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During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed thousands of
“nonstrategic” nuclear weapons that were intended to be used in support of troops in the field
during a conflict. These included nuclear mines; artillery; short, medium, and long-range ballistic
missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range “strategic” nuclear
weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations. At
the end of the 1980s, before the demise of the Soviet Union, each nation still had thousands of
these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft.
In 1991, both the United States and Soviet Union announced that they would withdraw most and
eliminate many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States now retains
approximately 1,100 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with a few hundred deployed with aircraft in
Europe and the remaining stored in the United States. Estimates vary, but experts believe Russia
still has between 3,000 and 8,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The
Bush Administration it indicated that nuclear weapons remained essential to U.S. national
security interests, but it did quietly redeploy and remove some of the nuclear weapons deployed
in Europe. In addition, Russia has increased its reliance on nuclear weapons in its national
security concept. Some analysts argue that Russia has backed away from its commitments from
1991 and may develop and deploy new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security of Russia’s
weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group;
questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy, and the likelihood
that either nation might use these weapons in a regional contingency with a non-nuclear nation;
questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a
continuing need for the United States to deploy these weapons at bases overseas; and questions
about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy,
particularly whether a U.S. policy that views these weapons as a militarily useful tool might
encourage other nations to acquire their own nuclear weapons, or at least complicate U.S. policy
to discourage such acquisition.
Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter
its policy. Others, however, argue that the United States should reduce its reliance on these
weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have suggested that the United States and
Russia expand efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of
these weapons, possibly by negotiating an arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and
allow for increased transparency in monitoring their deployment and elimination. Others have
suggested that any potential new U.S.-Russian arms control treaty count both strategic and
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This might encourage reductions or the elimination of these
weapons. The 111th Congress may review some of these proposals.
This report will be updated as needed.
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Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The Distinction Between Strategic and Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons......................................... 4
Definition by Observable Capabilities................................................................................ 4
Definition by Exclusion ...................................................................................................... 5
U.S. and Soviet Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons ............................................................................. 6
U.S. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War....................................................... 6
Strategy and Doctrine ......................................................................................................... 6
Force Structure.................................................................................................................... 7
Soviet Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War.................................................... 8
Strategy and Doctrine ......................................................................................................... 8
Force Structure.................................................................................................................... 8
The 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives ................................................................................. 8
U.S. Initiative ...................................................................................................................... 9
Soviet and Russian Initiatives........................................................................................... 10
U.S. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War..........................................................11
Strategy and Doctrine ........................................................................................................11
Force Structure.................................................................................................................. 12
Russian Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War ................................................... 14
Strategy and Doctrine ....................................................................................................... 14
Force Structure.................................................................................................................. 16
Changing the Focus of the Debate .......................................................................................... 17
Issues for Congress........................................................................................................................ 18
Issues ....................................................................................................................................... 18
Safety and Security of Russian Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons....................................... 18
The Role of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s National Security Policy .......... 19
The Role of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National Security Policy................. 19
The Role of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in NATO Policy and Alliance
Strategy .......................................................................................................................... 20
The Relationship Between Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons and U.S.
Nonproliferation Policy ................................................................................................. 21
Policy Options......................................................................................................................... 22
Status Quo......................................................................................................................... 22
Reduce Reliance on Nuclear Weapons ............................................................................. 22
Cooperative Responses ..................................................................................................... 23
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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 26
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During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were central to the U.S. strategy of deterring Soviet
aggression against the United States and U.S. allies. Towards this end, the United States deployed
a wide variety of systems that could carry nuclear warheads. These included nuclear mines;
artillery; short, medium, and long range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. The
United States deployed these weapons with its troops in the field, aboard aircraft, on surface
ships, on submarines, and in fixed, land-based launchers. The United States articulated a complex
strategy, and developed detailed operational plans, that would guide the use of these weapons in
the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union and its allies.
Most public discussions about U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons—including discussions about
perceived imbalances between the two nations’ forces and discussions about the possible use of
arms control measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war and limit or reduce the numbers of
nuclear weapons—have focused on long-range, or strategic, nuclear weapons. These include
long-range land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers that carry cruise missiles or gravity bombs. These were
the weapons that the United States and Soviet Union deployed so that they could threaten
destruction of central military, industrial, and leadership facilities in the other country—the
weapons of global nuclear war. But both nations also deployed thousands of nuclear weapons
outside their own territories with their troops in the field. These weapons usually had less
explosive power and were deployed with launchers that would deliver them to shorter ranges than
strategic nuclear weapons. They were intended for use by troops on the battlefield or within the
theater of battle to achieve more limited, or tactical, objectives.
These “nonstrategic” nuclear weapons did not completely escape public discussion or arms
control debates. Their profile rose in the early 1980s when U. S. plans to deploy new cruise
missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe, as a part of NATO’s nuclear strategy,
ignited large public protests in many NATO nations. Their high profile returned later in the
decade when the United States and Soviet Union signed the1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty and eliminated medium and intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles.
Then, in 1991, President George Bush, and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, each announced
that they would withdraw from deployment most of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons and
eliminate many of them.
These 1991 announcements, coming after the abortive coup in Moscow in July 1991, but months
before the December1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, responded to growing concerns about the
safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons at a time of growing political and economic
upheaval in that nation. It also allowed the United States to alter its forces in response to easing
tensions and the changing international security environment. Consequently, for many in the
general public, these initiatives appeared to address and solve the problems associated with
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, although the United States and Russia included these
weapons in some of their arms control discussions, most of their arms control efforts during the
rest of that decade focused on implementing the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
and negotiating deeper reductions in strategic nuclear weapons.
The lack of public attention did not, however, reflect a total absence of questions or concerns
about nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In 1997, President Clinton and Russia’s President Boris
Yeltsin signed a framework agreement that stated they would address measures related to
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nonstrategic nuclear weapons in a potential START III Treaty. Further, during the 1990s, outside
analysts, officials in the U.S. government, and many Members of Congress raised continuing
questions about the safety and security of Russia’s remaining nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Congress also sought a more detailed accounting of Russia’s weapons in legislation passed in the
late 1990s. Analysts have also questioned the role that these weapons might play in Russia’s
evolving national security strategy, the rationale for their continued deployment in the U.S.
nuclear arsenal, and their relationship to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. The terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001 also reminded people of the catastrophic consequences that might ensue if
terrorists were to acquire and use nuclear weapons, with continuing attention focused on the
potentially insecure stock of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Many analysts outside
government have argued that the United States and Russia should pursue a formal arms control
treaty, possibly including other nuclear weapons states, to reduce and eliminate these weapons.
These weapons have returned to the public eye in recent months. In early 2007, Russia threatened
to withdraw from the INF Treaty in response to U.S. plans to deploy a ballistic missile defense
radar in the Czech republic and interceptor missiles in Poland.1 Some analysts speculated that the
Russian desire for relief from the INF Treaty had as much to do with its growing interest in
deploying a new generation of medium-range missiles as it did with the U.S. missile defense
plans. Some even suggested that the international community explore the possible extension of
the INF Treaty to other nations, to address Russia’s growing concerns with emerging missile
programs.2
The Bush Administration did not adopt an explicit policy of reducing or eliminating nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. When it announced the results of its nuclear posture review in early 2002, it did
not outline any changes to the U.S. deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons at bases in
Europe; it stated that NATO would address the future of those weapons. It also did not discuss
these weapons with Russia during arms control negotiations in 2002. Instead, the Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty) signed in May 2003 limits only the number of
operationally deployed warheads on strategic nuclear weapons. Reports indicate, however, that
the United States has redeployed and withdrawn some of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons from
bases in Greece, Germany, and the United Kingdom.3
Further, after the NPR, the Bush Administration sought funding for a study to determine whether
the United States could modify an existing nuclear weapon to improve its capability as a “robust
nuclear earth penetrator”—a weapon that could attack and destroy hardened and deeply buried
targets. The Bush Administration argued that such a weapon would enhance the U.S. nuclear
deterrent and improve U.S. security by improving the U.S. ability to hold at risk key assets of
emerging adversaries. However, in the face of strong congressional opposition, the
Administration reportedly withdrew its request for funding during the FY2006 authorization and
appropriations process.
Many analysts outside government, and some Members of Congress, argued that the Bush
Administration’s policies not only ignored the potential risks from Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear
1 Finn, Peter. “Anti-missile Plan by U.S. Strains Ties with Russia.” Washington Post, February 21, 2007.
2 Ryan, Kevin. “Expand or Scrap Missile Ban.” Los Angeles Times, October 16, 2007.
3 Kristensen, Hans. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Withdrawn from the United Kingdom. Federation of American Scientists,
Strategic Security Blog. June 26, 2008. http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/06/us-nuclear-weapons-withdrawn-from-the-
united-kingdom.php
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weapons, but could also “ignite a new arms race” by raising the perceived utility of nuclear
weapons. This report will review the debate over the implications of the Bush Administration’s
policy in a later section. It is worth noting at this point, however, that this policy represented a
stark reversal from trends and debates during the late 1990s. At that time, debates in the nuclear
weapons policy community focused on whether the United States should retain its relatively
small arsenal of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (when compared with the size of the Russia
arsenal) or offer to reduce those weapons as a part of an effort to reduce and secure the remaining
Russian arsenal.
The Bush Administration initially quieted discussions about nonstrategic nuclear weapons arms
control and, instead, began to consider how the United States could maintain or enhance its own
stockpile of these weapons while discouraging the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other
nations. In the past few years, however, in response to the Administration’s emphasis on the role
that U.S. nuclear weapons can play in deterring or defeating nations armed with weapons of mass
destruction, and in response to requests for funding for studies on new nuclear weapons, Congress
had begun to review and debate the Administration’s plans for U.S. nuclear weapons. These
debates have not focused on the difference between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons or
on the particular concerns that have been raised about nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the past
decade. Instead, they have explored, in greater detail, Administration requests for funding for
research into new types of nuclear weapons. Congress has also required that the next
Administration conduct a new review of U.S. nuclear weapons posture and programs in the
FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill (H.Rept. 110-477). As the United States studies possible
changes to its nuclear force structure that might include the deployment of new nuclear weapons,
nonstrategic nuclear weapons may again rise to a higher profile. Congress might then pursue a
broader debate about nonstrategic nuclear weapons and consider further measures to either
broaden or narrow the role of these weapons in U.S. national security policy.
In addition, Congress has remained concerned about the potential risks associated with Russia’s
continuing deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The FY2006 Defense Authorization Act
(P.L. 109-163) contained two provisions that called for further study on these weapons. Section
1212 mandated that the Secretary of Defense submit a report that would determine whether
increased transparency and further reductions in U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons
are in the U.S. national security interest; Section 3115 called on the Secretary of Energy to submit
a report on what steps the United States might take to bring about progress in improving the
accounting for and security of Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Further, H.R. 5017, a Bill
to ensure implementation of the 9/11 Commission Report recommendations, included a provision
(Sec. 334) that called on the Secretary of Defense to submit a report that detailed U.S. efforts to
encourage Russia to provide a detailed accounting of its force of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It
also authorized $5 million for the U.S. to assist Russia in completing an inventory of these
weapons. The 109th Congress did not address this bill or its components in any detail. In the 110th
Congress, H.R. 1 sought to ensure the implementation of the 9/11 Commission Report
recommendations. However, in its final form (P.L. 110-53), it did not include any references to
Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
This report provides basic information about U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It
begins with a brief discussion of the differences between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. It then provides some historical background, describing the numbers and types of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed by both nations during the Cold War and in the past
decade; the policies that guided the deployment and prospective use of these weapons; and the
measures that the two sides have taken to reduce, eliminate, and, more recently, augment their
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forces. The report reviews the issues that have been raised with regards to U.S. and Russian
nonstrategic nuclear weapons, essentially identifying the “problems” many associate with the
continued deployment of these weapons. It concludes with a review of policy options, or
“solutions” for the preceding problems, that might be explored by Congress, the United States,
Russia, and other nations.
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The distinction between strategic and nonstrategic (also known as tactical) nuclear weapons
reflects the military definitions of, on the one hand, a strategic mission and, on the other hand, the
tactical use of nuclear weapons. According to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
Terms,4 a strategic mission is:
Directed against one or more of a selected series of enemy targets with the purpose of
progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy’s warmaking capacity and will to
make war. Targets include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical
material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, and
other such target systems. As opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations are
designed to have a long-range rather than immediate effect on the enemy and its military
forces.
In contrast, the tactical use of nuclear weapons is defined as “the use of nuclear weapons by land,
sea, or air forces against opposing forces, supporting installations or facilities, in support of
operations that contribute to the accomplishment of a military mission of limited scope, or in
support of the military commander’s scheme of maneuver, usually limited to the area of military
operations.”
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During the Cold War, it was relatively easy to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic
nuclear weapons because each type had different capabilities that were better suited to the
different missions.
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The long-range missiles and heavy bombers deployed on U.S. territory and missiles deployed in
ballistic missile submarines had the range and destructive power to attack and destroy military,
industrial, and leadership targets central to the Soviet Union’s ability to prosecute the war. At the
same time, with their large warheads and relatively limited accuracies (at least during the earlier
years of the Cold War), these weapons were not suited for attacks associated with tactical or
battlefield operations. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons, in contrast, were not suited for strategic
missions because they lacked the range to reach targets inside the Soviet Union (or, for Soviet
weapons, targets inside the United States). But, because they were often small enough to be
4 This dictionary, and these definitions can be found on the DOD website at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/
index.html.
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deployed with troops in the field or at forward bases, the United States and Soviet Union could
have used them to attack targets in the theater of the conflict, or on the battlefield itself, to support
more limited military missions.
Even during the Cold War, however, the United States and Russia deployed nuclear weapons that
defied the standard understanding of the difference between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. For example, both nations considered weapons based on their own territories that could
deliver warheads to the territory of the other nation to be “strategic” because they had the range
needed to reach targets inside the other nation’s territory. But some early Soviet submarine-
launched ballistic missiles had relatively short (i.e., 500 mile) ranges, and the submarines
patrolled close to U.S. shores to ensure that the weapons could reach their strategic targets.
Conversely, in the 1980s the United States considered sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)
deployed on submarines or surface ships to be nonstrategic nuclear weapons. But, if these vessels
were deployed close to Soviet borders, these weapons could have destroyed many of the same
targets as U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. Similarly, U.S. intermediate-range missiles that were
deployed in Europe, which were considered nonstrategic by the United States, could reach
central, strategic targets in the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, some weapons that had the range to reach “strategic” targets on the territory of the
other nations could also deliver tactical nuclear weapons in support of battlefield or tactical
operations. Soviet bombers could be equipped with nuclear-armed anti-ship missiles; U.S.
bombers could also carry anti-ship weapons and nuclear mines. Hence, the range of the delivery
vehicle does not always correlate with the types of targets or objectives associated with the
warhead carried on that system. This relationship between range and mission has become even
more clouded since the end of the Cold War because the United States and Russia have retired
many of the shorter and medium-range delivery systems considered to be nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. Further, both nations may develop the capability to use their longer-range “strategic”
systems to deliver warheads to a full range of strategic and tactical targets, even if longstanding
traditions and arms control definitions weigh against this change.
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During the Cold War, the longer-range strategic delivery vehicles also tended to carry warheads
with greater yields, or destructive power, than nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Smaller warheads
were better suited to nonstrategic weapons because they sought to achieve more limited, discrete
objectives on the battlefield than did the larger, strategic nuclear weapons. But this distinction has
also dissolved in more modern systems. Many U.S. and Russian heavy bombers can carry
weapons of lower yields, and, as accuracies improved for bombs and missiles, warheads with
lower yields could achieve the same expected level of destruction that had required larger
warheads in early generations of strategic weapons systems.
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The observable capabilities that allowed analysts to distinguish between strategic and
nonstrategic nuclear weapons during the Cold War have not always been precise, and may not
prove to be relevant or appropriate in the future. On the other hand, the “strategic” weapons
identified by these capabilities—ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers—are the only systems
covered by the limits in strategic offensive arms control agreements—the SALT agreements
signed in the 1970s, the START agreements signed in the 1990s, and the Moscow Treaty in
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signed in 2002. Consequently, an “easy” dividing line is one that would consider all weapons not
covered by strategic arms control treaties as nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This report takes this
approach when reviewing the history of U.S. and Soviet/Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons,
and in some cases when discussing remaining stocks of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
This definition will not, however, prove sufficient when discussing current and future issues
associated with these weapons. Since the early 1990s, the United States and Russia have
withdrawn from deployment most of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons and eliminated many of
the shorter and medium-range launchers for these weapons (these changes are discussed in more
detail below). Nevertheless, both nations maintain roles for these weapons in their national
security strategies. Russia has enunciated a national security strategy that allows for the possible
use of nuclear weapons in regional contingencies and conflicts near the periphery of Russia. The
Bush Administration, also stated that the United States would maintain those capabilities in its
nuclear arsenal because it might need counter the capabilities of potential adversaries. The
Administration did not, however, identify whether these capabilities would be resident on
strategic or nonstrategic nuclear weapons. That distinction will reflect the nature of the target, not
the yield or delivery vehicle of the attacking warhead.
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Throughout the Cold War, the United States deployed thousands of shorter-range nuclear
weapons with U.S. forces based in Europe, Japan, and South Korea and on ships around the
world. The United States maintained these deployments to extend deterrence and to defend its
allies in Europe and Asia. Not only did the presence of these weapons (and the presence of U.S.
forces, in general) increase the likelihood that the United States would come to the defense of its
allies if they were attacked, the weapons also could have been used on the battlefield to slow or
stop the advance of the adversaries’ conventional forces. The weapons in Asia also contributed to
U.S. efforts to defend its allies there from potential threats from China and North Korea.
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In most cases, these weapons were deployed to defend U.S. allies against aggression by the
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, but it did not rule out their possible use in contingencies
with other adversaries. In Europe, these weapons were a part of NATO’s strategy of “flexible
response.” Under this strategy, NATO did not insist that it would respond to any type of attack
with nuclear weapons, but it maintained the capability to do so and to control escalation if nuclear
weapons were used. This approach was intended to convince the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact
that any conflict, even one that began with conventional weapons, could result in nuclear
retaliation.5 As the Cold War drew to a close, NATO acknowledged that it would no longer
maintain nuclear weapons to deter or defeat a conventional attack from the Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact because “the threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO’s European
5 “The United States retains substantial nuclear capabilities in Europe to counter Warsaw Pact conventional superiority
and to serve as a link to U.S. strategic nuclear forces.” National Security Strategy of the United States, White House,
January 1988, p. 16.
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fronts has effectively been removed.”6 But NATO documents indicated that these weapons would
still play an important political role in NATO’s strategy by ensuring “uncertainty in the mind of
any potential aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression.7
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Throughout the Cold War, the United States often altered the size and structure of its nonstrategic
nuclear forces in response to changing capabilities and changing threat assessments. These
weapons were deployed at U.S. bases in Asia, and at bases on the territories of several of the
NATO allies, contributing to NATO’s sense of shared responsibility for the weapons. The United
States began to reduce these forces in the late 1970s, with the numbers of operational nonstrategic
nuclear warheads declining from more than 7,000 in the mid-1970s to below 6,000 in the 1980s,
to fewer than 1,000 by the middle of the 1990s.8 These reductions occurred, for the most part,
because U.S. and NATO officials believed they could maintain deterrence with fewer, but more
modern, weapons. For example, when the NATO allies agreed in 1970 that the United States
should deploy new intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe, they decided to remove 1,000
older nuclear weapons from Europe. And in 1983, in the Montebello Decision, when the NATO
defense ministers approved additional weapons modernization plans, they also called for a further
reduction of 1,400 nonstrategic nuclear weapons.9
These modernization programs continued through the 1980s. In his 1988 Annual Report to
Congress, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger noted that the United States was completing
the deployment of Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise
missiles in Europe; modernizing two types of nuclear artillery shells; upgrading the Lance short-
range ballistic missile; continuing production of the nuclear-armed version of the Tomahawk sea-
launches cruise missile; and developing a new nuclear depth/strike bomb for U.S. naval forces.10
However, by the end of that decade, as the Warsaw Pact dissolved, the United States had canceled
or scaled back all planned modernization programs. In 1987, it also signed the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched
shorter and intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles.11
6 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” NATO Office of Information and Press,
Brussels, Belgium, 1991, para. 8.
7 Ibid, para. 55.
8 Toward a Nuclear Peace: The Future of Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy, Report of the CSIS
Nuclear Strategy Study Group, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993. p. 27.
9 The text of the Montebello decision can be found in Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger, editors. Controlling
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons. Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air Force, Institute for National Security
Studies, July 2001. pp. 265-266.
10 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1988, January 1987, pp. 217-
218.
11 For a description of the terms and implications of this Treaty see, CRS Report RL30033, Arms Control and
Disarmament Activities: A Catalog of Recent Events, by Amy F. Woolf, coordinator.
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During the Cold War, the Soviet Union also considered nuclear weapons to be instrumental to its
military strategy.12 Although the Soviet Union had pledged that it would not be the first to use
nuclear weapons, most Western observers doubted that it would actually observe this pledge in a
conflict. Instead, analysts argue that the Soviet Union had integrated nuclear weapons into its
warfighting plans to a much greater degree than the United States. Soviet analysts stressed that
these weapons would be useful for both surprise attack and preemptive attack. According to one
Russian analyst, the Soviet Union would have used nonstrategic nuclear weapons to conduct
strategic operations in the theater of war and to reinforce conventional units in large scale land
and sea operations.13 This would have helped the Soviet Union achieve success in these theaters
of war and would have diverted forces of the enemy from Soviet territory.
The Soviet Union reportedly began to reduce its emphasis on nuclear warfighting strategies in the
mid-1980s, under Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. He reportedly believed that the use of
nuclear weapons would be catastrophic. Nevertheless, they remained a key tool of deterring and
fighting a large-scale conflict with the United States and NATO.
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The Soviet Union produced and deployed a wide range of delivery vehicles for nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. At different times during the period, it deployed “suitcase bombs,” nuclear
mines, shells for artillery, short-, medium, and intermediate ballistic missiles, short-range air-
delivered missiles, and gravity bombs. The Soviet Union deployed these weapons at nearly 600
bases, with some located in Warsaw Pact nations in Eastern Europe, some in the non-Russian
republics on the western and southern perimeter of the nation and throughout Russia. Estimates
vary, but many analysts believe that, in 1991, the Soviet Union had more than 20,000 of these
weapons. The numbers may have been higher, in the range of 25,000 weapons in earlier years,
before the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.14
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In September and October 1991, U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev sharply altered their nations deployments of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.15 Each
12 For a more detailed review of Soviet and Russian nuclear strategy see CRS Report 97-586, Russia's Nuclear Forces:
Doctrine and Force Structure Issues, by Amy F. Woolf and Kara Wilson (Out of print. For copies, contact Amy Woolf
at 202-707-2379.)
13 Ivan Safranchuk, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World: A Russian Perspective,” in Alexander, Brian and
Alistair Millar, editors, Tactical Nuclear Weapons (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2003), p. 53.
14 Joshua Handler, “The 1991-1992 PNIs and the Elimination, Storage and Security of Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” in
Alexander, Brian and Alistair Millar, editors, Tactical Nuclear Weapons (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2003), p.
31.
15 The speeches outlining these initiatives can be found in Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger, editors,
Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons. Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air Force, Institute for
National Security Studies, July 2001, pp 273-283.
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announced unilateral, but reciprocal initiatives that marked the end of many elements of their
Cold War nuclear arsenals.
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On September 27, 1991, U.S. President George H.W. Bush announced that the United States
would withdraw all land-based tactical nuclear weapons (those that could travel less than 300
miles) from overseas bases and all sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. surface ships,
submarines, and naval aircraft.16 Under these measures the United States began dismantling
approximately 2,150 warheads from the land-based delivery systems, including 850 warheads for
Lance missiles and 1,300 artillery shells. It also withdrew about 500 weapons normally deployed
aboard surface ships and submarines, and planned to eliminate around 900 B-57 depth bombs,17
which had been deployed on land and at sea, and the weapons for land-based naval aircraft.18
Furthermore, in late 1991, NATO decided to reduce by about half the number of weapons for
nuclear-capable aircraft based in Europe, which led to the withdrawal of an additional 700 U.S.
air-delivered nuclear weapons.
The United States implemented these measures very quickly. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons were
removed from bases in Korea by the end of 1991 and Europe by mid-1992. The Navy had
withdrawn nuclear weapons from its surface ships, submarines, and forward bases by the mid-
1992.19 The warhead dismantlement process has moved more slowly, taking most of the 1990s to
complete for some weapons, and with some work still to be done on others, but this is due to the
limits on capacity at the Pantex Plant in Texas, where the work is done.
The first Bush Administration decided to withdraw these weapons for several reasons. First, the
threat the weapons were to deter—Soviet and Warsaw Pact attacks in Europe—had diminished
with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989. Further, the military utility of the land-based
weapons had declined as the Soviet Union pulled its forces eastward, beyond the range of these
weapons. The utility of the sea-based weapons had also declined as a result of changes in U.S.
warfighting concepts that accompanied the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the withdrawal of the
sea-based weapons helped ease a source of tensions between the United States and some allies,
such as New Zealand and Japan, who had been uncomfortable with the possible presence of
nuclear weapons during port visits by U.S. naval forces.20
The President’s announcement also responded to growing concerns among analysts about the
safety and security of Soviet nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union had deployed
thousands of these weapons at bases in remote areas of it’s territory and at bases outside Soviet
territory in Eastern Europe. The demise of the Warsaw Pact, and political upheaval in Eastern
Europe generated concerns about the safety of these weapons. The abortive coup in Moscow in
16 President Bush also announced that he would remove from alert all U.S. strategic bombers and 450 Minuteman II
ICBMs that were to be eliminated under the START Treaty. He also cancelled several modernization programs for
strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons.
17 Joshua Handler, in Alexander and Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, pp 21-22.
18 The United States maintained the capability to return sea-based nuclear weapons to aircraft carriers and submarines
until this policy was changed through the Nuclear Posture Reviews of 1994 and 2001.
19 Joshua Handler, in Alexander and Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, p. 22.
20 See, for example, Crisis in U.S.-New Zealand Relations, CRS Report 85-92, by Robert G. Sutter, (Out of print. For
copies, contact Amy Woolf at 202-707-2379.)
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August 1991 had also caused alarms about the strength of central control over nuclear weapons
inside the Soviet Union. The U.S. initiative was not contingent on a Soviet response, and the
Bush Administration did not consult with Soviet leadership prior to its public announcement, but
many hoped that the U.S. initiative would provide President Gorbachev with the incentive to take
similar steps to withdraw and eliminate many of his nation’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
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On October 5, 1991, Russia’s President Gorbachev replied that he, too, would withdraw and
eliminate nonstrategic nuclear weapons.21 He stated that the Soviet Union would destroy all
nuclear artillery ammunition and warheads for tactical missiles; remove warheads for nuclear
anti-aircraft missiles and destroy some of them, destroy all nuclear land-mines; and remove all
naval non-strategic weapons from submarines and surface ships and ground-based naval aviation,
destroying some of them. Estimates of the numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed by
the Soviet Union varied, with a range as great as 15,000-21,700 nonstrategic nuclear weapons in
the Soviet arsenal in 1991.22 Consequently, analysts expected these measures to affect several
thousand weapons.
Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin pledged to continue implementing these measures after the
Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991. He also stated that Russia would destroy many of the
warheads removed from nonstrategic nuclear weapons.23 These included all warheads from short-
range missiles, artillery, and atomic demolition devices; one-third of the warheads from sea-based
nonstrategic weapons; half the warheads from air-defense interceptors; and half the warheads
from the Air Force’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Reports indicate that the Soviet Union had begun removing nonstrategic nuclear weapons from
bases outside Soviet territory after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and they had probably all
been removed from Eastern Europe and the Transcaucusus prior to the 1991 announcements.
Nevertheless, President Gorbachev’s pledge to withdraw and eliminate many of these weapons
spurred their removal from other former Soviet states after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Reports indicate that they had all been removed from the Baltic States and Central Asian
republics by the end of 1991, and from Ukraine and Belarus by mid-late spring 1992.24
The status of nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed on Russian territory is far less certain.
According to some estimates, the naval systems were removed from deployment by the end of
1993, but the Army and Air force systems remained in the field until 1996 and 1997.25
Furthermore, Russia has been far slower to eliminate the warheads from these systems than has
the United States, with many warheads still awaiting elimination at the end of the 1990s. Some
analysts and experts in the United States have expressed concerns about the slow pace of
eliminations in Russia. They note that the continuing existence of these warheads, along with the
increasing reliance on nuclear weapons in Russia’s national security strategy, indicate that Russia
21 President Gorbachev also addressed strategic nuclear weapons in his initiative, announcing that he would remove
bombers and more than 500 ballistic missiles from alert and cancelling many modernization programs.
22 Joshua Handler, in Alexander and Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, p. 31.
23 For the text of President Yeltsin’s statement, see Larsen and Klingenberger, pp. 284-289.
24 Joshua Handler, in Alexander and Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, p. 22.
25 Joshua Handler, “The September 1991 PNIs and the Elimination, Storage and Security Aspects of TNWs,”
Presentation for seminar at the United Nations, New York. September 24, 2001.
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may reverse its pledges and re-introduce nonstrategic nuclear weapons into its deployed forces.
Others, however, note that financial constraints could have slowed the elimination of these
warheads, or that Russia decided to coordinate the elimination effort with the previously-
scheduled retirement of older weapons.26
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Nonstrategic nuclear weapons have continued to play a role in U.S. and NATO policy. For the
United States, the emphasis has shifted from a strategy that emphasized the deterrence of an
attack from the Soviet Union and its allies to one that has placed a growing emphasis on the role
that nuclear weapons might play in deterring or responding to regional contingencies that
involved nations other than Russia. For example, former Secretary of Defense Perry stated that,
“maintaining U.S. nuclear commitments with NATO, and retaining the ability to deploy nuclear
capabilities to meet various regional contingencies, continues to be an important means for
deterring aggression, protecting and promoting U.S. interests, reassuring allies and friends, and
preventing proliferation (emphasis added).27 Specifically, the United States has maintained the
option to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks with conventional, chemical, or biological
weapons. For example, Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward Warner testified that “the U.S.
capability to deliver an overwhelming, rapid, and devastating military response with the full
range of military capabilities will remain the cornerstone of our strategy for deterring rogue
nation ballistic missile and WMD proliferation threats. The very existence of U.S. strategic and
theater nuclear forces, backed by highly capable conventional forces, should certainly give pause
to any rogue leader contemplating the use of WMD against the United States, its overseas
deployed forces, or its allies.”28 These statements do not indicate whether nonstrategic nuclear
weapons would be used to achieve battlefield or tactical objectives, or whether they would
contribute to strategic missions, but it remained evident, throughout the 1990s, that the United
States continued to view these weapons as a part of its national security strategy.
The Bush Administration also emphasized the possible use of nuclear weapons in regional
contingencies in its 2001 nuclear posture review. Further, the Bush Administration appeared to
shift towards a somewhat more explicit approach when acknowledging that the United States
might use nuclear weapons in response to attacks by nations armed with chemical, biological, and
conventional weapons, stating that the United States would develop and deploy those nuclear
capabilities that it would need to defeat the capabilities of any potential adversary whether or not
it possessed nuclear weapons. This does not, by itself, indicate that the United States would plan
to use nonstrategic nuclear weapons. However, many analysts concluded from these and other
comments by Bush Administration officials that the United States was planning for the tactical,
first use of nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration never confirmed this view, and, instead,
indicated that it would not use nuclear weapons in anything other than the most grave
circumstances.
26 Ivan Safranchik, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World: A Russian Perspective,” in Alexander and Millar,
Tactical Nuclear Weapons, p. 62.
27 Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, February 1995, p. 84.
28 Statement of the Honorable Edward L. Warner, III, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat
Reduction, before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 14, 1999.
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For NATO, nonstrategic nuclear weapons have played a reduced, but continuing, role in security
policy. They have been seen not only as a deterrent to a wide range of potential aggressors, but
also as an important element in NATO’s cohesion as an alliance. In the Press Communique
released after their November 1995 meeting, the members of NATO’s Defense Planning
Committee and Nuclear Planning Group stated that “Alliance Solidarity, common commitment,
and strategic unity are demonstrated through the current basing of deployable sub-strategic
[nuclear] forces in Europe.”29 NATO has also reaffirmed the importance of nuclear weapons for
deterrence. The “New Strategic Concept” signed in April 1999 states that “to protect peace and to
prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an
appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution
in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable.”30 NATO
had also emphasized the importance of nuclear weapons in its strategy in 1997, in the Founding
Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security Between the Russian Federation and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Although the NATO members assured Russia that it had “no
intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members,” it
also stated that it had no need “to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear policy—and do not
foresee any future need to do so (emphasis added).”31
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Through the late 1990s and through the Bush Administration, the United States has maintained
approximately 1,100 nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its active stockpile. Unclassified reports
indicate that, of this number, around 500 were air-delivered bombs deployed at bases in Europe.
The remainder, including some additional air-delivered bombs and around 320 nuclear-armed
sea-launched cruise missiles, are held in storage areas in the United States.32 After the Clinton
Administration’s 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States eliminated its ability to return
nuclear weapons to U.S. surface ships (it had retained this ability after removing the weapons
under the 1991 PNI). It retained, however, its ability to restore cruise missiles to attack
submarines, and it did not recommend any changes in the number of air-delivered weapons
deployed in Europe. The United States has consolidated its weapons storage sites for nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. It reportedly reduced the number of these facilities “by over 75%” between
1988 and 1994. It eliminated 2 of its 4 storage sites for sea-launched cruise missiles, retaining
only one facility on each coast of the United States. It also reduced the number of bases in Europe
that store nuclear weapons from over 125 bases in the mid-1980s to 10 bases, in seven countries,
by 2000.33 Some reports indicate that this number had declined further, with the withdrawal of the
weapons in Greece and at Ramstein Air Base in Germany between 2001 and 2005. In addition,
reports indicate that the United States has also withdrawn its nuclear weapons from the RAF
Lakenheath air base in the United Kingdom.34
29 NATO Press Communique M-DPC/NPG-2(95)117, November 29, 1995, para. 21.
30 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., April 23-24, 1999.
31 “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security Between the Russian Federation and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization,” signed at Paris, May 27, 1997.
32 “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2007.
See, also, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1954-2004, by Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists. November/December 2004.
33 Joshua Handler, in Alexander and Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, pp. 23.-25
34 Kristensen, Hans. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Withdrawn from the United Kingdom. Federation of American Scientists,
(continued...)
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The Bush Administration did not recommend any changes for U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons
after completing its Nuclear Posture Review in 2001. Reports indicate that it decided to retain the
capability to restore cruise missiles to attack submarines because of their ability to deploy, in
secret, anywhere on the globe in time of crisis.35 The NPR also did not recommend any changes
to the deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe, leaving decisions about their status
to the members of the NATO alliance. The alliance has reviewed these deployments and
reaffirmed that the weapons remain an important indicator of alliance unity, with the sharing of
information about the weapons and sharing of responsibility for their basing serving as an
important bond among the members of the alliance.
After completing the NPR, the Bush Administration indicated that the United States would
explore the development of new types of nuclear warheads. It commissioned a study on the
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, which would have been a modification of an existing type of
nuclear weapon.36 This program was designed to improve the U.S. capability to attack hardened
and deeply buried targets. The Administration argued that the United States had to improve its
capability to attack these types of targets because many potential adversaries have a significant
number of these facilities, which they could use to protect valued assets such as weapons stocks
and command facilities. The Bush Administration did not identify these weapons as either
“strategic” or “nonstrategic;” such a designation would likely depend on the intended target for
the weapon in the event of a conflict. The Bush Administration also funded research into
Advanced Concepts for nuclear weapons. This program did not pursue any particular research or
identify any new types of weapons for further study, but many of the Administration’s critics
believed it could be used to develop new types of “low yield” nuclear weapons. Congress
eliminated funding for the Advanced Concepts program in FY2005 and the Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator in FY2006.
The Bush Administration and others who supported research into a new earth-penetrator weapon
argued that, by burrowing underground before exploding, these weapons could not only achieve a
higher probability of destroying fortified targets, but might also do so with lower collateral
damage by exploding deeply underground. According to the Bush Administration, these features
would increase their credibility as a deterrent weapon. Some have also argued that new types of
nuclear weapons, such as highly accurate, low-yield weapons, could be used to attack and destroy
stocks of chemical or biological weapons in their bunkers, again, with lower collateral damage
than the larger, existing types of nuclear weapons. These programs’ critics argue that these
weapons, with their reduced collateral damage, might be more “useable” than existing nuclear
weapons, and, therefore, increase the likelihood that the United States would resort to nuclear
weapons during a conflict. They note that, even with their earth-penetrating capabilities, these
weapons would produce horrific damage and destruction. Further, they argue that any U.S.
attempt to make nuclear weapons appear more “useable” or to have greater military utility, is
likely to undermine U.S. efforts to convince other nations not to acquire their own nuclear
weapons.
(...continued)
Strategic Security Blog. June 26, 2008. http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/06/us-nuclear-weapons-withdrawn-from-the-
united-kingdom.php
35 Ibid.
36 Congress denied funding for this study in the FY2005 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-447).
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The targets for these new types of weapons could have been “strategic” in nature, supporting the
military or political infrastructure needed to pursue a conflict, or they could have been more
“tactical” in nature, supporting an adversary’s troops or battlefield formations. Therefore, the
question of whether these weapons would be strategic or nonstrategic would depend on future
war plans and targeting options. Yet with the sharp decline in the numbers and types of delivery
vehicles for nonstrategic warheads, these weapons might have been delivered by strategic
delivery vehicles, such as ballistic missiles or bombers, regardless of their targeting objective.
Hence, the U.S. plans for the development of new types of nuclear weapons highlight the
complexities discussed above in defining and identifying nonstrategic nuclear weapons because,
in future scenarios, it may be difficult to tell what a weapon is intended to attack by the range of
its delivery vehicle or the yield of its warhead.
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Russia has altered and adjusted the Soviet nuclear strategy to meet its new circumstances in a
post-Cold War world. It explicitly rejected the Soviet Union’s no-first use pledge in 1993,
indicating that it viewed nuclear weapons as a central feature in its military and security
strategies. However, Russia did not maintain the Soviet Union’s view of the need for nuclear
weapons to conduct surprise attacks or preemptive attacks. Instead, it seems to view these
weapons as more defensive in nature, as a deterrent to conventional or nuclear attack and as a
means to retaliate and defend itself if an attack were to occur.
Russia revised its national security and military strategy several times during the 1990s, with each
successive version appearing to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons.37 For example, the
military doctrine issued in 1997 allowed for the use of nuclear weapons “in case of a threat to the
existence of the Russian Federation.” The doctrine published in 2000 expanded the circumstances
when Russia might use nuclear weapons to include attacks using weapons of mass destruction
against Russia or its allies “as well as in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional
weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.”38
Analysts have identified several factors that contributed to Russia’s increasing dependence on
nuclear weapons. First, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the economic upheavals of the
1990s, Russia no longer had the means to support a large and effective conventional army. The
conflict in Chechnya highlighted for many just how weak Russia’s conventional military forces
had become. Russian analysts also saw emerging threats in other former Soviet states along
Russia’s periphery. Many analysts believed that by threatening, even implicitly, that it might
resort to nuclear weapons, Russia hoped it could enhance its ability to deter similar regional
conflicts. Russia’s sense of vulnerability, and its view that the threats to its security were
increasing, also stemmed from the debates over NATO enlargement in the mid-1990s. Russia
feared the growing alliance would create a new challenge to Russia’s security, particularly if
NATO moved nuclear weapons closer to Russia’s borders. These concerns contributed to the
37 According to Alexander Pikayev, a Russian defense analyst, scenarios for the possible use of nuclear weapons
broadened since 1993 and 1997. See David Hoffman, “New Russian Security Plan Criticizes West, Doctrine Broadens
Nuclear Use Policy,” Washington Post, January 15, 2000, p. 1.
38 “Russia’s Military Doctrine,” Reprinted in Arms Control Today, May 2000.
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statement that Russia might use nuclear weapons if its national survival were threatened. Russian
officials repeated many of their concerns about NATO enlargement and new nuclear threats
during the latest round of expansion in 2003 and 2004.
Finally, for many in Russia, NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo in 1999 underlined Russia’s
growing weakness and NATO’s increasing willingness to threaten Russian interests. Its National
Security Concept published in 2000 noted that the level and scope of the military threat to Russia
was growing. It cited, specifically, as a fundamental threat to its security, “the desire of some
states and international associations to diminish the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring
international security.” There are also threats in the border sphere. “A vital task of the Russian
Federation is to exercise deterrence to prevent aggression on any scale and nuclear or otherwise,
against Russia and its allies.” Consequently, Russia concluded that it “should possess nuclear
forces that are capable of guaranteeing the infliction of the desired extent of damage against any
aggressor state or coalition of states in any conditions and circumstances.”39
The debate over the role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s national security strategy considered both
strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons. With concerns focused on threats emerging around
the borders of the former Soviet Union, analysts specifically considered whether nonstrategic
nuclear weapons could substitute for conventional weaknesses in regional conflicts. The
government appeared to resolve this debate, in favor of the modernization and expansion of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons in 1999, shortly after the conflict in Kosovo. During a meeting of
the Kremlin Security Council, Russia’s President Yeltsin and his security chiefs reportedly agreed
“that Moscow should develop and deploy tactical, as well as, strategic nuclear weapons.”40
Vladimir Putin, who was then Chairman of the Security Council, stated that President Yeltsin had
endorsed “a blueprint for the development and use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.”41
Many analysts in the United States interpreted this development, along with questions about
Russia’s implementation of its obligations under the 1991 PNI, to mean that Russia was “walking
back” from its obligation to withdraw and eliminate nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Others drew a
different conclusion. One Russian analyst has speculated that the documents approved in 1999
focused on the development of operations plans that would allow Russia to conduct “limited
nuclear war with strategic means in order to deter the enemy, requiring the infliction of pre-
planned, but limited damage.”42 Specifically, he argued that Russia planned to seek a new
generation of nonstrategic, or low yield, warheads that could be to be delivered by strategic
launchers. Others believe Russia has also pursued the modernization of existing nonstrategic
nuclear weapons and development of new nuclear warheads for shorter-range nuclear missiles.
Concerns about Russia’s possible reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons in regional conflicts
returned in early 2007 when, as was noted earlier, Russia threatened to withdraw from the INF
Treaty.
39 “2000 Russian National Security Concept,” Nezavisimoye Voennaye Obozreniye, January 14, 2000.
40 Martin Nesirky, “Focus: Nuclear-power Russia Wants Tactical Weapons,” Reuters, April 29, 1999.
41 David Hoffman, “Kremlin to Bolster Nuclear Stockpile, Government Fears Short-Range Missiles May Be
Inadequate,” Washington Post, April 30, 1999, p. 19.
42
Ivan Safranchik, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World: A Russian Perspective,” in Alexander and Millar,
Tactical Nuclear Weapons, p. 54.
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It is extremely difficult to estimate the number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons remaining in the
Russia arsenal. This uncertainty stems from several factors: uncertainty about the number of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union had stored and deployed in 1991, when
President Gorbachev announced his PNI; uncertainty about the pace of warhead elimination in
Russia; and uncertainty about the whether all warheads removed from deployment are still
scheduled for elimination.
Analysts estimate that the Soviet Union may have deployed 15,000-25,000 nonstrategic nuclear
weapons, or more, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During the 1990s, Russian officials stated
publicly that they had completed the weapons withdrawals mandated by the PNIs and had
proceeded to eliminate warheads at a rate of 2,000 per year.43 However, many experts doubt these
statements, noting that Russia probably lacked the financial and technical means to proceed this
quickly. In addition Russian officials have offered a moving deadline for this process in their
public statements. For example, at the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference in
2000, Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov stated that Russia was about to finish implementing its
PNIs. But, at a follow-up meeting two years later, Russian officials stated that the elimination
process was continuing, and, with adequate funding, could be completed by the end of 2004.44 In
October 2007, an official from Russia’s Ministry of Defense stated that Russia had completed the
elimination of all of the warheads for its ground forces, 60% of its missile defense warheads, and
50% of its air force warheads, and 30% of its naval warheads.45
In late 2003, General Yuri Baluyevsky, who was then the first deputy chief of staff of the Russian
General Staff stated that Russia would not destroy all of its tactical nuclear weapons, that it
would, instead, “hold on to its stockpiles” in response to U.S. plans to develop new types of
nuclear warheads.46 General Nikolai Makarov, head of the Russian General Staff, made a similar
comment in late 2008. He said that Russia would “keep nonstrategic nuclear forces as long as
Europe is unstable and packed with armaments.”47
With consideration for these uncertainties, analysts have estimated that Russia may still have
between 2,000 and 8,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with the lower number
reflecting the number of deployed weapons and the higher number including those weapons that
remain in central storage. While some estimate that only air-delivered weapons remain
operational, the total amount may be split between warheads for tactical aviation, naval nuclear
weapons, and air defense missiles, with some ground forces still in the mix.48 Russia had also
43 Lewis Dunn, “Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons Control: What is the Problem?,” in Larsen, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J.
Klingenberger, editors, Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air
Force, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2001, p. 17.
44 Joshua Handler, in Alexander and Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, p. 29.
45 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
May/June 2008, p. 57.
46 Vladimir Isachenkov, “U.S. Nuke Development Concerns Russia,” Interfax, November 26, 2003.
47 “Russian Military Chief Defends Nonstrategic Nukes,” Global Security Newswire, December 17, 2008.
48 A table summarizing three different estimates can be found in Andrea Gabbitas, “Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons:
Problems of Definition,” in Larsen, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger, editors, Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear
Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air Force, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2001, p.
25. See also Nikolai Sokov, “The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Controversy,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 2001, pp.
16-17.
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reportedly reduced the number of military bases that could deploy nonstrategic nuclear weapons
by over 250 and had consolidated its storage areas for these weapons, eliminating about two-
thirds of the 500-600 facilities it had operated at the beginning of the 1990s.49
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The preceding sections of this report focus exclusively on U.S. and Soviet/Russian nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. These weapons were an integral part of the Cold War stand-off between the two
nations. The strategy and doctrine that would have guided their use and the numbers of deployed
weapons both figured into calculations about the possibility that a conflict between the two
nations might escalate to a nuclear exchange. Other nations—including France, Great Britain and
China—also had nuclear weapons, but these did not affect the central conflict of the Cold War in
the same way as U.S. and Soviet forces.
The end of the Cold War, however, and the changing international security environment during
the 1990s, renders incomplete any discussion of nonstrategic nuclear weapons that is limited to
U.S. and Russian forces. Because both these nations maintain weapons and plans for their use, the
relationship between the two nations could still affect the debate about these weapons. In
addition, Russian officials have turned to these weapons as a part of their response to concerns
about a range of U.S. and NATO policies. Nevertheless, both these nations have looked beyond
their mutual relationship when considering possible threats and responses that might include the
use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Both nations have highlighted the threat of the possible use
of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons by other potential adversaries or non-state actors.
Both have indicated that they might use nuclear weapons to deter or respond to threats from other
nations.
In addition, many analysts believe that a debate about nonstrategic nuclear weapons can no longer
focus exclusively on the U.S. and Russian arsenals. Even though tensions have eased in recent
years, with their nuclear tests in 1998 and continued animosity towards each other, India and
Pakistan have joined the list of nations that may potentially resort to nuclear weapons in the event
of a conflict. If measured by the range of delivery vehicles and the yield of the warheads, these
nations’ weapons could be considered to be nonstrategic. But each nation could plan to use these
weapons in either strategic or nonstrategic roles. Both nations continue to review and revise their
nuclear strategies, leaving many questions about the potential role for nuclear weapons in future
conflicts. China also has nuclear weapons with ranges and missions that could be considered
nonstrategic. Many analysts have expressed concerns about the potential for the use of nuclear
weapons in a conflict over Taiwan or other areas of China’s interests. This report does not review
the nuclear weapons programs in these nations.50 However, when reviewing the issues raised by,
problems attributed to, and solutions proposed for nonstrategic nuclear weapons, the report
acknowledges the role played by the weapons of these other nations.
49 Joshua Handler, in Alexander and Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, p. 30.
50 For a more detailed discussion of Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese nuclear weapons, see Alexander, Brian and Alistair
Millar, editors, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, op cit.
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Although nonstrategic nuclear weapons have not held a high profile in debates over national
security or arms control debates, the 111th Congress may still address issues raised by these
weapons in its discussions of U.S. nuclear weapons policy and U.S. nonproliferation policy.
Analysts have identified several issues, or problems, associated with the continuing deployment
of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. They have also identified potential policy
options, or solutions, that might resolve these problems. However, they do not all agree on the
importance of the problems or the need for the solutions. This section identifies these problems
and potential solutions and reviews the contrasting opinions about them.
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Most analysts agree that the greatest risks from Russia’s continued deployment of nonstrategic
nuclear weapons stem from potential problems with their safety and security in storage areas and
a possible lack of central control over their use when deployed in the field. These weapons were
deployed, and many remain in storage, at remote bases close to potential battlefields and far from
the central command authority in Moscow. Further, the economic chaos in Russia during the
1990s raised questions about the stability and reliability of the troops charged with monitoring
and securing these weapons. Hence, these issues raise concerns about the possibility that the
weapons might be lost, stolen, or sold to other nations or groups seeking nuclear weapons.51
Russian officials acknowledged concerns about the safety and security of these weapons in the
early 1990s, and such concerns may have contributed to acceptance of the PNIs in 1991. But
Russian officials deny that they have lost control over any of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons
and they contend that the problems have been resolved as the weapons have been withdrawn to
central storage areas.52
There is no public evidence from western sources about any episodes of lost, sold, or stolen
Russian nuclear weapons, but concerns remain that these weapons might find their way to
officials in rogue nations or non-state actors. For example, during comments made after a speech
in October 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that he was worried that the Russians
did not know the numbers or locations of “old land mines, nuclear artillery shells, and so on” that
might be of interest to rogue states or terrorists.53 Russia officials noted, in response to this
comment, that its stocks of nuclear weapons were secure and well-guarded and that Gates’s
concerns were not valid.
51 “Because of their size and forward basing, they are especially vulnerable to theft and unauthorized use.” See William
C. Potter and Nikolai Sokov, “Nuclear Weapons that People Forget,” International Herald Tribune, May 31, 2000.
52 Russia’s defense minister, Sergei Ivanov, has said that Russia’s nuclear arsenal is safe and militants could never steal
an atomic bomb from the country. He further noted that it is a myth that “Russian nuclear weapons are guarded badly
and weakly.” See “Russia Says No Militant Threat to Nuclear Arsenal,” Reuters, August 3, 2004.
53 Walter Pincus, “Gates Suggests New Arms Deal With Russia,” Washington Post, October 29, 2008, p. A9.
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Many analysts argue that Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons pose a risk to the United States,
its allies, and others because Russia has altered its national security concept and military
strategies, increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons. Some fear that Russia might resort to the
early use of nuclear weapons in a conflict along its periphery, which could lead to a wider conflict
and the possible involvement of troops from NATO or other neighboring countries. possibly
drawing in new NATO members. Some also believe that Russia could threaten NATO with its
nonstrategic nuclear weapons because Russia sees NATO as a threat to its security. Russian
analysts and officials have argued that NATO enlargement, with the possible deployment of
nuclear weapons on the territories of new NATO members close to Russia’s borders,
demonstrated how much NATO could threaten Russia.
Others argue, however, that regardless of Russia’s rhetoric, “Russia’s theater nuclear weapons are
not ... destabilizing.” Even if modernized, these weapons will not “give Moscow the capability to
alter the strategic landscape.”54 Further, many doubt that Russian weapons, even with its new
military strategy, pose a threat to NATO or U.S. allies. They argue that Russia would only use
these weapons in response to a weak performance by its conventional forces in an ongoing
conflict. Since it would be extremely unlikely for NATO to be involved in a conventional conflict
with Russia, it would be extremely unlikely for Russian weapons to find targets in NATO nations.
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The Bush Administration claimed, as a result of its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, that the United
States has reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons by increasing the role of missile defenses and
precision conventional weapons in the U.S. deterrent posture. However, the Administration also
noted, as a result of the Nuclear Posture Review, that the United States would no longer base the
size and structure of its nuclear forces only on “the Russian threat.” Instead, the United States
would acquire and maintain those capabilities that it needed to deter and defend against the
capabilities of any nation with the potential to threaten the United States, particularly if the
potential adversary possesses weapons of mass destruction. It noted that these new, threatening
capabilities could include hardened and deeply buried targets and, possibly, bunkers holding
chemical or biological weapons. It indicated that the United States would seek to develop the
capabilities to destroy these types of facilities.
The Bush Administration argued that its new policy was designed to enhance deterrence, by
giving the United States more credible, “tailored” options in the event of a conflict with a nation
armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. This, however presumes that the U.S.
military could identify a credible scenario that included the option of using nuclear weapons. This
may not be possible in battlefield contingencies, when U.S. forces would be vulnerable to fallout
and other nuclear effects. Further, the use of nuclear weapons to destroy underground bunkers
housing chemical or biological weapons presumes that the United States would have the exquisite
intelligence needed to locate the bunkers with the agents. Anything less than a direct, precise
attack could disperse more agent than it destroyed. Furthermore, such bunkers could be built
54 Robert Joseph, “Nuclear Weapons and Regional Deterrence,” in Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger,
editors, Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air Force, Institute
for National Security Studies, July 2001. pp. 90-92.
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within an extensive network of tunnels, using blast doors, reinforced concrete, and other shock
absorbing techniques, which would further interfere with U.S. efforts to destroy them. In addition,
the Administration’s critics argue that, by tailoring its nuclear weapons to achieve specific
battlefield objectives, the United States would actually increase the likelihood of nuclear use,
rather than enhance nuclear deterrence. Further, they note that the United States does not need
new nuclear weapons to achieve its battlefield objectives. It demonstrated in the early phases of
the war in Iraq that its conventional forces were more than capable of defeating an enemy and
overthrowing a regime, even one with many deeply buried targets, with relative ease.55 Therefore,
the demonstrated, overwhelming superiority of U.S. conventional forces, rather than the
hypothetical threat of nuclear use, would serve as a more potent deterrent in future conflicts.
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Many analysts have questioned whether the United States needs to continue to deploy nuclear
weapons in Europe, more than 15 years after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and demise of the
Soviet Union. NATO policy still views these weapons as a deterrent to any potential adversary,
and they also serve as a link among the NATO nations, with bases in several nations and shared
responsibility for nuclear policy planning and decision-making. But, if the United States develops
new nuclear warheads that can fulfill nonstrategic missions with delivery from a strategic
platforms (such as a heavy bomber), the need for forward basing in Europe diminishes. Hence,
some believe that the blurring of the distinction between nonstrategic and strategic delivery
vehicles, along with the increasing concerns about threats outside of Europe, have reduced the
utility of forward-deployed nuclear weapons.
Some also question whether the United States and NATO might benefit from the removal of these
weapons from bases in Europe. Recently, an Air Force Review of nuclear surety and security
practices identified potential security concerns for U.S. weapons stored at some bases in
Europe.56 The problems were evident at some of the national bases, where the United States
stores nuclear weapons for use by the host nation’s own aircraft, but not at U.S. air bases in
Europe. The review noted that “host nation security at nuclear-capable units varies from country
to country ...” and that most bases do not meet DOD’s security requirements. Some analysts have
suggested that, in response to these concerns, the United States might consolidate its nuclear
weapons at a smaller number of bases in Europe.57 Moreover, another recent review of the U.S.
nuclear weapons enterprise found that U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), which was once
the “principle advocate for nuclear weapons in Europe,” no longer advocates for these weapons
and no longer recognizes a political role for these weapons in NATO. According to this study,
officials at USEUCOM have argued that an “over-the-horizon” capability, weapons deployed
outside of Europe, could be just as credible as a deterrent to attack on NATO.58
55 William Arkin, “New Nukes? No Way,” Los Angeles Times, August 17, 2003.
56 Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures, February 8, 2008.
57 Kristensen, Hans. USAF Report: “Most” Nuclear Weapons Sites in Europe Do Not Meet U.S. Security
Requirements. Federation of American Scientist, Strategic Security Blog. June 19, 2008. http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/
2008/06/usaf-report-%e2%80%9cmost%e2%80%9d-nuclear-weapon-sites-in-europe-do-not-meet-us-security-
requirements.php#more-245
58 Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase II: Review of the
DOD Nuclear Missions, Washington, DC, December 2008, p. 59.
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Some argue that reducing or eliminating the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe
would not only address the Air Force’s operational and security costs associated with their
deployment, but also could serve as a signal to Russia of NATO’s intentions to address Russia’s
perception of the threat from NATO. This, in turn, might encourage Russia to accept negotiated
limits or transparency measures on its nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Some also believe that a
NATO “step away” from these weapons would encourage Russia to reduce its reliance on
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. However, the authors of the Task Force study cited above hold a
different view. They argue that U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO remain “a pillar of NATO unity.”
They argue that these weapons “convey the will of multiple allied countries, creating real
uncertainty for any country that might contemplate seeking political or military advantage
through the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction against the Alliance.”59 Removing these
weapons from Europe would, therefore, do more to undermine NATO’s political unity and
military security than it would to encourage Russia to reduce or contain its nonstrategic nuclear
weapons.
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The Bush Administration has stated that the new U.S. nuclear posture, along with the research
into the development of new types of nuclear warheads, contributes to U.S. efforts to stem the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. It argues that, by creating a more
credible threat against the capabilities of nations that seek these weapons, the U.S. policy deters
their acquisition or deployment. It also reinforces the value of the U.S. extended deterrent to allies
in Europe and Japan, thus discouraging them from acquiring their own nuclear weapons.60
Critics of the Administration’s policy question whether the United States needs new nuclear
weapons to deter the acquisition or use of WMD by other nations; as was noted above, they claim
that U.S. conventional weapons can achieve this objective. Further, many analysts claim that the
U.S. policy will actually spur proliferation, encouraging other countries to acquire their own
WMD. Specifically, they note that U.S. plans and programs reinforce the view that nuclear
weapons have military utility. If the world’s only conventional superpower needs more nuclear
weapons to maintain its security, then it would be difficult for the United States to argue that other
nations could not also benefit from these weapons. Such nations could also argue that nuclear
weapons would serve their security interests. Consequently, according to the Administration’s
critics, the United States might ignite a new arms race if it pursues new types of nuclear weapons
to achieve newly defined battlefield objectives.61 The Administration has countered this argument
by noting that few nations acquire nuclear weapons in response to U.S. nuclear programs. They
do so either to address their own regional security challenges, or to counter U.S. conventional
superiority.62
59 Ibid. p. 14.
60 An Assessment of the Impact of Repeal of the Prohibition on Low Yield Warhead Development on the Ability of the
United States to Achieve its Nonproliferation Objectives, jointly submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Energy, March 2004, p. 4.
61 “The long term consequences of developing new nuclear weapons might well be to push Iran, North Korea, and other
states to work harder and faster in developing and manufacturing their own nukes.” See William Arkin, “New Nukes?
No Way,” Los Angeles Times, August 17, 2003.
62 An Assessment of the Impact of Repeal of the Prohibition on Low Yield Warhead Development on the Ability of the
United States to Achieve its Nonproliferation Objectives, jointly submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of State,
(continued...)
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The Bush Administration, and some analysts outside government, argued that the United States
should not adopt any new or different policies to address the issues raised above. They argue that
the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review strengthened the U.S. nuclear deterrent by adjusting U.S.
strategy and doctrine to address emerging, rather than Cold War, threats. They do not believe that
these policy changes undermine U.S. nonproliferation policy or that they make the use of nuclear
weapons more likely in future conflicts.
The Bush Administration also did not adopt any new policies to address the potential risks created
by Russia’s continued deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It did not address these
weapons in the negotiations on the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, although Bush
Administration officials did pledge to raise concerns about these weapons in discussions with
their Russian counterparts. However, the Bush Administration appeared to believe that any
concerns about the safety and security of these weapons could be addressed through the ongoing
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. They argued, however, that Russian nonstrategic nuclear
weapons posed no military threat to stability or security for the United States or its allies, and
therefore, required no unilateral or cooperative responses from the United States.63 Further, some
argue that any reciprocal or cooperative effort to address concerns about Russia’s nonstrategic
nuclear weapons, such as negotiated transparency or arms control measures, could undermine
U.S. flexibility and limit U.S. and NATO options for the deployment of nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. Specifically, “pursuing arms control agreements on these weapons might undercut
NATO’s nuclear posture, generating political pressure to withdraw the remaining weapons.” In
addition, “arms control would make problematic the development of new [nonstrategic nuclear
weapons] capabilities that may be required to deter and defend against today’s threats, and,
especially, for the deterrence of rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction.”64
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Many analysts believe the United States should adopt a policy that reduces its reliance on nuclear
weapons, in general, and weapons with battlefield objectives, in particular. The Bush
Administration argued that its policy would achieve this objective, by including missile defenses
and precision strike conventional weapons in its new “triad” of U.S. forces and capabilities.
Others, however, argued that the Administration’s policy actually blurred the distinction between
conventional and nuclear weapons, and could increase the U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons by
adding to the contingencies when the United States would consider nuclear use. They argue,
instead, that the United States should adopt a “no first use” pledge, so that the United States
(...continued)
Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Energy, March 2004, p. 4.
63 An official with the Bush Administration’s National Security Council staff has stated that “Russia’s theater nuclear
weapons, even if modernized, will not give Moscow the capability to alter the strategic landscape.” He further noted
that “Russia’s theater nuclear weapons are not... destabilizing.” See Robert Joseph, “Nuclear Weapons and Regional
Deterrence,” In Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger, editors, Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons:
Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air Force, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2001, p. 90.
64 Ibid., p. 92.
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would make it clear that it would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. At present,
the United States does not explicitly threaten to use nuclear weapons, but it also will not rule out
their use. Supporters of the existing policy argue that this ambiguity enhances deterrence, by
keeping the possible prospect of nuclear attack in the adversary’s calculations.
Those who support a “no first use” pledge argue that it would reduce the perceived value of
nuclear weapons, indicating that they serve only as a deterrent to the use of nuclear weapons by
other nations. Many believe that this change in policy would not hinder U.S. deterrent strategy or
U.S. security because they believe that the U.S. nuclear deterrent is robust, with thousands of
deployed nuclear warheads, and that U.S. conventional forces are sufficient to address any
potential or emerging threats to U.S. security. This includes the potential need for the United
States to attack hardened and deeply buried targets, including those that might house chemical or
biological weapons. The United States could use its conventional weapons to seal off entry and
exit points and to cut off communications and ventilation,65 thereby “sealing” chemical or
biological weapons in place in their underground bunkers for the duration of a conflict. The
United States could then remove and dispose of these weapons after winning the conflict, without
risking dispersing them and creating fallout with a nuclear attack.
Some have also argued that, if the United States and NATO reduce their reliance on nuclear
weapons, possibly even withdrawing nonstrategic nuclear weapons from Europe, Russia might
also alter its policy. Others, however, argue that Russia’s policy is only rhetorically linked to
NATO policy, and with continuing concerns about weaknesses in its conventional forces, Russia
is unlikely to respond with its own change in policy. Some also believe that changes in U.S. and
NATO policy could affect the policies of other nations with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, such as
India, Pakistan, or China, by demonstrating that the United States has reduced its reliance on
nuclear weapons. Others, however, point out that these nations have acquired their nuclear
weapons to address their own security interests, and are unlikely to alter limit their forces simply
because the United States and NATO have set an example of reductions.
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Analysts have noted that the only arms control measures affecting nonstrategic nuclear weapons,
the 1991 PNIs, do not require data exchanges and did not establish monitoring provisions so each
nation can be certain that the other is adhering to its commitments. They also are voluntary;
because they are not incorporated in a formal treaty or agreement. Either side could reverse its
commitments at any time. Hence, the reductions under these measures may be vulnerable to
disruptions in the relationship between the United States and Russia. Those who believe that U.S.
and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons continue to pose a threat to international security,
either because of the prospects for loss of control over Russian weapons, by deliberate use by
either nation, or because of their symbolic value and potential to undermine nonproliferation
policies, argue that the United States and Russia should pursue further cooperative measures to
address the perceived threats from the weapons and the perceived weaknesses in the existing
controls on them. Congress also voiced its interest in the future of these weapons. Section 1212 of
the FY2006 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-163) calls on the Secretary of Defense to
determine whether it is in the U.S. national security interest “to identify and develop mechanisms
and procedures to implement the transparent reductions in nonstrategic nuclear weapons” and “to
65 Stansfield Turner, “Nukes: Can U.S. Practice What it Preaches?,” Christian Science Monitor, January 28, 2004.
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identify and develop mechanisms and procedures to implement the transparent dismantlement of
excess nonstrategic nuclear weapons.”
Analysts outside government have offered several proposals for cooperative measures that might
address concerns with nonstrategic nuclear weapons. For example, in an article published in the
Wall Street Journal in early 2008, several former senior defense and national security officials
argued that the United States should “start a dialogue, including within NATO and with Russia,
on consolidating the nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment to enhance their security,
and as a first step toward careful accounting for them and their eventual elimination.”66 This
proposal is a part of a larger agenda that these officials have outlined as part of a path toward a
“World Free of Nuclear Weapons.” Other analysts have proposed a number of measures that
might be taken specifically to address concerns about nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These
include:
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Many analysts argue that the United States and Russia should, at a minimum, provide each other
with information about their numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and the status (i.e.
deployed, stored or awaiting dismantlement) of these weapons. Such information might help each
side to monitor the other’s progress in complying with the PNIs; it could also help resolve
questions and concerns that might come up about the status of these weapons or their
vulnerability to theft or misuse. The United States and Russia have discussed transparency
measures for nuclear weapons in the past, in a separate forum in the early 1990s, and as a part of
their discussions the framework for a START III Treaty in the late 1990s. They failed to reach
agreement on either occasion. Russia, in particular, has seemed unwilling to provide even basic
information about its stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Some in the United States have
resisted as well, arguing, in particular, that public discussions about the numbers and locations of
U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe could increase pressure on the United States to withdraw these
weapons.
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In the early 1990s, as a part of the early efforts of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the
United States provided Russia with assistance in transporting nuclear weapons back to Russia
from other former Soviet republics. It has also provided Russia with assistance in improving
security at its central storage facilities for nuclear weapons. However, much of this assistance
focused on the warheads removed from strategic nuclear weapons, rather than nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. Because many nonstrategic nuclear weapons remain at remote storage areas
near former deployment areas, and concerns remain about security at these facilities. Some
analysts have suggested that the United States could expand its threat reduction assistance to
these sites, so that it could build confidence in the safety and security of these weapons. Others,
however, argue that the United States should only provide assistance at sites that support the
retirement or elimination of nuclear warheads and should not provide funding for sites that can
support the weapons’ continued deployment. Some have also questioned whether Russia would
accept assistance at these sites, particularly if it were not permitted reciprocal access to U.S.
66 George P. Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn. Toward a Nuclear Free World. Wall Street
Journal. January 15, 2008. p. 13.
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weapons storage sites. Russia did, however, recently conduct an exercise, with NATO observers
and CTR funding, to explore the vulnerability of its nuclear weapons storage sites to incursions
and theft.
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Several analysts have suggested that the United States and Russia negotiate a formal treaty to
both codify the measures outlined in the PNIs and to put further limits and restrictions on each
nation’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Such an agreement could mandate further reduction in
deployed weapons, including U.S. weapons in Europe, and could result in both nations reducing
their reliance on these weapons in their military strategies. Some analysts have also argued that
this treaty could be multilateral, to include nations such as China, India, and Pakistan, rather than
bilateral, thus introducing arms control limits to the forces of other nations with nonstrategic
nuclear weapons.
However, as have been noted throughout this report, the two sides would likely find it difficult to
agree on a definition of which weapons counted as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, particularly if
either nation begins to deploy warheads designed to achieve battlefield objectives on long-range
or strategic delivery vehicles. The issue would be further complicated by the fact that both the
United States and Russia hold many of these warheads in storage, and some could conceivably
return to deployment in a relatively short amount of time. To address these problems, some
analysts have suggested that the arms control regime count and limit all warheads—stored and
deployed, strategic and nonstrategic, etc. This type of agreement would allow each side to
determine, for itself, the size and mix of its deployed forces, within the limits on total warheads.67
Critics argue that such limits would be extremely difficult to define and monitor, making it
difficult to verify compliance with a warhead-control treaty. They also note that the lack of
symmetry between U.S. and Russian forces would make it extremely difficult to find common
definitions and limits that addressed each nations’ concerns. In particular, because Russia views
U.S. NATO weapons as a threat to its security, it could insist on the complete removal of these
weapons in exchange for less comprehensive limits on the far greater numbers of Russian
forces.68 Further, the other nations with nonstrategic nuclear weapons seem unlikely, at this time,
to be willing to join a regime that would limit their capabilities.
Analysts recognize that negotiating such an agreement would be complex and time-consuming.
But it suffers from still another problem. Neither the Russian nor U.S. governments have
expressed any interest in pursuing this path. Russian officials have denied that their weapons pose
a safety and security problem, and they still consider these weapons essential to Russian military
strategy and national security. The Bush Administration also had no interest in negotiating further
limits on U.S. nuclear warheads or weapons. To the contrary, in the 2002 Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty), the United States indicated that it would only count
“operationally deployed” strategic nuclear warheads under the limits in the Treaty. This metric
67 “The only way to get a real handle on NSNF security, and the relationship of these weapons to strategic arms control
and the real military threats they pose (while maintaining some capability) is the warhead control route.” See Joseph F.
Pilat, “Controlling Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces,” in Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger, editors, Controlling
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air Force, Institute for National Security
Studies, July 2001, p. 243.
68 Robert Gromoll and Dunbar Lockwood, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: Defining U.S. Objectives,” in Larson,
Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger, editors. Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons. Obstacles and
Opportunities, United States Air Force, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2001, p. 82.
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counts fewer warheads than the START Treaty, and far fewer than a metric that would include
stored and deployed strategic and nonstrategic nuclear warheads. The Bush Administration
resisted more confining arms control measures, arguing that the United States must maintain the
flexibility to adjust its forces and redeploy warheads to respond to changes in the international
security environment. The Obama Administration, however, may be more willing to consider
arms control measures that include limits on nonstrategic nuclear weapons. President Obama has
not only pledged to pursue new arms control agreements with Russia, he has also stated that his
Administration will seek “seek deep, verifiable reductions in all U.S. and Russian nuclear
weapons”(emphasis added).69
Analysts who view these weapons as a threat to U.S., Russian, and international security maintain
that a bilateral or multilateral treaty could address many concerns. For example, if the United
States and NATO reconsider the military utility of forward deployed nuclear weapons, and as
Russia’s economy and conventional forces recover more of their stability, both sides might grow
more willing to accept limits on their forces if it allows for greater openness and transparency at
both storage and deployment areas. Although it is harder to imagine other nations relinquishing
their nonstrategic nuclear weapons, some contend that a treaty that established a norm against
nonstrategic nuclear weapons, combined with diplomatic efforts to address security concerns,
could alter the perceptions of these nations, as well.
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Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
awoolf@crs.loc.gov, 7-2379
69 The White House, The Agenda: Homeland Security, http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/homeland_security/.
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