Order Code RL33376
Iraq’s Debt Relief: Procedure and Potential
Implications for International Debt Relief
Updated October 2, 2008
Martin A. Weiss
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade

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Iraq’s Debt Relief: Procedure and Potential Implications
for International Debt Relief
Summary
Following the ouster of the Saddam Hussein regime in spring 2003, Iraq’s
external debt was estimated to be around $130 billion. Reducing this debt to a
sustainable level has been a priority of the U.S. government. Since 2003, debt relief
negotiations have taken place in a variety of fora and led to the cancellation of a
significant amount of Iraq’s external debt.
Iraq’s external debt comprised four components: Paris Club bilateral debt ($42.5
billion), non-Paris Club bilateral debt ($67.4 billion), commercial debt ($20 billion)
and multilateral debt ($0.5 billion). Debt relief negotiations first led to an 80%
reduction of the Paris Club debt. The Paris Club agreement also set the terms for
non-Paris Club and commercial debt cancellation levels. A provision of the Paris
Club agreement is that Iraq cannot accept a debt cancellation agreement with other
creditors on more favorable terms for Iraq than those reached with the Paris Club.
Thus, Iraq is expected to receive no more than an 80% cancellation from all of its
creditors. Negotiations with non-Paris Club creditors are ongoing, and resolution of
the commercial debt is largely complete.
The negotiations and process of providing debt relief to Iraq may shed some
light on the approaches bilateral and corporate creditors take toward providing
international debt relief to middle-income countries who would not be eligible for the
debt relief already provided to the poorest countries. In light of Iraq’s experience,
three new precedents appear to have taken shape: (1) a willingness by the
international community to grant a stay on the enforcement of creditor rights to
collect unpaid sovereign debt; (2) an increased flexibility in Paris Club debt relief
decisions; and (3) an unwillingness by successor regimes to claim that their debt is
“odious” and repudiate it.
This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Contents
Iraq’s External Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Paris Club Debt Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Non-Paris Club Debt Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Commercial Debt Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Debt Relief Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Paris Club Debt Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Evian Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Iraq’s Paris Club Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Non-Paris Club Debt Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Commercial Debt Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Potential Policy Precedents for International Debt Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Granting a Stay on the Enforcement of Creditor Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Flexibility of Paris Club Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Implementing an Odious Debt Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
List of Figures
Figure 1. Regional Distribution of Iraq’s Commercial Claims, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . 5
List of Tables
Table 1. Total Iraq Paris Club Debt, 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Table 2. Non-Paris Club Debt (Various Estimates) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table 3: Paris Club Debt Relief as of September 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 4. Non-Paris Club Debt Relief as of September 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

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Iraq’s Debt Relief: Procedure and Potential
Implications for International Debt Relief
Iraq’s debt relief has been a priority for both the Bush Administration and
Congress. Debt relief is important to U.S. interests for several reasons, including
releasing funds to help support Iraq’s budget, pay for Iraq’s security, and reestablish
Iraq’s financial standing with international creditors and the financial markets.

Iraq’s Saddam-era debt is estimated at $130 billion and has been the focus of
numerous negotiations over the past three years among bilateral, multilateral, and
commercial creditors. These negotiations led to an 80% reduction of Paris Club and
commercial debt.1 Negotiations with non-Paris Club bilateral creditors including
Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries are ongoing. The United States
forgave its Saddam-era debt, worth $4.1 billion, in November 2004.
This report proceeds in three parts. The first provides a snapshot of the Iraq
debt situation following the ouster of the Saddam regime. The second discusses
subsequent debt relief negotiations and their resolution. The third presents three
possible implications for future debt relief cases that arise from Iraq’s experience.
They are: (1) a willingness by the international community to grant a stay on the
enforcement of creditor rights, (2) an increased flexibility in Paris Club debt relief
decisions, and (3) an unwillingness by successor regimes to claim that their debt is
odious and repudiate it.
Iraq’s External Debt
The precise dimensions of Iraq’s foreign debt obligations are unknown. This
is due to disagreements on what Iraq actually owes and how interest on this debt
should be calculated (or if it should be counted at all).2 Iraq’s external debt following
the end of the Saddam regime was approximately $130 billion. This debt comprised
1 The Paris Club is the forum where major creditor countries negotiate terms for
restructuring or resolving official government-to-government debt. It includes the United
States and 18 other permanent members: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Other creditors are allowed to participate
in negotiations on an ad-hoc basis.
2 Creditor countries use different interest rates and levy different penalties for Iraq’s
payment arrears. Hence, the debt owed to each creditor can grow at different rates. In
addition, Iraq could claim that it should not be expected to pay debt (or interest) accrued
after the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions in 1990 that made it illegal for
financial institutions to process Iraq’s financial transactions.

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CRS-2
four components: official Paris Club bilateral creditors ($42.5 billion), official non-
Paris Club bilateral creditors ($67.4 billion), commercial creditors ($20 billion) and
multilateral creditors3 ($0.5 billion). The first three major components are discussed
below.
Paris Club Debt Claims
At the time of Iraq’s Paris Club debt relief agreement on November 14, 2004,
it was determined that Iraq’s total external debt to Paris Club countries was $37.15
billion, including interest. 4 Later IMF estimates put the figure at $42.5 billion.5 On
July 10, 2003, the Paris Club issued a country-by-country breakdown of its member
states’ claims against Iraq. These figures are reproduced in Table 1.
Iraq’s debt to the United States consisted of loan guarantees issued between
1983 and 1993 by the U.S. Department of Agriculture for the sale of U.S. agricultural
products to Iraq. Iraq defaulted on $2.19 billion of these guaranteed loans in 1991,
just prior to the first Gulf War. The U.S. Department of Agriculture paid off the
creditors and assumed the debt. By the end of the Saddam regime, accumulated
interest increased Iraq’s U.S. debt to approximately $4.1 billion.
Table 1. Total Iraq Paris Club Debt, 2003
(in U.S. $ millions, excluding interest)
Creditor Nation
Debt Owed
Japan
$4,108.6
Russia
$3,450.0
France
$2,993.7
Germany
$2,303.9
United States
$2,192.0
Italy
$1,726.0
United Kingdom
$930.8
Austria
$813.1
3 Iraq’s debts to the World Bank and the IMF were cleared in 2004, largely by contributions
from Paris Club donor countries.
4 Iraq Paris Club Debt Treatment, November 14, 2004. Available at
[http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/countries/countries.php?IDENTIFIANT=397&POSITIO
N=0&PAY_ISO_ID=IQ&CONTINENT_ID=orient_afric_en&TYPE_TRT=&ANNEE=
&INDICE_DET=].
5 Iraq: First Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement and Financing Assurances Review
Staff Report; International Monetary Fund, September 15, 2008.
[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08303.pdf]

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Creditor Nation
Debt Owed
Canada
$564.2
Australia
$499.3
Spain
$321.2
Brazil
$192.9
Sweden
$185.8
Belgium
$184.5
Finland
$152.2
Switzerland
$117.5
Netherlands
$96.7
South Korea
$54.7
Denmark
$30.8
Total
$20,917.9
Source: The Paris Club
Non-Paris Club Debt Claims
The majority of Iraq’s external official debt is owed to non-Paris Club states.
The IMF is the only definitive source for non-Paris Club debt and it has not made a
country-by-country breakdown of this debt available. In the absence of such a
breakdown, CRS has reviewed estimates compiled by Jubilee Iraq, an affiliate of the
Jubilee organizations which campaign for international debt relief. These estimates
are presented in Table 2. These are unofficial figures, representing only Jubilee
Iraq’s compilation of figures reported in the press, think tank reports, or official
government remarks.6
Table 2. Non-Paris Club Debt (Various Estimates)
(in U.S. $ million)
Creditor Nation
Debt Owed
Saudi Arabia
$30,000
Kuwait
$27,000
China
$5,800
6 For the full Jubilee Iraq compilation, see [http://www.jubileeiraq.org/debt_today.htm].

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Creditor Nation
Debt Owed
Qatar
$4,000
United Arab Emirates
$3,800
Romania
$2,500
Serbia
$2,000
Turkey
$1,800
Bulgaria
$1,700
Jordan
$1,300
Poland
$564
Czech Republic
$147
Morocco
$32
South Africa
$24
Hungary
$17
India
$1
Source: Jubilee Iraq
Commercial Debt Claims
In 2003, Iraq’s debt to commercial creditors was estimated to be $15 billion.
In 2005, after further evaluation of claims by Iraq’s government, the figure was raised
to $20 billion. Commercial claims are geographically dispersed (Figure 1) and most
claims are relatively small.7 Of all the claims received, 36% of the claims were less
than $1 million and 37% were between $1 and $10 million. U.S. dollar-denominated
debt accounted for 72% of all claims, with the remainder denominated primarily in
Japanese Yen (17%) and in Euros (8%).8
7 Meeting with Iraq’s Commercial Claimants, Iraq Debt Reconciliation Office, May 4, 2005.
[http://www.eyidro.com]
8 Ibid.

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CRS-5
Figure 1. Regional Distribution of Iraq’s
Commercial Claims, 2005
Western Europe (43%)
Other (2%)
North America (2%)
Asia (32%)
Middle East (9%)
Central and Eastern Europe (12%)
Source: Iraq Debt Reconciliation Office
The Debt Relief Effort
Following the ouster of Saddam Hussein, the international community began the
process of helping Iraq rebuild its economy.9 An integral component of economic
reconstruction following any conflict is resolving old debts and regaining access to
the international financial community. Iraq, however, was a unique case. Unlike
many of the world’s poorest countries, Iraq is considered a middle-income country
because of its substantial petroleum reserves. Iraq would likely be able to service its
existing debts once its petroleum industry was functioning. Many analysts thus
argued that Iraq appeared to be a good candidate for so-called “debt flow” treatment,
involving rescheduling its official debts until it had the capacity to repay instead of
cancelling them completely as is done for the poorest countries, which lack any
natural resources that can be used to generate revenue. Others asserted that if Iraq’s
future oil revenues were used to fund repayment of old debts, not enough would
remain to fund its current and future economic needs.
Discussion of cancelling Iraq’s debt began soon after the ouster of the Hussein
regime. Led by the Bush Administration, a consensus was reached that Iraq would
receive debt relief on terms that were unique in light of its economic resources, but
not unprecedented given the political situation. Debt relief has been provided to
various countries for political and economic reasons. The United States, for
example, has provided special bilateral debt relief to Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, and
Poland, among many other countries.
9 See CRS Report RL31944, Iraq’s Economy: Past, Present, Future, coordinated by
Jonathan Sanford.

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Paris Club Debt Relief
The Paris Club is an informal arrangement among creditor countries to abide by
a fixed set of rules and principles for debt relief that have been agreed on by its
members. Paris Club members meet periodically to reschedule, and in some cases
collectively cancel, the debts owed to them by other countries. The U.S. share of any
Paris Club debt relief must be appropriated by Congress.
Since the Paris Club was the most organized of all of Iraq’s creditors, and
included the major industrialized countries, it was able to start the debt relief
negotiations and establish the precedents that other bilateral and commercial creditors
would need to follow.
In September 2003, the G7 Finance Ministers called on the Paris Club “to make
its best effort to complete the restructuring of Iraq’s debt before the end of 2004.”10
President Bush appointed former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III as his
personal envoy on the issue of Iraq’s debt in December 2003. Secretary Baker
traveled to Europe, Asia, and the Middle East for discussions with foreign
government officials in countries open to providing some debt relief to Iraq.
The Baker appointment, and the ensuing supportive response from other Paris
Club countries, showed that the major creditor countries were interested in cancelling
Iraq’s external debt even though Iraq had the natural resources to eventually service
its debts by itself. Prior to the Iraq case, Paris Club debt cancellation (rather than
debt rescheduling) was only available for the poorest countries. Paris Club members
began offering debt cancellation in addition to debt rescheduling in 1988. At the
1988 Toronto meeting of G7 Finance Ministers, Paris Club members agreed to
extend to poor countries up to one-third forgiveness of their bilateral debts.11 Over
the next decade, the Paris Club gradually increased the amount of debt that it would
be willing to cancel from 33.33% in 1988 to 90% in 1999.12 Iraq, however, did not
qualify for poor country debt relief due to its substantial petroleum reserves. Thus,
Paris Club members would need to create a new framework, the Evian Approach, to
cancel Iraq’s debts.
Evian Approach. Strong Bush Administration support for Iraq debt relief
likely contributed to the Paris Club’s reshaping of its approach to debt relief in the
runup to the 2003 Evian G8 Summit. The new Evian Approach introduces a new
strategy for determining Paris Club debt relief levels that is more flexible and can
provide debt cancellation to a greater number of countries then was available under
prior Paris Club rules.
10 Statement of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, September 20, 2003.
11 Many Paris Club policy decisions are decided during periodic finance ministers meetings
of the G7 countries.
12 More information on Paris Club debt treatment options is available at the Paris Club
website: [http://www.clubdeparis.org/].

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Instead of using economic indicators to determine eligibility for debt relief, as
had previously been done, all potential debt relief cases are now divided into two
groups: the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and non-HIPC countries.13 HIPC
countries will continue to receive assistance under Cologne terms, which sanction up
to 90% debt cancellation. All other countries will be assessed on a case-by-case
basis.
Under the Evian Approach, a country seeking debt relief first undergoes an IMF
debt sustainability analysis. This analysis determines whether the country suffers
from a liquidity problem, a debt sustainability problem, or both. If the IMF
determines that the country suffers from a temporary liquidity problem, its debts are
rescheduled until a later date. If the country is also determined to suffer from debt
sustainability problems, where it lacks the current resources to meet its debt
obligations and the amount of the debt adversely affects its future ability to pay, the
country is eligible for debt cancellation. During the Iraq discussions, Paris Club
members determined that Iraq possessed an unsustainable amount of external debt,
and began negotiating to cancel Iraq’s debts.
Iraq’s Paris Club Agreement. On November 21, 2004, the United States
and other Paris Club members agreed on a debt relief program for Iraq providing a
three-phase debt reduction of 80% of Iraq’s external debts. Going into the Paris
Club meeting to consider Iraq’s debt, the United States was reportedly pressing for
a 95% reduction of all of Iraq’s debt to Paris Club members, while the Europeans,
led by France and Russia, wanted only a 50% reduction. According to one press
account, Germany agreed to support a compromise figure of an 80% reduction, thus
tipping the negotiations toward that figure.14 According to the official Paris Club
program, the terms of the Iraq deal are:
First Reduction: cancels 30% of the debt upon signing the bilateral agreements
implementing the Paris Club agreement;
Second Reduction: cancels an additional 30% after an IMF program is signed; and
Third Reduction: cancels the final 20% of debt on completion of the last IMF Board
review of three years of implementation of the IMF program.
When fully implemented, the Paris Club’s treatment of Iraq’s debt will reduce
the total debt owed to Paris Club countries from $38.9 billion to $7.8 billion. This
remainder (20% of the original total), will be rescheduled over a period of 23 years
with an initial six-year grace period of repayments.
U.S. Debt Relief. On December 17, 2004, the United States forgave $4.1
billion (half principal and half interest) — 100% of the debt Iraq owed to the United
States. However, since the United States writes off debt in net present value terms,
13 CRS Report RL33073, Debt Relief for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries: Issues for
Congress, by Martin A. Weiss.
14 Manmohan Singh and Jochen Andritzky, “How the Iraq Deal Was Done,” Euromoney,
September 2005.

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CRS-8
not face value, the amount required was much less than the $4.1 billion. The fair
market value of Iraq’s debt was determined to be $360 million by the U.S. Treasury
and was appropriated in a reallocation of financial resources for Iraq approved by
Congress on September 29, 2004.
Other Paris Club Country Debt Relief. Unlike the United States, most
Paris Club members waited until Iraq signed an agreement with the IMF in December
2005 to implement their debt relief. Beginning in December 2005, remaining Paris
Club members formally implemented their Paris Club debt relief agreement. The last
Paris Club country to formally agree to a debt relief agreement with Iraq was Russia,
which granted a debt reduction of 60 percent as of end-2005 on a reduced stock of
debt of $4.5 billion on February 11, 2008.15
These agreements commenced the first two stages of Paris Club debt relief. In
accordance with the Paris Club agreement under the new Evian Approach, 30% of
bilateral debt would be immediately cancelled following signing the bilateral
agreement and 30% would be cancelled following the signing of the IMF Agreement.
The remainder of the debt would be cancelled following the successful completion
of the IMF program.
Table 3 provides additional information on Paris Club debt relief to date:
Table 3: Paris Club Debt Relief as of September 2008
in U.S. $ billion
Paris Club Creditors
Nominal Debt Stock
Before debt restructuring
$42.5
Debt relief to date
$25.8
Of which:
First debt reduction, end-2004
$14.3
Second debt reduction, end-2005
$11.5
Outstanding
$16.7
Source: IMF
15 Iraq: First Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement and Financing Assurances Review
Staff Report; International Monetary Fund, September 15, 2008.
[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08303.pdf]

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CRS-9
Non-Paris Club Debt Relief
In some country debt relief negotiations conducted by the Paris Club, non-Paris
club members participate on an ad-hoc basis. In the Iraq case, however,
approximately two-thirds of Iraq’s debt is held by non-Paris Club countries.
Including those countries in the Paris Club negotiations may have been unfeasible
and could have made a resolution much more difficult.
Arab creditor countries were not included in the Paris Club discussions, yet
Iraq’s Paris Club agreement required Iraq to seek terms that are at least equal to the
debt relief negotiated with Paris Club members.16 It may prove difficult to obtain
such a high rate of debt cancellation from Iraq’s non-Paris Club creditors. Moreover,
since Paris Club debt relief came with strings attached in the form of IMF
conditionality, it may be likely that non-Paris Club members will seek to attach
conditions to any debt relief themselves, possibly in the form of preferential access
to Iraqi oil, or other business and investment opportunities in Iraq.
During January 2004 meetings with representatives from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar — four Persian Gulf countries that,
combined, hold approximately $65 billion of Iraq’s debt — Secretary Baker received
assurances that the Persian Gulf countries would significantly reduce their Iraq debt
holdings once a sovereign Iraqi government was established.17 Many observers
suggest that Iraq’s neighbors may want to wait on any final debt reduction until they
see whether the future government in Iraq will be friendly to them. Arab creditors
that are Iraq’s Persian Gulf neighbors might also want more formal political
arrangements to resolve Sunni-Shiite disputes in Iraq on terms these creditors (all
Sunni-ruled countries) would find sufficiently equitable.18 To date, the only Gulf
country to complete debt relief for Iraq is the UAE. On July 7, 2008, the UAE
announced that it was fully writing off its remaining Iraq debt.19
In fall 2006, the Iraqi government, the United States, and several international
institutions launched a development program to create an “International Compact
with Iraq.” The objective of the compact is to secure agreement from the Iraqi
government to implement political and economic reforms in exchange for increased
Arab debt relief and international aid contributions.20 U.S. Secretary of State
16 Iraq Paris Club Comparability of Treatment Provision, November 21, 2004.
[http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/countries/countries.php?CONTINENT_ID=orient_afric_
en&DETAIL_DETTE_PAGE=4&IDENTIFIANT=397&PAY_ISO_ID=IQ]
17 “Baker Secures Promises of Iraq Debt Relief from Gulf Oil States,” Agence France
Presse, January 21, 2004.
18 See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam
Governance, by Kenneth Katzman.
19 Iraq: First Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement and Financing Assurances Review
Staff Report; International Monetary Fund, September 15, 2008.
[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08303.pdf].
20 The International Compact with Iraq: A Shared Vision, A Mutual Commitment, Draft
(continued...)

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Condoleezza Rice initially raised the issue of Iraqi debt relief during discussions with
Middle Eastern leaders in January 2007. In April 2007, Saudi Arabia reportedly
acknowledged that it would provide debt relief of 80%, in accordance with the Paris
Club agreement, although negotiations are continuing.21 Since then, however, there
has been no indication that debt relief is forthcoming from Saudi Arabia.
Iraq has resolved some of its smaller debts to non-Arab, non-Paris Club
creditors. Iraq authorities have signed agreement with nine non-Paris Club creditors.
Of these countries, six provide debt relief at Paris Club terms (Czech Republic,
Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Romania, and South Africa) and three provided 100%
debt relief. The latest agreement was signed with the countries of the former
Yugoslavia on January 21, 2008. According to the IMF, negotiations are under way
with 11 other non-Paris Club creditor countries, representing an estimated stock of
debt of about $16 billion. Furthermore, a memorandum of understanding has been
signed with China, which holds a remaining stock of Iraqi debt of $8.5 billion.
Table 4 provides summary information on non-Paris Club debt relief for Iraq.
Table 4. Non-Paris Club Debt Relief as of September 2008
(U.S. $ billion)
Non-Paris Club creditors
Nominal debt stock
(Concluded agreements only)
Before debt restructuring
9.4
Debt relief to date
7.5
Of which:
Full cancellation
0.2
Cash settlement
5.4
On Paris Club terms
2.0
Outstanding
1.9
Source: IMF
20 (...continued)
Outline. Document is available at [http://www.iraqcompact.org/documents/ICI%
20Outline%20Document%20-%20PG%20Version%20-%205%20Sep.pdf]. See also, Final
Report of the Iraq Study Group, December 2006, p. 27. According to the study group,
“Several U.S. and international officials told us that the compact could be an opportunity
to seek greater international engagement in the country.”
21 Barry Schweid, “Saudi’s Said Mulling Loan Relief for Iraq,” Associated Press, April 18,
2007.

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Commercial Debt Relief
The final portion of Iraq’s debt is commercial claims estimated at around $20
billion. These are outstanding commercial claims against various Iraqi guarantors
that arose prior to the August 6, 1990 U.N. sanctions imposed when Iraq invaded
Kuwait. The Iraqi government retained two U.S. companies, Ernst and Young and
Citigroup, to adjudicate these debt claims and to help negotiate various settlements
with small and large Iraqi creditors. The Iraq Debt Reconciliation Office was
established in Amman, Jordan in May 2004.22 On December 9, 2004, Iraq’s Ministry
of Finance posted an official query seeking information about commercial claims,
including claims held by financial institutions, outstanding against the Iraqi
government.
On July 26, 2005, Iraq announced the terms for its commercial debt
renegotiation. For small creditors (less than $35 million), Iraq would settle claims
through a cash buyback and cancellation. For larger claims, Iraq would seek a debt-
for-debt swap. For small creditors, the cash purchase price would equal 10.25% of
the outstanding claim up to a maximum of $4.3 million paid out. Larger creditors
would receive, in line with the 80% debt cancellation requirement established by the
November 2004 Paris Club agreement, new bonds carrying a face value of $200 for
every $1,000 of their old debt. The new bonds are so-called “Eurobonds,” arranged
in London and trading in U.S. dollars. The bonds are guaranteed by the Iraqi
government, will pay an annual coupon of 5.8%, and are due to mature in 2028.
The Eurobonds have been welcomed by investors and the exchange appears
to have been successful. The bonds traded in the grey market prior to issuance at
around 11% yield. This is an optimistic sign for the Iraqi economy. Several
developing countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, were forced to pay much higher
yields than Iraq did when they re-entered the bond market following their own recent
economic crises.
Iraq concluded its commercial debt settlement in July 2006. A total of $19.7
billion of Iraqi commercial claims were settled as a result of four installments of the
cash buyback offer for small debt holders, and two debt-for-debt exchanges.23 Iraq
reopened its commercial debt-restructuring program on January 30, 3008. According
to the IMF, the offer appears to be successful and results should be published in the
near future.
22 The Iraq Debt Reconciliation Office. [http://www.eyidro.com/]
23 Iraq Announces Conclusion of Commercial Debt Settlement. Available at
[http://www.eyidro.com/doc/Iraq_Annnounces_Conclusion_of_Commercial_Debt_Settle
ment.pdf]

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Potential Policy Precedents for International Debt
Relief
As Congress considers new international debt relief arrangements, several
precedents created by the Iraq case may be worth considering. In light of Iraq’s
experience, three new precedents appear to have taken shape: (1) a willingness by the
international community to grant a stay on the enforcement of creditor rights to
collect unpaid sovereign debt; (2) an increased flexibility in Paris Club debt relief
decisions; and (3) an unwillingness by successor regimes to claim that their debt is
odious and repudiate it.
Granting a Stay on the Enforcement of Creditor Rights
In the Iraq case, implementing a stay on the enforcement of creditor rights to
use litigation to collect unpaid sovereign debt was a major priority and was
implemented by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 shortly after the collapse of
the Saddam regime. Implementation of this stay occurred with very little debate over
whether such a comprehensive debt shield should be used.
In fact, a debate over the general advisability of debt shield mechanisms for
countries facing economic crisis did occur between 2001 and 2003 at the IMF. At
the time, there was concern that several South American countries, including
Argentina and Brazil, would default on their international debts. During this debate,
the U.S. Administration led the opposition to a comprehensive debt shield
mechanism and the proposal was eventually withdrawn. It appears that after Iraq,
however, such a debt shield mechanism is feasible if it is introduced in a political
forum such as the United Nations rather than an economic/financial one like the IMF,
and that it is an ad-hoc process, not attached to any formal mechanism for debt
resolution.24
Sovereign bonds (government issued debt) are the primary form of
developing country debt. These bonds are held by many types of investors, both
large and small. The common issuance of sovereign debt represents a major shift in
in how developing countries structure their debt. When countries ran into economic
difficulties during the economic crises of the 1980s, their debts consisted primarily
of bank loans issued by a small number of commercial banks. It was relatively easy
for the banks to work together with delinquent countries and arrange terms to
restructure the debt. There is now a much wider spectrum of investors in sovereign
bonds, creating much costlier and more difficult resolutions. However, outside of the
Paris Club, there is no formal mechanism to coordinate debt restructuring
negotiations between creditors and the debtor government.
To address these concerns, in 2001, the IMF proposed creating the Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) to help negotiate debt restructurings in
24 Anna Gelpern, “What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other,” Chicago
Journal of International Law, Summer 2005.

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general. Among other things, the IMF’s proposal was designed to afford rights to
defaulting countries similar to those afforded bankrupt companies in the United
States under Chapter 11 of U.S. bankruptcy codes. A stand-still on debt payments
was to go into effect, while countries renegotiated their debt contracts with their
creditors through a dispute resolution mechanism administered by the IMF. The debt
stand-still was considered one of the most important components of the proposed
SDRM.25 It also proved to be the one of the most highly contested issues concerning
the SDRM proposal.26
The SDRM proposal was rejected by the Bush Administration, the private
sector, and many Members of Congress. The Bush Administration advocated a more
decentralized, market-oriented approach that would include clauses in sovereign
bond contracts, known as Collective Action Clauses (CACs), which would stipulate
how the financial contracts would be resolved pending a financial crisis or default.
A majority of commercial creditors also discouraged the establishment of the
SDRM. For example, the Institute for International Finance (IIF), a global
association of financial institutions, was concerned that an international bankruptcy
court could inhibit investor confidence, delay renewed access of debtor countries to
capital markets that use the SDRM, and possibly lead to increased global financial
instability through contagion effects in other emerging markets.27 According to the
IIF, the SDRM also might encourage moral hazard by encouraging other sovereign
borrowers not to pay debts in order to receive stand-still protection.
The essential concern with the SDRM was whether the United States and the
international community should condone an official stay on creditor rights through
a litigation shield such as the SDRM. After two years of debate, the proposal was
eventually bypassed at the spring 2003 IMF meetings, when the United States
government threw its support behind including CACs in new bond contracts instead
of creating a new IMF function.
However, only a few months after these meetings, the United Nations
Security Council Iraq resolutions were passed, providing essentially the exact
protections to Iraq that were rejected at the IMF. Financial analysts note that
immunizing Iraq’s debts from foreign claims through a U.N. Security Council
Resolution is a radical move in the history of sovereign debt negotiations. In the
past, the U.S. government has taken a rather hands-off stance that let the financial
markets resolve debt disputes. This approach, known as the “restrictive approach to
state immunity,” and codified through the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(P.L. 94-583), established that foreign states are not immune from jurisdiction
25 “A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Preliminary Considerations,
International Monetary Fund,” November 30, 2001, available online at [http://www.imf.org/
external/NP/pdr/sdrm/2001/113001.pdf].
26 Blustein, Paul, “IMF Cuts Disputed Clause from Debt Plan,” Washington Post, January
8, 2003.
27 Action Plan of the Institute for International Finance, Special Committee on Crisis
Prevention and Resolution in Emerging Markets, April 2002.

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regarding, among other things, commercial activity including foreign debt.28 Thus,
the U.S. government typically allowed creditors to sue foreign governments regarding
debt claims, and remained uninvolved in matters between U.S. creditors and foreign
governments.29
The Iraq case thus illustrates that the United States and the international
community are willing to shield a debtor from its creditors on an ad-hoc basis, case-
by-case without a formal international bankruptcy regime. This can be accomplished
multilaterally through U.N. Security Council Resolutions or bilaterally through
executive orders. Since these measures were not taken in other recent financial
crisis-afflicted countries, such as Argentina or Brazil, it appears that policymakers
are only willing to use such measures selectively, and for countries that exhibit a
perceived or potential threat to U.S. and international security. This understanding
is made more explicit by implementing the stay on debt repayment through the
United Nations, a political institution seen principally as focused on international
security, rather than the International Monetary Fund, which is primarily a financial
institution.
Flexibility of Paris Club Agreements
In addition to providing a precedent for a comprehensive debt shield, the Iraq
case helped institutionalize increasing flexibility in Paris Club debt restructuring
treatments. Prior to Iraq, Paris Club members adhered to a relatively strict set of
rules to determine both which countries would be eligible for debt relief and the level
of that debt relief, based on their economic situation. However, whenever a new
situation arose where Paris Club members wanted to provide debt relief, but existing
rules would not support it, new rules were created offering deeper and deeper debt
reduction. Thus the Toronto Terms, introduced in 1988, begat Houston Terms in
1990, London Terms in 1991, Naples Terms in 1994, Lyon Terms in 1996, and
finally Cologne Terms in 1999, each offering increased debt relief.
Cologne Terms, part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Program, allow
for up to 100% debt cancellation for a select group of countries that the IMF and
World Bank deem to be the most heavily indebted. The prevalence of debt reduction
in Paris Club operations has led to what some have called the “slippery slope towards
HIPCization,” as increasing amounts of debt cancellation have been requested for
countries on geo-political rather than economic grounds.30 Pakistan, for example, is
not a HIPC country, yet it is considered to be an integral partner in U.S. anti-terror
efforts. When debt relief was sought for Pakistan in 2001, the Paris Club negotiated
28 For more information on state immunity, see CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against
Terrorist States By Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea; and Tom McNamara, A
Primer on Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP, available at
[http://www.worldservicesgroup.com/publications.asp?action=article&artid=1223].
29 Gelpern, p. 396.
30 Callaghy, Thomas M. “The Paris Club and International Economic Governance: Double
Crisis and Debt,” in Brigitte Granville and Vinod Aggarwal ed., Sovereign Debt: Origins,
Management and Restructuring, Royal Institute for International Affairs, 2003, p. 165.

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a special ad-hoc arrangement on near-Cologne terms even though Pakistan did not
economically qualify to receive such treatment.
Instead of continuing to treat special cases, like Pakistan, under ad-hoc terms,
the Paris Club formalized a new system of more flexible debt relief arrangements
with Iraq under the new Evian Approach. As discussed earlier in the report,
following Evian, potential debt-relief cases are divided into two groups, HIPC and
non-HIPC. The 38 poor and indebted countries that are part of the HIPC program
will continue to receive debt relief under the terms agreed to at Cologne. All other
countries will be treated on a case-by-case basis with any debt relief determined by
IMF debt sustainability analysis, with an option for three-part phased debt relief such
as Iraq is receiving.
The introduction of Evian terms was crucial for Iraq’s debt relief plan.
“Without Evian in place,” commented Euromoney, “it’s hard to imagine the Paris
Club members would have signed off on a deal as nakedly political as Iraq’s.”31
Some argue that the Evian Approach is unfair, and opens the door even wider to
political debt relief, using resources that could potentially go to increased debt relief
or foreign assistance to poor and developing countries. For example, Indonesia,
Kenya, and Georgia recently emerged from decades of authoritarian rule, and are
saddled with extensive government debt, yet they received nowhere near the level of
international exposure that has been given to Iraq.32 “It’s an outrageous double
standard,” according to Salih Booker, the head of Africa Action, a Washington-based
lobbying group.33
It appears that the new flexibility evidenced by the introduction of the Evian
approach is continuing. Following Evian, Paris Club members introduced even
greater flexibility in 2005 by allowing countries to buy back their debt, a policy that
had previously not been allowed. In 2004, Russia, using proceeds generated by
record high petroleum prices, approached the Paris Club and requested to buyback
some of its debt. Germany refused to participate, scuttling a Paris Club deal. A deal
was eventually agreed on in May 2005 that allowed Russia to repay $15 billion in
debts at par.34 According to this agreement, Russia’s debts were paid ahead of
schedule without requiring a pre-payment penalty.
Following the Russia agreement, additional buyback deals were reached with
Nigeria and Peru. In October 2005, a deal was reached where Nigeria was allowed
to buy back some of its debt at a discount, leading to debt relief worth $18 billion and
a total reduction of Nigeria’s Paris Club debt from $36 billion to $6 billion. The Peru
31 Manmohan Singh and Jochen Andritzky, “Paris Club Members Adapt to New
Rules,”Euromoney, September, 2005.
32 Joseph Siegle, “After Iraq, let’s forgive some other debts,” International Herald Tribune,
February 19, 2004.
33 Quoted in Sudarson Raghavan, “African Advocates to U.S.: Reduce Our Debt Like
Iraq’s,” The Miami Herald, February 20, 2004.
34 “Paris Club Reaches $15B ln Debt Repayment Deal With Russia,” MosNews, May 13,
2005, available at [http://www.mosnews.com/money/2005/05/13/parisclubfinal.shtml].

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buyback, like Russia’s, was at par, and will lead to Peru pre-paying $17 billion of its
Paris Club debt.
As some analysts have illustrated, introducing flexibility into Paris Club
arrangements was well underway prior to its handling of the Iraq case.35 However,
it appears that the precedent set by Iraq may open the door to increased debt relief for
middle-income countries. Combined with the new willingness to engage in debt-
buybacks, resolving international debt may be easier in the coming years.
Implementing an Odious Debt Strategy
Some analysts have argued that Iraq’s debt is odious, and therefore may be
repudiated under international law. There are three generally agreed upon
components of the legal principle of odious debt: (1) the general population does not
consent to the borrowing; (2) the proceeds do not benefit the general population or
the state; (3) and the creditor knows both of these facts at the time of lending.36
However, the concept of odious debt does not appear to be well established in
international law and has never been cited by either a national or international
tribunal as reason to repudiate a debt claim.37
Repudiating Iraq’s debts under the concept of odious debts was raised by
some Members of Congress in 2003 in H.R. 2482, The Iraq Freedom From Debt Act,
introduced by Representative Carolyn Maloney. The bill, which was not enacted,
called on the IMF and the World Bank to cancel Iraq’s odious debt and called on
Congress and the President to urge fellow Iraqi creditors to cancel their owed debt
as well.
Iraqi officials have steadfastly claimed that they would not seek repudiation
under the odious debt concept. In an interview with Euromoney in September 2004,
Iraq’s Minister of Finance, Adil Abdul Mahdi said:
Iraq’s need for very substantial debt relief derives from the economic
realities facing a post-conflict country that has endured decades of financial
corruption and mismanagement under the Saddam regime. Principles of
public international law such as the odious debt doctrine, whatever their
legal vitality, are not the reason why Iraq is seeking this relief.38
Iraq preferred to seek a reduction of its debts through normal and official
channels. The Paris Club’s Iraq agreement, reached three months after the Minister’s
Euromoney interview, provided an 80% total reduction and set the parameters for the
35 See Lex Rieffel, Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery,
Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
36 Todd Moss, Scott Standley, and Nancy Birdsall, “Double Standards, Debt Treatment, and
World Bank Country Classification: The Case of Nigeria,” Center for Global Development,
November 2004, p. 33, and Gelpern, p. 403.
37 Gelpern, pg. 406. See also the discussion in CRS Report RL31944, Iraq’s Economy: Past,
Present, Future.
38 Cited in Gelpern, p. 406.

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ongoing debt reduction efforts with non-Paris Club and commercial creditors. This
allowed Iraq to receive its debt relief without the potential destruction of creditor
relationships than can come about with a debt default.
In retrospect, it appears that an odious debt approach may have been difficult
for Iraq since many of Iraq’s debts were taken for economic development or
commercial purposes and appear legitimate.39 None of the debt in question was
borrowed during the period when Iraq was under U.N. sanctions, when large amounts
of Iraq’s oil revenue were diverted for the construction of Saddam Hussein’s palaces
and other indulgences. It is also not evident that, at least to a degree greater than in
other countries, the proceeds of the development loans were diverted for personal use
or to fund oppression within Iraq.
Iraq’s refusal to use an odious debt approach begs the question: under what
circumstances could the odious debt principle be applied? In its current form, the
odious debt doctrine, according to one analyst, “offers no meaningful guidance to
shape decisions on lending to emerging markets.”40 One proposal is for the IMF or
some other international body to assess a regime’s legitimacy and make an
odiousness determination, thus allowing any future government to declare any
sovereign debt incurred by the previous “illegitimate” regime odious and repudiate
it.41 Such a sanctions regime may act as an incentive to creditors, both private and
public, not to loan to problem regimes knowing that a successor government could
legitimately repudiate the former regime’s debts. U.S. foreign assistance to the new
regime could also be made contingent on repudiation of odious debts.
On the other hand, the United States, or other nations, may not necessarily
agree with the odiousness determination for various political reasons. It also may be
difficult to make such a determination while a problem regime is in place, especially
if other forms of political and economic statecraft are being employed.
However, given that the odious debt concept appears unusable in its current
format, refashioning the odious debt concept as a sanctions regime represents one
possible way to reduce the flow of financial resources to undesirable governments.
Such a system would create additional incentives for creditor governments and the
commercial sector to avoid lending to these regimes by creating the legal precedents
necessary for a successor regime to repudiate so-called odious debt.
39 CRS Report RL31944, Iraq’s Economy: Past, Present, Future, coordinated by Jonathan
Sanford.
40 Gelpern, 412.
41 Michael Kremer and Seema Jayachandran, “Odious Debt: When Dictators Borrow, Who
Repays the Loan?” The Brookings Review, Spring 2003.

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