ȱ
ȱ¢DZȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱǯȱȱ
ȱ¢ȱ
¢ȱŗŜǰȱŘŖŖşȱ
ȱȱȱ
ŝȬśŝŖŖȱ
   ǯǯȱ
ŚŖŗŚŞȱ
ȱȱȱ
Pr
  epared for Members and Committees of Congress        
ȱ¢DZȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱ
¢ȱ
Products liability refers to the liability of a manufacturer or seller for injury caused by his product 
to the person or property of a buyer or third party. Legal developments starting in the 1960s, 
particularly the adoption of strict tort liability, have made it substantially easier for persons 
injured by defective products to recover for damages. Starting in the 1980s, however, many states 
enacted tort reform legislation that limited the rights of injured parties. Advocates for consumers 
and plaintiffs view strong products liability law as necessary to ensure adequate compensation for 
injured workers and consumers and to furnish as incentive for the manufacture of safe products. 
Manufacturers and their insurers, by contrast, contend that many products liability judgments are 
unwarranted or excessive and that national uniformity in products liability law is needed. 
Therefore, they favor replacing the 50 state products liability laws with one federal law. As the 
111th Congress begins, there has been one piece of legislation introduced pertaining to product 
liability. However, as Congress moves forward, it may choose to revisit legislation from sessions 
past that would affect various aspects of product liability law. This report supersedes RL33423, 
Product Liability: A Legal Overview, by Henry Cohen and Vanessa K. Burrows. 
 
ȱȱȱ
ȱ¢DZȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
Background and Analysis ................................................................................................................ 1 
Glossary........................................................................................................................................... 2 
Federal Statutes Enacted, 97th-110th Congresses ............................................................................. 5 
Legislative Developments ............................................................................................................... 7 
111th Congress ........................................................................................................................... 7 
Selected Bills From the 110th Congress .................................................................................... 7 
For Additional Reading ................................................................................................................... 9 
Selected CRS Reports ................................................................................................................... 10 
 
ȱ
Author Contact Information ...........................................................................................................11 
Acknowledgments ..........................................................................................................................11 
 
ȱȱȱ
ȱ¢DZȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱ
ȱȱ¢ȱ
Products liability, which is primarily a matter of state law, is generally based on strict tort liability 
rather than on negligence. This means that a plaintiff need only prove that the defect was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Due care on the part of the defendant is ordinarily 
immaterial. The purpose of strict tort liability is “to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from 
defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather 
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.”1 
The Federal Interagency Task force on Product Liability, under the direction of the Department of 
Commerce, in its Final Report issued November 1, 1977, found that the cost of product liability 
insurance had risen dramatically, making it more difficult for some small firms to obtain adequate 
insurance coverage. The major causes of the dramatic rise in rates, the Task Force found, were 
irrational premium setting procedures by insurance companies, the manufacture of products that 
are not as safe as current technologies would allow, and uncertainties as to how personal injury 
litigation is conducted. 
On April 6, 1978, the Department of Commerce released an Options Paper that included a model 
bill entitled, “Product Liability Self-Insurance Act of 1978.”2 On September 11, 1978, the 
Department published a summary of over 300 comments submitted to it on its Options Paper.3 
On July 20, 1978, the Carter Administration unveiled its program to deal with product liability 
problems. The proposals generally followed those suggested by the Department of Commerce in 
its Options Paper. The Administration also directed that a model uniform product liability law be 
prepared to add stability to products liability law, which varies from state to state. 
The Department of Commerce subsequently published a Model Uniform Product Liability Act.4 
Although intended for enactment by the states, the draft version was introduced in the 96th 
Congress as H.R. 1676, and the final version was introduced as H.R. 5976 (both by 
Representative LaFalce). Hearings on the two versions were held, but neither was enacted. 
In October 1985, Attorney General Meese established the Tort Policy Working Group, which 
consisted of representatives of ten federal agencies and the White House. In February 1986, the 
group issued its report: “Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent and 
Policy Implications of the Current Crisis of Insurance Availability and Affordability.” The report 
made eight recommendations, including the elimination of joint and several liability and of the 
collateral source rule, a $100,000 cap on noneconomic damages, and 25% cap on the first 
$100,000 in a lawyer’s contingent fees (see “Glossary” regarding terms used in this sentence). In 
March 1987, the Tort Policy Working Group issued another report: “An Update on Liability 
Crisis.” 
                                                 
1 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
2 See “Options Paper on Product Liability and Accident Compensation Issues,” 43 Federal Register 14612, April 6, 
1978. 
3  Department of Commerce, 43 Federal Register 40438, September 11, 1978. 
4 See 44 Federal Register 2996, January 12, 1979. for the draft version and 44 Federal Register 62714, October 31, 
1979. for the final version. 
ȱȱȱ
ŗȱ
ȱ¢DZȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱ
During the 1980s, in response to the liability insurance “crisis,” many states enacted tort reform 
intended to limit the rights of injured parties. Some states limited the right of the plaintiff to sue 
product sellers other than the manufacturer; some states permitted awards of punitive damages 
only upon proof by “clear and convincing” evidence, or required that a portion of punitive 
damages or on noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering; some states limited or 
eliminated joint and several liability or the collateral source rule; and some enacted a statute of 
repose. (See “Glossary” for an explanation of these terms.) State reforms continued to be enacted 
through the 1990s and to the present day. 
On the federal level, since 1996, when Congress failed to override President Clinton’s veto of 
broad products liability legislation (H.R. 956, 104th Congress), tort reform bills have been less 
ambitious, being aimed generally at protecting defendants who sell particular types of products or 
commit particular types of negligence.5 
Consumer representatives and plaintiffs’ attorneys generally oppose limiting injured parties’ 
rights in product liability suits; they consider the present system necessary to provide incentives 
for the manufacture of safe products and to ensure adequate compensation for injured workers 
and consumers. Insurance companies and product manufacturers, by contrast, hoping to reduce 
the amount currently paid as the result of products liability suits, and seeking national uniformity 
in products liability law, have supported federal products liability reform. 
A federal products liability statute could bring about national uniformity with respect to some 
issues; some proposed legislation, for example, has included a federal statute of limitations or 
federal statute of repose for products liability suits. However, some legislative provisions, such as 
one that establishes a standard of conduct for the award of punitive damages, are necessarily 
subject to varying interpretations by every federal and state court, unless the Supreme Court 
establishes a national interpretation. Even if the Supreme Court does so, such a provision’s 
application to the facts of particular cases may vary among juries. Therefore, the possibility of 
uniformity should not be overestimated. 
	¢ȱ
The extent to which each of the following concepts is applicable in particular products liability 
lawsuits depends upon the relevant state law. 
Alteration of product. A possible contributing cause to an injury that may be performed by a 
plaintiff or a third party, such as a plaintiff’s employer; it may reduce or eliminate a defendant’s 
liability. 
Assumption of risk. A form of contributory fault by a plaintiff; it may reduce or eliminate a 
defendant’s liability. 
                                                 
5 For a list of federal tort reform statues, see CRS Report 95-797, Federal Tort Reform Legislation: Constitutionality 
and Summaries of Selected Statutes, by Henry Cohen and Vanessa K. Burrows. For a list limited to products liability 
statutes, see section below, “Federal Statutes Enacted, 97th-110th Congresses.” 
ȱȱȱ
Řȱ
ȱ¢DZȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱ
Breach of warranty. A basis for liability that permits the defendant to raise certain contract law 
defenses to avoid liability, but does not require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was 
negligent. 
Collateral source. A source, such as an insurance company or governmental entity, that 
compensates an injured party for the injury, and may, through subrogation, be entitled to recover 
such compensation paid out to the injured party. 
Collateral source rule. The rule that a plaintiff’s damages will not be reduced by amounts he 
recovered from sources other than the defendant, such as health insurance benefits. 
Comparative negligence. The rule that plaintiff’s recovery will be reduced in proportion to the 
degree that his own negligence (or other fault) was responsible for his injury. In its modified 
form, recovery is barred if the plaintiff’s responsibility exceeds a specific degree, such as 50%. 
Contributory negligence. Negligence (or other fault) on the part of the plaintiff that is wholly or 
partially responsible for his injury. In a few states, any degree of contributory negligence will 
totally bar recovery. 
Design defect. A defect resulting from a product that, although manufactured as it had been 
designed, was not designed as safely as it should have been. 
Economic damages. Out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the plaintiff, such as medical bills or 
loss of income. 
Failure to warn. A defect consisting of the defendant’s failure to provide adequate warnings or 
instructions regarding the use of its product. 
Government contractor defense. A rule established by the Supreme Court in Boyle v. United 
Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) that enables a defendant whose product complied with 
federal government contract specifications to avoid liability in some cases.  
Government standards defense. A rule in a few states enabling a defendant whose product 
complied with government safety standards to avoid liability or to establish a presumption that its 
product was not defective. 
Joint and several liability. The rule that each defendant who contributes to causing a plaintiff’s 
injury may be held individually liable for the total damages. 
Lawyers’ contingent fees. Fees payable only upon recovery of damages, based upon a 
percentage of the recovery. 
Manufacturing defect. A defect resulting from a product’s not having been manufactured as it 
had been designed. Compare with “Design defect,” supra. 
Market share liability. Liability for the percentage of a plaintiff’s damages equal to the 
defendant’s market share of the injury-causing product; a few cases have held market share 
liability applicable where a plaintiff cannot prove that a particular defendant manufactured the 
injury-causing product. 
ȱȱȱ
řȱ
ȱ¢DZȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱ
Misuse of product. A form of contributory fault by a plaintiff; it may reduce or eliminate a 
defendant’s liability. 
Negligence. Breach of a duty to exercise duty care; it is the traditional non-intentional tort 
standard in cases not based upon strict liability. 
No-fault recovery. Recovery permitted in the absence of fault; it is not the law in any state with 
respect to products liability. If adopted in the product liability context, it would permit recovery in 
the absence not only of negligence (as strict tort liability does), but in the absence of a product 
defect. 
Noneconomic damages. Damages payable for items other than out-of-pocket expenses, such as 
pain and suffering or punitive damages. Statutory caps on noneconomic damages, however, are 
generally distinct from statutory caps on punitive damages. 
Patent danger rule. The rule that a manufacturer is not liable for an injury caused by a design 
defect if the danger should have been obvious to the product user. 
Periodic payments of future damages. Payments by a defendant for a plaintiff’s future expenses 
on a periodic basis rather than in lump sum. 
Post-manufacturing improvements. Improvements in a product’s design that occur after an 
injury and which plaintiffs seek to introduce in court as evidence that an injury-causing product 
was defective. 
Punitive damages. Damages awarded, in addition to economic damages and other noneconomic 
damages, to punish a defendant for willful or wanton conduct. (Also called “exemplary 
damages”). 
Restatement (Second) Torts. A statement of tort law written by legal scholars; section 402A, 
which provides for strict tort liability for injuries caused by defective products, has been adopted 
by most states. On May 20, 1997, the American Law Institute adopted Restatement of the Law 
(3d), Torts: Product Liability, which is intended to replace section 402A. 
State of the art defense. The defense that permits a defendant to avoid liability in a design defect 
case if at the time of manufacture there was no feasible safer design available, or in a failure to 
warn case if at the time of manufacture there was no reasonable way that the defendant could 
have known of the danger he failed to warn against. 
Statute of limitations. A statute specifying the number of years after injury occurs, or is 
discovered, or its cause is discovered, within which suit must be filed. 
Statute of repose. A statute specifying the number of years after a product is first sold or 
distributed within which suit must be filed; it supplements the statute of limitations. 
Manufacturers favor statutes of repose because they preclude recovery when products are old; 
consumers oppose them because they result in suits being barred before injuries even occur. 
Strict tort liability. Liability established if a plaintiff proves that a product defect caused an 
injury; the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant was negligent. 
ȱȱȱ
Śȱ
ȱ¢DZȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱ
Subrogation. The right of a collateral source, such as an insurance company or governmental 
entity, that compensates an injured party, to recover the amount paid to injured party, by taking 
over the injured party’s right to recover from the person who caused the injury. 
Useful life limitation. A period of time set forth by statute after which a product’s useful life is 
deemed over and suit is barred or a presumption that the product was not defective is created; this 
is similar to a statute of repose. 
Workers’ compensation. Statutes in every state providing for limited no-fault compensation 
against employers by workers injured on the job. Receipt of such compensation ordinarily 
precludes from suing his employer; it does not preclude him from suing a product manufacturer. 
ȱȱǰȱşŝȬŗŗŖȱȱ
The 97th Congress enacted P.L. 97-45, the Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981. The 98th 
Congress enacted P.L. 98-193, A Clarification of the Product liability Risk Retention Act of 1981. 
This statute was intended to permit “product manufactures, sellers, and distributors to purchase 
… insurance on a group basis or to self-insure through insurance cooperatives called ‘risk 
retention groups.’”6 Federal legislation was necessary to accomplish this because many states 
have laws that would make the formation of such groups impractical on an interstate basis. The 
statute therefore exempts purchasing groups and risk retention groups from most regulation by 
states other than ones in which they are chartered. 
The 99th Congress enacted the Risk Retention Amendments of 1986, P.L. 99-563, which 
expanded the scope of Products Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981 to enable risk retention 
groups and purchasing groups to provide all types of liability insurance, not only products 
liability insurance. It renamed the act the Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986.7 
The 99th Congress also enacted the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.8 As amended, 
the act requires most persons suffering vaccine-related injuries, prior to filing a tort action, to file 
a claim in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims for no-fault compensation through the National 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program established by the act. Under the Program, compensation 
for pain and suffering is limited to $250,000. A party not satisfied with the compensation awarded 
under the Program may file a tort action under state law, but subject to some limitations. Although 
recovery under the Program is limited, it was hoped that “the relative certainty and generosity of 
the system’s awards will divert a significant number of potential plaintiffs from litigation.”9 
On August 17, 1994, the President signed into law the General Aviation Revitalization Act, P.L. 
103-298, which established an 18 year statute of repose (see “Glossary”) for planes with fewer 
than 20 seats that are not used in scheduled service.10 
                                                 
6 S. Rep. No. 97-192 (1981). 
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901 et seq. 
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 et seq. 
9 H. Rep. No. 99-908, pt. 1, at 13 (1986). 
10 49 U.S.C. § 40101. 
ȱȱȱ
śȱ
ȱ¢DZȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱ
The 104th Congress passed a products liability bill, H.R. 956, but failed to override President 
Clinton’s veto of it. 
The 104th Congress also enacted the Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act (P.L. 104-
210), which limits civil liability for a person or gleaner (“a person who harvests for free 
distribution to the needy”), except in cases of gross negligence or intentional misconduct, who 
donates apparently wholesome food or an apparently fit grocery product “in good faith to a non-
profit organization for ultimate distribution to needy individuals.” It also limits liability of the 
nonprofit organization that receives the donation, except in cases of gross negligence or 
intentional misconduct. 
The 105th Congress enacted H.R. 872, the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-
230), which limits the products liability under state law of biomaterials suppliers, which it defines 
as an entity that supplies a component part or raw materials for use in the manufacture of an 
implant. 
The 106th Congress enacted H.R. 775, the Y2K Act (P.L. 106-37), which limits contractual and 
tort liability under state law in suits, other than those for personal injury or wrongful death, “in 
which the plaintiff’s alleged harm or injury arises from or is related to an actual or potential Y2K 
failure….” 
The 107th Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), three sections of 
which limit the products liability of various defendants; section 304 immunizes manufacturers 
and administrators of smallpox vaccine from liability, section 863 limits the liability of sellers of 
anti-terrorism technology, and section 1714-1717 limit the liability of manufacturers and 
administrators of the components and ingredients of vaccines.11 
The 108th Congress enacted P.L. 108-7, Division L., § 102, of which repealed §§ 1714-17 of P.L. 
107-296 (2002). 
The 109th Congress enacted the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (P.L. 109-92). It 
prohibits “a civil action or proceeding or an administrative proceeding,” except in six 
circumstances, against a manufacturer or seller of a firearm or ammunition, or a trade association, 
for damages “resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse” of a firearm or ammunition. 
Section 5 of P.L. 109-92 is a separate law called the Child Safety Lock Act of 2005. With 
exception, it requires a “secure gun storage or safety device” (as defined in 18 U.S.C. 
§921(a)(34)) on handguns, and provides that a person who has lawful possession and control of a 
handgun, and who uses such a device, is entitled to the same immunity as granted to gun 
manufacturers, sellers, and trade associations by P.L. 109-92.12 
The 109th Congress also enacted the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (P.L. 
109-148). Division C limits liability with respect to pandemic flue and other public health 
countermeasures upon a declaration by the Secretary of Health and Human Services of a public 
health emergency or the credible risk of such emergency. Victims could, in lieu of suing, accept 
                                                 
11 See CRS Report RL31649, Homeland Security Act of 2002: Tort Liability Provisions, by Henry Cohen. 
12 See CRS Report RS22074, Limiting Tort Liability of Gun Manufacturers and Gun Sellers: Legal Analysis of P.L. 
109-92 (2005), by Henry Cohen. 
ȱȱȱ
Ŝȱ
ȱ¢DZȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱ
payment under a new “Covered Countermeasure Process Fund,” if Congress appropriates money 
for this fund.13 
Although many bills were introduced in the 110th Congress that would affect various aspects of 
products liability law, none were enacted. 
ȱȱ
In the 111th Congress, thus far, one piece of legislation pertaining to product liability has been 
introduced—S. 45. This bill is patterned on legislation introduced in the previous two Congresses. 
Following the synopsis of S. 45 is a summary of selected bills that have been introduced many 
times, most recently in the 110th Congress. Some of these bills may be reintroduced in the 111th 
Congress. 
ŗŗŗȱȱ
S. 45 (Ensign) Medical Care Access Protection Act of 2009 (MCAP Act). Introduced January 
6, 2009. Referred to Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. With respect 
to health care liability claims concerning the provision of health care goods or services, S. 45, 
with some exceptions, would create a three-year statute of limitations from “the date of the 
manifestation of injury” or one-year statute of limitations from the date the plaintiff “discovers, or 
… should have discovered, the injury, whichever [date] occurs first.” The bill would limit liability 
of health care providers for injuries caused not only by medical malpractice, but also by defective 
medical products (e.g., drugs, medical devices). Health care providers who prescribe or dispense 
Food and Drug Administration-approved prescriptions, drugs, biologic products, or medical 
devices for approved indications could not be named as a party to a product liability suit and 
would not be liable in a class action against the manufacturer, distributor, or product seller. The 
bill would impose a cap on noneconomic damages of $250,000 or a total of $500,000 in the event 
that noneconomic damages were awarded against multiple health care institutions, and a cap on 
punitive damages of the greater of $250,000 or twice the economic damages, and would set 
criteria for awarding punitive damages. In addition, the bill would prevent the discounting of an 
award for future noneconomic damages to present value, set limits on contingent fees for 
attorneys representing health care claimants, and establish qualifications for certain expert 
witnesses. S. 45 also would allow the introduction of evidence of collateral source payments, and, 
with exceptions, would reduce recovery by the amount of collateral source benefits to which the 
plaintiff is entitled. Joint and several liability would be eliminated, and parties would only be 
liable for their portion of the damages awarded. 
ȱȱȱȱŗŗŖȱȱ
H.R. 961 (Shuster) The Respirator Access Assurance Act of 2007. H.R. 961 would have 
shielded manufacturers and sellers of respirators from liability for defective design or warning in 
actions involving respirators that were approved by National Institute on Occupational Safety and 
                                                 
13 See CRS Report RS22327, Pandemic Flu and Medical Biodefense Countermeasure Liability Limitation, by Henry 
Cohen and Vanessa K. Burrows. 
ȱȱȱ
ŝȱ
ȱ¢DZȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱ
Health (NIOSH) and manufactured in compliance with NIOSH design and labeling standards. 
This bill was also introduced in the 109th Congress. 
H.R. 989 (Boren) Innocent Sellers Fairness Act. Under this bill, a product seller would not 
have been liable for damages arising out of an accident unless it had been the manufacturer, had 
participated in the design or installation of the product, or had “altered, modified, or expressly 
warranted the product in a manner not authorized by the manufacturer.” This bill was also 
introduced in the 109th Congress. 
H.R. 2067 (Reichert) Good Samaritan Protection for Construction, Architectural, and 
Engineering Volunteers Act. The bill would have limited liability for entities and employees, 
except in cases of gross negligence or willful misconduct, for damages for harm caused by a 
construction, architectural, or engineering entity, or an employee of such entity, if the entity or 
employee provided emergency construction, architectural, or engineering assistance on a 
voluntary basis, in good faith, and without expectation of compensation. The term “construction 
assistance” in this bill included equipment. The bill also would have also preempted inconsistent 
state laws, except that the bill would not have preclude states from providing a higher amount of 
protection from liability or from providing reimbursement for costs or expenses as authorized by 
state or local law. This bill was also introduced in the 109th Congress. 
H.R. 2183 (Boren) Commonsense Consumption Act of 2007. This bill would have prohibited a 
person from bringing suits in federal or state court against a manufacturer, marketer, distributor, 
advertiser, or seller of food, or a trade association, alleging that food caused weight gain, obesity, 
or a health condition caused or associated with weight gain or obesity. S. 1323 introduced in the 
110th was identical to this bill. This bill was also introduced in the 108th and 109th Congresses. 
H.R. 2580 (Gingery) Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) 
Act of 2007. This bill would have provided a cap noneconomic and punitive damages and 
attorneys’ contingent fees, and would have imposed other tort reforms on medical malpractice 
suits and medical products liability suits against manufacturers, distributors, suppliers, marketers, 
promoters, or sellers of medical products. This bill was also introduced in the 108th and 109th 
Congresses. 
H.R. 4936 (Ackerman) Antifreeze Bittering Act of 2007. This bill would have limited the 
liability of manufacturers, distributors, recyclers, or sellers of engine coolant or antifreeze who 
are in compliance with the requirements of the act for personal and property loss or damage to the 
environment that results from the inclusion of denatonium benzoate in any coolant or antifreeze. 
This bill was also introduced in the 108th and 109th Congresses. 
S. 328 (Menendez) Ensuring Implementation of the 9/11 Commission Report Act. Section 
117 of the bill would have limited civil liability for the donation of fire control or fire rescue 
equipment to volunteer fire companies, except in cases of gross negligence or intentional 
misconduct or cases in which the donor was the manufacturer of the equipment. The bill would 
have also preempted inconsistent state laws. This kind of bill has been introduced in the 106th- 
109th Congresses generally under the title of Good Samaritan Volunteer Firefighting Assistance 
Act. 
ȱȱȱ
Şȱ
ȱ¢DZȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱ
ȱȱȱ
American Enterprise Institute. Rollover Economics: Arbitrary and Capricious Product Liability 
Regimes, by Ted Frank. http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070104_LiabilityOutlookPosted_g.pdf 
Economic Policy Institute. The Frivolous Case for Tort Law Change: Opponents of the Legal 
System Exaggerate Its Costs, Ignore Its Benefits, by Lawrence Chimerine and Ross Eisenbrey. 
Washington, D.C., 2005. http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/bp157 
Economic Policy Institute. Tort Costs and the Economy: Myths, Exaggerations, and Propaganda, 
by Ross Eisenbrey. Washington, D.C., 2006. http://www.epi.org/briefingpapers/174/bp174.pdf 
Guy Carpenter & Co., Inc., Recent Legislative and Judicial Trends Affecting the U.S. Casualty 
Industry, 2005. http://www.guycarp.com/portal/extranet/pdf/GCPub/
Guy_Carpenter_Casualty_Legislative_Report_121605.pdf?vid=1 
Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy. The U.S. Tort Liability Index: 2006 Report, by 
Lawrence J. McQuillan and Hovannes Abramyan. San Francisco, CA, 2006. 
http://www.pacificresearch.org/pub/sab/entrep/2006/Tort_Reform_06.pdf 
Public Citizen’s Congress Watch. Federal asbestos legislation: The winners are ... Washington, 
D.C., May 2005. http://www.citizen.org/documents/master%20report.pdf 
Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice. Asbestos Litigation, by Stephen J. Carroll, Deborah 
Hensler, et al. Santa Monica, CA, 2005. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/
RAND_MG162.sum.pdf 
Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice. Product Liability and the Business Sector. Santa 
Monica, CA, 1989. See http://www.rand.org/icj/pubs/liability.html 
Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice. What We Know and Don’t Know About Product 
Liability. Santa Monica, CA, 1993. See http://www.rand.org/icj/pubs/liability.html 
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin. U.S. Tort Costs: 2006 Update on U.S. Tort Cost Trends. 
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=TILL/USA/2006/200611/
Tort_2006_FINAL.pdf 
U.S. Congressional Budget Office, The Economics of U.S. Tort Liability: A Primer. Washington, 
D.C., 2003. http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/46xx/doc4641/10-22-TortReform-Study.pdf 
U.S. Council of Economic Advisors. Who Pays for Tort Liability Claims?: An Economic Analysis 
of the U.S. Tort Liability System (April 2002). http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/
tortliabilitysystem_apr02.pdf 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Domestic Commerce. Product liability insurance: 
Assessment of related problems and issues; staff study. Washington, March 1976. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Interagency Task Force on Product Liability. Briefing report, 
Washington, January 1977; Final report, Washington, November 1977. 
ȱȱȱ
şȱ
ȱ¢DZȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱ
U.S. Department of Commerce. Interagency Task Force on Product Liability. Draft uniform 
product liability law (with analysis). Federal Register, vol. 44, January 12, 1979, p. 2996. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Interagency Task Force on Product Liability. Final report of the 
insurance study. 1 vol. Washington, 1977. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Interagency Task Force on Product Liability. Final report of the 
legal study. 7 vol. Washington, 1977. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Interagency Task Force on Product Liability. Final report of the 
industry study. 2 vol. Washington, 1977. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Interagency Task Force on Product Liability. Model Uniform 
Product Liability Act (with analysis). Federal Register, vol. 44, October 31, 1979, p. 62714. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Interagency Task Force on Product Liability. Options paper on 
product liability and accident compensation issues. Federal Register, vol. 43, April 6, 1978, p. 
14612. 
U.S. General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office). Product Liability: 
Insurance rate levels and claim payments during the 1970s and 1980s. Washington, D.C., 1981. 
(GAO/HRD-91-108) http://archive.gao.gov/d19t9/144815.pdf 
U.S. General Accounting Office (now the GAO). Product Liability: Extent of “litigation 
explosion” in Federal courts questioned. Washington, D.C., January 28, 1988. (GAO/HRD-88 
36BR) http://archive.gao.gov/d30t5/135159.pdf 
U.S. General Accounting Office (now the GAO). Product liability: Verdicts and case resolutions 
in five states. Washington, D.C., 1989. (GAO/HRD-89-99) http://archive.gao.gov/d26t7/
140004.pdf 
ȱȱȱ
CRS Report RL32286, Asbestos Litigation: Prospects for Legislative Resolution, by Edward 
Rappaport. 
CRS Report RS21540, Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2003 (S. 1125, 108th 
Congress), by Henry Cohen. 
CRS Report RS21815, Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2004 (S. 2290, 108th 
Congress), by Henry Cohen. 
CRS Report RS22081, S. 852: The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, by Henry 
Cohen and Vanessa K. Burrows. 
CRS Report RS22088, Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005 (H.R. 1360, 109th 
Congress), by Henry Cohen and Nathan Brooks. 
ȱȱȱ
ŗŖȱ
ȱ¢DZȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱ
CRS Report 95-797, Federal Tort Reform Legislation: Constitutionality and Summaries of 
Selected Statutes, by Henry Cohen and Vanessa K. Burrows. 
CRS Report RL31649, Homeland Security Act of 2002: Tort Liability Provisions, by Henry 
Cohen. 
CRS Report RS21931, Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, by Henry Cohen and Kenneth R. 
Thomas 
CRS Report RL32176, The Liability Risk Retention Act: Background, Issues, and Current 
Legislation, by Baird Webel. 
CRS Report RS22074, Limiting Tort Liability of Gun Manufacturers and Gun Sellers: Legal 
Analysis of P.L. 109-92 (2005), by Henry Cohen. 
CRS Report RS22054, Medical Malpractice Liability Reform: H.R. 5, 109th Congress, by Henry 
Cohen. 
CRS Report RS22075, Medical Malpractice Liability Reform: S. 354, 109th Congress, by Henry 
Cohen. 
CRS Report RS22327, Pandemic Flu and Medical Biodefense Countermeasure Liability 
Limitation, by Henry Cohen and Vanessa K. Burrows. 
CRS Report RL33927, Selected Federal Compensation Programs for Physical Injury or Death, 
coordinated by Sarah A. Lister. 
CRS Report RL32560, Selected Products Liability Issues: A 50-State Survey, by Henry Cohen.  
 
ȱȱȱ
 
Vivian S. Chu 
   
Legislative Attorney 
vchu@crs.loc.gov, 7-4576 
 
 
 ȱ
Henry Cohen, Legislative Attorney, original author of RL33423 Products Liability: A Legal Overview. 
 
 
 
 
ȱȱȱ
ŗŗȱ