In 1993, Russia formally applied for accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Its application was taken up by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor organization of the GATT, in 1995. Russia's application has entered into its most significant phase as Russia negotiates with WTO members on the conditions for accession.
Accession to the WTO had been critical to Russia and its political leadership. President, now Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin had made it a top priority. However, in the last year, Russian leaders have sent mixed signals regarding their commitment to the accession process. In August 2008, Prime Minister Putin stated that WTO accession may not be beneficial to Russia. Russia has also changed some of its trade rules, such as lowering quotas on meat imports and raising tariffs on auto imports, that contradict commitments that it made to the United States, the European Union and other WTO members as part of the accession process. However, in December 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that Russia was committed to acceding to the WTO. Russia is looking to join the WTO by January 1, 2010, but previous such goals have not been fulfilled, and outstanding issues may delay the process again.
Differences over some critical issues remain, making the time for Russian accession to the WTO uncertain. The European Union and the United States have raised concerns about Russian energy pricing policies which allow natural gas, oil, and electricity to be sold domestically far below world prices providing, they argue, a subsidy to domestic producers of fertilizers, steel, and other energy-intensive goods. Russia counters that the subsidies are not illegal under the WTO. Perhaps more significantly, Russia's WTO accession had been put on a virtual hold as a result of the early August 2008 Russian-Georgian armed conflict over South Ossetia and Abkhazia and due to some trade measures that Russia has taken that would appear to be in conflict with commitments it has made as part of the accession process.
Congressional interest in Russia's accession to the WTO is multifaceted. Members of Congress are concerned that Russia enters the WTO under terms and conditions in line with U.S. economic interests, especially gaining access to Russian markets as well as safeguards to protect U.S. import-sensitive industries. Some Members also assert that Congress should have a formal role in approving the conditions under which Russia accedes to the WTO, a role it does not have at this time. A number of Members of Congress and members of the U.S. business community have advised the Bush Administration not to agree too quickly to Russia's accession to the WTO and to ensure that U.S. concerns are met. The Congress has a direct role in determining whether Russia receives permanent normal trade relations (NTR) status which has implications for Russia's membership in the WTO and U.S.-Russian trade relations. Without granting permanent NTR (PNTR) to Russia, the United States might not benefit from the concessions that Russia makes upon accession. Issues regarding Russia's accession to the WTO may arise during the 111th Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.
In 1993, Russia formally applied for accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Its application was taken up by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, the successor organization of the GATT.1 Russia's application has entered into its most significant phase as Russia negotiates with WTO members on the conditions for accession. The process had been moving forward, but, the last few years, differences over some critical issues have made the timing of Russian accession to the WTO uncertain.
Accession to the WTO had been critical to Russia and its political leadership. President, now Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin had made it a top priority. However, in the last year, Russian leaders have sent mixed signals regarding their commitment to the accession process. In August 2008, Prime Minister Putin stated that WTO accession may not be beneficial to Russia. Russia has also changed some of its trade rules, such as lowering quotas on meat imports and raising tariffs on auto imports, that contradict commitments that it made to the United States, the European Union(EU) and other WTO members as part of the accession process. However, in December 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that Russia was committed to acceding to the WTO.2
The United States, the EU and other trading partners, have supported Russia's accession to the WTO as a way to increase stability and predictability in Russia's foreign trade and investment regime. However recently they have been critical of the trade barriers that Russia has imposed. Also, Russia's August 2008 military conflict with Georgia has caused the United States and other WTO members to re-examine their support.
On November 19, 2006, U.S. and Russian officials signed a bilateral agreement on Russia's accession to the WTO, thus completing a major step in the accession process. Russia still needs to complete "multilateral" negotiations with the WTO working party, that consists of representatives from about 60 WTO member countries, including the United States. That process has been on a virtual hold; the working group has been conducting only "informal meetings" because Georgia, a WTO member, has blocked formal meetings.
Congressional interest in Russia's accession to the WTO is multifaceted. Members of Congress are concerned that Russia enters the WTO under terms and conditions in line with U.S. economic interests, especially gaining access to Russian markets as well as safeguards to protect U.S. import-sensitive industries. Some Members also assert that Congress should have a formal role in approving the conditions under which Russia accedes to the WTO, a role it does not have at this time. The Congress has a direct role in determining whether Russia receives permanent normal trade relations (NTR) status which has implications for Russia's membership in the WTO and U.S.-Russian trade relations. Without granting PNTR to Russia, the United States might not benefit from the concessions that Russia makes upon accession.
This report examines the issue of Russia's accession to the WTO, focusing on the implications for Russia, the United States, and the WTO. It begins with a short overview of the WTO accession process and reviews the history of the Soviet Union's relationship with the GATT/WTO. It provides a brief discussion of Russian economic conditions and the status of economic reforms as they are a major impetus for Russia's application to join the WTO. The focus of the report is the status of Russia's accession application and the outstanding issues. The report concludes with an analysis of the implications of Russia's accession to the WTO for Russia, the United States, the other WTO members and for the WTO itself and with an analysis of the outlook for the Russia's application. This report will be updated as events warrant.
The WTO's membership of 153 countries and customs areas spans all levels of economic development, from the least developed to the most highly developed economies. The WTO came into existence in January 1995 as a part of the agreements reached by the signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations. The WTO's primary purpose is to administer the roughly 60 agreements and separate commitments made by its members as part of the GATT (for trade in goods), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS—for trade in services), and the agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS).
The membership in the GATT/WTO has grown exponentially. The GATT was originally founded in 1947 by 23 countries, and the WTO now has 153 members. Ukraine and Cape Verde are the newest two members, having joined on May 2008 and July 2008, respectively. Membership in the WTO commits its members to fundamental principles in trade with other members, including:
As part of its function to administer the rules established under the agreements, the WTO provides a mechanism for the settlement of disputes between members where the dispute involves alleged violations of WTO agreements. Moreover, each member's trade regime is reviewed by the WTO Secretariat from time-to-time to ensure that it conforms to WTO rules. Trade among WTO members accounts for about 90% of total world trade.3
The collapse of the Soviet Union and its East European Bloc and the movement of many developing countries toward liberal trade policies have spurred interest in joining the WTO. Article XII of the agreement that established the WTO sets out the requirements and procedures for countries to "accede." "Any state or customs territory having full autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies is eligible to accede to the WTO on terms agreed between it and WTO members."
The accession process begins with a letter from the applicant to the WTO requesting membership. The WTO General Council, the governing body of the WTO when the Ministerial Conference is not meeting, forms a Working Party (WP) to consider the application. Membership in the WP is open to any interested member-country. More than 60 member countries, including the United States, are part of the WP on Russia's accession. The U.S. delegation is led by the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for WTO and Multilateral Affairs and includes representatives from the U.S. Departments of Commerce and Agriculture.
The applicant submits a memorandum to the WP that describes in detail its current trade regime. The applicant and the WP then negotiate to determine what legislative and structural changes the applicant must make to meet WTO requirements and to establish the terms and conditions for entry of the applicant into the WTO. The WP's findings are then included in a "Report of the Working Party" and are the basis for drawing up the "Protocol of Accession."
While it negotiates with the WP, the applicant must also conduct bilateral negotiations with each interested WTO member. During these negotiations the WTO member indicates what concessions and commitments on trade in goods and services it expects the applicant to make in order to gain entry, and the applicant indicates what concessions and commitments it is willing to make until the two agree and set down the terms. The terms of the bilateral agreements are combined into one document which will apply on an MFN basis to all WTO members once the applicant has joined the WTO. The accession package is conveyed to the General Council or Ministerial Conference for approval.
Article XII does not establish a deadline for the process. The length of the process depends on a number of factors: how many legislative and structural changes an applicant must make in its trade regime in order to meet the demands of the WP, how quickly its national and sub-national legislatures can make those changes, and the demands on the applicant made by members in bilateral negotiations and the willingness of the applicant to accept those demands. Because WTO accession is a political process as well as a legal process, its success depends on the political will of all sides—the WTO member countries and the applicant country. A formal vote is taken in the WTO that requires a 2/3 majority for accession, although in practice the WTO has sought to gain a consensus on each application. The process can take a long time: China's application took over 15 years.
The Soviet Union was not invited to become a contracting-party of the GATT in 1947 after it declined to join the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—the other two multilateral organizations that resulted from the Bretton Woods conference immediately following the end of World War II. In fact, Soviet trade and economic policy conflicted with the principles of the GATT. The GATT was based on removing barriers to trade and on developing economic interdependence among countries. Soviet foreign economic policy was largely based on the concept of self-sufficiency—the domestic economy would produce as much as possible for itself and import only those products which it could not produce. Exports were used merely to buy necessary imports, not to build markets. These economic policies helped to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union modified the concept of self-sufficiency to include members of the Soviet Bloc-the East European countries, some Asian communist countries and Cuba, confining most of its trade with these countries in a system of limited international division of labor. Only a small amount of trade was conducted outside the Bloc. The Soviet Union spearheaded the formation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), what could be loosely described as the Soviet Bloc's version of the GATT.
In August 1986, the Soviet Union applied to take part in the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT as an observer with the intention of becoming a full member. The United States and other Western industrialized countries opposed the request because of the Soviet Union's central planning economic system.4 In 1990, however, the Soviet Union received observer status to the Uruguay Round negotiations after GATT signatories, including the United States, concluded that the Soviet Union was moving toward becoming an open economy under President Mikhail Gorbachev.5
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia retained the observer status held by the Soviet Union and, in June 1993, it formally applied to accede to the GATT. On June 16, 1993, the GATT established a working party on Russia's accession and, in January 1995, the application was converted to an application to become a member of the WTO.
Russia's motivation for and progress toward accession to the WTO are directly related to efforts to dismantle the Soviet economic system of central planning and replace it with a more market-based economy. Russian leaders have made entry into the WTO a top priority, as a mechanism for overcoming the political hurdles that have impeded economic restructuring. The possibility of accession to the WTO has been an opportunity to get some significant economic reform legislation through the Russian parliament. Many Russian and foreign experts have argued that these reforms, and more, are necessary if Russia is to achieve long-term economic growth and development. At the same time, a number of economic interest groups that favor the status-quo, such as agriculture, the auto industry, and raw material producers, have fought against economic reforms and oppose Russian accession to the WTO.
Russia has enjoyed economic growth (measured in annual changes in GDP) since 1999. The growth occurred after a long period of economic stagnation during the final years of the Soviet Union and a deep recession/depression during the 1990s. Many specialists have attributed the economic growth to the depreciation of the ruble at the end of the 1990s and to the rise in world energy prices since 2001.
However, Russia has been plagued by economic problems including a high poverty rate and poor health conditions. In addition, economic growth has taken place unevenly throughout the country with the major cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg and regions well-endowed with marketable natural resources accounting for most of the economic growth, while less fortunate regions remained stagnant or have become poorer. Moreover, income distribution among the Russian population has become increasingly unequal as a small portion of the population acquires larger shares of wealth. Russia's economic vulnerabilities surfaced in 2008 as plunging oil prices and the global financial crisis have diminished its economic growth prospects, have caused the value of the ruble to decline, and have led to a precipitous drop in Russian stock market indexes.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian economy has become more open to the rest of the world. The role of foreign trade in the Russian economy has grown. By 2008, Russian exports of goods and services were equivalent to an estimated 32% GDP and imports were equivalent to 23% of GDP.6 Russian foreign trade has become more geographically diverse. In 2007, most of Russian foreign trade took place outside the former Soviet Union—only 15.1% of Russian exports and 14.2% of Russian imports were with former Soviet states.7
Russia has been experiencing increasing current account surpluses largely due to the rapid growth in the value of Russian exports of crude oil, natural gas, other fuels, and other natural resources. In 2006, Russia's current account surplus was $95.6 billion, an increase from $29.1 billion in 2002. It declined to $78.3 billion in 2007.8 However, the surpluses could prove ephemeral. Russia exports primarily raw materials for which market prices tend to be highly volatile. In 2006, oil, natural, and fuel (such as coal) accounted for 65% of total Russian exports of goods. Metal and chemicals accounted for another 20%.9 While Russia has clearly benefitted from current high prices for fuels, a more diversified trade structure could stabilize its trade situation. Russian imports, especially of machinery and equipment and of processed foods, have increased sharply recently.10
Foreign direct investment in Russia has surged in the last few years indicating some investor confidence in Russian economic prospects despite Putin government measures to re-nationalize the energy sector. In 2002, $3.5 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) flowed into Russia; in contrast $55.0 billion in FDI flowed into Russia in 2007.11 The level of foreign direct investment is still considered low given the size and needs of the Russian economy.
Russia's transition from central planning was bound to be more difficult and longer than that of the Central and East European states. The communist system was much more entrenched in the Soviet Union than it was in the rest of the Soviet Bloc. Furthermore, Russia does not have a legacy of a market economy to draw on as is the case with some of the Central and East European countries. Russia has had to deal with the legacy of a Soviet economy that was administered to meet the needs of the military while civilian production and investment were given low priority.
However, Russia's economic problems also were the result of policy failures during the transition. These failures included loose monetary and fiscal policies early in the transition period. They have also included structural problems such as poorly developed and executed privatization programs that have left many potentially productive assets in the control of enterprise mangers from the Soviet period or in the hands of a few politically-connected individuals ("oligarchs") who extracted the value from many of these assets rather than making them commercially viable for the long run. In addition, an inefficient banking system, the lack of private land ownership protection, the absence of adequate commercial laws, and an inefficient and corrupt government bureaucracy have inhibited economic growth and development.
Despite the setbacks, Russia has made some important strides:
When he became president in 2000, President Putin forced Russia into a new phase of economic reform, at least until the completion of his first term in 2004. Putin enjoyed a high degree of popularity among the Russian people that translated into overwhelming political clout in the Russian parliament. In addition, the continuing period of economic growth provided a window of opportunity for Putin and his government to tackle economic restructuring. He was able to push important economic legislation through the Russian parliament: tax reform; land reform; reform of government bureaucracy to make it more responsive to the needs of the economy rather than an impediment to development and growth; judicial reform; and improvement in corporate governance, especially the protection of minority shareholders' rights.
The fragile basis of Russia's economic growth strongly suggests that Russia has far to go in economic reform. Analysts point to Russia's weak and underdeveloped financial sector, poorly developed system of commercial laws, and confusion over federal vs. regional and local responsibilities in important economic policy areas. Furthermore, even though Russian laws have been passed to restructure the economy, the success of their implementation remains to be seen. In addition, beginning in 2004, the Putin government has showed signs of braking, if not halting, reforms and re-established state control over critical sectors, particularly energy, generating some skepticism regarding Putin's commitment to Russian economic reform which lasted through the end of his second term in 2008 with the assumption of Dmitri Medvedev to the presidency and the appointment of Putin as Prime Minister. The Medvedev/Putin government's response to the financial crisis has increased concerns that it is tightening state control over the economy.
In determining the terms and conditions for Russia's accession to the WTO, WP members scrutinize Russia's foreign trade and investment regimes and policies to ascertain to what degree they conform to WTO rules and where Russia needs to change. Russia has made significant strides in that regard. It eliminated two important pillars of Soviet central planning in November 1991, the state monopoly on foreign trade and the ban on foreign investment in the Russian economy.
In October 1992, another legacy of central planning was eliminated when the Russian ruble was made convertible into foreign currencies and multiple exchange rates were eliminated. A dual exchange rate was briefly introduced in January 1999 as a result of the August 1998 financial crisis but was eliminated in June 1999. In the early to mid-1990s, the Central Bank imposed fixed or pegged exchange rates in an attempt to control ruble depreciation. Since the August 1998 crisis, the ruble has been allowed to float but the Central Bank of Russia intervenes by buying or selling rubles. The ruble has remained relatively stable since 1999.
In 1992, the Russian government adopted the Harmonized Tariff System that is used by WTO members, and it maintains a system of two-column tariff rates—MFN and non-MFN tariff rates. Tariff rates on non-agricultural products range from 0 to 30%. Some countries receive tariff advantages under Russia's Generalized System of Preferences(GSP) program in the form of tariff rates that are 25% below the MFN rate. A tariff-rate quota is applied to imports of sugar from countries receiving Russian GSP treatment.12 Of the more than 11,000 commodity categories in the Russian tariff tables, only fifty have tariff rates above 30%.
Over time, the Russian government has lowered tariff rates. In 1995, the trade-weighted average tariff rate was 16.0%; by 2001 it was 11.1%.13 Most products can be traded without restrictions, but the government requires exports and imports of some products, for example, pharmaceuticals, alcoholic beverages, precious metals and stones, to be licensed.14 Russia also applies export tariffs on oil to ensure that domestic oil supplies are adequate and to compensate for the large differential between domestic and export oil prices. In 1998, the Russian government passed laws to provide for antidumping, countervailing, and safeguards measures against imports. In response to the effects of the global economic crisis, the Russian government in 2008 implemented some trade restrictions that run counter to its trade liberalization trend. For example, it has raised tariffs on imports of foreign cars.
In early 1995, Russia submitted to the working party(WP) the "Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime" which describes the structure of its foreign trade regime and also the structure, policies, and practices of its economy that would likely affect its conduct of trade.15 Subsequently, the WP members submitted questions based on the memorandum, to which the Russian delegation replied. The process of submitting the original description of the trade regime, followed by a series of questions and replies established a benchmark on which the negotiations to determine the terms and conditions of Russia's accession would be based. The initial series of questions, replies and follow-up responses indicated strong concerns by the WP members in a broad range of areas including privatization, property rights, price controls, government financial support for business, and the structure and implementation of the tax regime.16
The Russian accession process is now at a critical stage. As with most negotiations, however, the last stages are the most difficult because negotiators now face the most contentious issues.17 The United States, the European Union, and other participants have had strong reservations about Russian policies and practices on intellectual property rights, energy pricing, agriculture, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, trade in services, civil aircraft, and other issues. Russia's accession to the WTO will likely hinge on the resolution of these issues, which are examined below in more detail.
The energy sector dominates the Russian economy. Not only do oil, natural gas, and electricity drive industry and provide heat to residents, but energy is also the largest Russian export and hard currency earner. The current structure of Russia's energy sector is largely a legacy of the Soviet Union. The oil industry has been broken up into several privatized companies. Natural gas and electricity are largely monopolies run by Gazprom and United Energy Systems (UES), respectively, which are joint-stock companies with significant government ownership. The structures of these companies are now the subject of reform, but that process has proved politically controversial and therefore slow.
Domestic prices for Russian energy are regulated by the government while exports of energy products command world prices. Domestic prices are lower than world prices, in some cases significantly, although the Russian government has been raising domestic energy prices and reducing the subsidies. The EU and the United States have pointed out that the gap between the world price for natural gas and the Russian domestic price has been as large as six to one, for electricity—five to one, and for oil—four to one.18 The "dual pricing" is partially a result of a policy of providing affordable heating and electricity to residential customers regardless of ability to pay and providing favorable fuels rates to enterprises and to government agencies, such as the military. 19
Some WP members, particularly the EU, and to a lesser extent the United States, have raised concern that dual energy pricing gives Russian manufacturers an unfair competitive advantage and would be illegal under the WTO subsidy agreement.20
WTO disciplines regarding subsidies are contained in the "Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures." Under the agreement, a subsidy is actionable only if it is a "specific subsidy," that is, it is a subsidy that is available only to an enterprise, an industry, a group of enterprises or industries in the country that gives the subsidy. The agreement defines three kinds of subsidies:
WTO members are calling on Russia to be in full compliance with the WTO agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) at the time of its accession, in terms of laws in place and enforcement. All WTO members are bound by the provisions of the TRIPS agreement, which was designed and ratified to introduce predictability and order to intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in all WTO members, because it has become an important factor in international trade. The TRIPS agreement requires WTO members to apply the fundamental principles of national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment in intellectual property rights protection. The agreement also requires WTO members to ensure protection of copyrights, trademarks, geographical indicators of products, and patents by imposing and enforcing appropriate laws.23
Russia has passed a number of laws to protect the holders of copyrights, patents, and trademarks and is a member of the major multilateral intellectual property rights conventions. While acknowledging that Russia has taken steps to improve IPR protection, U.S. industry has complained that the Russian government does not adequately enforce its laws, allowing intellectual property piracy to continue and grow with impunity—culprits are either not caught, or if caught they are not adequately punished.24 One concern of the United States and some other WTO members has been that in 2006 the Russian parliament (the Duma) passed a revision of Part IV of the Russian Federation Civil Code. This revision replaced Russia's IPR laws with one law. The United States and the EU want Russia's assurance that the revision does not signify a weakening of legal protection of intellectual property rights.
For the past 12 years, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has placed Russia on the Special 301 Priority Watch List.25 U.S. producers of copyrighted material have cited unauthorized Russian reproduction of American-made films, videos, sound recordings, books, and computer software as a source of lost revenues. Russian production of pirated DVDs has increased and has been a special source of concern. U.S. industry and government officials have complained about Russia-based websites that distribute unauthorized music recordings, films, and books. Losses due to copyright piracy of U.S. products in Russia in 2007 are estimated at $1.4 billion dollars.26 The production of counterfeit American products has become so large that they now make up the vast majority of Russian purchases of these products.27 Russia has argued that its enforcement of intellectual property rights is improving, and that it should not be singled out since intellectual piracy continues to take place in WTO member countries. IPR protection is of serious concern to the U.S. Congress.
Agriculture has been a sensitive part of the economy throughout Russian/Soviet history. Its political importance far outweighs its share of the Russian economy (about 3%of Russian GDP in 2003-2007).28 Agriculture has been severely affected by the transition to a market economy as much as, or more than, any other sector of the economy. According to one estimate, agricultural production declined around 40% in volume terms since 1991, much of the decline occurring in livestock production.29
Several factors have contributed to the downturn. One factor is Soviet agriculture policy. The Soviet government determined what and how much the economy should produce and directed resources accordingly. In the 1960s, the government decided that the Soviet people should eat more meat, and it subsidized animal feed production and imports of animal feed to fulfill this objective. The government set meat prices at a low level to make it affordable to consumers. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, market prices were instituted and state subsidies were dramatically cut, increasing the cost of meat production.30 Furthermore, when the Russian government liberalized trade, Russian producers of poultry and other meats could not compete with foreign producers who could sell them more cheaply. While the Russian federal government has cut support, local and regional governments have continued to provide assistance in the form of equipment, favorable credits, and export subsidies. They are concerned about food security and unemployment and about maintaining the supply of housing, education, and other services that state farms provided to the rural communities during the Soviet period and continue to provide.
A second factor contributing to the decline in agricultural production has been the slow pace of restructuring of Russian farms. Despite the introduction of privatization, the vast majority of former state and collective farms remain intact as joint stock operations or cooperatives and operate in virtually the same inefficient manner as they did under the Soviet government.
The Russian federal government is under pressure from regional and local governments and from factions within the Russian parliament to protect agriculture from further erosion and to provide time and resources to permit it to become competitive. This pressure has translated into a difference in positions in the accession negotiations between Russia and agricultural exporting countries including the United States, Canada, and Australia over the level and longevity of government support to agriculture. The Russian government has argued for higher levels and longer phase-out periods for supports than its negotiating partners are willing to accept. Russian negotiators have also asserted that it should not be required to bind itself to dramatically lower support levels during the accession process while other WTO members are currently in the process of negotiating the agriculture subsidies in the current round of WTO negotiations, Doha Development Agenda (DDA). The WTO members have argued that the subsidies that Russia wants to maintain distort trade and are concerned that they give Russian agriculture producers an unfair advantage. The Russian side has argued that without government support, Russian agriculture could not compete with EU and U.S. agriculture, both of which receive sizeable government subsidies.31
During the Uruguay Round, WTO members agreed to expand disciplines over trade in agricultural products, and agricultural trade is on the agenda of the current round, the DDA. Under the Agricultural Agreement all WTO members, except least developed countries, are committed to reduce tariffs and subsidies on the production and export of agricultural goods.32
Some WP members have raised concerns over Russia's sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards, that is standards and certification procedures that determine the safety of meats and other animal products, plants, and plant products. They argue that these procedures are not scientifically based and discriminate against imports thus violating WTO rules. Under the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPM), WTO members are permitted to apply controls on products in order to protect public health and safety, but those controls must be scientifically based and must not discriminate against imports.33 Russia has argued that its SPS controls meet the requirements of the SPM agreement.
The United States has expressed particular concern about this issue. In March 2002, the Russian government imposed a ban on imports of U.S. poultry because of the possible presence of avian influenza. Russia had become the largest market for U.S. exports of chicken. After months of negotiations, the United States and Russia agreed in August 2002 on a new veterinary certificate for U.S. poultry that would include inspections by Russian veterinarians of U.S. processing and storage facilities, but technical issues remained that prevented the process from being implemented. On April 3, 2003, the two sides announced the resolution of the problems, allowing the inspection of the facilities to go forward and U.S. poultry exports to resume.34 Nevertheless, the United States is concerned that Russia would impose similar restrictions in the future and has pressed Russia to adhere to the WTO requirements as part of the conditions of its accession.
Services, especially financial services (banking, insurance, and securities), are a relatively new phenomenon in the Russian economy. Under the Soviet Union, services were government-owned and operated and were confined to personal services (for example, lodging, hair salons, restaurants). They were not well developed because they were not a government priority. Financial services were virtually non-existent in the Soviet Union because their function as intermediaries between savers and borrowers of capital had no role in the Soviet planned economy.
The services sector has grown rapidly during Russia's transition to a market economy but has not matured in most cases. The United States, the EU, and other advanced developed WTO members have argued that Russia needs an efficient financial services industry to promote economic growth and development and that opening the industry to foreign investment would introduce expertise and new capital.
Russian officials and business representatives claim that their service industries must have government protection as "infant industries," because they are too immature and would be wiped out if they had to face foreign competition too soon. An example is the fledgling Russian insurance industry. Private insurance companies have been developing since the government monopoly was removed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but not sufficiently to meet demand. Foreign insurance companies that could help fill the gap and bring expertise and a wide range of products are restricted. For example, the government: limits total foreign capitalization to 15% of the domestic insurance industry; requires the general director and the chief accountant to be Russian citizens; restricts participation to foreign companies that have been in business no less than 15 years in their home country; and requires that foreign insurance companies operate as a minority shareholder in a Russian insurance company before they can be granted their own license. In addition, foreign providers are prohibited from underwriting and reinsuring mandatory insurance—auto and health insurance and insurance taken out by government entities—the fastest growing insurance market in Russia.35 Russian negotiators assert that those restrictions should remain while U.S., EU, and other working party participants want them loosened or removed.
The Russian banking sector is similarly underdeveloped. About 30% of the volume of Russian banking activity is conducted by two banks—Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank, both of which are owned by the Central Bank of Russia. Sberbank holds roughly 70% of the Russian savings deposits. Foreign participation in the banking sector is restricted by government laws and regulations. Foreign banks may operate in Russia only as subsidiaries and not as branches of the parent bank. Foreign banks have cited the lack of an effective deposit insurance program as a disincentive for new, private banks to develop. The government in effect backs deposits of Sberbank 100%.36 Russian negotiators claim that the government will establish a deposit insurance program for deposits in all banks but argues that the limit on foreign participation in Russian banking must be maintained to allow domestic banks to become competitive.37 U.S. negotiators and negotiators from some of the other working party countries are requesting that Russia liberalize its banking sector to increase foreign participation, arguing that the foreign influence would increase, not undermine, the competitiveness of Russian banks by promoting stability and popular confidence. Furthermore, a liberalized banking sector would likely boost other sectors of the economy.
In telecommunications, Russia permits 100% foreign ownership of telecommunication services providers, but it has requested to be bound by a commitment of only 49% foreign ownership. U.S. and EU negotiators oppose such a ceiling because they view the Russian telecommunications market as potentially lucrative for its firms. The Russian government has also indicated it wants long distance and international telephone communications to remain in the control of a monopoly, Rostelcom, until 2010.38
WTO rules on trade in services, including financial services, are contained in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) which was agreed to during the Uruguay Round. In general, the GATS is designed to apply internationally accepted rules, such as most-favored-nation treatment, to trade in services that are similar to those applied to trade in goods. In important respects, however, the GATS is less comprehensive than the GATT. For example, WTO rules on goods trade contained in the GATT apply to all goods, but many of the rules, contained in the GATS, including, "national treatment," apply only to those services and the modes of delivery of those services on which that the member country has identified in its schedule of commitments.
Russian aircraft manufacturers, as the case with the Russian defense-related industries in general, have seen demand for their production plummet after the government dramatically cut defense expenditures and after airlines from former Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union shifted to European and U.S. manufacturers for their aircraft. The Russian government wants to protect domestic aircraft manufacturers from further erosion of business. It imposes a 20% ad valorem tariff on imported aircraft. Russia argues that its aircraft industry is operating at only 0-15% of capacity and is in great need of modernization. For it to become competitive, it needs to be protected from foreign competition and therefore must apply high tariffs to imported aircraft. The United States and EU are pressing Russia to sign on to the plurilateral WTO Civil Aircraft Agreement (CAA) (only 26 members are currently signatories) which commits the signatories to eliminate tariffs on trade in civil aircraft and some related equipment. In an 1996 bilateral Memorandum of Understanding with the United States, Russia stated that it would sign the CAA but has backed off that commitment during the accession negotiations. Because its is a plurilateral agreement, a WTO member is not required to sign the CAA as part of its obligations.
Russia does grant some tariff waivers to allow domestic airlines to fulfill needs that cannot be accommodated by domestically manufactured aircraft. It has recently favored the European firm, Airbus Industries in granting those waivers. The United States has demanded that the waivers should be granted without favoring any particular company.39
In addition to the above issues, the United States, the EU, and other working party members have raised other issues about Russia's trade and foreign investment regime and want Russia to make changes as part of the conditions for its accession to the WTO. They include:
On November 19, 2006, USTR Susan Schwab and Russian Minister of Economic Development and Trade German Gref, signed the bilateral agreement on Russia's accession to the WTO and accompanying sideletters while attending the APEC summit in Hanoi, Vietnam. The agreement symbolized Russia's reaching critical milestone in its WTO accession process, although other milestones remain The agreement allowed the United States to address sensitive issues in its economic relations with Russia, although the United States did not accomplish all of its original objectives. Any debate in Congress on PNTR for Russia will likely include an evaluation of the bilateral agreement. The agreement and the sideletters cover a broad range of issues.
The bilateral agreement addresses some sensitive issues regarding Russian imports of U.S.-origin beef, some of which arose well after Russia's WTO accession process began. Russia had banned imports of beef and beef by-products since a case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), or "mad cow disease," was discovered on a farm in Washington State in 2003. Under the bilateral agreement, Russia agreed to permit the immediate resumption of imports of de-boned beef, bone-in beef, and beef by-products from cattle younger than 30 months and to allow imports of beef and beef by-products from cattle of all ages after the United States receives a positive evaluation as a beef producer from the World Organization for Animal Health.
Under the agreement, Russia accepts U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Safety and Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) certifications of pork and poultry producing facilities for producing products that can be exported to Russia and procedures to expedite the certification process. Russia also agreed to accept U.S. freezing as a adequate measure to prevent trichinae infestation in pork to be sold for further processing or for retail sale. Russia previously had only allowed frozen pork to be imported for further processing.
The bilateral agreement also covers various Russian government tariff-related measures. It commits Russia to continue to apply until 2009 the provisions of a 2005 U.S.-Russia bilateral agreement on meat that established tariff-rate quotas including in-and over-quota tariff rates and to conduct bilateral negotiations on the treatment of meat imports after the agreement expires. The quotas established under the 2005 agreement were revised under a bilateral agreement reached on December 29, 2008, that is to run through 2009.42The agreement also commits Russia to bind its tariffs on some agricultural products at current levels and to lower tariffs on other agricultural products.
Russia has agreed to accede to the WTO Information Technology and Telecommunications Agreement (ITA), which means that it will eliminate tariffs on information technology products. It has agreed to comply with 95% of the ITA commitments within its first three years of WTO membership. On the other hand, Russia did not agree to U.S. demands to accede to the WTO Civil Aircraft Agreement but did agree to reduce tariffs on wide-body aircraft, parts for civil aircraft, and on leased aircraft. It will also reduce tariffs on narrow-body aircraft. Russia has agreed to establish procedures to expedite imports of products of encryption technology and reduce duties on exports of scrap metal.
Regarding insurance, Russia acceded to U.S. demands that foreign insurance companies be permitted to own 100% of insurance operations and to establish branches in Russia, but Russia retains the right to impose limits on foreign direct investment in banking and insurance if the share of foreign direct investment of total investments in those sectors exceeds 50%. After five years, Russia will consider whether to lift the discretionary restriction on foreign investment in banking and insurance. Russia still will not allow foreign bank branches to operate. Russia also agreed to increase market access of foreign providers to other service areas including telecommunications, audio-visual services, energy services, express delivery services, distribution services, business services, and environmental services.
The bilateral agreement and sideletters commit Russia to strengthen enforcement of intellectual property rights, including the elimination of plants that produce optical disks, closing down websites that distribute pirated products, and strengthening enforcement at its borders to ensure that pirated goods are not imported. Russia also made a commitment to accede to the provisions of the WTO agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs) and to protect proprietary information provided by pharmaceutical companies to obtain marketing approval.
Russia still needs to complete negotiations with the working party and bilateral agreements with Saudi Arabia and Ukraine, two recently admitted members of the WTO. The working party members, including the United States, have argued that Russia still needs to resolve issues regarding government support of the agriculture sector and that its fulfillment of its commitments on IPR protection and industrial goods trade will be closely watched by them before finalizing the accession process.43
The working party process has been placed on a formal hold, and the WP has been conducting only informal meetings. Georgia has prevented formal meetings because of Russian restrictions on Georgian exports and, more recently, over Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Furthermore, the Russian government said it is reconsidering (unspecific) commitments its has made as part of the accession process, and Prime Minister Putin has expressed doubts about the benefits of WTO accession to Russia.
The United States has supported Russia's accession to the WTO since Russia first applied to join the GATT in 1993. The U.S. government has provided advice to the Russian government on how to make its trade and investment regime WTO compatible and to educate Russian firms on the implications of WTO accession. Because the United States is the world's largest economy, its support is critical to the success of Russia's application. However, the United States has also insisted that Russia enter the WTO on "commercial terms," that is, on terms that do not distort trade, and that Russia immediately adhere to WTO agreements upon accession.
U.S. support for Russian accession is just one part of post-Cold War U.S. trade and economic policy that has encouraged Russian endeavors to establish a market economy. And the trade and economic policy is itself part of a larger U.S. foreign policy strategy to anchor Russia in the world community and to reshape the U.S.-Russian relationship into one of cooperation.
U.S. support to Russia in the trade and investment areas has come in the form of technical assistance, trade preferences (including tariff preferences under the U.S. GSP program), and financial assistance to U.S. exporters to and investors in Russia through the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). Since 1992, the United States has granted Russia conditional normal trade relations (NTR), or most-favored-nation (MFN), status, which means that lower tariffs are applied to imports from Russia than was the case when Russia did not have NTR status.
The Bush Administration has indicated that Russia's accession to the WTO could be jeopardized because of Russia's August 2008 military incursion into Georgia and its recognition the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.44
U.S.-Russian trade and investment flows have increased in the post-Cold War reflecting the changed U.S.-Russian relationship, although they remain lower than what many observers consider their potential. U.S. imports from Russia have increased substantially since the end of the Cold War from $0.5 billion in 1992 peaking at $19.3 billion in 2007. U.S. exports have increased but not as significantly, from $2.1 billion in 1992 peaking at $7.4 billion in 2007. Since 1994, the United States has incurred growing trade deficits with Russia, peaking at $15.1 billion in 2006 but declining to $11.9 billion in 2007. The large increase in U.S. imports may reflect not so much an increase in the volume of trade but the rise in world prices of raw materials, particularly oil, that comprise the bulk of those imports.
Table 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Russia, 1992-2007
(in billions of dollars)
|
Year |
U.S. Exports |
U.S. Imports |
U.S. Trade Balances |
Year |
U.S. Exports |
U.S. Imports |
U.S. Trade Balances |
|
1992 |
2.1 |
0.5 |
1.6 |
2000 |
2.1 |
7.7 |
-5.6 |
|
1993 |
3.0 |
1.7 |
1.3 |
2001 |
2.7 |
6.3 |
-3.5 |
|
1994 |
2.6 |
3.2 |
-0.6 |
2002 |
2.4 |
6.8 |
-4.4 |
|
1995 |
2.8 |
4.0 |
-1.2 |
2003 |
2.4 |
8.6 |
-6.2 |
|
1996 |
3.3 |
3.6 |
-0.3 |
2004 |
3.0 |
11.9 |
-8.9 |
|
1997 |
3.4 |
4.3 |
-0.9 |
2005 |
3.9 |
15.3 |
-11.3 |
|
1998 |
3.6 |
5.7 |
-2.1 |
2006 |
4.7 |
19.8 |
-15.1 |
|
1999 |
2.1 |
5.9 |
-3.8 |
2007 |
7.4 |
19.3 |
-11.9 |
Source: Compiled by CRS from U.S. Department of Commerce Data. Bureau of the Census. FT900.
Despite the increase in bilateral trade, the United States and Russia still account for small shares of each others exports and imports. In 2007, Russia accounted for about 0.6% of U.S. exports and 1.0% of U.S. imports. The United States accounted for 2.5% of Russian exports and 4.9% of Russian imports. Major U.S. exports to Russia in 2006 consisted of machinery, vehicles, and meat (mostly chicken), and major U.S. imports from Russia consisted of oil, steel, and aluminum.45 On June 10, 2007, the Russian airline, Aeroflot, signed a contract to purchase 22 long-range Boeing 787 aircraft, a deal worth an estimated $3.5 billion.46
The United States accounted for $4.6 billion in foreign direct investment in Russia in 2006. The United States was technically the third largest source of foreign direct investment; however, the first two, Cyprus and Luxembourg, are considered to be largely sources of repatriated Russian capital rather than of original foreign capital.47
U.S. exporters and investors claim that a number of factors make them cautious about entering the Russian market: the lack of adherence to international standards of accounting; weak enforcement of intellectual property rights; the lack of protection of share-holders rights; burdensome taxation; and poor legal protection of contract sanctity. These concerns are largely mirrored in the demands the United States has made on Russia during its negotiations in the WTO.
For their part, Russian policymakers have asserted that U.S. trade policy has also been slow to adjust to the post-Cold War era. For example, they point out that the United States only recently removed the "nonmarket economy status" that was applied in antidumping duty cases against Russian imports.48 Under U.S. antidumping laws, "fair value" for imports from nonmarket economies is calculated differently than for imports from other economies. That methodology leads to higher dumping margins and antidumping duties and, therefore, placed imports from Russia at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other imports or U.S. domestic production. In response to requests from Russian steel producers, the U.S. Department of Commerce examined the possibility of no longer treating Russia as a nonmarket economy and removed the designation on June 7, 2002.49
More critical for Russia has been the U.S. government's continued application of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to trade relations with Russia. Russia's current conditional NTR status from the United States is governed by Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. Section 401 of Title IV requires the President to continue to deny NTR status to any country that was not receiving such treatment at the time of the law's enactment on January 3, 1975. In effect, this meant all communist countries, except Poland and Yugoslavia. Section 402 of Title IV, the Jackson-Vanik amendment, denies the countries eligibility for NTR status as well as access to U.S. government credit facilities, such as the Export-Import Bank, as long as the country denies its citizens the right of freedom-of-emigration. These restrictions can be removed if the President determines that the country is in full compliance with the freedom-of-emigration conditions set out under the Jackson-Vanik amendment. For a country to retain that status, the President must reconfirm his determination of full compliance in a semiannual report (by June 30 and December 31) to
Congress. His determination can be overturned by Congress via the enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval at the time of the December 31 report.
The Jackson-Vanik amendment also permits the President to waive full compliance with the free emigration requirement, if he determines that such a waiver would promote the objectives of the amendment, that is, encourage freedom of emigration. This waiver authority is subject to an annual renewal by the President and to congressional disapproval via a joint resolution. Before a country can receive NTR treatment under either the presidential determination of full compliance or the presidential waiver, both the United States and the country in question must have concluded and enacted a bilateral agreement that provides for, among other things, reciprocal extension of NTR (or MFN) status. The agreement and a presidential proclamation extending NTR status cannot go into effect until a joint resolution approving the agreement is enacted. In 1990, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a bilateral trade agreement. The agreement was subsequently applied to each of the former Soviet states. The United States first granted NTR treatment to Russia under the presidential waiver authority beginning in June 1992 and, since September 1994, under the full compliance provision. Presidential extensions of NTR status to Russia have met with virtually no congressional opposition.
Russian political leaders have continually pressed the United States to "graduate" Russia from Jackson-Vanik coverage entirely. They see the amendment as a Cold War relic that does not reflect Russia's new stature as a fledgling democracy and market economy. Moreover, Russian leaders argue that Russia has implemented freedom-of-emigration policies since the fall of the communist government, making the Jackson-Vanik conditions inappropriate and unnecessary.
While Russia remains subject to the Jackson-Vanik amendment, some of the other former Soviet republics have been granted permanent and unconditional NTR-Kyrgyzstan on June 29, 2000, and Georgia on December 29, 2000. Perhaps, what has particularly irked Russian leaders is that the United States granted permanent and unconditional NTR status to China, ostensibly still a communist country, January 1, 2002, and to Ukraine, March 23, 2006.
Granting Russia permanent and unconditional NTR status will have little direct impact on U.S.-Russian trade, since Russian imports have entered the United States on a NTR basis since 1992. The initiative would be a political symbol of Russia's treatment as a "normal" country in U.S. trade, further distancing U.S.-Russian relations from the Cold War. For investors and other business people, PNTR may mean a more stable climate for doing business. But many observers have concluded that U.S.-Russian economic ties will grow only when Russia has undertaken sufficient economic reforms to improve the climate for trade and investment.
It has a direct bearing on the WTO accession issue since the WTO requires its members to extend mutual unconditional MFN status to one another's exports. If the United States does not extend permanent NTR to Russia, the United States would not benefit from the concessions, except tariff reductions, that Russia makes upon acceding to the WTO.
Because the major trade powers—the United States, the EU, and Japan—have supported Russia's entry into the WTO, the pending question is not whether Russia will accede but when. The answer to that question depends on when Russia and the more than sixty members of the working party can finish hammering out the conditions of accession. Negotiators have reportedly reached agreement on most issues, but disagreements on difficult issues of energy pricing, agriculture, services, civil aircraft, and intellectual property rights, have slowed down the process. Russian leaders have stated a goal of completing the negotiations by the end of 2009 in order to become a WTO member by January 1, 2010.50
The stakes for Russia in joining the WTO are high. In his April 18, 2002 address to the Federal Assembly, the bicameral Russian legislature, then-President Putin underscored his administration's priority to get Russia into the WTO. In the speech, Putin emphasized the need for the Russian government to establish the conditions to improve the economic well-being of the Russian people and linked that effort with joining the WTO:
Tight competition is a norm in the international community and in the modern world, competition for markets, investments, economic and political influence. Russia must be strong and competitive in this fight.
The world market is already here and our market has become part of the system...
The WTO is an instrument. He who knows how to use it grows stronger; he who prefers to sit behind a fence of protectionist quotas, and duties—he is doomed, absolutely doomed strategically.
Our country is still excluded from the process of making world trade rules. We are already in the world trade but we have no say in shaping the rules of trade. This tends to stunt the Russian economy and make it less competitive.51
In acceding to the WTO, Russia is making a legally binding commitment to conform to WTO rules. In so doing, it agrees to make its foreign trade and investment regimes open to the scrutiny of the WTO and its members. At the same time, the WTO provides a multilateral forum for Russia to settle trade disputes with other WTO members. As a WTO member, Russia will have a voice in how those rules are made and implemented. It would be a major step in integrating Russia within the international trade system.
But before it can accede to the WTO, Russia must satisfy WTO members that it is ready to meet its obligations. The working party negotiations and the bilateral negotiations to date suggest that those countries are not satisfied and require that Russia make major adjustments in policies and regulations.
The adjustments include reviewing and possibly changing more than 100 Russian laws and reviewing more than 1,000 international agreements that Russia has with various countries.52 However, the overall impact of WTO accession on Russia will depend on the terms and conditions of accession that Russian and its trading partners in the WTO finally agree on. In general, Russia will likely have to reduce tariffs and other protective measures for import-sensitive industries such as autos and aircraft and will have to open up key financial service industries—banking and insurance—to foreign competition. In the short run, such adjustments could lead to the loss of jobs in those areas and the need for the Russian government to provide unemployment insurance and other adjustment assistance.
However, globally competitive industries, such as the raw material producers, could see markets abroad opening up and an increase in foreign investment as accession forces Russia to restructure its economy. In the long run, mainstream economic theory and the record of economies that have gone through similar transitions suggest that trade liberalization will lead to a more efficient Russian economy and to raising the living standard of the average Russian citizen.53 New industries will probably emerge over time helping to diversify the Russian economy.
The Russian business community is divided on the issue of accession. Some have expressed skepticism if not out right opposition to accession. Among this group is Oleg Deripaska, an influential and powerful aluminum and auto business magnate. He is concerned that WTO accession will force Russia to eliminate protection and that the domestic auto industry will face competition from U.S., European, and Japanese manufacturers. He is also concerned that Russia would have to charge higher prices for energy, a major input in aluminum production. Similarly, representatives of aviation, furniture, financial services, telecommunications, and agriculture have asserted that Russia stands to lose more than it will gain from accession because Russia has not matured sufficiently to meet the competition.54
Views on accession cut across regions with support coming from regional political leaders in the major business centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg and in regions where raw material production is located. Political leaders in regions where fledgling import-sensitive manufacturers are located have been skeptical or opposed to accession. For most Russians, accession has not attracted much interest.55
Putin and the current Russian political leadership have made economic growth and development their highest priority and they view Russia's admission into the WTO as an essential part of the strategy to fulfill those goals. Putin appears to view the accession process as a way of forcing the government bureaucracy, the Duma, and Russian industry to confront the changes that are required if Russia is to attain long-term sustainable economic growth and development. While Putin's political future probably does not depend directly on whether Russia gets into the WTO, it will likely be evaluated on the basis to what degree economic life in Russia has improved.
WTO accession would be a further sign of Russia's acceptance and participation in the major multilateral economic institutions: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund; and the G-8. In so doing, Russia would distance itself further from its Soviet past.
For U.S. exporters and investors, Russia's accession to the WTO may improve the business climate in Russia which has been unpredictable. The U.S. business community often cites poor intellectual property rights protection, inconsistent and opaque customs regulations, inconsistent enforcement of the regulations, and irrational SPS and technical trade barriers as among the impediments to trade and investment. Accession could bring more stability and openness in the business climate since Russia would have to adhere to WTO rules that promote these conditions.
The volume of U.S. imports from Russia has been low primarily because Russia's limited export-base. Nevertheless, some U.S. import-sensitive industries, for example steel, may face increased competition from Russian producers. These industries may press U.S. negotiators to include as part of the terms and conditions for Russia's accession, a special safeguard provision, beyond that provided in the WTO agreements, that would cushion the potentially adverse impact of a large increase in Russian imports upon accession. Such a provision was included in the conditions for China's accession to the WTO and was codified in U.S. law as Section 421 of the Trade Act of 1974.
Similar to Section 201 (escape clause) provision of the Trade Act of 1974, Section 421 allows the United States to temporarily restrict fairly traded imports that cause or threaten to cause injury to the domestic injury. Unlike Section 201, however, Section 421 permits the restrictions to be applied solely to imports of like products from China, rather than requiring them to be applied on an MFN basis on imports of like products from all countries. In addition, the required thresholds of cause and level of injury to the domestic industry for relief under Section 421 is lower than under Section 201. Section 201 requires that imports be a "substantial" cause of "serious injury," whereas Section 421 requires only that the imports be a "significant cause" of "material injury." For many in the U.S. business and agricultural community, the issue is not whether Russia should be allowed to join the WTO but one of assurance that Russia will enter under conditions that are commercially sound and will have minimal negative impact on U.S. industries.
Russia is the largest and most populous country that is not a member of the WTO. If Russia accedes, it would significantly expand the geographical coverage of WTO rules to all major economies leading to a larger degree of stability and transparency to the international trading system.
At the same time, Russia's entry into the WTO would continue a trend in which as the membership of the WTO becomes larger and more diverse, it becomes more difficult for that membership to reach a consensus on important issues. In addition, trade disputes between Russia and its trading partners will be brought to the WTO for resolution rather than addressed bilaterally, adding to the ever growing caseload of the WTO.
As an economy still in transition, Russia would bring its own perspective to WTO negotiations. For example, Russia could be expected to challenge the positions the United States and other countries have taken in the WTO on the role of subsidies in trade and the degree to which trade in services should be liberalized.
| 1. |
These agreements include the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), among others. |
| 2. |
International Trade Daily. December 11, 2008. |
| 3. |
Based on WTO background information located at http://www.wto.org. |
| 4. |
It should be noted that other nonmarket economies had acceded to the GATT, albeit under special conditions: Poland (1967); Hungary (1973); and Romania (1971). The United States was also concerned that the Soviet Union intended to use GATT membership for political purposes. The Soviet Union sought observer status once before in 1982. Kennedy, Kevin C, The Accession of the Soviet Union to the GATT, Journal of World Trade Law, April 1987, p. 23-39. |
| 5. |
Naray, Peter. Russia and the World Trade Organization. Palgrave. New York. 2001. p. 20. |
| 6. |
Calculations based on data found in Economist Intelligence Unit,. Country Data , 2008. |
| 7. |
Customs Committee of Russia. |
| 8. |
Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile—Russia. 2007. p. 66. |
| 9. |
Ibid. |
| 10. |
Ibid., p. 52. |
| 11. |
Economist Intelligence Unit. Official Russian economic data base.. |
| 12. |
GSP is a program under which a country gives preferential tariff treatment to imports from developing countries. Many industrialized countries have GSP programs to encourage economic growth and development in developing countries. |
| 13. |
WTO, Draft Report of the Working Party, WT/ACC/SPEC/RUS/25/Rev.1 p. 124. |
| 14. |
Some working party members wanted to be assured that Russian traders were not favored over foreigner traders in license approval process. Ibid. p. 19-23. |
| 15. |
WTO L/7410. |
| 16. |
World Trade Organization, Accession of the Russian Federation: Questions and Replies to the Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime, Geneva, June 2, 1995. WT/ACC/RUS/2 |
| 17. |
World Trade Organization, Draft Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation to the World Trade Organization, WT/ACC/SPEC/RUS/25/Rev.1. |
| 18. |
Ibid. p. 16. |
| 19. |
OECD, OECD Economic Surveys 2001-2002: Russian Federation, p. 125. |
| 20. |
Ibid. p. 17. |
| 21. |
The description of the agreement is taken from "What is the WTO?" located on the WTO website: http://www.wto.org. |
| 22. |
International Trade Reporter, November 7, 2002, p. 1904. |
| 23. |
The description of the agreement is taken from "What is the WTO?" located on the WTO website: http://www.wto.org. |
| 24. |
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, April 2007, p. 554. |
| 25. |
Special 301 refers to a statutory requirement under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, that the USTR annually identify those countries that are the egregious offenders of denying IPR protection and against which the United States could take action. In practice, the USTR has also identified countries which do not fit the category of most egregious offenders but bare serious monitoring on its annual "priority watch list." |
| 26. |
The estimates are according to the International Intellectual Property Rights Alliance (IIPA), a non-profit group representing copyright-based industries, http://www.iipa.com. Office of the United States Trade Representative. 2008 Special 301 Report. |
| 27. |
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, p. 335. |
| 28. |
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2008 |
| 29. |
Liefert, William, Agricultural Reform: Major Commodity Restructuring but Little Institutional Change, in Joint Economic Committee, p. 278. |
| 30. |
Ibid. |
| 31. |
Bush, Keith, Russian Economic Survey, April 2003, p. 25. |
| 32. |
WTO, op. cit. |
| 33. |
Ibid. |
| 34. |
Ibid., p. 332. Washington Trade Daily, April 7, 2003, p. 1. |
| 35. |
Vastine, Bob and Vladimir Gololobov, Moscow and the WTO: A Unique Chance to Modernize Russia, European Affairs, Winter 2003; and The Russian Ministry of Finance has proposed that the ban on foreign company issuance of compulsory insurance be lifted, EIU, Country Report: Russia, March 2003, p. 28. |
| 36. |
Coalition of Service Industries, CSI Background Paper on Russian Banking Services, May 22, 2002. |
| 37. |
Legislation to establish deposit insurance for other Russian banks is pending in the lower house of the Russian parliament, the Duma, but has not received action, Reuters, June 3, 2003. |
| 38. |
Washington Trade Daily, January 23, 2002. |
| 39. |
USTR, p. 340. |
| 40. |
USTR, p. 333. |
| 41. |
Moscow Times, March 4, 2002, p. 12. |
| 42. |
International Trade Reporter. January 8, 2009. |
| 43. |
Much Work Remains Before Russia Will be Able to Join the WTO, U.S. Official Says. International Trade Daily. November 24, 2006. |
| 44. |
International Trade Reporter. August 27, 2008. |
| 45. |
CRS calculations based on data from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Global Trade Information System. |
| 46. |
Financial Times. June 11, 2007. p. 16. |
| 47. |
The World Bank. Tendentsii I perspectiva (Trends and Outlook). Russian Economic Report. April 2006. p. 242007. |
| 48. |
Washington Trade Daily, June 7, 2002. |
| 49. |
Ibid. |
| 50. |
International Trade Daily. December 11, 1008. |
| 51. |
Annual Address by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation Moscow, April 18, 2002, http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru. |
| 52. |
Likhachev, Aleksei Evgenievich (State Duma Committee on Economic Policy and Enterprise), Presentation at Adam Smith Institute International Congress on Russia's Accession to the WTO, October 16-17, 2002, Moscow. |
| 53. |
For an examination of the possible economic impact of accession see, Stern, Robert M., An Economic Perspective on Russia's Accession to the WTO, William Davidson Working Paper Number 472, June 2002, The William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Business School. |
| 54. |
Financial Times, April 15, 2002. |
| 55. |
East West Institute, Regional Report, vol. 7, no. 22, July 10, 2002. |