
38 Id. at 75.
39 See 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (applying the criminal and civil laws of states adjacent to the OCS as federal law); see
also Guy R. Martin, The World’s Largest Wind Energy Facility in Nantucket Sound? Deficiencies in the Current
Regulatory Process for Offshore Wind Energy Development, 31 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 300, n.96 (2004).
40 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that because the United States does not own the OCS in fee
simple, it cannot claim trespass based on unauthorized construction on OCS. On the other hand, the court stated,
“[n]either ownership nor possession is, however, a necessary requisite for the granting of injunctive relief,” because the
United States has paramount rights to the OCS and an interest to protect. Thus damages available under trespass may
not be available for unauthorized construction on the OCS, while injunctive relief would appear possible even under
more constrained interpretations of U.S. authority. United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16, 22 (5th Cir. 1970).
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any injury to property or invasion of rights or any infringement of Federal, state or local laws
or regulations. The applicant’s signature on an application is an affirmation that the applicant
possesses or will possess the requisite property interest to undertake the activity proposed in
the application. The district engineer will not enter into disputes but will remind the
applicant of the above. The dispute over property ownership will not be a factor in the Corps
public interest decision.41
Although issues tangentially related to OCS property interests were addressed in the Alliance
cases, the reviewing courts left the matter substantially unsettled.42 Accordingly, prior to
enactment of the EPACT 2005, it was unclear whether a Corps permit was sufficient to authorize
the use of the OCS for wind energy purposes.43 EPACT 2005 addresses this issue by authorizing
offshore wind energy project permitting without completely abrogating the Corps’ authority under
the RHA. This legal authority and how it relates to earlier law are discussed below.
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Section 388 of the EPACT 2005 seeks to address the issues raised in litigation related to offshore
wind energy development by specifically establishing legal authority for federal review and
approval of various offshore energy related projects. The provision amends the OCSLA by adding
a new subsection that authorizes the Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with other federal
agencies, to grant leases, easements, or rights-of-way on the OCS for certain activities—wind
energy development among them—not authorized by other OCSLA provisions, the Deepwater
Port Act, the Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act, or “other applicable law.”44

41 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(g)(6).
42 See Alliance II, 398 F.3d 105, 114 (1st Cir. 2005). The courts held that the Corps is not required to validate existing
property rights or otherwise become involved in ongoing property disputes prior to issuing a RHA permit. Alliance I,
288 F.Supp. 2d at 77-78. Despite the Army Corps regulation, additional laws require the Corps to consider property
rights in granting RHA permits. In determining if issuance of a RHA permit is in the public interest, the Corps, under
its own regulations, is obligated to consider the “effects of the proposed work [i.e. offshore structure] on the outer
continental rights of the United States.” 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(f). In addressing this requirement in the Alliance case, the
First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Corps satisfied this requirement with respect to the preliminary data tower,
stating: “[i]t is inconceivable to us that permission to erect a single, temporary scientific device, like this, which gives
the federal government information it requires, could be an infringement on any federal property ownership interest in
the OCS.” Alliance II, 398 F.3d at 114.
43 Other energy-related developments on the outer continental shelf, for instance, require a lease issued by the
Department of the Interior (DOI), pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), prior to development.
43 U.S.C. § 1337.
44 43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(1). DOI authority to grant leases, easements, or rights-of-way on the OCS is contingent upon the
permitted activities being consistent with the purposes specified by the law. The relevant property interest may only be
issued if the OCS activity will:
(A) support exploration, development, production, or storage of oil or natural gas, except that a lease, easement, or
right-of-way shall not be granted in an area in which oil and gas preleasing, leasing, and related activities are
prohibited by a moratorium;
(B) support transportation of oil or natural gas, excluding shipping activities;
(C) produce or support production, transportation, or transmission of energy from sources other than oil and gas;
or
(D) use, for energy-related purposes or for other authorized marine-related purposes, facilities currently or
previously used for activities authorized under ... [the OCLSA], except that any oil and gas energy-related uses
shall not be authorized in areas in which oil and gas preleasing, leasing, and related activities are prohibited by a
moratorium. 2005 EPACT, § 388(a), adding new 43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(1)(A)-(D).
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The law also makes clear that federal agencies with permitting authority under other federal laws
retain their jurisdiction, despite enactment of this subsection.45 Thus, the Corps, consistent with
the Alliance case, continues to permit offshore development pursuant to the RHA, and other
federal agencies with jurisdiction over issues related to energy development, such as species
impacts, are similarly unaffected. The law does not specify which agency should take the lead
role in coordinating federal permitting and responsibility for preparing NEPA analysis. However,
several provisions within section 388 of the 2005 EPACT may indicate that DOI is charged with
primary responsibility. The law directs the Secretary of the Interior to consult with other agencies
as a part of its leasing, easement, and right-of way granting process.46 DOI is also responsible for
ensuring that activities carried out pursuant to its new authority provide for “coordination with
relevant federal agencies.... ”47 The precise division of responsibilities, however, will depend
upon the regulations that DOI eventually issues and any memoranda of understanding negotiated
by the stakeholders with regard to relative roles in the permitting process. The law also directs the
Secretary to establish a system of “royalties, fees, rentals, bonuses, or other payments” that will
ensure a fair return to the United States for any property interest granted under this provision.48
On July 9, 2008, the Minerals Management Service, within DOI, issued a proposed rule
establishing the permitting process and setting forth a royalty structure.49 A final rule is expected
soon.
Although section 388 provides DOI with significant latitude in crafting a regulatory regime for
offshore wind energy development, the law addresses certain aspects of the property interest
granting process expressly. First, the law directs that leases, easements, and rights-of-way are to
be issued on a competitive basis, subject to some exceptions described infra.50 The Secretary is
further authorized to provide for the duration of any property interest granted under this
subsection and to provide for suspension and cancellation of any lease, easement, or right-of-
way.51
Section 388 also establishes the method for allocation among states of royalty and other payments
collected by the government pursuant to offshore permitting. The allocation is to be based upon a
formula that equitably distributes 27% of the revenues collected by the government, based on the
proximity of the project to the affected states’ offshore boundaries. 52 The law establishes that
states that have a “coastline that is located within 15 miles of the geographic center of the
project” are entitled to a revenue share.53 More than one state may be eligible to receive a portion
of these revenues, depending upon the location of a project. This may prove controversial in some
instances to the extent that there are no established offshore boundaries between states.
The Minerals Management Service has prepared administrative boundaries for use in a variety of
circumstances, including the determination of “‘affected state’ status under the Coastal Zone
Management Act and the OCS Lands Act ...” and to help “define appropriate consultation and

45 Id. § 1337(p)(9).
46 Id. § 1337(p)(1).
47 Id. § 1337(p)(4).
48 Id. § 1337(p)(2)(A).
49 73 Fed. Reg. 39376 (July 9, 2008).
50 43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(3).
51 Id. § 1337(p)(5).
52 Id. § 1337(p)(2)(B).
53 Id.
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information sharing with States.”54 The notice informing the public that these boundaries have
been established does not appear to specifically state that they will be determinative in questions
over revenue sharing under section 388; however, these boundaries could form the basis for
making determinations as to proximity to state waters and, therefore, could affect the distribution
of revenues.
In addition, the law appears to authorize considerable regulation of impacts associated with
offshore development by requiring the Secretary to ensure that “any activity under this
subsection” be carried out in a manner that adequately addresses specified issues, including
environmental protection, safety, protection of U.S. national security, and protection of the rights
of others to use the OCS and its resources.55 In addition, specific financial security requirements
are also established by this subsection. The law requires the holder of a section 388 property
interest to “provide for the restoration of the lease, easement, or right-of-way” and to furnish a
surety bond or other form of security, leaving the amount and the exact purposes to which any
forfeited sums will be applied to the Secretary’s discretion.56 Further, in conjunction with the
authority to require some form of financial assurance, the Secretary is empowered to impose
“such other requirements as the Secretary considers necessary to protect the interests of the public
and the United States.”57 Thus, the Secretary, depending on how these authorities are exercised,
may potentially regulate many aspects of any industry that is permitted to operate on the OCS
under this subsection of the OCSLA.
The 2005 EPACT also contains a provision expressly providing for a state consultative role in the
permitting process. Section 388 requires the Secretary of the Interior to provide for coordination
and consultation with a state’s Governor or the executive of any local government that may be
affected by a lease, easement, or right-of-way granted under this new authority.58 In addition, the
law makes clear that it does not affect any state’s claim to “jurisdiction over, or any right, title, or
interest in, any submerged lands.”59
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As described above, section 388 of the EPACT 2005 sets forth procedures for granting a lease,
easement, or right-of-way in federal waters when the property interest will be used for certain
specified purposes, including wind energy production.60 However, subsection (d) exempts certain
actions from specific section 388 requirements. This “savings provision” states that the law does
not require:

54 71 Fed. Reg. 127 (January 3, 2006).
55 43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(4). The Minerals Management Service also appears to have adopted this interpretation, stating:
“MMS interprets the authority granted in section 388(a) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to issue leases, easements or
rights-of-way as also providing MMS authority to regulate or permit the activities that occur on those leases, easements
or rights-of-way, if those activities are energy related.” 70 Fed. Reg. 77345, 77346 (December 30, 2005).
56 43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(6).
57 Id.
58 Id. § 1337(p)(7).
59 EPACT 2005, P.L. 109-58 § 388(e) (August 8 2005).
60 Id.
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the resubmittal of any document that was previously submitted or the reauthorization of any
action that was previously authorized with respect to a project for which, before the date of
enactment of this Act—
(1) an offshore test facility has been constructed; or
(2) a request for a proposal has been issued by a public authority.
Thus, where a project has resulted from a public entity’s request for proposals or where a project
is associated with an existing offshore test facility, previously submitted documents do not need
to be resubmitted and previously authorized actions do not need to be reauthorized, essentially
maintaining the status quo with respect to these projects.61 This provision does not seem to
exempt unauthorized actions associated with the exempted actions, or, indeed, any other aspect of
the related project, from a requirement to comply with the property interest acquisition provisions
of section 388. Thus, siting and construction of an offshore data tower, such as Cape Wind’s data
tower in Nantucket Sound, would not have to be reauthorized. However, any activity that had not
been authorized before EPACT’s enactment on August 8, 2005, such as the construction of
additional facilities, would appear to be subject to the requirements of section 388.
Section 388 also contains two exceptions to the general requirement that a property interest issued
under this provision be granted on a “competitive basis”: (1) if the Secretary of the Interior
determines that there is no competitive interest, or (2) if the project meets the criteria established
by the savings provision in subsection (d).62 The first exemption, requiring a finding of no
competitive interest, is relatively straightforward, applicable if there aren’t multiple parties
interested in a particular property interest. The second exemption however, is more complex in
that it may apply more broadly than the savings provision itself. As the text of the law indicates,
“projects that meet the criteria established under section 388(d)” are exempted from the
requirement of competitive property interest acquisition.63 It is not clear that the “projects”
referenced are limited to the actions (such as a data tower constructed at the time of the 2005
EPACT’s enactment) previously authorized. Subsection (d) appears to use the term “project”
more broadly, such that a “project for which ... an offshore test facility has been constructed ...”
might encompass all future offshore development that would be supported by, or is in some way
related to, a qualifying test facility.64 It is also possible that a “project” for which a test facility has
been constructed could be interpreted more narrowly, such that the term “project” would include
only those actions authorized in conjunction with the test facility itself. In short, because there is
no definition provided for “project” in the applicable law, it would seem likely that the
administering agency would be responsible for providing a definition that is reasonably
supportable by the law.
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In addition to the regulatory regime authorized by section 388, it is also noteworthy that a variety
of laws predating the enactment of the 2005 EPACT remain applicable to offshore wind energy
development. The 2005 EPACT makes clear that the enactment of section 388 does not affect the

61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
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jurisdiction, responsibility, or authority of any federal or state agency operating under other
federal law.65 Thus, it would seem that the state role provided for by the CZMA and the Corps
permitting authority provided by the RHA, both described above, remain intact. Other federal
laws that are likely to be relevant in the permitting process are described below.
First, the Department of the Interior and any cooperating federal, state, or local entities are
required to undertake an environmental review process mandated by the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA).66 NEPA requires federal agencies to take a “hard look” at, and to disclose, the
environmental consequences of their actions. In general, NEPA and its implementing regulations
require various levels of environmental analysis depending on the circumstances and the type of
federal action contemplated. Certain actions that have been determined to have little or no
environmental effect are exempted from preparation of NEPA documents entirely and are
commonly referred to as “categorical exclusions.”67 In situations where a categorical exclusion
does not apply, an intermediate level of review, an environmental assessment (EA), may be
required. If, on the basis of the EA, the agency finds that an action will not have a significant
effect on the environment, the agency issues a “finding of no significant impact” (FONSI), thus
terminating the NEPA review process. On the other hand, major federal actions that are found to
significantly affect the environment require the preparation of an environmental impact statement
(EIS), a document containing detailed analysis of the project as proposed, as well as other
options, including taking no action at all. NEPA does not direct an agency to choose any
particular course of action; the only purpose of an EIS is to ensure that environmental
consequences are considered. Thus, in practice, NEPA review will likely provide information on
wind energy projects, including impacts on:
existing resources of the final alternative sites in terms of physical oceanography and
geology; wildlife, avian, shellfish, finfish and benthic habitat; aesthetics, cultural resources,
socioeconomic conditions, and air and water quality. Human uses such as boating and
fishing will also be described.68
In addition to the role interested parties and cooperating agencies may play under NEPA, certain
federal agencies have independent sources of jurisdiction over specific ocean resources. Thus,
they would also likely be involved in the permitting of offshore wind energy facilities. Some of
the most relevant authorities are the Endangered Species Act (ESA),69 the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (MMPA),70 and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA).71
Briefly, each of these laws makes it illegal to inflict certain kinds of harm upon designated
species of plants and animals. The ESA prohibits any person, including private entities, from
“taking” a “listed” species.72 “Take” is broadly defined as “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,

65 43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(9).
66 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et. seq.
67 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4.
68 See U.S. Army Corps Of Eng’rs, Environmental Impact Statement: Scope of Work, Wind Power Facility Proposed
by Cape Wind Associates, LLC 3, available at [http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/projects/ma/ccwf/windscope.pdf]. See
also United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 579-80 (1992) (holding that Corps permitting decisions under section 10
are not limited to considerations of navigation).
69 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
70 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407.
71 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712.
72 Under the ESA, species are listed as either “endangered” or “threatened” based on the risk of their extinction. An
(continued...)
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wound, kill, trap, capture or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”73 Additionally,
a federal agency permitting or undertaking action that could impact a protected species is subject
to section 7 of the ESA, which requires consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) or the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS or NOAA Fisheries), depending upon the
species affected.74
The section 7 consultation process involves several initial steps leading to a determination of
whether a listed species or its designated critical habitat is present in a project area.75 If a listed
species or critical habitat is present, then the permitting/acting federal agency must prepare a
biological assessment, evaluating the potential effects of the action.76 If the acting federal agency
determines that a project may adversely affect a listed species or critical habitat, formal
consultation and preparation of a biological opinion is required.77 The biological opinion contains
a detailed analysis of the effects of the agency action and contains the final determination as to
whether the proposed action is likely to jeopardize the species or destroy or adversely modify its
critical habitat.78 If review results in a jeopardy or adverse modification determination, the
biological opinion must identify any “reasonable and prudent alternatives” that could allow the
project to proceed.79 Projects that will result in a level of injury to a species or habitat that will
fall short of jeopardizing survival may still be approved subject to certain terms.80
The agency may be allowed to “take” some individuals of a listed species without triggering
penalties under the act. These incidental takings are to be described in a statement accompanying
the biological opinion.81 Takings allowed under the consultation process are deemed consistent
with the ESA; thus, they are not subject to penalties under the act, and no authorization other than
the Incidental Take Statement or permit is required.82
Similarly, non-government entities may take a listed species if they receive an Incidental Take
Permit from either FWS for NMFS under Section 10 of the ESA.83 To qualify for such a permit, a
party must prepare a habitat conservation plan, in which the applicant describes the steps it will
take to monitor, minimize, and mitigate any impacts to the threatened species; alternative actions

(...continued)
“endangered” species is “any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its
range.” A “threatened” species is “any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable
future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(6), (20).
73 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
74 Id. § 1536(a)(2).
75 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(c). It should also be noted that some protections also attach to “candidate” species, i.e., those
proposed but not officially listed. Under current law, an agency must “confer” with the appropriate Secretary if agency
action will likely jeopardize the continued existence of any candidate species or adversely modify critical habitat
proposed for designation. This is distinct from the section 7 consultation process, less formal, and meant to assist
planning early in the process should the species be listed and more definite protections attach. See 16 U.S.C. §
1536(a)(4); 50 C.F.R. § 402.10.
76 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(b),(d).
77 Id. § 402.14(e).
78 Id. § 402.14(h).
79 Id. § 402.14(h)(3).
80 Id. § 402.14(i).
81 Id. § 402.14(i)(1)(i)-(v).
82 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(5).
83 16 U.S.C. 1539.
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and why they are not being used; and any other necessary and appropriate measures imposed by
FWS or NMFS.84
The MMPA prohibits, with certain exceptions, the taking of marine mammals in U.S. waters and
by U.S. citizens on the high seas, as well as the importation of marine mammals and marine
mammal products into the United States. The statute is jointly administered by the Department of
Commerce (through NOAA/NMFS) and the Department of the Interior (through FWS).85 Among
the statutory exceptions to the moratorium is a provision allowing NMFS or FWS to authorize,
for a period of not more than five consecutive years, the “incidental” taking of small numbers of
marine mammals.86 Such incidental takes may be authorized only upon a finding that the take will
have a negligible impact on the species or stock and will not have an unmitigable adverse impact
on the availability of the species or stock for taking for subsistence purposes by Alaskan natives
as authorized by other sections of the MMPA.87
The regulations establish procedures for administering the MMPA, including application for
authorization for incidental take of small numbers of marine mammals.88 These regulations set
forth the procedures for submission of requests for such authorization to the NMFS or FWS,
standards for review and the form of the authorization.89
The MBTA is the domestic law that implements U.S. obligations under separate treaties with
Canada, Japan, Mexico, and Russia for the protection of migratory birds.90 The MBTA generally
prohibits the taking, killing, possession, or transportation of, and trafficking in, migratory birds,
their eggs, parts, and nests.91 Like the ESA, the general ban on taking protected birds can be
waived under certain circumstances. Pursuant to section 704, the Secretary of the Interior is
authorized to determine if, and by what means, the taking of migratory birds should be allowed.92
FWS is responsible for permitting activities that would otherwise violate the MBTA. Its
regulations at 50 C.F.R. § 21 make exceptions from permitting requirements for various purposes
and provide for several specific types of permits, such as import and export permits, banding and
marking permits, and scientific collection permits.93 More general permits for special uses are
also provided for under the regulations, although an applicant must make “a sufficient showing of
benefit to the migratory bird resource, important research reasons, reasons of human concern for
individual birds, or other compelling justification.”94

84 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b)(1) (for FWS); 50 C.F.R.§ 222.307(b)(5) (for NMFS).
85 The statute defines Secretary as the Secretary of the department in which NOAA is operating (Commerce) for
purposes of regulation related to all members of the order Cetacea (whales and porpoises) and all members, except
walruses, of the order Pinnipedia (seals). The statute defines Secretary as Secretary of the Interior (operating through
the FWS) with respect to all other marine mammals (manatees, dugongs, polar bears, sea otters and walruses). 16
U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A).
86 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (5)(A).
87 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (5)(A)(i).
88 50 C.F.R. § 18.27 (FWS regulations); 50 C.F.R. Part 216, Subpart I (NMFS regulations).
89 Id.
90 Birds that receive protection under the MBTA are listed at 50 C.F.R. § 10.13.
91 16 U.S.C. § 703.
92 16 U.S.C. § 704.
93 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.11-21.26.
94 Id. § 21.27.
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It appears that FWS has not set MBTA regulations specific to the sort of unintentional harm
caused by the rotating turbines of wind energy projects; thus, it is not clear that the permitting
process under current regulations is immediately applicable to wind energy projects.95 The FWS
has, however, adopted voluntary, interim guidelines for minimizing the wildlife impacts from
wind energy turbines.96 As these guidelines indicate, compliance does not shield a company from
prosecution for MBTA violations; however, “the Office of Law Enforcement and Department of
Justice have used enforcement and prosecutorial discretion in the past regarding individuals,
companies, or agencies who have made good faith efforts to avoid the take of migratory birds.”97
ȱ
Interest in developing offshore wind energy resources continues to grow, and projects are already
in the initial stages of development. It would seem that the United States, vis-a-vis other nations,
would have the right to permit offshore development in its territorial sea and on the Outer
Continental Shelf, subject to state authority over offshore areas under the Submerged Lands Act.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provides the Department of the Interior with authority to grant
offshore property interests for the purpose of wind energy development and appears to grant the
Secretary of the Interior the authority to regulate activities resulting from such development.
Additional laws that predate the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 continue in force
and also appear likely to remain a source of regulation, despite the apparent primary authority
granted to the Department of the Interior. Further, states also may claim a role in the permitting of
offshore wind energy development pursuant to authorities granted under existing federal law.

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Adam Vann

Legislative Attorney
avann@crs.loc.gov, 7-6978

95 See 69 Fed. Reg. 31074 (June 2, 2004) (“Current regulations authorize permits for take of migratory birds for
activities such as scientific research, education, and depredation control. However, these regulations do not expressly
address the issuance of permits for incidental take.”).
96 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Interim Guidelines to Avoid and Minimize Wildlife Impacts from Wind Turbines,
(May 2003) (available at [http://www.fws.gov/habitatconservation/wind.pdf].
97 Id. at 2.
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