Order Code RL32724
Mexico-U.S. Relations:
Issues for Congress
Updated November 14, 2008
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Colleen W. Cook
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Alessandra Durand
Research Associate
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Summary
The United States and Mexico have a close and complex bilateral relationship,
with extensive economic linkages as neighbors and partners under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Bilateral relations are generally
friendly, although the U.S. enactment of border fence legislation in 2006 caused
some tension in the relationship. Drug trafficking issues are prominent in relations
since Mexico is the leading transit country for cocaine, a leading supplier of
methamphetamine and heroin, and the leading foreign supplier of marijuana to the
United States.
In October 2007, the United States and Mexico proposed the Mérida Initiative
to combat drug trafficking, gangs, and organized crime in Mexico and Central
America. In legislative action in June 2008 on H.R. 2642 (P.L. 110-252), Congress
appropriated $400 million for Mexico — $352 million in FY2008 supplemental
assistance and $48 million in FY2009 bridge fund supplemental assistance.
Shortly after taking office in December 2006, President Felipe Calderón of the
conservative National Action Party (PAN) launched operations against Mexican drug
cartels. He has sent some 40,000 soldiers and 5,000 federal police to drug trafficking
“hot-spots,” and is contending with an escalation of drug violence throughout the
country. Calderón has increased extraditions to the United States, and has
demonstrated an unprecedented willingness to reach out for counternarcotics
assistance from the United States while also calling for increased U.S. efforts on
arms trafficking and a reduction in the U.S. demand for illicit drugs.
In his first two years in office, President Calderón secured approval of several
major reforms, including fiscal and pension reforms in 2007, and judicial and energy
reforms in 2008. An unexpected challenge for Calderón is the effect of the recent
global financial crisis on the Mexican economy, which already has led to a decline
in the stock market, the value of the peso, and remittances from Mexicans abroad.
Migration, border security, and trade issues also have dominated the bilateral
relationship in recent years. Comprehensive immigration reform was debated early
in the 110th Congress, but the issue was put aside following a failed cloture motion
in the Senate on the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (S. 1348). In
September 2006, Congress approved the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-367)
to authorize the construction of a border fence and other barriers along 700 miles of
the U.S.-Mexico border. The Bush Administration also launched a number of
initiatives to augment border security, curb the flow of weapons to Mexico from the
United States, and combat human smuggling. Since 1994, NAFTA institutions have
been functioning, trade between the countries has tripled. Bilateral trade disputes
have included trucking, tuna, and sweeteners.
For additional information, see CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic
Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications; CRS Report RS22837, Merida
Initiative: Proposed U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and
Central America; and CRS Report RL34215, Mexico’s Drug Cartels.

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Contents
Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background on Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Political Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Economic Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Global Financial Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Remittances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Foreign Policy Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Mexican-U.S. Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
U.S. Assistance to Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Drug Trafficking Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Mérida Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Border Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Human Smuggling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Border Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Security and Prosperity Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Weapons Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Trade Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Functioning of NAFTA Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Recent Trade Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Salmonella Outbreak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Political and Human Rights Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Concerns over Elections and Political Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Legislation and Legislative Initiatives in the 110th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Enacted Legislation and Approved Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Additional Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Economic Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Immigration and Border Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Criminal Gangs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

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Mexico-U.S. Relations:
Issues for Congress
Recent Developments
On November 15-16, 2008, President Calderón will be participating in the G-20
summit on the financial crisis in Washington. The global financial crisis is having
a significant effect on the Mexican economy, with a drop in the value of the peso and
the Mexican stock market declining over 30%. The decline in oil prices is a major
setback for Mexico, which has depended on oil proceeds for over one third of the
government revenue. The economic slowdown in the United States will affect U.S.
demand for imports from Mexico, which is highly dependent on the United States as
an export market. (See “Global Financial Crisis” below.)
On November 4, 2008, Mexico’s Interior Minister Juan Camilo Mourino, one
of President Calderón’s closest advisers, was killed in a plane crash in downtown
Mexico City. Eight others aboard the business jet, including several Mexican
government officials, were killed, as well as four people on the ground. Mexican
officials maintain that they have no evidence of foul play.
On October 28, 2008, Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies overwhelming approved
energy sector reform legislation intended to modernize the state-oil company,
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), and boost declining production. The measure had
been approved by the Mexican Senate on October 23. An earlier version proposed
by President Calderón in April 2008 had met with significant opposition.
On October 15, 2008, the Mexican government agreed to provide back pay to
thousands of former Mexican laborers, known as braceros, who worked in the United
States from 1942 to 1946 and currently live in the United States. Under the labor
program, a portion of the workers’ pay was deducted and transferred to the Mexican
government to be provided to the workers upon their return to Mexico, but many
never received the money. The agreement was pursuant to a settlement for a lawsuit
in Federal court in California. Under the settlement, each bracero or surviving heir
would receive $3,500.
On September 9, 2008, the House approved H.R. 6630, a bill that would
terminate the one-year Department of Transportation pilot project for Mexican trucks
operating in the United States beyond the border area, and would prohibit the
Secretary of Transportation from granting authority for Mexican motor carriers to
operate beyond U.S. municipalities and commercial zones on the U.S.-Mexico border
unless expressly authorized by Congress. In early August 2008, the Department of
Transformation had extended the pilot project for two years.

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CRS-2
On August 28, 2008, the Food and Drug Administration declared the end of a
salmonella outbreak that caused 1,442 illnesses in 43 states, the District of Columbia,
and Canada. After weeks of searching for the source of the outbreak, the FDA found
a positive sample in jalapeño and serrano peppers grown in Mexico.
On August 5, 2008, José Ernesto Medellín, a Mexican national convicted of
raping and murdering two teenage girls in Texas, was executed by lethal injection.
In a 2004 ruling, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) determined that Medellín
and 50 other Mexican nations on death row in the United States were entitled to
review of their cases due to violation of the Vienna Convention for failure to inform
them of a right to consular access. President Bush subsequently ordered Texas to
comply with the ICJ ruling, setting off a legal battle that culminated in a March 2008
ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court that ICJ rulings are not binding domestically.
On August 3, 2008, a U.S. Border Patrol agent was briefly held at gunpoint by
members of the Mexican military in Arizona. The State Department described the
incident as a “momentary misunderstanding,” but maintained that there are liaison
mechanisms in place to deal with incidents like this when they occur. (U.S.
Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, August 6, 2008).
On July 1, 2008, the media’s release of videos reportedly showing police from
an elite squad in the city of León, Mexico, practicing torture techniques provoked
strong expressions of concern by Mexican and international human rights
organizations. An American instructor was seen in the videos. A spokesman for the
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City maintained that the “U.S. government was not
involved in the training in any way.” (Alfredo Corchado, “U.S. Denies Involvement
in Training Videos Showing Mexican Officers Using Torture,” Dallas Morning
News, July 3, 2008.) Subsequently, the police chief of León and the head of police
training were fired.
On June 26, 2008, Congress completed action on the FY2008 Supplemental
Appropriations Act, H.R. 2642 (P.L. 110-252, signed into law June 30, 2009), which
provides $400 million in FY2008 and FY2009 assistance for Mexico under the
Mérida Initiative.
On June 17, 2008, President Calderón signed a judicial reform decree under
which Mexico will have eight years to replace its trial procedures, moving from a
closed door process based on written arguments to a public trial system with oral
arguments and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Mexico’s Chamber
of Deputies approved the measure in February and the Senate approved it in March,
while a majority of Mexico’s states also approved the measure.
On June 10, 2008, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved H.R. 6028,
which would have authorized $1.1 billion over three years, FY2008-FY2010, for
Mexico under the Mérida Initiative. No Senate action was taken on the measure.
On February 27, 2008, the Bush Administration announced delays in Project 28,
the first phase of the a virtual fence along 28 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border. In
April 2008, the Department of Homeland Security announced that most of Project

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CRS-3
28 system will be replaced by new equipment because the original design was not
compatible with Border Patrol needs.
On January 1, 2008, the full implementation of NAFTA began with the lifting
of remaining tariff protections on various agricultural products, including beans,
corn, sugar, and powdered milk, were lifted.
Background on Mexico
Political Developments
Felipe Calderón of the conservative National Action Party (PAN) won the July
2006 presidential elections in an extremely tight race, defeating Andrés López
Obrador of the center-left Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) by less than 1% of the
vote. He succeeded Vicente Fox, also from the PAN, who in 2000 became the first
opposition presidential candidate to defeat the long-ruling center-left Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI). Calderón was sworn to a six-year term on December 1,
2006 in an unusually brief inauguration ceremony due to fears that members of the
PRD congressional delegation would interrupt the ceremony.
While the PAN made significant gains in congressional elections and became
the largest block in the 128-member Senate and 500-member Chamber of Deputies,
it failed to win a majority in either house. The PRD also made significant gains and
has the second-largest block of members in the Chamber of Deputies and third in the
Senate. For the first time in history, the long-ruling PRI lost its plurality of seats in
Congress, although it still remains a significant political force in the legislative
branch, with the second-largest block in the Senate and the third-largest in Chamber
of Deputies.
Because the PAN does not have a majority in Congress, President Calderón has
often turned to the PRI to advance his legislative agenda, although that might prove
more difficult in the lead up to mid-term congressional elections in July 2009. Since
Calderón’s election, the PRI has fared well in state and municipal elections around
the country. Some observers view the next congressional elections as a contest
between the PAN and the PRI to secure the largest number of seats in the Chamber
of Deputies. Since the 2006 elections, the PRD has suffered from deep internal
divisions that code erode its chances for support in the 2009 congressional elections.1
In his first two years in office, President Calderón was able to secure
congressional approval of a number of reforms. In 2007, the government enacted
long-awaited fiscal and pension reforms that had stalled under the previous Fox
Administration. In June 2008, President Calderón signed a judicial reform decree
after securing the approval of Congress and Mexico’s states for an amendment to
Mexico’s Constitution. Under the reform, Mexico will have eight years to replace
its trial procedures, moving from a closed door process based on written arguments
1 “Mexico Politics: Outlook — Preparing for Mid-Congressional Election,” EIU ViewsWire,
November 10, 2008.

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CRS-4
to a public trial system with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence until
proven guilty.
In late October 2008, the government secured approval of an energy sector
reform intended to modernize the state-oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX),
and boost declining production. The enacted reform, which ultimately was supported
by a wide majority in Congress, was a watered down version of a reform measure
proposed by President Calderón in April 2008 that had met with significant
opposition by PRD supporters of Andrés López Obrador. As approved, the reform
measure strives to improve the transparency and management flexibility of PEMEX.
Some critics maintain that it will not do enough to encourage new exploration to
stem the country’s decline in oil reserves.
President Calderón also has made combating drug cartels and drug violence a
top priority of his administration. He has called increasing drug violence in Mexico
a threat to the Mexican state, and has sent some 40,000 soldiers and 5,000 federal
police to drug trafficking “hot-spots” throughout Mexico. In 2008, the government’s
crackdown and rivalries and turf wars among Mexico’s drug cartels fueled an
escalation in violence throughout the country, including in northern Mexico near the
U.S.-Mexico border. In an effort to control the most lucrative drug smuggling routes
in Mexico, rival drug cartels have been launching attacks on each other, as well as
on Mexican military and police. This heightened violence is posing a serious
challenge for Mexico’s security forces. As of early November 2008, drug violence
had claimed some 4,000 lives in 2008, with police and military frequently targeted
by drug traffickers. Since Mexico began its crackdown in late 2006, more than 500
police and military members have been slain.2
Kidnapping for money has also increased significantly in Mexico. While
official statistics show that about 65 people are kidnapped monthly, the actual figure
is reportedly far higher, and some 60 kidnapping victims have been killed over the
past two years. In August 2008, the killing of a 14-year-old kidnap victim, Fernando
Martí, the son of a wealthy businessman, resonated throughout Mexico and prompted
demonstrations calling for the government to take action against the escalation in
violence. Kidnapping victims have not only included the rich, but also working class
Mexicans whose families have been asked to pay as little as $500 in ransom.3 In late
October, a five-year-old boy, the son of a poor family, was kidnapped from a Mexico
City market and then killed by injecting acid into his heart.4
President Calderón has proposed a number of measures to counter the wave of
crime and kidnappings. These include separate prisons for kidnapers, anti-abduction
squads, a reward system for the capture of criminals, and a national database for
2 Ken Ellingwood, “Mexico Under Seige: Attacks on Police Continue Amid Crackdown on
Drugs,” Los Angeles Times, November 4, 2008.
3 Ken Ellingwood, “In Mexico, A Bounty on Every Head,” Los Angeles Times, September
1, 2008.
4 “Killing of 5-Year-Old Kidnapped from Market Shocks Mexico,” New York Times,
November 4, 2008.

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CRS-5
cellphones to track those used in crime.5 In early August 2008, he urged Congress to
pass a bill that would impose life sentences for kidnappers in certain cases.6
Instances of corruption of law enforcement and government officials has also
been a significant problem that has made the campaign against drug cartels more
difficult. In late October 2008, an elite unit within the federal Attorney General’s
office known as SIEDO was implicated in a scandal involving payoffs for sensitive
information about antidrug activities, with at least 35 officials and agents fired or
arrested.7 In August 2008, six members of SIEDO had been arrested on suspicion of
leaking information to drug traffickers.
Economic Conditions8
Mexico is a middle-income country of approximately 107 million people.
According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC), nearly 32% of Mexicans lived in poverty in 2006 and just under
9% of Mexicans lived in extreme poverty or indigence. This represents a significant
improvement from 2000, when 41% of Mexicans lived in poverty and 15% were
indigent.9
Mexico’s main program to reduce the effects of poverty is the Opportunities
program (Oportunidades, formerly known as Progresa). The program began under
President Ernest Zedillo (1994-2000) and expanded under President Vicente Fox
(2000-2006) to benefit 5 million families throughout Mexico. The program seeks to
not only alleviate the immediate effects of poverty through cash and in-kind transfers,
but to break the cycle of poverty by improving nutrition and health standards among
poor families and increasing educational attainment. This program provides cash
transfers to families in poverty who demonstrate that they regularly attend medical
appointments and can certify that children are attending school. The program also
provides nutrition support to pregnant and nursing women and malnourished
children.
Mexico is the second leading market for U.S. exports after Canada, and is the
third most important source of U.S. imports after Canada and China. The United
States is Mexico’s most important customer by far, receiving about 80% of Mexico’s
exports, including petroleum, automobiles, auto parts, and winter vegetables, and
providing about 50% of Mexico’s imports. The United States is the source of over
60% of foreign investment in Mexico, and the primary source of important tourism
5 Jose de Cordoba and David Luhnow, “Calderon Proposes Steps to Fight Mexico’s Crime,”
Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2008.
6 Laurence Iliff, “Mexican President Seeks Life for Some Kidnappers,” Dallas Morning
News, August 8, 2008.
7 Tracy Wilkinson, “Mexico Under Siege: Elite Police Tainted by Drug Gang,” Los Angeles
Times, October 28, 2008.
8 For background on the Mexican economy and U.S.-Mexican economic relations, see CRS
Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications.
9 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Panorama 2007.

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CRS-6
earnings. Mexico is also the leading country in Latin America in terms of U.S.
investment, with the total stock of U.S. investment being almost $92 billion in 2007.

Mexico’s economy is strongly affected by the U.S. business cycle. The
economy grew 4.8% in 2006, the last year of the Fox’s presidency, which was the
highest of his administration, while in 2007, the first year of the Calderón
government, economic growth slowed to 3.2% in 2007. Slower growth of 2.3 % was
already anticipated for 2008 due to declining demand in the United States, declining
oil production, and slow growth in remittances sent by Mexicans abroad, but the
global financial crisis further reduced the 2008 growth forecast to 1.8%.10 After years
of high growth, remittances only grew by 1% in 2007 to just under $24 billion,
possibly due to slower growth in the U.S. economy. In 2008, remittances declined
almost 4% through September, but the decline for the year could be more significant
because of the financial crisis and economic slowdown in the United States.11
Global Financial Crisis. The global economic crisis is having a significant
effect on the Mexican economy. Some of Mexico’s largest companies were involved
in the derivatives market and have taken big hits, with the Mexican stock market
declining over 30% as of mid-November 2008. The rapid decline in the price of oil
is also a major economic setback for Mexico, which depends on oil revenue for over
one third of government revenue. The decline in U.S. demand for imports from
Mexico resulting from the U.S. economic slowdown will have an impact on the
Mexican economy because of its dependence on the United States as an export
market. As noted above, economic growth already is slowing, and remittances from
Mexicans living in the United States are in decline. Unemployment is likely to
increase, which could increase pressure for Mexicans to migrate. An economic
slowdown in Mexico also might strain the government’s progress in reducing
poverty.
The Calderón government has taken a number of measures to attempt to cushion
the Mexican economy from the fallout of the global economic crisis and the onset of
recession in the United States. The value of the Mexican peso has declined by about
one-fifth since August 2008, although more recently has seen some improvement.
The government has used billions in its international reserves to shore up the peso,
and the Mexican central bank established a temporary reciprocal currency sway line
with the U.S. Federal Reserve for up to $30 billion. (In late October 2008, the IMF
announced that it would be creating a short-term lending facility for emerging
markets like Mexico that have a strong economic policy track record.) The
government has also announced that it has hedged its oil exports for 2009 at a price
of $70 a barrel in an effort to protect the economy from the decline in oil prices.12
In an effort to jump-start the economy, in mid-November 2008, Mexico’s Congress
approved President Calderón’s request to increase the 2009 budget by 13%.
10 Economist Intelligence Unit. “Country Report: Mexico,” November 2008.
11 “Mexico Money Sent Home From U.S. Drops 3.7 Percent This Year,” Agence France
Presse, October 29, 2008.
12 David Luhnow and Ann Davis, “Mexico Hedges All Oil Exports in ‘09 at $70,” Wall
Street Journal, November 14, 2008.

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CRS-7
Spending in some areas was cut back, while funding for education, infrastructure,
agriculture, and security was increased.13
President Calderón will also be participating in the upcoming G-20 summit on
the financial crisis in Washington on November 15-16, 2008. Mexico will join
Brazil and Argentina as the only Latin American countries to take part in the summit.
President Calderón maintains that the summit should focus on the reform of the
global financial system and giving developing nations a greater role in the
international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
According to Calderón, these institutions have been practically absent during the
financial crisis, and should be more agile in their response.14
Remittances. Remittances are often discussed as a potential tool to combat
poverty. Mexico is the third leading recipient of remittances after India and China,
accounting for just over 11% of global remittance flows in 2007.15 Its nationals
received $23 billion in 2006 and just under $24 billion in 2007. While Mexico
receives the largest amount of remittances in Latin America, it is a comparatively
small share of Mexican national income, accounting for about 3% of Mexico’s GDP
in 2007.16 As noted above, the rate of remittance growth slowed to just 1% in 2007,
far less than average annual increase of 19% from 2003 through 2006, and already
has declined almost 4% through in 2008 through September.
The pattern of remittance flows to Mexico suggests potential limitations to the
use of remittances to reduce poverty and inequality. Mexican states receiving the
most remittances are those with traditionally high rates of migration, which do not
represent the poorest states in Mexico. In 2006, roughly 55% of remittances sent to
Mexico went to 7 of Mexico’s 32 states. These states are Michoacán, Guanajuato,
Jalisco, Mexico, the Federal District, Veracruz, and Puebla. The impoverished states
of Oaxaca, Guerrero, and Chiapas received less than 14% of remittances sent to
Mexico in the first half of 2007.
The effect of remittances on poverty in Mexico remains unclear, though there
is evidence to suggest that remittances improve household income. It is estimated
that 80%-90% of remittances in Mexico are used to cover consumer needs, including
food and utilities. Another 10% is spent on investment, most likely housing. Home
town associations (HTAs) from the state of Zacatecas pioneered efforts to increase
the development impact of remittances. Beginning in 1993, the state of Zacatecas
and the Mexican federal government agreed to allocate one dollar for every dollar
Zacatecan HTAs spend on local development programs. In 1999, municipal
governments agreed to match donations dollar for dollar, making what is now known
13 Alexandra Olson, “Mexican Congress Approves 13 Percent Spending Increase for 2009
in Bid to Spur Economy, Jobs,” Associated Press Newswires, November 13, 2008.
14 “Mexico’s Pres: G20 Should Look to Reform Global Finial System,” Dow Jones
International News, November 13, 2008.
15 World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008.
16 Inter-American Development Bank, “Remittances in 2007, A Bend in the Road, or a New
Direction?” March 2008.

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CRS-8
as the “3-for-1” program, which triples HTA donations. President Fox extended the
program nationwide in 2002. Through 2005, HTAs, municipal, state, and federal
governments spent $230 million on 5,000 local development projects in partnership
with HTAs.17 While this is a significant amount of money, it amounts to just 1% of
remittances sent to Mexico in 2006. U.S. assistance to improve Mexico’s financial
sector, administered by USAID, includes small grants to help microfinance
institutions increase products and services, including remittance-related services.
Foreign Policy Challenges
President Calderón has sought to pursue an independent foreign policy with
closer ties to Latin America. He has tried to mend relations with Cuba and
Venezuela. Relations with both countries became tense under the administration of
President Vicente Fox (2000-2006). In September 2007, Mexican and Venezuelan
ambassadors presented credentials to the respective governments, restoring full
relations for the first time since November 2005, when President Fox expelled
Venezuela’s ambassador to Mexico. A Cuban ambassador to Mexico also presented
his credentials to President Calderón in September 2007. In May 2004, President
Fox recalled Mexico’s ambassador to Cuba; ambassadors were later restored, but
relations between the two countries remained tense through the remainder of the Fox
administration. Migration is likely to be an issue in Mexico-Cuba relations, with
Cubans increasingly preferring to emigrate to the United States via Mexico rather
than by sea.
Under President Fox, Mexico pursued a more activist and diversified foreign
policy, with greater involvement in UN activities, and stronger ties to Latin America
and Europe. He promoted the so-called Puebla-Panama Plan, which promotes
cooperative development efforts among the Central American countries and the
southeastern states of Mexico. He attempted to revive the G-3 group trade
preferences (Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico); however, Venezuela formally
withdrew from the group in November 2006 after joining the Common Market of the
South (Mercosur). Fox also sought better ties with Mercosur countries in South
America. He attempted to expand trade with the European Union under the EU-
Mexico free trade agreement that went into effect in July 2000, and with Japan under
the Mexico-Japan free trade agreement that entered into force in April 2005. Mexico
held a temporary seat on the U.N. Security Council in 2002 and 2003 and expressed
support for continuing diplomatic efforts under United Nations auspices to achieve
the disarmament of Iraq, leading to expressions of disappointment from the Bush
Administration.
Mexican-U.S. Relations
Until the early 1980s, Mexico had a closed and statist economy and its
independent foreign policy was often at odds with the United States. Beginning
under President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), and continuing more dramatically
17 Richard Lapper, “Village Depends on its Migrants in California,” Financial Times, May
9, 2007.

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CRS-9
under President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) and President Ernesto Zedillo
(1994-2000), Mexico adopted a series of economic, political, and foreign policy
reforms. It opened its economy to trade and investment, adopted electoral reforms
that leveled the playing field, and increased cooperation with the United States on
drug control, border issues, and trade matters. Cooperation under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the annual cabinet-level meetings of
the Binational Commission are the clearest indications of the close and increasing
relationships between the countries.
President Fox (2000-2006) encouraged strong relations with the United States,
and he called for greater cooperation under NAFTA and for a bilateral migration
agreement that would regularize the status of undocumented Mexicans in the United
States. Relations became strained during the debate on immigration reform in the
United States. After President Bush approved the Secure Fence Act of 2006,
Mexico, with the support of 27 other nations, denounced the proposed border fence
at the Organization of American States. (See Migration/Border Issues below for
more detail.)
Under the Calderón government, U.S.-Mexican relations have continued to be
close, with drug trafficking and violence, border security, and immigration
continuing to define the bilateral relationship. Felipe Calderón made his first official
visit to the United States as President-elect in early November 2006, after first
visiting Canada and several Latin American countries. During his visit, Calderón
criticized the authorization of 700 miles of fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border and
noted that it complicated U.S.-Mexico relations. He asserted that job-creation and
increased investment in Mexico would be more effective in reducing illegal
migration from Mexico than a border fence. Calderón signaled a shift in Mexican
foreign policy when he noted that while immigration is an important issue in the
bilateral relationship, it is not the only issue, as trade and economic development are
also important.
President Calderón reiterated these concerns during President Bush’s March
2007 visit to Mexico. During the visit, President Calderón also called for U.S.
assistance in combating drug and weapons trafficking. Specifically, Calderón
promised to continue his efforts to combat drug trafficking and called for U.S. efforts
to reduce the demand for drugs, stating, “while there is no reduction for demand in
your territory, it will be very difficult to reduce the supply in ours.”18 Calderón has
displayed an unprecedented willingness to increase narcotics cooperation with the
United States. This willingness led to the Mérida Initiative, a multi-year $1.1 billion
U.S. assistance effort announced in October 2007 to combat drug trafficking and
organized crime.
U.S. Assistance to Mexico
Mexico, a middle income country, traditionally has not been a major recipient
of U.S. foreign assistance, but this changed recently with congressional approval of
the Administration’s request for funding to support the Mérida Initiative aimed at
18 “Bush Reassures Skeptical Mexico on Immigration,” Reuters, March 13, 2007.

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CRS-10
helping Mexico combat drug trafficking and other criminal organizations. Because
of the Mérida Initiative funding, assistance rose from $65.4 million in FY2007 to an
estimated $402.6 million for FY2008.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico FY2005-FY2009
Account
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2008
FY2009
FY2009
(Est.)
Supp.
Suppl
(Req.)
(Est.)
(Est.)
P.L.
P.L.
110-252
110-252
CSH
3.23
3.99
3.72
2.68
—
—
2.50
DA
15.06
11.36
12.28
8.22
—
—
14.00
ESF
13.39
11.39
11.35
11.90
20.00
—
—
FMF
—
—
—
—
116.50
—
2.00
IMET
1.25
.01
.06
.37
—
—
.83
INCLE
39.68
39.60
36.68
26.55
215.50
48.00
477.82
NADR
.29
.63
1.30
.92
—
—
3.85
TOTAL
72.9
66.98
65.39
50.64
352.00
48.00
501.00
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations
FY2007-FY2009; and U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending
Plan, Mexico, Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.
Accounts
CSH
Child Survival and Health
DA
Development Assistance
ESF
Economic Support Fund
FMF
Foreign Military Financing
IMET
International Military Education and Training
INCLE
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
NADR
Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs
The FY2008 assistance estimate includes $50.6 million in regular foreign
assistance funding and an additional $352 million in FY2008 supplemental funding
(P.L. 110-252) specifically for the Mérida Initiative (see Table 1). The FY2008
supplemental funding measure also provided $48 million in FY2009 bridge fund
supplemental assistance for Mexico. For FY2009, the Administration requested a
total of $501 million for Mexico, including almost $478 million in funding for the
Mérida Initiative. At the end of September 2008, Congress approved a continuing
resolution (P.L. 110-329) providing FY2009 foreign aid funding through March 6,
2009 at FY2008 levels. Since the initial pot of Mérida Initiative funding in FY2008
was provided through a supplemental assistance measure rather than the regular
FY2008 foreign aid funding measure, the continuing resolution does not fund the
Mérida Initiative for FY2009. Rather, it funds only assistance programs that had

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CRS-11
been included in the regular FY2008 foreign aid funding measure. (Also see “Mérida
Initiative” below).
Drug Trafficking Issues
Mexico remains a major supplier of heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana,
as well as the major transit point for cocaine sold in the United States. Although
U.S.-Mexico counternarcotics efforts have been marked by distrust at times in the
past, with criticisms mounting in March of each year when the President was
required to certify that drug producing and drug transit countries were cooperating
fully with the United States, relations improved during the Fox administration (2000-
2006), and cooperation has continued under President Calderón.
Reforms to the drug certification process enacted in September 2002 have
helped improve bilateral relations on drug cooperation. The revised procedures
require the President to make a report, not later than September 15 of each year,
identifying the major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries. At the
same time, the President is required to designate any of the named countries that has
“failed demonstrably,” during the previous 12 months, to make substantial efforts to
adhere to international counter-narcotics agreements (defined in the legislation) and
to take other counter-narcotics measures.19
In the late 1990s, Congress acted to strengthen Border Patrol and international
interdiction efforts along the Southwest border, and it passed the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106-120), which strengthened the President’s
authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to block
the assets in the United States of designated international drug traffickers.20
According to the State Department’s March 2008 International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Mexico is a major foreign supplier of marijuana
and methamphetamine to the United States, and although it accounts for only a small
share of worldwide heroin production, it is a major supplier of heroin consumed in
the United States. The State Department estimates that 90% of cocaine entering the
United States transits Mexico. Despite Mexico’s major role as a producing and
transit country in 2007, the Calderón Administration was credited with carrying out
unprecedented efforts to eradicate and seize illicit drugs. Mexican authorities seized
more than twice the amount of cocaine in 2007 than it did in 2006 and over $200
million in cash from a methamphetamine precursor operation. The report praised the
19 U.S. assistance would be withheld from any designated countries unless the President
determines that the provision of assistance to that country is vital to the national interest of
the United States or that the designated country subsequently made substantial counter-
narcotics efforts. Notwithstanding the general suspension of the previous drug certification
and sanctions procedures, subsection 706(5)(B) provides that the President may apply those
procedures at his discretion. A transition rule provides that for FY2003, the required report
was to be submitted at least 15 days before foreign assistance funds are obligated or
expended.
20 See CRS Report 98-174, Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action,
1986-2002, by K. Larry Storrs.

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CRS-12
Mexican government for its efforts to implement regulations that will ban the import
of products containing methamphetamine precursors in 2008 and will ban the
commercial sale of products containing methamphetamine precursors in 2009.21
Until 2006, Mexico refused to extradite criminals facing the possibility of life
without parole to the United States. However, two decisions by the Mexican
Supreme Court have facilitated extraditions to the United States. In November 2005,
in a partial reversal of its October 2001 ruling, the Court found that life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole is not cruel and unusual punishment. The Mexican
Supreme Court ruled in January 2006 that U.S. extradition requests only need to meet
the requirements of the 1978 bilateral extradition treaty, not Mexico’s general law on
international extradition that was promulgated in 1975.22 That decision make the
extradition process easier. President Calderón has indicated that he will use
extradition as a major tool to combat drug traffickers. In 2007, Mexico extradited a
record 83 alleged criminals to the United States, including the alleged head of the
Gulf Cartel, Osiel Cárdenas. These extraditions surpassed a record 63 extraditions
in 2006.
Counternarcotics cooperation improved significantly during the Fox
administration, and combating drug cartels has become a priority of the Calderón
administration. In December 2007, President Calderón reorganized the two federal
police agencies — the Federal Investigations Agency (AFI) and Federal Preventative
Police (PFP) — by placing them under a single commander. Shortly after taking
office, President Calderón launched offensives against drug cartels and drug violence
in several states. Since December 2006, the Mexican government has deployed over
40,000 soldiers and 5,000 federal police to combat cartels in drug trafficking “hot-
spots.” Soldiers and law enforcement officials have been tasked with arresting
traffickers, establishing check points, burning marijuana and opium plants, and
interdicting drug shipments along the Mexican coast. Some have expressed concerns
about the militarization of Mexican law enforcement. The Calderón Administration,
however, maintains that it must use the military due to the corruption of state and
local police by the cartels. Additionally, a high-ranking member of the Mexican
armed forces has stated that the military has to be involved in fighting drug
traffickers because the police force cannot compete with the type of heavy weaponry
that the drug cartels are now using.23
21 Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2008, March 2008, hereafter INCSR 2008.
22 Jesus Aranda, “Allana la Corte el Camino para Extraditar a Connacionales a EU,” La
Jornada, February 1, 2006; “Mexico: Court Clears Way for Faster Extraditions to U.S.,”
Latin American Weekly Report, February 7, 2006; and, U.S. Department of State, INCSR
2006.
23 U.S. Government Printing Office, “The Mérida Initiative: Guns, Drugs, and Friends,”
Minority Staff Report to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,
December 21, 2007.

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CRS-13
Mérida Initiative.24 The United States and Mexico issued a joint statement on
October 22, 2007, announcing a multi-year plan for $1.4 billion in U.S. assistance to
Mexico and Central America to combat drug trafficking and other criminal
organizations. The Mérida Initiative, named for the location of a March 2007 meeting
between Presidents Bush and Calderón, expands bilateral and regional cooperation
to combat organized crime, drug cartels, and criminal gangs. The Administration
requested $500 million for Mexico (and $50 million for Central American countries)
in a FY2008 supplemental appropriations request. In the FY2009 foreign aid request,
the Administration requested another $550 million for Mexico under the Mérida
Initiative (and $100 million for Central American countries).
The stated objective of the Mérida Initiative, according to the October 2007 joint
statement, is to maximize the effectiveness of our efforts to fight criminal
organizations — so as to disrupt drug-trafficking (including precursor chemicals),
weapons trafficking, illicit financial activities, and currency smuggling, and human
trafficking.25 The joint statement highlights current efforts of both countries,
including Mexico’s 24% increase in security spending in 2007, and U.S. efforts to
reduce weapons, human, and drug trafficking along the Mexican border. Although
the statement did not announce additional funding for U.S. domestic efforts, it cited
several examples of such efforts to combat drugs and crime that are already in place.
Those examples included the 2007 Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, the
2008 National Drug Control Strategy, and the 2007 U.S. Strategy for Combating
Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico.
All proposed funding for the Mérida Initiative was designated for the INCLE
account, administered by the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). There were four categories of assistance in the
Mérida Initiative request. The largest category for “Counternarcotics,
Counterterrorism, and Border Security” would fund equipment and technology
infrastructure improvements for the Mexican military and law enforcement agencies.
The category of “Public Security and Law Enforcement” would fund such items as
inspection scanners, x-ray ions, computer equipment, and security equipment. A
third category would fund “Institution Building and Rule of Law” projects, while the
final category of assistance would fund program support.
Legislative Action. In late June 2008 legislative action on the Mérida
Initiative in H.R. 2642 (P.L. 110-252), Congress provided $400 million supplemental
assistance in FY2008 and FY2009 for Mexico, with not less than $73.5 million for
judicial reform, institution-building, anti-corruption, and rule of law activities. The
measure provides $352 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance within the
INCLE, FMF, and ESF accounts, and $48 million in FY2009 supplemental assistance
within the INCLE account. For FY2008, $3 million from the INCLE account is to
24 For additional information, see CRS Report RS22837, Merida Initiative: Proposed U.S.
Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America. For more on the
Central American components of the Mérida Initiative, see CRS Report RL34112, Gangs
in Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
25 U.S. Department of State and Government of Mexico, “Joint Statement on the Merida
Initiative,” October 22, 2007.

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CRS-14
be used for technical and other assistance to enable the Mexican government to
implement a unified national registry of federal, state, and municipal police officers.
The measure has human rights conditions softer than compared to earlier House
and Senate versions, in large part because of Mexico’s objections that some of the
conditions would violate its national sovereignty. The Secretary of State, after
consultation with Mexican authorities, is required to submit a report on procedures
in place to implement Section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961.
That section of the FAA “prohibits assistance to any unit of the security forces of a
foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has
committed gross violations of human rights.” An exception to this prohibition is
provided in Section 620J if the Secretary of State determines and reports to Congress
that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the
responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.
In P.L. 101-252, human rights conditions require that 15% of INCLE and FMF
assistance be withheld until the Secretary of State reports in writing that Mexico is
taking action in four human rights areas:
! improving transparency and accountability of federal police forces;
! establishing a mechanism for regular consultations among relevant
Mexican government authorities, Mexican human rights
organizations, and other relevant Mexican civil society
organizations, to make consultations concerning implementation of
the Mérida Initiative in accordance with Mexican and international
law;
! ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are
investigating and prosecuting, in accordance with Mexican and
international law, members of the federal police and military forces
who have been credibly alleged to have committed violations of
human rights, and the federal police and military forces are fully
cooperating with the investigations; and
! enforcing the prohibition, in accordance with Mexican and
international law, on the use of testimony obtained through torture
or other ill-treatment.
In other legislative action, on June 10, 2008, the House approved authorization
legislation for the Mérida Initiative, H.R. 6028, that would authorize $1.6 billion
over three years, FY2008-FY2010, for both Mexico and Central America, $200
million more than originally proposed by President Bush. Of that amount, $1.1
billion would be authorized for Mexico, and $73.5 million for activities of the U.S.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) to reduce the flow of
illegal weapons from the United States to Mexico. Among the bill’s various
conditions on providing the assistance, the measure would require that vetting
procedures were in place to ensure that members or units of military or law
enforcement agencies that may receive assistance have not been involved in human
rights violations. The Senate has not taken action on the measure.

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CRS-15
Migration
Widely cited demographers at the Pew Hispanic Center estimate that there were
7 million undocumented Mexican migrants residing in the United States as of March
2008, accounting for almost 59% of the total estimated illegal alien population of
11.9 million.26 Mexico takes the view that the migrants are “undocumented
workers,” making the point that since the U.S. market attracts and provides
employment for the migrants, it bears some responsibility. Mexico regularly voices
concern about alleged abuses suffered by Mexican workers in the United States, and
for the loss of life and hardships suffered by Mexican migrants as they utilize
increasingly dangerous routes and methods to circumvent tighter border controls.
Mexico benefits from illegal migration in at least two ways: (1) it is a “safety valve”
that dissipates the political discontent that could arise from higher unemployment in
Mexico; and (2) it is a source of remittances by workers in the United States to
families in Mexico, estimated at $24 billion in 2007.
In February 2006, the Mexican Congress approved a concurrent resolution on
migration and border security in which Mexico acknowledges that Mexican workers
will continue to emigrate until there are more opportunities in Mexico. Mexico also
accepts the need to revisit its migration policies to consider enforcement of its
northern and southern borders, enforcement of Mexican immigration laws that
respects the human rights of migrants, and the need to combat human trafficking.
Perhaps most significantly, the Mexican resolution states that the Mexican
government does not promote illegal migration and calls for the development of a
guest worker program in the United States under the principle of shared
responsibility. The resolution commits Mexico to enforcing legal emigration “if a
guest country offers a sufficient number of appropriate visas to cover the biggest
possible number of workers and their families, which, until now cross the border
without documents because of the impossibility of obtaining them.”27
In June 2007, the U.S. Senate voted against cloture on the Comprehensive
Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (S. 1348). The measure has not been considered
since that vote. The bill would have improved border security, established a
temporary worker program, and normalized the status of most illegal immigrants in
the United States. Mexico has long lobbied for such reforms and is cautiously
watching debate on this measure. Immigration reform legislation was introduced in
the House of Representatives in March 2007. The House measure, the Security
Through Regularized Immigration and Vibrant Economy Act of 2007 (H.R. 1645),
would have set border and document security benchmarks to be met before
normalizing the status of illegal immigrant or the creation of a guest worker program.
A variety of other migration-related legislative initiatives have been introduced in the
110th Congress. (See “Legislation in the 110th Congress” below for more detail.)
26 Pew Hispanic Center, Trends in Undocumented Immigration: Undocumented Inflow Now
Trails Legal Inflow, by Jeffrey Passel and D’Vera Cohn, October 2, 2008. For more detail
and comparisons with earlier years, see CRS Report RS21938, Unauthorized Aliens in the
United States: Estimates Since 1986, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
27 “Mexico-U.S.: Migration and Border Security,” Embassy of Mexico, February 2006.

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Congress last enacted major immigration reform in 1986 and 1996. Main
provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-603)
included civil and criminal penalties for U.S. employers who knowingly hire
undocumented workers; increased border control and enforcement measures; anti-
discrimination safeguards; provision for legalization of illegal aliens who resided
continuously in the United States before 1982; and a special legalization for farm
workers previously employed on American farms. In 1996, two laws relating to
immigration were enacted, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA, P.L. 104-208) and the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193). The first measure
sought to control illegal immigration by adding 1,000 Border Patrol agents per year
for five years (FY1997-FY2001), along with additional personnel, equipment, and
procedures. The IIRIRA increased penalties for unlawful presence and created the
expedited removal program.28 Individuals who depart the United States after more
than 180 days of unlawful presence now face either a three or 10 year bar to
admission to the United States, depending on the total period of unlawful presence.
Both measures aimed to reduce the attractiveness of immigration by restricting the
eligibility of aliens for federal programs.29
The 109th Congress had considered competing measures for comprehensive
immigration reform and increased border security, including the enactment of the
Secure Fence Act of 2006 which authorized construction of barriers along 700 miles
of the U.S. border with Mexico. Mexico has stated that the border fence will cause
difficulties in the bilateral relationship and goes against the trend of increased
cooperation on border security matters. The 109th Congress did not enact
comprehensive immigration reform because of disagreement over key provisions of
House and Senate proposals.
Border Issues
The United States has launched a number of initiatives in recent years to
improve border security, combat human and weapons trafficking, and improve the
economic competitiveness of NAFTA countries.
Human Smuggling. The Operation Against Smuggling Initiative on Safety
and Security (OASISS) is a bilateral effort to combat human smuggling established
in August 2005. The program was initially limited to the area between San Diego,
California and Yuma, Arizona, but was extended to El Paso, Texas in April 2006.
In August 2007, the United States and Mexico agreed to extend the program to the
Mexican state of Coahuila and the area between El Paso and Eagle Pass, Texas.
From its inception through FY2007, OASISS has led to the prosecution of 660
28 For more information on expedited removal, see CRS Report RL33109, Immigration
Policy on Expedited Removal of Aliens, by Alison Siskin and Ruth Ellen Wasem.
29 See CRS Report 95-881, Immigration Legislation in the 104th Congress, by Joyce Vialet.

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CRS-17
individuals in Mexico on smuggling or trafficking charges. Over 300 individuals
were presented for prosecution in Mexico during FY2007.30
In October 2007, U.S. Customs and Border Protection announced the creation
of “Operation Lifeguard,” an extension of OASISS in the El Paso Border Patrol
Sector. The objectives of the operation are to reduce migrant deaths and prosecute
human smugglers. In FY2007, migrant deaths fell 24% in the El Paso sector, from
33 to 25.31
Border Security. U.S. and Mexican authorities are also increasing joint
efforts to combat crime and increase border security. In 2004, the two countries
signed the U.S.-Mexico Action Plan for Cooperation and Border Safety, as well as
a Memorandum of Understanding on the Safe, Orderly, Dignified and Humane
Repatriation of Mexican Nationals. In April 2006, the U.S. Consul to Nuevo Laredo,
Tamaulipas and the Mexican Consul to Laredo, Texas announced a joint-effort to
increase cooperation among the police forces to more effectively combat crime in the
Laredos. U.S. and Mexican border governors announced plans to share crime data
in August 2006. The Secure Electronic Network for Traveler’s Rapid Inspection
(SENTRI) program, first initiated in 1995, has expanded in recent years to include
16 lanes at the nine largest ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border.
In November 2005, Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff launched the Secure
Border Initiative (SBI), a multi-year plan to secure U.S. borders, reduce illegal
immigration, and work toward the implementation of a viable temporary worker
program. The Department of Homeland Security planned to achieve these objectives
through increased detention and removal, including an end to the “catch and release”
of illegal immigrants; increased personnel at borders and ports of entry; increased
enforcement of immigration laws in the U.S. interior, including worksite inspections;
technological upgrades to assist in border enforcement; and improved infrastructure.
DHS submitted its SBI strategic plan to Congress in November 2006, including
estimates of the cost of the technology and infrastructure component referred to as
SBInet. DHS indicated that SBInet will allow the Department to gain operational
control of the U.S. southern border by 2011 and would cost an estimated $7.6 billion.
Congress has been critical of the progress of the SBI program, and Project 28,
a program to implement a virtual fence that would secure 28 miles of the U.S.-
Mexico border in southern Arizona. Project 28 was due to be completed in mid-
2007, but the $20 million project faced technological setbacks. The GAO testified
in an October 24, 2007 hearing before the House Homeland Security Committee that
the camera technology was too sensitive and that it misinterpreted items such as
moving shrubs as border crossers.32 In February 2008, the Bush Administration
announced further delays in Project 28. The design of the project reportedly was not
30 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Securing America’s Borders: CBP 2007 Fiscal
Year in Review,” November 6, 2007.
31 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “U.S. Border Patrol Partners with Agencies to
Unveil Operation Lifeguard,” October 17, 2007.
32 Elise Castelli, “Glitches Delay Virtual Fence on Border,” Federal Times, October 29,
2007.

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CRS-18
compatible with Border Patrol needs, and in April 2008, Department of Homeland
Security officials announced that a large amount of the P-28 system would be
replaced by new equipment and software. This delayed progress of SBInet, which
aimed to put a virtual fence along 100 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border by the end
of 2008. In May 2008, a CBP spokesman said that the first phase of P-28 would be
finalized with the installation of permanent surveillance towers, which would replace
nine temporary towers.
Delays in Project 28 have prompted some Members to question the Department
of Homeland Security’s ability to secure some 670 miles of the Southwest border by
December 2008.33 As of October 2008, DHS had completed 216 miles of pedestrian
fence and 154 miles along the Southwest border as part of SBI, short of the proposed
plan to complete 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fence by the
end of 2008. In September 2008, DHS officials asked for a reprogamming of $400
million in FY2008 funds (initially allocated to the development and deployment of
the virtual fence) to help spur construction of the 670 miles of pedestrian and vehicle
fence.
Security and Prosperity Partnership.34 On March 23, 2005, President
Bush, Mexican President Vicente Fox, and Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin
established the trilateral Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America.
Through the SPP, which consists of expanded cooperation and harmonization of
policies, the three nations have sought to advance the common security and
prosperity of the countries. The SPP is not a treaty or agreement and is limited to the
existing legal framework relating to the trilateral relationship. The SPP seeks to
address security and commercial cooperation at the regulatory level. To
operationalize this partnership, the leaders established Ministerial-led working
groups to develop measurable and achievable goals in the specified areas. In August
2006, the SPP working groups submitted their second report to SPP leaders outlining
completed initiatives and proposing new initiatives to ensure common security and
prosperity. The working groups established an Avian and Human Pandemic
Influenza Coordinating Body and a North American Competitiveness Council.
Cooperation under the SPP has increased security cooperation on port security
and border security. In April 2007, the United States and Mexico signed an
agreement to detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials.
Under the Megaports agreement, the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear
Security Administration and Mexican customs will install radiation detection devices
at four Mexican seaports. These ports account for 90% of container traffic in
Mexico. The three countries are also working to more efficiently determine the risk
of cargo at seaports. Mexico has implemented the Sea Cargo Initiative which gathers
data electronically before loading at a port of origin. Earlier completed initiatives
33 Ibid; Spencer S. Hsu, “Virtual Fence Along Border to be Delayed,” Washington Post,
February 28, 2008; “Secure Border Initiative to Adjust — Not Terminate,” Penton Business
Media, May 1, 2008; and Congressional Testimony of John P. Hutton, US Government
Accountability Office, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, May 8, 2008.
34 For more information, see CRS Report RS22701, Security and Prosperity Partnership of
North America: An Overview and Selected Issues.

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CRS-19
included measures to facilitate trade, such as the signing of a Framework of Common
Principles for Electronic Commerce,35 and border security through, among other
measures, an agreement between the U.S. and Mexico to create an Alien Smuggler
Prosecution Program along the common border.
At an SPP leaders’ meeting held in New Orleans, Louisiana in April 2008
President Bush, President Calderón, and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper
commended the success of NAFTA, which they say tripled trade between the three
countries to a projected $1 trillion in 2008. They also reevaluated the five priority
areas that were identified in a ministerial meeting held in Los Cabos, Mexico in
February 2008. The three leaders decided that their Ministers should renew and
focus their work on 1) increasing the competitiveness of business and economies by
making regulations between the countries more compatible and strengthening
intellectual property strategies; 2) making the borders between the countries more
secure by coordinating infrastructure plans, strengthening technological
advancements, and investigating new customs procedures; 3) fortifying energy
security and environmental protection initiatives by exchanging information and
collaborating on new projects; 4) improving citizen access to safe food, and health
and consumer products by deepening regulatory and inspection programs; and 5)
improving response to emergencies by updating bilateral agreements.36 The next SPP
leaders’ meeting is scheduled to be hosted in Mexico in 2009.
Weapons Trafficking. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
(ATF) began a program in FY2006 dubbed Project Gunrunner to increase its
resources at the Southwest border with Mexico. The initiative has the goals of
denying firearms to criminal organizations in Mexico and along the border, and
combating firearms-related violence affecting communities on both sides of the
border. As part of the initiative, ATF has dedicated some 100 special agents and 25
industry operations investigators to the Southwest border, and has deployed eTrace
firearms tracking technology to U.S. Consulates in Mexico.37
U.S. officials maintain that 90%-95% of the guns used in Mexico’s drug
violence have been traced to the United States.38 In early November 2008, the
Mexican government announced that it made the largest seizure of drug-cartel
weapons in Mexican history when it discovered a cache of 540 rifles, 165 grenades,
500,000 rounds of ammunition, and 14 sticks of TNT at a house in the city of
Reynosa, Mexico, across the border from McAllen, Texas.39
35 For more information, see CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations:
Trends, Issues, and Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
36 “Joint Statement by President Bush, and President Calderón, and Prime Minister Harper”
April 22, 2008.
37 U.S. Embassy, Mexico, “Border and Law Enforcement, Project Gunrunner,”ATF
Factsheet, available at [http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eng/texts/et080116eTrace.html]
38 “Washington Watch,” LatinNews Daily, August 14, 2008; and Randal C. Archibold, “2-
Nation Border Conference Discusses Gun Trafficking,” New York Times, August 16, 2008.
39 “Mexico: Army Seizes Huge Weapons Cache,” Los Angeles Times, November 8, 2008.

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President Calderón and other Mexican officials have been vocal about pressing
the United States to do more to curb the flow of guns into Mexico. In June 2008, the
House approved legislation authorizing assistance for the Mérida Initiative (discussed
above) that would include $73.5 million for ATF activities from FY2008 through
FY2010 to reduce the flow of illegal weapons from the United States to Mexico. No
action was taken on the measure by the Senate.40
Trade Issues41
Trade between Mexico and the United States has grown dramatically in recent
years under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the
United States, Mexico, and Canada. Total U.S. trade with Mexico more than tripled
from $82 billion in 1993 to a high of $347 billion in 2007, but the balance of U.S.
trade with Mexico has shifted from a surplus of $1.3 billion in 1994 to a generally
growing deficit of $74.3 billion in 2007 (exports of $136.5 billion; imports of $210.8
billion). High oil prices and growth in the factory sector explain much of the
increase in the trade deficit. This change in the trade balance caused some Members
of Congress to question the benefits of NAFTA. Despite the deficit, Mexico is one
of the fastest growing export markets for the United States in recent years, and it
became the second most important trading partner after Canada in 1999.
The NAFTA agreement was negotiated in 1991 and 1992, and side agreements
on labor and environmental matters were completed in 1993. The agreements were
approved by the respective legislatures in late 1993 and went into force on January
1, 1994. Under the agreements, trade and investment restrictions are being
eliminated over a 15-year period, with most restrictions eliminated in the early years
of the agreement. Over the years, spokesmen from the Clinton and Bush
Administrations have argued that NAFTA has been successful in increasing U.S.
exports to Mexico, particularly in heavily protected areas such as agricultural
products, and in promoting job creation and investment in both countries.
Functioning of NAFTA Institutions. Several NAFTA institutions
mandated by the agreements have been functioning since 1994. The tripartite
Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was established in Montreal,
Canada; and the Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC) was established in
Dallas, Texas. In addition, the bilateral Border Environment Cooperation
Commission (BECC), located in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico; and the North American
Development Bank (NADBank), headquartered in San Antonio, Texas, were created
to promote and finance border environment projects along the U.S.-Mexico border.
Following up on a March 2002 agreement by Presidents Bush and Fox in Monterrey,
Mexico, to broaden the mandate of the NADBank, Congress agreed in March 2004
to permit the NADBank to make grants and nonmarket rate loans for environmental
infrastructure along the border, and the measure (H.R. 254) was signed into law (P.L.
40 For information on ATF funding and Project Gunrunner, see CRS Report RL34514, The
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF): Budget and Operations, by
William J. Krouse.
41 For more information, see CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations, by
M. Angeles Villarreal.

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CRS-21
108-215) on April 5, 2004. The NAFTA institutions have operated to encourage
cooperation on trade, environmental and labor issues, and to consider
nongovernmental petitions under the labor and environmental side agreements.
Recent Trade Disputes. Trade disputes between the countries have
involved the access of Mexican trucks to the United States, the access of Mexican
sugar and tuna to the U.S. market, and the access of U.S. sweeteners to the Mexican
market.
Trucking. With respect to trucking issues, the Mexican government objected
to the Clinton Administration’s refusal, on safety grounds, to allow Mexican trucks
to have access to U.S. highways under the terms of NAFTA. A NAFTA dispute
resolution panel supported Mexico’s position in February 2001. President Bush
indicated a willingness to implement the provision, but the U.S. Congress required
additional safety provisions in the FY2002 Department of Transportation
Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-87). On November 27, 2002, with safety inspectors
and procedures in place, the Administration announced that it would begin the
process that will open U.S. highways to Mexican truckers and buses, but
environmental and labor groups went to court in early December to block the action.
On January 16, 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that full
environmental impact statements were required before Mexican trucks would be
allowed to operate on U.S. highways, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that
decision on June 7, 2004.
On September 22, 2004, the House approved 339-70 an amendment to the
Transportation-Treasury Appropriations (H.R. 5025) that would prohibit
implementation of a rule giving Mexican and Canadian truck operators an additional
two years to bring their trucks into compliance with U.S. safety provisions. This was
eventually incorporated into the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R.
4818/P.L. 108-447) approved by Congress late 2004. In October 2006, officials from
the Department of Transportation (DOT) indicated that the Department was prepared
to ensure that Mexican trucks meet U.S. and Canadian safety provisions. The head
of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, John Hill, indicated that a pilot
project could be implemented to allow a limited number of Mexican companies
access to the United States at some point in the future, but noted that there are “no
immediate plans” to open the border to Mexican trucks beyond the 20-mile
commercial limit.42
In February 2007, the Administration announced a pilot project to grant
Mexican trucks from 100 transportation companies full access to U.S. highways. The
Administration announced a delay in the program in April 2007, likely in response
to critics who contended that Mexican trucks do not meet U.S. standards. The Iraq
War Supplemental (P.L. 110-28), enacted May 25, 2007, mandated that any pilot
program to give Mexican trucks access beyond the border region could begin until
U.S. trucks had similar access to Mexico. Before a pilot project could begin, the
DOT needed to meet certain reporting and public notice requirements. The DOT’s
42 Angela Greiling Keane, “Cracking Open the Border,” Journal of Commerce, October 23,
2006.

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CRS-22
Inspector General needed to prepare a report to Congress to verify that the DOT had
established mechanisms to ensure that Mexican truck comply with U.S. federal motor
carrier safety laws. The report also needed to verify that Mexican trucks meet the
safety provisions of P.L. 107-87, mentioned above.
By September 2007, the Department of Transportation launched the one-year
pilot program to allow approved Mexican carriers beyond the 25-mile commercial
zone, with a similar program allowing U.S. trucks to travel beyond Mexico’s
commercial zone. As of early January 2008, 57 trucks from 10 Mexican companies
had received permission to operate in the United States and 41 trucks from 4 U.S.
companies received permission to operate in Mexico. Department of Transportation
data reportedly shows that U.S. carriers have made twice as many trips to Mexico as
Mexican carriers have to the United States from the time the program was launched
until early January 2008.
In the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161), signed into law
in December 2007, Congress included a provision prohibiting the use of FY2008
funding for the establishment of a pilot program. The Department of Transportation
determined that it could continue with the pilot program because it had already been
established. In February 2008, a coalition of unions and environmental groups filed
suit in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals to end the pilot program, but a decision is still
pending.43
In March 2008, the DOT issued an interim report on the cross-border trucking
demonstration project to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation. The report made three key observations: 1) The Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) plans to check every participating truck each
time it crosses the border to ensure that it meets safety standards; 2) There is less
participation in the project than was expected; and 3) The FMCSA has implemented
methods to assess possible adverse safety impacts of the project and to enforce and
monitor safety guidelines.44
In early August 2008, the Department of Transportation announced that it
would be extending the pilot program for an additional two years. On September 9,
2008, the House approved (by a vote of 396 to 128) H.R. 6630, a bill that would
prohibit the Department of Transportation from granting Mexican trucks access to
U.S. highways beyond the border and commercial zone. The bill would also prohibit
the Department of Transportation from renewing such a program unless expressly
authorized by Congress. No action was taken by the Senate on the measure.
Sugar and High Fructose Corn Syrup. The United States and Mexico
recently resolved a long standing trade dispute involving sugar and high fructose corn
43 “9th Circuit Considers Injunction to Halt Mexican Truck Pilot Program,” International
Trade Daily, February 13, 2008; Rosalind McLymont, “Long Haul Across the Border,”
Shipping Digest, January 7, 2008; and “Hoffa Blasts Bush Administration’s Indifference to
NAFTA Harm,” PR Newswire, March 10, 2008.
44 Department of Transportation. “Cross-Border Trucking Demonstration Project,” March
11, 2008.

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CRS-23
syrup. Mexico argued that the sugar side letter negotiated under NAFTA entitled it
to ship net sugar surplus to the United States duty free under NAFTA, while the
United States argued that the sugar side letter limited Mexican shipments of sugar.
Mexico also complained that imports of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) sweeteners
from the United States constituted dumping, and it imposed anti-dumping duties for
some time, until NAFTA and WTO dispute resolution panels upheld U.S. claims that
the Mexican government colluded with the Mexican sugar and sweetener industries
to restrict HFCS imports from the United States.
In late 2001, the Mexican Congress imposed a 20% tax on soft drinks made with
corn syrup sweeteners to aid the ailing domestic cane sugar industry, and
subsequently extended the tax annually despite U.S. objections. In 2004, USTR
initiated WTO dispute settlement proceedings against Mexico’s HFCS tax, and
following interim decisions, the WTO panel issued a final decision on October 7,
2005, essentially supporting the U.S. position. Mexico appealed this decision, and
in March 2006, the WTO Appellate Body upheld its October 2005 ruling. In July
2006 the United States and Mexico agreed that Mexico would eliminate its tax on
soft drinks made with corn sweeteners no later than January 31, 2007. The tax was
repealed, effective January 1, 2007.
The United States and Mexico reached a sweetener agreement in August 2006.
Under the agreement, Mexico can export 500,000 metric tons of sugar duty free to
the United States from October 1, 2006 to December 31, 2007. The United States
can export the same amount of HFCS duty free to Mexico during that time. NAFTA
provides for the free trade of sweeteners, which began January 1, 2008. The House
and Senate sugar caucuses expressed objections to the agreement, questioning the
Bush Administration’s determination that Mexico is a net-surplus sugar producer to
allow Mexican sugar duty free access to the U.S. market.45
Tuna. On tuna issues, the Clinton Administration lifted the embargo on
Mexican tuna in April 2000 under relaxed standards for a dolphin-safe label in
accordance with internationally agreed procedures and U.S. legislation passed in
1997 that encouraged the unharmed release of dolphins from nets. However, a
federal judge in San Francisco ruled that the standards of the law had not been met,
and the Federal Appeals Court in San Francisco sustained the ruling in July 2001.
Under the Bush Administration, the Commerce Department ruled on December
31, 2002, that the dolphin-safe label may be applied if qualified observers certify that
no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the netting process, but Earth Island
Institute and other environmental groups filed suit to block the modification. On
April 10, 2003, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
enjoined the Commerce Department from modifying the standards for the dolphin-
safe label. On August 9, 2004, the federal district court ruled against the Bush
45 “Bush Administration Defends Sugar Deal to Congress,” Inside U.S. Trade, November
3, 2006; “Grassley, U.S. Industry Welcome Agreement with Mexico on Sugar, HFCS,”
International Trade Reporter, August 3, 2006; and, “U.S., Mexico Reach Agreement on
WTO Soft Drink Dispute Compliance Deadline,” International Trade Reporter, July 13,
2006.

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Administration’s modification of the dolphin-safe standards, and reinstated the
original standards in the 1990 Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act. That
decision was appealed to the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled
against the Administration in April 2007, finding that the Department of Commerce
did not base its determination on scientific studies of the effects of Mexican tuna
fishing on dolphins.
In late October 2008, Mexico initiated World Trade Organization dispute
proceedings against United States, maintaining that U.S. requirements for Mexican
tuna exporters prevents them from using the U.S. “dolphin-safe” label for its
products.46
Other Trade Disputes. On other issues, in early October 2002, the U.S.-
Mexico working group on agriculture dealt with major agricultural issues, including
Mexico’s recent anti-dumping decisions on apples, rice, swine, and beef, and
safeguard actions on potatoes. In January 2003, the countries agreed to permit
Mexican safeguard measures against U.S. imports of chicken legs and thighs, and in
July 2003, these safeguard measures were extended until 2008, with tariffs declining
each year. In September 2006, Mexico revoked anti-dumping duties imposed on
U.S. rice imports in 2002 following rulings by the WTO and WTO Appellate Body
in 2005 which found that the duties were contrary to WTO rules. Mexico banned
beef imports from the United States in December 2003 following the discovery of
one cow infected with mad cow disease in Washington state. Mexico resumed
importation of boneless beef in early March 2004, and bone-in beef in February 2006
in response to improved beef cow screening.
Salmonella Outbreak. From April to July 2008, the United States
experienced a four-month salmonella outbreak that sickened more than 1,400 people
in 43 states and the District of Columbia and was ultimately determined to have
originated in a farm in northeastern Mexico. For months, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration focused on tomatoes as the potential source of the outbreak, costing
the industry as much as $100 million since the outbreak began. The FDA ultimately
traced the salmonella strain to jalapeño and serrano peppers. Health authorities
declared the end of the outbreak in August. The agriculture industry is estimated to
have lost between $130 million and $250 million.47 The outbreak led to increased
interest in food safety, especially related to on-farm practices. (For additional
information, see CRS Report RL34612, Food Safety on the Farm: Federal Programs
and Selected Proposals, by Geoffrey Becker.)
Political and Human Rights Issues
Concerns over Elections and Political Rights. Mexico has become
increasingly democratic, and effectively ended 71-years of one party rule by the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 2000 when Vicente Fox of the conservative
46 “Mexico Initiates WTO Dispute Proceeding Against U.S. ‘Dolphin-Safe’ Label for Tuna,”
International Trade Reporter, October 30, 2008.
47 Tiffany Hsu, “Salmonella Outbreak Ends But Issues Linger,” Los Angeles Times, August
29, 2008.

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National Action Party (PAN) was elected President. Mexico has concentrated on
developing its political institutions and election agency. The Federal Election
Institute (IFE) and Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF) were well-regarded going into
the 2006 presidential and congressional elections.
The July 2, 2006, presidential race was extremely close and final results were
not announced until September 5 when the TEPJF completed adjudication of all the
challenges. According to the final vote count, Calderón won just under 36% of the
vote, defeating PRD candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador by less than 234,000
votes. Voter turnout was 59%.48
After the vote, Andrés Manuel López Obrador led a campaign of civil
disobedience, including the blockade of Mexico City’s principal avenue, Paseo de la
Reforma, until mid-September 2006. On September 1, 2006, PRD members of the
Mexican Congress prevented President Fox from delivering the state of the union
address at the actual Congress. López Obrador rejected the election tribunal’s ruling,
and was named the “legitimate president” of Mexico at a democratic convention of
his supporters held on September 16, 2006, at the Zocalo, Mexico City’s main
square. He swore himself in as the “legitimate president” on November 20, 2006, a
symbolic action that had little political effect. In mid-September 2006, PRD founder
Cuahtémoc Cárdenas criticized López Obrador’s tactics as undemocratic, and
criticized him for surrounding himself with advisors who helped to orchestrate what
many believe to be Carlos Salinas de Gortari’s fraudulent defeat of Cuahtémoc
Cárdenas in the 1988 elections.49
Human Rights. According to the State Department’s 2007 human rights
report, issued in early March 2008, the Mexican government generally respected
human rights during 2007, but many problems remained. It recognized the Mexican
government’s efforts to reform and professionalize the police force, although it
highlighted that corruption and impunity, particularly at the state and local levels,
remain endemic problems. The conduct of state law enforcement officials in
response to protests in Oaxaca and Michoacán was of particular concern in 2006, but
these situations stabilized in 2007. However, no progress was made during 2007
concerning the allegations of state abuses and killings during these 2006 protests.
Additionally, during 2007, there were reports of the police sometimes torturing
suspects to force confessions, which were sometimes used in prosecution despite a
constitutional prohibition. While the government took action against some improper
behavior by law enforcement personnel, including firing some 250 federal police
commanders and 34 regional police coordinators, many officers committed crimes
with impunity and without fear of prosecution.
Violence among drug cartels was of particular concern during 2007. According
to the State Department’s human rights report, approximately 2,470 people were
killed by drug cartels, including some 300 police officers and 27 soldiers. Narcotics-
48 For more information, see CRS Report RS22462, Mexico’s 2006 Elections, by Colleen
W. Cook.
49 “Mexico: López Obrador Declared ‘Legitimate President,’” LatinNews Daily, September
18, 2006; and “Critica CCS intolerancia perredista,” La Reforma, September 14, 2006.

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CRS-26
related killings and violence increased, and there were credible reports that some
individual local, state, and federal police, immigration, and customs officials were
involved in facilitating drug trafficking, according to the human rights report.
Despite various judicial reforms, lengthy pretrial detentions, lack of due process, and
judicial inefficiency and corruption persisted.
Human rights conditions in Oaxaca were of concern in 2006, due to significant
political unrest from May to December 2006. The unrest was initially due to the
violent repression of a peaceful teachers union strike, but expanded to include other
parties and broader political interests. A central goal of the protesters was the
removal of Oaxacan governor Ulises Ruiz of the Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI). The protests, led by the Popular Assembly of the People of Oaxaca (APPO),
resulted in what amounted to a blockade of the historic city center, with millions of
dollars in lost tourist revenue. At least nine people were killed in the violence,
including American independent journalist Bradley Will. The Mexican Congress has
the power to remove the governor, but did not. Ruiz remains in his post.
On December 11, 2006, thousands of protesters demanded Governor Ruiz’s
resignation and the withdrawal of federal police from the city. Federal troops
withdrew from Oaxaca on December 16, and the city has been relatively calm since
then. Human rights activists criticized the arrest of over 100 protesters in November
and December 2006. Many were released toward the end of the year, but APPO
leader Flavio Sosa remains in custody in a high security prison outside Mexico City.
APPO insists that the conflict is not over and has protests planned for January 2007
and is considering a march on January 27 calling for the Oaxacan governor’s
resignation. On January 4, Oaxacan officials confirmed that the federal prosecutor
is investigating the deaths of APPO supporters. In May 2007, Mexico’s National
Human Rights Commission determined that federal authorities were responsible for
the abuse and torture of some protestors. The Commission also determined that
federal police were responsible for the killing of at least one protestor.50
Former President Fox pledged to investigate and prosecute those responsible for
human rights violations, including the “Dirty War” period from the 1960s to 1980s.
Human rights activists are critical of what they view as lukewarm efforts by his
administration to improve human rights in Mexico and to address past violations.
The National Commission on Human Rights presented a report to President Fox, on
November 27, 2001, that documented human rights abuses and disappearances of
persons in the 1970s and early 1980s, and President Fox named legal scholar Ignacio
Carrillo as a Special Prosecutor to investigate these and other cases on January 4,
2002. In April 2006, the Fox administration announced that the special prosecutor’s
office would be disbanded. In November 2006, Ignacio Carrillo presented his final
report on the repressive era from the late 1960s to 1982. The report found that the
50 “Mexico Rights Panel: Feds Committed Acts of Torture in Oaxaca,” EFE News Service,
May 24, 2007; Gerardo Soriano and Paulina I. Valencia, “Investiga PGR Crímenes
Cometidos durante Conflicto en Oaxaca,” Notimex, January 4, 2007; Gerardo Soriano and
Paulina I. Valencia, “Asegura APPO que Conflicto en Oaxaca no Ha Terminado,” Notimex,
January 4, 2007; and “Calderón Opts for Ruiz,” Latin American Regional Report - Mexico
and NAFTA, January 2007.

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CRS-27
repression was a matter of state policy and led to the summary execution of over 700
Mexicans; torture; and the razing of villages.
The report was praised by some as an acknowledgment of state responsibility
for the repression that can be used to prosecute those responsible for human rights
violations. Others remain critical, as no one has been convicted of charges relating
to these alleged crimes. Only one of the three presidents from this period, Luis
Echeverria (1970-1976), is still alive. President Echeverria faced genocide charges
for his role in the repression of a 1968 student protest that left dozens dead when he
was interior minister. Echeverria tried to evade prosecution by claiming the 30-year
statute of limitations had expired. A judge rejected this argument and reinstated the
arrest order in November 2006 after he determined that the statute of limitations did
not go into effect until Echeverria left public office in December 1976. In July 2007,
the Criminal Tribunal absolved Echeverria of any responsibility for the 1968
killings.
The unsolved murders of over 400 women killed and disappeared in Ciudad
Juárez and other parts of the northern state of Chihuahua since 1993 remain a
concern to human rights activists who maintain that the lack of prosecutions and
inadequate investigations demonstrate the level of impunity in Mexico and a lack of
official accountability to Mexican citizens. In February 2006, the Fox administration
closed the special prosecutors office charged with coordinating federal and state
investigations into the murders and folded it into an office responsible for crimes
against women throughout Mexico. The Mexican government also announced in
February 2006 that it found no evidence of serial killings in Ciudad Juárez. Nineteen
women were reportedly murdered in Ciudad Juárez in 2007, and nine suspects were
arrested and four are under investigation.
Over 90 Members of Congress signed a letter from Representative Hilda Solis
to President Felipe Calderón in August 2007. The letter commends the Calderón
Administration for enacting a federal ban on violence against women, and calls on
the Mexican federal government to encourage states to enact similar legislation. The
letter also suggests that Mexico reform its penal codes to increase penalties for
violence against women. The Members also expressed concern that Mexico’s 14-
year statute of limitations meant that the families of women killed in 1993 will no
longer have legal options to seek justice in their daughters’ deaths. The letter
requested that President Calderón encourage state and local authorities to prioritize
cases that are about to expire under the statute of limitations.
Drug violence contributed to a hostile environment for journalists in 2007. Two
journalists and three media assistants were killed and three disappeared, reportedly
due to their reporting on drug trafficking and organized crime. Self-censorship
among journalists who fear reprisals for their work is reported to be common in
Mexico. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Mexico is the
fourth most dangerous country for journalists — tied with Colombia, Pakistan, and
Russia. In 2006, CPJ reports that two journalists were killed as a result of their work,
including American Bradley Will, who was killed during civil unrest in Oaxaca. The
Deputy Attorney General for Organized Crime is responsible for crimes against
journalists committed by drug traffickers, terrorists, and human traffickers.

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Legislation and Legislative Initiatives
in the 110th Congress
Enacted Legislation and Approved Resolutions
P.L. 110-432 (H.R. 2095), Railroad Safety Enhancement Act of 2008.
Signed into law on October 16, 2008. Section 416, related to safety inspections in
Mexico, provides that mechanical and brake inspections of rail cars performed in
Mexico shall not be treated as satisfying U.S. rail safety laws or regulations until the
Secretary of Transportation certifies that certain conditions are met.
P.L. 110-329 (H.R. 2638), FY2009 Consolidated Security, Disaster
Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act. Signed into law September 30,
2008, the bill provides an additional $37.5 million for the “International Boundary
and Water Commission, United States and Mexico” for construction of the water
quantity program to meet immediate repair and rehabilitation requirements.
P.L. 110-252 (H.R. 2642), Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008.
Originally introduced June 11, 2007 as the FY2008 Military Construction and
Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, this bill subsequently became the vehicle for
the second FY2008 supplemental appropriations measure, which was signed into law
on June 30, 2008. As amended by the House on May 15, 2008, the bill would
provide $400 million for Mexico for funding the Administration’s proposed Mérida
Initiative. Instead of restricting Mérida Initiative funding to the INCLE account, as
proposed by the Administration, the House version would provide funding under the
INCLE, ESF, and FMF accounts. The Senate version of H.R. 2642, as amended on
May 22, 2008, would have provided $450 million for the Mérida Initiative, with $350
million for Mexico under the INCLE account.
In the final version of the bill, approved by the House on June 19, 2008 and by
the Senate on June 26, 2008, Congress provided $400 million supplemental
assistance in FY2008 and FY2009 for Mexico, with not less than $73.5 million for
judicial reform, institution-building, anti-corruption, and rule of law activities. The
measure provides $352 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance for Mexico
within the INCLE, FMF, and ESF accounts, and $48 million in FY2009
supplemental assistance within the INCLE account. The measure has human rights
conditions softer than compared to earlier House and Senate versions, in large part
because of Mexico’s objections that some of the conditions would violate its national
sovereignty. In the final version, human rights conditions require that 15% of INCLE
and FMF assistance be withheld until the Secretary of State reports in writing that
Mexico is taking action in four human rights areas. The Secretary of State, after
consultation with Mexican authorities, is required to submit a report on procedures
in place to implement Section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 related to
the prohibition against providing assistance to any unit of the security forces of a
foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has
committed gross violations of human rights.
P.L. 110-181 (H.R. 4986), FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act.
This bill, signed into law on January 28, 2008, contains a provision in Title X,

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Section 1022, that allows for the Department of Defense to provide support for
counter-drug activities to Mexico.
P.L. 110-161 (H.R. 2764), Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008. The
Consolidated Appropriations Act, signed into law on December 26, 2007, includes
several FY2008 appropriations measures. It includes several provisions related to
Mexico.
In Division, K, Title I, Section 136 prohibits funding for the establishment of
a Department of Transportation (DOT) NAFTA trucking pilot program, under which
a limited number of Mexican cargo trucks can deliver goods within the United States.
Division E, Title VI, incorporates the Border Infrastructure and Technology Act
of 2007, which includes a provision in Section 606 authorizing funds as needed
(from FY2009 to FY2013) for the implementation of projects described in the
Declaration on Embracing Technology and Cooperation to Promote the Secure and
Efficient Flow of People and Commerce across our Shared Border between the
United States and Mexico, agreed to March 22, 2002, Monterrey, Mexico (commonly
known as the Border Partnership Action Plan).
In Division G, Title V, Section 526 provides that no funds appropriated by this
Act may be used by the Commissioner of Social Security or the Social Security
Administration to pay the compensation of employees of the Social Security
Administration to administer Social Security benefit payments, under any agreement
between the United States and Mexico establishing totalization arrangements
between the social security system established by title II of the Social Security Act
and the social security system of Mexico, which would not otherwise be payable but
for such agreement.
The joint explanatory statement also noted the Administration’s request for $500
million in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations request to fund the proposed
Mérida Initiative, but stated that the Department of State failed to adequately consult
with Congress prior to submitting the budget amendment.
P.L. 110-53 (H.R. 1), Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations
Act of 2007. Section 701 of P.L. 110-53, signed into law August 3, 2007, requires
that the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, with the Director of National
Intelligence, and heads of other relevant agencies, submit a report to Congress, no
later than 270 days after the bill’s enactment, on the status of U.S. efforts to
collaborate with allies and international partners to improve border security, global
document security, and to exchange terrorist information. Section 511 of the measure
calls for the Secretary of Homeland Security to make it a priority to assign personnel
from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Coast Guard to regional, state, and local intelligence
fusion centers in order to enhance land and maritime border security and to improve
dissemination of information amongst the myriad of jurisdictions in border areas.
P.L. 110-28 (H.R. 2206), U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina
Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007. The bill was
signed into law on May 25, 2007. Section 6901 mandates that a pilot program to

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give Mexican trucks access beyond the border region cannot begin until U.S. trucks
have similar access to Mexico. Before a pilot project can begin, the Department of
Treasury must meet certain reporting and public notice requirements. The
Transportation Department’s Inspector General must prepare a report to Congress to
verify that the Department of Transportation has established mechanisms to ensure
that Mexican trucks comply with U.S. federal motor carrier safety laws. The report
must also verify that Mexican trucks meet the safety provisions of P.L. 107-87. The
Department of Transportation must also publish a Federal Register notice and allow
for public comment on pre-audit inspection data and plans to protect the health and
safety of Americans.
H.Res. 642 (Solis). The resolution expresses sympathy and support for the
people and governments of Central America, the Caribbean, and Mexico for the
damage from Hurricanes Felix, Dean, and Henriette. Introduced September 7, 2007.
House approved (418-0) September 25, 2007.
H.Res. 812 (Sanchez, Linda). The resolution expresses sympathy and pledges
the urgent support of the House of Representatives and the people of the United
States for the victims of the devastating flooding in southern Mexico. Introduced
November 8, 2007. House approved (421-0) November 14, 2007.
Additional Legislative Initiatives
H.Con.Res. 22 (Goode). Introduced January 10, 2007, the resolution would
express the sense of Congress that the United States should withdraw from NAFTA
due to increased trade deficits, and potential health and security risks of permitting
Mexican trucks to transport goods throughout the United States.
H.Con.Res. 40 (Goode). Introduced January 22, 2007, the resolution would
express the sense of Congress that the United States should not engage in the
construction of a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Superhighway
System or enter into a North American Union with Mexico and Canada.
H.Con.Res. 119 (Goode). Introduced April 18, 2007, the resolution would
express the sense of the Congress that the President should immediately and
unequivocally call for the enforcement of existing immigration laws in order to
reduce the threat of a terrorist attack and to reduce the massive influx of illegal aliens
into the United States.
H.Con.Res. 146 (Goode). Introduced May 9, 2007, the resolution would
express the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Transportation may not grant
authority to Mexico-domiciled motor carriers to operate beyond the commercial
zones of the United States-Mexico border.
H.Con.Res. 218 (Gresham). Introduced September 24, 2007, the resolution
would express the sense of Congress regarding U.S. immigration and border security
laws.
H.Con.Res. 304 (Barrow). Introduced February 27, 2008, the resolution would
express the sense of Congress that allowing motor carriers domiciled in Mexico to

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operate in the United States without adequate regulation jeopardizes the safety and
security of U.S. citizens.
H.Res. 18 (Goode) and H.Res. 22 (King, Steve). H.Res. 18 and H.Res. 22,
introduced January 4, 2007 and January 11, 2007, respectively, would express the
disapproval of the House of Representatives of the Social Security Totalization
Agreement signed by Mexico and the United States in 2004.
H.Res. 499 (Smith, Lamar) and S.Res. 239 (Sessions). Introduced June 19,
2007, both resolutions would express the sense of Congress that the Administration
should rigorously enforce the laws of the United States to substantially reduce the
illegal immigration and greatly improve border security.
H.Res. 545 (Chabot). Introduced July 13, 2007, the resolution would express
the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the border fence dispute with
Mexico.
H.Res. 696 (Costa). Introduced October 1, 2007, the resolution would express
gratitude for the foreign guest laborers known as Braceros who worked in the United
States from 1942 to 1964.
H.Res. 1087 (Kaptur). Introduced April 8, 2008, this resolution would express
the sense of Congress that NAFTA must be renegotiated to foster fair trade that truly
benefits all Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. citizens.
H.R. 98 (Dreier), Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Social Security
Protection Act of 2007. Introduced January 4, 2007, the bill would seek to curtail
the hiring of unauthorized workers by modifying social security cards to include a
machine readable strip and the creation of an employment eligibility database by the
Department of Homeland Security. Employers would be required to verify potential
employee’s eligibility to work in the United States before allowing the individual to
commence employment. The bill was referred to the House Committees on Judiciary,
Homeland Security, Education and Labor, and Ways and Means.
H.R. 133 (Gallegly), Citizenship Reform Act of 2007. Introduced January 4,
2007, the bill would deny citizenship to children born in the United States whose
parents are not U.S. citizens or permanent residents. This measure would apply to
all nationalities, including children born to Mexicans in the United States who are not
citizens or permanent residents.
H.R. 305 (Pearce). Introduced January 5, 2007, the bill would amend the
Immigration and Nationality Act to prohibit the parole into the United States of aliens
who become ill at a port of entry or who seek emergency medical assistance from a
Department of Homeland Security agent at, or near, the border.
H.R. 371 (Berman), AgJOBS Act of 2007. Introduced January 10, 2007, the
bill would reform the H-2A, temporary agricultural worker provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and create a temporary agricultural worker program,
called “blue card,” that includes derivative status for spouses and children and allows
for eligible blue card holders to adjust status to permanent residents within seven

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years of the legislation’s enactment. While not specific to Mexico, Mexican
agricultural workers could potentially benefit from the proposed program.
H.R. 502 (Cuellar), Prosperous and Secure Neighbor Alliance Act of 2007.
Introduced January 17, 2007, the bill would amend the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 to provide assistance to improve security and economic development in Mexico
by professionalizing its law enforcement personnel, providing personnel with
technology, strengthening the judicial branch, supporting anti-corruption programs,
and reducing poverty through targeted funding.
H.R. 1645 (Gutierrez), Security Through Regularized Immigration and a
Vibrant Economy Act of 2007. Introduced March 22, 2007, the bill would
normalize the status of eligible illegal immigrants and establish a guest worker
program. These programs would not be created until certain border and document
security requirements were met and the implementation of the first phase of an
employment verification system.
H.R. 1756 (Hunter), NAFTA Trucking Safety Act of 2007. Introduced
March 29, 2007, the bill would prohibit Mexico-domiciled motor carriers from
operating beyond United States municipalities and commercial zones on the United
States-Mexico border until certain conditions are met to ensure the safety of such
operations. Also see P.L. 110-161 above and H.R. 1773 and H.R. 6630 below.
H.R. 1773 (Boyda), Safe American Roads Act of 2007. Introduced March 29,
2007; reported by the House Committee on Transportation May 14, 2007 (H.Rept.
110-47). House passed (411-0) May 15, 2007. The bill would limit the authority of
the Secretary of Transportation to grant authority to motor carriers domiciled in
Mexico to operate beyond United States municipalities and commercial zones on the
United States-Mexico border, except as provided in a three-year pilot program
authorized in the bill that may operate under certain conditions. No action was taken
by the Senate on this bill. For additional action, see P.L. 110-161 above and H.R.
6630 below.
H.R. 3270 (Filner), Visitors Interested in Strengthening America (VISA)
Act of 2007. Introduced August 1, 2007, the bill would waive certain entry
documentary requirements for a non-immigrant child (unmarried and under the age
of 16) who is a citizen or national of Mexico and accompanying parent or adult
chaperone in instances of medical visits, student groups, and/or special community
events.
H.R. 3531 (Brown-Waite), Accountability in Enforcing Immigration Laws
Act of 2007. Introduced September 14, 2007, the bill would make illegal
immigration a felony as opposed to a violation of administrative law. It would also
require select airport security screeners to undergo immigration status checks. It also
addresses local and state authority issues, including the reimbursement of state and
local jurisdictions for any detention costs of illegal aliens who are apprehended by
state or local law enforcement officers, upholding authority of state and local law
enforcement personnel to assist in immigration enforcement while carrying out their
routine duties, establishing an immigration-related training manual for state and local
law enforcement personnel, and providing financial assistance to state and local law

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enforcement agencies for immigration enforcement assistance. Section 106 would
expresses condemnation of rapes by smugglers along the international land border
of the United States and strongly advocates that the Government of Mexico work in
coordination with United States Customs and Border Protection to take immediate
action to prevent such incidents from occurring. This measure would affect all illegal
immigrants present within the United States, including Mexicans.
H.R. 4065 (Sensenbrenner), Border Enforcement, Employment
Verification, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2007. Introduced November
1, 2007, the bill would amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to strengthen
enforcement of the immigration laws and enhance border security. It would provide
mandatory minimum sentences on smuggling convictions and for aliens convicted
of reentry after removal, make illegal U.S. presence a crime, and increase penalties
for improper U.S. entry and marriage fraud. It would also revise passport, visa, and
immigration fraud provisions and expand the institutional removal program (IRP) to
all states. The bill would require the mandatory detention of illegal aliens
apprehended along the borders, create a National Crime Information Center database
to list immigration violators, and makes an unlawful alien deportable for driving
while intoxicated.
H.R. 4088 (Shuler), SAVE Act of 2007. Introduced November 6, 2007, the
bill would provide immigration reform by securing America’s borders, clarifying and
enforcing existing laws, and enabling a practical employer verification program. The
bill sets forth provisions for increasing border patrol, recruiting former military
personnel, using Department of Defense equipment along the border, aerial
surveillance, and mandatory use of the E-verify system.
H.R. 4192 (Tancredo), Optimizing Visa Entry Rules and Demanding
Uniform Enforcement Immigration Reform Act of 2007. Introduced November
15, 2007, the bill would establish new terms of birth right citizenship to make it
unlawful to obtain citizenship or nationality for a person born in the United States
unless one parent is a U.S. citizen or a lawful permanent resident. It also provides
criminal penalties for unlawful presence in the United States; document, benefit, or
citizenship fraud; and for employer hiring violations. Electronic fingerprinting for
U.S. passports and electronic birth and death registration systems would also be
established. The bill would also address local and state authority issues, which
would allow local and state law enforcement personnel to have the inherent authority
to apprehend, arrest, detain, or transfer aliens in the United States to federal custody.
Most significantly, the bill would eliminate federal reimbursement of emergency
health services provided to undocumented aliens after FY2007 and coverage of
Mexicans with border crossing cards.
H.R. 4329 (Kaptur), NAFTA Accountability Act of 2007. Introduced
December 6, 2007, the bill would provide that, unless the specified conditions set
forth in the bill are met, Congress would withdraw its approval of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) effective October 1, 2009 and that the
President, not later than April 1, 2009, would provide written notice of withdrawal
to the governments of Canada and Mexico. It also would express the sense of
Congress that the President should not engage in negotiations to expand NAFTA to

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include other countries and that trade promotion authority should not be renewed
with respect to the approval of any such NAFTA expansion.
H.R. 4987 (Jones, Walter B. Jr.), Fence By Certain Date Act of 2008.
Introduced November 16, 2007, the bill would require construction of fencing and
security improvements in the border area from the Pacific Ocean to the Gulf of
Mexico, which would include the U.S.-Mexican border area. Specifically, it would
ensure construction of at least 2 layers of reinforced fencing, and the installation of
additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors to be completed by
May 2008.
H.R. 5124 (Hunter), Reinstatement of the Secure Fence Act of 2008.
Introduced January 23, 2008, the bill would provide for two-layered 14-foot
reinforced fencing along the southwest border.
H.R. 5568 (Graves), Start Building a Real Fence Act of 2008. Introduced
March 18, 2008, the bill would clarify the requirements for building a physical fence
along the southwest border.
H.R. 5728 (Capito), Border Fence Trust Fund Act of 2008. Introduced April
8, 2008, the bill would amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow individual
taxpayers to designate a portion of income taxes to fund the improvement of barriers
at the United States border.
H.R. 5863 (Cuellar); H.R. 5869 (Rodriguez); S. 2867 (Bingaman),
Southwest Border Violence Reduction Act of 2008. H.R. 5863 and H.R. 5869,
introduced April 22, 2007, and S. 2867, introduced April 15, 2007, would authorize
additional resources to identify and eliminate illicit sources of firearms smuggled into
Mexico for use by violent drug trafficking organizations. The bill also would expand
the resources provided for the Project Gunrunner initiative of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to identify, investigate, and prosecute individuals
involved in the trafficking of firearms across the international border between the
United States and Mexico.
H.R. 6028 (Berman), Merida Initiative to Combat Illicit Narcotics and
Reduce Organized Crime Authorization Act of 2008. Introduced May 13, 2008,
the bill would authorize $1.6 billion over three years, FY2008-FY2010, for both
Mexico and Central America, to combat drug trafficking and organized crime. Of
that amount, $1.1 billion would be authorized for Mexico, $405 million for Central
America, and $73.5 million for activities of the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) to reduce the flow of illegal weapons from the
United States to Mexico. The measure requires that vetting procedures are in place
to ensure that members or units of military or law enforcement agencies that may
receive assistance have not been involved in human rights violations. The House
approved the bill on June 10, 2008, by a vote of 311 to 106. No Senate action was
taken on the bill.
H.R. 6630 (DeFazio). Introduced July 29, 2008; reported by the House
Committee on Transportation September 9, 2008 (H.Rept. 110-833). The House
approved the bill on September 9, 2008 (by a vote of 395 to 18). The bill would

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prohibit the Department of Transportation from continuing a pilot program granting
certain Mexican trucks access to U.S. highways beyond the commercial zone, and
would prohibit the Department of Transportation from renewing such a program
unless expressly authorized by Congress. No Senate action was taken on the bill.
S. 9 (Reid), Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007. Introduced
January 4, 2007, S. 9 would express the sense of Congress that both the House and
Senate should pass immigration reform that acknowledges the United States’
immigrant heritage, creates more effective border enforcement, prevents illegal
immigration, and reforms the legal immigration process.
S. 132 (Allard), Methamphetamine Trafficking Enforcement Act of 2007.
Introduced January 4, 2007, S. 132 would express the sense of Congress that efforts
to reduce the trafficking of methamphetamine and its precursor chemicals should be
included in all bilateral and multilateral negotiations of the U.S. Trade
Representative, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
Attorney General. Section Four also would express the sense of Congress that the
Drug Enforcement Administration should collaborate with law enforcement officials
from countries that are known to traffic in methamphetamine and its precursor
chemicals and calls for education, training, and information sharing on the
international trafficking and use of methamphetamine. Mexico is a leading foreign
source of methamphetamine.
S. 193 (Lugar), Energy Diplomacy and Security Act of 2007. Introduced
January 4, 2007, and reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee April 12,
2007 (S.Rept. 110-54), the bill would increase cooperation on energy issues between
the U.S. government and foreign governments. This would include a Hemispheric
Energy Cooperation Forum to enhance cooperation among major producers and
consumers in the hemisphere, including Mexico.
S. 575 (Domenici) / H.R. 2431 (Cuellar), Border Infrastructure and
Technology Modernization Act of 2007. S. 575 was introduced February 13, 2007,
while H.R. 2431 was introduced May 22, 2007. Each bill includes a provision that
would permit funds authorized in the Act to be used for the implementation of
projects described in the Declaration on Embracing Technology and Cooperation to
Promote the Secure and Efficient Flow of People and Commerce across our Shared
Border between the United States and Mexico, agreed to March 22, 2002, Monterrey,
Mexico (commonly known as the Border Partnership Action Plan). Similar language
was incorporated in P.L. 110-161 listed above.
S. 844 (Feinstein) Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2007.
Introduced March 12, 2007, S. 844 would address the care and custody of
unaccompanied alien children and directs immigration officers who find such
children at U.S. land borders or ports of entry to permit them to withdraw their
applications for admission and return to their country of nationality or last habitual
residence. In the majority of cases, it gives the Office of Refugee Resettlement at the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) jurisdiction over the care and
custody of those unaccompanied alien children under the age of 18 who have not
committed a federal crime or pose a threat to national security.

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S. 1007 (Lugar), United States-Brazil Energy Cooperation Pact of 2007.
Introduced March 28, 2007, and reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
September 23, 2008 (without written report), S. 1007 would establish a Western
Hemisphere Energy Cooperation Forum to strengthen relationships between the
United States and Western Hemisphere countries, particularly the countries of Brazil,
Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela, through cooperation on energy issues. Regarding
Mexico, the bill would direct the Secretary of Energy to work with Mexico to
conduct a technical analysis of the Mexican oil and gas production status, future
technological and investment needs, and recommendations for maintaining and
increasing hydrocarbon production.
S. 1216 (Domenici), Laser Visa Extension Act of 2007. Introduced April 25,
2007, the bill would permit a national of Mexico to travel up to 100 miles from the
international border between Mexico and New Mexico if the person possesses a valid
machine-readable biometric border crossing identification card issued by a
Department of State consular officer, enters New Mexico through a port of entry
where such card is processed using a machine reader, has successfully completed any
required background check, and is admitted into the United States as a nonimmigrant
tourist or business visitor.
S. 1269 (Inhofe), Engaging the Nation to Fight for Our Right to Control
Entry Act of 2007. Introduced May 2, 2007, the bill would direct the Commissioner
of the United States Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) to establish a National
Border Neighborhood Watch Program to allow retired law enforcement officers and
civilian volunteers to assist in carrying out such a program and establish a Border
Regiment Assisting in Valuable Enforcement Force (BRAVE Force), which would
consist of retired law enforcement officers, who would be employed to carry out the
Program.
S. 1348 (Reid), Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007.
Introduced May 4, 2007, the bill would significantly reform the U.S. immigration
system. The measure would establish a temporary worker program; normalize the
status of illegal immigrants; reduce the backlog of pending family- and employment-
based immigration petitions; enhance border security; and introduce a point-based
immigration system to replace the current emphasis on family reunification. It would
call for increased cooperation between the United States, Canada, and Mexico to
improve security in North America. It would require annual reports to Congress on
the status of information sharing between the United States, Mexico, and Canada in
areas such as security clearances and document integrity; visa policy; terror watch
lists; and money laundering. It would seek to improve the security of Mexico’s
southern border through a review of assistance needed to secure the borders of
Guatemala and Belize. The bill also would call for improved coordination between
the United States and Mexico to improve border security and to reduce: drug
trafficking, human trafficking, gang membership, domestic violence, and crime. A
provision in the bill would improve circular migration between Mexico and the
United States; this could include development assistance to create employment
opportunities in Mexico. In June 2007, the U.S. Senate voted against cloture on S.
1348. The measure was not considered after that vote.

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S. 2348 (Cornyn), Emergency Border Security Funding Act of 2007.
Introduced November 13, 2007, the bill would direct the President, no later than two
years after enactment of the bill, to ensure that operational control of the
U.S.-Mexico border will be met, the Border Patrol will have 23,000 full-time agents,
specified barriers will be installed along such border, and specified detention
capacities will be met.
S. 2712 (DeMint), Complete the Fence Act. Introduced March 5, 2008, the
bill would require the Secretary of Homeland Security to complete at least 700 miles
of reinforce fencing along the southwest border by December 31, 2010.
S. 3235 (Vitter). Introduced July 9, 2008, the bill would reduce the amount of
financial assistance provided to the government of Mexico in response to the illegal
border crossing from Mexico into the United States.
S. 3288 (Leahy), FY2009 State Department, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act. Introduced and reported by the Senate
Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 110-425) July 18, 2008. The bill would provide
not more than $300 million in INCLE and ESF assistance for Mexico only to combat
drug trafficking and related violence and organized crime, and for judicial reform,
institution building, anti-corruption, and rule of law activities, of which not less than
$35,000,000 shall be for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, and
rule of law activities. The bill would provide conditions on the assistance as set forth
in P.L. 110-252 that funded the first year of the Mérida Initiative.

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For Additional Reading
Mexico
CRS Report RL34215. Mexico’s Drug Cartels, by Colleen W. Cook.
CRS Report RS22837. Merida Initiative: Proposed U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug
Assistance for Mexico and Central America, by Colleen W. Cook, Rebecca G.
Rush, and Clare Ribando Seelke.
CRS Report RS22462. Mexico’s 2006 Elections, by Colleen W. Cook.
CRS Report RL32934. U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and
Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
CRS Report RL34733. NAFTA and the Mexican Economy, by M. Angeles Villarreal
and Marisabel Cid.
Economic Issues
CRS Report RS22701. Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: An
Overview and Selected Issues, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Jennifer E. Lake.
CRS Report 98-253. U.S. Agricultural Trade: Trends, Composition, Direction, and
Policy, by Charles E. Hanrahan, Beverly A. Banks, and Carol Canada.
CRS Report RL33577. U.S. International Trade: Trends and Forecasts, by Dick K.
Nanto, Shayerah Ilias, and J. Michael Donnelly.
CRS Report RL31356. Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and
Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, by William H. Cooper.
Immigration and Border Security
CRS Report RS22802. Passports: Current Regulations, by Susan Epstein.
CRS Report RL34007. Immigration Fraud: Policies, Investigations, and Issues, by
Ruth Ellen Wasem.
CRS Report RL32270. Enforcing Immigration Law: The Role of State and Local
Law Enforcement, by Blas Nuñez-Neto, Michael John Garcia, and Karma
Ester.
CRS Report RL32657. Immigration-Related Document Fraud: Overview of Civil,
Criminal, and Immigration Consequences, by Yule Kim and Michael John
Garcia.
CRS Report RL32235. U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions, by Ruth
Ellen Wasem.

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CRS Report RL31381. U.S. Immigration Policy on Temporary Admissions, by Chad
C. Haddal and Ruth Ellen Wasem.
CRS Report RS22574. Immigration Reform: Brief Synthesis of the Issue, by Ruth
Ellen Wasem.
CRS Report RL32044. Immigration: Policy Considerations Related to Guest
Worker Programs, by Andorra Bruno.
CRS Report RL32004. Social Security Benefits for Noncitizens: Current Policy and
Legislation, by Dawn Nuschler and Alison Siskin.
CRS Report RL33896. Unaccompanied Alien Children: Policies and Issues, by
Chad C. Haddal.
CRS Report RL32861. Farm Labor: The Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR), by
William G. Whittaker.
CRS Report RL30395. Farm Labor Shortages and Immigration Policy, by Linda
Levine.
CRS Report RL33659. Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S. International
Border, by Blas Nuñez-Neto and Yule Kim.
Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Criminal Gangs
CRS Report RL34514. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(ATF): Budget and Operations, by William J. Krouse.
CRS Report RL32352. War on Drugs: Reauthorization and Oversight of the Office
of National Drug Control Policy, by Mark Eddy.
CRS Report 98-958. Extradition To and From the United States: Overview of the
Law and Recent Treaties, by Charles Doyle.
CRS Report RS22325. Methamphetamine: Legislation and Issues in the 110th
Congress, by Celinda Franco.
CRS Report RL34317. Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress,
by Clare Ribando Seelke and Alison Siskin.
CRS Report RL34233. The MS-13 and 18th Street Gangs: Emerging Transnational
Gang Threats? by Celinda Franco.
CRS Report RL34112. Gangs in Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.

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