ȱ
·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ
Ǳȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
¢ȱŗřǰȱŘŖŖşȱ
ȱȱȱ
ŝȬśŝŖŖȱ
ǯǯȱ
ŚŖŗřśȱ
ȱȱȱ
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
¢ȱ
Increasing violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations, gangs, and other criminal
groups is threatening citizen security in Mexico and Central America. Drug-related violence
claimed more than 5,300 lives in Mexico in 2008, and several Central American countries have
some of the highest homicide rates in the world. Mexican drug cartels dominate the illicit drug
market in most regions of the United States and are expanding their operations by forming
partnerships with U.S. gangs. As a result, some of the drug-related violence in Mexico has begun
to spillover into the United States.
On October 22, 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, a multi-year
proposal for $1.4 billion in U.S. assistance to Mexico and Central America aimed at combating
drug trafficking and organized crime. The Administration requested $500 million for Mexico and
$50 million for Central America in FY2008 supplemental appropriations, and another $450
million for Mexico and $100 million for Central America in the FY2009 budget request. While
the Bush Administration did not request any additional funding for domestic programs to
complement the Mérida Initiative, U.S. officials pledged to step up efforts to prevent arms,
precursor chemicals, and bulk cash flows from the United States into Mexico, and to reduce U.S.
drug demand.
In June 2008, the 110th Congress appropriated $465 million in FY2008 and FY2009 supplemental
assistance for Mexico and Central America in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act,
H.R. 2642 (P.L. 110-252). In the act, Mexico receives $352 million in FY2008 supplemental
assistance and $48 million in FY2009 bridge fund supplemental assistance, while Central
America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic receive $65 million in FY2008 supplemental
assistance. The 110th Congress did not include funding for Mérida in a continuing resolution (P.L.
110-329) providing FY2009 funding through March 6, 2009 at FY2008 levels.
The 111th Congress may examine the Mérida Initiative as it considers the Bush Administration’s
pending FY2009 foreign aid request, as well as the FY2010 budget to be submitted by the Obama
Administration. Policy debates that may emerge during congressional consideration of Mérida
may include what levels and types of funding should be provided to Mexico and Central America;
how well the interagency community, in coordination with its counterparts in partner countries, is
implementing the Initiative; and the degree to which the nations involved, including the United
States, are fulfilling their domestic obligations under Mérida. Congress may also maintain a keen
interest in enforcement of Mérida’s human rights conditions. This report provides an overview of
the funding provided for the Mérida Initiative and a discussion of some policy issues that
Congress may consider as it oversees implementation of the Initiative. For related information,
see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan and
June S. Beittel. This report will be updated.

ȱȱȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
ȱ
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Funding for the Mérida Initiative .................................................................................................... 2
Mérida Authorization Legislation ............................................................................................. 3
FY2008 Supplemental Request and Appropriations for Mérida ............................................... 3
Mexico ................................................................................................................................ 4
Central America .................................................................................................................. 5
Haiti and the Dominican Republic...................................................................................... 7
FY2009 Budget Request ........................................................................................................... 7
Mexico ................................................................................................................................ 8
Central America .................................................................................................................. 8
Legislative Action on the FY2009 Request for Mérida ...................................................... 8
Policy Issues .................................................................................................................................... 8
Is Mérida the Right Drug Control Approach?........................................................................... 9
Monitoring Progress................................................................................................................ 10
Balancing “Hard-side” and “Soft-side” Assistance................................................................. 10
Interagency Coordination.........................................................................................................11
Role of the Department of Defense......................................................................................... 12
U.S. Pledges Under the Mérida Initiative ............................................................................... 13
Weapons Trafficking ......................................................................................................... 13
Drug Demand.................................................................................................................... 14
Bulk Cash Smuggling ....................................................................................................... 15
Mexico Policy Issues............................................................................................................... 15
Domestic Counterdrug Efforts .......................................................................................... 15
Police Reform and Anti-Corruption Efforts...................................................................... 16
Implementation of Judicial Reforms................................................................................. 17
Protection of Human Rights.............................................................................................. 17
Central America Policy Issues................................................................................................. 18
Haiti and the Dominican Republic .......................................................................................... 19
Mexico .................................................................................................................................... 20
Central America, Haiti and the Dominican Republic.............................................................. 20

ȱ
Table 1. FY2008 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account ...................................................... 5
Table 2. FY2008 Mérida Funding for Central America by Aid Account ........................................ 6
Table 3. Estimated Mérida Requests and Appropriations by Country............................................. 7

¡ȱ
Appendix. Conditions on FY2008 Supplemental Assistance for Mérida...................................... 20

ȱȱȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
ȱ
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 21

ȱȱȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
In October 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, a three-year
proposal for $1.4 billion in U.S. assistance to Mexico and Central America1 aimed at combating
drug trafficking, gangs, and organized crime.2 Named for the location of a March 2007 meeting
between Presidents George W. Bush and Felipe Calderón of Mexico, the Mérida Initiative seeks
to expand bilateral and regional anticrime and counterdrug cooperation. In June 2008, the 110th
Congress appropriated $465 million in supplemental assistance for Mexico, Central America,
Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-
252). On December 3, 2008, the United States and Mexico signed a Letter of Agreement,
allowing $197 million in Mérida funds to be disbursed.3
The Bush Administration requested a second installment of Mérida funding – $450 million for
Mexico and $100 million for Central America – in its FY2009 budget request. Congress did not
include funding for the Mérida Initiative in a continuing resolution (P.L. 110-329) providing
FY2009 funding through March 6, 2009 at FY2008 levels.4 For that reason, early in its first
session, the 111th Congress may consider what level and types of funding should be provided for
Mérida in the FY2009 and FY2010 budgets.
This report provides an overview of the funding provided for Mérida, as well as a discussion of
several issues that Congress may consider as it oversees implementation of the Initiative.
ȱ
The stated objective of the Mérida Initiative, according to the U.S. and Mexican government joint
statement of October 2007, is to maximize the effectiveness of efforts against drug, human, and
weapons trafficking. The joint statement highlights counterdrug and anticrime efforts of both
countries, including Mexico’s 24% increase in security spending in 2007 under President Felipe
Calderón and U.S. efforts to reduce weapons, human, and drug trafficking along the Mexican
border.5 The Central America portion of the Initiative aims to bolster the capacity of governments
to inspect and interdict unauthorized drugs, goods, arms, and people and to support regional anti-
gang efforts.

1 The Central American countries include Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Panama.
2 For background information on conditions in Mexico and Central America, see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S.
Relations: Issues for Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan and June S. Beittel; CRS Report RL34215, Mexico's Drug Cartels,
by Colleen W. Cook, and CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
3 The $197 million is from the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) foreign aid funding
account, and will fund equipment, training, and technology programs. More than $136 million under the Mérida
Initiative from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Economic Support Funds (ESF) accounts was already being
used to support antidrug and anticrime programs. See Embassy of the United States in Mexico, Press Release, “Mérida
Initiative Monies Released; Letter of Agreement signed,” December 3, 2008. Letters of Agreement are being negotiated
with the Central American countries, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.
4 Since the initial pot of Mérida Initiative funding in FY2008 was provided through a supplemental assistance measure
rather than the regular FY2008 foreign aid funding measure, the continuing resolution does not fund the Mérida
Initiative for FY2009.
5 Although the statement did not announce additional funding for U.S. domestic efforts, it cited several examples of
such efforts to combat drugs and crime that are already in place. Those examples included the 2007 Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy and the 2008 National Drug Control Strategy. See U.S. Department of State and Government
of Mexico, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative,” October 22, 2007.
ȱȱȱ
ŗȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
The Mérida Initiative is not only the largest foreign aid package for the Western Hemisphere
since Plan Colombia,6 it is, according to its proponents, a new kind of partnership between the
United States, Mexico and Central America. Analysts and U.S. officials have said that in order for
the Initiative to be successful, all the countries involved will have to accept their “shared
responsibility” to tackle domestic problems contributing to drug trafficking and crime in the
region, including U.S. drug demand.7 Since President Calderón took office in December 2006,
Mexico has, for its part, increased security spending (to some $4 billion in 2008), mobilized
thousands of soldiers and police to drug trafficking “hot-spots” throughout the country, and
extradited record numbers of drug traffickers to the United States.
Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and other organized criminal groups pose an increasing
security threat to Mexico and Central America. In 2008, the Calderón government’s crackdown
on the cartels, as well as rivalries and turf wars among Mexico’s drug cartels fueled an escalation
in violence throughout the country, including northern states along the U.S.-Mexico border. Some
5,376 Mexicans died in the first 11 months of 2008, many as a result of drug-related violence.8
Mexico and Central American security officials lack the training and equipment needed to deal
with DTOs and other criminal groups who are securing illicit arms and cash resources from the
United States and elsewhere. In addition, Mexico and Central America continue to have problems
with impunity, police corruption, and human rights abuses by security forces that have hindered
the performance and reputation of their law enforcement and judicial systems.
ȱȱȱ·ȱȱ
The Bush Administration designed the Mérida Initiative as a three-year counterdrug and anticrime
package for Mexico and Central America that would begin in FY2008 and last through FY2010.
Prior to the FY2008 supplemental request for Mérida, neither Mexico nor the countries of Central
America had received large amounts of U.S. counternarcotics (CN) assistance.9 In FY2007,
Mexico received $14.6 million in CN assistance and the only Central American countries to
receive CN funds were Guatemala ($1. 9 million) and Panama ($3.3 million).
This section of the report briefly discusses Mérida authorization legislation that was considered,
but not enacted, during the 110th Congress. It then compares the FY2008 supplemental request for
Mérida with the FY2008 supplemental funds that were enacted by Congress in June 2008. This is
followed by a brief summary of the Bush Administration’s pending FY2009 request for Mérida,
which may be taken up by the 111th Congress. Table 3, included at the end of this funding
section, provides a country-level breakdown of all Mérida requests and appropriations.

6 Developed by former Colombian President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002), Plan Colombia sought to end Colombia’s
military conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economic and social development. Since FY2000, Congress
has appropriated more than $6 billion to support Plan Colombia, largely through the Andean Counterdrug Program
account.
7 Eric L. Olson, “Six Key Issues in U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation,”Woodrow Wilson Center, July 2008; Statement
by Thomas Shannon, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs at a briefing entitled, “The Merida
Initiative: Our Partnership Moves Forward,” States News Service, July 9, 2008.
8 These Mexican government statistics were cited in “Mexico Says Gang Killings More Than Double in 2008,”
Associated Press, December 8, 2008. The figure cited for the same period in 2007 was 2,477.
9 For an evaluation of recent U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Mexico, see Government Accountability Office, “U.S.
Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but Tons of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow into the United
States,” August 17, 2007.
ȱȱȱ
Řȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
·ȱ£ȱȱ
While several Members of Congress initially expressed concern that they were not adequately
consulted by the Administration during the development of the Mérida Initiative, a majority of
House Members subsequently voted to authorize the aid package. On June 11, 2008, the House
approved H.R. 6028 (Berman), the Merida Initiative to Combat Illicit Narcotics and Reduce
Organized Crime Authorization Act of 2008 by a vote of 311 to 106, demonstrating bipartisan
support for the proposed assistance. The Senate did not take any action on the measure so
legislative attention turned to consideration of appropriations for the Mérida Initiative.
As passed by the House, H.R. 6028 would have authorized $1.6 billion over three years, FY2008-
FY2010, for both Mexico and Central America, $200 million more than originally proposed by
President Bush.10 Of that amount, $1.1 billion would have been authorized for Mexico, $405
million for the countries of Central America, and $73.5 million for activities of the U.S. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) to reduce the flow of illegal weapons from the
United States to Mexico. Among the bill’s various conditions on providing the assistance, the
measure would have required that vetting procedures be in place to ensure that members or units
of military or law enforcement agencies receiving assistance were not involved in human rights
violations.
ŘŖŖŞȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱ
The Bush Administration requested $500 million for Mexico and $50 million for Central
American countries in its FY2008 supplemental appropriations request.11 All of the funding was
requested through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account,
administered by the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs (INL). Administration officials justified inclusion of the Mérida request in an emergency
supplemental request rather than the FY2009 regular foreign aid budget request, which was not
submitted until February 2008, because of the gravity of the security situation in Mexico.
In the FY2008 supplemental request, the size, goals, and composition of the Mexican and Central
American portions of the Mérida Initiative differed markedly. Prior to the October 2007 joint
announcement of the proposed aid package, U.S. and Mexican officials had met over many
months to craft the Mexican portion of the Initiative. As a result, the FY2008 supplemental
budget request for Mexico was 10 times as large, and much further along in its development than
the initial Mérida request for Central America. The largest category of assistance to Mexico
would fund equipment and technology infrastructure improvements for military and law
enforcement agencies. Another category of assistance would fund such items as inspection
scanners, x-ray ions, computer equipment, and security equipment. A third category would fund
institution-building and justice sector projects, while the final category of assistance would fund
program support.

10 In H.R. 6028, the term “countries of Central America” is defined to include Haiti and the Dominican Republic, along
with Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.
11 For a detailed description of the Bush Administration’s FY2008 supplemental assistance proposal for the Mérida
Initiative, see CRS Report RS22837, Merida Initiative: U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and
Central America, by Colleen W. Cook and Clare Ribando Seelke.
ȱȱȱ
řȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
The Central America portion of the Initiative would bolster the capacity of governments to
inspect and interdict unauthorized drugs, goods, arms, and people. It would also support
implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Combating Criminal Gangs from Central America and
Mexico, announced at a July 2007 U.S.-Central American Integration System (SICA) summit. In
contrast to the Mexico request, which focused on providing training and equipment to fight drug
trafficking, the majority of proposed funding for Central America would fund programs to
improve policing and support anti-gang efforts, including prevention programs. Limited funding
would also support judicial and police reform, as well as efforts to improve countries’ capacity to
share information on gang members and other criminals, interdict illicit goods on land and at sea,
and curb weapons trafficking.
FY2008 supplemental funding for the Mérida Initiative was considered as part of a broader
FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2642 (Edwards). Originally introduced June 11,
2007 as the FY2008 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, this bill
subsequently became the vehicle for the second FY2008 supplemental appropriations measure.
On June 19, 2008, the House approved an amended version of the FY2008 Supplemental
Appropriations Act, H.R. 2642, that provides $465 million in FY2008 and FY2009 supplemental
assistance for Mexico and Central America. The Senate approved the compromise House version
of H.R. 2642 on June 26, 2008. The bill was then signed into law by President Bush on June 30,
2008 (P.L. 110-252).
In the act, Mexico receives $352 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance and $48 million in
FY2009 bridge fund supplemental assistance, while Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican
Republic receive $65 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance. The measure has human rights
conditions softer than compared to earlier House and Senate versions, largely because of
Mexico’s objections that some of the original conditions, particularly those in the Senate version
of the bill, would violate its national sovereignty. The language in the final enacted measure
reduced the amount of funding subject to human rights conditions, from 25% to 15%, removed
conditions that would have required the Mexican government to try military officials accused of
abuses in civilian courts and to enhance the power of its National Human Rights Commission,
and softened the language in other conditions. (See Appendix for the final language of the human
rights conditions included in P.L. 110-252).
The State Department subsequently developed a spending plan for how it and the other U.S.
agencies involved will spend the FY2008 supplemental funding and FY2009 bridge funding
appropriated for the Mérida Initiative.12 In its plan, the State Department elected to break its
program descriptions out by funding account, rather than by the program components it had
included in the FY2008 supplemental request.
¡ȱ
In contrast to the Administration, which requested all Mérida funding in the INCLE account,
Congress divided the funding for Mexico in P.L. 110-252 between the ESF, INCLE, and FMF aid
accounts. Additionally, while the vast majority of funds provided ($352 million) were labeled as
FY2008 supplemental assistance, Congress provided another $48 million in FY2009 bridge fund
assistance. As noted above, Congress made 15% of INCLE and FMF funds contingent upon

12 U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan: Mexico, Central America, Haiti,
and the Dominican Republic, September 9, 2008.
ȱȱȱ
Śȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
human rights conditions. Another significant change that Congress made to the Administration’s
request was to limit the amount of FMF and INCLE available to provide equipment to the
Mexican Army/Air Force and Navy. As a result, the FY2008 State Department spending plan
includes $94 million less funding for the Mexican armed forces than the FY2008 supplemental
request. Due to other funding limitations, some border security and justice sector reform
programs also had to be scaled back from the budget request. Congress provided $24 million for
program and staff support for the Mérida Initiative, $13 million less than the Administration’s
request. In addition to these aid cuts, Congress included a $73.5 million earmark for judicial
reform, institution building, rule of law, and anti-corruption activities, as well as $18 million in
other earmarks.13
Table 1. FY2008 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account
($ in millions)
FY2008 Supplemental
FY2009 Bridge
Account
Funds
Funds
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
20.0
0.0
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
215.5 48.0
(INCLE)
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related
0.0 0.0
Programs (NADR)
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
116.5
0.0
Total 352.0
48.0
Source: U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan

According to the State Department’s spending plan, ESF funds will support implementation of
Mexico’s recently enacted judicial reforms, as well as efforts to provide human rights training to
Mexican police, military, and judicial officials. ESF funds will also seek to build civil society’s
capacity to monitor and document human rights abuses. FMF funds will be used to purchase two
aircraft, up to five helicopters, and ion scanners for the Mexican armed forces. The majority of
INCLE funds ($180 million total, of which $34 million is FY2009 bridge funding) will provide
equipment and programs to strengthen the Mexican government’s capacity to interdict drugs,
arms, and people. Another $59.5 million in INCLE funds (of which $14 million is FY2009 bridge
funding) will support Mexico’s law enforcement and judicial systems.
ȱȱ
14 As with Mexico, Congress divided the funding for Central America between several different
aid accounts. In addition to changing the account structure, Congress shifted the bulk of funding
for Central America from public security and law enforcement programs to institution building,

13 Aside from the broad $73.5 million earmark, Congress earmarked $3 million to support the creation a national police
registry, $10 million for drug demand reduction programs, and $5 million for police education and training programs.
14 For information on the Mérida funds provided for anti-gang programs, see CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central
America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
ȱȱȱ
śȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
rule of law, and development programs. It did so by earmarking $25 million in ESF funds for the
creation of an Economic and Social Development Fund for Central America. Of the ESF funds
provided, $20 million are to be administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) for youth violence prevention, community policing, and community development
programs in violence-prone areas. The other $5 million in ESF funds are to fund educational and
cultural exchange programs administered by the State Department. Congress also earmarked $1
million to support the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG).15

Table 2. FY2008 Mérida Funding for Central America by Aid Account
($ in millions)
Account
FY2008 Supplemental Funds
Economic Support Fund
25.0
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
24.8
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs
6.2
Foreign Military Financing
4.0
Total
60.0
Source: U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan.

Due to the aforementioned shifts in the type of funds provided by Congress, the State Department
had to scale back some of its proposed law enforcement programs supported by INCLE funding.
As compared to the FY2008 supplemental request, the FY2008 spending plan included less
funding devoted to transnational anti-gang units, police equipment, and police training provided
at the International Law Enforcement Academy.
Congress did provide close to full funding for counternarcotics and border security programs
requested by the Bush Administration. Those programs include efforts to include information-
sharing and data collection among the Central American countries; programs to improve port,
airport, and border security; and regional arms trafficking and maritime interdiction programs.
These programs will be supported by a combination of INCLE, FMF, and NADR funding.
According to the State Department spending plan, some 40% of the Mérida funding appropriated
for Central America will be used to support regional programs. Among the Central American
countries, those with the highest violent crime rates and greatest prevalence of gangs and
organized criminal groups – El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras – will receive the most
bilateral funding (see Table 3 for Mérida funding by country).

15 In December 2006, the United Nations and the Guatemalan government signed an agreement to establish the
International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) to investigate illegal security groups and clandestine
organizations, some of which have been tied, directly or indirectly, to the Guatemalan state. In August 2007, the
Guatemalan Congress ratified the UN-Guatemala agreement allowing the creation of the CICIG. The CICIG was
inaugurated on January 11, 2008.
ȱȱȱ
Ŝȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ
Although not included in the original Mérida request, Congress dedicated $2.5 million in INCLE
funding for Haiti and $2.5 million for the Dominican Republic, two major drug transit countries
in the Caribbean. In Haiti, Mérida funds will be used to install a secure communications network
for the Haitian National Police (HNP), to support the HNP’s drug interdiction efforts and to
provide training for Haitian judicial officials. In the Dominican Republic, Mérida funds will be
used to support police professionalization programs, to provide logistical support to interdiction
units, and to train judicial authorities in implementing the new criminal procedure code. A portion
of the Mérida funds for each country will also support the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH), which has been providing joint counternarcotics and border security training to
Haitian and Dominican security officials.
Table 3. Estimated Mérida Requests and Appropriations by Country
($ in millions)
FY2008 Supp.
FY2008 Supp. App. Act P.L. 110-
FY2009
Country
Request
252
Request
Mexico 500.0
400.0
450.0
Belize 1.9
1.5
5.8
Costa Rica
4.3
4.3
9.5
El Salvador
7.1
6.1
17.3
Guatemala 11.1
10.6
17.7
Honduras 10.8 7.3
12.4
Nicaragua 3.7
2.4
6.7
Panama 3.9
2.0
8.9
Central America
7.2 24.9
21.7
(Regional)
Central America (total)
50.0
60.0
100.0
Haiti 0.0
2.5
0.0
Dominican Republic
0.0
2.5
0.0
Total 550.0
465.0
550.0
Source: U.S. Department of State briefing papers provided to Congressional offices; FY2008 Supplemental
Appropriations Spending Plan

ŘŖŖşȱȱȱ
In the FY2009 foreign aid request, the Bush Administration asked for another $550 million for
the Mérida Initiative – $450 million for Mexico and $100 million for Central American countries.
All of the funding was requested through the INCLE account, administered by the State
Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). As in the
FY2008 supplemental request, no Mérida funding was requested for Haiti or the Dominican
Republic. (See Appendix for a description of the FY2009 request by program components).
ȱȱȱ
ŝȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
¡ȱ
In the FY2009 request, the Administration placed more emphasis on assistance to non-military
agencies. The FY2009 request included $118 million to improve infrastructure and information
systems at non-military agencies, including Mexico’s immigration agency, the Attorney General
Office’s (PGR), the intelligence service (CISEN), the postal service, and customs. With respect to
military agencies, the FY2009 request included $100 million to support aircraft for surveillance
and counternarcotics interception missions carried out by the Mexican Navy and $20 million in
inspection equipment for use at Army checkpoints. For FY2009, the Administration requested
$158.5 million in public security and law enforcement assistance. Most of the assistance, $147.6
million, would go to support the Mexican federal police. The Administration requested
significantly less funding for institution building programs in FY2009 than in the FY2008
supplemental, $30.7 million, with $23.4 million to improve the justice system; $8.5 million to
support the PGR’s Forensic Institute; and $9.4 million to support improved data collection and
analysis. The FY2009 request included $22.5 million to cover the cost of U.S. personnel,
administration, and budget services related to the proposed aid package.
ȱȱ
For FY2009, the Administration requested $40 million for border security and counterdrug
programs. More than half of that money, $25.8 million, would go to land and maritime
interdiction assistance, as well as to a regional arms tracking program. The FY2009 request
included $13 million to implement the U.S. anti-gang strategy, with $7.5 million of that for
prevention programs, up from $5 million in the FY2008 supplemental request. It also included
$13 million for police modernization and technical assistance and $6 million to support the
International Law Enforcement Academy in El Salvador. The Administration’s FY2009 budget
request for institution-building programs rose to $23 million. The largest increases from the
FY2008 supplemental request were for courts management programs and training to improve
prosecutorial capacity. The FY2009 budget request also included $2 million for juvenile justice
systems and rehabilitation programs and $1 million for programs to build public confidence in the
justice system, two components not included in the FY2008 supplemental request.
The FY2009 budget request also included $5 million in unspecified program support.
ȱȱȱȱŘŖŖşȱȱȱ·ȱ
The 110th Congress did not conclude its consideration of the Bush Administration’s FY2009
foreign aid budget request. Instead, Congress passed a continuing resolution (P.L. 110-329)
providing FY2009 funding through March 6, 2009 at FY2008 levels. Since the initial pot of
Mérida Initiative funding in FY2008 was provided through a supplemental assistance measure
rather than the regular FY2008 foreign aid funding measure, the continuing resolution does not
fund the Mérida Initiative for FY2009. As a result, the 111th Congress may consider what level of
funding to include for the Mérida Initiative in the FY2009 budget.
¢ȱȱ
A broad consensus appears to be shared by Congress and the policy community on the need for
the United States to support neighboring governments in Mexico and Central America that are
ȱȱȱ
Şȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
struggling to address drug-related violence. The 111th Congress may consider the efficacy of U.S.
and regional counterdrug and anticrime efforts as it provides funding and oversight of the Mérida
Initiative. Congress may also choose to examine how well the U.S. government is demonstrating
its “shared responsibility” to tackle domestic problems contributing to drug trafficking and crime
in the region, including U.S. drug demand. This section of the report raises some questions and
policy issues for Congress to consider at it oversees implementation of the Mérida Initiative.
ȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱǵŗŜȱ
Unless programs like the Mérida Initiative are woven into a more holistic U.S. drug policy
focusing on reducing supply and demand, many analysts predict that they are unlikely to have a
significant impact on drug flows in the region. Analysts from a range of organizations, including
the Brookings Institution, the Inter-American Dialogue, the Heritage Foundation, and the
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), have called for a new comprehensive U.S.
counternarcotics policy that attacks the drug problem in source, transit, and, perhaps most
importantly, consumer countries. As a comparison, many recent studies, including an October
2008 report by the Government Accountability Office, have concluded that while Plan Colombia
has improved security conditions in Colombia, it has not significantly reduced the amount of
drugs flowing into the United States.17 Other recent assessments of U.S. drug policy’s historic and
current tendency to focus on eradication, interdiction, and extraditions of drug traffickers have
been even more pessimistic.18
Assessments of the likely impact of the Mérida Initiative are varied. Mérida supporters describe
the initiative as a security cooperation partnership against drug traffickers and organized criminal
groups, rather than a foreign assistance program. They emphasize the importance of fully funding
Mérida in order to build up the capacity of both military and civilian institutions in partner
nations so that bilateral and regional counterdrug efforts can be more successful.19 The Heritage
Foundation supports the Mérida Initiative and recommends that the next Congress provide
funding above the $1.4 billion originally proposed by the Bush Administration if the Initiative has
positive results. At the same time, it maintains that “the U.S. needs to do more to secure the
border [and] reduce the flow of illegal arms and illicit cash” to Mexico.20 WOLA, the Council on
Foreign Relations, and others maintain that fighting the drug trade will require more than
providing equipment and training for Mexican (and Central American) military and police forces.
They assert that Mérida needs to include more funding to address the weak civilian judicial and
police institutions, as well as the underlying societal problems, such as poverty,
underdevelopment, and corruption, that have allowed the drug trade to flourish in Mexico and

16 For more information on U.S. international drug control policy, see CRS Report RL34543, International Drug
Control Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler.
17 Government Accountability Office, “Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, But Security Has
Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance,” October 2008, GAO-09-7.
18 Michael Shifter, “Latin America’s Drug Problem,” Current History, February 2007; International Crisis Group,
“Latin American Drugs II: Improving Policy and Reducing Harm,” March 14, 2008; Brookings Institution, “Re-
Thinking U.S.-Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World,” November 24, 2008.
19 American Enterprise Institute, “Five Perspectives on the Mérida Initiative: What it is and why it Must Succeed,”
March 4, 2008.
20 Heritage Foundation, “Executive Summary: Mexico, Drug Cartels, and the Merida Initiative: A Fight We Cannot
Afford to Lose,” by Ray Walser, July 23, 2008.
ȱȱȱ
şȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
Central America. They also emphasize the importance of addressing U.S. and European drug
demand.21
ȱȱ
In the last year, several think tanks held forums addressing the issue of how to monitor progress
in implementing the Mérida Initiative. Many analysts maintain that it is crucial for both the U.S.
and Mexican executive branches to manage legislative and popular expectations for the Initiative.
They argue that it is important that the goals for the Initiative be realistic, and that progress made
towards meeting those goals be regularly communicated to legislators and to the general public in
both countries. For example, in this vain, an achievable goal would not be to end drug trafficking
through Mexico, but to reduce trafficking and related violence to a public security issue, rather
than a national security threat. Some contend that it is likely to take much longer than three fiscal
years for the Mérida Initiative to help partner governments make real headway in achieving that
goal.22 A recent press report describes how difficult it is proving to be for the United States and
Mexico to overcome decades of mistrust in order to work together to implement Mérida.23
U.S. and Mexican security experts have also urged Congress to look at a range of indicators when
evaluating the Mérida Initiative, rather than merely measuring its effects on drug seizures and
flows. Perhaps in response to that advice, Congress asked the State Department to include a list of
performance measures for each portion of the Mérida Initiative in its FY2008 supplemental
spending plan. For example, one indicator that is to be used to measure improvements in the
Mexican justice system would be the percentage change in the Mexican federal criminal case
backlog.
ȱȃ ȬȄȱȱȃȬȄȱȱ
During the 110th Congress, there was ongoing debate between some in Congress and the Bush
Administration over what levels and types of assistance should be provided to countries in Latin
America. The most vigorous debates centered on what type of assistance should be provided to
large aid recipients like Colombia and, more recently, Mexico.24 The Bush Administration tended
to favor “hard-side” security-related assistance, whereas a majority in Congress sought to balance
security assistance with “soft-side” rule of law, human rights, and development assistance
programs.25 These debates may continue in the 111th Congress.

21 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), “The Mérida Initiative and Citizen Security in Mexico and Central
America,” March 19, 2008; Council on Foreign Relations, “Task Force Report: U.S.-Latin America Relations: A New
Direction for a New Reality,” May 2008.
22 See, for example, comments made at the Woodrow Wilson Center Event, “U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: The
Mérida Initiative and Beyond,” February 8, 2008. Available at
[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=5949&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=370648].
23 Josh Meyer, “Mistrust Bedevils War on Mexican Drug Cartels,” Los Angeles Times, December 31, 2008.
24 For example, the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161) cut security-related aid to Colombia
significantly from the Administration’s request, and increased funding for alternative development, human rights, and
institution-building programs.
25 In Mexico and Central America, “hard-side” assistance generally refers to counterdrug and anti-terror assistance
provided to police and military forces, while “soft-side” assistance refers to rule of law, human rights, and economic
and social development programs. In Andean drug-producing countries like Colombia, the “hard-side/soft-side”
dichotomy is not just about security vs. development assistance, but also an allusion to crop eradication (“hard-side) vs.
(continued...)
ȱȱȱ
ŗŖȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
With respect to Mérida, debates emerged within the human rights community and Congress about
the balance of security vs. institution-building funding in the Bush Administration’s FY2008
supplemental request for Mexico.26 Several Members of Congress opposed the request’s apparent
emphasis on providing expensive equipment to the Mexican military, with its poor human rights
record. In response, Administration officials contended that the Calderón government specifically
requested security assistance from the United States because Mexican law enforcement and
military forces were being outgunned by the drug cartels. They assured Members of Congress
that military and police units receiving U.S. equipment and training would be properly vetted.27
As noted above, Congress employed a variety of measures to ensure that various “soft-side”
programs received support from the Mérida Initiative. These included limiting the FMF and
INCLE funds available to provide equipment to the Mexican military, as well as earmarking
$73.5 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance for institution building, rule of law, and anti-
corruption activities in Mexico. Congress reduced border security and counterdrug assistance for
Central America in order to free up $25 million in ESF funds for the creation of an Economic and
Social Development Fund for the subregion.
¢ȱȱ
In the last few years, several studies have noted the proliferation of U.S. agencies engaged in
foreign assistance activities, as well as the challenges of getting those agencies to work together
in a coordinated fashion.28 Each federal agency tends to have its own mission, priorities, and
operating style. Instead of working together to implement a particular policy or initiative,
agencies often engage in “turf battles” as they compete for leadership roles and budgetary
resources.
Interagency coordination may prove particularly difficult during implementation of the Mérida
Initiative since its diverse program components are being carried out by a wide range of U.S.
agencies under the leadership of the State Department. Like many other foreign aid programs in
Latin America, most Mérida programs are being administered by the State Department and
USAID. However, since border security is a key component of Mérida, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) is to also have a major role to play in its implementation. Within DHS,
officials from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), and the U.S. Coast Guard are to provide training and logistical support to their
counterparts in Mexico and Central America.29 Additionally, the Department of Justice is to have
agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) working with their counterparts in partner countries. According to a press

(...continued)
alternative development (“soft-side”) programs.
26 WOLA, “The Mérida Initiative and Citizen Security in Mexico and Central America,” March 19, 2008; Center for
International Policy Americas Policy Program,”A Primer on Plan Mexico” by Laura Carlsen, updated July 10, 2008.
27 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Hearing on Mexico and Central America Counternarcotics Aid,” November
15, 2007.
28 See, for example, Ann Van Dusen and Carol Lancaster, Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid: Confronting the Challenges of
the 21st Century, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2005.
29 Testimony of Paul Rosenzweig, Acting Assistance Secretary of the Office of International Affairs, Department of
Homeland Security, before the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global
Counterterrorism, June 6, 2008.
ȱȱȱ
ŗŗȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
report from late 2008, some Members of Congress have complained about the lack of
coordination, turf battles, and general confusion among the various federal agencies
implementing the Initiative.30
Similar “turf battles” may also play out in the congressional committees that have an interest in
overseeing Mérida. Since it is a foreign assistance program, primary oversight responsibilities for
Mérida is to rest with the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees.
However, other committees, such as the Senate and House Homeland Security Committees, may
seek to weigh in on how Mérida funding is being spent, how its progress is being evaluated, and
how Mérida-funded programs are dovetailing with U.S. homeland security programs.
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) has become
increasingly involved in funding counterterrorism and other foreign assistance programs around
the world.31 In Latin America, DOD, acting through its Southern Command (Southcom), has
expanded its definition of security threats to include nontraditional threats such as international
crime, public health crises, radical populism, and even poverty and inequality. Human rights
groups have tracked DOD’s expanding role in providing foreign aid in Latin America, alleging
DOD’s “mission creep” into programs and activities they feel are best funded and administered
by the State Department or USAID.32 Many analysts have expressed similar concerns about
Mexico and some of the Central American countries’ increasing reliance on military forces to
perform anticrime and counternarcotics activities traditionally handled by civilian law
enforcement personnel.
When the Mérida Initiative was first announced, analysts from across the political spectrum
praised the fact that it did not appear to involve an active role for U.S. military forces in Mexico
or Central America.33 Some were pleased that civilian officials from the Central American
Integration System (SICA) and the State Department designed the Central American portion of
the proposal, rather than military personnel from the Central American Armed Forces Conference
(CFAC) and Southcom.34 Although DOD may not have taken a leadership role in designing
Mérida, it will be administering assistance provided to Mexico through the FMF aid account, as
well as a maritime assistance package in Central America. DOD also has programs in the works
to complement the Mérida Initiative, such as a proposed Regional Aircraft Modernization
Program (RAMP) for Central America that reportedly may cost as much as $300 million.35

30 Josh Meyer, “Mexico Under Siege; Mistrust Bedevils War on Cartels” Los Angeles Times, December 31, 2008.
31 For more information, see CRS Report RL34639, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance:
Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress, coordinated by Nina M. Serafino.
32 WOLA, Center for International Policy, and Latin America Working Group Education Fund, “Ready, Aim, Foreign
Policy: How the Pentagon Takes Over More and More Areas of Foreign Policy,” April 20, 2008.
33 Heritage Foundation, July 2008; WOLA, March 2008.
34 U.S. Department of State, Office of Language Services Translating Division, “Not All That is Gold Glitters and Not
All That Glitters is Gold,” by Joel Fyke and Maureen Meyer, originally published in Foreign Affairs en Español, vol. 8,
no. 1.
35 See “House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere Holds a Hearing on Central
America and the Mérida Initiative,” CQ Transcriptions, May 8, 2008.
ȱȱȱ
ŗŘȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
ǯǯȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱ
In the U.S. and Mexico joint statement announcing the Mérida Initiative, the United States
government pledged to “intensify its efforts to address all aspects of drug trafficking (including
demand-related portions) and continue to combat trafficking of weapons and bulk currency to
Mexico.”36 Many security experts argue that this pledge may be even more important to the
success of regional counterdrug and anticrime efforts than any amount of U.S. foreign aid
provided to Mexico or Central America.37 However, Mérida was proposed and funded as a
foreign assistance package without any companion legislation on the domestic side. As such, it
may prove difficult for Congress to monitor the degree to which the U.S. government is fulfilling
its domestic pledges under the Mérida Initiative.
ȱȱ
U.S. officials maintain that 90%-95% of the guns used in Mexico’s drug violence have been
traced to the United States.38 Mexican drug cartels and enforcer gangs are reportedly buying
semiautomatic versions of AK-47 and AR-15 style assault rifles, and other military-style firearms
in the United States. The cartels often obtain their weapons through a series of “straw purchases,”
whereby guns are legally purchased from licensed gun dealers or at gun shows in border states
and then sold to a third party, who smuggles the guns across the border. In November 2008, the
Mexican government announced that it made the largest seizure of drug-cartel weapons in
Mexican history when it discovered a cache of 540 rifles, 165 grenades, 500,000 rounds of
ammunition, and 14 sticks of TNT at a house in the border town of Reynosa, Mexico.39
During FY2006 and FY2007, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF)
dedicated approximately 100 special agents and 25 industry operations investigators (IOIs) to a
new Southwest border initiative known as Project Gunrunner. The initiative aims to deny firearms
to criminal organizations in Mexico, and to combat firearms-related violence affecting
communities on both sides of the border. In FY2007, ATF agents investigated 187 firearms
trafficking cases and recommended 465 defendants for prosecution. As of November 2008, 146
special agents and 68 IOIs had been deployed to the Southwest border to bolster Project
Gunrunner. In addition to these efforts along the U.S.-Mexico border, ATF has deployed eTrace
firearms tracking technology to U.S. Consulates in Mexico to help with arms trafficking
investigations.40
In response to the increasing flow of high-caliber weapons from the United States to Mexico,
ICE, in collaboration with Mexican law enforcement agencies, has launched a new bilateral
program against weapons smuggling, known as Armas Cruzadas. Among other things, the

36 U.S. Department of State and Government of Mexico, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative,” October 22, 2007.
37 Brookings Institution, November 2008.
38 “Washington Watch,” LatinNews Daily, August 14, 2008; and Randal C. Archibold, “2-Nation Border Conference
Discusses Gun Trafficking,” New York Times, August 16, 2008.
39 “Mexico: Army Seizes Huge Weapons Cache,” Los Angeles Times, November 8, 2008.
40 U.S. Embassy, Mexico, “Border and Law Enforcement, Project Gunrunner,”ATF Factsheet, available at
[http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eng/texts/et080116eTrace.html] Updated figures obtained from Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives official, November 28, 2008.
ȱȱȱ
ŗřȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
program is to involve intelligence sharing and joint law enforcement efforts with vetted Mexican
units.41
Gun control advocates have suggested that the U.S. government could further expand its efforts
against gun trafficking to Mexico. They have advocated for, among other things, improving
regulations to combat “straw purchases,” better regulating how weapons that are particularly
attractive to criminal groups (such as “vest-buster” handguns and anti-armor rifles) are marketed,
and enacting an effective assault weapons ban.42
ȱȱ
In 2007, more than 35 million people in the United States reported using illicit drugs or abusing
prescription drugs. U.S. drug demand fuels a multi-billion dollar illicit industry that has enhanced
the power of DTOs and other allied gangs and organized criminal groups. Some 90% of the
cocaine consumed in the United States is now trafficked from South America through the
Mexico-Central America corridor. Mexico is also a major supplier of marijuana,
methamphetamines, and heroin. Mexican DTOs have become the leading drug distributors of
cocaine, heroin, and other illicit drugs in the United States, with supply networks established in at
least 230 U.S. cities.43
Studies have shown that addressing drug demand through a combination of treatment programs
for heavy users and prevention programs is more successful and cost-effective than through
supply reduction programs.44 Nevertheless, the U.S. drug control budget has continued to
emphasize supply-side programs, including drug crop eradication in source countries,
interdiction, and domestic law enforcement efforts, rather than demand reduction efforts. Since
FY2002, funding for supply-side programs reportedly has increased by almost 57%, whereas
support for demand reduction efforts has increased by less than 3%.45 Supply reduction efforts
now account for nearly two-thirds of the federal drug control budget.
It remains to be seen whether U.S. pledges to intensify domestic demand reduction efforts in
order to complement the Mérida Initiative will be reflected in new budgetary priorities. For
example, in the Bush Administration’s FY2009 budget request, which was submitted after Mérida
was announced, funding for drug prevention programs was cut by 25% as compared to the
previous year. Ongoing debates about the proper balance of funding for supply reduction vs.
demand reduction programs are likely to continue during the 111th Congress.46

41 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Fact Sheet: Armas Cruzadas,” available at
[http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheet/armas_cruzadas.htm]
42 Tom Diaz, Violence Policy Center, “Disrupting Arms Trafficking to Mexico,” October 17, 2008.
43 NDIC, National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, November 2008.
44 P. Rydell and S. Everingham, “Controlling Cocaine Supply Versus Demand Programs,” RAND: Santa Monica, C.A.,
1994; David Boyum and Peter Reuter, An Analytic Assessment of U.S. Drug Policy, Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, 2005.
45 “FY02-FY09 Budget Emphasizes Least Effective Ingredients of Drug Policy,” Carnevale Associates, February 2008.
46 For more information on U.S. domestic drug policy, seeCRS Report RL32352, War on Drugs: Reauthorization and
Oversight of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, by Mark Eddy.
ȱȱȱ
ŗŚȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
ȱȱȱ
Each year Mexican drug trafficking organizations repatriate huge amounts of illicit revenues from
drug sales in the United States to Mexico, perhaps totaling some $15 to 20 billion annually.47 In
order to address this problem, the DEA has carried out bulk cash seizure investigations with the
FBI, ICE, and CBP. In 2005, ICE and CBP launched a program known as “Operation Firewall,”
which resulted in increased operations against bulk cash smuggling in the U.S.-Mexico border
region. Many operations have been carried out in coordination with Mexican customs and the
Mexican money laundering vetted unit. In 2008, ICE created a Trade Transparency Unit (TTU) in
Mexico. Mexican TTU representatives are receiving training and technical support from ICE
officials in how to identify cross-border trade anomalies that could be indicative of bulk cash
smuggling.
¡ȱ¢ȱŚŞȱ
As Congress oversees implementation of the Mérida Initiative, it is likely to maintain an interest
in what the Mexican government is doing to combat the drug cartels and reform its law
enforcement and judicial systems. Congress may want to ensure that U.S. and Mexican
counternarcotics programs are complementing, rather than duplicating each other’s efforts.
Congress may also to monitor the Mexican government’s anti-corruption efforts, as well as its
ability to hold police and military forces accountable for human rights abuses.
ȱȱȱ
President Calderón has made combating drug cartels a top priority of his administration. He has
increased Mexico’s security budget from roughly $2 billion in 2006, to some $4 billion in 2008.
He has mobilized thousands of soldiers and federal police to arrest drug traffickers, establish
check points, burn marijuana and opium plants, and interdict drug shipments. According to the
U.S. State Department, Mexican authorities seized more than twice the amount of cocaine in
2007 than they did in 2006.49 A recent U.S. government report credits Mexico’s recently
established import restrictions on products containing methamphetamine precursors with
reducing Mexican methamphetamine shipments to the United States.50 President Calderón has
also used extradition as a major tool to combat drug traffickers, extraditing 83 alleged criminals
to the United States in 2007 and a record 85 individuals in 2008.
While a majority of Mexicans still support President Calderón, some predict that popular
frustration with his government may soon mount if his two-year campaign against the drug cartels
fails to produce measurable results.51 Drug seizures and extraditions have increased, but drug-
related violence has reached record levels. As of early December 2008, drug violence had claimed

47 Testimony of John P. Walters, Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, before the House Oversight
and Government Reform Subcommittee on Domestic Policy, March 12, 2008.
48 For more information, see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan
and June S. Beittel.
49 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report 2008, March 2008.
50 NDIC, National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, November 2008.
51 Laurence Iliff, “Calderón’s 2nd Year Ends With Fresh Turmoil,” Dallas Morning News, December 1, 2008.
ȱȱȱ
ŗśȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
some 5,300 lives, with police and military frequently targeted by drug traffickers. More than 500
police and military members have been slain since late 2006.52 Some have expressed concerns
about the militarization of Mexican law enforcement. Calderón officials, however, maintain that
the military has to be used for counterdrug efforts due to the corruption of state and local police
by the cartels, and because the police cannot compete with the type of heavy weaponry that the
drug cartels are using.53 Others assert that Calderón has not devoted enough resources to
addressing issues that are closely linked to the drug trade, such as money laundering. Still others
are concerned about ongoing corruption, impunity, and human rights abuses by military and
police forces.
ȱȱȱȬȱȱ
Instances of corruption of law enforcement and government officials have been a significant
problem that has made the campaign against drug cartels more difficult. In late October 2008, for
example, an elite unit within the federal Attorney General’s office known as SIEDO was
implicated in a scandal involving payoffs for sensitive information about antidrug activities, with
at least 35 officials and agents fired or arrested.54 In August 2008, six members of SIEDO
reportedly had been arrested on suspicion of leaking information to drug traffickers.
President Calderón has taken steps to reform the country’s federal, state, and municipal police
forces and to crack down on corruption within the police and other government institutions.
Calderón has reorganized the two federal police agencies under a single commander, established a
new police training institute, and created a national database through which police can share
information and intelligence. His government has begun to test the competency of state and local
police forces and to reward units whose officers meet certain standards with higher budgets. Only
roughly 50% of officers tested in 2008 are said to have met the minimum standards. President
Calderón has also purged hundreds of corrupt police officers. In late December 2008, he asserted
that some 11,500 law enforcement and other government employees had been fined for
corruption in the past two years, with fines totaling close to $300 million.55
The State Department’s 2007 human rights report, issued in March 2008, recognized the Mexican
government’s efforts to reform and professionalize the police force, although it highlighted that
corruption and impunity, particularly at the state and local levels, remain endemic problems.
Analysts have suggested that the Calderón government consider implementing other reforms,
including, but not limited to, strengthening police professionalization programs, establishing a
career track within federal and state police forces, and developing internal and external review
mechanisms for police performance.56

52 “Mexico Says Gang Killings More Than Double in 2008,” Associated Press, December 8, 2008; Ken Ellingwood,
“Mexico Under Siege: Attacks on Police Continue Amid Crackdown on Drugs,” Los Angeles Times, November 4,
2008.
53 U.S. Government Printing Office, “The Mérida Initiative: Guns, Drugs, and Friends,” Minority Staff Report to
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, December 21, 2007.
54 Tracy Wilkinson, “Mexico Under Siege: Elite Police Tainted by Drug Gang,” Los Angeles Times, October 28, 2008.
55 Sara Miller Llana, “Setbacks in Mexico’s War on Corruption,” Christian Science Monitor, December 29, 2008.
56 Woodrow Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, “The United States and Mexico: Toward a Strategic Partnership,”
January 2009.
ȱȱȱ
ŗŜȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
ȱȱȱȱ
The Mexican judicial system has been widely criticized for being opaque, inefficient, and corrupt.
It is plagued by long case backlogs, a high pre-trial detention rate (some 40% of Mexican inmates
are simply awaiting trials), and an inability to secure convictions. In June 2008, President
Calderón signed a judicial reform decree after securing the approval of Congress and Mexico’s
states for an amendment to Mexico’s Constitution. Under the reform, Mexico will have eight
years to replace its trial procedures, moving from a closed door process based on written
arguments to a public trial system with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence until
proven guilty. In addition to oral trials, the judicial system is to adopt more alternative means of
dispute resolution (ADR), which should help make it more flexible and efficient.
Implementing these judicial reforms is likely to bring with it a series of challenges that will have
to be addressed. Many observers hope that the federal government can learn how to identify and
overcome those challenges by looking at the experiences that states such as Chihuahua and
Oaxaca have had in adopting an accusatorial justice system and in using ADR.57 Some of those
challenges may include the need to update law school curricula, retrain current legal
professionals, build new courtrooms, improve forensic technology, and encourage the use of
ADR. USAID has been supporting state-level judicial reform programs in Mexico since the mid-
1990s, and will now be supporting implementation of the federal judicial reform.
ȱȱ ȱȱ
Both the Mexican police and military have poor human rights records. According to the State
Department’s most recent human rights report, there were credible reports of police involvement
in extrajudicial killings, kidnappings for ransom, and torture. On July 1, 2008, the media’s release
of videos reportedly showing police from an elite squad in the city of León, Mexico, practicing
torture techniques provoked strong expressions of concern by Mexican and international human
rights organizations. An American instructor was seen in the videos. A spokesman for the U.S.
Embassy in Mexico City maintained that the “U.S. government was not involved in the training
in any way.”58
There is increasing concern that the Mexican military, which has less human rights training and is
less accountable to civilian authorities than the police, will commit more human rights abuses as
it is tasked with law enforcement and duties for which it is ill-trained and ill-suited.59 Between
December 2006 and May 2008, Mexico’s Human Rights Commission (the CNDH) received 634
reports of human rights abuses by Mexican military forces. In July 2008, the CNDH issued a
report recommending that, among other measures, the military should conduct investigations into
each of the cases, punish those who are found guilty of abuses, pay damages to victims, and
develop plans to prevent future abuses. There are also concerns that the desertion rate among
military members is increasing, with a number of those deserters leaving to join the cartels. Some
have urged the Calderón government to develop a time-table for when Mexico’s military will

57 David Shirk and Lourna M. Márquez-Carrasquillo, “Border Brief: State Level Judicial Reform Initiatives in
Mexico,” February 21, 2008.
58 Alfredo Corchado, “U.S. Denies Involvement in Training Videos Showing Mexican Officers Using Torture,” Dallas
Morning News, July 3, 2008.
59 Roderic al Camp, “Role of Military to Military Cooperation and the Implications and Potential Risks to Civil-
Military Relations,” Testimony before the Congressional Policy Forum, May 8, 2008.
ȱȱȱ
ŗŝȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
disengage from law enforcement efforts. In the meantime, many experts maintain that there needs
to be greater oversight of the military by civilian institutions, particularly the Congress.60
ȱȱ¢ȱȱ
A number of policy issues may emerge as Congress considers the Central American portion of the
Mérida Initiative including concerns about:
• Funding: When the Mérida Initiative was first announced, Central American
leaders and some Members of Congress expressed concerns about the funding
disparity between the Mexican and Central American portions of the Initiative.61
Depending upon how much funding Central America receives in the FY2009 and
FY2010 budgets for Mérida, there may be lingering questions about the adequacy
of the funds provided, as well as how much of those funds should be spent on
regional programs versus bilateral programs in the seven Central American
countries.
• Type of Funds Provided: In the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act,
Congress reduced the funds appropriated for law enforcement programs in
Central America in order to increase funding for institution-building, rule of law,
and development programs. Members are likely to continue to debate how
funding should be balanced between the various program components,
particularly how much funding should support law enforcement programs and
drug interdiction efforts versus institution-building and rule of law activities.
• Interagency Coordination: Debates are likely to continue concerning what U.S.
agency is best equipped to oversee Mérida programs, including the issue of
whether there is a role for the U.S. Southern Command in anticrime efforts, and
how U.S. programs should be coordinated with those funded by other donors.
• Domestic Efforts by Partner Governments: Congress and the Obama
Administration are likely to monitor the political will among the Central
American governments to combat corruption and impunity, address crime and
violence in a holistic way, and to complement U.S. funding with support from
their national budgets, the private sector, and other international donors.
• Anti-gang Policies: There is ongoing disagreement over the level and
combination of preventive and suppressive policies that should be used in Central
America to address the gang problem. Proponents of law enforcement solutions
maintain that Central American law enforcement officials lack the capacity and
resources to target gang leaders effectively, share data, and conduct thorough
investigations that lead to successful prosecutions. Human rights groups tend to
emphasize the importance of prevention and rehabilitation programs.
• U.S. Deportation Procedures: Congress may also maintain an interest in how
U.S. deportation procedures for individuals with criminal records might be

60 Woodrow Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, “The United States and Mexico: Toward a Strategic Partnership,”
January 2009.
61 Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Central Americans See Peril in Bush’s Anti-Drug Priorities,” Washington Post, November
29. 2007.
ȱȱȱ
ŗŞȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
improved and whether U.S. assistance should be provided to help receiving
governments reintegrate deportees.
ȱȱȱȱȱ
The Bush Administration originally conceived the Mérida Initiative as a foreign assistance
package for Mexico and Central America, the countries through which the bulk of cocaine
heading to the United States now flows. However, some Members of Congress felt that the
Initiative should also include funding for the Caribbean drug transit countries of Haiti and the
Dominican Republic. If not, they argued, drug traffickers are likely to return to the Caribbean
transit zone rather than the Mexico-Central America drug transit corridor. As a result, the 110th
Congress included Haiti and the Dominican Republic in Mérida authorizations and appropriations
legislation. The 111th Congress may consider whether to insert additional Mérida funding for
Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the pending FY2009 budget request. Similarly, the Obama
Administration may or may not include Haiti and the Dominican Republic in its FY2010 request
for Mérida.
Some favor including Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the Mérida Initiative since both
countries are key transhipment points for cocaine bound from South America to the United States
and Europe. They point out that both countries have experienced a surge in air smuggling of
cocaine from Venezuela since 2007.62 Haiti, the poorest and most unstable country in the Western
Hemisphere, is particularly attractive to narcotics traffickers since its coasts and border with the
Dominican Republic are largely uncontrolled.
Others oppose providing additional Mérida funds for Haiti and the Dominican Republic since
there are only limited funds available for the Initiative. Haiti and the Dominican Republic already
receive U.S. counternarcotics assistance through other foreign aid accounts. Moreover, they
argue, both countries are also receiving counternarcotics training and support from the U.N.
Stabilization Mission in Haiti.

62 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2008.
ȱȱȱ
ŗşȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
¡ǯ ȱȱȱŘŖŖŞȱȱ
ȱȱ·ȱ
¡ȱ
The FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252), which includes the first tranche of
funding provided for the Mérida Initiative, has human rights conditions softer than compared to
earlier House and Senate versions, in large part because of Mexico’s objections that some of the
conditions would violate its national sovereignty. The Secretary of State, after consultation with
Mexican authorities, is required to submit a report on procedures in place to implement Section
620J of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961. That section of the FAA “prohibits assistance
to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible
evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights.” An exception to this
prohibition is provided in Section 620J if the Secretary of State determines and reports to
Congress that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the
responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.
In P.L. 110-252, human rights conditions require that 15% of INCLE and FMF assistance be
withheld until the Secretary of State reports in writing that Mexico is taking action in four human
rights areas:
• improving transparency and accountability of federal police forces;
• establishing a mechanism for regular consultations among relevant Mexican
government authorities, Mexican human rights organizations, and other relevant
Mexican civil society organizations, to make consultations concerning
implementation of the Mérida Initiative in accordance with Mexican and
international law;
• ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are investigating and
prosecuting, in accordance with Mexican and international law, members of the
federal police and military forces who have been credibly alleged to have
committed violations of human rights, and the federal police and military forces
are fully cooperating with the investigations; and
• enforcing the prohibition, in accordance with Mexican and international law, on
the use of testimony obtained through torture or other ill-treatment.
ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ
P.L. 110-252 includes similar conditions on assistance provided to Central America, Haiti and the
Dominican Republic. As with Mexico, The Secretary of State is required to submit a report on
procedures in place to implement Section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 in
order for Mérida funding to be released.
Other human rights conditions require that 15% of INCLE and FMF assistance be withheld until
the Secretary of State reports in writing that the governments of the countries in Central America,
Haiti, and the Dominican Republic are taking action in three areas:
ȱȱȱ
ŘŖȱ

·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
• establishing police complaints commissions with authority and independence to
receive complaints and carry out effective investigations;
• implementing reforms to improve the capacity and ensure the independence of
the judiciary; and
• investigating and prosecuting members of the federal police and military forces
who have been credibly alleged to have committed violations of human rights.

ȱȱȱ

Clare Ribando Seelke

Specialist in Latin American Affairs
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229

ȱȱȱ
Řŗȱ