ȱ
¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱ
Ž›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
˜›œȱ’—ȱ ›Ššȱ
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ŽŒŽ–‹Ž›ȱŗśǰȱŘŖŖŞȱ
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŝȬśŝŖŖȱ
   ǯŒ›œǯ˜Ÿȱ
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Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
ž––Š›¢ȱ
On July 17, 2007, President Bush issued Executive Order No. 13438, “Blocking Property of
Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Iraq.” It is the latest in a series of executive
orders based on the national emergency declared by President Bush with respect to “the unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by
obstacles to the orderly reconstruction of Iraq, the restoration and maintenance of peace and
security in that country, and the development of political, administrative and economic
institutions in Iraq.”
The President’s authority to issue the executive order stems from the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA). The executive order covers financial transactions and
authorizes property controls with respect to three categories of persons: (1) individuals or entities
determined “to have committed, or to pose a significant risk, of committing an act or acts of
violence that have the purpose or effect of ... threatening the peace or stability of Iraq ...”; (2)
individuals or entities determined “to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, logistical, or technical support for, or goods or services in support of, such an act or acts
of violence or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this
order ...”; and (3) individuals and entities determined “to be owned or controlled by, or to have
acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and
interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order....”
This report provides a brief history of the development of presidential powers in peacetime. It
discusses some of the issues that might be raised in light of the contrast between the executive
order’s broad language and its narrow aim—supplementation of sanctions applicable to Al-Queda
and former Iraq regime officials to cover terrorists operating in Iraq. It examines the reach of the
executive order and provides legal analyses of some of the constitutional questions raised in the
courts by similar sanctions programs, noting that the broad language of the executive order is not
unprecedented. In view of the fact that there is an expectation that the Department of the
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) will publish names of persons designated
under the executive order and issue regulations further refining its terms and applicability, the
report examines some of the procedures available to challenge OFAC sanction regulations and
briefly discusses OFAC’s rules, which may be of concern to attorneys representing individuals
and entities subjected to sanctions or involved in transactions with sanctioned persons.

˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
˜—Ž—œȱ
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Recent Developments...................................................................................................................... 2
Statutory Basis: IEEPA.................................................................................................................... 2
Executive Order No. 13438 Coverage............................................................................................. 9
Persons Covered........................................................................................................................ 9
Objectives................................................................................................................................ 10
Transactions Covered...............................................................................................................11
Implementation Process ...........................................................................................................11
Penalties .................................................................................................................................. 12
Reach....................................................................................................................................... 13
Precedents ............................................................................................................................... 14
Attorney-Client Implications .................................................................................................. 16
OFAC Administrative Procedures ................................................................................................. 18
Challenging Designations.............................................................................................................. 20
Potential Impact of OFAC Designations ....................................................................................... 21

˜—ŠŒœȱ
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 22

˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
ŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱ
On July 17, 2007, President Bush issued Executive Order No. 13438, “Blocking Property of
Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Iraq.”1 It is the latest in a series of
executive orders based on the national emergency declared by President Bush with respect to “the
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States
posed by obstacles to the orderly reconstruction of Iraq, the restoration and maintenance of peace
and security in that country, and the development of political, administrative and economic
institutions in Iraq.”2 The broad language of this executive order has been the subject of a degree
of criticism as potentially reaching beyond insurgents in Iraq to third parties, such as U.S.
citizens, who may unknowingly be providing support for the insurgency.3
Having declared a national emergency, the President invoked authority available under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA)4 and ordered the blocking of
financial transactions and the institution of property controls with respect to any property or
interests in property of persons determined to fall within three categories of individuals or entities
threatening the stabilization efforts in Iraq. Implementation of this executive order is the
responsibility of the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC),
which currently “administers economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and
national security goals against targeted foreign countries, terrorists, international narcotics
traffickers, and those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.”5 OFAC has promulgated regulations implementing sanctions involving: the Balkans,
Burma, Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Cuba, diamond trading, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, narcotics
trafficking, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, terrorists, and
Zimbabwe.6

1 72 Fed. Reg. 39,719 (July 19, 2007).
2 Exec. Order No. 13,350, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,055 (July 30, 2004) (expanding on the national emergency declared May 28,
2003 (Exec. Order No. 13,303, 68 Fed. Reg. 3,193), which was expanded on September 3, 2003 (Exec. Order No.
13,155, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,314).
3 See, e.g., Walter Pincus, “Destabilizing Iraq, Broadly Defined,” Washington Post, A-15 (July 23, 2007) (quoting
Bruce Fein as raising questions about whether lawyers who provide legal assistance for persons listed under the
executive order might be subject to asset freezes); ACLU website, “ACLU Says Executive Order ‘Material Support’
Provision Sweeps Too Broadly and Will Restrict Humanitarian Efforts in Iraq” (7/27/2007) http://www.aclu.org/natsec/
warpowers/31113prs20070727.html; and, CivicActions website (asking whether the “executive order just
criminalize[d] the anti-war movement in the US, giving the president the power to clean out our bank accounts?”)
http://www.civicactions.com/blog/
executive_order_blocking_property_of_certain_persons_who_threaten_stabilization_efforts_in_iraq.
4 P.L. 95-223, Tit. II, 91 Stat. 1652, 1626; 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. IEEPA authority is triggered when the President
declares a national emergency with respect to “any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or
substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States.”
Other statutes invoked by the President in issuing the executive order are: the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§
1601 et seq (setting procedures for declaring, terminating, informing Congress about, reporting expenses incurred by
national emergencies, and establishing a joint resolution as the means by which Congress may terminate the national
emergency); and section 301 of Title 3, U.S.C. (authorizing agency heads to issue regulations).
5 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Our Mission,” http://www.treas.gov/offices/
enforcement/ofac/mission.shtml (last visited, November 7, 2007).
6 Texts of the sanctions regulations, legal documents ordering the sanctions, and guidance to the various industries
required to abide by the sanctions can be found at OFAC’s website: http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/
legal/index.shtml.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
ŽŒŽ—ȱŽŸŽ•˜™–Ž—œȱ
A list of designees added to OFAC’s Special Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List7
under Executive Order 13438 was issued by Treasury on January 9, 2008.8 It included Ahmed
Fouruzandeh, Brigadier General, Commanding Officer of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps-Qods Force, Ramazan Corps, who “leads terrorist operations against Coalition
Forces and Iraqi Security Forces, and directs assassinations of Iraqi figures.”9 Also included were
two Iran-based Iraqi nationals, and one Syria-based Iraqi national as well as Al-Zawra Television
Station, based in Syria. The Treasury announcement includes a description of the activities of the
designees that have led to the prohibition of transactions between them and any U.S. person and
the freezing of any of their assets that are under the jurisdiction of the United States.
On September 23, 2008, the names of five newly designated individuals and two newly
designated entities were added to the list of blocked persons and entities under the authority of
Executive Order No. 13438.10 One Iranian national was included,11 as were three Iraqi
nationals,12 and one Syrian national.13 The newly designated entities were both broadcasters
operating in Syria: Al-Ra’y Sattellite Television Channel, Near Damasus in the Yaafur area, and
Suraqiya for Media and Broadcasting, Damascus.
Šž˜›¢ȱŠœ’œDZȱ ȱ
The July 17, 2007, executive order cites as its authority IEEPA. Under IEEPA, once the President
has declared a national emergency with respect to a threat “to the national security, foreign policy,
or economy of the United States” from a source “in whole or in substantial part outside the
United States,”14 broad authority is available to the President to impose an economic embargo
over transactions and property in which a foreign nation or foreign person has an interest.
Specifically, the statute authorizes the President to:
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit—
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, or through, or to any banking
institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any
foreign country or national thereof; and

7 http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/t11sdn.pdf. Names of “blocked persons,” “specially designated
nationals,” and “specially designated terrorists,” with whom U.S. persons may not trade are also published in the
Federal Register and in appendices to 31 C.F.R. “IRAQ3” is the designation given to names added pursuant to
Executive Order 13438.
8 http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp759.htm. U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release HP-859, “Treasury
Designates Individuals, Entity Fueling Iraqi Insurgency.”
9 Id.
10 73 Fed. Reg. 54896.
11Abdul Reza.
12 Arkah Abbas Al-Kabi, Harith Sulayman Al-Dari, and Ahmad Hassan Kaka Al-Ubaydi.
13 Raw’a Al-Usta,
14 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Řȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities ... and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or
exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or
transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has
any interest; by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.15
This language is derived from section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA),16
which grants authority to the President to block and freeze enemy property and interests in
property and to regulate financial transactions involving enemy countries, their nationals and their
allies during a declared war.17 It was first used in peacetime in 1933, in the midst of the Great
Depression, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt proclaimed a bank holiday and closed banks in
the United States, thereby interfering with both foreign and domestic financial transactions, in
response to what he deemed to be a national banking emergency related to “extensive speculative
activity abroad in foreign exchange ... [resulting] in severe drains on the Nation’s stocks of
gold.”18 Congress immediately ratified this action and amended TWEA,19 extending the
emergency powers granted under the original legislation to cover both wartime and “any other
period of national emergency declared by the President” and provided the President with
authority to regulate purely domestic transactions.20 President Roosevelt invoked TWEA again in
peacetime in 1939, as Hitler was advancing in Europe, to block assets of Norway and Denmark
and their nationals. Eventually TWEA was used to block assets of the Axis enemies of the United
States.21 A 1940 amendment expanded presidential power under TWEA by specifically
authorizing asset freezes and expanding authority beyond transactions with enemies or allies of
enemies to cover financial transactions in which any foreign state or foreign national had an
interest.22 TWEA, thus, was used to block assets of friendly nations threatened by Axis

15 50 U.S.C. App. 1702(a)(1).
16 Act of October 6, 1917, ch. 106, § 5, 40 Stat. 411; as amended 12 U.S.C. § 95(a), 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1 - 44.
17 As enacted, this statute excluded U.S. citizens and corporations incorporated in the United States from the definition
of “enemy.” Id. § 2 , 40 Stat. 441. The current version continues to exclude “citizens of the United States” and
corporations incorporated in the United States from its definition of “enemy.” 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2(c) and (a).
18 Proclamation No. 2039, 48 Stat. 1689 (March 6, 1933).
19 Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1.
20 Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, § 2, 48 Stat. 1. Not only did the 1933 amendment remove the TWEA requirement for a
declared war, it also removed the requirement of a foreign nexus, authorizing the President “to investigate any
transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit between or payments by banking institutions ... and export,
hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency by any person within the United States.”
Upon enactment of this legislation, President Roosevelt issued an executive order authorizing the Secretary of the
Treasury to permit banks to reopen and to regulate exports of gold. Exec. Order No. 6073 (March 10, 1933).
21 After Hitler invaded Norway and Denmark, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 8389 on April 10, 1940,
prohibiting foreign exchange transactions involving the property of Norway or Denmark or any national thereof.
Congress confirmed that executive order and its implementing regulations by Joint Resolution of May 7, 1940, ch. 185,
§ 2, 54 Stat. 179. Subsequently, this executive order was amended repeatedly to regulate transactions with over thirty
Axis nations, Axis-occupied countries, Axis allies, and other countries threatened by the Axis powers. See 12 U.S.C. §
95a, note.
22 As amended in 1940, TWEA section 5(b) specifically authorized the President to “investigate, regulate, or prohibit ...
any transfer, withdrawal or exportation of, or dealing in, any evidences of indebtedness or evidences of ownership of
property in which any foreign state or a national or political subdivision thereof, as defined by the President, has any
interest.” Joint Resolution of May 7, 1940, ch. 185, § 2, 54 Stat., at 179.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
řȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
occupation. A 1941 amendment to TWEA added the power to seize and vest23 title to any property
of a foreign person or nation.24 This amendment extended the “power of seizure ... to all property
of any foreign country or national so that no innocent appearing device could become a Trojan
horse,” i.e., it was designed “to reach enemy interests which masqueraded under ... innocent
fronts.”25 The Supreme Court upheld the seizing and vesting of property of a non-enemy alien in
wartime26; it also upheld the authority of the Treasury Department to vest assets of an enemy
(Austrian) entity, making them unavailable to U.S. creditors despite a New York court’s having
appointed a temporary receiver to collect the Austrian concern’s assets and ultimately distribute
them to U.S. creditors.27
In the 1970s, during the Vietnam war, congressional concern with ways to oversee presidential
use of emergency power led to questioning of the broad invocation of TWEA in circumstances
not directly related to war and not substantially originating abroad.28 One result was the
enactment of the National Emergencies Act of 1976 (NEA) and IEEPA, in 1977. NEA sets forth
various procedures to be followed by the President when declaring a national emergency, such as
Federal Register publication29 and specification of the provisions of law under which the actions
under the national emergency are to be taken.30 It specifies procedures for terminating national

23 According to material that Bethany Kohl Hipp, “Defending Expanded Presidential Authority to Regulate Foreign
Assets and Transactions,” 17 Emory Inter’l L. Rev. 1311, 1345 - 1346( 2003)(citations omitted), gleaned from
Emergency Controls on International Economic Transactions: Hearing on H.R. 1560 and H.R. 2382 Before the
Subcomm. On Int’l Econ. Policy & Trade, House Comm. on Int’l Relations & Markup of Trading with the Enemy
Reform Legislation,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., n. 30, at 51 (1977):
Freezing, or blocking, is not taking assets; rather it is a short- or long-term deprivation of the assets
or the usage thereof. Freezing does not involve a transfer of title. For example, during World War
II, both German and Dutch assets held in the United States were frozen. German assets were
subsequently vested in the United States—title passed from Germany or nationals thereof to the
United States. The Court held that the vesting of German property was not a compensable taking
because the Fifth Amendment does not apply to enemy property. Conversely, Dutch assets were
never vested. The blocking, or freezing, and vesting of foreign assets have never been held to be
unconstitutional.
24 Act of December 18, 1941, ch. 593, § 301, 55 Stat. 838, 839 - 841, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. The statute provided, inter
alia
, that “any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms,
directed by the President, in such agency or person as may be designated from time to time by the President, and upon
such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe such interest or property shall be held, used, administered,
liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States.” Id. at 840.
Originally, TWEA permitted vesting of “enemy” property and defined “enemy” in terms of nations at war with the
United States and citizens thereof and entities having a principal place of business therein. 40 Stat. 411, § 2. This
allowed enemy nations to “cloak” their ownership of property by organizing a business entity under the laws of a
friendly nation.
25 Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., 332 U.S. 480, 48 and 485 (1947).
26 Silesian-American Corporation v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469 (1947).
27 Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949). The Court, thus, held that the freezing order nullified any subsequent
unlicensed judicial attempt to transfer the assets. The Court stated: “Through the Trading with the Enemy Act, in its
various forms, the nation sought to deprive enemies, actual or potential, of the opportunity to secure advantages to
themselves or to perpetrate wrongs against the United States or its citizens through the use of assets that happened to be
in this country. To do so has necessitated some inconvenience to our citizens and others who, as here, are not involved
in any actions adverse to the nation’s interest.” Id. at 481 - 482.
28 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 8,843, 6 Fed. Reg. 4,020 (August 15, 1940) (issued by President Roosevelt to regulate
consumer installment loans); Exec. Order No. 11,387, 33 Fed. Reg. 47 (January 3, 1968) (issued by President Lyndon
Johnson to regulate capital transfers abroad).
29 50 U.S.C. § 1621(a).
30 50 U.S.C. § 1631.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Śȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
emergencies and provides a role for Congress by imposing presidential reporting requirements
and establishing congressional review procedures.31 NEA terminated existing national
emergencies,32 except for those invoking section 5(b) of TWEA, therefore, imposing no notice
and reporting requirements on the President when invoking section 5(b). This was changed with
the enactment of IEEPA.33
IEEPA was enacted primarily, according to the Senate Report accompanying the legislation, as a
direct response to expanding use of emergency power by Presidents:
The purpose of the bill is to revise and delimit the President’s authority to regulate
international economic transactions during wars or national emergencies. The bill is a
response to two developments: first: extensive use by Presidents of emergency authority
under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 to regulate both domestic and
international economic transactions unrelated to a declared state of emergency and, second,
passage of NEA, which provides safeguards for the role of Congress in declaring and
terminating national emergencies, but exempts section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy
Act from its coverage.34
By restricting the use of TWEA section 5(b) to wartime, IEEPA draws a distinction between the
power provided Presidents in declaring peacetime national emergencies having their origin
abroad and that available when war has been declared. Nonetheless, because of the need to
provide Presidents with sufficient flexibility to respond to emergencies,35 the breadth of authority
provided in IEEPA is considerable with respect to affording powers to the President to impose
economic sanctions in peacetime emergencies originating abroad. To use these powers, the
President must declare a national emergency with respect to “any unusual and extraordinary
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national
security, foreign policy or economy of the United States.”36 Once such a national emergency has
been declared, IEEPA provides the President with broad power to impose controls over economic
transactions involving transfers abroad and foreign property controls.
1. Under IEEPA, the President may “under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of
instructions, licenses, or otherwise ... investigate, regulate, or prohibit” any foreign exchange

31 50 U.S.C. § 1622.
32 P.L. 94-412, Tit. V, § 502(a)(1), 90 Stat. 1258.
33 To continue in existence, declarations of national emergencies must be renewed annually. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(d). Other
procedural requirements are succinctly summarized as follows:
IEEPA requires the President to consult with Congress, whenever possible before declaring a
national emergency, and while it remains in force. Once a national emergency goes into effect, the
President must submit to Congress a detailed report explaining and justifying his actions and listing
the countries against which such actions are to be taken, and why. The President is also required to
provide Congress periodic follow up reports every six months with respect to actions taken since
the last report and any change in information previously reported. H. Comm. on Ways and Means.
Overview and Compilation of U.S. Trade Statutes 209 (Comm. Print 2003 ed.).
34 Sen. Rep. 95-466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess 2 (1977).
35 See Note, “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to Control Presidential
Emergency Power,” 96 Harvard Law Review 1102, 1106 (1983).
36 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a). The statute emphasizes that “[t]he authorities granted to the President ... may only be exercised
to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared for
purposes of this chapter and may not be exercised for any other purpose. Any exercise of such authorities to deal with
any new threat shall be based on a new declaration of national emergency which must be with respect to such threat.”
50 U.S.C. § 1701(b).
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
śȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
transaction, any transfers of credit or payments involving any foreign interest, and the import or
export of currency or securities “by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.”37
2. IEEPA also empowers the President to “investigate, block during pendency of an investigation,
regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding,
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in,
or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any
property in which any foreign country or national thereof has any interest by any person, or with
respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”38
3. IEEPA does not provide authority to block international communications,39 information or
informational materials.40 Humanitarian aid41 is excepted to the blocking authority; however,
humanitarian aid may be restricted if the President determines that humanitarian aid “would
seriously impair his ability to deal with” the national emergency; is coerced; or would endanger
U.S. armed forces.42
4. Until 2001, IEEPA did not authorize the vesting of property, i.e., taking title to blocked or
frozen property. With the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act43 in 2001, IEEPA provides
authority for the President, during “armed hostilities” or when the United States has been
attacked, to confiscate property of foreign persons, organizations, or countries he has determined
to have “planned, authorized, aided or engaged in” the armed hostilities or attacks and to vest title
in any agency or person for the benefit of the United States.44 The first and, to date only, use of

37 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (a)(1)(A).
38 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (a)(1)(B). The USA PATRIOT Act, P.L. 107-56, § 106(1)(B), 115 Stat. 277, added “block during
the pendency of an investigation.”
39 50 U.S.C. § 1702(3)(b)(1) specifies that the authority granted to the President does not include authority to regulate
“any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of anything of
value.”
40 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2).
41 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3). It has been held that the plain language of the statute does not include monetary aid within
the humanitarian aid exception. Veterans Peace Convoy Inc. v. Schultz, 722 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Tex. 1988); Holy Land
Foundation for Relief and Development v. Aschroft
, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D. D.C 2002), aff’d 333 F. 3d 156 (D.C. Cir
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004). OFAC.’s refusal of a license to a Quaker wishing to contribute $2,000 to a
Canadian Friends organization to aid North and South Vietnam non-combatants was upheld in Welch v. Kennedy, 319
F. Supp. 945 (D.D.C. 1970) with the court noting the possibility that any funds or supplies sent to North Vietnam
would be diverted from civilian purposes to free up funds for military weaponry.
42 50 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2).
43 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
44 The statute reads,
... the President may ... when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked
by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that [the President]
determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against the
United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as,
and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the President may
designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe,
such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with
in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may
perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes. P.L. 107-
(continued...)
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¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
this power under IEEPA occurred on March 20, 2003. On that date, in Executive Order 13290,
President Bush ordered the blocked “property of the Government of Iraq and its agencies,
instrumentalities, or controlled entities” to be vested “in the Department of the Treasury.... [to] be
used to assist the Iraqi people and to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq.”45 A subsequent
executive order ordered further blocking and confiscation of property of former Iraqi officials and
their families and the vesting of title in the Department of the Treasury to be transferred to the
Development Fund for Iraq to be “used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the
economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of
Iraq, for the cost of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefitting of the Iraqi
people.”46
Unlike the language of TWEA, the language of IEEPA appears to withhold certain powers from
the President: (1) IEEPA provides no explicit authority over purely domestic transactions47; (2)
IEEPA provides no explicit authority to regulate gold and silver bullion48; (3) IEEPA provides no
explicit authority to seize records49; and (4) IEEPA provides no authority to interfere with
international communications.50 Because IEEPA covers “any interest” in property by a foreign
national or government and provides the President with expansive power to issue interpretative
regulations,51 there has been some speculation that “any large scale financial transaction, even if it
involved only United States parties, might be subject to regulation if it affected the economy of a
foreign nation.”52
Constitutional challenges to actions taken under IEEPA’s authority to regulate foreign transactions
and property have generally failed. Regulations issued under the authority of IEEPA placing
controls on foreign assets have been upheld against claims of impermissible delegation and

(...continued)
56, § 106, 115 Stat. 272, 277, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C).
45 Exec. Order No. 13,290, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,307 (March 24, 2003).
46 Exec. Order No. 13,315, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,315 (September 3, 2003).
47 Section 5(b) of TWEA includes language authorizing the President in wartime to regulate an array of financial
transactions, including inter alia, “transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution”
“by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. App. §
5(b)(1). IEEPA’s grant of authority over such financial transactions runs only “to the extent that such transfers or
payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof.” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(A)(ii).
48 Included in the language of section 5(b) of TWEA is the authority to regulate “the importing, exporting, hoarding,
melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion.” 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)(1)(A).
49 IEEPA provides authority to order recordkeeping and production of records, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(2), but does not
include authority as included in TWEA to require “if necessary to the national security or defense, the seizure, of any
books of account, records, contracts, letters, memoranda, or other papers, in the custody or control of” persons required
to keep reports on covered transactions. 50 U.S.C. § 5(b)(B).
50 Section 3 of TWEA includes authority to censor international communications, 50 U.S.C. App. § 3; IEEPA states
that “[t]he authority granted to the President by this section does not include the authority to regulate or prohibit,
directly or indirectly ... any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, orother personal communication, which does not involve a
transfer of any thing of value.” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(3)(b).
51 50 U.S.C. § 1703 provides that “[t]he President may issue such regulations, including regulations prescribing
definitions, as may be necessary for the exercise of the authorities granted by this chapter.”
52 Note, “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to Control Presidential
Emergency Power,” 86 Harvard L. Rev. 1102, 1110 - 1111(footnote omitted) (1983). The author reasoned: “It is
unlikely that any significant economic activity in the United States would not be reached under such a theory of
presidential power, given the current interdependence of the world’s industrial economies.” Id. at 1111.
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ŝȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.53 The fact that blocked assets are those of a
U.S. person and purely domestic has not been held to place them beyond the reach of the
President’s power to subject them to freeze orders under IEEPA so long as there is an “interest”54
of a foreign country or national.55 Moreover, provided the executive order declaring the national
emergency makes the requisite findings with respect to regulating humanitarian assistance, a
freeze order directed against assets intended for humanitarian aid is enforceable.56 It has also been
held that notice and a pre-seizure hearing are not constitutionally mandated with respect to freeze
orders.57 It has also withstood challenge on first amendment grounds.58
The Supreme Court has upheld Presidential exercise of authority under IEEPA on very broad
grounds, saying that when “taken pursuant to specific congressional authorization, it is ‘supported

53 In Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F. 2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966), the indefinite freezing of a Cuban
national’s U.S. bank account pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations was upheld against claims of
impermissible delegation by Congress to the President and by the President to the Department of the Treasury. The
court also ruled that the regulations did not constitute a taking both because, without vesting, there was no transfer of
title, hence no taking, and because the regulations were found to have provided adequate due process protections.
54 “Interest” is defined in OFAC regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.311 - .312 to mean “an interest of any nature whatsoever,
direct or indirect.” The Supreme Court has ruled that “any interest” may be construed as broadly as possible. Regan v.
Wald
, 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
55 In Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d 315 F. 3d 748 (7th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003), the court upheld an order freezing assets of a U.S. based Muslim charitable
organization pending investigation of its possible links to the September 11 terrorist attack upon the United States.
Although the organization itself was a U.S. person, two of its three directors were resident aliens, i.e., foreign nationals,
who were directly involved in soliciting funds and distributing them abroad. The freeze order was based on Executive
Order No. 13224, declaring a national emergency based on terrorist acts and the threat of further acts of terrorism. In
upholding the freeze order, the court relied on the grant of authority authorized by Congress in the 2001 amendment to
IEEPA, which authorized the President to “block during the pendency of an investigation ... any acquisition, holding,
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of ... any right, power, or privilege
with respect to ... any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person ...
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” According to the court,
Congress’ decision to use repeatedly the word ‘any’ in this section of the statute guides our
interpretation of the President’s power to block during the pendency of an investigation. It is clear
that Congress intended to provide the President with sweeping power to regulate all relevant
property upon his declaration of a national emergency. Furthermore, if Congress had intended to
only authorize the President to block foreign assets that were located within the United States, it
could have made that intention clear. However, repeated use by Congress of the word ‘any’ as well
as its choice of the phrase ‘any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,’ without an
indication that it meant only foreign property, compels our conclusion that the powers granted to
the President under IEEPA include the ability to block purely domestic assets of a U.S. person
pending an investigation. Id. at 793 (emphasis in original).
56 Id. at 794 - 796.
57 Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002). According to the court:
[a]lthough pre-seizure hearing is the constitutional norm, postponement is acceptable in
emergencies.... Risks of error rise when hearings are deferred, but these risks must be balanced
against the potential for loss of life if assets should be put to violent use. Opportunity to obtain
recompense under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a), if the blocking turns out to be invalid,
provides the private party with the very remedy that the Constitution names: just compensation. Id.
at 754 (citations omitted).
58 In Holy Land Foundation v. Aschroft, 333 F. 3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003). cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that “there is no First Amendment right nor any other
constitutional right to support terrorists” and that a freeze order affecting all the property of a Muslim charity supported
by evidence of original sponsorship by, fund raising on behalf of, meetings with, and funneling money to Hamas
supplied sufficient evidence of supporting terrorists.
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¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
by the strongest presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.’”59
¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱ˜ǯȱŗřŚřŞȱ˜ŸŽ›ŠŽȱ
Ž›œ˜—œȱ˜ŸŽ›Žȱ
The executive order does not identify particular persons whose property is to be blocked or
frozen; rather it leaves identification of the particular individuals and entities to the Secretary of
the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. These
individuals are to fall into three categories provided in the executive order:
1. Individuals or entities determined “to have committed, or to pose a significant risk, of
committing an act or acts of violence that have the purpose or effect of ... threatening the peace or
stability of Iraq or the Government of Iraq ... or ... undermining the efforts to promote economic
reconstruction and political reform in Iraq or to provide humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi
people....”60
2. Persons or entities determined “to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, logistical, or technical support for, or goods or services in support of, such an act or acts
of violence or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this
order....”61
3. Persons determined “to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or
on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to this order....”62
The executive order, moreover, provides that these prohibitions include “the making of any
contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person

59 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 (1981), citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
637 (1952). The case involved a plaintiff who had a contract claim against the Iranian government and had secured a
prejudgment attachment pursuant to a general license issued under the regulations implementing Executive Order No.
12170. That executive order invoked IEEPA to declare a national emergency with respect to the seizure of the U.S.
embassy in Tehran and to freeze the assets of the government and the central bank of Iran. Under the Algiers Accords,
an executive agreement with Iran to secure the release of American hostages held in the embassy, all litigation was
terminated; all interests of U.S. nationals in Iranian assets were nullified; all Iranian assets were to be transferred to the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York for transfer to Iran; and claims against Iran or against the assets to be transferred to
Iran were to be subjected to a binding arbitration process—the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. After executive
orders implementing the Algiers Accords had been issued, the plaintiff secured a final judgment, which the district
court suspended. It also vacated the prejudgment attachment and stayed further proceedings. Plaintiff sued to prevent
enforcement of the executive orders and implementing Treasury regulations, alleging that they were unconstitutional to
the extent that they affected its litigation. Ultimately, the Supreme Court interpreted the language of IEEPA to
authorize the President’s action, saying, “where, as here, the settlement of claims ftlinehas been determined to be a
necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our country and another, and where, as
here, we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the President’s action, we are not prepared to say that the President
lacks the power to settle such claims.” Id. at 688.
60 Exec. Order No. 12,438, Section 1(a)(i).
61 Id., Section 1(a)(ii).
62 Id., Section 1(a)(iii)
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şȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order, and ... the receipt of
any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.”63 There is also a
prohibition covering transactions by a U.S. person, or within the United States with the purpose
of evading the prohibitions of the executive order; attempts to violate any of the prohibitions, and
conspiracy formed to violate the executive order’s prohibition.64
In issuing the executive order, the President made the requisite finding with respect to aid and,
thus, prohibited humanitarian assistance65; he also made a finding that for effectiveness sake, no
prior notice need be given to those with a constitutional presence in the United States whose
property and interests in property are to be blocked “because of the ability to transfer funds or
other assets instantaneously.”66
‹“ŽŒ’ŸŽœȱ
Molly Millerwise, spokesperson for the U.S. Department of the Treasury, has reportedly provided
certain information concerning the background and objectives of the executive order, including a
statement that appears to indicate that one of the desired effects of the order is to motivate foreign
financial institutions to voluntarily comply with these prohibitions.67 She also is reported to have
indicated that the executive order: (1) is needed to supplement current sanctions programs
because these cover elements of the former Saddam Hussein regime68 and Al Queda69 but not
insurgent groups now active in Iraq; (2) is intended to apply to “Shia militia groups linked with
Iran, Sunni insurgent groups with sanctuary in Syria and some of the indigenous Iraqi insurgent
groups”; (3) will result in blocking of assets of U.S. residents and citizens “because they’re
actively abetting a panoply of insurgent and militia groups”; (4) will result in a list that Treasury
is compiling of entities and individuals covered by the order that will be ongoing and made
public.70

63 Id., Section 1(b).
64 Id., Section 2.
65 Id., Section 4. Under 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2), humanitarian aid may be prohibited if the President makes a
determination “that such donations (A) would seriously impair his ability to deal with any national emergency declared
under section 1701 ..., (B) are in response to coercion against the proposed recipient or donor, or (C) are in a situation
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by circumstances.”
66 Id., Section 5.
67 Spencer Ackerman, “Treasury: Exec. Order ‘Filling in the Cracks’ of Insurgent Financing,”
http://www.tpmmuckraker.com/archives/003733.php (last visited November 7, 2007).
68 Exec. Order No. 13,315 blocks property of the former Iraqi regime, its senior officials and their family members.
69 On September 23, 2001, President Bush issued an executive order blocking property and prohibiting transactions
with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism. This executive order was based on the President’s
declaring a national emergency involving the “grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign
terrorists ... and the immediate threat of continuing further attacks on the United States. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 68
Fed. Reg. 49,079 (September 25, 2001). “Al Qaida/Islamic Army” heads list of persons and entities initially designated
under this executive order and included in an annex published with it.
70 Spencer Ackerman, “Treasury: Exec. Order ‘Filling in the Cracks’ of Insurgent Financing,”
http://www.tpmmuckraker.com/archives/003733.php, quotes Ms. Millerwise as saying: “Be assured that the individuals
and entities we add to this list are in full faith acting in an aggressive, violent and reckless way in financing the
insurgency,” and as stating that groups making charitable donations to orphans does not seem to be “a valid concern.”
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¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
›Š—œŠŒ’˜—œȱ˜ŸŽ›Žȱ
The executive order blocks “all property and interests in property” of the three categories of
persons, supra at footnote 15, provided that the property or interests in the property is in the
United States or comes within the control of U.S. persons. Although the executive order does not
define “property” or “interest in property,” OFAC regulations define these terms to have a broad
reach. “Interest” when used in connection with property is defined to mean “an interest of any
nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.”71 In defining “property,” the regulations provide a list of
categories but make it clear that the list is “not by way of limitation.”72
–™•Ž–Ž—Š’˜—ȱ›˜ŒŽœœȱ
The executive order leaves the process of designating specific individuals and entities whose
transactions and property are to be frozen or blocked to the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense.73 A list of designees added to OFAC’s
Special Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List74 under this executive order was issued
by Treasury on January 9, 2008.75 It included Ahmed Fouruzandeh, Brigadier General,
Commanding Officer of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, Ramazan
Corps, who “leads terrorist operations against Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces, and
directs assassinations of Iraqi figures.”76 Also included were two Iran-based Iraqi nationals, and
one Syria-based Iraqi national as well as Al-Zawra Television Station, based in Syria. The
Treasury announcement includes a description of the activities of the designees that have led to
the prohibition of transactions between them and any U.S person and the freezing of any of their
assets that are under the jurisdiction of the United States. There is authority for the issuance of
blocking orders prior to OFAC’s listing of persons to be sanctioned under the executive order.77

71 31 C.F.R. § 500.312.
72 31 C.F.R. § 500.311. The list is as follows: “money, checks, drafts, bullion, bank deposits, savings accounts, any
debts, indebtedness obligations, notes, debentures, stocks, bonds, coupons, any other financial securities, bankers’
acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or other right in the nature of security, warehouse receipts, bills of lading, trust
receipts, bills of sale, any other evidences of title, ownership or indebtedness, powers of attorney, goods, wares,
merchandise, chattels, stocks on hand, ships, goods on ships, real estate mortgages, deeds of trust, vendors’ sales
agreements, land contracts, real estate and any interest therein, leaseholds, ground rents, options, negotiable
instruments, trade acceptances, royalties, book accounts, accounts payable, judgments, patents, trademarks, copyrights,
contracts or licenses affecting or involving patents, trademarks or copyrights, insurance policies, safe deposit boxes and
their contents, annuities, pooling agreements, contracts of any nature whatsoever, services, and any other property, real,
personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or interest or interests therein, present, future, or contingent.”
73 Exec. Order No. 13,438, Sec. 1(a).
74 http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/t11sdn.pdf. Names of “blocked persons,” “specially designated
nationals,” and “specially designated terrorists,” with whom U.S. persons may not trade are also published in the
Federal Register and in appendices to 31 C.F.R. “IRAQ3” is the designation given to names added pursuant to
Executive Order 13438.
75 http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp759.htm. U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release HP-859, “Treasury
Designates Individuals, Entity Fueling Iraqi Insurgency.”
76 Id.
77 OFAC apparently has had a practice of blocking accounts prior to formal designation. After the enactment of the
USA PATRIOT Act, IEEPA permits blocking orders pending investigations. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). This authority
was lacking in 1998 when OFAC ordered the freezing of accounts belonging to Salah Idris, owner of the factory
bombed following the terrorist attack on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. After the filing of a law suit
challenging the freeze order, OFAC ordered the accounts unblocked rather than risk having to disclose intelligence
sources. See, Peter L. Fitzgerald, “‘If Property Rights Were Treated Like Human Rights, They Could Never Get Away
(continued...)
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ŗŗȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
The expectation, however, is that ultimately the names of blocked individuals and entities
identified for blocking orders will be publicly disseminated by being added to OFAC’s Special
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List.
The executive order authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretaries
of State and Defense, to issue regulations.78 Although there is a possibility that development of
implementing regulations will be a slow process,79 the expectation is that implementing
regulations will be issued.80 These regulations, will likely elaborate on the executive order’s
prohibition on “the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or
for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked ... and the
receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.”81 It is
expected that implementing regulations will be issued to elaborate on which transactions are
prohibited. Specifically, the regulations are likely to follow the general contours of the now-
discontinued Libyan sanctions82 and the current regulatory scheme applicable to global
terrorism.83 That means that they are likely to include broad bans on trade and financial
transactions, authorize certain activities pursuant to a general license, and permit other activities
pursuant to a specific license, issued upon application to OFAC on a case-by-case basis. If the
regulations follow the model of the global terrorism sanctions, they are likely to specify the types
of legal services that may be provided pursuant to a general license but permit reimbursement
only on the basis of a specific license.84 OFAC regulations prescribe recordkeeping and reporting
requirements applicable to all OFAC sanction programs.85
Ž—Š•’Žœȱ
Violation of sanctions under Executive Order 13438 are subject to the penalties applicable under
IEEPA. With the enactment of P.L. 110-96,86 the civil penalties for IEEPA violations have been
raised to the greater of $250,000 or twice the amount of the transaction on which the penalty is

(...continued)
With This’: Blacklisting and Due Process in U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs,” 51 Hastings Law Journal 73, 111 -
113, 134 (1999) (hereinafter, Fitzgerald, Property Rights), citing Vernon Loeb, “A Dirty Business,” Washington Post,
F1 (July 25, 1999); Milt Bearded, “U.S. Should Admit Its Mistake in Sudan Bombing,” Wall Street Journal, A-20 (May
20, 1999); and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Unfreezes Accounts in Suit on Sudan Bombing,” Wall Street Journal A-8 (May
4, 1999).
78 Exec. Order No. 13,438, Sec. 6.
79 For a list of the time lags between issuance of various executive orders and OFAC’s implementing regulations, see,
Fitzgerald, Property Rights, at 111 - 113.
80 See supra, footnote 56 and accompanying text indicating that Treasury will issue regulations and make public the
names of persons and entities included on the list. In the interim, OFAC may follow its past practices and operate the
sanctions program informally or administratively by issuing unpublished notices and authorizations equivalent to
general licenses, which will later be incorporated into the promulgated regulations when they are published in the
Federal Register. Details of the use of this method are summarized in Fitzgerald, Property Rights, at 114 - 115.
81 Exec. Order No. 13,438, Section 1(b).
82 31 C.F.R., Part 550 (2004), discontinued by Exec. Order No. 13,357, Termination of Emergency Declared in
Executive Order 12543 With Respect to the Policies and Actions of the Government of Libya and Revocation of
Related Executive Orders (September 20, 2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 56, 665 (September 22, 2004).
83 31 C.F.R. Part 594.
84 See e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 594.506.
85 31 C.F.R. Part 501.
86 121 Stat. 1101, 50 U.S.C. §1705 (2007).
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŘȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
based; criminal penalties have been raised to $1,000,000 and 20 years imprisonment. Previously,
the civil penalty prescribed was a fine of up to $50,000 for violation of a license, order, or
regulation issued under its authority and criminal penalties of up to $50,000 and twenty years
imprisonment.87
ŽŠŒ‘ȱ
Executive Order 13438 covers essentially five categories of individuals or entities: (1) those
committing acts of violence having the effect of destabilizing Iraq; (2) those committing acts of
violence with the purpose of destabilizing Iraq; (3) those posing a significant risk of committing
such acts of violence; (4) those providing support for such acts of violence and (5) those
providing support for any person whose property has been blocked pursuant to the executive
order. The executive order also forbids transactions by U.S. persons that evade or have the
purpose of evading the prohibitions of the executive order, attempts to avoid the order, and
conspiracies to violate the order. The potential reach of this executive order is broad. In addition
to persons whose property may be controlled based on an act or risk of violence destabilizing
Iraq, persons aiding or supporting such act of violence or supporting anyone may also be the
target of property controls whether they are U.S. citizens or not and whether the act of violence
occurs in Iraq or elsewhere. Anyone supplying financial, material, logistical, or technical support
or goods and services for such acts of violence or for anyone whose property is blocked pursuant
to the order may also have their property blocked whether or not they are United States citizens.
How broadly that authority will be applied or interpreted awaits OFAC’s issuance of
implementing regulations and identification of blocked individuals and entities. For example,
although the executive order does not limit potential targets to “foreign” persons, as some
executive orders have done,88 OFAC could produce a list of blocked persons that includes no U.S.
persons. A Treasury Department spokesperson89 has indicated that the primary focus of any list
implementing the executive order will be on foreigners by saying that the list, when issued,90 will

87 50 U.S.C. § 1705. Other statutes which carry penalties may also apply, e.g., the United Nations Participation Act (22
U.S.C. § 287c(b) and 18 U.S.C. 3751) authorizes criminal and civil penalties as well as forfeiture of property concerned
in the violation.
88 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13224 of September 23, 2001, 66 Fed Reg. 4909, Blocking Property and Prohibiting
Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism.
89 Spencer Ackerman, “Treasury: Exec. Order ‘Filling in the Cracks’ of Insurgent Financing,” quoting “Treasury
Department spokeswoman, Molly Millerwise,” TPMMUCKRAKER.COM (July 19, 2007)
http://www.tpmmuckraker.com/archives/003733.php.
90 One commentator has described the OFAC designation process as follows:
According to the Administration, ‘a number of U.S. agencies, including the Treasury, State, Justice,
the FBI and the intelligence community, review open source and confidential information,
including tips and leads, about persons and entities who commit, threaten to commit or support
terrorism.’ A ‘subset of agencies’ is then responsible for developing a file on the entity, which is
then reviewed by a ‘larger group’ before it is forwarded to the National Security Council. The
Security Council ‘convenes a meeting of Deputy Agency heads’ who make a recommendation to
the Secretary of the Treasury, who, in cooperation with the Secretary of State [with respect to
Executive Order No. 13348, Secretary of Defense] and Attorney General, issues a final designation
and a blocking order. This blocking order is implemented by OFAC, pursuant to the President’s
mandate ... [in the executive order] gives the entity no prior notice that its assets will be frozen.
Upon issuance of the blocking order, the entity is told that its assets have been frozen, its name is
published in the Federal Register, and this information is disseminated to financial institutions.
Nicole Nice-Peterson, “Justice for the ‘Designated’: The Process That Is Due to Alleged Financiers of Terrorism, 2005
(continued...)
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗřȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
include “Shia militia groups linked with Iran, Sunni insurgent groups with sanctuary in Syria and
some of the indigenous Iraqi insurgent groups.”91 The practice, however, since September 11,
2001, has been that foreign terrorists have formed the preponderance of designees on OFAC’s
lists, but blocking orders, seizures, and penalties have been directed against U.S. persons based
on allegations that they have in their possession property or interests in property which is either
legally or beneficially the property of a designated or blocked person, or that they have been
conducting prohibited transactions in blocked property or with blocked persons. The
piggybacking potential of the executive order has also raised questions.92 The issue is whether the
executive order’s application to anyone who provides “support” for a designated entity might
affect U.S. persons inadvertently involved in some form of assistance, such as arranging
transportation for, selling consumer goods to, or providing routine legal assistance to an entity
which becomes blocked under the executive order. Could such U.S. persons find themselves
designated under the authority of the executive order and thereby have all of their assets subject
to blocking whether or not the assets have any nexus with the transaction with the blocked entity
or with any foreign entity?
›ŽŒŽŽ—œȱ
With respect to those whose property is to be blocked on the grounds of providing material
assistance to those who are designated as committing or posing a significant risk of committing
acts of violence, the scope covered by the executive order has raised an array of questions such
as: (1) To what extent are peaceful demonstrations or demonstrations that include limited violence
and public criticism of U.S. policy in Iraq potentially subject to the executive order? (2) To what
extent are lawyers representing persons and entities on the list subject to the order? (3) To what
extent are donors to various U.S. charities operating internationally subject to the order?
These and other questions raised by the executive order, itself, are likely to be further clarified
when regulations are issued by OFAC. Such regulations, moreover, are likely to be similar to
those issued in other situations. An example of how OFAC implements financial transaction and
property controls imposed under executive orders invoking IEEPA is illustrative. The Global
Terrorist Sanctions Program93 implements Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001.94 That

(...continued)
Georgetown Law Journal 1287, 1394 (2005) (footnotes omitted). (Exec, Order No. 13,348, 69 Fed. Reg. 44,885 (July
27, 2004), blocks property of certain persons and prohibits the importation of certain goods from Liberia.)
91 Millerwise statement, See supra, footnote 64. Ms. Millerwise did not foreclose the possibility of listing U.S.
nationals, but indicated that compiling the list would be an exercise in precision, saying, “‘Be assured that individual
and entities we add to this list are in full faith acting in an aggressive, violent and reckless way in financing the
insurgency.... These things are strongly vetted, going layers and layers back. (A group) donating money to orphans
getting swept up in this doesn’t seem to be a valid concern.’”
92 See, Pincus, supra .footnote 3, who states that “... the text of the order, if interpreted broadly, could cast a far bigger
net to include not just those who commit violent acts or pose the risk of doing so in Iraq, but also third parties—such as
U.S. citizens in this country—who knowingly or unknowingly aid or encourage such people.”
93 31 C.F.R. Part 594.
94 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079. In addition to the Global Terrorists Sanctions, OFAC administers two other sanctions programs:
(1) the Terrorist Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R., Part 595, implementing Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995,
60 Fed. Reg. 5,079, which declared a national emergency with respect to “grave acts of violence committed by foreign
terrorists that disrupt the Middle East peace process” and (2) the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R., Part 597, implementing provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, P.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1248 - 1253, 8 U.S.C. § 1189, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŚȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
executive order declared a national emergency with respect to “grave acts of terrorism and threats
of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists.” It contained a list of foreign terrorist persons and
provided authority for administrative designations of various categories of persons, some of
which need not be confined to foreign persons.95 Subsequently, some U.S. based charitable
organizations were listed on OFAC’s terrorist lists.96 Under the Global Terrorism Regulations,
U.S. financial institutions are required to take precautions lest they engage in prohibited
transactions.97 The names of persons whose property is blocked are published both on OFAC’s
website and in the Federal Register.98 The regulations prohibit various transactions and specify
procedures to comply with the prohibitions99and define applicable terms.100 They also specify
such matters as the nullification of property transfers made in violation of the regulations,101
report and recordkeeping requirements,102 and penalties and penalty procedures.103
The reach of Executive Order 13438 is not unprecedented. The language is similar to at least one
other order, Executive Order No. 13219 of June 25, 2001, Blocking Property of Persons Who
Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans.104 That executive order,
among other things, authorizes property and transaction controls with respect to persons
designated by the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the Secretary of State as having
committed or posing “a significant risk of committing, acts of violence that have the purpose or
effect of threatening the peace or diminishing the stability or security of any area or state in the
Western Balkans regime, undermining the authority, efforts or objectives of international
organizations or entities present in the region, or endangering the safety of persons participating
in or providing support to the activities of those international organizations or entities.” Also
covered by Executive Order No. 13219 are persons determined “to have actively obstructed, or
pose a significant risk of actively obstructing, the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001 relating
to Macedonia, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 relating to Kosovo or the
Dayton Accords or the Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held in London on
December 8-9, 1995, including the decisions or conclusions of the High Representative, the Peace

95 It authorized designation of (1) “foreign persons determined by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts
of terrorism that threaten, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S.
nationals or the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States”; (2) “persons determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to be owned or
controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of” persons designated under the executive order; and (3) with certain provisos,
“persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General (i) to assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other
services to or in support of, such acts of terrorism” of persons designated under the executive order, or (ii) “otherwise
associated with” designated persons. Exec. Order. No. 13, 224, section 1, 66 Federal Register 49079 - 49980.
96 See http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting/fto.shtml, Designated Charities and Potential
Fundraising Front Organizations for FTOs (listed by affiliation and designation date).
97 Exec. Order 13,224, section 2, like Executive Order 13438, prohibits transactions by U.S. persons in property or
interests in property blocked pursuant to the order; transactions by U.S. persons evading or having the purpose of
evading or attempting to violate the prohibitions of the executive order; and any conspiracy to violate any of the
prohibitions of the executive order.
98 31 C.F.R. § 594.201, note 2 to paragraph (a).
99 31 C.F.R. §§ 594.201 - 594.206.
100 31 C.F.R. §§ 594.311 - 594.315.
101 31 C.F.R. § 594.202.
102 31 C.F.R. § 594.601.
103 31 C.F.R. §§ 594.701 - 594.705.
104 66 Fed. Reg. 3,477, as amended by Executive Order No. 13304 §§ 3,4, May 28, 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 32,315.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗśȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
Implementation Council or its Steering Board relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina.”105 The
executive order includes an annex listing the names of blocked individuals and entities, a list
which has been expanded and is now found at the beginning of OFAC’s list of Specially
Designated Nationals.106
Given the concern that Executive Order 13438 might place lawyers providing legal assistance to
targets of the freeze orders at risk, it might be helpful to note that on July 9, 2003, OFAC issued a
general license to permit U.S. persons to provide professional legal services relating to the
representation of persons whose property is blocked in matters pending before the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.107
˜›—Ž¢Ȭ•’Ž—ȱ –™•’ŒŠ’˜—œȱ
The potential impact of OFAC regulations on attorney-client relationships has been the focus of
some litigation and commentary in legal journals.108 The one federal case that has dealt with the
issue is American Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan.109 It held that, under the Cuban sanctions,
OFAC had authority to require a license for payment of legal fees from blocked assets, but not to
“condition the bare formation of an attorney-client relationship on advance government
approval.”110 The holding does not rest on constitutional grounds, but rather on the court’s
analysis of whether preventing a designated entity from obtaining counsel could be said to further
the purposes for which the particular provision of TWEA on which OFAC relied had been
enacted. By concluding that the basic intent of Congress was to deny an enemy nation use of
economic resources, the court found that access to legal services, without access to any blocked
funds, was not within the coverage contemplated by TWEA. Language in the opinion suggests
that OFAC’s exercise of the power to prevent a designated person from consulting an attorney
might raise due process concerns as tantamount to denying the person the right to a meaningful
challenge of the designation.
Despite the American Airways ruling, OFAC’s regulations continue to include bans on the
provision of legal services. Some of the recent regulations differ both in purpose and scope from
those at issue in American Airways. Whether the differences will be sufficient for courts to find
that OFAC’s reach extends to the formation of lawyer-client relationships with blocked persons is
a question that remains unanswered until a proper case is presented. OFAC’s Global Terrorism
Sanctions Regulations, promulgated after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which might
form the model for regulations to be issued under Executive Order 13438, differ from the

105 Executive Order No. 13219, as amended, § 1(B) and (C); 50 U.S.C. § 1701, note.
106 http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/prgrmlst.txt.
107 http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/balkans/gls/balkans_gl1.pdf, General License No. 1, Legal
Representation in Matters Pending before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
108 Two courts have found OFAC without authority to prevent the mere formation of an attorney-client relationship:
American Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F. 2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Looper v. Morgan, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10241 (S.D. Tex. 1995). Others have found that an attorney’s lack of an OFAC license is not a bar to court jurisdiction;
Comet Enterprises Ltd. v. Air-A-Plane Corp., 128 F. 3d 855 (4th Cir. 1997); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez,
741 F. 2d 355 (11th Cir. 1984); National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del. 1990). See also Jill
M. Troxel, “Office of Foreign Assets Control Regulations: Making Attorneys Choose Between Compliance and the
Attorney-Client Relationship, 24 Review of Litigation 637 (2005); Michael P. Malloy, “Economic Sanctions and
Retention of Counsel,” 9 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 515 (1995).
109 746 F. 2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
110 Id., at 866 - 867.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŜȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
sanctions at issue in American Airways. They rely on the authority of IEEPA rather than TWEA
and focus on private individuals and entities rather than on a particular foreign nation. Moreover,
they coincide with the changed congressional focus reflected in the post September 11, 2001
IEEPA amendments and the tendency of the courts to uphold OFAC’s authority in the face of
constitutional challenges.111
Many of the OFAC regulations prohibit the provision of services, including legal services, to
designated persons or blocked entities and require a specific license for all but a limited list of
legal services for which a general license112 is provided in the regulations.113 For reimbursement
for any legal services, application must be made to OFAC for a specific license.114
OFAC’s Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations illustrate this framework. Under 31 C.F.R. §
594.406, “U.S. persons115 may not, except as authorized by or pursuant to this part, provide legal
... services to a person whose property or interests in property are blocked pursuant to §
594.201(a).”116 Under 31 C.F.R. § 594.506, five types of legal services are authorized “provided
that all receipts of payment of professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses must be
specifically licensed.”117 Other legal services must be specifically licensed.118 The types of legal
services which may be provided without a specific license are:
(1) Provision of legal advice and counseling on the requirements of and compliance with the
laws of any jurisdiction within the United States, provided that such advice and counseling
are not provided to facilitate transactions in violation of this part;
(2) Representation of persons when named as defendants in or otherwise made parties to
domestic U.S. legal, arbitration, or administrative proceedings;
(3) Initiation and conduct of domestic U.S. legal, arbitration, or administrative proceedings
in defense of property interests subject to U.S. jurisdiction;

111 Troxel, supra footnote 103, at 662 - 666.
112 “General license” is defined in 31 C.F.R. § 500.317; licensing procedures are set forth in 31 C.F.R. § 501.801. In
addition to general licenses specified in regulations, general licenses may be issued for sanction programs not yet
codified in regulations.
113 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 594.406, which is the provision of services provision of the Global Terrorism Sanctions
Regulations. It also might be noted that there is always the possibility that OFAC will require documentation or reports
in connection with a general license. Under 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(a), “persons availing themselves of certain general
licenses may be required to file reports and statements in accordance with the instructions specified in those licenses.”
114 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 515.212 (Cuba); 31 C.F.R. § 536.506 (Narcotics Trafficking); 31 C.F.R. §537.507 (Burma);
31 C.F.R. § 538.505 (Sudan); 31 C.F.R. 541.507 (Zimbawe); 31 C.F.R. § 542.507 (Syria); 31 C.F.R. § 545.513
(Taliban); 31 C.F.R. § 560.525 (Iran—general license authorizes a longer list of legal services and payment of fees and
reimbursement of costs for all listed legal services); 31 C.F.R. § 586.509 (Kosovo); 31 C.F.R. § 587.507 (Yugoslavia—
Milosevic); 31 C.F.R. § 588.507 (Yugoslavia—Kosovo); 31 C.F.R. § 594.506 (Global Terrorism); 31 C.F.R. § 595.506
(Terrorism); and 31 C.F.R. § 598.507 (Foreign Narcotics Kingpin).
115 “United States person” is defined for purposes of the Global Terrorism Sanctions Program as “any United States
citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States (including foreign branches), or
any person in the United States.” 31 C.F.R. § 594.404.
116 31 C.F.R. § 201(a) defines those persons whose property has been blocked under the executive orders covering
global terrorism.
117 The procedures for specific licenses are detailed in 31 C.F.R. § 801(b).
118 31 C.F.R. § 594.506(b).
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŝȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
(4) Representation of persons before any federal or state agency with respect to the
imposition, administration, or enforcement of U.S. sanctions against such persons; and
(5) Provision of legal services in any other context in which prevailing U.S. law requires
access to legal counsel at public expense.119
The descriptions of legal services permitted under the general license have been criticized as
ambiguous and narrow.120 For example, the first one authorizes providing legal counsel to comply
with U.S. laws. but not to facilitate prohibited transactions without any elaboration on how to
distinguish what is allowed from what may cross the line and subject the lawyer to liability.121
This might mean that any prudent lawyer will decide not to provide any legal services regarding
attempted transactions without securing a specific license. The fact that OFAC’s list is ever-
growing with names added frequently also means that lawyers providing legal services to clients
involved in business transactions with designated persons or entities prior to their designation
likely must apply for a specific license to continue the legal services since the general licenses
apply only to legal services provided to or on behalf of blocked persons, not to individuals and
entities involved in transactions with them.122
ȱ–’—’œ›Š’ŸŽȱ›˜ŒŽž›Žœȱ
OFAC regulations specify procedures for imposing and challenging penalties imposed under
TWEA123 and for each of the sanctions programs operating under authority of IEEPA.124 Among
the rights provided in connection with TWEA sanctions are: right to receive a prepenalty
notice,125 right to provide a written response to the prepenalty notice,126 right to request a hearing

119 31 C.F.R. § 594.506(a)(1) - (5).
120 See, Troxel, supra footnote 103, at 648 - 650.
121 Since the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations prohibit “any transaction by any U.S. person or within the United
States on or after the effective date that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate
any of the prohibitions set forth.” 31 C.F.R. § 594.205.
122 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 594.506(a) (Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations). The implications of an OFAC
requirement for a specific license to maintain an existing attorney-client relationship is explored within the context of
representing a defendant before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Anne Back
and Sylvia Tonova, “No Legal Representation Without Governmental ‘Interposition,’” 17 Georgetown Journal of Legal
Ethics 597 (2004). Exec. Order No. 13,304, 68 Fed. Reg. 32,315 (May 28, 2003), added to the designees under the
Western Balkans Stabilization Regulations (Yugoslavia), names of individuals under indictment by the ICTY.
Responding to an inquiry, OFAC informed the attorneys that their activity was not covered by the general license,
thereby, prompting some of them to seek suspension of the case rather than face the prospect of OFAC penalties.
Subsequently, OFAC revised its position and granted a general license by letter entitled, “31 C.F.R. Part 588 General
License No. 1, authorizing legal representation of ICTY defendants named in the Executive Order.” Although the
general license covered provision of legal services, it did not extend to payment from any source other than the ICTY.
123 31 C.F.R. §§ 501.701 - 501.747.
124 Procedures for each sanction program, other than those imposed under the authority of TWEA, are detailed
separately within the regulations applicable to each sanctions programs. The procedures applicable to OFAC’s
imposition of penalties under the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations are found at 31 C.F.R., Part 594. They
include notice of the potential penalties which may be imposed under the various statutes (IEEPA, the United Nations
Participation Act, and 18 U.S.C. § 1001), and the right to a prepenalty notice. Also specified are: the right to respond to
the prepenalty notice; the right to a written notice imposing a penalty; and the right to be notified that imposition of a
penalty is final agency action, appealable to a federal district court.
125 31 C.F.R. § 501.706.
126 31 C.F.R. §§ 501.706(b)(2) and 501.707.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗŞȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
on the record127 before an administrative law judge for any penalty assessed,128 right to discovery
in preparation for the hearing (subject to various privileges),129 and, an opportunity—after the
hearing—to file proposed findings and conclusions of law.130 There is also the possibility of an
OFAC review of the administrative law judge’s conclusion.131
The regulations also include an appendix detailing OFAC’s procedures for enforcement of
sanctions as they relate to banking institutions supervised by one of the federal banking
regulators.132 Among its highlights are annexes providing “Risk Matrices,” which banking
institutions may use to evaluate their compliance programs,133 and an outline of “Sound Banking
Institution OFAC Compliance Programs.”134 The enforcement procedures cover such issues as:
(1) the effect of voluntary disclosure by an institution with respect to a violation of the
sanctions135; (2) OFAC’s policy of acting promptly in the face of significant violations, leaving
other apparent violations for inclusion in periodic reviews scheduled according to an institution’s
“risk profile.”136; and (3) OFAC coordination with the banking regulators in determining use of
enforcement tools.137 The civil enforcement tools which OFAC may use against a banking
institution include administrative subpoenas, cease and desist orders, evaluation letters, civil
penalty proceedings, and suspension or revocation of OFAC licenses.138 OFAC may refer
potential criminal violations to the Department of Justice and also pursue civil penalties.139 There
is also a list of factors which OFAC will consider in determining whether to impose any civil
penalties. It includes such factors as the institution’s history of sanctions violations, its
compliance programs, the size of the institution in relation to number of violations, and whether
the violations are atypical. Also included are the following considerations: whether there has been
a voluntary disclosure by the institution or an effort to conceal, the harm attributable to the
violation, whether the institution has undertaken actions to correct the situation, and OFAC’s
evaluation of the potential deterrent effect of a sanction.140

127 31 C.F.R. § 501.739.
128 31 C.F.R. 501.711.
129 31 C.F.R. § 501.723.
130 31 C.F.R. § 501.735.
131 31 C.F.R § 501.741. This is not a right, but a request for a review is a prerequisite for federal court review of the
agency’s decision under the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704.
132 These are: the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
National Credit Union Administration, and the Office of Thrift Supervision.
133 31 C.F.R., Part 501, Appendix A, Annex A. Both of the risk matrices are taken from the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council’s Bank Secrecy Act Anti-Money Laundering Examination (2005).
134 31 C.F.R., Part 501, Annex B. The major components which OFAC includes in its outline of sound compliance
programs are: identifying high risk business areas; maintaining internal controls; conducting testing; identifying
responsible individuals; and providing appropriate training.
135 31 C.F.R., Part 501, Annex A, I (D).
136 31 C.F.R., Part 501, Appendix A, II (B).
137 31 C.F.R., Part 501, Appendix A, II (A).
138 31 C.F.R., Part 501, Appendix A, II (A).
139 31 C.F.R., Part 501, Appendix A, II (C).
140 31 C.F.R., Part 501, Appendix A, IV.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗşȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
‘Š••Ž—’—ȱŽœ’—Š’˜—œȱ
OFAC regulations include provisions governing availability of information,141 procedures to have
funds unblocked on grounds of mistaken identity,142 and procedures for removing names from
OFAC’s lists of designated persons.143 With respect to release of information, the regulation
covers only: public information available under the Freedom of Information Act144; information
which the Privacy Act145 requires to be made available to individuals; OFAC forms; and
information on civil penalties.146 The regulations specify that OFAC must release certain
information on its website with respect to the civil penalties which it has imposed, including the
name and address of the entity penalized; the sanctions program involved; a description of the
violation; whether there was voluntary disclosure; and, whether there is a settlement or imposition
of penalty. Names of individuals may not be released, and OFAC may choose to disclose more
information than required.147 There is no indication of the extent to which OFAC must or may
disclose any information concerning the evidence relied on for making a designation under a
sanctions program or for blocking transactions and property. Challenges to IEEPA designations
confront the prospect that the evidence on which the government has based its designation is
classified and may be presented to the court ex parte and in camera.148
The OFAC regulations also include general provisions permitting challenges to blocking orders
on the grounds of mistaken identity. Under 31 C.F.R. § 501.806, a person whose funds have been
blocked who believes that there has been mistaken identity may challenge the order by following
the prescribed procedures. These require a written request to OFAC containing various
information about the transaction being blocked and the basis on which the applicant believes the
blocking to have resulted from mistaken identity.
OFAC’s regulations provide procedures to: (1) have funds unblocked that have been blocked
through mistaken identity149 and (2) have a designation reconsidered or to assert that changed
circumstances have rendered a designation inapplicable.150 Persons named to one of the terrorists
lists may challenge the designation by presenting arguments or evidence that there is an
insufficient basis for the designation.151 The same officer responsible for making the designation,
OFAC’s director, is responsible for reviewing the challenge to the designation. The regulations
contain no specifications with respect to the review process, such as requirements for a written
record, a hearing on the record, or specified time line for consideration of the challenge to the
designation. Without a full written record, for a federal court challenge to an OFAC designation to

141 31 C.F.R. § 501.805.
142 31 C.F.R. § 501.806.
143 31 C.F.R. § 501.807.
144 5 U.S.C. § 552.
145 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
146 31 C.F.R. §§ 501.805 (a), (b)and (d).
147 31 C.F.R. § 501.806.
148 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) provides that “[i]n any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the
determination was based on classified information ... such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex
parte and in camera.”
149 31 C.F.R. § 501.806.
150 31 C.F.R. § 807.
151 31 C.F.R. § 501.807.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŘŖȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
succeed, the plaintiff must convince the court that OFAC’s designation is arbitrary and capricious;
were a full record available, the issue might be whether the designation was based on substantial
evidence in the record.152
In mistaken identity applications, any party to a transaction in which funds have been blocked
may direct a written request to OFAC for the release of the funds. That request must include
various types of specific information and documentation, such as: the identity of the requester, the
nature of the transaction and of the applicant’s interest in the transaction, the amount in question,
and why the applicant believes that the transaction has been blocked due to mistaken identity.153
Upon receipt of this information, OFAC may require the applicant to provide more
documentation.154 There have been instances in which listed persons have been able to have their
names removed from OFAC’s lists by showing that OFAC has made a mistake. In 1989, for
example, an OFAC list of specially designated Cuban nationals included the Spanish
government’s tobacco monopoly, Tabacalera; a month later the company was removed from the
list.155
˜Ž—’Š•ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜ȱȱŽœ’—Š’˜—œȱ
OFAC designations have repercussions both in the United States and in terms of the international
banking system. OFAC has characterized its anti-terrorism economic sanctions programs as a
“wide-ranging assault on international terrorism and its supporters and financiers,” and reported
that these programs have resulted in the blocking, as of December 31, 2006, of $16 million in
terrorist assets of which $7 million is that of Al-Qaida.156 The total dollar amount of terrorist
assets which have been blocked does not represent the total effect of the economic sanctions.
When OFAC designates an organization or an individual under its terrorists’ programs, the impact
may extend beyond assets frozen by the United States. Not only does the international banking
community have to provide transparency in its transactions with U.S. financial institutions to
prevent them from unknowingly handling prohibited transactions, but the designation of an
international terrorist may inspire international cooperation. OFAC reports that “banks and other
private institutions around the world voluntarily consult OFAC’s [terrorist] list[s] and routinely
report denying access to their institutions.”157


152 In its Final Report to Congress, the Judicial Review Commission on Foreign Asset Control, 113-116 (2001),
mentioned this possible consequence of what it had identified as deficiencies in OFAC’s administrative process: lack of
an appeal process, inability to review the record on which OFAC based its decision, lack of a right to a prompt post- or
pre-designation hearing, and lack of requirements for a written record.
153 A list of requirements is contained in 31 C.F.R. §§ 501.806(b) - (d).
154 31 C.F.R. § 806(e) references 31 C.F.R. § 501.602, which authorizes OFAC to require production under oath of
reports and records of any transaction subject to OFAC’s regulations, including “the production of any books of
account, letters or other papers connected with any such transaction or property, in the custody or control of the persons
required to make such reports.” The regulation also authorizes OFAC to issue subpoenas to require attendance and
testimony of witness and production of documents relating to any matter under investigation.
155 54 Fed. Reg. 49,258, 24,259 (November 29, 1989); 55 Fed.Reg. 2, 644, 2,645 (January 26, 1990).
156 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Terrorist Assets Report: Calendar Year 2006, 1
- 2 and 8. The Report notes that the $16 million figure “does not include amounts reported to OFAC as blocked where
the appropriateness of the blocking is under review.” Id. at 2.
157 Id. at 10.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Řŗȱ

¡ŽŒž’ŸŽȱ›Ž›ȱŗřŚřŞDZȱ•˜Œ”’—ȱ›˜™Ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŽ›Š’—ȱŽ›œ˜—œȱ‘˜ȱ‘›ŽŠŽ—ȱŠ‹’•’£Š’˜—ȱ
ȱ
ž‘˜›ȱ˜—ŠŒȱ —˜›–Š’˜—ȱ

M. Maureen Murphy

Legislative Attorney
mmurphy@crs.loc.gov, 7-6971




˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŘŘȱ