Order Code RS22973
October 22, 2008
Congress and U.S. Policy on North Korean
Human Rights and Refugees: Recent
Legislation and Implementation
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The passage of the reauthorization of the North Korean Human Rights Act in
October 2008 (P.L.110-346) reasserted congressional interest in influencing the Bush
Administration’s policy toward North Korea. In addition to reauthorizing funding at
original levels, the bill expresses congressional criticism of the implementation of the
original 2004 law and adjusts some of the provisions relating to the Special Envoy on
Human Rights in North Korea and the U.S. resettlement of North Korean refugees.
Some outside analysts have pointed to the challenges of highlighting North Korea’s
human rights violations in the midst of the ongoing nuclear negotiations, as well as the
difficulty in effectively reaching North Korean refugees as outlined in the law. Further,
the law may complicate coordination on North Korea with China and South Korea. For
more information, please see CRS Report RL34189, North Korean Refugees in China
and Human Rights Issues: International Response and U.S. Policy Options
, coordinated
by Rhoda Margesson.
Introduction
North Korea’s systematic violation of its citizens’ human rights and the plight of
North Koreans trying to escape their country have been well documented in multiple
reports issued by governments and other international bodies. The Bush Administration
initially highlighted and later de-emphasized Pyongyang’s human rights record as its
policy on nuclear weapons negotiations evolved. Congress has consistently drawn
attention to North Korean human rights violations on a bipartisan basis. On several
occasions, Congress has criticized the executive branch for its approach to these issues,
through tough questioning of Administration witnesses during multiple hearings and
through written letters of protest to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

CRS-2
The passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (H.R. 4011; P.L.
108-333; and 22 U.S.C. 7801.) and its reauthorization in 2008 (H.R. 5834, P.L.110-346)
serve as the most prominent examples of legislative action on these issues. The
legislation both reinforces some aspects of the Administration’s rhetoric on North Korea
and expresses dissatisfaction with other elements of its policy on North Korea. The
reauthorization bill explicitly criticizes the implementation of the original law and
reasserts Congressional interest in adopting human rights as a major priority in U.S.
policy toward North Korea.
U.S. attention to North Korean human rights and refugees is complicated by the
geopolitical sensitivities of East Asia. China is wary of U.S. involvement in the issue and
chafes at any criticism based on human rights. South Korea also had reservations about
a more active U.S. role, particularly in terms of refugees, although the current
administration in Seoul has been more amenable to such efforts. Both want to avoid a
massive outflow of refugees, which they believe could trigger instability or the collapse
of North Korea. U.S. executive branch officials worry that criticism of how Seoul and
Beijing approach North Korea’s human rights violations could disrupt the multilateral
negotiations to deal with Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programs. North Korean refugees
seeking resettlement often transit through other Asian countries, raising diplomatic,
refugee, and security concerns for those governments.
The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Policy Toward North Korea
In the first several years of the Bush Administration, high-level officials, including
the President and Secretary of State, publicly and forcefully criticized the regime in
Pyongyang for its human rights practices. As efforts to push forward the Six-Party talks
accelerated in 2007, the Administration did not propose any negotiations with North
Korea over human rights but asserted that human rights is one of several issues to be
settled with North Korea after the nuclear issue is resolved. The Six-Party Agreement of
February 13, 2007, calls for the United States and North Korea to “start bilateral talks
aimed at resolving bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations.” Prior
to the Agreement in 2007, the Bush Administration held that it would not agree to
normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea until there was progress on human
rights (presumably including refugees) and other issues. However, since the signing of
the agreement in February 2007, some observers say that Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill has focused exclusively on a satisfactory
settlement of the nuclear issue. It remains unclear how and when North Korea’s human
rights record and refugee issues might emerge as agenda items in U.S.-North Korea
relations.
The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004
The 108th Congress passed by voice vote, and President Bush signed, the North
Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (NKHRA). The legislation
! authorized up to $20 million for each of the fiscal years 2005-2008 for
assistance to North Korean refugees, $2 million for promoting human
rights and democracy in North Korea and $2 million to promote freedom
of information inside North Korea;

CRS-3
! asserted that North Koreans are eligible for U.S. refugee status and
instructs the State Department to facilitate the submission of applications
by North Koreans seeking protection as refugees; and
! required the President to appoint a Special Envoy to promote human
rights in North Korea.
The act also expressed the sense of Congress that human rights should remain a key
element in negotiations with North Korea; all humanitarian aid to North Korea shall be
conditional upon improved monitoring of the distribution of food; support for radio
broadcasting into North Korea should be enhanced; and that China is obligated to provide
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with unimpeded access
to North Koreans inside China.
Some hail the NKHRA as an important message that human rights will play a central
role in the formulation of U.S. policy towards North Korea. Passage of the legislation
was driven by the argument that the United States has a moral responsibility to stand up
for human rights for those suffering under repressive regimes. Advocates claim that, in
addition to alleviating a major humanitarian crisis, the NKHRA will ultimately enhance
stability in Northeast Asia by promoting international cooperation to deal with the
problem of North Korean refugees. Critics say the legislation risks upsetting relations
with South Korea and China, and ultimately the diplomatic unity necessary to make North
Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program through the Six-Party Talks. Further, they
insist that the legislation actually worsens the plight of North Korean refugees by drawing
more attention to them, leading to crackdowns by both North Korean and Chinese
authorities and reduced assistance by Southeast Asian countries concerned about
offending Pyongyang.
Selected Implementation Progress
While the passage of the NKHRA raised the profile of congressional interest in
North Korean human rights and refugee issues, many of the activities had existing
authorizations already in place. The State Department had programs directed toward
raising awareness of North Korean human rights issues as well as providing some
assistance to vulnerable North Korean refugees through other organizations. Korean-
language broadcasting by Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of American (VOA) pre-
dated the passage of the law. However, some activities appear to have been enhanced as
a result of the law’s enactment, particularly the admission of North Korean refugees for
resettlement in the United States.
Human Rights. Reports required by the act have outlined steps taken by the State
Department and other executive branch bodies to promote human rights in North Korea.
The State Department has not requested funding explicitly under the NKHRA, but
officials assert that the mission of the NKHRA is fulfilled under a number of existing
programs. For democracy promotion in North Korea, the State Department’s Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) Bureau gives grants to U.S.-based organizations: in the
FY2008 budget, DRL requested $1 million for North Korea human rights programs, as
well as $1 million for media freedom programs. DRL also considers several other
programs, such as those under the National Endowment of Democracy account specific

CRS-4
to North Korea, as fulfilling part of the NKHRA’s mission. The Special Envoy attended
three international Freedom House conferences organized to raise awareness of human
rights conditions in North Korea in 2005-2006. The U.S. government has also sponsored
and supported United Nations resolutions condemning North Korea’s human rights
abuses.
Refugee Resettlement. The NKHRA appears to have had the greatest impact
in the area of refugee admissions. As of September 2008, the United States had accepted
64 North Korean refugees for resettlement from undisclosed transit states. The first
refugees — four women and two men — were accepted in May 2006. The State
Department’s Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) Bureau annually provides
funds for UNHCR’s annual regional budget for East Asia, which includes assistance for
North Korean refugees, among other refugee populations. PRM funds international
organizations such as UNHCR and the International Committee for the Red Cross.
Radio Broadcasting into North Korea. The NKHRA calls on the Broadcasting
Board of Governors (BBG) to “facilitate the unhindered dissemination of information in
North Korea” by increasing the amount of Korean-language broadcasts by RFA and VOA.
The hours of radio broadcasts into North Korea, through medium- and short-wave, were
modestly increased beginning in 2006, and original programming was added in 2007. The
BBG currently broadcasts to North Korea ten hours per day: RFA broadcasts three and
one-half hours of original programming and one and one-half hours of repeat
programming, and VOA broadcasts four hours of original and one hour of repeat
programming with news updates each day. In FY2008, the BBG’s budget request
included $8.1 million to implement the 10-hour broadcast schedule, and the FY2009
request includes $8.5 million to maintain this schedule.
Content includes news briefs, particularly news involving the Korean peninsula,
interviews with North Korean defectors, and international commentary on events
happening inside North Korea. The BBG cites an InterMedia survey of escaped defectors
that indicates that North Koreans have some access to radios, many of them altered to
receive international broadcasts.1 The BBG continues to explore ways to expand medium
wave broadcast capability into North Korea. VOA is broadcast from BBG-owned stations
in Tinian, Thailand, and the Philippines, and from leased stations in Russia and Mongolia.
RFA is broadcast from stations in Tinian and Saipan and leased stations in Russia and
Mongolia.
Reauthorization Bill
The reauthorization bill renews funding that expired in FY2008, reasserts key tenets
of the legislation, and criticizes the pace of the executive branch implementation of the
original law. It also cites the small number of resettlements of North Korean refugees and
cites the slow processing of such refugees overseas. Funding is reauthorized through
2012 at the original levels of $2 million annually to support human rights and democracy
programs, $2 million annually to promote freedom of information to North Koreans, and
$20 million annually to assist North Korean refugees. It also requires additional reporting
— portions of which can be classified as necessary — on U.S. efforts to process North
1 Broadcasting Board of Governors, Executive Summary of Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request.

CRS-5
Korean refugees, along with reporting from the Broadcasting Board of Governors on
progress toward achieving 12 hours per day of broadcasting Korean language
programming.
Focus on Special Envoy. The role and activities of the Special Envoy for
Human Rights in North Korea (per the reauthorization bill, now the “Special Envoy for
North Korean Human Rights Issues”) have garnered particular attention from Congress.
Jay Lefkowitz, appointed as the Special Envoy by President Bush nearly five months after
the law was enacted in August 2005, was criticized for accepting the job as a part-time
position while maintaining his legal career in New York. The reauthorization bill
stipulates that the Special Envoy be an ambassador-level position — which requires
confirmation by the Senate — and expresses the sense of Congress that the position
should be full-time. Whereas the original legislation was vague on whether the refugee-
specific provisions fell under the Envoy’s responsibilities, the reauthorization bill includes
the sense of Congress that the Envoy should “participate in policy planning and
implementation” on North Korean refugee issues.
Lefkowitz’s role has varied in its public profile: at times he has been an active and
vocal advocate for human rights issues, and at other times he has faded from public view.
He has attended international conferences dedicated to raising awareness of human rights
abuses in North Korea and testified at multiple congressional hearings. As the Korean-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement was negotiated, he raised questions about labor practices at
the Kaesong complex, an industrial park located in North Korea in which a consortium
of South Korean firms employ North Korean labor.2 Lefkowitz’s visibility declined
particularly in 2007 as the Bush Administration renewed its effort on nuclear negotiations.
His statements occasionally have sparked controversy: in January 2008, he gave a speech
at a Washington think tank in which he criticized the denuclearization talks and voiced
doubt that North Korea would ever give up its nuclear weapons. In response, Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice said, “Jay Lefkowitz has nothing to do with the Six-Party
Talks ... he certainly has no say in what American policy will be in the Six-Party Talks.”3
Complications with the Refugee Provisions
Implementation Challenges. Some observers contend that good-faith
implementation of NKHRA’s refugee provisions may be counterproductive. They argue
that the legislation on North Korean refugee admissions could send a dangerous message
to North Koreans that admission to the United States as a refugee is assured, encouraging
incursions into U.S. diplomatic missions overseas. State Department officials say that
given the tight security in place at U.S. facilities abroad, unexpected stormings could
result in injury or death for the refugees. Secondly, granting of asylum status to North
Korean refugees involves a complex vetting process that is further complicated by the fact
that the applicants originate from a state with which the United States does not have
official relations. In congressional hearings, State Department officials have cautioned
that effective implementation of the NKHRA depends on close coordination with South
2 For more information, see CRS Report RL34093,The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial
Complex
by Dick Nanto and Mark Manyin.
3 “Diplomats Who Stray from Official US policy Cause Headaches for Rice and State
Department,”Associated Press. February 1, 2008.

CRS-6
Korea, particularly in developing mechanisms to vet potential refugees given the dearth
of information available to U.S. immigration officials on North Koreans.4
Funding Concerns. Some government officials and NGO staff familiar with
providing assistance to North Korean refugees say that funding explicitly associated with
the NKHRA is problematic because of the need for discretion in reaching the vulnerable
population. Refugees are often hiding from authorities, and regional governments do not
wish to draw attention to their role in transferring North Koreans, so funding is labeled
under more general assistance programs. In addition, many of the NGOs that help
refugees do not have the capacity to absorb large amounts of funding effectively because
of their small, grass roots nature.
A Ready Alternative for Resettlement. South Korea remains the primary
destination for North Korean refugees. In addition to automatically granting South Korean
citizenship, the South Korean government administers a resettlement program and
provides cash and training for all defectors. According to press reports, over 14,000
defectors from North Korea have resettled in the South since the conclusion of the Korean
War in 1953, including over 2,500 in 2007 alone.5 The South Korean system of accepting
refugees is faster and more streamlined than the U.S. process.
Changes in South Korea’s Approach?
As part of its policy of increasing economic integration and fostering better ties with
North Korea, South Korea until recently refrained from criticizing Pyongyang’s human
rights record and downplayed its practice of accepting North Korean refugees. Lee
Myung-bak’s election as South Korea’s president in December 2007, however, appeared
to usher in a new approach: Lee’s administration has tied assistance from the South to
North Korean progress on denuclearization and openly criticized North Korea’s human
rights situation. In years past, South Korea had usually abstained from voting on United
Nations resolutions calling for improvement in North Korea’s human rights practices. At
the U.N. Human Rights Council meeting in March 2008, however, South Korea voted for
a similar resolution. Lee has also conditioned fertilizer and food aid on improved access
to the North’s distribution systems to ensure that such aid is not going only to
Pyongyang’s elite and military. This approach has contributed to a considerable chill in
North-South relations since Lee took office. A joint statement from President Bush and
President Lee in August 2008 urged progress in improving North Korea’s human rights,
the first time such a mention appeared.
4 Transcript of April 28, 2005 joint hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific and the
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations entitled, “The
North Korean Human Rights Act: Issues and Implementation,” accessed at
[http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/20919.pdf].
5 “North Korea Newsletter No. 19,” Yonhap English News. September 4, 2008.