Order Code RL34509
Zimbabwe: 2008 Elections and
Implications for U.S. Policy
Updated September 26, 2008
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Zimbabwe: 2008 Elections and Implications for U.S.
Policy
Summary
On March 29, 2008, Zimbabwe held presidential, parliamentary and local
elections. Months later, the country’s political future remains uncertain. For the first
time since independence, the ruling party has lost its majority in the National
Assembly. After a month of rising tensions, the results of the presidential race were
belatedly announced on May 2. They indicated that opposition leader Morgan
Tsvangirai had received more votes than the incumbent, President Robert Mugabe,
but had failed to garner the 50 percent needed to avoid a runoff. Days before that
runoff was scheduled to take place, on June 27, 2008, Tsvangirai pulled out of the
race, citing widespread political violence and the absence of conditions for a free and
fair election. Mugabe was declared the winner in the runoff, which many observer
missions suggest did not reflect the will of the people.
Reports of violence and political repression increased significantly in the wake
of the March elections, which were held amidst a deepening economic crisis in the
Southern African country. Zimbabwe’s gross domestic product (GDP) has decreased
over 50 percent in the last decade, the inflation rate is estimated in the millions, and
unemployment is higher than 80 percent. The adult HIV infection rate of 20 percent
has contributed to a sharp drop in life expectancy, and more than a third of the
population is expected to require food aid in 2008. Deteriorating conditions in the
country have led many Zimbabweans to emigrate to neighboring countries, creating
a substantial burden on the region. In South Africa, Zimbabwean immigrants and
others have been the target of xenophobic attacks.
On September 15, 2008, after several weeks of negotiations in South Africa,
President Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai signed a power-sharing arrangement aimed
at resolving the political standoff. As part of the deal, Tsvangirai will become Prime
Minister, and cabinet positions will be divided among the parties. The government
of President Mugabe, who will remain head of state under the agreement, has been
seen as autocratic and repressive by its critics, and its human rights record is poor.
The regime has suppressed freedom of speech and assembly, and many contend that
it has restricted access to food, already scarce, in opposition areas. The U.S.
Secretary of State labeled Zimbabwe an “outpost of tyranny,” and other
Administration officials have accused Mugabe's party of rigging the election and
orchestrating political violence. The United States has enforced targeted sanctions
against top Zimbabwe officials and associates since 2002. Congress has expressed
its opposition to the government’s undemocratic policies in the Zimbabwe
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-99) and other subsequent
legislation, including H.Con.Res. 100, S.Con.Res. 25, S. 1500, S.Res. 533, H.Res.
1230, H.Res. 1270, H.Res. 1301, and H.Con.Res. 387 during the 110th Congress. For
more background, see CRS Report RL32723, Zimbabwe, by Lauren Ploch.

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
March 2008 Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Election Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Alleged Vote Buying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Pre-Election Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Election Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Press Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Election Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Presidency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Runoff Elections Called . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
June 2008 Runoff Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Planning for Coalition Government? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Post-Election Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Power-Sharing Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
International Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) . . . . . . . . . 13
The African Union (AU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
U.S. Policy on Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Current U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Congressional Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Diplomatic Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Economic Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Accountability and Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
List of Tables
Table 1. Regional Efforts to Block Arms Transfer to Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

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Zimbabwe: 2008 Elections and Implications
for U.S. Policy
President Robert Mugabe, 84, and his party, the Zimbabwe African National
Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), have ruled Zimbabwe since its independence in
1980. Rising inflation and unemployment rates contributed in the late 1990s to the
creation of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The MDC
enjoyed initial success, campaigning against a referendum in 2000 that would have
expanded the president’s powers, made government officials immune from
prosecution, and allowed the uncompensated seizure of white-owned land for
redistribution to black farmers. The referendum failed, and the MDC won nearly half
the parliamentary seats in that year’s election. ZANU-PF has since taken numerous,
often undemocratic actions to maintain power. A power sharing agreement has
recently been negotiated between ZANU-PF and the opposition, but details of its
implementation remain unclear.
Background
Following the violent March 2007 assault by police on government critics,
which drew widespread international criticism, then-South African President Thabo
Mbeki initiated a mediation effort between the Government of Zimbabwe and the
opposition. The main objective of the mediation, as described by Mbeki, was to
create political conditions for free and fair elections, the results of which would be
accepted by all parties. Although the negotiations resulted in the amendment of some
laws seen as restricting press freedom and political activity, the talks were abandoned
after Mugabe announced that elections would be held on March 29, 2008.1 Human
rights activists argue that the legislative changes were cosmetic and that the talks
failed to create a level playing field prior to the elections.2
March 2008 Elections
Election Preparations. Many domestic and international observers assert
that elections since 2000 have fallen short of democratic standards. In the period
preceding the March 2008 elections, civil society activists reported significant pre-
1 The Electoral Laws Amendment Act, which came into effect on January 11, 2008,
eliminated one of the two electoral administration bodies and required polling places to be
located in areas readily accessible to the public. It also established a continual voter
registration process and explicitly prohibited intimidation during the campaign period.
2 See, for example, Human Rights Watch (HRW), All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses
and Flawed Electoral Conditions in Zimbabwe’s Coming General Elections, Vol. 20, No.
2(A), March 2008, and International Crisis Group (ICG), Africa Report No. 138, Zimbabwe:
Prospects from a Flawed Election, March 20, 2008.

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CRS-2
election irregularities. Critics charged that the Zimbabwe Election Commission
(ZEC), which oversees elections, lacked independence, and that it was further
crippled by limited administrative capacity and budget shortages.3 The electoral body
is led by Justice George Chiweshe, a former military officer, and reports indicate that
the Commission and its regional offices are staffed by numerous former military
personnel. Election reports from domestic groups suggest that the registration
process was, at best, inconsistent, and there is no indication that the ZEC addressed
alleged inaccuracies in the voters’ roll from previous elections.
The March elections were Zimbabwe’s first attempt at holding “harmonized”
elections for all levels of government (local, National Assembly, Senate, and
presidential) simultaneously. In addition to the logistical challenges this posed, civic
groups argued that the complexity of a four-ballot election required a nationwide
voter education campaign. They claim that the ZEC’s education efforts were
inadequate and that independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were
barred from engaging in voter education programs of their own.
The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), a domestic observer group
composed of 38 NGOs, alleges that the ruling party had redrawn constituencies4 to
ensure its continued hold on power. In its pre-election report, ZESN argued that there
were not enough polling stations designated for urban areas, where the MDC is
believed to have its strongest support. ZESN’s report also suggested that, as in past
elections, the ruling party manipulated state resources for campaign purposes.5 And
despite amendments to two laws, the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), which critics suggest
restrict freedom of speech and assembly, advocacy groups argue that the police
selectively interpreted the laws and significantly limited the MDC’s ability to
campaign.6 Sections of POSA which prohibit false statements “prejudicial” to the
state and criminalize statements construed as engendering hostility toward the
president remain in effect.
Alleged Vote Buying. In addition to the allegedly partisan administration of
the elections, many observers contend that the government used public resources to
3 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Can the Elections be Free and Fair in the Current
Environment? March 18, 2008.
4 Parliament passed Constitutional Amendment No. 18 in late 2007, increasing the number
of parliamentary seats from 120 to 210. Following a rushed delimitation exercise, the ZEC
presented its final report, which outlined changes to several constituency and ward
boundaries, with no time for debate before parliament adjourned at the end of January 2008.
5 Lance Guma, “Election Body Calls for More Polling Stations,” SW Radio Africa, March
11, 2008, available at [http://www.allafrica.com].
6 Amendments to POSA allowed groups to present notifications for rallies and
demonstrations to the nearest police station, and if denied approval, provided for appeals to
be dealt with in a timely manner by the local magistrates court rather than the Home Affairs
Minister. Amendments to AIPPA abolished the “journalism without accreditation” offense,
although journalists remain prohibited from covering official events, like elections, without
accreditation. HRW, All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral
Conditions in Zimbabwe’s Coming General Elections, Vol. 20, No. 2(A), March 2008.

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buy votes. In the weeks preceding the polls, President Mugabe announced significant
salary increases for the military and civil servants and signed into law the
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Bill, requiring foreign-owned firms to
transfer 51 percent of their shares to domestic investors. His administration also
reportedly distributed vehicles and agricultural equipment worth millions of U.S.
dollars to ZANU-PF supporters.7 At the same time, in a country where 45 percent of
the population is considered by the World Food Program to be malnourished,
domestic groups reported numerous incidents of opposition supporters being denied
access to state food supplies.8 NGOs operating in Zimbabwe report that the ban on
their distribution of food and other humanitarian aid prior to the runoff continued
until August, despite claims by the Mugabe government that it had been lifted.9
Pre-Election Violence. According to a domestic human rights group, the
year prior the 2008 elections was marked by a significant increase in incidents of
politically motivated violence from previous years. In 2007, there were 603 reported
incidents of torture, 865 incidents of assault, and 2,766 reports of arrest and
detention. In the months directly preceding the elections, from November 2007 to
March 2008, there were 1775 reported incidents of political violence.10 The
government routinely deployed riot police to break up demonstrations, meetings and
rallies, despite changes to the laws regulating freedom of assembly. In January,
police allegedly teargassed and assaulted protestors in Harare after a local magistrate
overruled a police order banning the march.11 In February, members of the
Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe reported being abducted and beaten by
ZANU-PF supporters; according to their accounts several members of the police and
intelligence service were present during the attacks.12 According to reports, the
perpetrators were not arrested, but the union leaders were charged with violating a
law that prohibits the distribution of pamphlets in public areas.13
Several of the country’s security service chiefs, including the heads of the army
and the police, publicly announced that they would not recognize an electoral victory
by anyone other that Mugabe.14 In speeches and statements to the press, they and
other public officials, including the President himself, referred to opposition leaders
as traitors or puppets of the West. In October 2007, the International Bar Association
issued a report accusing Zimbabwe’s police of being “blatantly partisan” and
7 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Can the Elections in Zimbabwe be Free and Fair
in the Current Environment? March 18, 2008.
8 “Concern Over Pre-Election Environment, Election Update (1),” ZESN Press Statement,
January 25, 2008.
9 "Zimbabwe: NGO Ban Starting to Bite," IRIN, July 7, 2008.
10 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Can the Elections in Zimbabwe be Free and Fair
in the Current Environment? March 18, 2008.
11 “Zimbabwe: Opposition Activists Teargassed, Beaten,” IRIN, January 23, 2008.
12 HRW, All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral Conditions in
Zimbabwe’s Coming General Elections,Vol. 20, No. 2(A), March 2008.
13 ICG, “Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election,” March 20, 2008.
14 “Zim Prisons Chief Orders Officers to Vote Mugabe,” Reuters, February 29, 2008.

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CRS-4
suggesting that the force’s failure to guarantee equal protection of the law “is a major
obstacle to democracy in Zimbabwe and a considerable impediment to free and fair
elections.”15 As part of the 2008 electoral reforms, police were banned from the
polling stations to allay fears of intimidation. However, just over a week before the
elections President Mugabe issued a decree allowing police into polling stations,
allegedly to help disabled voters.
Election Monitoring. The Government of Zimbabwe reportedly invited
election observers from over 40 countries and regional organizations, including the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU),
but barred observers from countries considered to be critical of its policies.16 CNN
and other western media organizations and journalists were reportedly denied
permission to cover the elections.17 The AU observer mission, led by former
President of Sierra Leone Tejan Kabbah, issued a preliminary statement after the
elections suggesting that the elections were generally free and fair and expressed the
will of the people. Kabbah urged all parties to accept the results. The SADC observer
mission found the elections to be “a credible expression of the will of the people” but
noted concerns regarding opposition access to the media, inflammatory statements
by senior security officials, the presence of police officers at polling stations, and the
delay in the publication of the voters’ roll. Two members of the delegation, both
from South Africa’s largest opposition party, refused to sign the report, calling the
elections “chaotic” and “deeply flawed.”18 Other observer groups differed with the
SADC findings. The delegation of the World Council of Churches, in a joint
statement with the African Council of Churches, found the elections to be “skewed
in favor of the incumbent who openly utilized state resources to his advantage” and
reported media bias, “violence, intimidation and outright confrontation,” and the use
of food as a “political tool.”19
Press Restrictions. Two international journalists, one a Pulitzer Prize-
winning American correspondent for the New York Times, were arrested on April 3,
2008. After several days in jail, they were released on bail but were blocked from
leaving the country. They were acquitted on April 16. Several other journalists, both
domestic and foreign, have been arrested since the elections. The director of the
ZESN was briefly detained by police on April 14 and questioned about possible ties
to the Washington-based National Democratic Institute, which monitors elections
worldwide. The editor of The Standard, the country’s only remaining independent
newspaper, was arrested for printing an editorial by opposition leader Arthur
15 International Bar Association, Partisan Policing: An Obstacle to Human Rights and
Democracy in Zimbabwe, An International Bar Association Human Rights Institute Report,
October 2007.
16 “First Poll Observers in Zimbabwe,” BBC, March 11, 2008.
17 “CNN Denied Permission to Cover Elections in Zimbabwe,” CNN, March 25, 2008.
18 Statement issued by South African Member of Parliament Diane Kohler Barnard, “DA
Rejects SADC Assessment of Zimbabwe Election as ‘Peaceful and Credible,’” available at
[http://www.da.org.za].
19 “Ecumenical Observers Challenge Zimbabwe Election Process and Demand Respect for
the Will of the People,” World Council of Churches Press Release, April 29, 2008.

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Mutambara entitled, “A Shameful Betrayal of National Independence.” He was later
released, but faces trial for publishing statements prejudicial to the state. Mutambara
was arrested weeks later.
Election Results
Parliament. The MDC, which split into two factions in 2005 (known as
MDC-T and MDC-M for their respective leaders, Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur
Mutambara), remained divided for the March elections, and this division likely cost
the party several parliamentary seats.20 The ZEC, widely criticized for its delayed
release of the electoral results, announced the National Assembly results four days
after the election. The MDC factions, which reunited on April 28, won a majority in
the 220-seat National Assembly with 109 seats, over ZANU-PF’s 97.21 Three weeks
after the election, the electoral commission conducted a recount of 23 of these races,
an overwhelming majority of which were won by the opposition.22 The original
results were upheld. On April 6, the ZEC announced that the ruling party had
retained its majority in the Senate, where over one-third of its 93 members are
appointed by the president. Of the 60 seats directly elected, ZANU-PF won 30,
MDC-Tsvangirai 24, and MDC-Mutambara 6. Several senior ruling party members
lost their parliamentary seats, including the Ministers of Justice, Agriculture, Mines,
Energy, and Transport, and several senior MDC-M parliamentarians, including
Mutambara, lost to MDC-T candidates.
The Presidency. The MDC’s decision to contest the election while still
divided may also have cost the party a clear victory in the initial presidential race. In
February 2008, then-ZANU-PF senior member Simba Makoni announced his
intention to run against President Mugabe in the upcoming elections.23 He was
subsequently expelled from the party and ran as an independent, although he was
rumored to have been supported by several senior ruling party officials. MDC faction
leader Arthur Mutambara, who had planned to run against Mugabe and Tsvangirai,
withdrew as a presidential candidate and expressed his support for Makoni. It is
unclear how many supporters of his faction voted for Makoni instead of Tsvangirai.
20 A Financial Times report suggests that ZANU-PF won ten parliamentary seats that would
have been claimed by the MDC had its votes not been split between the two factions.
“Acrimonious Division Cost MDC Success,” Financial Times, April 4, 2008.
21 The Tsvangirai faction won 99 seats and MDC-Mutambara won 10. One seat was won
by an independent, and three seats were subject to by-elections in June 2008 due to
candidates’ deaths. In those by-elections, MDC-T won one seat and ZANU-PF won two.
22 According to press reports, the ZEC conducted the recount in violation of a court order
to stop recounts for 23 parliamentary constituencies. The MDC had petitioned the court on
the basis that ZANU-PF’s requests for recounts were not valid because they were not filed
within 48 hours of the election in accordance with ZEC rules. The court allegedly ruled that
a recount could not be ordered until after the original results were released.
23 Makoni, 57, served as Finance Minister from 2000 to 2002 and was reportedly dismissed
after criticizing the administration’s economic policies.

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CRS-6
The main MDC faction claimed victory for Tsvangirai days after the election
with over 50 percent of the votes cast, basing its claim on tallies of poll results posted
outside the polling stations and constituency centers immediately following the
elections. Some have differed with the MDC count, suggesting that while Tsvangirai
almost certainly received more votes than Mugabe, he may not have achieved the
necessary 50 percent to avoid a runoff.24 ZESN noted that results were not posted in
three constituency tabulation centers despite a legal requirement to do so.
The results of the presidential race were not officially announced until five
weeks after the elections. The opposition called for a nationwide strike on April 14
to protest the delayed release of results, asking supporters to stay home rather than
to demonstrate publicly. Dozens of opposition supporters, including a newly elected
member of parliament, were reportedly arrested that day for allegedly trying to incite
violence or for obstructing the freedom of movement. According to reports, the
strike was largely unsuccessful. With over 80 percent unemployment, some analysts
suggest many Zimbabweans could not afford to miss a day’s wages; other
Zimbabweans said they had not heard of the strike.25 On the evening of May 2, the
ZEC declared that Tsvangirai had received 47.9 percent of the votes, while Mugabe
received 43.2 percent and Makoni 8.3 percent. Some in the international community
questioned whether the government’s delay in releasing the presidential results
should be considered a political coup. The MDC appealed unsuccessfully to the
courts to have the results released, but the electoral commission claimed that it could
not do so until a “process of verification of the presidential ballots” was complete.26
Runoff Elections Called. Although the opposition accused the government
of manipulating the presidential results and initially objected to participating in a
runoff, Morgan Tsvangirai agreed to stand against President Mugabe in a second
round of voting.27 ZESN also questioned the validity of the presidential results,
saying, “ZESN cannot substantiate ZEC figures as the network is not aware of the
chain of custody of the ballot materials during the aforementioned period” and
claiming that the delayed announcement of the presidential results undermined the
impartiality of the ZEC. These concerns were echoed by the United States and others.
Having waited for over a month to hear the final results from the first round of
elections, Zimbabweans faced another significant delay before the second round.
While the electoral law requires the government to hold a runoff within 21 days of
announcing the initial results, the ZEC declared that the runoff would not be held
until June 27, three months after the first round. Some analysts questioned whether
the government could afford another election, estimated to cost up to $60 million.
24 According to ZESN, Tsvangirai received 49.4% of the vote and Mugabe 41.8%.”ZESN
poll projections on March 29 presidential elections,” ZESN press release, March 31, 2008.
25 “Zimbabwe Opposition Strike Fails,” BBC, April 16, 2008.
26 “Opposition Unites Against Mugabe,” Al Jazeera, April 28, 2008.
27 The MDC suggested that the government had access to the ballot boxes for over two
weeks in April without opposition or observer supervision, and thus they could not be sure
the ballots had not been manipulated.

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CRS-7
According to official Reserve Bank figures, government borrowing in the first three
months of 2008 was 43 percent above the projected budget deficit for the year.28

The MDC initially called for the immediate deployment of election observers
from outside Africa (in addition to the SADC and AU observers) as well as the
deployment of regional peacekeepers during the runoff. The party later modified its
demands, saying that an increased SADC and AU observer presence would be
sufficient, if combined with an immediate repeal of restrictions on the MDC’s ability
to campaign and an end to political violence. The opposition nevertheless remained
largely unable to hold public rallies, which were banned by police in the capital in
mid-April. Tsvangirai, who left the country a week after the elections amidst MDC
concerns about his safety, returned on May 25. Given post-election statements by
government officials accusing him of treason, many believed he would not be
allowed to campaign freely inside the country.29 The MDC leader had been tried, and
acquitted, for treason in 2004. Based on interviews with high-ranking Zimbabwean
officials, the International Crisis Group (ICG) issued a report suggesting a Tsvangirai
victory in the runoff could trigger a military coup.30
June 2008 Runoff Election
During the weeks following the announcement of the presidential results,
reports of political violence increased dramatically. Critics contend that the violence
was a government-orchestrated attempt to punish opposition supporters and ensure
a Mugabe victory in the runoff.31 According to media reports, security forces and
militias manned roadblocks and detention centers throughout the country, despite the
increased presence of over 500 international monitors from SADC and the AU. In
July, the Washington Post reported on the government's alleged campaign of violence
against the opposition, referred to as "Coercion. Intimidation. Beating.
Displacement.," or CIBD. The Post article highlighted debate within the ruling
party's inner circle over the effort, which has reportedly targeted mid-level MDC
organizers, as well as ordinary citizens, for severe beatings and or death. President
Mugabe was quoted in the press saying, "We shed a lot of blood for this country. We
are not going to give up our country for a mere X on a ballot. How can a ballpoint
pen fight with a gun?"32
28 “Crisis Looms After Harare Vote-Buying,” Financial Times, April 11, 2008.
29 Referring to an alleged letter between Tsvangirai and Prime Minister Gordon Brown,
Zimbabwe’s Herald accused the MDC leader of plotting “illegal regime change” and quoted
outgoing Justice Minister Chinamasa , “It is clear... that Tsvangirai along with Brown are
seeking regime change in Zimbabwe,and on the part of Tsvangirai, this is treasonous...There
is no doubting the consequences for acting in a treasonous manner.” The MDC says the
letter is a forgery. See “Zimbabwe Opposition Accused of Treason,” CNN, April 17, 2008.
30 ICG, “Negotiating Zimbabwe’s Transition,” Africa Briefing No. 51, May 21, 2008.
31 Human Rights Watch called the violence "a brutal campaign of torture and intimidation"
and documented direct involvement by the security forces. "Zimbabwe: Army Behind New
Wave of Human Rights Abuses," HRW Press Release, April 30, 2008.
32 "Zimbabwe Election: Mugabe Threatens to Arrest Opposition Leaders" The Guardian,
(continued...)

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Tsvangirai was detained by police several times during the runoff campaign, and
on two occasions sought refuge in the Dutch Embassy. The MDC's Secretary
General, Tendai Biti, was arrested in June 2008 upon return from South Africa and
was charged with treason. After two weeks in jail, he was released on bail. On June
13, former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan joined over 40 African leaders and
former heads of state, including the group known as the Elders, in a letter calling on
the government to stop the violence, postpone the runoff, and ensure conditions for
free and fair elections.
On June 22, less than a week before the runoff, ZANU-PF supporters, armed
with sticks, iron bars, and rocks, blocked an MDC rally in Harare. Citing the high
number of attacks against MDC supporters and the lack of a level playing field,
Tsvangirai withdrew from the race the following day. By MDC accounts, over 100
of its supporters have been killed since the March elections, and tens of thousands
displaced. Despite public comments from African observer missions and a
presidential statement from the U.N. Security Council arguing that conditions for a
free and fair election did not exist due the high level of violence, the government held
the runoff as scheduled. Mugabe was declared the winner with over 85% of the vote
and inaugurated on June 29, 2008.
SADC fielded over 400 observers for the second round. In their preliminary
report, the observers found the pre-election environment marred by "politically
motivated violence resulting in loss of life, damage to property, and serious injuries
sustained and hindering political activities." They also noted the "disruption of
campaigning of the opposition party and the regrettable inaction of the law
enforcement agencies," and cited harassment of their own observers. The SADC
mission found that the pre-election period did not conform to SADC Principles and
Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, which impinged on the credibility of
the electoral process. Ultimately, the delegation reported that runoff "did not
represent the will of the people of Zimbabwe."33
The observer delegation from the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was similarly
critical of the runoff, saying, "political tolerance in Zimbabwe has deteriorated to the
lowest ebb in recent history." The delegation reported witnessing roadblocks and
"male-dominated groups [that] intercepted voters and gave them pieces of paper on
which they were required to write the serial number of their ballots" at many polling
stations. The PAP's report questioned the impartiality of the ZEC, and found that
"the current atmosphere prevailing in the country did not give rise to the conduct of
32 (...continued)
June 17, 2008.
33 Preliminary Statement Presented by the Hon. Jose Marcos Barrica of the SADC Observer
Mission, issued on June 30, 2008.

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CRS-9
free, fair and credible elections."34 The African Union team echoed the SADC and
PAP findings, declaring that process fell short of accepted AU standards.35
Planning for Coalition Government? Prior to the runoff, Zimbabwe’s
state-controlled media sent mixed signals about the regime’s post-election plans. On
April 23, the government-owned Herald newspaper printed an editorial that
suggested SADC should mediate between the parties to create a transitional coalition
government, led by President Mugabe, that would organize new elections.36 The
following day the paper announced on its website that a unity government was “not
feasible.” According to the May 2008 ICG report, some senior ZANU-PF members,
including Vice President Joyce Mujuru and Reserve Bank governor Gideon Gono,
tried to convince the president to accept a unity government, but were overruled by
senior security officials. Critics alleged that the ruling party might try to exercise
influence over the courts to overturn the MDC’s parliamentary majority. Both parties
challenged the results of over 50 parliamentary races, and although the new
parliament has been sworn in, the judiciary’s findings still could affect the balance
of power in the parliament. Central to ZANU-PF concerns, its critics assert, are
questions regarding immunity for serious human rights abuses committed since
independence. Both parties issued public statements after the elections indicating a
willingness to negotiate, but ZANU-PF declared that Tsvangirai must acknowledge
Mugabe's victory as a prerequisite. Tsvangirai refused to do so. Some believe
ZANU-PF had planned to negotiate even before the runoff, but wanted to enter the
talks from a position of power, with Mugabe having won the second round.
Post-Election Violence. As noted above, although observers suggest that
the March 29 election day was largely peaceful, reports of politically-motivated
violence subsequently increased to a level not seen in two decades, according to
advocacy groups. In May, the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights
reported that its doctors had treated hundreds of victims with injuries consistent with
assault and torture since the election date, and that “the violence is now on such a
scale that it is impossible to properly document all cases.”37 The MDC has alleged
that over 100 of its supporters have been killed. U.S. Ambassador James McGee
implicated the ruling party in orchestrating the attacks (see U.S. Policy below).38
34 Interim Statement Presented by the Hon. Marwick Khumalo of the Pan-African Parliament
Observer Mission, issued on June 30, 2008.
35 Preliminary Statement of the African Union Observer Mission, issued on June 29, 2008.
36 “West Should Stop Blocking Zimbabwe’s Way Forward,” The Herald (Harare), April 23,
2008.
37 As of May 9, 2008 the group reported treating 900 people. See “Mbeki Meets Mugabe
for Talks,” Al Jazeera, May 9, 2008.
38 Statement by Ambassador James McGee, “Breaking the Silence on Political Violence in
Zimbabwe,” issued on May 8, 2008.

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CRS-10
ZANU-PF and the Zimbabwean army have denied involvement with the
violence, although the army, police, intelligence service, “war veterans”39 and
Zimbabwe’s National Youth Service, also known as the “Green Bombers,” have all
been implicated. One week after the elections, self-styled war veteran leader Jabuli
Sibanda warned, “It has come to our realization that the elections were used as
another war front to prepare for the re-invasion of our country.... As freedom fighters,
we feel compelled to repel the invasion,” echoing a frequent Mugabe refrain that an
opposition victory would be tantamount to the British reinstating colonial rule. The
state-owned Herald newspaper, contributed to fears of a white takeover in the wake
of the election, reporting, “An increasing number of white former commercial
farmers are reportedly threatening resettled black farmers throughout the country with
eviction from their farms or face the wrath of an anticipated ‘incoming MDC
government.’”40 These pronouncements coincided with farm invasions throughout
the country, and by April 16 the Commercial Farmers Union reported that over 100
of the estimated remaining 400 white farmers had been forced off their lands.
Since independence, Mugabe’s regime has employed terminology associated
with military-style campaigns for government programs ranging from the
implementation of price controls, known as Operation Reduce Prices, to the
demolition of informal urban settlements, or Operation Murambatsvina (translated
as “Clean Out the Filth”).41 Reports suggest that the recent round of violence had its
own campaign name, Operation Mavhoterapapi (“Who did you vote for?”).42 Critics
note the government’s historic use of violent tactics against political opponents,
pointing to the infamous Operation Gukurahundi (“The rain that washes away the
chaff before the rain”), the violent “pacification” campaign by a North Korean-
trained military unit, the 5th Brigade, in the 1980s against alleged dissidents and
supporters of ZANU-PF’s political rival at the time, the Zimbabwe African People’s
Union (ZAPU). Gukurahundi is now better known as the Matabeleland Massacres,
which resulted in the deaths of as many as 20,000 civilians, mostly from the Ndebele
ethnic group in the southwest.43 That 5th Brigade was led by then-Lt. Col. Perence
Shire, now commander of Zimbabwe’s Air Force. Other security officials involved
in the campaign were elevated to senior government posts, including Defense
Minister Sydney Sekeremayi and Rural Housing Minister Emerson Mnangagwa.
Mnangagwa, then Minister of State Security in charge of intelligence, once reportedly
warned that the government would burn down “all the villages infested with
dissidents.” He has been considered a possible successor to Mugabe within the party
and is rumored to be in charge of Joint Operations Command (JOC), a secretive
39 Some “war veterans” have questionable credentials and some were too young to have
participated in the liberation struggle. Other veterans disagree with ZANU-PF’s policies.
40 “White Former Farmers Threaten Blacks with Eviction,” The Herald, May 7, 2008.
41 For more information, see CRS Report RL32723, Zimbabwe, by Lauren Ploch.
42 “Zimbabwe: Operation Glossary - A Guide to Zimbabwe’s Internal Campaigns,” IRIN,
May 1, 2008.
43 For further information on Operation Gukurahundi, see the report by the Catholic
Commission for Justice and Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation, Breaking the
Silence - Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the
Midlands 1980-1988, April 1999, available at [http://www.sokwanele.com/pdfs/BTS.pdf].

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CRS-11
group of the country’s security chiefs and top commanders that some allege control
the government.44
Zimbabwe’s rural areas appear to have been the hardest hit by the violence; the
U.S. Embassy in Harare documented thousands who fled the countryside for urban
areas in the months after the March elections. Most Harare medical clinics were at
full capacity during the height of the violence, according to the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID).45 Zimbabwe’s largest farmers’ union reported
that militias displaced over 40,000 farm workers, and there have been widespread
reports of burned homes, granaries, and livestock.46 Human Rights Watch detailed
the “re-education” and torture of more than 70 MDC supporters, seven of whom
reportedly died from their injuries, in Mashonaland province on May 5.47 Amnesty
International reported that victims were often denied medical access and that
humanitarian organizations have been targeted by militias for providing assistance.48
The United Nations’ resident representative in Zimbabwe warned of an impending
crisis, stating, “there is an emerging pattern of political violence inflicted mainly, but
not exclusively, on suspected followers of the MDC.” The level of violence was
confirmed by an 8-person SADC mission, “we have seen it, there are people in
hospital who said they have been tortured, you have seen pictures, you have seen
pictures of houses that have been destroyed and so on.”49
Some who fled to the cities have faced further intimidation. Police repeatedly
raided the offices of both the MDC and ZESN. Hundreds were arrested in the MDC
raids, many of whom had reportedly suffered attacks in their rural homes and fled to
the MDC offices for refuge. In these raids, the police, allegedly looking for
subversive documents, took computers and documents. On May 9, police arrested the
leaders of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) based on speeches made
at a worker’s day rally. The head of the Progressive Teacher’s Union was also
arrested. On May 5, more than 50 people were reportedly beaten by riot police
during a public protest against the ongoing violence in the city of Bulawayo; eleven
members of a women’s advocacy group were arrested.
Some Zimbabwean officials, including the country’s police chief, have accused
the opposition of rigging and inciting violence. The MDC reports that eleven of its
newly elected legislators have been arrested since the March elections; several remain
in detention. If convicted, they could lose their parliamentary seats. According to
press reports, over 100 election officers were arrested on charges of committing fraud
44 See, for example, “The Opposition Goes for Broke,” The Economist, May 17, 2008, and
“Zimbabwe Under Military Rule, Former Minister Claims,” Pretoria News, May 12, 2008.
45 USAID, Zimbabwe: Complex Emergency and Drought, Situation Report 1, May 16, 2008.
46 “Hunger Drives Post-Election Violence, Deepens Poverty,” IRIN, May 9, 2008.
47 “Zimbabwe: End Violence Before June Runoff,” HRW Press Release, May 16, 2008.
48 Amnesty International, “Zimbabwe Violence Reaches Crisis Levels,” May 16, 2008.
49 “Call for State of Emergency Over Zim Violence,” Mail & Guardian, May 14, 2008.

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CRS-12
and abusing public office in favor of the MDC in the March elections.50 Independent
reports suggest that teachers, who held many of the election officer positions, were
specifically targeted by government supporters.
Power-Sharing Agreement. President Mugabe delayed the swearing in of
the new parliament and the naming of a new cabinet as President Mbeki and other
international leaders pressed for talks between the parties. When the parliament was
sworn in on August 25, 2008, Lovemore Moyo, an MP from the MDC Tsvangirai
faction, was elected as Speaker. He received 110 votes, beating MDC-M MP Paul
Themba-Nyathi, who had received 98 votes, including those of most ZANU-PF
members of parliament. Two MDC-T MPs were arrested when they arrived for the
swearing in, but were later released.
On September 15, after several weeks of negotiations overseen by Mbeki,
Mugabe and Tsvangirai signed a power-sharing arrangement aimed at resolving the
political standoff. The agreement outlines a time frame for the drafting and adoption
of a new constitution. As part of the deal, Tsvangirai will become Prime Minister in
a new unity government, and cabinet positions will be divided among the parties.
The MDC factions will reportedly take 16 ministerial positions, three of which will
come from the MDC-M faction, and ZANU-PF will take 15 positions. Early reports
suggested that Tsvangirai would gain control of the police force, but Mugabe, who
will remain head of state, would retain control of the armed forces. The text of the
agreement, however, leaves oversight of the police, which falls under the Ministry
of Home Affairs, undetermined. Mugabe will lead the cabinet, but reports suggest
that Tsvangirai, who will chair a Council of Ministers, will be responsible for the
day-to-day management of government affairs.51 As was the case in Kenya during
power sharing negotiations in early 2008, the Zimbabwe parties are now struggling
to determine who will control key ministries, and implementation will undoubtedly
require major concessions from all sides.
International Reactions
The international community has been divided over how to respond to the
political crisis in Zimbabwe. As the weeks progressed after the March elections
without the announcement of official results, world leaders began to debate whether
Zimbabwe was "in crisis." MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai traveled throughout the
region to advocate for intervention. The African Union joined the growing number
of calls for the release of the election results on April 20. As the delay continued,
media attention turned to focus on a Chinese arms shipment bound for Zimbabwe.
In an April 23 speech to the House of Commons, British Prime Minister Gordon
Brown called for an international arms embargo against Zimbabwe, accusing the
government of rigging the elections and calling the political situation "completely
unacceptable." The European Union (EU) maintains targeted sanctions against
members of Mugabe's administration, and EU sanctions already prohibit member
states from selling weapons to the country. The United States, which also prohibits
50 “New Delay in Zimbabwe Elections,” Voice of America, May 5, 2008.
51 "Zimbabwe Rivals Sign Power-Sharing Deal," Reuters, September 15, 2008.

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CRS-13
weapons sales to Zimbabwe and maintains targeted sanctions, expressed support for
Brown's proposal, which was included in a U.S.-sponsored draft of a U.N. Security
Council resolution. Britain's Queen Elizabeth stripped Mugabe of an honorable
Knighthood he received in 1994.
Table 1. Regional Efforts to Block Arms Transfer to Zimbabwe
On April 18, 2008, as the Chinese freighter An Yue Jiang sat in the waters off South
Africa’s port city of Durban waiting to unload its cargo, the High Court of South Africa
issued a court order blocking the cargo’s transfer through South African territory.52
According to court documents, the ship carried 77 tons of bullets, rocket-propelled
grenades, and mortars bound for Zimbabwe. Freight and dock workers of the South
African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU) had already refused to unload
or transport the shipment. Their protest was backed by the powerful Congress of
Southern African Trade Unions (COSATU) and International Transport Workers’
Federation (ITF), which called for an international boycott of the vessel, dubbed by some
as the “Ship of Shame.” The unions based their protest on concerns that the weapons
could fuel violence in the aftermath of Zimbabwe’s elections.
The international media closely tracked the freighter’s location as it searched for
another African port in which to unload the cargo. Zambia’s President publicly urged
regional governments to bar the An Yue Jiang from entering their waters. He welcomed
Mozambique’s decision not to allow the ship access, “because we don’t want a situation
which will escalate the (tension) in Zimbabwe more than what it is.” U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer called upon both the regional governments and China
to prevent the weapons transfer. On April 22, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson
announced that the ship would return to China. The An Yue Jiang later docked in Angola
to refuel and unload construction supplies bound for the Angolan market, but was denied
permission to unload its Zimbabwe cargo.
The Southern African Development Community (SADC). Zambia’s
recently deceased President, Levy Mwanawasa, who was also head of the regional
body SADC, convened an extraordinary meeting of the Southern African heads of
state on April 12, 2008 to discuss Zimbabwe’s elections. SADC has remained largely
silent in recent years as Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis has worsened.
Mwanawasa, however, expressed public concern with the situation in Zimbabwe in
2007, calling the country “a sinking Titanic whose passengers are jumping out to
save their lives.”53 He convened a similar emergency summit in late March 2007,
following the beating and arrest of opposition officials earlier that month. Although
the SADC leaders reportedly chastised President Mugabe privately at that time, they
did not publicly condemn the regime’s actions and instead appointed President
Mbeki to mediate between the Zimbabwean government and the opposition.
During the April 12 summit, attended by Tsvangirai and Makoni but not
Mugabe, the SADC leaders declined to call the situation in Zimbabwe a crisis. They
did, however, publicly urge the government to release the electoral results
“expeditiously,” allow opposition representatives to be present when vote tabulations
52 High Court of South Africa Durban & Coast Local Division Case No. 4975/08
53 “Zimbabwe ‘A Sinking Titanic,’”Financial Times, March 22, 2007.

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CRS-14
were verified, and ensure that a runoff, if needed, would be held in a “secure
environment.” The SADC leaders also called on Mbeki to continue his role as
mediator.54 According to some reports, Mwanawasa asked the leaders to seek
solutions that would allow “the people’s verdict” to be heard so that Zimbabweans
could “turn [over] a new leaf in their history.” Zimbabwe civil society groups were
supportive of SADC’s statements on the electoral results, but critical of its continued
support for Mbeki’s mediation. Mugabe reportedly called the SADC meeting “a
show staged by Britain.”55
Following Tsvangirai's withdrawal from the runoff, President Mwanawasa
reportedly commented that "elections held in such an environment will not only be
undemocratic but will also bring embarrassment to the region."56 President
Mwanawasa reportedly suffered a stroke on the eve of the AU Summit in Sharm el-
Sheikh and passed away on August 19, 2008. Since the runoff, Botswana appears to
have taken the strongest stance on Zimbabwe, declaring on July 4 that the
government would not recognize Mugabe as president. President Ian Khama
reportedly called on other SADC leaders to do the same, and he boycotted an August
2008 SADC summit attended by Mugabe.57
The African Union (AU). In a communique on April 17, the African Union
expressed concern over the delayed results, “which creates an atmosphere of tension
that is not in the least conducive to the consolidation of the democratic process that
was so felicitously launched through the organization of the elections.”58 In early
May, Chairman of the AU Commission Jean Ping led an AU mission to Zimbabwe,
Zambia, and South Africa. He called for Zimbabwe’s political actors to:
conduct their activities in a free, transparent, tolerant, and non-violent manner
to enable eligible Zimbabweans [to] exercise their democratic rights. It is
essential also that peace and security be maintained, and that the will of the
people be respected by all stakeholders once the results are announced.59
At the June 29- July 1 AU Summit in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, Botswana's Vice
President joined leaders from Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana in calling for
punitive measures against the Mugabe regime. The AU leaders ultimately failed to
reach consensus on sanctions, but issued a public call for talks to establish a unity
government.
54 SADC Communique, “2008 First Extra-ordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and
Government Issued on 13 April 2008, in Lusaka, Zambia.”
55 Fiona Forde, “Summit on Zim ‘Coup’ Crisis Stalls,” Sunday Independent, April 13, 2008.
56 "Tsvangirai Withdrawal: Key Quotes," BBC, June 23, 2008.
57 "Botswana Refuses to Recognize Mugabe as President of Zimbabwe," BBC Monitoring
Africa, July 8, 2008.
58 African Union Division of Communication and Information, “Communique on the
Situation in Zimbabwe,” April 17, 2008.
59 Statement by the Chairman of the AU Commission on the Situation in Zimbabwe on May
6, 2008, available at [http://www.africa-union.org].

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CRS-15
While the AU has traditionally deferred to regional mediation efforts, reports
suggest the AU Chairman, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete (who is also a
member of SADC), encouraged a greater role on Zimbabwe by the United Nations.
Kenya’s new prime minister, Raila Odinga, and former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan commented that Southern African leaders could do more to resolve the crisis.
Odinga received widespread attention for his recent comments on Zimbabwe, and he
called on AU leaders not to allow Mugabe to attend the Sharm el-Sheikh summit.
The African Union has some precedent for intervening in support of democracy
within its member countries, should it chose to do so.60 The intervention of AU
leaders in the early days of the 2007/2008 Kenyan election crisis is viewed by many
as having helped move the two opposed parties toward negotiations and an eventual
post-election agreement. As in Kenya, however, implementing the details of the
September 2008 Zimbabwe agreement is likely to prove challenging. Both SADC
and the AU are identified as guarantors of the Zimbabwe agreement.
South Africa. Thabo Mbeki, who resigned from his position as President of
South Africa on September 21, 2008, drew substantial criticism at home from
opposition parties, trade unions, and civil society groups for his reaction to
Zimbabwe’s elections. Mbeki, after visiting Mugabe in Harare on his way to the
April 12 SADC summit, declared he did not believe Zimbabwe was facing a crisis,
that the delayed release of the presidential results was a “natural process,” and that
Zimbabweans must patiently await their release. Tsvangirai criticized Mbeki for his
“quiet support for the dictatorship,” and called for him to step down as mediator in
early 2008.61 According to reports, Mbeki wrote President Bush a letter warning the
United States not to interfere in the Zimbabwe situation after the March elections.62
Others within the South African government and its ruling party took a harder
line publicly on Zimbabwe than Mbeki. “In resolving the problem of Zimbabwe,
Thabo Mbeki is not speaking on behalf of the ANC,” a spokesman for the ruling
60 In 2005, after the death of the President of Togo, the Togolese army installed his son as
president. The AU declared the intervention to be a military coup and the AU Peace and
Security Council demanded the resignation of the new president and urged members to
impose diplomatic, travel, and arms sanctions until elections were held. The president
stepped down the day after sanctions were imposed. It is notable, in the case of Togo, that
the relevant regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
played an important role in denouncing the coup and leading the campaign for sanctions. In
the second instance of AU intervention, the AU suspended Mauritania from all
organizational activities after the country’s military led a successful coup. The president,
in office for 21 years, was considered autocratic, and reports suggest that most Mauritanians
supported the military’s actions. Nevertheless, the AU upheld the suspension because it
opposed the unconstitutional overthrow of a civilian regime. Following an investigation, the
AU decided against sanctions, but held the suspension until elections were held in 2007.
Mauritania was suspended from the AU again in August 2008 following another coup.
61 Barry Bearak, “Zimbabwe Opponent Criticizes Mbeki,” New York Times, February 14,
2008.
62 Michael Gerson, "The Despots' Democracy," Washington Post, May 28, 2008.

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African National Congress youth wing declared in April.63 Baleka Mbete, the new
speaker of parliament and ANC national chairperson, called the delayed release of
results a “democratic process gone wrong.” In a gathering of the Inter-Parliamentary
Union, she urged representatives of 147 countries not to remain silent on the issue.64
The new president of the ANC, Jacob Zuma, who defeated Mbeki in December
2007 for the party presidency, openly criticized the delayed announcement of the
March results, saying, “There is a crisis in Zimbabwe. We ought to stand up and do
something about it.” While not directly charging the Mugabe administration with
rigging, he has distanced himself from Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” approach. In late
April, he told reporters, “Definitely there is something wrong with those elections....
I think the manner in which the electoral commission has acted has discredited itself,
and therefore that is tantamount to sabotaging the elections.”65 Zuma did not call for
Mbeki to step down as mediator, but said “I imagine that the leaders in Africa should
really move in to unlock this logjam,”66 and called for African leaders to “assist”
Mbeki as mediator, “given the gravity of the situation.”67 As ANC president, Zuma
is expected to be the party's presidential candidate in South Africa’s May 2009
elections.68 Many analysts have predicted that South African policy toward
Zimbabwe, and Mugabe in particular, could change under a possible Zuma
administration, or even under the administration of interim President Kgalema
Motlanthe, particularly if the September 2008 agreement is not fully implemented.69
In the months following the March elections in Zimbabwe, domestic public
pressure may ultimately have forced Mbeki to take a stronger position on the
violence in Zimbabwe: Mbeki visited the country several times in the wake of the
elections and in May dispatched six retired generals to investigate reports of attacks
on the opposition. The generals reportedly expressed shock at the level of violence.70
On the day of the runoff, the ANC issued a public statement noting the effect
Zimbabwe's instability has had on the SADC region, accused the Zimbabwe
government of "riding roughshod over the hard-won democratic rights of the people."
The statement cited "compelling evidence of violence, intimidation and outright
terror; the studied harassment of the leadership of the MDC, including its Presidential
candidate, by the security organs of the Zimbabwean government." The ANC also
63 “Zimbabwe’s Political Crisis Enters South Africa Domestic Politics,” Voice of America,
April 17, 2008.
64 Statement by Speaker Baleka Mbete in Cape Town, April 13, 2008, available at
[http://www.parliament.gov.za].
65 “Zimbabwe Crisis at Critical Level, Warns Zuma,” CNN, April 24, 2008.
66 “Africa Shows Impatience on Zimbabwe Crisis,” Reuters, April 22, 2008.
67 “Zuma Ratchets Up Rhetoric Over Zimbabwe,” Financial Times, April 22, 2008.
68 Zuma, who has been linked to a number of controversies, was expected to face corruption
charges in August 2008, but the case has been dismissed on procedural grounds.
Prosecutors are appealing. If convicted prior to the elections, he would be ineligible to run.
69 CRS Report RL31697, South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations, by Lauren Ploch.
70 “Anxiety Grows for Kidnaped Zimbabwe Activist,” Voice of America, May 18, 2008.

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CRS-17
warned outside players not to try to impose regime change, and expressed support for
President Mbeki's continued mediation efforts.71 According to local press reports, on
July 8, Mbeki declared that there was no legitimate government in Harare,
necessitating the creation of a unity government.72
An outbreak of xenophobic violence in South Africa had some, including ANC
ally the South African Communist Party, calling for early elections in South Africa.73
In May and June 2008, Zimbabweans and other foreign nationals were targeted by
mobs in several South African townships; at least 60 were killed and over 25,000 fled
their homes. South Africa is home to some three to five million illegal immigrants,
most from Zimbabwe, and some South Africans blame them for the country’s high
crime and unemployment rates and rising food prices. President Mbeki condemned
the attacks, but the opposition criticized the government for not addressing tensions
earlier. On May 21, Mbeki deployed the army internally for the first time since the
end of apartheid to stem the violence.
The United Nations. In the wake of the March elections, U.N. Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon joined the United States, Great Britain, and France in calling
on the U.N. Security Council to address the Zimbabwe situation. In remarks to the
Security Council on April 16, Ban expressed his deep concern with the delayed
release of the electoral results, warning,
Absent a transparent solution to this impasse, the situation could deteriorate
further with serious implications for the people of Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean
authorities and the countries of the region have insisted that these matters are for
the region to resolve but the international community continues to watch and
wait for decisive action. The credibility of the democratic process in Africa could
be at stake here.
The Secretary-General, who declared the runoff election illegitimate, engaged
world leaders to determine how the international community could “help the
Zimbabwean people and authorities to resolve this issue.”74 His concern was echoed
by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour, who called the runoff
a "perversion of democracy.”75
Thabo Mbeki chaired the April 16 Security Council meeting, which was
originally called by South Africa, as rotating chairman of the Council, to discuss
cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union. U.S. Ambassador
to the United Nations Zalmay Khalilzad recommended that a U.N.-AU mission visit
the country. The only African representative to address the Zimbabwe issue at the
71 “South Africa: Finding a Workable Solution to the Crisis,” Press Release issued by the
ANC on June 27, 2008.
72 “Mbeki Brands Mugabe's Rule Illegitimate,” Pretoria News, July 8, 2008.
73 “Anti-Foreigner Violence Escalates in South Africa,” Reuters, May 19, 2008.
74 “U.N. Council and AU to debate Zimbabwe,” Reuters, April 16, 2008.
75 “Elections Won't Be Delayed, Zimbabwe Insists,” International Herald Tribune, June 27,
2008.

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meeting was Tanzanian President Kikwete, who praised SADC for working to
“ensure that the will of the people of Zimbabwe is respected,” and suggested that the
regional body would meet again soon to discuss Zimbabwe.76
The U.N. Security Council held a special session on April 29 to discuss
Zimbabwe, reportedly at the behest of incoming Security Council chair Britain.
European and Latin American members pressed for a U.N. envoy to visit the country,
while other delegations, including South Africa’s, rejected the proposal. President
Mugabe denounced the closed session as “sinister, racist, and colonial.”77 On June
22, the Council issued a Presidential Statement condemning the violence and acts of
political repression by the Government of Zimbabwe.
On July 8, 2008, the Group of Eight (G8) nations, many of whom already have
bilateral sanctions in place, agreed to impose sanctions against the Mugabe regime
due to the ongoing violence. The G8's announcement set the stage for a
U.S.-sponsored resolution in the U.N. Security Council. The resolution (S/2008/447)
called for targeted sanctions on 14 members of the Mugabe regime, and an
international arms embargo. It also requested the appointment of a U.N. Special
Representative on Zimbabwe, and the creation of a Panel of Experts to monitor and
evaluate the situation and the effects of the sanctions. On July 11, Russia and China
vetoed the resolution. The vote was 9, including Burkina Faso, in favor, and 5
against, with South Africa joining Russia, China, Vietnam, and Libya in opposition.
The United States expressed its disappointment with the two vetos, particularly that
of Russia, which had supported the G8 agreement earlier in the week.78
South Africa's Ambassador to the U.N. had repeatedly expressed reservations
about imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe, arguing that the situation in Zimbabwe does
not pose a threat to international security and thus should not be considered to be a
matter for the U.N. Security Council. Some observers have criticized South Africa's
position, suggesting that the xenophobic violence against Zimbabwean immigrants
in South Africa is only one of several examples of how the political and economic
crisis in Zimbabwe has affected the neighboring region. Some analysts suggest that
the African Union acknowledged the threat to regional security in a July 2 resolution
issued during its Sharm el-Sheikh summit, which noted the "urgent need to prevent
further worsening of the situation and with a view to avoid the spread of the conflict
with the consequential negative impact on the country and the subregion."79
U.S. Policy on Zimbabwe
Current U.S. Policy. Although the United States’ ability to influence internal
developments in Zimbabwe is limited, the U.S. government has been an outspoken
76 “Spotlight Turned on Zimbabwe at UN Council,” Reuters, April 16, 2008.
77 “Zimbabwe Dismisses U.N. Talks,” Reuters, April 30, 2008.
78 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Africa Subcommittee on July 15, 2008.
79 African Union Summit Resolution on Zimbabwe, Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, July 2, 2008.

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critic of the Mugabe Administration. U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe has included a
combination of targeted sanctions against the Government of Zimbabwe, including
financial and visa sanctions against select individuals;80 a ban on transfers of defense
items and services; a suspension of non-humanitarian assistance to the government;
and support for South Africa’s mediation between the parties.

In reaction to the uncertainty following the March elections, the Bush
Administration repeatedly called for the immediate release of the results, and in April
called for all parties to accept and implement legitimate election results, “including,
as appropriate, changes in the parliament, changes in the government.”81 The State
Department later registered “deep concern” about the inadequate “chain of custody”
of the ballot boxes in the weeks after the election, and expressed its view that
conditions on the ground would not allow for a free and fair runoff. Prior to the
runoff, Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer accused Mugabe of “trying to steal
the election,” saying, “My preferred option would be that the will of the people be
accepted. That Mr. Mugabe does the honorable thing and steps down.”82
The Bush Administration has been highly critical of the government’s role in
the latest wave of violence. In May, a State Department spokesman urged Mugabe
to “call off his dogs,”83 and U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe James McGee publicly
condemned what he refered to as a “systematic campaign of violence designed to
block this vote for change...orchestrated at the highest levels of the ruling party.”84
American diplomats and officials from other foreign embassies report that they have
repeatedly been harassed by elements of the Mugabe regime, in violation of the
Vienna Convention. On May 13, Zimbabwean police tried to interfere with a multi-
country diplomatic convoy outside Harare.85 The convoy had been visiting hospitals
and an alleged interrogation center, and during the encounter a policeman reportedly
threatened to beat a U.S. embassy official. Ambassador McGee described seeing
evidence of violence of a “massive” scope, including proof that civilians had been
interrogated at “torture camp” the convoy visited.86 He was later reportedly
summoned by Zimbabwe’s Foreign Minister for allegedly violating diplomatic
80 President Bush imposed these sanctions through Executive Order 13288, issued in March
2003. The Order prohibits transactions with persons, entities, or organizations found to be
undermining democratic institutions and processes in Zimbabwe, who are included in a
Specially Designated Nationals(SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Treasury Department’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
81 News Briefing by State Department Spokesman Tom Casey on April 22, 2008.
82 News Briefing by State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack on April 15, 2008, and
“Mugabe Trying to Steal Elections, Says U.S. Official,” CNN, April 24, 2008.
83 Daily Press Briefing by State Department Spokesman Tom Casey, May 1, 2008.
84 Statement by Ambassador McGee, “Breaking the Silence on Political Violence in
Zimbabwe,” May 8, 2008, available at [http://harare.usembassy.gov].
85 The convoy included the ambassadors of the United States, Britain, the EU, and Japan;
the deputy ambassadors of Tanzania and the Netherlands; and embassy staff and journalists.
86 “U.S. Ambassador Says Zimbabwe Government Doing Nothing to Stop Post-Election
Violence,” Voice of America, May 14, 2008.

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protocol and was warned not to interfere in internal affairs. On June 5, five
American embassy staff and two local embassy workers were detailed by police; one
of the local workers was beaten. Embassy staff have collected evidence and
documented abuses for submission to the U.N, SADC, and the AU.
In the months following the elections, the Administration repeated its calls for
African governments to play a greater role in resolving the political impasse. During
a visit by the British Prime Minister to Washington, President Bush told the media,
“The United Nations and the A.U. must play an active role in resolving the situation
in Zimbabwe.”87 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said more bluntly, “It is
time for Africa to step up.”88
U.S. Assistance. The United States is one of the largest donors of
humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwe, providing over $93 million in food and other
humanitarian aid in FY2007 and $186 million to date in FY2008. The
Administration’s FY2009 request for $45.4 million includes $19.4 million for health
programs and $26 million in Economic Support Funds, much of which are designated
for either governance or economic recovery efforts.89 This reflects a substantial
increase from previous years; $23.2 million was obligated in FY2007 and $22.9
million in FY2008. Democracy and governance assistance has been augmented by
funding from USAID’s global Elections and Political Processes fund (EPP). These
resources support political party strengthening, voter registration, and training of
election monitors. According to the State Department’s Congressional Budget
Justification (CBJ), “in anticipation of a more moderate government arising in 2008,”
FY2009 funding will support programs to “re-establish and strengthen democratic
institutions, processes and systems, and to build legislative consensus on democratic
reform.” Such programs would support legal reforms, national dialogue on key
issues, civil society advocacy, and enhanced media capacity. In the event of no
change in government in 2008, the CBJ proposes to reprogram these resources to aid
opposition efforts to press for reforms.
Congressional Interest. Several Members of Congress have issued
statements highly critical of the Mugabe Administration, the delayed release of the
election results, and the political violence in Zimbabwe. Some have written letters
to Bush Administration officials or African leaders. On April 25, the Senate passed
S.Res. 533, introduced by Senator John Kerry, calling for the immediate release of
the presidential results, an end to the political violence and intimidation, and a
peaceful transition to democratic rule. The resolution also supported calls for an
international arms embargo and other targeted sanctions against the Mugabe regime,
and encouraged the creation of a comprehensive political and economic recovery
package in the event a democratic government is installed. The House of
Representatives passed H.Res. 1230, sponsored by Representative Donald Payne and
87 Remarks by President Bush during a press conference with Prime Minister Brown at the
White House, April 17, 2008.
88 On-the-Record Briefing by Secretary Rice in Washington, DC, April 17, 2008.
89 This amount does not include food aid, which is allocated throughout the year in response
to need.

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all the House Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, among others,
condemning the violence and calling for a peaceful resolution to the political crisis.
The House also passed H.Res. 1270, sponsored by Representative Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen, calling for an international arms embargo, urging the United Nations
to deploy a special envoy to Zimbabwe, and encouraging the parties to discuss the
creation of a government of national unity. Prior to the June runoff, Representative
Adam Schiff introduced legislation calling on the Zimbabwe government to postpone
the election. Representative Tom Tancredo also introducted legislation, H.Con.Res.
387, calling for the United States to sever diplomatic ties with Zimbabwe.
President Mugabe has frequently claimed that Western sanctions are to blame
for the collapse of the country’s economy, despite the absence of trade sanctions
against Zimbabwe. In 2001, Congress passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and
Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA) (P.L. 107-99), criticizing the “economic
mismanagement” and “undemocratic practices” in Zimbabwe. This legislation called
for consultations with allies on economic sanctions and a travel ban. It also
prohibited U.S. support for financial assistance to Zimbabwe by international
financial institutions until the President has been able to certify that certain
conditions pertaining to the rule of law, democratic elections, and legal and
transparent land reform have been met. Zimbabwe was, however, already ineligible
to receive loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank’s
International Development Association (IDA) because it is in arrears to those
institutions for debt payments.

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CRS-22
Policy Options90
The Bush Administration has expressed its support for the September 2008
power sharing agreement, but has yet to indicate the circumstances under which it
might lift sanctions or provide financial support for Zimbabwe's economic recovery.
Some details surrounding the implementation of the agreement remain uncertain.
Should a unity government be established, donor countries and institutions are likely
to expect that certain economic and political policy changes be made prior to a
resumption of financial assistance. If the agreement falls apart, or the installation of
Tsvangirai and other MDC officials into government positions is significantly
delayed, the international community may explore other avenues for addressing the
country's political and economic problems.
Diplomatic Pressure. Certain countries, including the United States, have
declared the Mugabe Administration illegitimate. Prior to the September agreement,
some suggested that these governments should officially recognize Tsvangirai as
President, and allow him to establish a government in exile. The MDC and others
had called for the United Nations to deploy human rights monitors to investigate the
political violence. Although South Africa and SADC have already deployed inquiry
teams, the presence of U.N. monitors could be influential, particularly if the
Zimbabwe government takes no initiative to investigate or prosecute abuses. There
have been calls for members of the Mugabe government to be referred to
international justice regimes, although some observers suggest such calls for justice
should be considered carefully if a unity government is established.
Humanitarian Assistance. The food security situation in Zimbabwe
remains critical, with an estimated five million people in need of food assistance in
2008. Several Southern African countries have suffered from chronic food insecurity
in recent years, stemming from a combination of weather-related and man-made
factors, including prolonged drought, floods, poor economic performance, and the
impact of HIV/AIDS. Although drought is partly to blame for Zimbabwe’s food
shortages, analysts believe that disruptions to the farming sector resulting from
Mugabe’s land seizure program are the main reason for reduced food production.91
Nearly all of the country’s 4,500 commercial farms have now been taken by the
government and redistributed or divided. The government’s land redistribution
program is reportedly plagued by inefficiencies, with large portions of redistributed
land not being actively farmed. Tractors and other inputs to production are in short
supply. Thousands of experienced farm workers were reportedly forced to flee seized
commercial farms, and many of those who now hold farmland have no agricultural
90 There have been a number of studies conducted on policy options to re-engage Zimbabwe,
including, Michelle D. Gavin, Planning for Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, Council on Foreign
Relations (CFR) Special Report No. 31, October 2007; Todd Moss and Stewart Patrick, The
Day After Comrade Bob: Applying Post-Conflict Recovery Lessons to Zimbabwe, Center for
Global Development Working Paper no. 72, December 2005; and “After Mugabe: Applying
Post-Conflict Recovery Lessons to Zimbabwe,” Africa Policy Journal, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, vol. 1, Spring 2006.
91 On the land takeovers in Zimbabwe, see AI, Zimbabwe: Power and Hunger — Violations
of the Right to Food, October 15, 2004.

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CRS-23
expertise. The displacement of farm workers and vandalism that has followed the
March elections also contributes to food insecurity. The 2008 maize harvest has been
severely affected by a combination of flooding followed by extreme dry weather. The
crop production deficit in much of the country is estimated at 75 to 100 percent.
Global food needs have increased dramatically since the beginning of 2008, primarily
due to rising commodity and fuel prices, and the competition for international
resources may severely affect the international community’s ability to address food
insecurity in Zimbabwe.
Poor sanitation and water shortages pose serious health risks in Zimbabwe’s
urban centers. Basic hygiene items, such as soap, have become too expensive for
many residents. In the country’s second largest city, Bulawayo, service delivery,
including garbage collection, has declined severely because of budget shortages, and
reports suggest many ambulances and fire trucks sit unused because the city council
cannot afford fuel or spare parts. According to U.N. reports, the political violence
has impeded the delivery of assistance by NGOs.
Economic Recovery.92 The Bush Administration and other international
actors have discussed financial incentives and assistance to facilitate Zimbabwe’s
economic recovery in the event of a democratic transition. Zimbabwe’s economy has
collapsed in the last decade, and every sector of the economy has been affected.
Annual outputs of wheat, maize, and tobacco, once Zimbabwe’s largest foreign
exchange earner, have plummeted. Manufacturing output dropped over 47 percent
in the decade between 1996 and 2006. Zimbabwe’s mining sector has been similarly
affected, although the platinum industry remains a major income earner for the
government.93 World Bank and IMF lending has been suspended for more than six
years due to nonpayment of arrears, and foreign currency for essential imports,
particularly fuel, is in extremely short supply. Zimbabwe’s inflation rate, at 11
million percent according to official government figures, is the highest in the world
and has contributed significantly to the country’s economic collapse. Zimbabweans
have faced steep rises in the prices of food and non-food items, including rents.
These factors have all contributed to increasing pressure on both the people of
Zimbabwe and members of Mugabe’s regime. On September 26, 2008, Zimbabwe
began officially trading in foreign currency in an attempt to lower prices.
According to the IMF, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s quasi-fiscal activities
are primarily responsible for the surge in the country’s money supply in recent years.
Losses from such activities were estimated to be 75 percent of GDP in 2006. These
92 Information in this section was drawn from a variety of sources, including David Coltart,
“A Decade of Suffering in Zimbabwe: Economic Collapse and Political Repression under
Robert Mugabe,” CATO Institute Development Policy Analysis No. 5, March 24, 2008;
Sonia Munoz, “Central Bank Quasi-fiscal Losses and High Inflation in Zimbabwe: A Note,”
IMF Working Paper, April 2007; and “Zimbabwe: Article IV Consultation - Staff Notes,”
IMF Country Report No. 05/360, October 2005.
93 Zimbabwe has the world’s second largest reserves of platinum, behind South Africa. The
largest mining operations in the country are controlled by Impala Platinum and Anglo
Platinum, respectively. These South African-owned companies are the world’s largest
platinum producers.

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activities include monetary operations to absorb excess liquidity; subsidized credit;
sustained foreign exchange losses through subsidized exchange rates for selected
government purchases and multiple currency practices; and financial sector
restructuring. After the government implemented its price control policy in June
2007, cutting prices of basic commodities by 50 percent in an effort to stem inflation,
manufacturing output fell more than 50 percent within six months and many firms
were forced to close. The price controls also resulted in a shortage of basic goods
and have contributed to worsening social indicators. The government’s fast track
land reform and more recent policy changes such as the Indigenization and Economic
Empowerment Act, have created significant uncertainty over property rights,
deterring foreign direct investment and lowering consumer confidence.
The MDC has outlined its program to revive the economy.94 The party has
committed to stop printing new money, eliminate price controls, open foreign
exchange,95 and bring in the IMF to assist in reforming the government’s fiscal
policies. Tsvangirai has also floated the idea of replacing the Zimbabwe dollar with
a new currency.96 Some analysts have suggested that the existing dollar could be
temporarily linked to either the South African rand or the U.S. dollar to stabilize its
value. The party’s economic policy stresses a free market approach, and promises
to privatize most state-owned companies, dismantle patronage networks, and
simplify the tax code. In recognition that the government’s bloated budget has
contributed significantly to current economic woes, Tsvangirai initially promised a
significantly smaller cabinet, if he were to become president, as part of a deficit-
reduction strategy. In addition, the MDC has proposed a land audit and a program to
“harmonize” land-tenure so that those on communal lands can hold an individual
title. The party would consider compensation for those who lost land illegally. As
the implementation details of the September agreement are discussed, it remains
unclear how much influence the MDC will have in pressing its economic policies
under a unity government. The need for a land audit, for example, has been
acknowledged in the agreement, but the large power sharing cabinet may challenge
Tsvangirai's goal of reducing the size of government.
The State Department’s FY2009 budget request states that “If political change
ensues and legislative restrictions are lifted, Zimbabwe will need significant support
from the United States, in coordination with other donors, to reform, rebuild, and
recover.” Western donors, including the United States, met twice in Europe in 2007
to explore reconstruction options, and their representatives meet regularly in Harare
to coordinate existing aid programs. Some reports suggest, however, that there has
been little concrete planning on what this reconstruction support should entail.97
Norway has pledged a major economic stabilization package from Nordic countries
94 See, for example, Morgan Tsvangirai, “Freedom for Zimbabwe,” The Wall Street Journal,
March 21, 2008.
95 The Reserve Bank made a major change to its fiscal policy in May 2008, allowing the
Zimbabwe dollar to float to address hyperinflation. Analysts have expressed doubts that the
government will maintain this policy if the Zim dollar depreciates faster than expected.
96 “Tsvangirai Promises New Zimbabwe Currency,” The Australian, March 28, 2008.
97 Morrison and Bellamy, “The Close of the Mugabe Era,” op cit.

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in return for “a true democratic election” and the adoption of sound fiscal policies,
although the exact amount of such a package has not been announced. Britain has
made similar pledges, and has maintained its willingness to release funds to pay for
parts of an orderly land redistribution program if Mugabe retires and the rule of law
is returned. With Mugabe remaining in office under the September agreement, it is
unclear whether Britain would concede to release such funds. By some estimates, the
cost of Zimbabwe’s economic recovery may be almost $4 billion over a five-year
period to cover food support, land reform, health services and education,
infrastructure, balance of payment and budget support, and emergency aid programs.
In the event of political change in Zimbabwe, ESF funds in the State Department’s
FY2009 request would be directed toward support for “monetary and fiscal policy
reform and economic revitalization, specifically agricultural and private sector
productivity and improvement of the business enabling environment.”
The World Bank and the IMF have developed strategies for Zimbabwe’s
economic recovery, but the IMF suggests that liberalizing the foreign exchange rate
will require careful management. Given the need to cut government spending to
reduce the government deficit, significant donor assistance will be required to rebuild
the public health sector, which according to reports may have lost as much as 80
percent of its skilled workforce. Reviving the country’s agriculture industry will
require delicate handling to address historical grievances against white Zimbabweans
regarding land distribution and tenure.98 Congress authorized $20 million in its
ZDERA legislation for land reform assistance for FY2002, and some analysts suggest
this level of annual assistance may still be appropriate.99
Accountability and Reform. The inability of the country’s judicial system
to protect its citizens or their property, or to provide due process to those seeking
remedy or compensation, suggests a fundamental crisis in the implementation of the
rule of law in Zimbabwe. Analysts suggest that the country will require significant
judicial and security sector reforms as part of larger constitutional reforms. The
people of Zimbabwe will also have to determine what level of accountability they
may seek, not only for recent political violence, but for historical grievances and
alleged official corruption under the Mugabe Administration. Tsvangirai has
proposed the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission similar to that of
South Africa, “striking a healthy balance between reconciliation and
accountability.”100 Prior to the September 2008 agreement, he offered Mugabe “an
honorable exit as... father of the nation,” but it is unlikely that the MDC would
98 The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has suggested that raising the yields
of communal farming areas, which compose almost 50 percent of Zimbabwe’s land, could
guarantee its food security. The country’s annual maize requirement for human
consumption is estimated at 1.4 million metric tons. The FAO estimates that a $50 million
investment annually for three years to train farmers and provide seeds and fertilizer would
significantly increase yields and cost less than what Zimbabwe now pays to import food. See
“Zimbabwe: Small Scale Farmers Seen as Backbone of Food Security,” IRIN, May 15,
2008.
99 Gavin, Planning for Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, Council on Foreign Relations Special
Report No. 31, October 2007.
100 Morgan Tsvangirai, “Freedom for Zimbabwe,” The Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2008.

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consider extending such an offer to all senior security officials implicated in acts of
violence.101 Under the terms of the power sharing agreement, a new constitution is
expected to be developed within two years; many expect fresh elections to be held
at that point. Mugabe and other senior officials may resist a peaceful exit from
power if they fear subsequent prosecution, as occurred with the former presidents of
Liberia, Chad, and Zambia.102
101 “Zimbabwe Opposition Seeks Peacekeepers for Run-off,” Reuters, May 11, 2008.
102 Former Liberian President Charles Taylor now faces war crimes charges before the
Special Court for Sierra Leone at the Hague; former Chadian President Hissan Habre is
expected to be tried in Senegal for human rights abuses committed by his regime; and
former Zambian President Frederick Chiluba is on trial in Zambia for corruption.

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