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Pr
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The Islamic Republic of Iran, a resource-rich and labor-rich country in the Middle East, is a
central focus of U.S. national security policy. The United States asserts that Iran is a state sponsor
of terrorism and that Iran’s uranium enrichment activities are for the development of nuclear
weapons. To the extent that U.S. sanctions and other efforts to change Iranian state policy target
aspects of Iran’s economy as a means of influence, it is important to evaluate Iran’s economic
structure, strengths, and vulnerabilities.
Since 2000, Iran has enjoyed broad-based economic growth. However, strong economic
performance has been hindered by high levels of inflation and unemployment and low levels of
foreign investment. Some contend that President Ahmadinejad’s expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies have worsened unemployment, inflation, and poverty in Iran.
Iran has long been subject to U.S. economic sanctions, and more recently, to United Nations
sanctions, over its uranium enrichment program and purported support for terror activities. Such
sanctions are believed by many analysts to contribute to Iran’s growing international trade and
financial isolation.
Iran’s economy is highly dependent on the production and export of crude oil to finance
government spending, and consequently is vulnerable to fluctuations in international oil prices.
Although Iran has vast petroleum reserves, the country lacks adequate refining capacity and is
highly dependent on gasoline imports to meet domestic energy needs. To reduce this dependency,
the country is seeking foreign investment to develop its petroleum sector. While some deals have
been finalized, reputational and financial risks may have limited other foreign companies’
willingness to finalize deals.
While Iran-U.S. economic relations are limited, the United States has a key interest in Iran’s
relations with other countries. As some European countries have curbed trade and investment
dealings with Iran, other countries, such as China and Russia, have emerged as increasingly
important economic partners. Iran also has focused more heavily on regional trade opportunities,
such as with the United Arab Emirates.
High oil prices have increased Iran’s leverage in dealing with international issues, but the
country’s dependence on oil and other weak spots in the economy have to come to light by the
2008 international financial crisis, which may portend a slowing down of Iran’s economy.
Members of Congress are divided about the proper course of action in respect to Iran. Some
advocate a hard line, while others contend that sanctions are ineffective at promoting policy
change in Iran and hurt the U.S. economy. In the 110th Congress, several bills were introduced
that reflect both perspectives. Policies toward Iran likely will remain a key issue for the 111th
Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Historical Context............................................................................................................................ 2
Overview of Iran’s Economy........................................................................................................... 4
Economic Policy and Reform Efforts.............................................................................................. 5
Iran and the Recent Global Economic Turndown ........................................................................... 7
Economic Stakeholders ................................................................................................................... 8
Bonyads..................................................................................................................................... 8
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.......................................................................................... 9
Private Sector .......................................................................................................................... 10
Economic Sectors ...........................................................................................................................11
Oil and Natural Gas................................................................................................................. 12
Agriculture .............................................................................................................................. 13
Manufacturing ......................................................................................................................... 13
Steel .................................................................................................................................. 13
Automotives...................................................................................................................... 13
Food Products ................................................................................................................... 14
Petrochemicals .................................................................................................................. 14
Financial Sector....................................................................................................................... 14
Tehran Stock Exchange..................................................................................................... 15
Financial Sanctions ........................................................................................................... 16
Money Laundering............................................................................................................ 17
Informal Finance Sector.................................................................................................... 18
International Trade ........................................................................................................................ 18
Major Goods Traded ............................................................................................................... 18
Importance of Oil Exports to Iran’s Economy .................................................................. 19
Iran’s Dependence on Gasoline Imports ........................................................................... 20
Key Trading Partners............................................................................................................... 20
United Arab Emirates and Transshipment Trade .............................................................. 23
U.S.-Iranian Trade................................................................................................................... 24
International Sanctions and International Trade...................................................................... 25
Trade Liberalization ................................................................................................................ 26
International Financial Flows ........................................................................................................ 27
Foreign Exchange Reserves .................................................................................................... 27
Foreign Investment in Iran’s Economy ................................................................................... 28
International Loans and Assistance ......................................................................................... 30
World Bank ....................................................................................................................... 30
Bilateral Official Development Assistance ....................................................................... 31
Congressional Issues and Options ................................................................................................. 32
Unilateral and Multilateral Approaches to Sanctions.............................................................. 32
Impact of Sanctions on Iran’s Economy and Policy................................................................ 33
Impact of Sanctions on U.S. Economy ................................................................................... 34
Action in the 110th Congress ................................................................................................... 34
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Figure 1. Iran’s Exports to Select Countries, FY2000-FY2007 .................................................... 22
Figure 2. Iran’s Imports From Select Countries, FY2000-FY2007............................................... 22
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Table 1. Iran Country Overview ...................................................................................................... 1
Table 2. Iran’s Average Annual Real GDP Growth: 2000-2009 ...................................................... 4
Table 3. Iran Merchandise Trade, FY2004-FY2007...................................................................... 19
Table 4. Major Export Markets and Sources of Imports for Iran, FY2007 ................................... 21
Table 5. U.S.-Iranian Trade, FY2000-FY2007 .............................................................................. 24
Table 6. Recent International Energy Deals Negotiated by Iran ................................................... 29
Table 7. Net ODA to Iran from OECD DAC Members, 2001-2006 ............................................. 31
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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 35
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The Islamic Republic of Iran is a central focus of U.S. national security policy. The United States
has designated the Iranian government as a state sponsor of terrorism. The Administration’s 2006
U.S. National Security Strategy argues that the United States “may face no greater challenge from
a single country than from Iran.”1 The United States contends that Iran is a destabilizing force in
the Middle East and expresses concern about its growing influence in the region and
internationally. The Bush Administration has accused Iran of arming Shiite militias in Iraq,
providing support to Hezbollah and Hamas, and inflaming sectarian strife in the Middle East. The
Administration also has decried Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, which it alleges are being
used to develop nuclear weapons.
This report provides a general overview of Iran’s economy, addresses related U.S. policy
concerns, and discusses policy options for Congress. The purpose of this report is two-fold. First,
it provides insight into important macroeconomic trends, policy reforms and objectives, key
economic sectors, international trade patterns, and sources of foreign exchange.2 Second, in the
context of U.S. economic sanctions imposed for national security and foreign policy reasons, it
evaluates Iran’s economic structure, strengths, and vulnerabilities and discusses issues and
options for Congress.
Iran boasts the word’s third largest petroleum reserves, following Saudi Arabia and Canada, and
the second largest gas reserves, after Russia. Iran also has the Middle East and North Africa
region’s second largest economy, after Saudi Arabia, and the second largest population, after
Egypt (see Table 1). Nevertheless, Iran faces a number of significant economic challenges.
Internal challenges include dependence on oil export revenues to finance government spending
and vulnerability to oil price fluctuations; dependence on gasoline imports to meet domestic
energy needs; high inflation, unemployment levels, and poverty levels; reported domestic
economic mismanagement; and widespread economic inefficiency. External challenges include
U.S. and United Nations (U.N.) sanctions and other forms of U.S.-led financial pressure and the
fallout from the recent global economic turndown. This report will be updated as warranted by
events.
Table 1. Iran Country Overview
Indicator Description
Land Area
1.6 million square kilometers (slightly larger than Alaska) (CIA)
Population
65.9 million (CIA)
Median Age
26.4 years (CIA, July 2008 estimate)
Head of State
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, elected as President in August 2005
Capital Tehran
1 “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America—2006,” March 2006.
2 Economic data for this report are drawn from data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As a member of the
IMF, Iran reports on its economy to the IMF. The economic data are limited in their means of independent verification
by the IMF. In addition, this report relies on data from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and Global Insights,
international economic research and forecasting agencies. U.S. government sources of data include the Central
Intelligence Agency for general economic indicators and the Census Bureau for trade data.
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Indicator Description
Life Expectancy at Birth
70.9 years (CIA, 2008 estimate)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
$768 billion (purchasing power parity) (EIU FY2007);
$724 billion (real GDP translated into U.S. dollars using PPP exchange rate in
2005) (EIU, FY2007 estimate)
GDP Real Growth Rate
7.8% (EIU, FY2007 estimate)
GDP Per Capita
$10,781 (EIU, FY2007 estimate)
GDP Composition at Factor Cost
Oil and gas, 27%; industry, 17%; services, 46%; agriculture, 10% (IMF, 2008)
(Current Prices)
Unemployment Rate
12%, reported by Iranian government (CIA, 2007 estimate)
Population Below Poverty Line
18% (CIA, 2007 estimate)
Inflation Rate (Consumer Prices)
17.1% (EIU, FY2007)
Exports
$91 billion (IMF, FY2007)
Export Commodities
Petroleum, chemical and petrochemical products, fruits and nuts, carpets
(CIA)
Imports
$55 billion (IMF, FY2007)
Import Commodities
Industrial raw materials and intermediate goods, capital goods, foodstuff and
other consumer goods, technical services (CIA)
Sources: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Factbook; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics
Note: The Iranian fiscal year runs from March 21st to March 20th.
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The 1979 Islamic revolution changed Iran’s modern political and economic history. Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini and his supporters transformed Iran into an Islamic state with a public sector-
dominated economy that was increasingly internationally isolated. With the Iran-Iraq war (1980-
1988), Iran faced negative rates of real economic growth, declines in oil production and revenue,
and high levels of inflation. This represented a reversal of economic prosperity in 1960s and
1970s, during which Iran’s economy experienced real economic growth rates nearing 10%, one of
the world’s highest, along with growth in per capita income and low inflation levels.3
During the 1990s, Iran strived to rebuild war-torn local production, attract international
investment, enhance foreign relations, liberalize trade, and, more recently, redistribute wealth
under a series of a five-year economic plans. Post-war economic growth included recovery in oil
output, but the country faced a severe economic downturn in the latter part of the decade due to a
drop in international oil prices.4
3 Abdelali Jbili, Vitali Kramarenko, and José Bailén, “Islamic Republic of Iran: Managing the Transition to a Market
Economy,” IMF, 2007, pp.1-5.
4 Ibid.
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Iran is the second largest oil producer in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). The country’s oil and gas reserves rank among the world’s largest. Iran’s economy is
largely dependent on oil and is highly susceptible to oil price shocks.
Since the 1979 U.S. embassy hostage crisis in Tehran, Iran has been subject to various U.S.
economic sanctions. Such actions have been motivated over time by concerns regarding Iran’s
nuclear program and support for terrorist organizations. More recently, the United States
increasingly has focused on targeted financial measures to isolate Iran from the U.S. financial and
commercial system. Sanctions have been imposed in order to change the Iranian government’s
policies with respect to its nuclear program and support to terrorist organizations. To that end, the
United States has imposed sanctions to curtail the development of Iran’s petroleum sector and
constrain Iran’s financial resources in a way that motivates policy change in Iran. The United
States also has applied diplomatic pressure on foreign countries and companies to limit business
with Iran.5 In addition to the United States, some European Union states and other countries have
imposed sanctions on Iran in line with moves by the United Nations (U.N.).
The United States also has pushed for stronger international sanctions against Iran in the U.N.
Most recently, in March 2008, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a third round
of sanctions against Iran through Resolution 1803, calling for the inspection of suspicious
international shipping to and from Iran that are suspected of carrying prohibited goods. It
encourages greater monitoring of named Iranian financial institutions, travel bans for named
Iranians, and freezes of additional assets related to Iran’s nuclear program.
In June 2008, the five permanent members of the UNSC (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the
United States) and Germany offered to suspend further sanctions against Iran if Iran agreed to halt
its uranium enrichment program and to begin negotiations on constraints of its nuclear activity.6
The six countries considered Iran’s response unclear, and in August 2008, they agreed to pursue a
fourth round of U.N. sanctions against Iran.7
Iran has opposed U.S. and U.N. sanctions vehemently. The country has long maintained that the
purpose of its uranium enrichment program is to produce fuel for nuclear power reactors, rather
than fissile material for nuclear weapons. The government asserts its right to develop nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes. Iran increasingly has questioned the justification of the sanctions in
light of some recent positive reports on its nuclear activities. A November 2007 U.S. National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assesses that Iran stopped its nuclear activities for weapons
proliferation in 2003.8 Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed in August
2007 on a work program that would clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s nuclear
program. Iran has clarified some questions, but a May 2008 report by the IAEA raised major new
questions about Iran’s nuclear intentions.9
5 For more information on U.S. sanctions against Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy
Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
6 “U.S. Pushes for Tighter United Nations Sanctions Against Iran,” The Oil Daily, August 7, 2008.
7 Jonathan S. Landay, “U.S., 5 other nations to seek tougher sanctions against Iran,” The Anniston Star, August 5, 2008.
8 NIE, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” November 2007, accessible at
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf.
9 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council 1737 (2006),
1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, May 26, 2008,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-15.pdf.
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Since FY2000, Iran’s economy has experienced real economic growth rates of about 6.4% on
average annually.10 The annual change in real GDP reached a high of 7.8% in FY2007 (see Table
2). Recent economic growth has been driven by government spending on priority sectors,
expansionary monetary and fiscal economic policies, increased growth in credit, and private
consumption. Despite high international oil prices, the contribution of the oil and gas sector to
economic growth has been more modest; real oil and gas GDP growth was estimated to be 1% in
FY2007. The oil economy has been faced with low levels of production and inadequate
investment.11 U.S. and UN sanctions levied against Iran, along with the poor domestic business
environment, may contribute to low levels of investment. Iran’s economic growth is expected to
slow in the coming months, owing to the decline in international oil prices in late 2008, domestic
economic mismanagement, and limited oil revenue savings to weather the recent global economic
turndown.12
Table 2. Iran’s Average Annual Real GDP Growth: 2000-2009
Fiscal Year
Average Annual Growth (%)
2000 5.1
2001 3.7
2002 7.5
2003 7.1
2004 5.1
2005 4.7
2006 5.8
2007 7.8
2008 (estimate)
6.5
2009 (forecast)
3.5
Source: Economic Intelligence Unit (derived from World Bank, World Development Indicators).
Iran’s economic growth has been hampered by consistently double-digit rates of inflation.
Although high inflation is widespread among the oil-exporting countries in the Middle East and
Central Asia, Iran has one of the highest.13 Iran’s average Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation
reached 17.1% in FY2007 and is projected to grow to 28.0% for FY2008.14 By some estimates,
Iran’s inflation level is over 30% presently.15 Iranians struggle with the rising cost of basic foods,
such as rice, chicken, and eggs, and housing prices,16 which have eroded real wages. The poor are
10 Iran’s fiscal year runs from March 21st to March 20th.
11 Ibid.
12 Global Insight, “Iran Country Report,” updated December 16, 2008.
13 IMF, “Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia,” World Economic and Financial Surveys,
October 2008, p. 41.
14 EIU Country Data.
15 “Oil falls pile pressure on Tehran,” Middle East Economic Digest, December 5, 2008.
16 Anne Penketh, “Iran enters new year in sombre mood as economic crisis bites,” The Independent, March 24, 2008.
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hit hardest by inflation. It is the poor, mainly from rural areas, who supported President
Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential election. Support for Ahmadinejad weakened marginally
during the March 14, 2008 parliamentary elections, despite Iran’s economic difficulties.
Domestic factors contributing to the rise in inflation include expansionary government economic
policies and growing consumption demands. External factors include international sanctions
against Iran and rising international food and energy import prices.17 Inflation levels have been
associated with Ahmadinejad’s efforts to curb banking interest rates for loans to sub-inflation
levels. The Central Bank has opposed these hikes. Inflation levels are expected to ease in the
coming months due to the decline in international prices for oil and other commodities.
The unemployment rate remains high, reaching 12.1% in FY2007.18 Some observers contend that
the unemployment rate is higher than figures reported by the Iranian government. At least one-
fifth of Iranians lived below the poverty line in 2002.19 Iran has a young population20 and each
year, about 750,000 Iranians enter the labor market for the first time, placing pressure on the
government to generate new jobs.21 The emigration of young skilled and educated people
continues to pose a problem for Iran. The IMF reports that Iran has the highest “brain drain” rate
in the world.22
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Over the past few decades, Iran has engaged in a series of five-year economic plans in order to
shift its state-dominated economy into an economy that is market-oriented, private sector-led, and
economically diversified. Reform efforts have experienced resistance from various elements of
Iran’s political establishment.
Significant strides toward trade liberalization, economic diversification, and privatization took
place under the Khatemi administration (1997-2005). The government introduced some structural
reforms such as tax policy changes and adoption of new foreign investment laws to promote
Iran’s global market integration and attract investment. Iran shifted to a unified managed float
exchange rate system in March 2002.23 At various times previously, Iran has had different
combinations of exchange rates, including official, export, parallel market, and Tehran stock
market versions. The exchange rate reform is considered to have improved Iran’s trading
environment and to have enhanced public sector transparency modestly.24
President Ahmadinejad has taken a more populist approach with his economic policies, with
promises of “bringing the oil money to people’s tables” when he took office in 2005. Some critics
17 Ibid, p. 21.
18 IMF, “Islamic Republic of Iran: 2008 Article IV Consultation ,” IMF Country Report No. 08/284, August 2008.
19 EIU, “Iran: Country Profile 2007,” p. 33.
20 About 30% of the population estimated to be under age 15 and less than 5% above age 64 in 2004.
21 EIU, “Iran: Country Profile 2007,” p. 33.
22 Anne Penketh, “Iran enters new year in sombre mood as economic crisis bites,” The Independent, March 24, 2008.
23 Abdelali Jbili, Vitali Kramarenko, and José Bailénm, “Islamic Republic of Iran: Managing the Transition to a Market
Economy,” IMF, 2007.
24 EIU, “Iran rank: Macroeconomic risk,” January 22, 2008.
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maintain that policies under President Ahmadinejad have been a major contributor to budget
deficits and are ineffective tools for combating inflation, unemployment, and poverty.25
In line with Ahmadinejad’s populist agenda, fiscal policy has been expansionary. The government
provides extensive public subsidies on gasoline, food, and housing. Energy subsidies alone
represent about 12% of Iran’s GDP. Some observers estimate total subsidies to reach over 25% of
GDP. When including implicit subsidies, the government’s spending on subsidies may be even
higher. In addition to subsidies, President Ahmadinejad has provided cash handouts to the poor.
Subsidies and cash handouts are considered by many to be un-targeted and ineffective at helping
the poor. The IMF has encouraged Iran to reduce its subsidies.26
Monetary policy also has been expansionary under Ahmadinejad. The government has provided
low-interest loans for agriculture, tourism, and industry and has instituted loan forgiveness
policies. Other activities include the creation of a number of social programs to assist farmer and
rural residents.27 Ahmadinejad’s cabinet established the $1.3 billion Imam Reza Mehr Fund
(Imam Reza Compassion Fund) to assist youth with marriage, housing, and education in 2006.28
As in other Middle Eastern countries, the rising cost of marriage is financially prohibitive to
many young Iranians. Interest-free loans are available to youth for marriage through the fund.
Some economists contend that Ahmadinejad’s efforts to lower the interest rate have led to
excessive liquidity and inflation.29
The government has used oil export revenues from the Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF) to support
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. The OSF was created by Iran’s Central Bank, the
Bank Markazi, in 2001 to store surplus oil revenue and to smooth economic vulnerabilities
associated with oil price fluctuations.30 Iran has been drawing down on its OSF to finance
discretionary spending, such as for public subsidies, cash handouts to the poor, and low-interest
loans. Of primary concern to the United States and the international community is the purported
use of oil export revenues to finance Iran’s nuclear program and alleged support for terrorist
groups.
Economic concerns continued to erode President Ahmadinejad’s political support base in the
weeks before the March 2008 parliamentary elections.31 Ahmadinejad’s party appeared to emerge
from the elections with significant continued support, but some allege that this is because many
reformist candidates were disqualified from running. Others say that Ahmadinejad’s faction
successfully painted Iran’s economic difficulties as caused by U.S. pressure. Presidential elections
25 Fredrik Dahl, “Iranians worry about high food prices before vote,” Reuters, March 6, 2008.
26 IMF Country Report No. 07/100, “Islamic Republic of Iran: 2006 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report; Staff
Statement; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for
the Islamic Republic of Iran,” March 2007, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07100.pdf.
27 Gareth Smyth, “Middle East: Iran cuts farm lending rate in populist ‘social justice’ move,” Financial Times,
November 15, 2005. Najmeh Bozorgmehr and Roula Khalaf, “World News—Iran: Bank chief takes a realistic tack,”
Financial Times, March 6, 2008.
28 Najmeh Bozorgmehr and Gareth Smyth, “Coping with the rising cost of marriage, Iranian-style: The new president is
to set up a fund to deal with rising expectations of the good life,” Financial Times, November 8, 2005.
29 EIU, “Iran: Monetary shrinkage,” April 1, 2008.
30 “Iran: Ahmadi-Nejad populism damages economy,” Oxford Analytica, February 19, 2008.
31 EIU, “Business outlook: Iran,” March 1, 2008.
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are planned for March 2009, and while Ahmadinejad is favored to win, his position is weakening,
in part because of economic concerns.32
Analysts debate the extent to which Iran’s economic policies are a result of poor decisions by the
Iranian government and sub-optimal choices taken by the government in response to U.S. and
international sanctions. Some economists believe that the sanctions augment the government’s
tendency toward state-led rather than private sector-oriented market policies.33
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The recent global economic turndown has placed downward pressure on international oil prices.
Given that oil exports account for the bulk of Iran’s exports and government revenue, the
economic downturn is expected to lead to slower economic growth, with annual growth in GDP
expected to decline from an estimated 6.5% in FY2008 to a forecasted 3.5% in FY2009.34 The
economic downturn also may lead to higher levels of unemployment and a reduction in foreign
exchange reserves for Iran. On the upside, lower oil prices may ease inflationary pressures. In a
reversal of previous public stances, in December 2008, Ahmadinejad admitted for the first time
that the decline in international oil prices will have a negative effect on Iran’s economy.35
While estimates vary about the size of the Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF), many observers express
concern that there are no longer sufficient funds in the OSF to cushion against the global
economic turndown.36 Ahmadinejad has been drawing down on the OSF to fund his expansionary
economic policies and, reportedly, to fund Iran’s uranium enrichment program and terror support.
In light of the recent fluctuations in oil prices, the government may revise its budget estimates for
next year. Previously, the government planned to base the budget on an oil price of $50 to $60 per
barrel, but now may use an oil price estimate of $37.50 per barrel.37 Ahmadinejad has proposed a
plan to eliminate energy subsidies and to provide monthly allowances to the poor instead. Critics
contend that the plan would push inflation higher and is an effort to boost Ahmadinejad’s
election-year support.38 There are also concerns that elimination of government subsidies may
lead to social instability.
Iran’s isolation from the financial world due to U.S. and international sanctions has provided
some insulation for Iranian banks and the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) from the global financial
crisis. However, between October and December of 2008, the TSE fell by nearly 20%, with
investor confidence shaken by the global economic turndown and the impact of declining oil
prices on Iran’s economy.39 Moreover, as world credit markets dry up, Iran has faced decreased
options in circumventing U.S. sanctions and accessing foreign investment.40 Iran’s weakened
32 Oxford Analytica, “Prospects 2009: Iran faces economic crisis,” November 14, 2008.
33 Gareth Smyth, “Sanctions fail to fuel dissent on Iran’s streets,” Financial Times, July 24, 2007.
34 Economic Intelligence Unit (derived from World Bank, World Development Indicators).
35 “President Makes Damaging Admission on State of Iran’s Economy,” Global Insight, December 5, 2008.
36 Oxford Analytica, “Prospects 2009: Iran faces economic crisis,” November 18, 2008.
37 “Iran: Oil Minister Says Iran to Base Budget on Oil Price of $37.50,” Thai News Service, January 5, 2009.
38 Nazila Fathi, “Iranian President Proposes Ending Energy Subsidies,” The New York Times, December 31, 2008.
39 Global Insight Daily Analysis, “Iran’s Bourse Pummelled by Worrying Economic News,” December 16, 2008.
40 “Tehran suffers as finance dries up,” Middle East Economic Digest, November 1,4 2008.
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economic position may reduce its leverage against the U.S. and other foreign countries over its
uranium enrichment program and reported terror financing.
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Iran’s economy is heavily dominated by the state, which is the recipient of revenues from crude
oil exports, and quasi-state actors, such as the bonyads and the commercial entities of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC). Private sector activity is limited, although the government is
engaged in some privatization efforts.
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Sometimes referred to as “Islamic congolomerates,” bonyads (Persian for “foundation”) are semi-
private charitable Islamic foundations or trusts that are believed to wield enormous political and
economic power in Iran. They were among the institutions used by the regime to help nationalize
Iran’s economy after the 1979 revolution. Bonyads are not subject to the Iranian government’s
checks and balances. Bonyads report directly to the Supreme Leader and are not subject to
parliamentary supervision. They do not fall under Iran’s General Accounting Law and,
consequently, are not subject to financial audits. Because bonyads are not required to disclose
their financial activities, it is not known exactly the magnitude of their wealth.
The largest Iranian charitable trust is the Foundation of the Oppressed and War Veterans (Bonyad
e-Mostazafan va Janbazan, MJF). With more than 200,000 employees and 350 subsidiaries, the
MJF has an estimated value of more than $3 billion, at least 10% of Iran’s gross domestic budget
(GDP). The MJF provides financial assistance, medical care, and recreational opportunities to
Iran’s poor and individuals wounded or disabled from the Iran-Iraq war. Through its company
affiliates, the MJF is involved in both Iran’s domestic economy and foreign economies. The
MJF’s domestic economic scope is expansive, with affiliates involved in economic areas such as
agriculture, construction, industries, mining, transportation, commerce, and tourism. Since 1991,
the MJF has invested in energy, business, engineering, and agricultural activities in Europe,
Russia, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Some allege that the MJF is used for Iranian
intelligence activities for buying dual-use products for proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs).41
Many believe that bonyads enjoy a significant advantage over private companies. Prior to the
unification of Iran’s exchange rate system, the bonyads were able to access foreign exchange at
deep discounts compared to private enterprises. Presently, bonyad officials have longstanding
connections with politicians, and frequently get special access to credit at state-owned banks.42 In
addition, bonyads get privileges on taxation and import duties. Some critics contend that
economic and political reform in Iran will not be significant unless bonyads are reformed. Some
also contend that they contribute to political corruption and limit the funneling of oil wealth to the
poor. Bonyads also may limit privatization, because shares for many of Iran’s national companies
undergoing privatization are given to bonyads, rather than wholly private enterprises.
41 “Iran: Mostzafan va Janzaban Supports Veterans, Covert Activities,” Open Source Center report, May 2, 2006.
42 EIU, “Iran risk: Legal and regulatory risk,” January 22, 2008.
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The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was founded in 1979 by the Ayatollah Khomeini
and is a branch of the Iranian government’s military. The IRGC is comprised of five branches: the
Grounds Force, Air Force, Navy, Basij militia, and Qods Force special operations.43
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps increasingly is becoming an important player in the
Iranian economy. The IRGC’s initial economic involvement consisted of postwar reconstruction
activities, largely infrastructure projects. More recently, the IRGC has become involved in
commercial activity in the construction, oil and gas, and telecommunications sector.44 Elements of
the Iranian private sector have expressed displeasure with the IRGC. Through its powerful
connections, the IRGC frequently acquires business contracts for new projects at the expense of
private sector businesses. The IRGC also serves as a leading investment tool for many of Iran’s
leaders.
Some Iranians express concern that the IRGC is involved in Iran’s underground economy. The
IRGC has significant control over Iran’s borders and airports. The IRGC is allegedly involved in
smuggling alcohol and other low-level contraband into Iran. Some report that the IRGC smuggles
gasoline, which is heavily subsidized in Iran, to other countries for profit.45
Some analysts believe that the Revolutionary Guard benefits from Iran’s economic isolation. With
foreign businesses unwilling or unable to enter into deals, the Revolutionary Guard faces less
competition for acquiring new contracts. However, because the IRGC frequently does not have
the technical expertise that many international companies do, the IRGC sometimes subcontracts
to international companies, making a profit as an intermediary in the transaction.46
The United States contends that the IRGC is involved in proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs). Under Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, the United States can sanction
entities for proliferation concerns. The sanctions prohibit all transactions between U.S. persons
and the sanctioned entity and freeze any assets that the sanctioned entity has in the United
States.47 On October 25, 2007, under E.O. 13382, the U.S. Department of State designated the
IRGC for proliferation concerns. The U.S. embargo on the IRGC represented the first time that
the United States has sanctioned a foreign country’s military. Also on the same day and under the
same executive order, the U.S. Treasury identified nine companies either owned or controlled by
the IRGC and five individuals associated with the IRGC for proliferation concerns.48 These
companies all are reportedly tied to Iran’s energy sector.49 They are listed below:
43 For more information on the IRGC, see Kenneth Katzman, “The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard,”
Westlaw Press, 1993.
44 Ali Alfoneh, “How Intertwined Are the Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s Economy?,” American Enterprise Institute,
October 22, 2007.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 E.O. 13382, “Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters,” June 28, 2005.
48 Treasury press release, “Statement by Secretary Paulson on Iran Designations,” October 25, 2007,
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp645.htm.
Treasury press release, “Factsheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and
Support for Terrorism,” October 25, 2007, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp644.htm.
49 “U.S. dilemma: Targeting Iran’s oil industry could hurt Iran more,” International Herald Tribune, November 5,
(continued...)
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Companies:
• Khatam al-Anbya Construction Headquarters: Main engineering headquarters of
the IRGC; secured deals of at least $7 billion in oil, gas, transportation, and other
sectors50; owned or controlled by the IRGC
• Oriental Oil Kish: Drilling company; owned or controlled by the IRGC
• Ghorb Nooh: Owned or controlled by the IRGC
• Sahel Consultant Engineering: Owned or controlled by the IRGC
• Sepasad Engineering Company: Owned or controlled by the IRGC
• Omran Sahel: Owned or controlled by the IRGC
• Hara Company: Engineering firm associated with Khatam al-Anbya; owned or
controlled by the IRGC
• Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem: Business services company owned or controlled
by the IRGC
Individuals:
• General Hosein Salimi: Commander of the Air Force, IRGC
• Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie: Deputy Commander, IRGC
• Vice Admiral Ali Akhbar Ahmadian: Former Chief of the IRGC Joint Staff
• Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi: Former Commander of Bassij resistance
force
• Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani: Commander of the Qods Force
In addition to WMD proliferation concerns, the United States asserts that the IRGC is involved in
terrorist activities. E.O. 13224 permits the President to freeze the assets of terrorists and their
supporters.51 On October 25, 2007, the United States sanctioned the IRGC-Qods Force under
E.O. 133224. The United States asserts that the Qods Force provides to Hezbollah’s military and
terrorist activities, with assistance ranging between $100 to $200 million a year.52
ȱȱ
Prior to the 1979 revolution, Iran boasted a vibrant, significant private sector. However, under the
leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the bulk of private sector companies, including commercial
(...continued)
2007.
50 Treasury press release, “Factsheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and
Support for Terrorism,” October 25, 2007, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp644.htm.
51 E.O. 13224, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or
Support Terrorism,” September 23, 2001.
52 Treasury press release, “Factsheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and
Support for Terrorism,” October 25, 2007, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp644.htm.
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banks, were taken over by state and quasi-state institutions. Foreign participation in Iran’s
economy was prohibited.
Currently, wholly private enterprises are present in agriculture, trade, small-scale manufacturing,
and mining, but play a minimal role in large-scale economic activity.53 In an effort toward more
private sector development, Iran began a major privatization initiative in July 2006. It allowed
issuances of up to 80% of shares in strategic industries through the stock market, including
downstream oil sector businesses, banks, insurance, utilities, and transportation.54 Iran is also
working to privatize state-run oil and gas companies.
Iran’s private sector competes with the businesses operated by the bonyads and the IRGC. For
example, Iranian officials have encouraged foreign companies to enter into the Iranian market.
However, many business contracts have been won by quasi-state actors, such as the bonyads and
commercial entities of the IRGC. In addition, the private sector is critical of the government’s use
of assets in the OSF to fund state-run companies at the expense of loans to private businesses.55
Some observers are critical of the Iranian government’s continued strong involvement in the
country’s economy. Some Iranians believe that the government needs to invest oil export
revenues in Iran’s private sector rather than spending revenues on imports56 and socially minded
programs.
Historically, Iran has been a society of trade merchants, the bazaari class. As manufacturing in
Iran is limited, merchants import goods, mark up the goods for profit, and then sell. In order to be
economically viable, the bazaaris need low employment costs, low rents, free trade, and low
regulation. The bazaaris tend to be skeptical of a large government role in the economy. They are
supportive of Iranian trade with foreign countries. However, they tend to be critical of foreign
investment because it would open up their companies to foreign competition.57
ȱȱ
Iran’s economy has a number of key sectors. In FY2007, oil and gas represented about 27% of the
country’s GDP. Industry, which includes petrochemicals, steel, textile, and automotive
manufacturing, accounted for 17% of the GDP. The services sector, including financial services,
represented 46% of Iran’s economy. Agriculture constituted about 10% of Iran’s economy.58
Agriculture continues to be one of the economy’s largest employers, representing one-fifth of all
jobs based on a 1991 census.59 Some analysts have expressed concern that excessive focus on the
53 IMF, “Islamic Republic of Iran: 2006 Article IV Consultation ,” IMF Country Report No. 07/100, March 2007, p. 12.
54 Ibid.
55 Global Insight, “Iran Country Analysis,” updated July 10, 2008.
56 Ibid.
57 Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Joint Economic Committee
Hearing on Iran, July 25, 2006.
58 IMF, “Islamic Republic of Iran: 2008 Article IV Consultation ,” IMF Country Report No. 08/284, August 2008.
Economic sectors’ contribution to Iran’s GDP is at factor cost with current prices.
59 EIU, “Country Profile 2007: Iran,” 2007, p. 27.
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oil and gas sector is crowding out investment and expansion opportunities in other sectors and
opportunities for economic diversification.60
ȱȱȱ ȱ
Holding an estimated 10% of global proven oil reserves, Iran boasts the world’s third largest
proven petroleum reserves following Saudi Arabia and Canada. Most of Iran’s crude oil reserves
are in the southwestern region near the Iraqi border. Among the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) members, Iran is the second largest oil producer following Saudi
Arabia. Presently, Iran produces about 4 million barrels of crude oil per day (mbd), approximately
5% of total global production. While oil export revenues have spiked in recent years due to a
surge in oil prices, Iran’s crude oil output has remained essentially flat. The government has set a
goal of 5 mbd, which is still below the 6 mbd pre-revolution capacity.
Iran’ oil production levels are limited by a number of factors. The oil industry faces a high rate of
natural decline of mature oil fields and low oil recovery rates. It is believed that millions of
barrels of oil are lost annually because of damage to reservoirs and these natural declines. Iran
also has been plagued by aging infrastructure and old technology. Structural upgrades and access
to new technologies, such as natural gas injections and other enhanced oil recovery efforts, have
been limited by a lack of investment, due in part to U.S. sanctions.61 The United States is
restricted from oil development investments in Iran, but other countries, until recently, have
actively invested in Iran’s oil sector development.
With an estimated 15% of the world’s gas reserves, Iran has the second largest natural gas
reserves globally, following Russia. 62 Despite its vast gas resources, Iran has been unable to
become a major international gas exporter. In fact, Iran was a net importer of natural gas as late as
2005. Natural gas production could be used for domestic consumption, exports to European and
Asian markets, and development of Iran’s petrochemicals industry.63 Iran has been seeking
international investment to help build its natural gas sector. However, U.S. sanctions have limited
Iran’s access to technologies from abroad that are necessary for developing liquified natural gas
plants. The intellectual property for these technologies belong to a small network of U.S. and
Japanese companies. Providing such technologies to Iran would violate the U.S. trade ban on
Iran.64
The oil and gas sector is heavily state-dominated. Iran is engaging in efforts to privatize nearly 50
state-run oil and gas companies, estimated to be worth $90 billion, by 2014 through the Tehran
Stock Exchange. Both domestic and foreign investors would be able to buy shares. Privatization
of these energy companies may make it easier for investors to circumvent U.S. sanctions, which
complicate investors’ ability to engage in business transactions with Iran directly.65
60 Ibid, pp. 26-27.
61 EIA, “Country Analysis Briefs: Iran,” October 2007.
62 Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Briefs: Iran,” October 2007.
63 EIU, “Country Profile 2007: Iran,” 2007, p. 42.
64 Samuel Ciszuk, “Tightened Iran Sanctions Introduced by UN Security Council in Anticipation of IAEA Report,”
February 22, 2008.
65 “Tehran opens energy sector to overseas investment,” Middle East Economic Digest, February 8, 2008.
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Iran is a major world provider source of caviar and pistachio nuts, a significant non-oil export for
Iran. The country’s climate and terrain also support tobacco, tea, wheat and barley, among other
food commodities. Iran’s agriculture production is vulnerable to periodic droughts, including a
severe drought in 2008. In addition to climate change, the agricultural sector faced setbacks in
production during the 1979 revolution and the war with Iraq.66 Overfishing and environmental
degradation also threaten the agriculture sector.
Iran typically has used oil export revenues to pay for agricultural imports. However, rising
international food commodity prices combined with a large population increase have placed
pressure on Iran’s economy, despite high international oil prices. Other Middle Eastern countries
are experiencing similar economic strains.67
ȱ
Iran is working to build up various industries within its manufacturing sector, including steel,
automotives, food products, and petrochemicals. There is some concern that Iran’s manufacturing
sector has declined because oil export revenues have increased Iran’s exchange rate, making the
manufacturing sector less competitive.68 Manufacturing activity reportedly has been impeded by
international sanctions. Iranian manufacturing units rely on imported parts and services from
Europe. Access to imported intermediate goods has been complicated because a number of
European banks have scaled down financial transactions with Iranian businesses.69
ȱ
Iran is the largest producer of steel in the Middle East.70 In 2006, Iran ranked as the 20th largest
producer of crude steel globally. Despite Iran’s high production levels, the country is a net
importer of steel.71 There has been a ramp-up of growth in demand for steel in the Middle East,
fueled by the need for investments in energy project infrastructure and expansion of construction
activity.
ȱ
Iran is the 15th largest motor vehicle producer in the world and the largest automaker among the
Middle Eastern countries. Iran produces both light and heavy vehicles.72 Its two biggest
66 EIU, “Country Profile 2007: Iran,” 2007, pp. 35-36.
67 Javier Blas, “Mideast reels as hunger outgrows oil earnings,” Financial Times, May 7, 2008.
68 “Economy & Dutch Disease,” Iran Daily, Islamic Republic News Agency, April 24, 2007. Lionel Beehner, “What
Sanctions Mean for Iran’s Economy,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 5, 2006.
69 Global Insights, “Iran Country Analysis,” updated July 10, 2008.
70 EIU, “Country Profile 2007: Iran,” 2007, p. 45.
71 World Steel Association, “World Steel in Figures 2008, 2nd Edition,” 2008 http://www.worldsteel.org/.
72 International Organization of Motor Vehicles (OICA), “World Motor Vehicle Production by Country and Type:
2006-2007,” http://oica.net/category/production-statistics/.
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automakers are Iran Khodro and Sapia.73 Auto plants frequently have outdated technology and
parts must be imported through third countries. Cars frequently are not fuel-efficient, contributing
to pollution.74 Despite Iran’s high level of automotive production, domestic demand for motor
vehicles exceeds supply. Iran imports a variety of vehicles, including basic models, luxury
vehicles, and vehicles for construction and mining. Iran reduced the tariff rate on auto imports in
2006. Iran recently began joint ventures with foreign companies for auto production, including
Peugeot and Citroen (France), Volkswagen (Germany), Nissan and Toyota (Japan), Kia Motors
(South Korea), Proton (Malaysia), and Chery (China).75 Foreign companies have entered the
Iranian auto market with some caution in light of concerns about U.S. reaction and reputational
risks.
ȱȱ
Additionally, there has been a growth in agriculture-related manufacturing, such as rice milling
and manufacturing of canned food and concentrates, fruit juices, and confectionary. Foreign
companies, such as Nestle, Coca Cola, and Pepsi have signed deals for production with local
Iranian businesses.76 Under U.S. sanctions regulations, foreign subsidiaries of American
companies are able to trade or engage in business in Iran.
ȱ
Iran is the second largest manufacturer of petrochemicals in the Middle East, following Saudi
Arabia. About half of Iran’s petrochemical product sales are for its domestic market.77 In an
attempt to diversify its exports, Iran also is building up its petrochemicals industry.78 The industry
reportedly faces some challenges from state intervention and price-fixing. Additionally,
international sanctions have reduced commercial banks’ willingness to finance international deals
to build the petrochemical sector.79
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Iran’s financial sector has been heavily dominated by large, public banks since the nationalization
of the banking system after the 1979 revolution. Over the past couple of decades, Iran has
engaged in some privatization and liberalization of its financial sector. In 2001, Iran’s Central
Bank approved licenses for three full functioning private banks. Efforts toward privatization have
been thwarted frequently by the Guardian Council.
The government has direct control over lending and investment activities of commercial banks.
The Bank Markazi, Iran’s Central Bank, is not able to conduct a “proactive” monetary policy and
73 Eric Ellis, “Made in Iran,” Fortune Magazine, September 12, 2006.
74 Ibid.
75 EIU, “Country Profile 2007: Iran,” 2007, p. 45. Prime Vista Research and Consulting, “Automotive Industry and
Marketing of Iran 2007,” June 2007.
76 EIU, “Country Profile 2007: Iran,” 2007, p. 46.
77 Global Insights, “Iran Country Analysis,” updated July 10, 2008.
78 EIU, “Country Profile 2007: Iran,” 2007, p. 44.
79 “Iran Petrochemicals Report Q1 2008,” Business Monitor International, February 20, 2008.
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has no control over the government’s fiscal policy. In addition, the Central Bank is limited in its
ability to issue direct instruments to combat inflationary pressures. The Central Bank must obtain
approval from the Majlis in order to issue participation papers.80
State-owned banks are considered by many to be poorly functioning as financial intermediaries.
Private banks are hampered by extensive regulations and the government’s populist policies,
including controls on rates of return and subsidized credit for specific regions. In May 2007,
President Ahmadinejad capped lending rates to 12% for state-owned banks and 13% for
commercial banks, despite strong opposition from the Central Bank. Setting interest rates below
the rate of inflation reportedly has placed many commercial banks under financial duress.81 In
addition, most of the financial intermediaries’ loan portfolios are comprised of low-return loans to
state-owned enterprises and quasi-government agencies, such as the bonyads. Some believe that
the financial system has stifled domestic business and has lowered Iran’s attractiveness to foreign
businesses.
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In 1967, Iran began operating the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). With initially six companies, the
TSE now lists over 300 companies. Capitalization through the TSE is permitted for the
automotive, mining, petrochemical, and financial sectors. Since 2005, foreign investors have been
able to participate in the TSE. Foreign investors are permitted to hold a maximum of 10% of
shares of each company listed and are not allowed to withdraw their capital for three years after
purchases. However, foreign activity in the TSE is low. Aside from concerns about the
international tensions associated with Iran’s nuclear standoff, low foreign activity may also reflect
concerns about liquidity, transparency, and the poor legal environment protecting foreign
holdings.82
The TSE index performed strongly between 2000 and 2004, but declined following President
Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005. During the 2007, the TSE market stabilized, but was still 20%
lower than before Ahmadinejad came into power.83 At the end of 2007, TSE market capitalization
stood at $46 billion.84 It is hoped by the Ahmadinejad government that privatization plans will
help to revive the stock market.
Because the TSE is not extensively integrated into the world market, it has been somewhat
insulated from the global financial crisis. However, between October and December of 2008, the
TSE fell by nearly 20%, with investor confidence shaken by the global economic turndown and
the impact of declining oil prices on Iran’s economy.85
80 EIU, “Iran economy: Quick View—Monetary strife—Country Briefing,” ViewsWire, April 21, 2008.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 EIU, “Iran risk: Financial risk,” April 23, 2008.
84 Global Insight, “Iran Country Analysis,” updated July 10, 2008.
85 Global Insight Daily Analysis, “Iran’s Bourse Pummelled by Worrying Economic News,” December 16, 2008.
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The U.S. Department of Treasury recently has employed targeted financial measures against Iran.
The United States is attempting to isolate Iran from the international financial and commercial
system in an effort to promote policy change in Iran regarding its nuclear program and purported
terror financing. The United States also hopes that financial isolation will limit Iran’s resources
for its nuclear program and its alleged support for terrorist organizations. In recent congressional
testimony, the Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes
stated, “Iran utilizes the international financial system as a vehicle to fund these terrorist
organizations... the Iranian regime operates as the central banker of terrorism, spending hundreds
of millions of dollars each year to fund terrorism.”86
Several major Iranian banks are under U.S. and U.N. sanctions. Under E.O. 13224,87 the Treasury
has designated several Iranian entities for supporting terrorism. On October 25, 2007, the
Treasury designated Bank Saderat, a major Iranian state-owned financial institution, for terrorism
support. Iranian authorities contend that two external audits of Bank Saderat conducted in
Lebanon and London found no evidence of such allegations.88
On January 9, 2007, the Treasury sanctioned Bank Sepah, another major Iranian financial
enterprise, under E.O. 1338289 for assisting with Iran’s missile program.90 U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1747 named Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International as financial institutions
involved in financing nuclear or ballistic missile activities. Subsequently, on October 25, 2007,
under E.O. 13382, the Treasury Department sanctioned Bank Melli and Bank Mellat, other major
Iranian financial institutes, as WMD proliferators or supporters.91 In June 2008, the European
Union also decided to sanction Bank Melli.
In a signal to Arab countries, the United States sanctioned the Bahraini Future Bank B.S.C. in
March 2008 under E.O. 13382 for reportedly assisting in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.
The United States contends that Future Bank B.S.C. is controlled by the embargoed Bank Melli.92
In a move to further restrict Iran’s access to the U.S. financial system, the Treasury revoked the
“U-turn” license for U.S. financial institutions on November 6, 2008.93 With respect to Iran, “U-
turn” fund transfers are financial transactions that pass through the U.S. financial system only en
86 Daniel Glaser, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and
South Asia and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, April 17, 2008, HP-933.
87 E.O. 13224, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or
Support Terrorism,” September 23, 2001.
88 IMF, “Islamic Republic of Iran: 2006 Article IV Consultation ,” IMF Country Report No. 07/100, March 2007, p. 17.
89 E.O. 13382, “Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters,” June 28, 2005.
90 Treasury press release, “Iran’s Bank Sepah Designated By Treasury,” January 9, 2007, http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/hp219.htm.
91 Treasury press release, “Statement by Secretary Paulson on Iran Designations,” October 25, 2007,
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp645.htm. Treasury press release, “Factsheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and
Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism,” October 25, 2007, http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/hp644.htm.
92 Treasury press release, “Treasury Designates Iran-Controlled Bank for Proliferation: Future Bank Controlled by
Iran’s Bank Melli,” March 12, 2008, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp869.htm.
93 Treasury press release, “Fact Sheet: Treasury Strengthens Preventative Measures Against Iran,” November 6, 2008,
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1258.htm.
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route from one offshore non-Iranian financial institution for another, conducted for the direct or
indirect benefit of the Iranian government, banks, or individuals. Previously, U.S. financial
institutions were allowed to process such financial transactions.
The United States and some European countries assert that certain Iranian banks and their
branches are attempting to circumvent international financial sanctions in order to engage in
proliferation-related activity and terrorist financing. Iranian government officials have denied
these claims.94
Financial sanctions reportedly have affected the profitability of Iranian banks and damaged Iran’s
credit ratings. Financial intermediaries have faced challenges financing development projects,
such as building oil infrastructure.95 Iran is taking steps to protect its foreign assets from future
international sanctions. For instance, Iran reportedly has started shifting billions of dollars from
European banks to Iranian and Asian banks and purchasing gold and equities. However, some
economists express concern that Asian banks may not be reliable because of their close
relationship to Europe’s economy.96
¢ȱȱ
Iran’s financial system may be vulnerable to money laundering. Since 2002, the Central Bank of
Iran has engaged in efforts to combat money laundering. In January 2008, Iran passed its first
anti-money laundering law, which criminalized money laundering. Critics contend that Iran’s
money laundering framework is not adequate to combat the terrorist financing through Iran’s
financial system. There is international concern that these vulnerabilities pose a threat to the
international financial system.
On March 3, 2008, the U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crime Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a
statement emphasizing concern about ongoing deficiencies in Iran’s efforts to combat money
laundering and the financing of terrorism through its financial system. The U.S. Treasury
advisory stated that, using state-owned banks, Iran “disguises its involvement in proliferation and
terrorism activities through an array of deceptive practices specifically designed to evade
detection.” Of particular concern to the U.S. Treasury is that Iran’s central bank and commercial
banks have requested their names to be removed from international transactions in order to make
it more difficult to track their involvement.
The Treasury advisory noted 59 major Iranian banks or their branches in international financial
cities that pose threats, including Iran’s central bank. None of the banks listed currently face U.N.
or U.S. sanctions.97 The advisory encouraged all financial institutions to consider the risks
associated with doing with the specified Iranian financial institutions.98 Additionally, the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a Paris-based “international financial watchdog,” called on
94 “Iran: Iran Dismisses US Allegations against Banks as Ridiculous,” Thai News Service, August 18, 2008.
95 “Investment shortfall ‘threatens Iran oil output,” AFX Asia, July 9, 2007.
96 Steven Lee Myers and Nazila Fathi, “European Leaders Back Bush on Iran,” The New York Times, June 11, 2008.
97 Robin Wright, “Iran a Nuclear Threat, Bush Insists; Experts Say President Is Wrong and Is Escalating Tensions,”
The Washington Post, March 22, 2008.
98 Daniel Dombey and Stephani Kirchgaessner, “Steer clear of Iran central bank, says US,” Financial Times, March 21,
2008. Jeannine Aversa, “Treasury warns banks that Iran is engaging in deceptive practices to skirt sanctions,”
Associated Press, March 20, 2008.
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its 34 member states to encourage banks to monitor their financial interactions with Iran. The
FATF alleges that Iran has not taken adequate actions to combat money laundering and terror
financing.99 Iranian officials assert that the Bank Markazi complies with international best
practices and that it vigilantly regulates domestic financial institutions.
ȱȱȱ
Many Iranian businesses and individuals also rely on hawala, an informal trust-based money
transfer system that exists in the Middle East and other Muslim countries. Hawala transactions
are based on an honor system, with no promissory instruments exchanged between the parties and
no records of the transactions. Some analysts consider the hawala system as particularly
susceptible to terrorist financial transactions.
Since the imposition of recent U.S. and U.N. financial sanctions on Iran, the use of hawala by
Iranians reportedly has increased. It is considered by many Iranians to be a more cost-effective
way to transfer money in light of the added expenses incurred through working through the
formal financial system in light of the sanctions. According to a Iranian merchant, “If we wanted
to send money through the banking system it would cost a small fortune, so we move money to
dealers and they send the money through Dubai to China.” While some assert that the use of
hawala shows that Iran is able to circumvent international sanctions successfully, others suggest
that the increased use of hawala is a sign of the sanctions’ effectiveness in making it more
difficult for Iran to finance transactions.100
ȱȱ
International trade contributes significantly to Iran’s economy and has increased dramatically
over the past few years. Between 2004 to 2007, Iran’s total trade in goods (exports plus imports)
nearly doubled, reaching about $147 billion in 2007. Iran enjoys a growing and positive trade
balance in goods, benefitting from high international oil prices. This trade surplus registered at
about $36 billion in 2007. Exports totaled about $91 billion, while imports reached about $55
billion that same year (see Table 3). Some analysts point out that Iran’s trade with the world may
actually be higher due to transshipment or black market trade. Overall, Iran’s external sector
position has strengthened in recent years. The current account balance reached an estimated $29
million in 2007, about 10% of Iran’s GDP at market price.101 The current account surplus is
expected to decline in 2009 with the drop in international oil prices.
ȱ ȱȱ
Oil and gas exports dominate Iran’s export revenues, constituting about 80% of total exports and
are the most important source of foreign exchange earnings for the country. Other major export
commodities are petrochemicals, carpets, and fresh and dried fruits. Top destinations for Iran’s
non-oil exports, including natural gas liquids, are the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iraq, China,
99 Jeannine Aversa, “Treasury warns banks that Iran is engaging in deceptive practices to skirt sanctions,” Associated
Press, March 20, 2008.
100 Anna Fifield, “No problem,” Financial Times, April 14, 2008.
101 IMF, “Islamic Republic of Iran: 2008 Article IV Consultation,” August 2008, IMF Country Report No. 08/284.
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Japan, and India. Major imports for Iran include gasoline and other refined petroleum products,
industrial raw materials and intermediate goods used as manufacturing inputs, capital goods, food
products, and other consumer goods.
Table 3. Iran Merchandise Trade, FY2004-FY2007
(millions of U.S. dollars)
Merchandise
2004 2005 2006 2007a
Exports
44,364 64,366 75,537 91,289
Oil and gas
36,827
53,820
62,458
76,858
Non-oil and gas
7,537
10,546
13,079
14,431
Imports
38,199 43,058 49,292 55,352
Gasolineb
2,639 4,190 5,745 6,135
Trade
Balance
6,165 21,281 26,245 35,938
Total
Trade
82,563 107,451 124,829 146,641
Sources: IMF, “Islamic Republic of Iran: 2008 Article IV Consultation,” August 2008, IMF Country Report No.
08/284. IMF, “Islamic Republic of Iran: 2006Article IV Consultation,” March 2007, IMF Country Report No.
07/100.
a. All data for 2007 are estimated.
b. Gasoline imports data, based on the “2006 Article IV Consultation,” are preliminary for 2005 and projected
for 2006 and 2007. The “2008 Article IV Consultation” does provide an update on gasoline imports data.
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Despite low production levels, Iran remains the fourth largest exporter of crude oil worldwide,
after Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Norway.102 Net crude and product exports in 2006 totaled 2.5
million barrels per day and $54 billion revenues. Top export markets for Iran are Japan, China,
India, South Korea, and Italy. More than 40% of the world’s oil traded goes through the Strait of
Hormuz, a channel along Iran’s border. The Strait of Hormuz is considered a global “chokepoint”
because of its importance to global energy security. It is a narrow channel with a width of only 21
miles at its widest point through which large volumes of oil are shipped.103
Oil revenue accounts for the majority of export earnings and represents the bulk of government
revenue (about 40%). Iran’s dependence on oil export revenues makes the country highly
susceptible to the volatility of international oil prices. The quadrupling of global oil prices since
2002 has given Iran enormous economic and political leverage, cushioning the extent to which
Iran’s economy has been affected by international sanctions and domestic policy mismanagement.
However, the recent decline in oil prices may highlight weaknesses in Iran’s economy.
There is debate about the extent to which the recent decline in oil prices will affect Iran’s
economy. Oil price declines would reduce government revenue and spending and potentially
increase Iran’s vulnerability to sanctions. Oil price drops also would affect the private sector, as
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
103 Energy Information Administration (EIA), “World Transit Oil Chokepoints,” January 2008.
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Iran imports a significant portion of its capital and machinery goods from abroad. A fall in oil
prices and subsequent economic downturn may increase political dissent among Iranians, already
facing high unemployment and inflation levels.
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Despite Iran’s vast oil reserves, the country must import close to half of all refined petroleum
products to meet domestic consumption needs. Iranian gasoline imports were projected to total
$5.7 billion in FY2006 and $6.1 billion in FY2007.104 Extensive government subsidies on
gasoline have contributed to high gasoline consumption rates. Many analysts contend that high
subsidies do not give Iranians an incentive to conserve. In addition, there has been an increase in
vehicle sales, particularly of fuel-inefficient older models. Import levels are also high because
Iran has limited domestic refinery capacity to produce light fuels.105 However, gasoline’s share of
imports has fallen recently, from 18% in FY2005 to 6% during the first eleven months of
FY2007, according to Iran’s Customs Administration. In June 2007, the government implemented
a gasoline rationing system to reduce gasoline consumption. This policy was extremely unpopular
and led to public riots, but has led to a drop in gasoline consumption. Oil consumption also is
declining as consumers are moving more toward natural gas use.
Major gasoline suppliers to Iran historically have been India, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, the
Netherlands, France, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates. Iran also imports gasoline from
multinational companies (MNCs), particularly Europe-based wholesalers. Based on data from
2005 through 2006, Turkmenistan was Iran’s only supplier of natural gas.106 In 2006, Vitol, a
MNC based in Switzerland, supplied Iran with 60% of its total gasoline cargo imports. In
December 2007, Vitol reportedly declined to renew long-term contracts with Iran, but still
provides gasoline to Iran on the spot market. Major gasoline suppliers to Iran include BP, Royal
Dutch/Shell (Netherlands), Total (France), Lukoil (Russia), and Sinopec (China). In addition,
Venezuela supplies small quantities of gasoline from time to time in a show of political solidarity
with Iran. Iran and Venezuela have sought to counter U.S. global influence and strengthen their
own international standing and reputation through strategic alliances.107
Iran would be threatened if it was cut off from imports of gasoline, which allows Iran to meet
domestic energy consumption demands. This vulnerability was highlighted in December 2007,
when Turkmenistan halted natural gas supplies to Iran in a pricing dispute. Millions of Iranians
suffered from the bitter cold with lack of gasoline for heating during one of the coldest winters in
recent Iranian history. Turkmenistan has since resumed supplying gasoline to Iran.
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In 2007, Iran’s top overall trading partner was China. Iran’s next overall largest trading partner is
Japan, followed by Italy, South Korea, and Germany. Significant export markets for Iran are
104 IMF, “Islamic Republic of Iran: 2006 Article IV Consultation ,” IMF Country Report No. 07/100, March 2007, p.
29.
105 Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Country Analysis Briefs: Iran,” October 2007.
106 Telephone conversation with EIA official, April 29, 2008.
107 EIA, “Country Analysis Briefs: Iran,” October 2007. Power and Interest News Report (PINR), “Iran Looks for
Allies through Asian and Latin American Partnerships,” May 27, 2007.
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China, Japan, Turkey, and Italy. Major merchandise suppliers for Iran include Germany, China,
the United Arab Emirates, and South Korea (see Table 4).
Table 4. Major Export Markets and Sources of Imports for Iran, FY2007
(millions of U.S. dollars)
Country
Total Trade
Exports
Imports
Trade Balance
China 20,135
12,188
8,017 4,101
Japan 13,064
11,599
1,465 10,134
South Korea
8,421
5,139
3,282
1,857
Italy 8,039
5,215
2,824 2,391
Turkey 7,539 6,013
1,526 4,487
Germany 6,066 621
5,445 -4,824
UAE 5,915 747
5,168 -4,421
France 5,334 3,069
2,265 804
Russia 3,272 282
2,990 -2,708
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics
Iran’s trading relations have changed over time as international concern over Iran’s nuclear
program has affected economic activity. Historically, Iran has had strong trade ties with Germany.
In 2007, Iran’s exports to Germany increased by 50%, while imports from Germany declined by
4%. Despite the increase in exports, Iran’s total trade with Germany dropped by 0.3% in 2007.108
Along with Germany, other European countries also have scaled down trade with Iran lately.
Iran’s trade has shifted from Western countries to the developing world. Asian countries,
particularly China and Japan; Russia and other Central Asian countries; and Middle Eastern
countries, especially the United Arab Emirates, have emerged as growing and important trading
partners for Iran. Figure 1 shows the shift in Iran’s exports to trading partners is shown in from
FY2000 to FY2007, while Figure 2 shows the change in Iran’s import relationships during the
same period.
108 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics.
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Figure 1. Iran’s Exports to Select Countries, FY2000-FY2007
14,000
rs 12,000
China
lla
o 10,000
Japan
Turkey
.S. D
8,000
f U
Italy
6,000
O
s
Korea
n
4,000
France
illio
2,000
M
Germany
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics
Figure 2. Iran’s Imports From Select Countries, FY2000-FY2007
9,000
rs 8,000
a
ll 7,000
o
China
6,000
. D
Germany
.S 5,000
U
UAE
4,000
of 3,000
South Korea
ns 2,000
io
ill 1,000
M
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics
Facing challenges in trading with Western countries, Iran has sought to strengthen ties with Asian
countries, most notably China and Japan. Between 2000 and 2007, total trade between Iran and
China grew more than nine-fold, reaching about $20 million in 2007. China was Iran’s biggest
exporter in 2007, followed by Japan and Turkey. Iran benefits from low-cost imports from China.
Major Chinese exports to Iran include mechanical and electrical equipment and arms. Iran’s
growing trade relationship with China also may be rooted in strategic reasons, such as China’s
position as one of five permanent UNSC members.109
Russia is becoming an important trading partner for Iran. While Iran-Russia trade is low
compared to Iran’s trade with other countries, this relationship has grown significantly. Iranian
imports from Russia more than tripled from 2000 to 2007 and registered at about $3 million in
2007. In addition, several countries in central Asia have declared their interest in boosting
109 Global Insight, “Iran Country Report,” updated July 10, 2008.
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economic engagement with Iran, including Tajikistan.110 Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan have held
discussions on building a joint railway through the three countries in order to enhance relations,
trade, and travel.111
Iran also has pursued increased integration with its neighbors in the Middle East. Merchandise
trade with the Middle East has grown. Arab nations may be weary of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but
they appear to value trade and investment relations with Iran. Many are hoping that positive
economic engagement with Iran will mitigate international tensions over Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
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The UAE is a major trading partner for Iran, with trade largely dominated by UAE exports to
Iran. According to the UAE Ministry of Economy, total non-oil trade between UAE and Iran was
upwards of $6 billion in 2006. The bulk of merchandise supplied to Iran by the UAE is believed
to be products imported into the UAE from foreign markets, including the United States,
European Union, China, and India, and subsequently repackaged for shipment to Iran. Iran
represents about 14% of the UAE’s total exports, including re-exports. According to the Dubai
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, re-exports accounted for about 60% of the UAE’s $6.8
billion trade with Iran in 2006. The rest of the trade came from the UAE’s free trade zones. Iran’s
foreign investments in Dubai are more difficult to verify, but may have neared $300 billion, about
a quarter of Iran’s total foreign investments.112
The UAE thrives as a central re-exporting and distribution center in the Persian Gulf because of
its low tax rates, free trade zones, lower delivery times, enhanced handling and service capacity,
and a perception of lax export controls. Dubai, in particular, is Iran’s economic lifeline to the rest
of the world. Through Dubai, Iran is able to import goods that the country cannot import directly
due to international and U.S. sanctions. Although U.S. businesses are outlawed from operating in
Iran, many reportedly can circumvent U.S. sanctions by sending their investments through Dubai.
The United States increasingly has pressured the UAE to make its export controls more stringent.
Generally speaking, the UAE has resisted such pressure. In recent months, the UAE appears to be
taking actions to regulate trade and investment relations with Iran in a more stringent manner. In
September 2007, the UAE passed a law permitting it to place restrictions on dual-use
technologies, chemical and biological weaponry, and military equipment. The UAE recently used
the new law for the first time to impound a vessel at Jebel Ali that was delivering merchandise to
be transshipped to Iran.113 About 40 Iranian companies were closed in 2007 based on UAE efforts
to reduce trade in goods with potential “dual use.”114
Financial institutions in the UAE reportedly are restricting Iran’s access to credit, making it
harder for Iranian businesses to trade goods with the UAE. Some UAE banks reportedly have
frozen the assets of Iranian firms and have reduced opening letters of credits to Iranian
110 “Tajik speaker says Tajikistan keen on active cooperation with Iran,” ASIA-Plus Information Agency, March 27,
2008.
111 “Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkey to build joint railway,” BBC Monitoring Caucasus, March 27, 2008.
112 Ibid.
113 Barbara Surk, “Dubai at center of US efforts to pressure Iran, “Associated Press Newswires, October 26, 2007.
114 “UAE/Iran: Trade squeeze, or business as usual?”, EIU—Business Middle East, January 16, 2008.
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businesses.115 UAE-based banks may be wary of reputational and financial risks associated with
such transactions. Consequently, some Iranian businesses have had to shift to other regional
banks or have had to engage in cash-based transactions, raising the costs of goods on the end-
user.116 Dubai continues to be an important transshipment hub for Iran, but some parts of the
Iranian business community are concerned about the potential implications of a more stringent
UAE approach to commercial ties with Iran. There is a possibility that trade diversion to Iran may
take place through other countries if the UAE is perceived as a hostile business environment.117
Ahmadinejad asserts that foreign interference would not affect expanding economic relations
between Iran and the UAE, Iran’s most important trading partner. While bilateral trade between
the United States and the UAE is significant, the UAE’s trade with Iran is far greater.118 Both Iran
and UAE officials maintain that they would protect their relations from foreign pressure.119
ǯǯȬ ȱȱ
U.S. trade with Iran is limited, receding drastically with the 1987 U.S. ban on imports from Iran
and the 1995 ban on U.S. exports to and investments in Iran. Before 1995, major U.S. exports to
Iran included machinery and industrial equipment. U.S. exports virtually came to a standstill with
the 1995 embargo on U.S. trade and new investment in Iran. Sanctions were relaxed to a certain
extent in 2000, with the election of President Khatami in Iran.
While U.S. trade with Iran is low compared to U.S. trade with other countries, there has been
notable growth in U.S.-Iranian trade. In 2007, U.S. exports to Iran totaled $145 million, close to
double 2006 export levels and more than eight times greater than 2000 export levels (see Table
5).
Table 5. U.S.-Iranian Trade, FY2000-FY2007
(millions of U.S. dollars)
Year
U.S. Exports
U.S. Imports
Balance
2000 17
169
-152
2001 7
143
-136
2002 32
156
-124
2003 99
161
-62
2004 85
152
-67
2005 96
175
-79
2006 86
157
-79
2007 145
173
-28
115 Global Insight, Country Intelligence—Analysis, “U.A.E. Banks Latest to Restrict Iran’s Access to Credit,” October
28, 2008.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Oxford Analytica, “United Arab Emirates: Dubai/Iran trade defies US moves,” April 29, 2008.
119 “Iran president says no third party can harm Iran-UAE ties,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, February 18, 2008.
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics
Currently, the primary U.S. exports to Iran are pharmaceuticals, tobacco products, wood pulp, and
optical and medical instruments. The top U.S. imports from Iran are textile and floor coverings,
art and antiques, fish and seafood (caviar), prepared meat and fish, and edible nuts and foods
(pistachios). There is evidence that Iran is able to obtain embargoed U.S. goods through the re-
export trade, mainly through Dubai.120
In general, entities targeted by U.S. sanctions do little business with the United States.
Consequently, the United States must depend on other countries to reduce trade and investment
with Iran in an effort to change Iran’s policies. In December 2005, President Bush remarked, “We
are relying on others because we have sanctioned ourselves out of influence with Iran.”121
According to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the targeted financial sanctions are a
“powerful deterrent to every international bank and company that thinks of doing business with
the Iranian government.”122 Such sanctions would have little effect on U.S.-Iran trade since such
trade is already limited. However, the action would send a strong signal to foreign countries and
may hurt Iran’s trade with major trading partners.123
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Since 2006, European Union countries, including France, Germany, and Britain, have curtailed
export credits to companies doing business in Iran.124 For example, in 2007, German export
credits backing trade with Iran totaled about $730 million, about half the value of German export
credits in 2006 and one-fifth that in 2004.125 Germany does not actively dissuade companies from
doing business in Iran, but it is conducting extra scrutiny of export authorizations requests and
evaluating the financial risks of doing business with Iran more closely.126
Some large European banks have reduced businesses with sanctioned Iranian bodies. For
instance, Germany’s Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank, have been reducing or stopping business
with Iran. The United Kingdom’s HSBC and Standard Chartered have also reduced business with
Iran.127 Many European banks that have curtailed business with Iran are leaving offices open on a
minimal basis in case there is a change in the international climate towards Iran.128
The merchant class has particularly been hurt by the international sanctions. Iranian businessmen
reportedly have increased difficulty opening bank accounts abroad and getting foreign banks to
honor letters of credit. According to Iranian officials, over half of the banks in Dubai no longer
120 GAO-08-58, “Iran Sanctions: Impact in Furthering U.S. Objectives Is Unclear and Should Be Reviewed,” p. 18,
December 2007.
121 Daniel Dombey and Stephanie Kirchgaessner, “Fresh ways of turning the screw on Iran,” Financial Times, October
22, 2007.
122 “Iran sanctions put west’s unity at risk,” Financial Times, October 26, 2007.
123 Glenn R. Simpson, “Democrats Urge Sanctions on Iran’s Central Bank,” The Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2008.
124 Danielle Pletka, “Congress’s Ill-Timed Iran Bills,” Washington Post, August 28, 2007.
125 Ibid.
126 Bertrand Benoit, “Berlin hardens trade stance with Iran,” Financial Times, February 11, 2008.
127 “German imports from Iran up despite nuclear row-paper,” Reuters News, January 8, 2008.
128 Samuel Ciszuk, “UN Security Council Tightens Iran Sanctions, Complicating Oil and Gas Developments and
Trade,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, March 4, 2008.
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provide credit to businesses based in Iran.129 As Iranian businesses experience setbacks in
obtaining trade financing from international banking partners, they may turn to lesser known
banks or to other banking partners not susceptible to international pressure, but potentially raising
the cost of business. In particular, the Islamic Republic has turned toward banks in Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.
Sanctions against Iran’s shipping industry also may pose challenges for Iran’s trade with the rest
of the world. U.S. sanctions imposed on the shipping company Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines (IRISL) and its affiliates likely will have limited affect on Iranian trade, as the IRISL and
its subsidiaries do little business in U.S. waters, the bulk being in China and other Asian
countries. U.N. sanctions, which allow for the inspection of Iranian vessels suspected of carrying
embargoed goods, may have more impact on Iran’s international trade. To avoid being stopped,
Iranian vessels may choose to sell under foreign flags, which are subjected to a 10% import duty
by the Iranian government. While the Transportation Minister exempted Iranian vessels sailing
under foreign flags from the import tax, the provision has yet to be implemented. Consequently, if
the U.N. sanctions are followed closely, they may ramp up the cost of business for Iranian
shipping companies and raise the price of imports for Iranian consumers.130
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In 1995, Iran became a WTO observer state and, since then, has repeatedly put forth applications
to become a permanent WTO member. Accession to the WTO is a stated priority of the Iranian
government. Iran cites the more favorable treatment that WTO members give to one another and
competition from Asian countries in textiles and manufactures as important challenges to Iranian
exports.131 The United States repeatedly blocked Iran’s bids to join the WTO over concerns about
Iran’s nuclear program and support for terrorist activities. On the other hand, many European
Union countries and developing countries have supported Iran’s accession. Iran and many other
countries maintain that WTO membership should not be based on political reasons, but rather, on
economic and business grounds.132
In a significant policy shift toward Iran in May 2005, the United States agreed to stop blocking
Iran’s attempts to join the WTO as part of economic incentives to Iran to resolve the nuclear
program issue. However, the most recent negotiations for accession have ceased because of
political reasons and Iran continues to not be a member of the WTO.133 The WTO accession
process is lengthy and some Iranians have expressed concern that domestic momentum for the
reforms necessary for accession has waned. Iran, along with Russia, now remain the two largest
economies outside of the WTO.
129 Anna Fifield, “No problem,” Financial Times, April 14, 2008.
130 Global Insight, Country Intelligence—Analysis, “Iran: U.S. and UN Sanctions Hit Iran’s Shipping Industry,” April
29, 2008.
131 IMF, “Islamic Republic of Iran: 2006 Article IV Consultation ,” IMF Country Report No. 07/100, March 2007, p.
18.
132 Fiona Fleck, “Iraq Is Granted Observer Status at the WTO,” The New York Times, February 12, 2004.
133 IMF, “Islamic Republic of Iran: 2006 Article IV Consultation ,” IMF Country Report No. 07/100, March 2007, p.
18.
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Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries134 reportedly have agreed to engage in
trade negotiations. Such talks are notable given the history of tensions between the Sunni-based
GCC countries and the Shia-dominated Islamic Republic. A trade agreement may help mitigate
the trade impact of international sanctions.135
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Iran’s foreign exchange reserves, which include the OSF, tend to follow international oil prices.
Based on IMF estimates, Iran’s international reserves grew from $60.5 billion in FY2006 (10.2
months of imports) to $81.7 billion in FY2007 (11.5 months of imports).136 Owing to the recent
drop in oil prices, Iran’s international reserves may shrink with declines in oil income. There is
concern that domestic economic mismanagement has reduced funds available through the OSF to
smooth economic vulnerabilities facing Iran during the current global economic and financial
crisis.
The composition of Iran’s foreign reserves has changed lately. In December 2007, Iran stopped
accepting payments in U.S. dollars for oil export purchases by foreign countries and is shifting to
other currencies, such as the euro and the yen. Iran also called upon other OPEC members to shift
away from the dollar in favor of other currencies during a November 2007 OPEC summit. Aside
from Venezuela, all other member states opposed the switch.137 The Central Bank also is reducing
the proportion of dollars in its foreign reserves and diversifying to other currencies.138 Iran
reportedly still has a solid external reserves position.
Iran claims that this move away from dollars is in response to the recent slide of the U.S. dollar,
and cited the dollar as an unreliable currency. Others contend that the shift away from the dollar is
a retaliatory measure against the United States. Iran’s currency diversification also may be an
effort to seek independence from the dollar in light of punitive U.S. measures against Iran, which
have contributed to Iran’s isolation from the international financial system. This may mitigate
U.S. ability to pressure other countries to follow along with sanctions against Iran.139 For the
United States, these recent events may raise questions about the long-term viability of the U.S.
dollar as the global oil currency and have potential implications for the U.S. economy. U.S.
massive current account deficits are financed by foreign countries’ purchase of U.S. dollar
denominated assets.
134 GCC members are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain.
135 Simeon Kerr and Najmeh Bozorgmehr, “Gulf states plan trade talks with Iran,” Financial Times, September 17,
2007.
136 IMF, “Islamic Republic of Iran: 2006 Article IV Consultation ,” IMF Country Report No. 08/284, August 2008.
137 “Iran stops accepting U.S. dollars for oil,” RIA Novosti, December 8, 2007.
138 Najmeh Bozorgmehr and Roula Khalaf, “World News—Iran: Bank chief takes a realistic tack,” Financial Times,
March 6, 2008.
139 “Iranian oil no longer available for U.S. dollars,” RIA Novosti, December 11, 2007.
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As the most populous country in the Middle East and with vast natural resources, Iran should be a
significant market for foreign businesses. However, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Iran
historically has been low. In 2007, the flow of FDI into Iran stood at $754 million, compared to
FDI inflows of $24.3 billion to Saudi Arabia, $22.0 billion to Turkey, and $11.6 billion to Egypt.
While low, FDI inflows to Iran have fluctuated in recent years. Iran’s FDI in Iran was more than
double 2006 inflows of $317 million, but down from 2005 inflows of $917 million.140
A stringent domestic regulatory environment and government reluctance to allow foreign
investment have contributed to low levels of FDI. For instance, in the energy sector, foreign
investment is believed to be limited due to Iran’s buy-back system. Under this system,
international oil companies that contract with an Iranian affiliate pay a fee—such as an
“entitlement to oil or gas from development operation.” In 2006, buybacks were projected to
reach $500 million.141 Despite some widespread resistance within the Iranian parliament (the
Majlis) and other parts of government, Iran is slowly letting investors into the country.
However, international sanctions and political uncertainty have clouded Iran’s economy and have
made foreign business and investors wary about economic involvement in Iran.U.N. and some
U.S. sanctions are targeted toward obstructing Iran’s development of its oil and gas sectors in
order to constrain Iran’s resources for uranium enrichment and alleged terrorist financing.142
Foreign companies have had difficulty obtaining financing due to U.S. Treasury Department
pressure on international banks to cut off ties with Iran.143 Foreign companies also have limited
investment in order to avoid U.S. opposition and to maintain good relations with the United
States. International investors reportedly have withdrawn from development projects in the
country, such as in the oil and gas, shipping, and automotive industries.144 Iran faces a problem of
significant domestic capital flight abroad, particularly to the UAE.
International energy companies that have decided to suspend development projects in Iran include
British Petroleum, Total, Royal Dutch Shell, Repsol YPF, StatoilHydro, and Eni. Some
companies have decided to continue current projects, but to not engage in any future projects with
Iran for the time being.145 As some European companies have scaled down energy sector
development projects, other European partners are stepping in (see Table 6 for selected recent
deals negotiated by Iran). For instance, Iran signed gas deals in 2007 with Switzerland and
Austria, deals that were strongly opposed by the United States. The State Department is
evaluating the deals for possible violations of the Iran Sanctions Act.146 In addition, Germany
recently announced plans to build three LNG plans in Iran.
With Western involvement in Iran’s energy sector tenuous, Iran has been turning toward Asian
countries, such as China and Pakistan; Russia and Central Asian countries; and regional partners,
140 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Foreign Direct Investment online database.
141 IMF, “Islamic Republic of Iran: 2006 Article IV Consultation ,” IMF Country Report No. 07/100, March 2007, p.
29.
142 See CRS Report RS20871, The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), by Kenneth Katzman.
143 “Iran economy: Oil breakthrough?,” Economist Intelligence Unit, December 10, 2007.
144 Global Insight, “Iran Country Report,” updated July 10, 2008.
145 BMI Industry Insights, “StatoilHydro Pulling Out of Iran, But Pulling In The Profits,” August 1, 2008.
146 Eli Lake, “State Department Looks to Sanction Law,” The New York Sun, March 21, 2008.
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such as Bahrain and Turkey. While new agreements have been negotiated, their successful
completion has been slow. Many speculate that the deals are not finalized because of international
concerns over Iran’s nuclear enrichment program and the specter of sanctions.147 According to a
GAO report, State and Treasury officials assert that U.S. sanctions have contributed to a delay in
foreign investment in Iran’s hydrocarbon sector.148 The Iranian government contends that
sanctions and international pressure have not slowed down foreign investment in Iran’s gas sector.
Others point out that LNG contracts with Asian and Eastern European countries may not be able
to deliver the same quality as Western contracts. For instance, despite the possible termination of
Shells’ LNG project with Iran, Iran appears to be “keep[ing] open the option of enlisting Shell’s
technical and marketing know-how and financial input for an LNG project linked to a future
phase of South Pars.”149
Iran also is engaging in efforts to privatize nearly 50 state-run oil and gas companies, estimated to
be worth $90 billion, by 2014 through the Tehran Stock Exchange. Both domestic and foreign
investors would be able to buy shares. Privatization of these energy companies may make it easier
for investors to circumvent U.S. sanctions, which complicate investors’ ability to engage in
business transactions with Iran directly.150
In the United States, there has been a growing grassroots movement to divest from Iran.
Divestment is a decision to not hold stock in a company or bank that does business with Iran.
There is a call to remove current stock from such companies. States such as Louisiana and
California recently have passed measures to divest from Iran.151
Table 6. Recent International Energy Deals Negotiated by Iran
Country Notes
Swiss energy company EGL signed a 25-year LNG export deal with the National Iranian Gas Export
Switzerland Company (NIGC) in March 2007, reportedly valued at €18 billion. Switzerland will buy 5.5 billion cubic
meters of Iranian natural gas each year, beginning in 2011. This would be Europe’s second largest gas
deal.152 There is some skepticism that Iran will not be able to supply gas to Switzerland for the
foreseeable future because no pipeline connects Iran to Europe at present. The State Department is
evaluating the deal for possible violations of the Iran Sanctions Act.
Austria
Austrian partially state-owned energy company OMV signed letters of intent with Iran in April 2007 for
Iran to supply Europe with gas, transactions reportedly valued at $23 billion. The State Department is
evaluating the deal for possible violations of the Iran Sanctions Act.
Russia
In February 2008, Russian state gas company Gazprom announced a deal to establish a joint venture
company to develop the offshore Iranian South Pars gas field. Iran would benefit from a build-up of its
gas export infrastructure.153
147 “Iran: Sanctions and threats damage economy,” Oxford Analytica, June 15, 2007.
148 GAO-08-58, “Iran Sanctions: Impact in Furthering U.S. Objectives Is Unclear and Should Be Reviewed,” p. 18,
December 2007.
149 EIU, “Iran economy: Au revoir LNG?—Country Briefing,” ViewsWire, May 12, 2008.
150 “Tehran opens energy sector to overseas investment,” Middle East Economic Digest, February 8, 2008.
151 “Divesting from Iran: State-by-State Update,” Israel Project news release, accessed via US Fed News, February 21,
2008.
152 Benjamin Weinthal, “Switzerland to sign second-largest Iran gas deal today,” The Jerusalem Post, March 17, 2008.
153 “Gazprom announces gas deals with Iran and Nigeria,” Energy Economist, March 1, 2008.
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Country Notes
China
A China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) investment deal, reportedly valued at $16
billion, to develop Iran’s North Pars gas field and to build a liquid natural gas (LNG) plant, was
supposed to be signed on February 27, 2008 but has been delayed. Some analysts believe that China
has been hesitant to finalize the deal because of international reaction to Iran’s nuclear program and
the tightening of United Nations sanctions. The state-operated National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)
and CNOOC signed a memorandum of understanding in December 2006 for the project, under which
CNOOC would purchase 10 million metric tons per year of LNG for 25 years.154 The United States
has criticized China’s pursuit of the deal with Iran. China has also looked into alternate suppliers, such
as Qatar and Australia.155
Pakistan
NIGC is expected to finalize a natural gas export deal with Pakistan in April 2008, reportedly valued at
$7.4 billion. Exports are set to begin in 2011. The gas would be transported through a “Peace Pipeline.”
The plan initially also included exporting gas to India, but negotiations have stalled over pricing. The
United States has strongly opposed the pipeline and pressured India and Pakistan to halt the project.
Turkey
Iran is discussing gas production and export deals with Turkey. Under the plans, Turkey would assist in
developing Iran’s South Pars field in exchange for cash or natural gas. Gas would be shipped from Iran
to Turkey and then to other parts of the world, including Europe, via a new pipeline that Turkey plans
to build.156
Germany
In November 2008, the German company Steiner recently announced plans to build three LNG plants
in Iran, reportedly valued at $147 million.157 While there has been some international criticism of this
decision, German authorities point out that the deal did not violate export controls of sensitive
goods.158 Iranian officials assert that it will continue to develop Iran’s gas fields, even with foreigners
pulling out investment.
Malaysia
In December 2008, Iran signed gas deals reportedly valued at $14 billion with Malaysia’s SKS Group.
The deal included a contract to build an LNG plant.159
Bahrain
In December 2008, Iran and Bahrain drafted an agreement on the delivery of 1 billion cubic feet per
day of natural to Bahrain.160
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Iran receives loans from the World Bank. As of November 30, 2008, the net principle amount of
World Bank loans totaled Iran $3.4 billion, of which $2.6 billion had been disbursed.161 The
World Bank currently has nine active portfolios in Iran, focused on reconstruction efforts. The
World Bank’s activity in Iran restarted in 2000, following a seven year halt. World Bank loans to
154 “Chinese delegation to sign major gas deal soon: source,” Platts Commodity News, March 5, 2008.
155 David Winning and Renya Peng, “Update: CNOOC, Iran to Ink Deal for 10 Mln Tons LNG-Sources,” Dow Jones
Newswires, January 21, 2008.
156 “Iran, Turkey to Discuss Gas Projects,” Turkish Daily News, May 5, 2008. “Iran-Turkey Deals Could Prove Key to
Europe’s Gas Import Plans,” International Oil Daily, December 1, 2008.
157 Rikard Jozwiak, “EU exports to Iran rise,” European Voice, July 8, 2008.
158 “EU exports to Iran rising despite sanctions,” Reuters EU Highlights, August 6, 2008.
159 “Iran/Turkey: Iran, Turkey Plan to Set up Gas Company,” Thai News Service, December 29, 2008.
160 Oxford Analytica, “Gas deal points to Bahraini confidence,” Global Strategic Analysis, Monday 8, 2008.
161 World Bank data accessed August 20, 2008.
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Iran come only from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the
Bank’s market-rate lending facility. Iran is unable to borrow from the Bank’s International
Development Agency (IDA), a concessional lending and grant-making fund, because of its per
capita GDP. The United States has not made any contributions to the IBRD, which lends to Iran,
since 1996. Some lawmakers call for reducing U.S. contributions to the IDA in protest of IBRD
lending to Iran. However, some question the merits of penalizing other countries that receive
loans from the IDA.
In addition, the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) recently invested in Iran,
providing a $5 million joint venture among a Iranian private bank, a French bank, and the IFC. In
addition, Iran has joined the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),
which offers political risk insurance to foreign and domestic investors in Iran.162
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In terms of bilateral official development assistance (ODA), major donor countries to Iran are
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Japan. On the whole, the United States does not
provide foreign assistance, but does provide some humanitarian assistance, to Iran. For instance,
USAID has provided disaster relief assistance following the earthquake that struck near the
Iranian city of Bam on December 26, 2003. Total ODA given by countries of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to Iran amounted to $71 million in 2006 (see
Table 7).
Iran has the lowest foreign debt ratio of any country in the Middle East and reportedly maintains
solid external reserves. During the last oil windfall, Iran paid off a significant portion of its
international debt.
Table 7. Net ODA to Iran from OECD DAC Members, 2001-2006
(millions of U.S. dollars)
Donor
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Austria
3.5 3.4 5.7 6.4 4.4 3.4
Germany
32.6 31.8 38.8 41.2 40.6 38.4
France
6.8 7.9 9.5 15.7 14.8 15.4
Japan
34.4 17.5 11.3 19.8 -2.5a -7.3a
Netherlands
3.8 3.8 7.7 11.1 6.8 1.0
Norway
3.7 5.3 9.7 11.5 4.3 2.6
United
States
— 0.2 0.5 4.8 3.8 2.3
Total DAC Countriesb 90.8 81.5 102.1 138.9 78.2 70.8
Source: OECD, “Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries,” 2007 and 2008
editions.
162 For more information on World Bank lending to Iran, see CRS Report RS22704, The World Bank and Iran, by
Martin A. Weiss and Jonathan E. Sanford.
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a. Negative grants may be due to the return to the owner of unspent balances that were previously disbursed
as grants.
b. OECD DAC members for which data is reported for are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Members of Congress appear to be divided about the United States’ course of action with respect
to Iran. Some contend that the United States should pursue harsher measures against Iran, given
the gravity of the real and potential threats posed by Iran’s uranium enrichment program and
terrorism financing. Others suggest that perhaps the United States should consider more positive
engagement with Iran through rebuilding diplomatic ties and pursuing economic engagement
with Iran, such as through Iran’s accession to the World Trade Organization. They suggest that the
Iranian state would be receptive to sincere positive engagement on the part of the United States.
In a move to expand economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran, some lawmakers have advocated
targeting Iran’s dependency on imports of refined petroleum products. Some lawmakers have
advocated directly banning international exports of fuel products to Iran. For instance,
H.Con.Res. 362, which was introduced in the 110th Congress, called on the President to prohibit
the export to Iran of all refined petroleum products.163 Others encourage eliminating U.S. support
for foreign companies that supply gasoline to Iran. In November and December of 2008, two
groups of Members of Congress sent letters to the Export-Import Bank advocating that the bank
ends loan guarantees to companies doing key business with Iran. Since the letter, India’s Reliance
Industries has announced that it will terminate gas sales to Iran once the current contract expires.
Supporters of such punitive options assert that they will place pressure on the Iranian
government, given Iran’s lack of refining capacity and dependence on gasoline imports. Others
express concern that such action would adversely affect global energy supplies and ramp up
prices for U.S. consumers.164 Some critics also maintain that such an action would target the
Iranian populace, more so than the regime.
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There is debate about whether or not the United States should pursue more sanctions against Iran
unilaterally or through U.N. action. Some lawmakers assert that U.S. unilateral efforts to pressure
Iran may detract from building multilateral consensus to widen punitive measures against Iran
through the United Nations. Some maintain that unilateral efforts also might reduce Iran’s
willingness to cooperate with the United Nations. Additionally, foreign countries, such as the
Persian Gulf states, may not be as responsive to unilateral action by the United States as they
would be to multilateral action, given the growing trade ties between the Gulf states and Iran. For
instance, Arab diplomats note that while they would respect U.N. sanctions against business with
163 H.Con.Res. 362, “Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the threat posed to international peace, stability in the
Middle East, and the vital national security interests of the United States by Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and
regional hegemony, and for other purposes,” May 22, 2008.
164 Jad Mouawad, “Iran feels West’s grip; Energy troubles carry risks of protests,” International Herald Tribune,
February 13, 2007.
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Iran, it is difficult to comply with unilateral U.S. sanctions in light of growing trade relations with
Iran.165
Others note that pursuing multilateral action can be a lengthy process and that it is difficult to find
consensus among foreign countries with various competing interests, such as promoting
international security and promoting economic growth through trade with Iran. The United
Nations successfully passed the third round of sanctions against Iran only after watering them
down to satisfy Chinese and Indian concerns. As industrializing countries with increasing energy
demands and insufficient supplies, China and India view Iran as a critical energy supplier for their
needs. Such short-term national interest priorities may override international long-term security
concerns about Iranian alleged terrorist financing or nuclear technology development.Still, many
lawmakers consider the recently-passed third U.N. resolution a good first step and support
pushing for more punitive action through the UNSC. Others suggest that to the extent to which
China and India engage in economic transactions with Iran may be muted somewhat by the two
countries’ ties with the United States.
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Analysts debate the impact of sanctions on Iran’s economy. International tensions associated with
Iran’s nuclear program and alleged financing for terrorist organizations undoubtedly have
complicated Iran’s business environment. Some analysts point to Iran’s low levels of foreign
investment, difficulties obtaining trade finance, and challenges in developing its oil and gas
sectors as evidence of the impact of sanctions.
On the other hand, according to a GAO report, “Iran’s global trade ties and leading role in energy
production make it difficult for the United States to isolate Iran and pressure it to reduce
proliferation activities and support for terrorism.” The Peterson Institute for International
Economics (IIE) writes that sanctions increasingly have been unsuccessful as globalization has
allowed embargoed countries to find other suppliers and export destinations for trade and
investment.166 Sanctions may not raise the costs to the point that they are crippling to the Iranian’s
trade and financial interactions with the rest of the world. Iran reportedly is able to circumvent the
trade ban by transshipment of U.S. exports through other countries, such as the UAE. In addition
to transshipment, analysts also note that international sanctions may simply divert Iran’s trade to
other countries that do not enforce sanctions against Iran.
In addition to the impact of sanctions on Iran’s economy, some lawmakers question the
effectiveness of sanctions, noting that despite thirty years of sanctions, the United States has not
been able to significantly shift the Iranian government’s policies. Previous studies have found that
sanctions have little impact on government policy. Rather, they tend to hurt the population of a
country. In congressional testimony, one observer stated, “In a broader sense, sanctions often end
up hurting ordinary people while having little impact on the government leaders we are trying to
influence.”167 The recent enforcement of targeted financial measures appears to signal an effort to
165 Jay Solomon, “U.S. Sanctions Bahrain Bank Over Iran,” The Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2008.
166 Jeffrey J. Schott, “The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996: Results to Date,” Peterson Institute of International
Economics, Testimony before the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, July 23, 1997.
167 William A. Reinsch, President of National Foreign Trade Council and Co-Chairman of USA*Engage, Testimony
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Regarding S. 970, The Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007,” April 8,
2008.
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avoid the drawbacks of past broader trade sanctions efforts and to concentrate pressure on key
negative actors. Despite the narrow focus of targeted financial sanctions, the effects of these
sanctions may spill over to the broader Iranian populace. There is uncertainty about how
sanctions affect the elite, and how elite views may spillover into government policy.168
Congress may choose to follow with GAO’s assessment and require the U.S. Treasury and State
to collect data to assess the economic impact of sanctions on Iran. According to a recent GAO
report, U.S. economic sanctions on Iran have had affected Iran, but the extent of these effects on
Iran’s economy and behavior are difficult to gauge. The GAO notes that assessment of the impact
of sanctions is challenging because of a lack of data collection by the U.S. government and
baseline information for comparability.169
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In addition to considering the impact of sanctions on Iran’s economy, Congress may opt to
evaluate how sanctions affect the U.S. economy. U.S. sanctions curtail U.S. economic activity,
imposing costs on American workers and businesses and reducing U.S. exports.170 U.S.
businesses have expressed concerns about U.S. measures against companies that are unable to
control re-exports of high-technology goods to Iran and other targeted countries. Others have
noted that U.S. policies in Iran may deprive the United States of significant business opportunities
in Iran. Europe, China, India, and Russia are stepping in and taking advantage of Iran’s sizeable
market and untapped potential. Proponents of sanctions suggest contend that the security,
repututational, and financial risks associated with doing business with Iran outweigh the
economic benefits. Some lawmakers question the sincerity of the Administration’s willingness to
apply economic pressure on Iran in a way that harms U.S. commercial interests. They note that
the United States has yet to sanction any U.S. multinational corporations that do not comply with
sanctions laws.
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In the 110th Congress, several bills were passed in the House related to Iran. House-passed bills
encouraged tighter sanctions against Iran, but noted that such action does not indicate
congressional support for U.S. military action against Iran. The following were some of the major
pieces of legislation proposed by lawmakers:
• H.R. 957, “To amend the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 to expand and clarify the
entities against which sanctions would be imposed,” would stiffen existing
sanctions against Iran. The bill was passed by the House on July 31, 2007 and
referred to Senate committee on August 3, 2007.
• ●H.R. 2347, “Iran Sanctions Enabling Act of 2007,” and the corresponding
Senate version of the bill (S. 1430) would encourage divestment from companies
that conduct business with Iran. The Administration has opposed H.R. 2347 on
168 “Iran: Sanctions and threats damage economy,” Oxford Analytica, June 15, 2007.
169 GAO-08-58, “Iran Sanctions: Impact in Furthering U.S. Objectives Is Unclear and Should Be Reviewed,” p. 18,
December 2007.
170 Jeffrey J. Schott, “The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996: Results to Date,” Peterson Institute for International
Economics, Testimony before the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, July 23, 1997.
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the grounds that it may interfere with Administration’s foreign policy efforts. The
bill would allow for sanctions against countries such as China, Russia, and
France for conducting business with Iran.171 H.R. 2347 was passed by the House
on July 31, 2007 and referred to Senate committee on August 3, 2007.
• ●H.R. 1400, “The Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007,” and its companion
bill, S. 970, would expand economic sanctions against Iran and remove the
presidential waiver in the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. H.R. 1400 was passed by the
House on September 25, 2007 and referred to Senate committee on September
26, 2007.
• H.R. 2798 is a more narrowly targeted measure against Iran. It would prohibit
any assistance by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to
individuals who have finance or investment ties to countries that are state
sponsors of terror. The bill would target Iran, North Korea, and Sudan. The bill
was passed by the House on July 23, 2007 and was ordered to be reported out to
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and placed on the Senate Legislative
Calendar on March 4, 2008.
• H.R. 1357, “To require divestiture of current investments in Iran, to prohibit
future investments in Iran, and to require disclosure to investors of information
relating to such investments,” was referred to House subcommittee on June 5,
2007.
• H.R. 7112, “Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
of 2008,” widens current sanctions to U.S. firms with foreign subsidiaries doing
business in Iran; encourages businesses to divest from Iran; and imposes
penalties on countries that are involved in transhipment, re-exportation, or
diversion of sensitive goods to Iran. H.R. 7112 was passed by the House on
September 26, 2008 and referred to House committees. The related Senate
measure, S. 3445, was introduced on September 26, 2008.
U.S. policy toward Iran likely will remain an important issue for the 111th Congress.
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Shayerah Ilias
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
silias@crs.loc.gov, 7-9253
171 Adam Graham-Silverman, “Despite Flurry of Action in House, Congress Unlikely to Act Against Iran,”
Congressional Quarterly Today, September 12, 2007.
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