Order Code RL33819
Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress
Updated September 24, 2008
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress
Summary
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating
the communist nation through economic sanctions, which the Bush Administration
has tightened significantly. A second policy component has consisted of support
measures for the Cuban people, including private humanitarian donations and
U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. As in past years, the main
issue for U.S. policy toward Cuba in the 110th Congress has been how to best support
political and economic change in one of the world’s remaining communist nations.
Unlike past years, however, Congress is examining policy toward Cuba in the context
of Fidel Castro’s departure from heading the government because of poor health.
Raúl Castro, who had served as provision head of government since July 2006, was
selected on February 24, 2008 by Cuba’s legislature to continue in that role officially.
In the 110th Congress, Congress fully funded the Administration’s FY2008
request for $45.7 million for Cuba democracy programs in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161). In other action, on July 27, 2007,
the House rejected H.Amdt. 707 to H.R. 2419, the 2007 farm bill, that would have
facilitated the export of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. On May 21, 2008, the
Senate approved S.Res. 573, recognizing the struggle of the Cuban people. On June
25, 2008, the House Appropriations Committee approved the FY2009 Financial
Services and General Government Appropriations bill with provisions easing
restrictions on family travel and U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. The Senate
version of the bill, S. 3260, also has provisions easing restrictions on agricultural
exports and family travel. Both S. 3260 and the Senate version of the FY2009
agriculture appropriations bill, S. 3289, also have provisions easing restrictions on
travel related to the sale of agricultural and medical goods
Several other legislative initiatives introduced in the 110th Congress would ease
sanctions: H.R. 177 (educational travel); H.R. 216 (Cuban baseball players); H.R.
217 and H.R. 624 (overall sanctions); H.R. 654, S. 554, and S. 721 (travel); H.R. 757
(family travel and remittances); H.R. 1026 (sale of U.S. agricultural products); H.R.
2819/S. 1673 (sale of U.S. agricultural and medical products and travel); and S. 1268,
S. 2953, H.R. 3182, and H.R. 3435 (development of Cuba’s offshore oil). S. 554
would terminate U.S.-government sponsored television broadcasting to Cuba.
Several initiatives would tighten sanctions: H.R. 525 (related to U.S. fugitives in
Cuba), and H.R. 1679/S. 876 and S. 2503 (related to Cuba’s offshore oil
development). Two initiatives, H.R. 1306 and S. 749, would amend a provision of
law restricting the registration or enforcement of certain Cuban trademarks; five
initiatives — H.R. 217, H.R. 624, H.R. 2819, S. 1673, and S. 1806 — would repeal
the trademark sanction. H.R. 5627 and S. 2777 would award the congressional gold
medal to Cuban political prisoner Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet. H.Res. 935 would
commemorate the 1996 shootdown of two U.S. civilian planes by Cuba. S. 3288 has
a provision that would fund U.S. work to establish anti-drug cooperation with Cuba.
In the aftermath of Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, several initiatives would temporarily
ease some U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba: H.R. 6913, H.R. 6962, and S.Amdt.
5581 to S. 3001. For more information, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S.
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances.
Contents
Major Developments in 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Political Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Background to the Succession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Varela Project and the National Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Assembly to Promote Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Economic Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Economic Changes Under Raúl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Bush Administration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
May 2004 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report . . . . . . 16
July 2006 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report . . . . . . . 17
U.S. Reaction to Fidel’s Ceding of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
October 2007 Policy Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
U.S. Response to Raúl’s Official Selection as President . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Debate on the Overall Direction of U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Aftermath of 2008 Hurricanes and Tropical Storms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Agricultural Exports and Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Trademark Sanction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Offshore Oil Sector Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Drug Interdiction Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Cuba and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Cuba as the Victim of Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Radio and TV Marti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Controversies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Migration Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1994 and 1995 Migration Accords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Coast Guard Interdictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
U.S. Travel Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Migration Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Guantanamo Naval Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Legislation in the 110th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Approved Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Additional Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Legislation in the 109th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Appropriations Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Human Rights Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Active CRS Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Archived CRS Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress
Major Developments in 2008
On September 18, 2008, the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee
on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight held a hearing on U.S.
restrictions on Cuban-American travel to Cuba.
From mid-August through September 10, 2008, four major storms (Hurricanes
Gustav and Ike, and Tropical Storms Hanna and Fay) caused widespread damage
throughout Cuba. The two hurricanes caused most of the damage. Overall, just 7
people were killed, but the hurricanes severely affected the housing sector (with
almost 500,000 homes damaged and over 63,000 destroyed), the power grid, and the
agricultural sector. Some 200,000 Cubans are reportedly without shelters, and
damages are estimated to amount to $5 billion. The United States is providing
assistance through non-governmental organizations. To date, U.S. offers of direct
assistance to the Cuban government have been rejected, although the Cuban
government has not responded to a September 19 offer to supply some $6.3 million
in construction materials. Cuba has, however, called on the United States to allow
U.S. companies to sell relief supplies to Cuba. In the aftermath of the hurricanes,
Several legislative initiatives were introduced – S.Amdt. 5581 (Dodd) to S. 3001,
H.R. 6913 (Flake), and H.R. 6962 (Delahunt) – that would temporarily ease U.S.
embargo restrictions in several areas. (See “Aftermath of 2008 Hurricanes” below.)
On July 21, 2008, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of
the FY2009 Agriculture Appropriations bill, S. 3289 (S.Rept. 110-426), with a
provision (section 737) that would ease restrictions on travel to Cuba for the sale of
agricultural and medical goods.
On July 18, 2008, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of
the FY2009 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, S. 3288 (S.Rept. 110-425). Among its Cuba provisions, the bill
would provide $1 million for preliminary work by the Department of State, or other
entity designated by the Secretary of State, to establish cooperation with appropriate
Cuban agencies on counternarcotics matters. The report to the bill recommended full
funding for the Administration’s requests of $34.392 million for Cuba broadcasting
and $20 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs, and called for the State
Department and USAID to conduct regular evaluations to ensure the cost
effectiveness of the programs.
On July 14, 2008, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of
the FY2009 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill, S. 3260
(S.Rept. 110-417), which includes provisions easing restrictions on payment terms
CRS-2
for the sale of agricultural goods to Cuba (section 618), travel relating to the sale of
commercial and agricultural goods (section 619), and family travel (section 620).
On July 11, 2008, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report
that criticized the practices of the International Broadcasting Bureau and the Office
of Cuba Broadcasting for their practices in awarding noncompetitive contracts in
December 2006 to two private U.S. commercial stations to transit Radio and TV
Martí. According to GAO, the approach for awarding the two contracts did not
reflect sound business practices. (U.S. Government Accountability Office,
“Broadcasting to Cuba, Weaknesses in Contracting Practices Reduced Visibility into
Selected Award Decisions,” GAO-08-764, July 2008.)
On June 25, 2008, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version
of the FY2009 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill that
includes provisions easing restrictions on family travel and U.S. agricultural exports
to Cuba. The bill would liberalize family travel to Cuba by allowing for such travel
once a year (instead of the current restriction of once every three years) and by
allowing such travel to visit aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and first cousins. It
would ease restrictions on agricultural trade with Cuba through a provision
prohibiting funds in the act from being used to administer, implement, or enforce an
amendment to the Cuban embargo regulations from February 25, 2005, that requires
that U.S. agricultural exports must be paid for before they leave U.S. ports. The
committee’s draft report to the bill requires the Treasury Department’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to provide detailed information on OFAC’s Cuba-
related licensing and enforcement actions. The House Appropriations Subcommittee
on Financial Services and General Government had approved the measure on June
17. (Also see “Restrictions on Travel and Remittances” and “Agricultural Exports
and Sanctions” below.)
On June 19, the European Union approved the permanent lifting of diplomatic
sanctions that it had imposed on Cuba in 2003. The action was largely symbolic,
because the sanctions had been temporarily suspended since 2005. Cuban Foreign
Minister Felipe Perez Roque welcomed the EU’s decision, which will be reviewed
in 12 months. U.S. State Department officials looked positively at the benchmarks
that will be used in the EU’s dialogue with Cuba, including Cuba’s release of
political prisoners, implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, access to the Internet, and allowing all EU delegations to meet with
members of the opposition as well as the Cuban government.
On June 13, 2008, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it
deported a U.S. citizen wanted in the United States for sexual exploitation of a minor
and for child pornography who had entered Cuba from Mexico in April.
On June 4, 2008, the State Department issued its 2008 Trafficking in Persons
Report, with Cuba again placed on the Tier 3 list of countries that do not cooperate
in the fight against trafficking. According to the report, Cuba is principally a source
country for women and children trafficked within the country for the purpose of
commercial sexual exploitation. Cuba rejected the report as distorting Cuban reality
in an attempt to justify the U.S. embargo. Although countries on the list are subject
CRS-3
to U.S. foreign aid sanctions, Cuba is already ineligible for most U.S. assistance
because of other aid sanctions.
On May 21, 2008, the Senate passed S.Res. 573 (Martinez) by unanimous
consent, which recognized Cuba Solidarity Day and the struggle of the Cuban people.
On the same day, President Bush called for the Cuban government to take steps to
improve life for the Cuban people, including opening up access to the Internet. He
also announced that the United States would change U.S. regulations to allow
Americans to send mobile phones to family members in Cuba.
On May 19, 2008, Cuba accused the chief of the U.S. Interests Section in
Havana, Michael Parmly, of carrying mail to dissidents that contained private funds
from Santiago Alvarez, a Cuban American currently jailed in Miami on weapons
charges.
In April 2008, the Cuban government announced that it would be revamping the
state’s wage system by removing the limit that a state worker can earn. (See
“Economic Changes Under Raúl” below.)
In March 2008, the government announced the lifting of restrictions on the sale
of such electronic consumer products as microwaves, DVD and video players, and
on the sale and use of cell phones. It also began rolling out a reform of the
agricultural sector focusing on decentralization in order to boost production. The
government also lifted a ban on Cubans staying at tourist hotels.
On March 11, 2008, the State Department issued its 2007 report on human
rights practices in Cuba, maintaining that the Cuban “government continued to deny
its citizens their basic human rights and committed numerous, serious abuses.” See
the full report at [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100635.htm].
On March 7, 2008, President Bush asserted that in order to improve U.S.-Cuban
relations, Cuba “must release all political prisoners...have respect for human rights
in word and deed, and pave the way for free and fair elections.”
On March 5, 2008, the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held
a hearing on Cuba in the aftermath of Fidel Castro permanently stepping down from
power.
On February 24, 2008, Cuba’s legislature, the National Assembly of People’s
Power, selected Raúl Castro as President of the Council of State, a position that
makes him Cuba’s head of state and government. In a surprise move, the Assembly
also selected José Ramón Machado Venture as the Council’s First Vice-President,
making him the official successor to Raúl according to the Cuban Constitution. A
physician by training, Machado is 77 years old and part of the older generation of so-
called históricos, part of the 1959 Cuban revolution.
On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would not accept the
position of President of the Council of State when Cuba’s legislature meets on
February 24 to select from among its ranks the members of the 31-member Council
of State.
CRS-4
On February 16, 2008, Cuba released four political prisoners — union activist
Pedro Pablo Alvarez Ramos, human rights activist Omar Pernet Hernández, and
journalists Jose Gabriel Ramón Castillo and Alejandro González Raga — but sent
them into forced exile to Spain. The four had been imprisoned since March 2003.
On January 20, 2008, Cuba elected representatives to its 614-member
legislature, the National Assembly of People’s Power, and Fidel Castro was once
again among those elected. As in the past, voters were offered only a single slate of
candidates.
Political Conditions
On February 24, 2008, Cuba’s legislature selected Raúl Castro as President of
the 31-member Council of State, a position that officially made him Cuba’s head of
government and state. Most observers expected this since he already had been
heading the Cuban government on a provisional basis since July 2006 when his
brother Fidel Castro, Cuba’s long-ruling communist leader, stepped down as
President because of poor health.
For many years, Raúl, as First Vice President of the Council of State and the
Council of Ministers, had been the officially designated successor and was slated to
become chief of state with Fidel’s departure. Raúl also had served as Minister of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) since the beginning of the Cuban Revolution.
When Fidel stepped down from power in late July 2006 because of poor health, he
signed a proclamation that ceded political power to Raúl on a provisional basis,
including the positions of First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC),
Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and President of the
Council of State.
Despite the change in government in February 2008, Fidel still holds the official
title of First Secretary of the PCC. In late April 2008, Raúl announced that the
PCC’s sixth congress would be held in 2009 (the last was held in 1997). Some
observers speculate that Fidel Castro could officially be replaced as the head of the
party at that time, and it is likely that some of the PCC’s 25-member Political Bureau
(Politburo) will be replaced.
While it was not a surprise to observers for Raúl to succeed his brother Fidel as
head of government, the selection of José Ramón Machado Ventura as the Council
of State’s First Vice President was a surprise. A physician by training, Machado is
77 years old, and is part of the older generation of so-called históricos of the 1959
Cuban revolution. He has been described as a hard-line communist party ideologue,
and reportedly has been a close friend and confident of Raul’s for many years.1
Machado’s position is significant because it makes him the official successor to Raúl,
according to the Cuban Constitution. Many observers had expected that Carlos
Lage, one of five other Vice Presidents on the Council of State, would have been
1 Daniel Dombey, Richard Lapper, and Andrew Ward, “A Family Business, Cuban-
Americans Look Beyond the Havana Handover,” Financial Times, February 27, 2008.
CRS-5
chosen as First Vice President. He was responsible for Cuba’s economic reforms in
the 1990s, and at 56 years of age, represents a younger generation of Cuban leaders.
While not rising to First Vice President, Lage nevertheless retained his position as
a Vice President on the Council of State, and also will continue to serve as the
Council’s Secretary.
Several key military officers and confidants of Raúl also became members of
the Council, increasing the role of the military in the government. General Julio
Casas Regueiro, 72 years of age, who already was on the Council, became one of its
five vice presidents. Most significantly, Casas, who had been first vice minister in
the FAR, was selected by Raúl as the country’s new Minister of the FAR, officially
replacing Raúl in that position. Casas also is chairman of GAESA (Grupo de
Administracion Empresarial, S.A.), the Cuban military’s holding company for its
extensive businesses. Two other military appointments to the Council were Gen.
Alvaro López Miera, the army’s chief of staff, and Gen. Leopoldo Cintra Frías, who
commanded the Western army, one of Cuba’s three military regions.2
Since Fidel stepped down from power in 2006, Cuba’s political succession from
Fidel to Raúl Castro has been characterized by a remarkable degree of stability.
Although initially there were not any significant economic changes under Raúl, there
were signs that changes could be coming. In July 2007 speech, Raúl maintained that
structural changes were needed in the Cuban economy in order to increase efficiency
and production. In his first speech as President in February 2008, Raúl promised to
make the government smaller and more efficient, to review the potential reevaluation
of the Cuban peso, and to eliminate excessive bans and regulations that curb
productivity.3 Since March 2008, the government has implemented a number of
economic changes that from the outside might not seem significant, but are
significant policy changes for a government that has heretofore followed a centralized
communist economic model. (See “Economic Changes Under Raúl” below.)
While additional economic changes under Raúl Castro are likely over the next
year, few expect there will be any change to the government’s tight control over the
political system, which is backed up by a strong security apparatus. Some observers
point to the reduced number of political prisoners, from 283 at the end of 2006 to
around 230 today, as evidence of a lessening of repression, but dissidents maintain
that the overall situation has not improved. Some observers contend that as the new
government of Raúl Castro becomes more confident of ensuring social stability and
does not feel threatened, it could move to soften its hard repression, but for now the
government is continuing its harsh treatment of the opposition. The selection of José
Ramón Machado as First Vice President also appears to be a clear indication that the
Cuban government has no intention of easing tight control over the political system.
For background, also see CRS Report RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession:
From Fidel to Raúl Castro, and CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political
2 Pablo Bachelet, “New Cuban Leader Adds Military Loyalists to Team,” Miami Herald,
February 25, 2008.
3 “Cuba: Full Text of Raúl Castro’s National Assembly Address,” Cubavisión, Havana (as
translated by Open Source Center) February 24, 2008.
CRS-6
Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches, written in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s
stepping down because of poor health in 2006.
Background to the Succession
Until Fidel stepped down, he had ruled since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, which
ousted the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batista. In April 1961, Castro stated that
the Cuban Revolution was socialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself
to be a Marxist-Leninist. From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled by decree. A
Constitution was enacted in 1976 setting forth the PCC as the leading force in state
and society, with power centered in a Political Bureau headed by Fidel Castro. In
October 1997, the Cuban Communist Party held its 5th Congress (the prior one was
held in 1991) in which the party reaffirmed its commitment to a single party state and
reelected Fidel and Raúl Castro as the party’s first and second secretaries.
Cuba’s Constitution also outlines national, provincial, and local governmental
structures. Legislative authority is vested in a National Assembly of People’s Power
that meets twice annually for brief periods. When the Assembly is not in session, a
Council of State, elected by the Assembly, acts on its behalf. According to Cuba’s
Constitution, the President of the Council of State is the country’s head of state and
head of government. Executive power in Cuba is vested in a Council of Ministers,
also headed by the country’s head of state and government, i.e. the President of the
Council of State. From the promulgation of the 1976 Constitution until February 24,
2008, Fidel served as served as head of state and government through his position as
President of the Council of State.
Although National Assembly members were directly elected for the first time
in February 1993, only a single slate of candidates was offered. Direct elections for
the National Assembly were again held in January 1998 and January 2003, but voters
again were not offered a choice of candidates. In contrast, at the local level elections
for municipal elections are competitive, with from two to eight candidates. To be
elected, the candidate must receive more than half of the votes cast. As a result,
runoff elections between the two top candidates are common.
In 2007, the process of nominating candidates for the local municipal assemblies
took place in September 2007. Municipal elections were held October 21, 2007 (with
runoffs on October 28), and over 15,000 local officials were chosen. The new
municipal assemblies then met on December 2, 2007 to nominate candidates for
provincial assemblies and for the National Assembly of People’s Power.
National Assembly elections were held on January 20, 2008 (along with
elections for 1,201 delegates to 14 provincial assemblies), and Fidel Castro was once
again among the candidates elected to the now 614-member legislative body. As in
the past, voters were only offered a single slate of candidates.
On February 24, 2008, the new Assembly was scheduled to select from among
its ranks the members of the Council of State and its President. Many observers
speculated that because of his poor health, Fidel would choose not be re-elected as
President of the Council of State, which would officially confirm his departure from
heading the Cuban government. Statements from Castro himself in December 2007
CRS-7
hinted at his potential retirement. That proved true on February 19, 2008, when Fidel
announced that he would not accept the position as President of the Council of State,
essentially confirming his departure as titular head of the Cuban government.
Before Fidel stepped down from power in July 2006, observers discerned
several potential scenarios for Cuba’s future after Fidel. These fit into three broad
categories: the continuation of a communist government; a military government; or
a democratic transition or fully democratic government. According to most
observers, the most likely scenario, at least in the short term, was continued
leadership under Raúl. This was likely for a variety of reasons, but especially
because of Raúl’s designation by Fidel as successor in the party and his position as
leader of the FAR. The FAR has been in control of the government’s security
apparatus since 1989 and has played an increasing role in Cuba’s economy through
the ownership of numerous business enterprises. The scenario of a military-led
government was viewed by some observers as a possibility only if a successor
communist government failed because of divisiveness among leaders or political
instability. For many observers, the least likely scenario upon Fidel’s death or
departure was a democratic transition government. With a strong totalitarian security
apparatus, the Castro government successfully impeded the development of
independent civil society, with only a small and tightly regulated private sector, no
independent labor movement, and no unified political opposition.
Human Rights
Overview. Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government
sharply restricting freedoms of expression, association, assembly, movement, and
other basic rights. It has cracked down on dissent, arrested human rights activists and
independent journalists, and staged demonstrations against critics. Although some
anticipated a relaxation of the government’s oppressive tactics in the aftermath of the
Pope’s January 1998 visit, government attacks against human rights activists and
other dissidents have continued since that time. The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights maintains in its 2007 annual human rights report that the Cuban
government’s “restrictions on political rights, freedom of expression, and
dissemination of ideas have created, over a period of decades, a situation of
permanent and systematic violations of the fundamental rights of Cuban citizens.”4
According to the State Department’s human rights report for 2007, issued in
March 2008, the Cuban government continued to commit numerous serious abuses
during the year. Among the human rights problems cited in the State Department
report were arbitrary arrest and detention of human rights advocates and members of
independent professional organizations; harassment, beatings, and threats against
political opponents by government-recruited mobs, police, and state security
officials; beatings and abuse of detainees and prisoners (which led to the death of two
prisoners in 2007); denial of fair trial; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions,
including denial of medical care; and interference with privacy, including pervasive
4 Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Annual
Report of the IACHR 2007,” December 29, 2007, “Chapter IV, Cuba” available at
[http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2007eng/Chap.4b.htm].
CRS-8
monitoring of private communications. As noted in the report, the government
tightly controlled Internet access, with citizens only accessing it through government-
approved institutions or through a few Internet facilities offered by foreign
diplomatic offices. The government reviewed and censored e-mail, and forbade
attachments. (See the full State Department human rights report on Cuba, available
at [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100635.htm].)
The government conducted a severe crackdown on activists in March 2003 and
imprisoned 75 democracy activists, including independent journalists and librarians
and leaders of independent labor unions and opposition parties. At present, 55 of the
“group of 75” political prisoners remain incarcerated. The most recent release of the
group of 75 occurred on February 16, 2008, when Cuba released four political
prisoners — union activist Pedro Pablo Alvarez Ramos, human rights activist Omar
Pernet Hernández, and journalists Jose Gabriel Ramón Castillo and Alejandro
González Raga — but sent them into forced exile to Spain. Prior to that, Hector
Palacios was released for health reasons in December 2006.
In 2007, the government released several other political prisoners, including
prominent dissident René Gómez Manzano and two others in February, and Jorge
Luis García Pérez and six others in April. Incarcerated for 17 years, García Pérez
was one of Cuba’s longest serving political prisoners. In August 2007, two more
political prisoners were released after serving much of their sentences: Francisco
Chaviano Gonzalez, a leader of the dissident Cuban Civil Rights Council, was
released on medical parole after serving 13 of 15 years; Lazaro Gonzalez Adan was
released after serving three years in prison.
As of July 2008, the independent Cuban Commission on Human Rights and
National Reconciliation (CCDHRN) documented at least 219 political prisoners,
down from 234 in January 2008. This number reflects a decline from previous years
when the number of prisoners was at least 283 at the end of 2006 and 333 at the end
of 2005. The Commission maintains, however, that the real number of prisoners is
likely greater because of Cuba’s totalitarian regime that does not allow scrutiny of the
prison system.5
Despite the reduction in the number of prisoners, human rights activists
maintain that the overall situation has not improved. Cuban human rights activist
Elizardo Sánchez, the head of the CCDHRN, asserts that the government is still
repressing dissidents, with threats, police searches of people’s homes, interrogations,
and short detentions. Sánchez asserts that the police state is still in force in Cuba,
reflected in almost every aspect of national life.6 In late February 2008, Cuba signed
two U.N. human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
Some considered this a positive step, but others stressed that it remains to be seen
whether the Cuban government will take action to guarantee civil and political
5 Comisión Cubana de Derechos Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional, August 12, 2008
report.
6 Ibid; Isabel Sanchez, “Cuba’s Raúl Castro Marks 100 Days in Power,” Agence France-
Presse, June 2, 2008.
CRS-9
freedoms.7 One significant step taken by the government in late March 2008 was the
lifting of a ban on Cubans staying at tourist hotels. Although few Cubans will be
able to afford the cost of staying in such hotels, the move is symbolically significant
and ends the practices of what critics had dubbed “tourism apartheid.”
A human rights group known as the Ladies in White (Damas de Blanco) was
formed in April 2003 by the wives, mothers, daughters, sisters, and aunts of the
members of the “group of 75” dissidents arrested a month earlier in Cuba’s human
rights crackdown.8 The group conducts peaceful protests calling for the
unconditional release of political prisoners. Dressed in white, its members attend
Mass each Sunday at St. Rita’s church in Havana and then walk silently through the
streets to a nearby park. In October 2005, the group received the Sakharov Prize for
Freedom of Thought from the European Parliament. On April 21, 2008, ten members
of the Ladies in White were physically removed from a park near the Plaza of the
Revolution in Havana when they demanded the release of their husbands and the
other members of the “group of 75” still imprisoned.
In December 2006, independent Cuban journalist Guillermo Fariñas Hernández
received the 2006 Cyber Dissident award from the Paris-based Reporters Without
Borders. Fariñas went on a seven-month hunger strike in 2006, demanding broader
Internet access for Cubans.
In November 2007, President Bush awarded Cuban dissident Dr. Oscar Elias
Biscet with the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Biscet, who has spent most of the
last eight years in jail, was sentenced in 2003 to 25 years in prison. Legislation was
introduced in the 110th Congress in March 2008 — H.R. 5627 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln)
and S. 2777 (Martinez) — to award the congressional gold medal to Biscet.
Since late 2007, Cuban Internet blogger Yoaní Sánchez has received
considerable international attention for her website, Generación Y, that includes
commentary critical of the Cuban government. In May 2008, Sánchez was awarded
Spain’s Ortega y Gasset award for digital journalism, but the Cuban government did
not provide her with an exit permit to accept the award. (Sánchez’s website is
available at [http://www.desdecuba.com/generaciony/]).
Varela Project and the National Dialogue. Named for the 19th century
priest, Felix Varela, who advocated independence from Spain and the abolition of
slavery, the Varela Project has collected thousands of signatures supporting a national
plebiscite for political reform in accordance with a provision of the Cuban
Constitution. The referendum, if granted, would call for respect for human rights,
an amnesty for political prisoners, private enterprise, and changes to the country’s
7 James C. McKinley, Jr, “Cuban Signs Rights Pacts That It Long Had Fought,” New York
Times, March 1, 2008.
8 The website of the Damas de Blanco is available at [http://www.damasdeblanco.com/].
CRS-10
electoral law that would result in free and fair elections. The initiative is organized
by Oswaldo Payá, who heads the Christian Liberation Movement.9
In May 2002, organizers of the Varela Project submitted 11,020 signatures to
the National Assembly calling for a national referendum. This was more than the
10,000 required under Article 88 of the Cuban Constitution. Former President
Jimmy Carter noted the significance of the Varela Project in his May 14, 2002
address in Havana that was broadcast in Cuba. Carter noted that “when Cubans
exercise this freedom to change laws peacefully by a direct vote, the world will see
that Cubans, and not foreigners, will decide the future of this country.”10 In response
to the Varela Project, the Cuban government orchestrated its own referendum in late
June 2002 that ultimately led to the National Assembly amending the Constitution
to declare Cuba’s socialist system irrevocable. The Varela Project has persevered
despite the 2003 human rights crackdown, which included the arrest of 21 Project
activists. In October 2003, Oswaldo Payá delivered more than 14,000 signatures to
Cuba’s National Assembly, again requesting a referendum on democratic reforms.
Since December 2003, Payá has been involved in another project known as the
National Dialogue with the objective of getting Cubans involved in the process of
discussing and preparing for a democratic transition. According to Payá, thousands
of Cubans have met in dialogue groups to discuss a working document covering such
themes as: economic, political, and institutional changes; social issues; public health
and the environment; public order and the armed forces; media, science, and culture;
reconciliation; and reuniting with the exile community.11
Assembly to Promote Civil Society. Led by three prominent Cuban
human rights activists — Marta Beatriz Roque, René Gómez Manzano, and Felix
Bone — the Assembly to Promote Civil Society held two days of meetings in Havana
on May 20-21, 2005, with some 200 participants. The date was significant because
May 20 is Cuba’s independence day. Many observers had expected the government
to prevent or disrupt the proceedings. The Cuban government did prevent some
Cubans and foreigners from attending the conference, but overall the meeting was
dubbed by its organizers as the largest gathering of Cuban dissidents since the 1959
Cuban revolution.12 The Assembly issued a ten-point resolution laying out an agenda
for political and economic change in Cuba.13 Among its provisions, the resolution
called for the release of all political prisoners, demanded respect for human rights,
9 For further information, see the website of Oswaldo Payá, at [http://www.oswaldopaya.
org/es/].
10 “Text of Jimmy Carter’s Speech, Broadcast Live to Cuban People,” Associated Press,
May 15, 2002.
11 Oswaldo Payá, “Dissidents’ Goal: A National Dialogue,” Miami Herald, August 9, 2005.
12 Nancy San Martin, “‘A Triumph’ in Cuba as Dissidents Gather,” Miami Herald, May 21,
2005.
13 The full text of the resolution is available in Spanish from Cubanet: [http://www.cubanet.
org/ref/dis/052305.htm].
CRS-11
demanded the abolition of the death penalty, and endorsed a 1997 dissident document
on political and economic rights entitled the “Homeland Belongs to Us All.”14
Economic Conditions
With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced
severe economic deterioration from 1989-1993, with estimates of economic decline
ranging from 35-50%, but there has been considerable improvement since 1994.
From 1994-2000, as Cuba moved forward with some limited market-oriented
economic reforms, economic growth averaged 3.7% annually. From 2001-2006,
economic growth averaged almost 5%.
Economic growth has been strong over the past three years, registering an
impressive 9% in 2005 (despite widespread damage caused by Hurricanes Dennis
and Wilma), 12% in 2006, and 6.5% in 2007. The forecast for 2008 is 6.4%
growth.15 The economy has benefitted from the growth of the tourism, nickel, and
oil sectors, and support from Venezuela and China in terms of investment
commitments and credit lines. Cuba benefits from a preferential oil agreement with
Venezuela, which provides Cuba with more than 90,000 barrels of oil a day. Some
observers maintain that Venezuela’s oil subsidies amounted to more than $3 billion
a year 2006 and could increase to $4 billion in 2007.16 Venezuela also helped Cuba
upgrade an oil refinery in Cienfuegos, which was inaugurated in 2007. Two
problems facing the Cuban economy that could affect growth are the declining price
of nickel, which accounts for a major share of Cuba’s exports, and the rising cost of
food imports. The devastation wrought by Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008,
particularly in the agricultural sectors, could also affect economic growth.
Over the years, Cuba has expressed pride for the nation’s accomplishments in
health and education. In 2005, according to the U.N. Development Programs’s
2007/2008 Human Development Report, life expectancy in Cuba was 77.7 years,
adult literacy was estimated at almost 100%, and the infant mortality rate was 6 per
1,000 live births, the lowest rate in Latin America. For 2006 and 2007, Cuba has
boasted an infant mortality rate of 5.3.17
When Cuba’s economic slide began in 1989, the government showed little
willingness to adopt any significant market-oriented economic reforms, but in 1993,
faced with unprecedented economic decline, Cuba began to change policy direction.
Beginning in 1993, Cubans were allowed to own and use U.S. dollars and to shop at
dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists and diplomats. Self-employment was
authorized in more than 100 occupations in 1993, most in the service sector, and by
14 See the full text of “The Homeland Belongs to Us All” online at [http://www.cubanet.org/
CNews/y97/jul97/homdoc.htm].
15 “Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, July 2008.
16 Frances Robles, “Venezuelan Oil Subsidies to Cuba Balloon,” Miami Herald, August 2,
2007.
17 “Infant Mortality, .3 in 2007!” Granma Internacional, January 4, 2008.
CRS-12
1996 that figure had grown to more than 150 occupations. Also in 1993, the
government divided large state farms into smaller, more autonomous, agricultural
cooperatives (Basic Units of Cooperative Production, UBPCs). It opened agricultural
markets in 1994, where farmers could sell part of their produce on the open market,
and it also permitted artisan markets for the sale of handicrafts. In 1995, the
government allowed private food catering, including home restaurants (paladares),
in effect legalizing activities that were already taking place), and approved a new
foreign investment law that allows fully owned investments by foreigners in all
sectors of the economy with the exception of defense, health, and education. In 1996,
it authorized the establishment of free trade zones with tariff reductions typical of
such zones. In 1997, the government enacted legislation to reform the banking
system and established a new Central Bank (BCC) to operate as an autonomous and
independent entity.
After Cuba began to recover from its economic decline, the government began
to backtrack on some of its reform efforts. Regulations and new taxes made it
extremely difficult for many of the nation’s self-employed. Some home restaurants
were forced to close because of the regulations. In 2004, the Cuban government
limited the use of dollars by state companies for any services or products not
considered part of their core business. Some analysts viewed the measure as an effort
to turn back the clock on economic reform measures.18 Also in 2004, Fidel Castro
announced that U.S. dollars no longer would be used in entities that currently accept
dollars (such as stores, restaurants, and hotels). Instead, dollars had to be exchanged
for “convertible pesos,” with a 10% surcharge for the exchange. Dollar bank
accounts are still allowed, but Cubans are not able to deposit new dollars into the
accounts. Beginning in April 2005, convertible pesos were no longer on par with the
U.S. dollar, but instead were linked to a basket of foreign currencies. This reduced
the value of dollar remittances sent to Cuba and provides more hard currency to the
Cuban government.19
18 Larry Luxner, “New Decree Limits Dollar Transactions as Cuba Tightens Controls Once
Again,” CubaNews, April 2004.
19 Larry Luxner, “Cuba’s ‘Convertible Peso’ No Longer Linked to U.S. Dollar,” CubaNews,
April 2005, p. 3.
CRS-13
Economic Changes Under Raúl
When Raúl Castro assumed provisional power in July 2006, there was some
expectation that the government would be more open to economic policy changes,
and a debate about potential economic reforms re-emerged in Cuba. On July 26,
2007, in a speech commemorating Cuba’s revolutionary anniversary, Raúl Castro
acknowledged that Cuban salaries were insufficient to satisfy needs, and maintained
that structural changes were necessary in order to increase efficiency and production.
He also maintained that the government was considering increasing foreign
investment in the country. Some observers maintain that the speech was a forecast
for economic reforms under Raúl, while others stressed that only small marginal
changes had occurred in Raúl’s first year in power.20
In the aftermath of Raúl’s July 2007 speech, Cuban public expectations for
economic reform increased. Thousands of officially sanctioned meetings were held
in workplaces and local PCC branches around the country where Cubans were
encouraged to air their views and discuss the future direction of the country.
Complaints focused on low salaries and housing and transportation problems, and
some participants advocated legalization of more private businesses.21 Raised
expectations for economic change in Cuba increased the chance that government
actually would adopt some policy changes. Doing nothing would run the risk of
increased public frustration and a potential for social unrest. Increased public
frustration was in evident in a clandestine video, widely circulated on the Internet in
early February 2008, of a meeting between Ricardo Alarcón, the head of Cuba’s
legislature, and university students in which a student was questioning why Cuban
wages are so low and why Cubans are prohibited from visiting tourist hotels (a policy
subsequently changed in late March 2008) or traveling abroad. The video
demonstrated the disillusionment of many Cuban youth with the poor economic
situation and repressive environment in Cuba.
Since Raúl Castro officially assumed the presidency in February 2008, his
government has announced a series of economic changes. In his first speech as
President in February 2008, Raúl promised to make the government smaller and more
efficient, to review the potential reevaluation of the Cuban peso, and to eliminate
excessive bans and regulations that curb productivity.22 In mid-March, the
government announced that restrictions on the sales of consumer products such as
computers, microwaves, and DVD and video players would be lifted. In late March,
it announced that it would lift restrictions on the use of cell phones, and this officially
occurred in mid-April.
One of Cuba’s major reform efforts under Raúl Castro in 2008 is focused on the
agriculture sector, a vital issue because Cuba reportedly imports some 80% of its
20 Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Cuba’s Call for Economic Detente,” Washington Post, July 27,
2007.
21 Frances Robles, “Cubans Urged to Vent Views,” Miami Herald, October 2, 2007.
22 “Cuba: Full Text of Raúl Castro’s National Assembly Address,” Cubavisión, Havana (as
translated by Open Source Center) February 24, 2008.
CRS-14
food needs and is paying an increasing amount for such imports because of rising
food prices. In an effort to boost food production, the government is giving farmers
more discretion over how to use their land and what supplies to buy. Decision-
making on agriculture reportedly has been shifted from the national government to
the local municipal level, with government bureaucracy reportedly cut significantly.23
In April 2008, the government announced that it would be revamping the state’s
wage system by removing the limit that a state worker can earn. This an effort to
boost productivity and to deal with one of Cuba’s major economic problems: how to
raise wages to a level where basic human needs can be satisfied. Cuban state
companies reportedly have until August to revise their salary structures in order to
reward workers who work hard with more compensation.24 The problem of low
wages in Cuba is closely related to another major economic problem: how to unify
the two official currencies circulating in the country — the Cuban convertible peso
(CUC) and the Cuban peso, which trades for about 25 to 1 CUC. Most people are
paid in Cuban pesos, and the minimum monthly wage in Cuba is about 225 pesos
(about $9 U.S. dollars25), but for increasing amounts of consumer goods, convertible
pesos are used. Cubans with access to foreign remittances or work in jobs that give
them access to convertible pesos are far better off than those Cuban who do not have
such access.
Looking ahead, several factors could restrain the magnitude of economic policy
change in Cuba. A number of observers believe that as long as Fidel Castro is
around, it will be difficult for the government to move forward with any major
initiatives that are viewed as deviating from Fidel’s orthodox policies. Other
observers point to the significant oil subsidies and investment that Cuba now receives
from Venezuela that have helped spur Cuba’s high economic growth levels over the
past several years and maintain that such support lessens the government’s impetus
for economic reforms. Another factor that bodes against rapid economic policy
reform is the fear that it could spur the momentum for political change. Given that
one of the highest priorities for Cuba’s government has been maintaining social and
political stability, any economic policy changes are likely to be smaller changes
introduced over time that do not threaten the state’s control.
There was some expectation that Raúl Castro would announce additional
economic reforms in his July 26, 2008 speech on Cuba’s revolutionary anniversary,
but there were no such announcements. Instead, Castro acknowledged the “large
number of problems that still need to be resolved, the majority of which directly
affect the population.”26 Nevertheless, in an address earlier in the month to the
23 Marc Frank, “Raúl Castro Overhauls Cuba’s Farm Bureaucracy,” Reuters News, May 1,
2008.
24 Frances Robles, “Cubans Who Work More Will Get Higher Salaries,” Miami Herald,
June 12, 2008.
25 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007, Cuba,”
March 11, 2008.
26 “Cuba: Raúl Castro’s 26 July Rebellion Day Speech,” Havana Cubavisión (Open Source
(continued...)
CRS-15
National Assembly, Raúl again pointed to the goal of increasing salaries based on job
performance. According to Castro: “Socialism means social justice and equality, but
equality of rights and opportunities, not salaries. Equality does not mean
egalitarianism.”27
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro
began to build a repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward
close relations with the Soviet Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-
Cuban relationship is illustrated by such events and actions as U.S. covert operations
to overthrow the Castro government culminating in the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of
Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United States confronted
the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba; Cuban
support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments
in Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans
to the United States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than
30,000 Cubans who were interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo and
Panama; and the February 1996 shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian
planes operated by the Cuban American group, Brothers to the Rescue, which
resulted in the death of four U.S. crew members.
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating
the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo
on trade and financial transactions. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR),
first issued by the Treasury Department in July 1963, lay out a comprehensive set of
economic sanctions against Cuba, including a prohibition on most financial
transactions with Cuba and a freeze of Cuban government assets in the United States.
The CACR have been amended many times over the years to reflect changes in
policy, and remain in force today.
These sanctions were made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of
1992 (P.L.102-484, Title XVII) and with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114), the latter often referred to as the Helms/Burton
legislation. The CDA prohibits U.S. subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba
and prohibits entry into the United States for any vessel to load or unload freight if
it has engaged in trade with Cuba within the last 180 days. The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act, enacted in the aftermath of Cuba’s shooting down of two
U.S. civilian planes in February 1996, combines a variety of measures to increase
pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba once it begins the transition
to democracy. Most significantly, the law codified the Cuban embargo, including all
restrictions under the CACR. This provision is especially noteworthy because of its
26 (...continued)
Center), July 26, 2006.
27 “Cuba: Text of Raúl Castro’s 11 July National Assembly Speech,” Havana Cubavisión
(Open Source Center), July 11, 2008.
CRS-16
long-lasting effect on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. The executive branch is
circumscribed in lifting or substantially loosening the economic embargo without
congressional concurrence until certain democratic conditions are met. Another
significant sanction in the law is a provision in Title III that holds any person or
government that traffics in U.S. property confiscated by the Cuban government liable
for monetary damages in U.S. federal court. Acting under provisions of the law,
however, both President Clinton and President Bush have suspended the
implementation of Title III at six-month intervals.
In addition to sanctions, another component of U.S. policy, a so-called second
track, consists of support measures for the Cuban people. This includes U.S. private
humanitarian donations, medical exports to Cuba under the terms of the Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992, U.S. government support for democracy-building efforts,
and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. In addition, the 106th
Congress approved the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for agricultural exports to Cuba, albeit with
restrictions on financing such exports.
The Clinton Administration made several changes to U.S. policy in the
aftermath of the Pope’s January 1998 visit to Cuba, which were intended to bolster
U.S. support for the Cuban people. These included the resumption of direct flights
to Cuba (which had been curtailed after the February 1996 shootdown of two U.S.
civilian planes), the resumption of cash remittances by U.S. nationals and residents
for the support of close relatives in Cuba (which had been curtailed in August 1994
in response to the migration crisis with Cuba), and the streamlining of procedures for
the commercial sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba. In
January 1999, President Clinton announced several additional measures to support
the Cuban people. These included a broadening of cash remittances to Cuba, so that
all U.S. residents (not just those with close relatives in Cuba) could send remittances
to Cuba; an expansion of direct passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional
U.S. cities other than Miami (direct flights later in the year began from Los Angeles
and New York); and an expansion of people-to-people contact by loosening
restrictions on travel to Cuba for certain categories of travelers, such as professional
researchers and those involved in a wide range of educational, religious, and sports
activities.
Bush Administration Policy
The Bush Administration essentially has continued the two-track U.S. policy of
isolating Cuba through economic sanctions while supporting the Cuban people
through a variety of measures. However, within this policy framework, the
Administration has emphasized stronger enforcement of economic sanctions and has
further tightened restrictions on travel, remittances, and humanitarian gift parcels to
Cuba. There was considerable reaction to the Administration’s June 2004 tightening
of restrictions for family visits and to the Administration’s February 2005 tightening
of restrictions on payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba.
May 2004 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report. In May
2004, President Bush endorsed the recommendations of a report issued by the inter-
agency Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, chaired by then-Secretary of State
CRS-17
Colin Powell. The Commission made recommendations for immediate measures to
“hasten the end of Cuba’s dictatorship” as well as longer-term recommendations to
help plan for Cuba’s transition from communism to democracy in various areas. The
President directed that up to $59 million be committed to implement key
recommendations of the Commission, including support for democracy-building
activities and for airborne broadcasts of Radio and TV Marti to Cuba. The report’s
most significant recommendations included a number of measures to tighten
economic sanctions on family visits and other categories of travel and on private
humanitarian assistance in the form of remittances and gift parcels. Subsequent
regulations issued by the Treasury and Commerce Departments in June 2004
implemented these new sanctions. (The full Commission report is on the State
Department website at [http://www.state. gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/2004/].)
In 2005, the Administration continued to tighten U.S. economic sanctions
against Cuba by further restricting the process of how U.S. agricultural exporters may
be paid for their sales. In July 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice appointed
Caleb McCarry as the State Department’s new Cuba Transition Coordinator to direct
U.S. government “actions in support of a free Cuba.” Secretary Rice reconvened the
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba in December 2005 to identify additional
measures to help Cubans hasten the transition to democracy and to develop a plan to
help the Cuban people move toward free and fair elections.
July 2006 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report. In July
2006, the inter-agency Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba issued its second
report making recommendations to hasten political change in Cuba toward a
democratic transition. The full report is available at [http://www.cafc.gov/rpt/].
The Commission called for the United States to provide $80 million over two
years for the following: to support Cuban civil society ($31 million); to fund
education programs and exchanges, including university training in Cuba provided
by third countries and scholarships for economically disadvantaged students from
Cuba at U.S. and third country universities ($10 million); to fund additional efforts
to break the Cuban government’s information blockade and expand access to
independent information, including through the Internet ($24 million); and to support
international efforts at strengthening civil society and transition planning ($15
million). According to the Cuba Transition Coordinator, this assistance would be
additional funding beyond what the Administration is already currently budgeting for
these programs.28 Thereafter, the Commission recommended funding of not less than
$20 million annually for Cuba democracy programs “until the dictatorship ceases to
exist.” This would roughly double the amount currently spent on Cuba democracy
programs.
The report also set forth detailed plans of how the U.S. government, along with
the international community and the Cuban community abroad, could provide
assistance to a Cuban transition government to help it respond to critical
humanitarian and social needs, to conduct free and fair elections, and to move
28 U.S. Department of State, Second Report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free
Cuba, Briefing, July 10, 2006.
CRS-18
toward a market-based economy. The report also outlined a series of preparatory
steps that the U.S. government could take now, before Cuba’s transition begins, so
that it will be well prepared in the event that assistance is requested by the new
Cuban government. These included steps in the areas of government organization,
electoral preparation, and anticipating humanitarian and social needs.
The Commission report received a mixed response from Cuba’s dissident
community. Although some dissidents, like former political prisoner Vladimiro
Roca, maintain that they would welcome any U.S. assistance that helps support the
Cuban dissident movement, others expressed concerns about the report. Dissident
economist and former political prisoner Oscar Espinosa Chepe stressed that Cubans
have to be the ones to solve their own problems. According to Chepe, “We are
thankful for the solidarity we have received from North America, Europe, and
elsewhere, but we request that they do not meddle in our country.”29 Miriam Leiva,
a founding member of the Ladies in White, a human rights organization, expressed
concern that the report could serve as a rationale for the government to imprison
dissidents.30 Leiva also faulted the Commission’s report for presuming what a Cuban
transition must be before U.S. recognition or assistance can be provided. According
to Leiva, “Only we Cubans, of our own volition ... can decide issues of such singular
importance. Cubans on the island have sufficient intellectual ability to tackle a
difficult, peaceful transition and reconcile with other Cubans here and abroad.”31
U.S. Reaction to Fidel’s Ceding of Power. In response to Fidel Castro’s
announcement that he was temporarily ceding power to his brother Raúl, President
Bush issued a statement on August 3, 2006, that “the United States is absolutely
committed to supporting the Cuban people’s aspiration for democracy and freedom.”
The President urged “the Cuban people to work for democratic change” and pledged
U.S. support to the Cuban people in their effort to build a transitional government in
Cuba. U.S. officials indicated that there are no plans for the United States to “reach
out” to the new leader. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated U.S. support
for the Cuban people in an August 4, 2006, statement broadcast on Radio and TV
Marti. According to Secretary Rice, “All Cubans who desire peaceful democratic
change can count on the support of the United States.”32
Although there was some U.S. concern that political change in Cuba could
prompt a migration crisis, there was no unusual traffic after Castro ceded provisional
power to his brother. The U.S. Coast Guard had plans to respond to such a migration
crisis, with support from the Navy if needed. In her August 4, 2006, message to the
Cuban people, Secretary of State Rice encouraged “the Cuban people to work at
home for positive change.” Department of Homeland Security officials also
29 Nicholas Kralev, “Bush OKs Initiative to Support Opposition,” Washington Times, July
11, 2006.
30 Frances Robles and Pablo Bachelet, “Plan for Change in Cuba Gets OK,” Miami Herald,
July 11, 2006.
31 Miriam Leiva, “We Cubans Must Decide,” Miami Herald, July 15, 2006.
32 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice Message to the People
of Cuba,” August 4, 2006.
CRS-19
announced several measures to discourage Cubans from risking their lives on the
open seas. U.S. officials also discouraged those in the Cuban American community
wanting to travel by boat to Cuba to speed political change in Cuba. (For more, see
“Migration Issues” below.)
Raúl Castro asserted in an August 18, 2006, published interview that Cuba has
“always been disposed to normalize relations on an equal plane,” but at the same time
he expressed strong opposition to current U.S. policy toward Cuba, which he
described as “arrogant and interventionist.”33 In response, Assistant Secretary of
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon reiterated a U.S. offer to
Cuba, first articulated by President Bush in May 2002, that the Administration was
willing to work with Congress to lift U.S. economic sanctions if Cuba were to begin
a political opening and a transition to democracy. According to Shannon, the Bush
Administration remains prepared to work with Congress for ways to lift the embargo
if Cuba is prepared to free political prisoners, respect human rights, permit the
creation of independent organizations, and create a mechanism and pathway toward
free and fair elections.34
In a December 2, 2006 speech, Raúl reiterated an offer to negotiate with the
United States. He said that “we are willing to resolve at the negotiating table the
longstanding dispute between the United States and Cuba, of course, provided they
accept, as we have previously said, our condition as a country that will not tolerate
any blemishes on its independence, and as long as said resolution is based on the
principles of equality, reciprocity, non-interference, and mutual respect.”35
On July 26, 2007, in a speech on Cuba’s revolutionary anniversary
(commemorating the 1953 attack on the Moncada military barracks), Raúl Castro
reiterated for the third time an offer to engage in dialogue with the United States, and
strongly criticized U.S. trade and economic sanctions on Cuba. A U.S. State
Department spokesman responded that “the only real dialogue that’s needed is with
the Cuban people.”36
In the aftermath of Fidel’s ceding of power to his brother, the Bush
Administration established five interagency working groups to manage U.S. policy
toward Cuba. The State Department led working groups on diplomatic actions, to
build international support for U.S. policies; strategic communications, to ensure that
Cubans understand U.S. government positions; and democratic promotion. The
Commerce Department led a working group on humanitarian aid, in the event that
a democratic transition government requests assistance. The Department of
Homeland Security and the National Security Council headed a working group on
33 “No Enemy Can Defeat Us,” interview of Raúl Castro by Laszar Barredo Medina, Diario
Granma, August 18, 2006.
34 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy Toward Cuba,” Thomas Shannon, Assistant
Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, August 23, 2006.
35 “English Transcript of Raul Castro’s Speech,” Miami Herald, December 2, 2006.
36 Frances Robles, “Raúl Again Offers ‘Olive Branch’ to U.S.,” Miami Herald, July 27,
2007; “U.S. Government Rejects Dialogue with Cuba,” EFE, July 27, 2007,
CRS-20
migration.37 In addition to these working groups, in August 2006, then-U.S. Director
of National Intelligence John Negroponte announced the establishment of the
position of Mission Manager for Cuba and Venezuela responsible for integrating
collection and analysis on the two countries across the Intelligence Community.
In September 2007, President Bush and other key Administration officials made
several statements on Cuba. In a speech before the U.N. General Assembly on
September 25, President Bush stated that “the long rule of a cruel dictator is nearing
its end,” and called on the United Nations to insist on free speech, free assembly, and
free elections as Cuba “enters a period of transition.”38 U.S. Commerce Secretary
Carlos Gutierrez stated in a speech on September 17 that “unless the regime changes,
our policy will not,” but indicated that the United States is “prepared to respond to
genuine democratic change in Cuba.”39 In a speech on September 20, Assistant
Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon contended that
“there is a quiet consensus in the Americas and in Europe that Cuba’s future must be
democratic.” He maintained that there are differences about “how to promote Cuba’s
democratic future” and pointed out how “Latin America’s historic commitment to the
principles of non-intervention and national sovereignty shape how many in the region
are prepared to engage with Cuba.” He maintained, however, that “helping the
Cuban people achieve their democratic destiny and re-integrate into the Americas
will be one of the biggest diplomatic challenges we face.”40
October 2007 Policy Speech.41 On October 24, 2007, President Bush made
a policy speech on Cuba that reflected a continuation of the sanctions-based approach
toward Cuba. According to the President: “As long as the [Cuban] regime maintains
its monopoly over the political and economic life of the Cuban people, the United
States will keep the embargo in place.”
The President also proposed three new initiatives to provide support to the
Cuban people. First, the President proposed allowing licensed non-governmental
organizations and faith-based groups to provide computers and Internet access to the
Cuban people if the Cuban government ends restrictions on public Internet access.
Second, the President proposed inviting Cuban youths whose families suffer
oppression to participate in the Partnership for Latin American Youth scholarship
programs if the Cuban government allows them to participate. Third, the President
announced a new effort to develop an international multi-billion dollar Freedom
37 Pablo Bachelet, “U.S. Creates Five Groups to Eye Cuba,” Miami Herald, September 13,
2006.
38 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “President Bush Addresses the United
Nations General Assembly,” September 25, 2007.
39 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Commerce Secretary Carlos M. Gutierrez Remarks at
the Heritage Foundation,” September 17, 2007.
40 U.S. Department of State, Thomas A. Shannon, Assistant Secretary for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, “The Americas: Dynamic Change in the 21st Century,” September 20,
2007.
41 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “President Bush Discusses Cuba Policy,”
October 24, 2007.
CRS-21
Fund for Cuba to help the Cuban people rebuild their economy and make the
transition to democracy. The effort would be led by Secretary of State Rice and
Secretary of Commerce Gutierrez and involve enlisting foreign governments and
international organizations to contribute to the initiative. According to the President,
monies from the fund would be available if the Cuban government demonstrates that
it has adopted, in word and in deed, fundamental freedoms, including freedom of
speech, freedom of association, freedom of press, freedom to form political parties,
and freedom to change the government through periodic, multi-party elections.
In the speech, President Bush also sent a message to Cuban military, police, and
government officials that “when Cubans rise up to demand their liberty,” they have
a choice to embrace the Cuban people’s desire for change or “defend a disgraced and
dying order by using force.” The President conveyed to these officials that “there
is a place for you in a free Cuba.”
The President also lauded the countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland as being vital sources of support and encouragement to Cuba’s democratic
opposition. He called on other nations to make tangible efforts to show public
support for the dissidents, by opening up their embassies in Havana to pro-democracy
leaders, use the lobbies of their embassies to give Cubans access to the Internet and
books and magazines, and encourage their country’s non-governmental organizations
to reach out directly to Cuba’s independent civil society.
U.S. Response to Raúl’s Official Selection as President. In the
aftermath of Fidel Castro’s February 19, 2008 announcement that he was officially
stepping down as head of state, President Bush maintained that he viewed “this as a
period of transition and it should be the beginning of a democratic transition in
Cuba.” State Department officials made clear that U.S. policy would not change. On
February 24, 2008, the day that Raúl Castro officially became Cuba’s head of state,
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a statement urging “the Cuban
government to begin a process of peaceful, democratic change by releasing all
political prisoners, respecting human rights, and creating a clear pathway towards
free and fair elections.”
In remarks on Cuba policy in early March 2008, President Bush maintained that
in order to improve U.S.-Cuban relations, “what needs to change is not the United
States; what needs to change is Cuba.” The President asserted that Cuba “must
release all political prisoners ... have respect for human rights in word and deed, and
pave the way for free and fair elections.”42 He reiterated these words again in a
speech to the Council of the Americas on May 7, 2008.43 On May 21, 2008,
President Bush called for the Cuban government to take steps to improve life for the
Cuban people, including opening up access to the Internet. He also announced that
42 White House, “President Bush Delivers Remarks on Cuba,” March 7, 2008.
43 “Text of Bush Speech to Council of the Americas,” Miami Herald, May 9, 2008.
CRS-22
the United States would change regulations to allow Americans to send mobile
phones to family members in Cuba.44
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations
Debate on the Overall Direction of U.S. Policy
Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall
objectives of U.S. policy toward Cuba — to help bring democracy and respect for
human rights to the island — there have been several schools of thought about how
to achieve those objectives. Some advocate a policy of keeping maximum pressure
on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuing current U.S.
efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes
referred to as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they
believe are hurting the Cuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue.
Still others call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S.
embargo.
Fidel Castro’s initially provisional, and now permanent, departure as head of
government could eventually foster a re-examination of U.S. policy. In this new
context, there are two broad policy approaches to contend with political change in
Cuba: a status-quo approach that would maintain the U.S. dual-track policy of
isolating the Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban people; and
an approach aimed at influencing the Cuban government and Cuban society through
increased contact and engagement. (For additional information, see CRS Report
RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raúl Castro. Also see CRS
Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches,
written in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s stepping down from power in July 2006.)
In general, those who advocate easing U.S. sanctions on Cuba make several
policy arguments. They assert that if the United States moderated its policy toward
Cuba — through increased travel, trade, and diplomatic dialogue — then the seeds
of reform would be planted, which would stimulate and strengthen forces for
peaceful change on the island. They stress the importance to the United States of
avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a mass exodus to the United
States and the potential of involving the United States in a civil war scenario. They
argue that since the demise of Cuba’s does not appear imminent, even without Fidel
Castro at the helm, the United States should espouse a more pragmatic approach in
trying to induce change in Cuba. Supporters of changing policy also point to broad
international support for lifting the U.S. embargo, to the missed opportunities for
U.S. businesses because of the unilateral nature of the embargo, and to the increased
suffering of the Cuban people because of the embargo. Proponents of change also
argue that the United States should be consistent in its policies with the world’s few
remaining communist governments, including China or Vietnam, and also maintain
that moderating policy will help advance human rights.
44 While House, “President Bush Discusses Cuba, Marks Day of Solidarity,” May 21, 2008.
CRS-23
On the other side, opponents of changing U.S. policy maintain that the current
two-track policy of isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through
measures of support, is the best means for realizing political change in Cuba. They
point out that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 sets forth the
steps that Cuba needs to take in order for the United States to normalize relations.
They argue that softening U.S. policy at this time without concrete Cuban reforms
would boost the Castro regime, politically and economically, and facilitate the
survival of the communist regime. Opponents of softening U.S. policy argue that the
United States should stay the course in its commitment to democracy and human
rights in Cuba, and that sustained sanctions can work. Opponents of loosening U.S.
sanctions further argue that Cuba’s failed economic policies, not the U.S. embargo,
are the causes of Cuba’s difficult living conditions.
Aftermath of 2008 Hurricanes and Tropical Storms
From mid-August through early September 2008, two hurricanes and two
tropical storms caused widespread damage throughout Cuba. Tropical Storm Fay
passed through central Cuba on August 18, causing severe flooding. On August 31,
Hurricane Gustav struck the tobacco-growing province of Piñar del Río in western
Cuba and the Isle of Youth. Tropical Storm Hanna, which did not strike Cuba
directly, caused flooding in eastern Cuba in early September. Hurricane Ike made
landfall in eastern Cuba on September 7 as a Category Four hurricane and severely
affected both the eastern and western parts of the island, but especially the provinces
of Holguin, Camaguey, and Las Tunas in the eastern part of the island. The two
hurricanes caused most of the damage. Overall, just 7 people were killed, but the
hurricanes severely affected the housing sector (with almost 500,000 homes damaged
and over 63,000 destroyed), the power grid, and the agricultural sector. Some
200,000 Cubans are reportedly without shelters, and damages are estimated to
amount to $5 billion.45
The U.S. Chief of Mission at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Jonathan
Farrar, issued a disaster declaration for Cuba on September 3, 2008, and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) approved the release of $100,000
in emergency relief funds to nongovernmental organizations in Cuba in response to
Hurricane Gustav.46 On September 12, in response to Hurricane Ike, the U.S.
government provided another $100,000 in cash assistance to relief organizations on
the ground in Cuba. The State Department maintains that the United States offered
to send a humanitarian assessment team to Cuba to determine additional assistance
needs, but that the Cuban government rejected the offer. U.S. officials subsequently
offered a $5 million aid package for disaster relief for Cuba on September 13 that
was also rejected by the Cuban government. USAID Administrator Henrietta Fore
reportedly maintained that $2 million in plastic sheeting, hygiene kits, and other relief
items would have been provided directly to the Cuban government, but that about $3
45 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Situation Report 17
– Caribbean Hurricane Season,” September 22, 2008.
46 USAID, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), Office
of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), “Latin America and the Caribbean – Hurricane
Season 2008, Fact Sheet #3, FY2008,” September 10, 2008.
CRS-24
million in cash would still be provided through NGOs.47 The State Department made
a new offer to Cuba on September 19 to supply some $6.3 million in corrugated zinc
roofs, nails, tools, lumber, sheeting, and light shelter kits that would help some
48,000 people, but the Cuban government has not responded.48
In addition, according to the State Department, the U.S. government has
increased authorizations for U.S.-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
provide larger amounts of assistance to Cuba in the aftermath of the hurricanes,
including expedited authorization over 90 days for up to $10 million per NGO.49
In response to the U.S. offer to send a disaster assessment team, the Cuban
government maintained that it already had a sufficient number of well-trained experts
in Cuba, and noted that other countries worldwide were sending humanitarian aid
without inspecting the affected areas. Instead, Cuba asked the United States to allow
U.S. companies 1) to sell needed relief supplies to Cuba for the repair of housing and
electrical networks; and 2) to grant private commercial credit to Cuba in order to buy
food in the United States.50 In response to the U.S. offer to send $2 million in
supplies to the Cuban government, the Cuban Interests Section in Washington again
called for the United States to allow U.S. companies to sell relief supplies to Cuba,
if not on a permanent basis, then at least for the next six months.51
Legislative Initiatives. In the aftermath of the hurricanes, a number of
observers, including some Members of Congress, have called for the temporary
relaxation of restrictions on family travel and remittances (limited to $300 per
quarter) as well as on the provision of gift parcels52 to Cuba. Some observers also
have called for temporary changes to the U.S. embargo regulations to allow for
unrestricted U.S. cash sales to Cuba of food and medicines, farm machinery or
equipment, and relief supplies, including building materials and electrical supplies.
On September 5, 2008, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Howard
47 Frances Robles, “Cuba Rejects U.S. Supplies, Asks for Suspension of Trade Embargo,”
Miami Herald, September 16, 2008.
48 Frances Robles, “U.S. Offers $6.3M in Construction Materials to Cuba,” Miami Herald,
September 22, 2008; Joshua Partlow, “Hurricanes Shift Debate on Embargo Against Cuba,”
Washington Post, September 24, 2008.
49 U.S. Department of State, “Humanitarian Assistance to the Cuban People Following
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike,” September 15, 2008.
50 Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Cuba Asks Washington to Lift Commercial
Restrictions,” September 11, 2008; and “Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,”
September 6, 2008.
51 Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Urges Cuba to Accept Aid; Storm Relief Would Be Sent Directly
to Havana Government,” Washington Post, September 16, 2008.
52 In June 2004, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
published changes to the Export Administration Regulations that placed new limits on gift
parcels sent to Cuba. This included prohibiting the inclusion of previously-allowed items
such as seeds, clothing, personal hygiene items, veterinary medicines and supplies, fishing
equipment and supplies, and soap-making equipment. (Federal Register, June 22, 2004, pp.
34565-34567)
CRS-25
Berman asked President Bush to suspend for 90 days restrictions on family visits,
remittances, and gift parcels.
Several legislative initiatives have been introduced that would temporarily ease
U.S. embargo restrictions in several areas. On September 15, 2008, Senator Dodd
offered S.Amdt. 5581 to the Department of Defense authorization bill (S. 3001) that
would have, for a 180-day period: allowed unrestricted family travel; eased
restrictions on remittances by removing the limit and allowing any American to send
remittances to Cuba; expanded the list of allowable items that may be included in gift
parcels; and allowed for unrestricted U.S. cash sales of food, medicines, and relief
supplies to Cuba. The amendment was not considered, and therefore not part of the
final bill.
In the House, two legislative initiatives were introduced. On September 16,
2008, Representative Flake introduced H.R. 6913, which would any prohibit funds
from going to the Department of Commerce to implement, administer, or enforce
tightened restrictions on the contents of gift parcels to Cuba that were introduced in
June 2004. On September 18, 2008, Representative Delahunt introduced H.R. 6962,
the Humanitarian Relief to Cuba Act, which would for a 180-day period: allow
unrestricted family travel; ease restrictions on remittances by removing the limit and
allowing any American to send remittances to Cuba; and expand the list of allowable
items that may be included in gift parcels.
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances
Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component
of U.S. efforts to isolate the communist government of Fidel Castro for much of the
past 40 years. Over time there have been numerous changes to the restrictions and
for five years, from 1977 until 1982, there were no restrictions on travel. Restrictions
on travel and remittances to Cuba are part of the CACR, the overall embargo
regulations administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC).
Major arguments made for lifting the Cuba travel ban are that it contributes to
the suffering of Cuban families; it hinders efforts to influence conditions in Cuba and
may be aiding Castro by helping restrict the flow of information; it abridges the rights
of ordinary Americans; and Americans can travel to other countries with communist
or authoritarian governments. Major arguments in opposition to lifting the Cuba
travel ban are that more American travel would support Castro’s rule by providing
his government with potentially millions of dollars in hard currency; that there are
legal provisions allowing travel to Cuba for humanitarian purposes that are used by
thousands of Americans each year; and that the President should be free to restrict
travel for foreign policy reasons.
Under the current Bush Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on
Cuba travel has increased, and restrictions on travel and on private remittances to
Cuba have been tightened. In March 2003, the Administration eliminated travel for
people-to-people educational exchanges unrelated to academic course work. In June
2004, the Administration significantly restricted travel, especially family travel, and
the provision of private humanitarian assistance to Cuba in the form of remittances
CRS-26
and gift parcels. In April 2005, OFAC cracked down on certain religious
organizations promoting licensed travel to Cuba and warned them not to abuse their
license by taking individuals not affiliated with their organizations. OFAC’s actions
were prompted by reports that groups practicing the Afro-Cuban religion Santería
had been taking large groups to Cuba as a means of skirting U.S. travel restrictions.53
In 2006, the Administration suspended the licenses of several travel service
providers, including one of the largest such providers in Florida, La Estrella de Cuba.
Several religious organizations also had their licenses suspended, and church groups
and several Members of Congress expressed concern about more restrictive licenses
for religious travel.54
Among the June 2004 restrictions that remain in place are the following:
! Family visits were restricted to one trip every three years under a
specific license and are restricted to immediate family members,
with no exceptions. Under previous regulations, family visits could
occur once a year under a general license, with travel more than once
a year allowed, but under a specific license. Previously travel had
been allowed to visit relatives to within three degrees of relationship
to the traveler.
! Cash remittances, estimates of which range from $400 million to
$800 million, were further restricted. Quarterly remittances of $300
may still be sent, but are now restricted to members of the remitter’s
immediate family and may not be remitted to certain government
officials and certain members of the Cuban Communist Party. The
regulations were also changed to reduce the amount of remittances
that authorized travelers may carry to Cuba, from $3000 to $300.
! Gift parcels were limited to immediate family members and were
denied to certain Cuban officials and certain members of the Cuban
Communist Party. The contents of gift parcels may no longer
include seeds, clothing, personal hygiene items, veterinary medicines
and supplies, fishing equipment and supplies, or soap-making
equipment.
! The authorized per diem allowed for a family visit was reduced from
the State Department per diem rate (currently $179 per day for
Havana) to $50 per day.
! With the exception of informational materials, licensed travelers
may not purchase or otherwise acquire merchandise and bring it
back into the United States. Previous regulations allowed visitors to
Cuba to import $100 worth of goods as accompanied baggage.
53 Oscar Corral, “Is Santería Used as Ploy to Skirt Travel Rules?,” Miami Herald, February
27, 2005
54 Oscar Corral, “Feds Lay Down the Law on Cuba to Travel Agents,” Miami Herald, April
29, 2006; Pablo Bachelet, “New Rules Impede Religious Travel,” Miami Herald, March 16,
2006.
CRS-27
! Fully-hosted travel, by a person not subject to U.S. jurisdiction, was
prohibited as a permissible category of travel.
! Travel for educational activities was further restricted, including the
elimination of educational exchanges sponsored by secondary
schools.
There was mixed reaction to the tightening of Cuba travel and remittance
restrictions. Supporters maintain that the increased restrictions deny the Cuban
government dollars that help maintain its repressive control. Opponents argue that
the tightened sanctions are anti-family and only result in more suffering for the
Cuban people. There were also concerns that the new restrictions were drafted
without considering the full consequences of their implementation. For example, the
elimination of fully-hosted travel raised concerns about the status of 70 U.S. students
receiving full scholarships at the Latin American School of Medicine in Havana.
Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, who were instrumental in the
establishment of the scholarship program for U.S. students, expressed concern that
the students may be forced to abandon their medical education because of the new
OFAC regulations. As a result of these concerns, OFAC ultimately licensed the
medical students in August 2004 to continue their studies and engage in travel-related
transactions.
On July 19, 2007, the U.S. International Trade Commission issued a report,
requested by the Senate Committee on Finance, maintaining that lifting travel
restrictions would result in travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba rising to between 550,000
and 1 million from an estimate of 171,000 in 2005.
Legislative Initiatives. From 2000-2004, one or both houses of Congress
approved amendments to appropriations bills that would have eased restrictions on
travel to Cuba in various ways, but these provisions ultimately were stripped out of
final enacted measures. The Administration regularly threatened to veto legislation
if it contained provisions weakening Cuba sanctions.
In the first session of the 110th Congress, two Senate Appropriations
Committee reported-versions of appropriations bills had provisions that would have
eased restrictions on travel to Cuba for the marketing and sale of agricultural and
medical goods, but ultimately these provisions were not included in the FY2008
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161). The Senate version of the
FY2008 Financial Services and General Government appropriations bill, reported
July 19, 2007, H.R. 2829, had a provision in Section 620 that would eased such
travel restrictions, while the Senate version of the FY2008 Agriculture
appropriations bill, S. 1859, reported July 24, 2007, had such a provision in Section
741.
In the second session of the 110th Congress, the House Appropriations
Committee approved its version of the FY2009 Financial Services and General
Government Appropriations bill on June 25, 2008, that includes provisions easing
restrictions on family travel. The bill would liberalize family travel to Cuba by
allowing for such travel once a year (instead of the current restriction of once every
CRS-28
three years) and allowing such travel to visit aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and first
cousins (instead of currently being limited to immediate family members). The
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General
Government had approved the measure on June 17.
The Senate version of the bill, S. 3260 (S.Rept. 110-417), reported out of the
Senate Appropriations Committee on July 14, 2007, includes provisions easing
restrictions on family travel and on travel to Cuba relating to the commercial sale
of agricultural and medical goods. With regard to family travel (section 620), the bill
would provide that no funds may be used to administer, implement, or enforce the
Administration’s June 2004 tightening of restrictions related to travel to visit
relatives in Cuba. With regard to travel for agricultural or medical sales (section
619), the bill would allow for a general license for such travel instead of a specific
license that requires permission from the Treasury Department. This is similar to
a provision (section 737) in the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the
FY2009 Agriculture Appropriations bill, S. 3289 (S.Rept. 110-426), reported out of
committee on July 21, 2008.
A number of other initiatives introduced in the 110th Congress would ease Cuba
travel restrictions. H.R. 654 (Rangel), S. 721 (Enzi), and Section 254 of S. 554
(Dorgan) would prohibit the President from regulating or prohibiting travel to Cuba
or any of the transactions incident to travel. Two bills that would lift overall
economic sanctions — H.R. 217 (Serrano) and H.R. 624 (Rangel) — would also lift
travel restrictions. H.R. 177 (Lee) would ease restrictions on educational travel to
Cuba. H.R. 757 (Delahunt) would lift restrictions on family travel and the provision
of remittances for family members in Cuba. H.R. 1026 (Moran, Jerry), which would
facilitate the sale of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba, includes a provision that
would provide for general license authority for travel-related transactions for people
involved in agricultural sales and marketing activities or in the transportation of
such sales. H.R. 2819 (Rangel) and S. 1673 (Baucus), which would ease restrictions
on U.S. agricultural and medical exports to Cuba, would also lift restrictions on
travel to Cuba.
In addition, as noted above, several initiative introduced in the aftermath of
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike would temporarily ease U.S. embargo restrictions in
several areas, including travel and remittances. S.Amdt. 5581 (Dodd) to S. 3001, the
FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act, and H.R. 6962 (Delahunt) would
allow for family travel and unrestricted remittances for six months.
Agricultural Exports and Sanctions
U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba have been allowed for several
years, but with numerous restrictions and licensing requirements. The 106th
Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000
or TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for one-year export licenses for selling
agricultural commodities to Cuba, although no U.S. government assistance, foreign
assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are available to finance
such exports. TSRA also denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial
financing or credit; all transactions must be conducted in cash in advance or with
financing from third countries. TSRA reiterates the existing ban on importing goods
CRS-29
from Cuba but authorizes travel to Cuba, under a specific license, to conduct
business related to the newly allowed agricultural sales.
In February 2005, OFAC amended the Cuba embargo regulations to clarify that
TSRA’s term of “payment of cash in advance” means that the payment is received
by the seller or the seller’s agent prior to the shipment of the goods from the port at
which they are loaded. U.S. agricultural exporters and some Members of Congress
strongly objected that the action constitutes a new sanction that violates the intent
of TSRA and could jeopardize millions of dollars in U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba.
OFAC Director Robert Werner maintained that the clarification “conforms to the
common understanding of the term in international trade.”55 On July 29, 2005,
OFAC clarified that, for “payment of cash in advance” for the commercial sale of
U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, vessels can leave U.S. ports as soon as a foreign
bank confirms receipt of payment from Cuba. OFAC’s action was aimed at
ensuring that the goods would not be vulnerable to seizure for unrelated claims
while still at the U.S. port. Supporters of overturning OFAC’s February 22, 2005
amendment, such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, were pleased by the
clarification but indicated that they would still work to overturn the February rule.56
Since late 2001, Cuba has purchased more than $2.2 billion in agricultural
products from the United States. Overall U.S. exports to Cuba rose from about $7
million in 2001 to a high of $404 million in 2004. U.S. exports to Cuba declined
in 2005 and 2006 to $369 million and $340 million, respectively, but increased to
$447 million in 2007. In the first five months of 2008, U.S. agricultural exports to
Cuba amounted to $310 million, far higher than the same time period in previous
years, in part because of the rise in the cost of food prices.57
On July 19, 2007, the U.S. International Trade Commission issued a report,
requested by the Senate Committee on Finance, maintaining that the U.S. share of
Cuba’s agricultural, fish, and forest imports would rise from one-third to between
one-half and two-thirds if trade restrictions were lifted. See the full report available
at [http://www.usitc.gov/ext_relations/news_release/2007/er0719ee1.htm]
Some groups favor further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba.
They argue that the restrictions harm the health and nutrition of the Cuban
population. U.S. agribusiness companies that support the removal of restrictions on
agricultural exports to Cuba believe that U.S. farmers are missing out on a market
of over $700 million annually so close to the United States. Some exporters want
to change U.S. restrictions so that they can sell agriculture and farm equipment to
Cuba.58 Agricultural exporters who support the lifting of the prohibition on
55 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Testimony of Robert Werner, Director, OFAC, before
the House Committee on Agriculture, March 16, 2005.
56 Christopher S. Rugaber, “Treasury Clarifies Cuba Farm Export Rule, and Baucus Relents
on Nominees,” International Trade Reporter, August 4, 2005.
57 World Trade Atlas, which uses Department of Commerce Statistics.
58 “Ag Groups Split Over Trade With Cuba,” Congress Daily AM, National Journal,
(continued...)
CRS-30
financing contend that allowing such financing would help smaller U.S. companies
expand purchases to Cuba more rapidly.59
Opponents of further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba
maintain that U.S. policy does not deny such sales to Cuba, as evidenced by the
large amount of sales since 2001. Moreover, according to the State Department,
since the Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in 1992, the United States has licensed
billions of dollars in private humanitarian donations. Opponents further argue that
easing pressure on the Cuban government would in effect be lending support and
extending the duration of the Castro regime. They maintain that the United States
should remain steadfast in its opposition to any easing of pressure on Cuba that
could prolong the Castro regime and its repressive policies. Some agricultural
producers that export to Cuba support continuation of the prohibition on financing
for agricultural exports to Cuba because it ensures that they will be paid.
Legislative Initiatives. In the first session of the 110th Congress, Congress
approved the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161) in December
2007, which dropped provisions easing Cuba sanctions that had been included in
the House-passed and Senate-committee versions of H.R. 2829, the FY2008
Financial Services and General Government appropriations bill, and the Senate-
committee version of S. 1859, the FY2008 agriculture appropriations bill. The
House-passed version of H.R. 2829 had a provision in Section 903 that would have
prevented Treasury Department funds from being used to implement the February
2005 tightening of policy requiring the payment of cash in advance prior to the
shipment of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba. The House had adopted the provision
during June 28, 2007 floor consideration when it approved H.Amdt. 467 (Moran,
Kansas) by voice vote. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported version of
the bill included a similar provision in Section 619, and in Section 620 would have
ease travel to Cuba for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods.
The Administration’s statement of policy on the bill maintained that the President
would veto the measure if it contained a provision weakening current restrictions
against Cuba. The Senate Appropriations Committee-reported version of the S. 1859
(S.Rept. 110-134) included a provision that would have authorized general licenses
for travel to Cuba for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods.
In other first session action, on July 27, 2007, the House rejected (by a vote of
182-245) H.Amdt. 707 (Rangel) to H.R. 2419, the Farm, Nutrition, and Bioenergy
Act of 2007, also known as the 2007 farm bill. The amendment would have eased
restrictions on the commercial sale of agricultural products to Cuba by clarifying the
meaning of “payment of cash in advance” for the sale of such products; authorizing
direct transfers between U.S. and Cuban financial institutions for such sales; and
authorizing the issuance of U.S. visas for Cubans to conduct activities, including
phytosanitary inspections, related to such sales.
58 (...continued)
February 11, 2003.
59 “Farm Equipment Exports Likely to Face Tough Opposition from White House,
Congress,” Cuba Trader, Vol. III, No. 7, February 17, 2003.
CRS-31
In the second session of the 110th Congress, the House Appropriations
Committee approved its version of the FY2009 Financial Services and General
Government Appropriations bill on June 25, 2008, that includes provisions easing
restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports. The bill has a provision that would prohibit
funds in the act from being used to administer, implement, or enforce an amendment
to the Cuban embargo regulations from February 25, 2005, that requires that U.S.
agricultural exports must be paid for before they leave U.S. ports. The House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government had
approved the measure on June 17.
The Senate version of the bill, S. 3260 (S.Rept. 110-417), reported out of the
Senate Appropriations Committee on July 14, 2007, includes a similar provision
(section 618) easing restrictions on payment terms for the sale of agricultural goods
to Cuba. The bill also has a provision easing restrictions on the travel related to the
commercial sale of agricultural and medical goods (section 619). This is similar to
a provision (section 737) in the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the
FY2009 Agriculture Appropriations bill, S. 3289 (S.Rept. 110-426), reported out of
committee on July 21, 2008.
Several other legislative initiatives introduced in the 110th Congress would ease
restrictions on the sale of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba:
! H.R. 1026 (Moran, Jerry) would facilitate the sale of U.S.
agricultural products to Cuba by providing for general license
authority for travel-related expenses for people involved in sales
and marketing activities or in the transportation for such sales;
authorizing the issuance of a temporary visa for a Cuban national
conducting activities related to the purchase of U.S. agricultural
goods, including phytosanitary inspections; clarifying the “payment
of cash in advance” term used in TSRA to mean that the payment
by the purchaser and the receipt of such payment to the seller
occurs prior to the transfer of title of the commodity or product to
the purchaser and the release of control of such commodity or
product to the purchaser; and prohibiting the President from
restricting direct transfers from a Cuban financial institution to a
U.S. financial institution for U.S. agricultural sales under TSRA.
! H.R. 2819 (Rangel) and S. 1673 (Baucus), among other provisions,
would clarify the meaning of “payment of cash in advance;”
authorize direct transfers between Cuban and U.S. financial
institutions for the execution of payments for sales pursuant to
TSRA; establish an agricultural export promotion program with
respect to Cuba; and increase the airport ticket tax for travel to or
from Cuba by $1.00, with funds going to a newly established
Agricultural Export Promotion Trust Fund. The Senate Finance
Committee held a hearing on S. 1673 on December 11, 2007.
! Two broader bills that would lift economic sanctions on Cuba —
H.R. 217 (Serrano) and H.R. 624 (Rangel) — would include lifting
restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba by amending TSRA.
CRS-32
Three bills that would lift overall travel restrictions — H.R. 654
(Rangel), S. 554 (Dorgan), and S. 721 (Enzi) — would have the
effect of lifting travel restrictions for those involved in travel
related to agricultural sales.
Trademark Sanction60
A provision in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (Section 211 of
Division A, Title II, P.L. 105-277, signed into law October 21, 1998) prevents the
United States from accepting payment for trademark registrations and renewals from
Cuban or foreign nationals that were used in connection with a business or assets in
Cuba that were confiscated, unless the original owner of the trademark has
consented. The provision prohibits U.S. courts from recognizing such trademarks
without the consent of the original owner. The measure was enacted because of a
dispute between the French spirits company, Pernod Ricard, and the Bermuda-based
Bacardi Ltd. Pernod Ricard entered into a joint venture with the Cuban government
to produce and export Havana Club rum, but Bacardi, whose company in Cuba was
expropriated in the 1960s, maintains that it holds the right to the Havana Club name.
Although Pernod Ricard cannot market Havana Club in the United States because
of the trade embargo, it wants to protect its future distribution rights should the
embargo be lifted.
The European Union initiated World Trade Organization dispute settlement
proceedings in June 2000, maintaining that the U.S. law violates the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). In January 2002, the WTO
ultimately found that the trademark sanction violated WTO provisions on national
treatment and most-favored-nation obligations in the TRIPS Agreement.
On March 28, 2002, the United States agreed that it would come into
compliance with the WTO ruling through legislative action by January 3, 2003.61
That deadline was extended several times since no legislative action had been taken
to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO ruling. On July 1, 2005,
however, in an EU-U.S. bilateral agreement, the EU agreed that it would not request
authorization to retaliate at that time, but reserved the right to do so at a future date,
and the United States agreed not to block a future EU request.62 On August 3, 2006,
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office announced that Cuba’s Havana Club
trademark registration was “cancelled/expired,” a week after OFAC had denied a
60 For additional information, see CRS Report RL32014, WTO Dispute Settlement: Status
of U.S. Compliance in Pending Cases, by Jeanne J. Grimmett, and CRS Report RS21764,
Restricting Trademark Rights of Cubans: WTO Decision and Congressional Response, by
Margaret Mikyung Lee.
61 “U.S., EU Agree on Deadline for Complying with Section 211 WTO Finding,” Inside
U.S. Trade, April 12, 2002.
62 “Japan, EU Suspend WTO Retaliation Against U.S. in Two Cases,” Inside U.S. Trade,
July 15, 2005.
CRS-33
Cuban government company the license that it needed to renew the registration of
the trademark.63
Two different approaches have been advocated to bring Section 211 into
compliance with the WTO ruling. Some want a narrow fix in which Section 211
would be amended so that it also applies to U.S. companies instead of being limited
to foreign companies. Advocates of this approach argue that it would affirm that the
United States “will not give effect to a claim or right to U.S. property if that claimed
is based on a foreign compensation.”64 Others want Section 211 repealed altogether.
They argue that the law endangers over 5,000 trademarks of over 500 U.S.
companies registered in Cuba.65 They maintain that Cuba could retaliate against
U.S. companies under the Inter-American Convention for Trademark and
Commercial Protection.
In the 110th Congress, five initiatives — H.R. 217 (Serrano), H.R. 624
(Rangel), H.R. 2819 (Rangel), S. 1673 (Baucus), and S. 1806 (Leahy) — have
provisions that would repeal the Section 211 trademark sanction from law, while
two other initiatives — H.R. 1306 (Wexler) and S. 749 (Nelson) would advance the
narrow fix to Section 211 in order to comply with the WTO ruling. Similar
legislative initiatives on both sides of the issue were introduced in the 108th and
109th Congresses, but no action was taken on these measures. The July 2005 EU-
U.S. bilateral agreement, in which the EU agreed not to retaliate against the United
States, but reserved the right to do so at a later date, reduced pressure on Congress
to take action to comply with the WTO ruling.
Offshore Oil Sector Development
The issue of Cuba’s development of its deepwater offshore oil reserves in the
Gulf of Mexico has been a concern among some Members of Congress. According
to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, industry analysts maintain that there
could be at least 1.6 billion crude oil reserves in Cuba’s offshore sector; the U.S.
Geological Survey estimated a mean of 4.6 billion barrel of undiscovered oil.66 To
date, Cuba has signed agreements for six concessions involving seven foreign oil
companies for the exploration of offshore oil and gas. Repsol (Spain), Norsk-Hydro
(Norway), and ONGC (India) are partners in a joint project, while Sherritt
International (Canada), ONGC (India), PdVSA (Venezuela), Petronas (Malaysia),
and PetroVietnam also have additional concessions.67 In mid-February 2008, the
63 “PTO Cancels Cuban ‘Havana Club’ Mark; Bacardi Set to Sell Rum Under Same Mark,”
International Trade Daily, August 10, 2006.
64 Brian Lehman, testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, hearing on “An
Examination of Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,” July 13, 2004.
65 “USA-Engage Joins Cuba Fight,” Cuba Trader, April 1, 2002.
66 U.S. Energy Information Administration , “Country Analysis Briefs: Caribbean,”
September 2007; U.S. Geological Survey, “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas
Resources of the North Cuban Basin, Cuba, 2004,” Fact Sheet 2005-3009, February 2005.
67 Jorge Piñon, “Cuba’s Energy Future,” Canadian Foundation for the Americas, FocalPoint,
(continued...)
CRS-34
Brazilian state-oil company Petrobras signed a wide-ranging agreement for potential
exploration and production cooperation with Cuba’s state oil company, Cupet.
Some Members have expressed concern about oil development so close to the
United States and about potential environmental damage to the Florida coast. In
April 2008, Cuba announced that drilling in its offshore oil sector would not begin
until 2009.68
Although there have been some claims that China is drilling in Cuba’s offshore
deepwater oil sector, to date its involvement in Cuba’s oil sector has been focused
on exploring onshore/close coastal oil extraction in Piñar del Rio province through
its state-run China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec).69 China does
not have a concession in Cuba’s offshore oil sector in the deepwaters of the Gulf of
Mexico.70
In the 110th Congress, two legislative initiatives — H.R. 1679 (Ros-Lehtinen),
S. 876 (Martinez), and S. 2503 (Nelson, Bill) — would impose sanctions related to
Cuba’s offshore oil development on its northern coast. H.R. 1679 and S. 876 would
exclude from admission to the United States aliens who have made investments
contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum
resources off its coasts; and require the President to impose sanctions on persons
(including foreign subsidiaries) that are determined to have made an investment
equal to or exceeding $1 million that contributes to the enhancement of Cuba’s
ability to develop petroleum resources of the submerged lands off Cuba’s coast. S.
2503 would also exclude from admission to the United States aliens who have
directly and significantly contributed to the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum
resources. The bill would also nullify a 1977 Maritime Boundary Agreement
between the United States and Cuba.
In contrast, several legislative initiatives – S. 1268 (Dorgan), S. 2953 (Craig),
H.R. 3182 (Udall), H.R. 3435 (Pickering) – would allow U.S. companies to work
with Cuba for the offshore exploration and extraction of oil along Cuba’s northern
coast. In addition, H.R. 6735 (Hobson) would terminate the application of
restrictions on exploration, development, and production of oil and gas in areas of
the outer Continental Shelf adjacent to Cuba.
67 (...continued)
April 2007, Vol. 6, No. 3; “PetroVietnam Gets Go-Ahead to Explore Seven Cuban Oil
Fields,” Dow Jones International News, November 20, 2007.
68 “Cuban Off-Shore Oil Drilling Put Off Until 2009,” Reuters News, April 16, 2008.
69 Domingo Amuchastegui, “Cuban Again Invites U.S. Oil Giants to Invest in Oil Sector,”
CubaNews, May 2007.
70 Lesley Clark and Erika Bolstad, “China-Cuba Rumors Fuel Renewed Offshore Drilling
Debate, Rumors of China Drilling in Cuban Waters Are Rallying Support for Drilling off
Florida’s Coast, But Experts Say They’re Untrue,” Miami Herald, June 12, 2008.
CRS-35
Drug Interdiction Cooperation
Because of Cuba’s geographic location, the country’s waters and airspace have
been used by illicit narcotics traffickers to transport drugs for ultimate destinations
in the United States. Over the past several years, Cuban officials have expressed
concerns over the use of their waters and airspace for drug transit as well as
increased domestic drug use. The Cuban government has taken a number of
measures to deal with the drug problem, including legislation to stiffen penalties for
traffickers, increased training for counternarcotics personnel, and cooperation with
a number of countries on anti-drug efforts. Cuba has bilateral counternarcotics
agreements with 33 countries and less formal arrangements with 16 others,
according to the Department of State. For several years, Cuba’s Operation Hatchet
has focused on maritime and air interdiction and the recovery of narcotics washed
up on Cuban shores. Narcotics smuggling through Cuban territory deceased in
2006, according to both U.S. and Cuban officials.71 According to the Department
of State, Cuba aggressively pursues an internal enforcement and investigation
program against its incipient drug market with an effective nationwide drug
prevention and awareness campaign, Operation Popular Shield.
Over the years, there have been varying levels of cooperation with Cuba on
anti-drug efforts. In 1996, Cuban authorities cooperated with the United States in
the seizure of 6.6 tons of cocaine aboard the Miami-bound Limerick, a Honduran-
flag ship. Cuba turned over the cocaine to the United States and cooperated fully
in the investigation and subsequent prosecution of two defendants in the case in the
United States. Cooperation has increased since 1999 when U.S. and Cuban officials
met in Havana to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation. Cuba accepted
an upgrading of the communications link between the Cuban Border Guard and the
U.S. Coast Guard as well as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction
Specialist (DIS) at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. The Coast Guard official
was posted to the U.S. Interests Section in September 2000, and since that time,
coordination has increased.
The State Department, in its March 2008 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report, maintains that narcotics cooperation occurs on a case-by-case basis
primarily through the Coast Guard DIS, which increased in 2007. The report noted
that Cuban authorities carried out some operations in coordination with the Coast
Guard DIS in 2007. These included cooperation in the interception of a drug-laden
aircraft destined for the Bahamas in February and a joint U.S.-Cuba container
inspection at the port of Havana in June. The report also noted that Cuban
authorities have provided the DIS more exposure to Cuban counternarcotics efforts,
including investigative criminal information, debriefings on drug trafficking cases,
visits to the Cuban national canine training center and anti-doping laboratory in
Havana, and access to meet with the Chiefs of Cuba’s INTERPOL and Customs
office.
71 Frances Robles, “Drug-Trafficking at 11-Year Low, Cuba Says,” Miami Herald, March
3, 2007; U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March
2007, p. 188.
CRS-36
Cuba maintains that it wants to cooperate with the United States to combat
drug trafficking, and on various occasions has called for a bilateral anti-drug
cooperation agreement with the United States.72 In January 2002, Cuba deported to
the United States Jesse James Bell, a U.S. fugitive wanted on drug charges, and in
early March 2002, Cuba arrested a convicted Colombian drug trafficker, Rafael
Bustamante, who escaped from jail in Alabama in 1992. At the time, then Drug
Enforcement Administration head Asa Hutchison expressed appreciation for Cuba’s
actions, but indicated that cooperation would continue on a case-by-case basis, not
through a bilateral agreement.73 In February 2007, Cuba extradited drug trafficker
Luis Hernando Gómez Bustamante to Colombia, an action that drew praise from
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs Anne Patterson.74 Gómez Bustamante was subsequently extradited to the
United States in July 2007 to face drug trafficking charges.
In April 2008, John Walters, Director of the White House Office of National
Drug Control Policy, lauded U.S. anti-drug cooperation with Cuba as a good
example of how cooperation has been achieved despite overall political differences
between the two countries.75
Legislative Initiatives. Over the past several years, House and Senate
versions of Foreign Operations appropriations bills have contained contrasting
provisions related to funding for cooperation with Cuba on counternarcotics efforts.
House bills have generally prohibited funds for such efforts, while Senate versions
would have funded such efforts. Ultimately, none of these provisions were included
in enacted measures.
This happened again in December 2007 when Congress approved the FY2008
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161). The act dropped contrasting
provisions from the House and Senate versions of H.R. 2764, the FY2008 State,
Foreign Operations and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. The House-passed
version of H.R. 2764 contained a provision, in Section 673, that would have
specifically prohibited International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) assistance to the Cuban government. In contrast, the Senate-passed
version of the bill would have provided, in Section 696, $1 million in INCLE
72 On March 12, 2002, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cuban Interests Section
in Washington delivered three diplomatic notes to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana and
the State Department in Washington proposing agreements on drug interdiction, terrorism,
and migration issues. See “Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Prominent Drug
Trafficker Arrested in our Country,” Information Office, Cuban Interests Section, March 17,
2002; “Cuba Offers to Sign Anti-Drug Pact,” Miami Herald, April 8, 2006.
73 Anthony Boadle, “U.S. Thanks Cuba, But Declines Anti-Drug Accord,” Reuters, March
19, 2002.
74 U.S. Department of State, Release of the 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, Anne W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, On-The-Record Briefing, March 1, 2007.
75 “White House Office of National Drug Control Policy Director Waters Holds News
Briefing on Emerging Transatlantic Drug Threats at the Foreign Press Center,” Newsmakers
Transcripts, CQ.com, April 28, 2008.
CRS-37
funding for preliminary work by the Department of State, or such other entity as the
Secretary of State may designate, to establish cooperation with the Cuban
government on counternarcotics matters. The amount would not have been
available if Cuba did not have in place appropriate procedures to protect against the
loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection with the interdiction
of illegal drugs, and if there is credible evidence of involvement of the Cuban
government in drug trafficking during the preceding 10 years.
In the second session of the 110th Congress, the Senate Appropriations
Committee version of the FY2009 State, Department, Foreign Operations, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, S. 3288, contains a provision (section 779)
providing for $1 million for preliminary work by the Department of State, or other
entity designated by the Secretary of State, to establish cooperation with appropriate
Cuban agencies on counternarcotics matters. The money would not be available,
however, if the Secretary certifies that Cuba 1) does not have in place procedures
to protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection
with the interdiction of illegal drugs; and 2) there is credible evidence of
involvement of the government of Cuba in drug trafficking during the preceding 10
years.
Cuba and Terrorism76
Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring
international terrorism in 1982 because of its alleged ties to international terrorism
and support for terrorist groups in Latin America. Cuba had a long history of
supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa,
but in 1992, Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was
a thing of the past. Cuba’s change in policy was in large part because of the breakup
of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in annual
subsidies to Cuba, and led to substantial Cuban economic decline.
Cuba remains on the State Department’s terrorism list. According to the State
Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 report (issued April 30, 2008),
Cuba has “remained opposed to U.S. counterterrorism policy, and actively and
publicly condemned many associated U.S. policies and actions.” The report also
noted that Cuba maintains close relationships with other state sponsors of terrorism,
such as Iran and Syria, and has provided safe haven for members of several Foreign
Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) and two
Colombian insurgent groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Colombia has publicly acknowledged that
it wants Cuba mediation with the ELN.
The 2007 report also maintained that Cuba continued to permit U.S. fugitives
from justice to live legally in Cuba. Most of the fugitives entered Cuba in the
1970s, and are accused of hijacking or committing violent actions in the United
States. The State Department report noted that Cuba stated in 2006 that it would no
76 For further information, see CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of
Terrorism List, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS-38
longer provide safe haven to new fugitives who may enter Cuba. In 2006, Cuba
returned a U.S. fugitive who had sequestered his son and flew a stolen plane to Cuba
in September. In April 2007, Cuba returned another U.S. fugitive, Joseph Adjmi,
who was convicted of mail fraud in the 1960s, but disappeared before beginning his
10-year sentence. On June 13, 2008, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced
that it deported another U.S. citizen, Leonard Auerbach, wanted in the United States
for sexual exploitation of a minor and for child pornography who had entered Cuba
from Mexico in April.77
In the 110th Congress, H.R. 525 (King), would amend the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 to require that, in order to determine that a
democratically elected government in Cuba exists, the Cuban government extradite
to the United States individuals who are living in Cuba in order to escape
prosecution or confinement for criminal offense committed in the United States. A
similar initiative was introduced in the 109th Congress, H.R. 332 (King), but no
legislative action was taken. In addition, Section101(1)(H) of House-passed H.R.
2601 would have authorized funds for the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to
disseminate the names of U.S. fugitives residing in Cuba and any rewards for their
capture, but action on the measure was not completed before the end of the
Congress.
In general, those who support keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that
there is ample evidence that Cuba supports terrorism. They point to the
government’s history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin
America and Africa. They point to the government’s continued hosting of members
of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice. Critics of retaining
Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover from the Cold War. They
argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list and
maintain that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles
against serious terrorist threats.
Cuba as the Victim of Terrorism. Cuba has been the target of various
terrorist incidents over the years. In 1976, a Cuban plane was bombed, killing 73
people. In 1997, there were almost a dozen bombings in the tourist sector in Havana
and in the Varadero beach area in which an Italian businessman was killed and
several others were injured. Two Salvadorans were convicted and sentenced to
death for the bombings in March 1999, and three Guatemalans were sentenced to
prison terms ranging from 10-15 years in January 2002. Cuban officials maintain
that Cuban exiles funded the bombings.
In November 2000, four anti-Castro activists were arrested in Panama for a plot
to kill Fidel Castro. One of the accused, Luis Posada Carriles, was also allegedly
involved in the 1976 Cuban airline bombing noted above.78 The four stood trial in
March 2004 and were sentenced on weapons charges in the case to prison terms
77 Patricia Grogg, “Cuba: Government Deports U.S. Citizen Charged with Child Abuse,”
Inter Press Service, June 16, 2008.
78 Frances Robles, “An Old Foe of Castro Looks Back on His Fight,” Miami Herald,
September 4, 2003.
CRS-39
ranging from seven to eight years. In late August 2004, Panamanian President
Mireya Moscoso pardoned the four men before the end of her presidential term.
Three of the men are U.S. citizens and traveled to Florida, where they received
strong support from some in the Cuban American community, while Posada Carriles
reportedly traveled to another country.
On April 13, 2005, Posada’s lawyer said that his client, reportedly in the United
States after entering the country illegally, would seek asylum in the United States
because he has a “well-founded fear of persecution” for his opposition to Fidel
Castro.79 Posada, a Venezuelan citizen, had been imprisoned in Venezuela for the
bombing of the Cuban airliner in 1976, but reportedly was allowed to “escape” from
prison in 1985 after his supporters paid a bribe to the prison warden.80 He had been
acquitted for the bombing but remained in prison pending a prosecutorial appeal.81
Posada also reportedly admitted, but later denied, involvement in the string of
bombings in Havana in 1997, one of which killed an Italian tourist.82 Posada
subsequently withdrew his application for asylum on May 17, 2005. Later that day,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested Posada, and
subsequently charged him with illegally entering the United States. A Department
of Homeland Security press release indicated that ICE does not generally deport
people to Cuba or countries believed to be acting on Cuba’s behalf.83 Venezuela
requested Posada’s extradition and pledged that it would not hand Posada over to
Cuba. On September 26, 2005, however, a U.S. immigration judge ruled that
Posada likely faced torture in Venezuela and could not be deported in keeping with
U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture.84
ICE reviewed the case and determined on March 22, 2006, that Posada would
not be freed from a detention federal immigration facility in El Paso, Texas.85 In
November 2006, however, a U.S. federal judge, who was considering Posada’s plea
that he be released, ordered the government to supply evidence, by February 1,
2007, justifying his continued detention. On January 11, 2007, a federal grand jury
in Texas indicted Posada on seven counts for lying about how he entered the United
79 Alfonso Chardy and Nancy San Martin, “Lawyer Expects Posada to Show Soon,” Miami
Herald, April 14, 2005.
80 Ann Louise Bardach, “Our Man’s in Miami. Patriot or Terrorist?,” Washington Post,
April 17, 2005.
81 Although Posada was acquitted by a military court, a higher court ordered a new civilian
trial. Reportedly a first set of prosecutors recommended against charging Posada, but a
second set of prosecutors took the case to trial, and Posada escaped during that time in 1985.
See Oscar Corral, “Debate Focuses on Escape,” Miami Herald, June 19, 2005.
82 Oscar Corral and Alfonso Chardy, “Victim’s Kin Oppose Posada Bid for Asylum,” Miami
Herald, May 7, 2005.
83 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Public Affairs, Statement, May 17, 2005.
84 Alicia Caldwell, “Judge Says Cuban Militant Can’t Be Deported to Venezuela,”
Associated Press, September 28, 2005.
85 Oscar Corral, “Cuban Exile Militant Luis Posada Denied Release,” Miami Herald, March
22, 2006.
CRS-40
States illegally in March 2005, whereupon he was transferred from immigration
detention in El Paso to a country jail in New Mexico near the Texas border. The
Cuban government responded by maintaining that Posada needs to be charged with
terrorism, not just lying about how he entered the United States. Another grand jury
in New Jersey is reportedly examining Posada’s alleged role in the 1997 bombings
in Cuba.86 Press articles in early May 2007 reported that the FBI has been gathering
evidence in the 1997 bombing and that FBI agents have visited Havana as part of
their investigation.87
Posada was released from jail in New Mexico on April 19, 2007, and allowed
to return to Miami under house arrest to await an upcoming trial on immigration
fraud charges, but on May 9, 2007 a federal judge in Texas dismissed the charges.
The judge maintained that the U.S. government mistranslated testimony from
Posada and manipulated evidence.88 On June 5, 2007, Justice Department
prosecutors filed a notice of appeal with the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
New Orleans and on November 6, 2007, federal prosecutors field a brief requesting
that the court reverse the lower court’s decision.89 On June 4, 2008, the appeals
court heard arguments from both sides in the case; a ruling reportedly could take
several months.90 Both Cuba and Venezuela strongly denounced Posada’s release,
contending that he is a terrorist. In late June 2008, Panama’s Supreme Court ruled
that Posada’s 2004 pardon was unconstitutional, and in mid-July 2008, a
Panamanian court initiated a request for Posada’s extradition to the Panamanian
government.
The House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and
Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing focusing on the
Posada case on November 15, 2007.
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights
Since 1996, the United States has provided assistance — primarily through the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but also through the State
Department and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) — to increase the
flow of information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise to Cuba.
86 Alfonso Chardy and Jay Weaver, “Posada a Target of New Federal Probes,” Miami
Herald, November 12, 2006, and “Grand Jury Indicts Cuban Exile Militant Luis Posada
Carriles,” Miami Herald, January 12, 2007.
87 Alfonso Chardy, Oscar Corral, and Jay Weaver, “FBI, Cuba Cooperating on Posada,”
Miami Herald, May 3, 2007; “U.S., Cuba Unite to Investigate Former CIA Op,” National
Public Radio, Morning Edition, May 4, 2007.
88 Carol J. Williams, “Pressure Grows to Prosecute Cuban Exile,” Los Angeles Times, May
10, 2007.
89 The federal prosecutors’ brief is available at [http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2007/
11/06/20/Posada_5CA_07-50737_electronic_copy.source.prod_affiliate.56.pdf]
90 Michael Kunzelman, “Appeals Court Hears Cuban Militant’s Immigration Case,”
Associated Press, June 4, 2008.
CRS-41
USAID’s Cuba program has supported a variety of U.S.-based non-
governmental organizations with the goals of promoting a rapid, peaceful transition
to democracy, helping develop civil society, and building solidarity with Cuba’s
human rights activists.91 These efforts are largely funded through Economic Support
Funds (ESF) in the annual foreign operations appropriations bill. In recent years,
funding for such projects amounted to about $5 million for each of FY2001 and
FY2002, $6 million in FY2003, $21.4 million in FY2004 (because of re-
programmed ESF assistance to fund the democracy-building recommendations of
the Commission to Provide Assistance for a Free Cuba), and $8.9 million in
FY2005. In FY2006, $10.9 million in Cuba democracy funding was provided,
including $8.9 million in ESF and $2 million in Development Assistance.
For FY2007, the Administration requested $9 million in ESF to support the
recommendations of the President’s Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, and
to support USAID-administrated democracy and human rights programs. The report
to the House-passed version of the FY2007 Foreign Operations appropriations bill,
H.R. 5522 (H.Rept. 109-486), recognized the work of USAID in promoting
democracy and humanitarian assistance for Cuba and urged the agency to continue
to promote its Cuba program. The report to the Senate version of H.R. 5522
(S.Rept. 109-277) recommended $2.5 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs,
$6.5 million less than the Administration’s request. Final action on H.R. 5522 was
not completed before the end of the 109th Congress. Foreign Operations
appropriations for FY2007 was funded by a series of continuing resolutions
completed in the 110th Congress. Ultimately, the Administration provided $13.3
million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs in FY2007, $4.3 million more than
it requested.
For FY2008, Congress fully funded the Administration’s request for $45.7
million in ESF for democracy assistance for Cuba in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 101-161); an estimated $45.33 million,
however, will be provided because of an overall 0.81% rescission. The amount is
more than four times the amount provided in FY2006 and more than five times the
amount requested in FY2007. According to the State Department’s FY2008
Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ), the increase in assistance is in order to
fulfill the recommendations of the July 2006 report of the Commission for
Assistance to a Free Cuba to provide support for Cuban civil society, expand
international awareness, break the regime’s information blockade, and continue
support for a democratic transition. That report, as described above, recommended
$80 million over two years for a variety of measures to hasten Cuba’s transition to
democracy, and not less than $20 million annually thereafter for Cuba democracy
programs.
Both the House- and Senate-passed versions of the FY2008 State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, H.R. 2764, fully funded the
Administration’s request for $45.7 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs.
The House committee-reported version of the bill would have provided just $9
91 See USAID’s Cuba program website: [http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america
_caribbean/country/cuba/].
CRS-42
million in ESF for such programs, but during June 21, 2007, floor consideration, the
House approved H.Amdt. 351 (Diaz-Balart) by a vote of 254-170 that increased
funding for ESF by $36.7 million in order to fully fund the Administration’s request.
The Senate Appropriations Committee report to the bill would have provided $15
million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs. However, during September 6, 2007,
floor consideration, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 2694 (Martinez) by voice vote that
increased funding for Cuba democracy programs by $30.7 million to fully fund the
Administration’s request.
For FY2009, the Administration has requested $20 million in ESF to continue
to implement program recommendations of the Commission for Assistance to a Free
Cuba. The money would assist human rights activists, independent journalists,
Afro-Cubans, and women, youth, and student activists. The report to the Senate
Appropriations Committee version of the FY2009 State Department, Foreign
Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, S, 3288 (S.Rept. 110-425),
recommends fully funding the Administration’s request for Cuba, but also calls for
the State Department and USAID to conduct regular evaluations to ensure the cost
effectiveness of the programs.
Until FY2008, NED’s democratization assistance for Cuba had been funded
largely through the annual Commerce, Justice, and State (CJS) appropriations
measure, but is now funded through the State Department, Foreign Operations and
Related Agencies appropriations measure. NED funding for Cuba has steadily
increased over the past several years: $765,000 in FY2001; $841,000 in FY2002;
$1.14 million in FY2003; and $1.15 million in FY2004. For FY2005, NED funded
17 Cuba projects with $2.4 million. For FY2006, NED funded 13 projects with
almost $1.5 million, including $0.4 million from State Department ESF. For
FY2007, NED funded 12 projects with almost $1.5 million, which included almost
$1.4 million funded by the State Department.
Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Cuba. In November 2006,
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report examining U.S.
democracy assistance for Cuba from 1996-2005, and concluded that the U.S.
program had significant problems and needed better management and oversight.
According to GAO, internal controls, for both the awarding of Cuba program grants
and oversight of grantees, “do not provide adequate assurance that the funds are
being used properly and that grantees are in compliance with applicable law and
regulations.”92 Investigative news reports on the program maintained that high
shipping costs and lax oversight have diminished its effectiveness.93 Representative
William Delahunt, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, had
requested the GAO study along with Representative Jeff Flake.
92 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Democracy Assistance for Cuba Needs
Better Management and Oversight, GAO-07-147, November 2006.
93 Oscar Corral, “Federal Program to Help Democracy in Cuba Falls Short of Mark,” Miami
Herald, November 14, 2006, and “Is U.S. Aid Reaching Castro Foes?” Miami Herald,
November 15, 2006.
CRS-43
In March 2008, a White House aide to President Bush, Felipe Sixto, resigned
because of alleged misuse of funds when he worked for the Center for a Free Cuba,
which has been a major recipient of U.S. democracy funding.94 USAID’s Inspector
General is reportedly investigating the matter, while the Justice Department is
reportedly looking into whether to prosecute.95 Another group, Grupo de Apoyo a
la Democracia (Group in Support of Democracy), is also under investigation by
USAID for misuse of funds. USAID has suspended assistance to the two groups,
which historically have been the two largest recipients of U.S. democracy funding
for Cuba.96
The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) released a report in May
2008 maintaining that a majority of the assistance for Cuba has been spent in
operating expenses by U.S.-based grantees, transition studies, and U.S.-based
activities. Among the recommendations in its report, the CANF called for USAID
grantees to spend a minimum of 75% of government funds in direct aid to Cuban
civil society. It also called for the assistance program to provide direct cash aid to
independent civil society groups, dissidents, and families of political prisoners.97
Radio and TV Marti
U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba —
Radio and TV Martí — began in 1985 and 1990 respectively. As spelled out in the
Broadcasting Board of Governors FY2009 Budget Request, the objectives of Radio
and TV Martí are (1) to support the right of the Cuban people to seek, receive, and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers; (2) to
be effective in furthering the open communication of information and ideas through
use of radio and television broadcasting to Cuba; (3) to serve as a consistently
reliable and authoritative source of accurate, objective, and comprehensive news;
and (4) to provide news, commentary, and other information about events in Cuba
and elsewhere to promote the cause of freedom in Cuba.
Until October 1999, U.S.-government funded international broadcasting
programs had been a primary function of the United States Information Agency
(USIA). When USIA was abolished and its functions were merged into the
Department of State at the beginning of FY2000, the Broadcasting Board of
Governors (BBG) became an independent agency that included such entities as the
94 Alfonso Chardy and Pablo Bachelet, “Cuban Exile Activist Felt ‘Betrayal’ by
Employees,” Miami Herald, April 24, 2008.
95 William E. Gibson, “Cuba Dissident Funds May Have Been Misused,” South Florida Sun-
Sentinel, March 29, 2008.
96 Frances Robles, “Hold on Funds for Cuba Democracy Project Lifted,” Miami Herald, July
23, 2008.
97 Alfonso Chardy, “Exile Group: Not Enough Money Getting to Cuban Dissidents,” Miami
Herald, May 15, 2008; Cuban American National Foundation, “Findings and
Recommendations on the Most Effective Use of USAID-CUBA Funds Authorized by
Section 109(a) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Helms-Burton) Act of
1996,” March 2008.
CRS-44
Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free
Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), which manages Radio and TV
Marti. OCB is headquartered in Miami, Florida, and operates under the BBG’s
International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB). Legislation in the 104th Congress (P.L.
104-134) required the relocation of OCB from Washington D.C. to south Florida.
The move began in 1996 and was completed in 1998.
Radio Martí broadcasts on short and medium wave (AM) channels for 24 hours
six days per week, and for18 hours one day per week utilizing transmission facilities
in Marathon, Florida and Greenville, North Carolina, according to the BBG.
TV Martí broadcasts daily from its facilities in Cudjoe Key Florida, on the
Hispasat satellite, and is available on the Internet 24 hours a day. It is also available
on 176 cable stations throughout Latin America, according to the BBG. Until July
2005, TV Martí had also been broadcast via blimps from facilities in Cudjoe Key,
Florida for four and one-half hours daily, but the aerostats were destroyed by
Hurricane Dennis. From mid-2004 until 2006, TV Martí programming was
transmitted for several hours once a week via an airborne platform known as
Commando Solo operated by the Department of Defense utilizing a C-130 aircraft.
In August 2006, OCB began to use a contracted private aircraft to transmit pre-
recorded TV Martí broadcasts six days weekly, and by late October 2006 the OCB
inaugurated an aircraft-broadcasting platform known as Aero Martí with the
capability of transmitting live broadcasts. Aero Martí transmits broadcasts five
hours daily from Monday to Saturday during the evening. According to OCB, since
mid-FY2007, it has had two contracted private aircraft transmitting the broadcasts.
In December 2006, the OCB contracted with two private U.S. commercial
stations to transmit Radio and TV Martí.98 It provided a six-month contract with
Radio Mambí (710 AM) in Florida, at a cost of $182,500, to broadcast one hour of
Radio Martí programming five days a week from midnight to 1:00 am. Radio
Mambí is a popular station in south Florida, with a 50,000 watt capacity, that is
well-known for its strong anti-Castro stance. A second six-month OCB contract
with WPMF (Channel 38) in Miami, known as TV Azteca, at a cost of $195,000,
provided for two 30-minute TV Martí newscasts at 6 pm and 11:30 pm weekdays,
along with one-minute news updates hourly over a 12 hour period weekdays. OCB
chose the station because it is offered on DirecTV and because it has only a small
audience in Miami. In June 2007, the two contracts were extended for an additional
six months with similar terms. The contract with Radio Mambí subsequently
expired in early 2008, whereas TV Martí continues to be shown on Channel 38. In
July 2008, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report that
criticized the IBB’s and OCB’s practices in awarding the two contracts as lacking
discipline required to ensure transparency and accountability. According to GAO,
the approach for awarding the Radio Mambi and TV Azteca contracts did not reflect
sound business practices.99
98 Christina Hoag, “Radio, TV Martí To Be Aired Locally,” Miami Herald, December 19,
2006.
99 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Broadcasting to Cuba, Weaknesses in
(continued...)
CRS-45
Controversies. Both Radio and TV Martí have at times been the focus of
controversies, including questions about adherence to broadcast standards. There
have been various attempts over the years to cut funding for the programs, especially
for TV Martí, which has not had much of an audience because of Cuban jamming
efforts. In December 2006, press reports alleged significant problems in the OCB’s
operations, with claims of cronyism, patronage, and bias in its coverage.100 In
February 2007, the former director of TV Martí programming pled guilty in U.S.
federal court to receiving more than $100,000 in kickbacks over a three-year period
from a vendor receiving OCB contracts.101
Over the years, there have been various government studies and audits of Radio
and TV Martí, including investigations by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office, by a 1994 congressionally established Advisory Panel on Radio and TV
Martí, and by the State Department’s and BBG’s Office Inspector General offices
in 1999, 2003, and 2007.102
The most recent State Department/BBG Office of Inspector General (OIG)
report, issued in June 2007, maintained that OCB has significantly improved its
operations under its current director, Pedro Roig, with an organizational realignment
that has streamlined operations and has helped improve the quality of broadcasts.
According to the report, “IBB quality reviews show that radio and television
broadcasts have markedly improved over the past two years in production quality
and content,” although the report also called for greater emphasis on internal quality
control to ensure that editorial standards are followed. The report lauded the
introduction of new technology allowing OCB to broadcast television signals live
into Cuba using airborne platforms, and maintained that there are indications that
99 (...continued)
Contracting Practices Reduced Visibility into Selected Award Decisions,” GAO-08-764,
July 2008.
100 Oscar Corral, “Radio, TV Martí Face Another Government Audit,” Miami Herald,
December 18, 2006, and “Problems Dog Broadcaster,” Miami Herald, December 19, 2006.
101 Jay Weaver, “TV Martí Executive Admits Taking Kickbacks,” Miami Herald, February
14, 2007.
102 See the following reports and audits: U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Broadcasts
to Cuba, TV Marti Surveys are Flawed, GAO/NSIAD-90-252, August 1990; U.S. GAO, TV
Marti, Costs and Compliance with Broadcast Standards and International Agreements,
GAO/NSIAD-92-199, May 1992; U.S. GAO, Letter to Hon. Howard L. Berman and Hon.
John F. Kerry regarding Radio Marti broadcast standards, GAO/NSIAD-93-126R, February
17, 1993; Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Marti, Report of the Advisory Panel on Radio
and TV Marti, Three Volumes, March 1994; U.S. GAO, Radio Marti, Program Review
Processes Need Strengthening, GAO/NSIAD-94-265, September 1994; U.S. GAO, U.S.
Information Agency, Issues Related to Reinvention Planning in the Office of Cuba
Broadcasting, GAO/NSIAD-96-110, May 1996; U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Inspector General, Review of Polices and Procedures for Ensuring that Radio Marti
Broadcasts Adhere to Applicable Requirements, 99-IB-010, June 1999; U.S. Department of
State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General, Review of the
Effectiveness and Implementation of Office of Cuba Broadcasting’s New Program
Initiatives, Report No. IBO-A-03-01, January 2003, and Report of Inspection, Office of Cuba
Broadcasting, Report No. ISP-IB 07-35, June 2007.
CRS-46
more Cubans are watching TV Martí broadcasts. It recommended that the BBG’s
International Broadcasting Bureau should review and assess the leases with Radio
Mambí and TV Azteca at the end of the lease period to determine whether they
provide additional listeners and viewers and are worth the cost, or whether they
could be replaced with lease options for other stations. Looking ahead, the report
maintained that OCB needs a “long-term strategic plan that anticipates the future
needs of the Cuban audience, provides a template on how to compete with
commercial broadcasters, and addresses what to do with OCB and its broadcasting
facilities if and when uncensored broadcasting is allowed inside a democratic
Cuba.”103
One of the most controversial aspects of the OIG report, and one that has often
been at the center of past congressional debate over TV Martí, is the extent to which
TV Martí can be viewed in Cuba. The report maintains that there is anecdotal
evidence that the Aero Martí airborne transmissions have increased viewership. The
report refers to a January 2007 survey of Cuban arrivals — commissioned by
Spanish Radio Productions with the cooperation of Miami Dade College — that
found listening rates for Radio and TV Martí within Cuba were significantly higher
than previously reported, especially for TV Martí. Although specific survey figures
are not cited in the OIG report, OCB officials maintain that the survey shows that
17% of recent Cuban arrivals had watched TV Martí.104 The OIG report also points
to a February 2007 survey by the U.S. Interests Section (USINT) in Havana that
reflected increased viewership. According to the BBG, that survey was completed
by 500 Cuban visitors to the USINT (where TV Martí can be viewed) in January and
February 2007, with 10% of the visitors indicating that they could watch TV Martí
via UHF for brief periods.
Other observers contend that TV Martí can hardly be viewed in Cuba because
of the government’s jamming efforts. John Nichols, a Pennsylvania State University
communications professor, visited Cuba in late June 2007 on a factfinding mission
sponsored by the Center for International Policy (a group that opposes U.S. policy
toward Cuba), and concluded “that the signal from the plane is essentially unusable”
and that there was “no evidence of significant viewership of TV Martí.”105 In
interviews with the Associated Press, more than two dozen Cuban immigrants to
Florida contended that while Radio Martí can be heard throughout Cuba, TV Martí
can rarely be seen.106 Prior BBG commissioned phone surveys in Cuba from 2003,
2005, and November 2006 estimated past week TV Martí viewership between 0.1%
103 The State Department originally issued a two-page summary of the report on its website
on June 5, 2007, and pointed out that the full report received only “limited official
distribution.” On July 31, 2007, the State Department issued the entire 43-page report on its
website, with certain sections redacted. That version is available at [http://oig.state.gov/
lbry/].
104 Pablo Bachelet, “Martí Extending Its Reach, U.S. Says,” Miami Herald, June 20, 2007.
105 Vanessa Bauza, “TV Martí Signal Weak in Cuba, Broadcast Specialist Says,” South
Florida Sun-Sentinel, July 31, 2007.
106 Laura Wides-Muñoz, “Despite Expenditures, TV Martí Still Tough to See in Cuba,”
Associated Press, July 30, 2007.
CRS-47
and 0.3% of those surveyed and past month viewership of almost 0.5%. The
November 2006 survey, reportedly designed to show the early effects of the Aero
Martí transmissions that began in late October, showed no statistically significant
change from the 2003 and 2005 surveys. In the same surveys, Radio Martí had
listenership of between 1% to 2% in the past week and 4% to 5% in the past month.
Funding. From FY1984 through FY2007, about $564 million has been spent
for broadcasting to Cuba, with $28.6 million in FY2005, $37.5 million in FY2006,
and $33.9 million in FY2007, and an estimated $33.4 million in FY2008. For
FY2009, the Bush Administration has requested $34.4 million for broadcasting to
Cuba. Until FY2005, the Administration provided funding information for Cuba
broadcasting with a breakdown of the amounts spent for Radio versus TV Martí.
Since FY2005, however, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has not made such
a distinction in its annual budget request.
FY2007 Funding. The Administration requested $36.279 million for Cuba
broadcasting in FY2007, with $2.7 million of this to purchase an aerostat for
broadcasting TV Marti. The request was slightly below the $37.129 million
appropriated in FY2006 (when Congress funded the Administration’s request to
acquire and outfit an aircraft for dedicated airborne radio and television broadcasts
to Cuba), but almost $9 million above the $27.6 million appropriated in FY2005.
On June 29, 2006, the House passed H.R. 5672, the FY2007 Science, State, Justice,
Commerce and Related Agencies appropriations bill, that would fund Cuba
broadcasting under the International Broadcasting Operations account. The report
to the bill (H.Rept. 109-520) recommended $36.102 million for Cuba broadcasting,
including $2.7 million to improve transmission capabilities via aerostat for
broadcasting TV Martí. The Senate version of H.R. 5522, the FY2007 Foreign
Operations appropriations bill, would fund Cuba broadcasting. The Senate report
to the bill (S.Rept. 109-277) recommended full funding of the Administration’s
request of $36.279 million. Final action was not completed on either bill before the
end of the 109th Congress, but ultimately was funded by a series of continuing
resolutions completed in the 110th Congress that provided $33.9 million for Cuba
broadcasting for FY2007.
FY2008 Funding. For FY2008, the Administration requested $38.7 million
for Cuba broadcasting, including $3.2 million to enhance programming to Cuba in
support of the recommendations of the July 2006 report of the Commission for
Assistance to a Free Cuba. According to the BBG’s FY2008 budget request, of the
$3.2 million to enhance programming to Cuba, $1.2 million would be to improve
programming and Radio and TV Martí program production in OCB’s Miami facility
by adding a second television studio, virtual sets, and additional portable production
capability. The remaining $2 million would be spent to continue and expand
transmission leases begun in FY2007 for DirecTV and medium wave radio
frequencies.
Congress provided $33.681 million for Radio and TV Marti in the FY2008
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161), while a 0.81% rescission brought
the enacted amount to $33.408 million. This was about $5 million less than the
Administration’s request and similar to the amount provided for FY2007. Both the
House and Senate committee reports to the FY2008 State Department, Foreign
CRS-48
Operations, and Related Program Appropriations bill had recommended $33.681
million. S.Amdt. 2695 (Martinez), which was withdrawn from consideration on
September 6, 2007, would have increased funding by $5.019 to fully fund the
Administration’s request.
FY2009 Request. For FY2009, the Administration has requested $34.392
million for broadcasting to Cuba, slightly more than provided by Congress in
FY2008. The request amount includes funding for the airborne platform that the
Office of Cuba Broadcasting uses to broadcast Radio and TV Martí. The report to
the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the FY2009 State Department,
Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, S. 3288 (S.Rept.
110-425), recommends fully funding the Administration’s request for Cuba
broadcasting.
Migration Issues
1994 and 1995 Migration Accords. Cuba and the United States reached
two migration accords in 1994 and 1995 designed to stem the mass exodus of
Cubans attempting to reach the United States by boat. On the minds of U.S.
policymakers was the 1980 Mariel boatlift in which 125,000 Cubans fled to the
United States with the approval of Cuban officials. In response to Castro’s threat
to unleash another Mariel, U.S. officials reiterated U.S. resolve not to allow another
exodus. Amid escalating numbers of fleeing Cubans, on August 19, 1994,
President Clinton abruptly changed U.S. migration policy, under which Cubans
attempting to flee their homeland were allowed into the United States, and
announced that the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy would take Cubans rescued at sea
to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite the change in policy,
Cubans continued fleeing in large numbers.
As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks
that culminated in a September 9, 1994 bilateral agreement to stem the flow of
Cubans fleeing to the United States by boat. In the agreement, the United States and
Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly Cuban migration to the United
States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The United States agreed to
ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimum
of 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. In a change
of policy, the United States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to
all Cuban migrants who reach the United States, while Cuba agreed to take
measures to prevent unsafe departures from Cuba.
In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which
the United States would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo
into the United States, but would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to
enter the United States by sea and would return them to Cuba. The two countries
would cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also pledged to ensure that no
action would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequence of
their attempt to immigrate illegally. On January 31, 1996, the Department of
Defense announced that the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and
housed at Guantanamo had left the U.S. Naval Station, most having been paroled
into the United States.
CRS-49
Coast Guard Interdictions. Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S.
Coast Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to their
country, while those deemed at risk for persecution have been transferred to
Guantanamo and then found asylum in a third country or eventually the United
States. Those Cubans who reach shore are allowed to apply for permanent resident
status in one year, pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-732).
This so-called “wet foot/dry foot” policy has been criticized by some as encouraging
Cubans to risk their lives in order to make it to the United States and as encouraging
alien smuggling. Others maintain that U.S. policy should welcome those migrants
fleeing communist Cuba whether or not they are able to make it to land.
The number of Cubans interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard has risen in
recent years, from 931 in 2002 to 2,952 in 2005, almost twice the number
interdicted in 2004. In 2006, Cuban interdictions drooped to 2,293, but 2007 saw
a large increase with 3,197 Cubans interdicted for the year. As of late June 2008,
over 1,000 Cuban migrants were interdicted at sea.107 In recent years, increasing
numbers of Cuban migrants attempting to reach the United States have been
intercepted in Mexico, with some 1,359 intercepted in 2007 and some 1,000 in the
first four months of 2008. Cuba and Mexico are reportedly negotiating a migration
agreement to curb the irregular flow of migrants through Mexico.108
U.S. prosecution against migrant smugglers in Florida has increased in recent
years with numerous convictions. There have been several violent incidents in
which Cuban migrants have brandished weapons or in which Coast Guard officials
have used force to prevent Cubans from reaching shore. In late December 2007, a
Coast Guard official in Florida called on the local Cuban American community to
denounce the smuggling and stop financing the trips that are leading to more deaths
at sea.109 The Cuban government also has taken forceful action against individuals
engaging in alien smuggling. Prison sentences of up to three years may be imposed
against those engaging in alien smuggling.
In the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s July 2006, announcement that he was
temporarily ceding political power to his brother, Department of Homeland Security
officials announced several measures to discourage Cubans from risking their lives
on the open seas. On August 11, 2006, Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Deputy Secretary Michael P. Jackson urged “the Cuban people to stay on the island”
and discouraged “anyone from risking their life in the open seas in order to travel
to the United States.” At the same time, DHS announced additional measures to
discourage Cubans from turning to alien smuggling as a way to enter the United
States. The measures support family reunification by increasing the numbers of
Cuban migrants admitted to the United States each year who have family members
in the United States, although the overall number of Cubans admitted to the United
107 U.S. Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction, Coast Guard Office of Law Enforcement,
“Total Interdictions, Calender Year 1982 to Present,” June 20, 2008.
108 Diego Cevallos, “Migration: More and More Cubans Entering U.S. Through Mexico,”
Inter Press Service News Agency, June 17, 2008.
109 Laura Morales, “Exiles Urged to Stem Tide of Cubans,” Miami Herald, December 29,
2007.
CRS-50
States annually will remain at about 21,000. Cubans who attempt to enter the United
States illegally will be deemed ineligible to enter under this new family reunification
procedure. In another change of policy, Cuban medical personnel currently
conscripted by the Cuban government to work in third countries are now allowed
to enter the United States; their families in Cuba are also allowed to enter the United
States.110
In March 2007, some 50 federal, state, and local agencies conducted a two-day
mass migration response exercise in Florida, dubbed Operation Vigilant Sentry, that
was designed to prepare for potential mass migration from Cuba in the event of the
collapse of the communist government. Coordinated by the Coast Guard, the
exercise was designed to improve migrant-interdiction skills as well as skills to
intercept vessels heading to Cuba.
U.S. Travel Documents. On July 17, 2007, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs issued a statement maintaining that the United States had only awarded
10,724 visas for permanent legal migration to the United States so far in FY2007 as
of the end of June 2007, out of an annual minimum of 20,000 agreed to in the 1994
bilateral migration accord. The State Department subsequently responded that the
United States was not going to meet its minium quota because Cuba has impaired
the ability of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to operate in several ways. It
maintained that Cuba has refused to allow the U.S. Interests Section to hire local
staff to replace those who have resigned or retired; for over a year, has held at least
28 shipping containers with essential supplies and materials for the operation of the
diplomatic facility; and has refused to issue temporary visas for U.S. technical
personnel to visit Havana to maintain systems in the diplomatic facility.111 In early
October 2007, an official at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana said that the United
States had issued only about 15,000 of the 20,000 emigrant visas and blamed Cuba
because of the inability to hire local personnel.112
On November 21, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security announced that
it was creating a new Cuban Family Reunification Parole (CFRP) Program that
offers beneficiaries of approved family-based immigration visa petitions an
opportunity to come to the United States rather than remain in Cuba to apply for a
green card. According to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the
purpose of the program is to expedite family reunification through safe, legal, and
orderly channel of migration to the United States and to discourage dangerous and
110 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Announces Additional Measures to Combat
Alien Smuggling of Cubans,” and “USCIS Will Further Strengthen Measures that Support
the Reunification of Families Separated by the Castro Regime,” Press Releases, August 11,
2006; Pablo Bachelet, “U.S. Program for Defecting Cuban Doctors a Success,” Miami
Herald, March 12, 2007.
111 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, Sean McCormack, July 18, 2007.
112 Anita Snow, “U.S. Says it Granted 15,000 of 20,000 Visa Quota for Cubans Last Fiscal
Year,” Associated Press, October 1, 2007.
CRS-51
irregular maritime migration.113 Those granted parole into the United States will
count towards the annual 20,000 figure set forth in the 1994 migration accord.
Migration Talks. Semi-annual U.S.-Cuban talks alternating between Cuba
and the United States had been held regularly on the implementation of the 1994 and
1995 migration accords, but the State Department cancelled the 20th round of talks
scheduled for January 2004, and no migration talks have been held since.
According to the State Department, Cuba has refused to discuss five issues
identified by the United States: (1) Cuba’s issuance of exit permits for all qualified
migrants; (2) Cuba’s cooperation in holding a new registration for an immigrant
lottery; (3) the need for a deeper Cuban port used by the U.S. Coast Guard for the
repatriation of Cubans interdicted at sea; (4) Cuba’s responsibility to permit U.S.
diplomats to travel to monitor returned migrants; and (5) Cuba’s obligation to accept
the return of Cuban nationals determined to be inadmissible to the United States.114
In response to the cancellation of the talks, Cuban officials maintained that the U.S.
decision was irresponsible and that Cuba was prepared to discuss all of the issues
raised by the United States.115
Guantanamo Naval Base
The 45-square mile U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has been a
U.S. base since 1903, and under a 1934 treaty that remains in force, the U.S.
presence can only be terminated by mutual agreement or by abandonment by the
United States. When Fidel Castro assumed power in the 1959 Cuban revolution, the
new government gave assurances that it would respect all its treaty commitments,
including the 1934 treaty covering the Guantanamo base. Subsequently, however,
as U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated, the Cuban government opposed the presence
as illegal.
The mission of the base has changed over time. During the Cold War, the base
was viewed as a good location for controlling Caribbean sea lanes, as a deterrent to
the Soviet presence in the Caribbean, and as a location for supporting potential
military operations in the region. In 1994-1995, the base was used to house
thousands of Cubans and Haitians fleeing their homeland, but by 1996 the last of the
refugees had departed, with most Cubans paroled into the United States, pursuant
to a May 1995 U.S.-Cuban migration accord. Since the 1995 accord, the U.S. Coast
Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to Cuba, while
a much smaller number, those deemed at risk for persecution, have been taken to
Guantanamo and then granted asylum in a third country.
Another mission for the Guantanamo base emerged with the U.S.-led global
campaign against terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
113 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
“Fact Sheet: Cuban Family Reunification Program,” November 21, 2007.
114 U.S. Department of State. State Department Regular Briefing, Richard Boucher. January
7, 2004.
115 “Migration Talks Cancelled,” Miami Herald, January 8, 2004.
CRS-52
attacks in the United States. With the U.S. war in Afghanistan in 2001, the United
States decided to send some captured Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters to be imprisoned
in Guantanamo. Although the Cuban government has objected to the U.S. presence
at Guantanamo, it did not initially oppose the new mission of housing detainees.
Defense Minister Raúl Castro noted that, in the unlikely event that a prisoner would
escape into Cuban territory, Cuba would capture the prisoner and return him to the
base.116 The Cuban government, however, has expressed concerns about the
treatment of prisoners at the U.S. base and has said it will keep pressing the
international community to investigate the treatment of terrorist suspects.117 In
January 2005, it denounced what it described as “atrocities” committed at the
Guantanamo base.118
Some Members of Congress have called for the closure of the Guantanamo
detention facility. S. 1249 (Feinstein) and H.R. 2212 (Harman) would require the
President to close the detention facility at Guantanamo within one year, while S.
1469 (Harkin) would require the closure of the facility within 120 days. The final
version of H.R. 1585, the FY2008 defense authorization bill, H.R. 1585, had a
provision (Section 1067) requiring the Secretary of Defense to prepare a report within
60 days on transferring individuals detained at Guantanamo. (An earlier version of
that provision was first added to the bill by H.Amdt. 297 (Moran, Virginia), approved
during May 17, 2007 House floor consideration.) The President ultimately vetoed
H.R. 1585 on December 28, 2007 for other policy reasons, but the new version of the
FY2008 defense authorization bill, H.R. 4986, approved by both houses in January
2008 and signed into law on January 28, 2008 (P.L. 110-181) contains the identical
provision on Guantanamo in Section 1067.
With regard to the future of the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114, Section 210) states that
once a democratically elected Cuban government is in place, U.S. policy is to be
prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to renegotiate
the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms.
116 “Cuba Would Hand Over Escapees, Raúl Castro Says,” Miami Herald, January 20, 2002.
117 For information on terrorist suspects held at Guantanamo, see CRS Report RL31367,
Treatment of “Battlefield Detainees” in the War on Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea; and
CRS Report RS22173, Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
118 Ana Radelat, “Cuba Turns Up Rhetoric on Guantanamo as UN Condemns Human Rights
Abuses,” CubaNews, April 2005.
CRS-53
Legislation in the 110th Congress
Approved Measures
P.L. 110-161 (H.R. 2764). FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act. H.R.
2764 was originally introduced and reported by the House Committee on
Appropriations (H.Rept. 110-197) on June 18, 2007 as the FY2008 State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. The House passed (241-178)
the measure on June 22, 2007. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported the
bill on July 10, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-128), and the Senate passed (81-12) it on
September 6, 2007. On December 17, 2007, H.R. 2764 subsequently became the
vehicle for the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, which included 11 FY2008
appropriations measures. The President signed the measure into law on December
26, 2007.
As signed into law, Division J of the Consolidated Appropriations Act covers
State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies appropriations. The law
has the following Cuba provisions:
! Similar to previous years, Section 607 of Division J would prohibit
direct funding for Cuba. This provision had been included in both
the House and Senate versions of the bill.
! Section 620 of Division J adds Cuba to the list of countries requiring
a special notification to the Appropriations Committees for funds
obligated or expended under the act. This provision had been
included in the Senate version of the bill.
! Section 691(b) of Division J provides that Cubans who supported an
anti-Castro guerrilla group in the 1960s know as the Alzados are
eligible for U.S. refugee status. The Senate version of the bill had
included this provision.
! As set forth in the joint explanatory statement, the measure provides
$45.7 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs as requested by
the Administration. Both the House- and Senate-passed versions of
H.R. 2764 fully funded the Administration’s request for $45.7
million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs. The House
committee-reported bill would have provided $9 million in ESF for
such programs, but during June 21, 2007, floor consideration,
however, the House approved H.Amdt. 351 (Diaz-Balart) by a vote
of 254-170 that increased ESF by $36.7 million in order to fully fund
the Administration’s request. The Senate Appropriations Committee
report to the bill would have provided $15 million in ESF for Cuba
democracy programs, but during September 6, 2007, floor
consideration, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 2694 (Martinez) by
voice vote that increased funding for Cuba democracy programs by
$30.7 million to fully fund the Administration’s request.
CRS-54
! As set forth in the joint explanatory statement, the measure provides
$33.681 million for Radio and TV Marti broadcasting to Cuba,
$5.019 million below the Administration’s request of $38.7 million
and identical to the amount provided for FY2007. Both the House
and Senate committee reports to the bill had recommended $33.681
million for Cuba broadcasting. S.Amdt. 2695 (Martinez), which was
withdrawn from consideration on September 6, 2007, would have
increased funding by $5.019 to fully fund the Administration’s
request.
! The measure does not include contrasting provisions related to
counternarcotics assistance for Cuba that were included in the House
and Senate versions of the bill. Section 673 of the House bill would
have specifically prohibited International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) assistance to the Cuban government. Section
696 of the Senate bill would have provided $1 million in INCLE
assistance for preliminary work by the Department of State, or such
other entity as the Secretary of State may designate, to establish
cooperation with the Cuban government on counternarcotics matters.
The final enacted measure does not include provisions easing Cuba sanctions
that had been included in the House and Senate-committee versions of the FY2008
Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act or the Senate-
committee reported version of the FY2008 Agriculture Appropriations bill.
P.L. 110-96 (S. 1612). International Emergency Economic Powers
Enhancement Act. Introduced and reported by the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs on June 13, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-82). Senate approved, amended,
by unanimous consent on June 26, 2007. House approved by voice vote October 2,
2007. As approved, the bill amends the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA) to increase the potential civil penalty imposed on any person who
commits an unlawful act under the act to not exceed the greater of $250,000 (from
$50,000) or an amount that is twice the amount of the transaction. The bill also
increases a criminal penalty to not more than $1 million and/or 20 years
imprisonment.
S.Res. 573 (Martinez). Celebrates Cuba Solidarity Day, recognizes the
injustices face by the Cuban people, and stands in solidarity with the Cuban peoples
as they continue to work towards democratic changes in their homeland. Introduced
and passed by the Senate on May 21, 2008, by unanimous consent.
Additional Legislative Initiatives
H.Res. 995 (Diaz-Balart, Mario). Commemorates the 12th anniversary of the
1996 shooting down of two unarmed U.S. civilian aircraft by the Cuban regimes.
Introduced February 25, 2008; referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 177 (Lee). Pursuit of International Education (PIE) Act of 2007. Prohibits
the use of funds available to the Department of the Treasury to implement regulations
CRS-55
from June 2004 that tightened restrictions on travel to Cuba for educational activities.
Introduced January 4, 2007; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 216 (Serrano). Baseball Diplomacy Act. Waives certain prohibitions with
respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized baseball.
Introduced January 4, 2007; referred to Committees on Foreign Affairs and Judiciary.
H.R. 217 (Serrano). Cuba Reconciliation Act. Lifts the trade embargo.
Removes provisions restricting trade and other relations with Cuba, including repeal
of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act of 1996, and provisions of Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 related to transactions or payments with
respect to trademarks. Introduced January 4, 2007; referred to the Committees on
Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Judiciary, Financial
Services, Oversight and Government Reform, and Agriculture.
H.R. 275 (Smith, Christopher). Would promote freedom of expression on the
Internet, and protect U.S. businesses from coercion to participate in repression by
authoritarian foreign governments. Introduced January 5, 2007, and referred to
Committees on Foreign Affairs and on Energy and Commerce. Reported by the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs December 10, 2007 (H.Rept. 110-481, Part 1).
H.R. 525 (King). Amends the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of
1996 to require that, in order to determine that a democratically elected government
in Cuba exists, the government extradite to the United States convicted felon William
Morales and all other individuals who are living in Cuba in order to escape
prosecution or confinement for criminal offense committed in the United States.
Introduced January 17, 2007; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 624 (Rangel). Free Trade With Cuba Act. Would lift most economic
sanctions on Cuba, including a trademark sanction in Section 211 of the Department
of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999. Introduced January
22, 2007; referred to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Energy
and Commerce, Judiciary, Financial Services, Oversight and Government Reform,
and Agriculture.
H.R. 654 (Rangel). Export Freedom to Cuba Act of 2007. Would lift overall
restrictions on travel to Cuba. Introduced January 24, 2007; referred to House
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 757 (Delahunt). Cuban-American Family Restoration Act. Would lift
restrictions on family travel and the provision or remittances for family members in
Cuba. Introduced January 31, 2007; referred to House Committee on Foreign
Affairs.
H.R. 1026 (Moran, Jerry). Agricultural Export Facilitation Act of 2007.
Would facilitate the sale of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba by providing for
general license authority for travel-related expenditures for persons engaging in sales
and marketing activities for agricultural products or in the transportation by sea or air
of such products; authorizing a consular officer to issue a temporary visa for a Cuban
CRS-56
national conducting activities related to the purchase of U.S. agricultural goods,
including phytosanitary inspections; clarifying the “payment of cash in advance” term
used in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA)
to mean that the payment by the purchaser and the receipt of such payment to the
seller occurs prior to the transfer of title of the commodity or product to the purchaser
and the release of control of such commodity or product to the purchaser; and
prohibiting the President from restricting direct transfers from a Cuban financial
institution to a U.S. financial institution for U.S. agricultural sales under TSRA.
Introduced February 13, 2007; referred to House Committees on Foreign Affairs,
Judiciary, Financial Services, and Agriculture.
H.R. 1306 (Wexler)/S. 749 (Nelson). Identical bills would modify the
prohibition on recognition by U.S. courts of certain rights relating to certain marks,
trade names, or commercial names. H.R. 1306 introduced March 1, 2007; referred
to House Committee on the Judiciary. S. 749 introduced March 2, 2007; referred to
Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 1679 (Ros-Lehtinen). Caribbean Coral Reef Protection Act. Would
exclude from admission to the United States aliens who have made investments
contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum
resources off its coast; require the President to impose economic sanctions on persons
(including foreign subsidiaries) that are determined to have made an investment equal
to or exceeding $1 million that contributes to the enhancement of Cuba’s ability to
develop petroleum resources of the submerged lands off Cuba’s coast. Introduced
March 26, 2007; referred to House Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the
Committees on Foreign Affairs, Financial Services, and Oversight and Government
Reform. Similar, but not identical, to S. 876 described below.
H.R. 2419 (Peterson). Farm, Nutrition, and Bioenergy Act of 2007. Introduced
May 22, 2007; House passed July 27, 2007. Senate passed December 14, 2007.
During House floor consideration on July 27, 2007, the House rejected (182-245)
H.Amdt. 707 Rangel, that would have clarified the meaning of “payment of cash in
advance” for the sale of agricultural commodities to Cuba; authorized direct transfer
between U.S. and Cuban financial institutions for a product authorized for sale under
the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000; and would have
authorized the issuance of U.S. visas for Cubans to conduct activities, including
phytosanitary inspections, related to the export of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba.
In the Senate, S.Amdt. 3660 (Baucus), which would have eased restrictions on
U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba, was proposed on December 11, 2007, but
subsequently withdrawn the same day. Several amendments regarding Cuba were
submitted, but never proposed: S.Amdt. 3668 (Baucus), would have eased
restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba; S.Amdt. 3796 (Nelson, Bill), would
have required a certification of certain human rights conditions in Cuba before
restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba would be eased; S.Amdt. 3792
(Martinez), would have expressed the sense of the Senate regarding the human rights
situation in Cuba; and S.Amdt. 3793 (Martinez), would have prevented the easing of
restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba as long as the country is identified
by the Secretary of State as a “state sponsor of terror.”
CRS-57
H.R. 2819 (Rangel)/S. 1673 (Baucus). Promoting American Agricultural and
Medical Exports to Cuba Act of 2007. H.R. 2819 introduced June 21, 2007; referred
to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Judiciary, Agriculture, and
Financial Services. S. 1673 introduced June 21, 2007; referred to the Committee on
Finance, which held hearings on December 11, 2007. Among other provisions, the
bills would clarify the meaning of “payment of cash in advance;” authorize direct
transfers between Cuban and U.S. financial institutions for the execution of payments
for sales pursuant to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act;
establish an agricultural export promotion program with respect to Cuba; repeal the
so-called Section 211 Cuba trademark sanction; lift restrictions on travel to Cuba;
repeal an onsite verification requirement for the commercial sale of medicines and
medical devices to Cuba; and increase the airport ticket tax for travel to or from Cuba
by $1.00, with funds going to a newly established Agricultural Export Promotion
Trust Fund.
H.R. 2829 (Serrano). FY2008 Financial Services and General Government
Appropriations Act. Introduced and reported by House Appropriations Committee
(H.Rept. 110-207) June 22, 2007. Reported by Senate Appropriations Committee
July 13, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-129). House passed (240-179) June 28, 2007. As
approved by the House, Section 903 would have prevented Treasury Department
funds from being used to implement a February 2005 regulation that requires the
payment of cash in advance prior to the shipment of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba.
The House adopted the provision during June 28, 2007 floor consideration when it
approved H.Amdt. 467 (Moran, Kansas) by voice vote. The Senate Appropriations
Committee version had a similar provision in Section 619, as well as another
provision in Section 620 that would have allowed for travel to Cuba under a general
license for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods. The Cuba
provisions of both the House and Senate versions of the bill were not included in the
final enacted version of the measure, which was included as Division D of the
FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161, H.R. 2764).
H.R. 3161 (DeLauro)/ S. 1859 (Kohl). FY2008 Agricultural, Rural
Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act. H.R. 3161 introduced and reported by House Appropriations Committee July
24, 2007; House passed August 2, 2007. S. 1859 introduced and reported by Senate
Appropriations Committee July 24, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-134). Section 741 of the
Senate bill would authorize travel to Cuba under a general license for the marketing
and sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba. The Cuba provision in the
Senate version was not included in the final enacted version of the measure, which
was included as Division A of the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L.
110-161, H.R. 2764).
H.R. 3182 (Udall). U.S. Participation in Cuban Energy Exploration Act. Would
allow U.S. persons to participate in energy development offshore from Cuba and
other nearby countries. Introduced July 25, 2007; referred to the Committees on
Foreign Affairs and Ways and Means.
H.R. 3435 (Pickering). SAFE Energy Act of 2007. Includes provisions that
would allow authorize activities and exports for the exploration of hydrocarbon
resources from any portion of any foreign exclusive economic zone that is contiguous
CRS-58
to the exclusive economic zone of the United States (section 201); and that would
allow for travel-related transactions under a general license for travel to Cuba by
persons engaging in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction activities (section 202).
Introduced August 3, 2007; referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and
in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, Science and Technology, Natural
Resources, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Intelligence.
H.R. 5627 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln)/ S. 2777 (Martinez). Similar bills to award
the congressional gold medal to Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, in recognition of his
courageous and unwavering commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba.
Both bills were introduced March 13, 2008, with H.R. 5627 referred to the House
Committee on Financial Services and S. 2777 referred to the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
H.R. 6735 (Hobson). Would terminate the application of restrictions on
exploration, development, and production of oil and gas in areas of the outer
Continental Shelf adjacent to Cuba. Introduced July 31, 2008; referred to the
Committee on Natural Resources.
H.R. 6913 (Flake). Would provide that no funds made available to the
Department of Commerce may be used to implement, administer, or enforce certain
amendments made to regulations relating to license exemptions for gift parcels and
humanitarian donations for Cuba. Introduced September 16, 2008; referred to House
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 6962 (Delahunt). Humanitarian Relief to Cuba Act. Would, for a 180-day
period: allow unrestricted family travel; ease restrictions on remittances by removing
the limit and allowing any American to send remittances to Cuba; and expand the list
of allowable items that may be included in gift parcels. Introduced September 18,
2008; referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
S. 554 (Dorgan). Act For Our Kids. Title I, Section 101 would terminate U.S.
government-sponsored television broadcasting to Cuba and prohibit funding. Title
II, Section 254, the Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2007, would prohibit the
President from regulating or prohibiting travel to or from Cuba by U.S. citizens or
legal residents, or any of the transactions ordinarily incident to such travel.
Introduced February 12, 2007; referred to Senate Committee on Finance.
S. 721 (Enzi). Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2007. Would prohibit the
President from regulating or prohibiting travel to or from Cuba by U.S. citizens or
legal residents, or any of the transaction ordinarily incident to such travel. Introduced
March 1, 2007; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.
S. 876 (Martinez). Would exclude from admission to the United States aliens
who have made investments contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba
to develop its petroleum resources off its coast; require the President to impose
economic sanctions on persons (including foreign subsidiaries) that are determined
to have made an investment equal to or exceeding $1 million that contributes to the
enhancement of Cuba’s ability to develop petroleum resources of the submerged
lands off Cuba’s coast. Introduced March 14, 2007; referred to the Committee on
CRS-59
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Similar, but not identical, to H.R. 1679
described above.
S. 1268 (Dorgan). Would provide for the development of certain outer
Continental resources. Amends the Cuba embargo regulations to provide for general
license authority for travel-related expenditures by persons engaging in hydrocarbon
exploration and extraction activities. Introduced May 2, 2007; referred to the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 1806 (Leahy). Would repeal the so-called Section 211 Cuba trademark
sanction provision of the FY1999 Department of Commerce and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act. Introduced July 17, 2007; referred to Senate Committee on the
Judiciary.
S. 2503 (Nelson, Bill). Would nullify the 1977 Maritime Boundary Agreement
between the United States and Cuba, and would exclude from admission to the
United States any aliens who have directly and significantly contributed to the ability
of Cuba to develop its petroleum resources. Introduced December 18, 2007; referred
to the Committee on the Judiciary.
S. 2953 (Craig). Domestic Offshore Energy Security Act of 2008. Includes
provisions (in section 2) that would: authorize activities and exports for the
exploration of hydrocarbon resources from any portion of any foreign exclusive
economic zone that is contiguous to the exclusive economic zone of the United
States; and allow for travel-related transactions under a general license for travel to
Cuba by persons engaging in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction activities.
Introduced May 1, 2008; referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources.
S. 3001(Levin). FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act. S.Amdt. 5581
(Dodd), submitted on September 15, 2008, would, for a 180-day period: allow
unrestricted family travel; ease restrictions on remittances by removing the limit and
allowing any American to send remittances to Cuba; expand the list of allowable
items that may be included in gift parcels; and allow for unrestricted U.S. cash sales
of food, medicines, and relief supplies to Cuba. The amendment was not considered
and therefore not included in the final bill.
S. 3260 (Durbin). Financial Services and General Government Appropriations
Act, 2009. Introduced and reported by Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept.
110-417) on July 14, 2008. Includes provisions easing restrictions on payment terms
for the sale of agricultural goods to Cuba (section 618), travel relating to the
commercial sale of agricultural and medical goods (section 619), and family travel
(section 620).
S. 3288 (Leahy). Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2009. Introduced and reported by Senate
Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 110-425) July 18, 2008. Includes several Cuba
provisions: section 706 continues a prohibition on assistance to Cuba, unless the
President determines that it is in the national interest of the United States; section 719
continues the provision from FY2008 that requires that any assistance for Cuba go
CRS-60
through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations;
section 779 provides for $1 million for preliminary work by the Department of State,
or other entity designated by the Secretary of State, to establish cooperation with
appropriate Cuban agencies on counternarcotics matters, although the money would
not be available if the Secretary certifies that Cuba 1) does not have in place
procedures to protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in
connection with the interdiction of illegal drugs; and 2) there is credible evidence of
involvement of the government of Cuba in drug trafficking during the preceding 10
years. The Senate Appropriations Committee report to the bill recommended full
funding for the Administration’s requests of $34.392 million for Cuba broadcasting
and $20 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs, and called for the State
Department and USAID to conduct regular evaluations to ensure the cost
effectiveness of the programs.
S. 3289 (Kohl). Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug
Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008. Introduced and
reported by Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 110-426) July 21, 2008.
Includes a provision (section 737) that would ease restrictions on travel to Cuba for
the sale of agricultural and medical goods.
CRS-61
Legislation in the 109th Congress
The following listing consists of enacted appropriations measures with Cuba-
related provisions, FY2007 appropriations bills with Cuba provisions that were not
completed by the end of the 109th Congress, and human rights resolutions that were
approved. For a complete listing of legislative initiatives in the 109th Congress, see
CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
Appropriations Measures
P.L. 109-102 (H.R. 3057). FY2006 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs. Signed into law November 14, 2005. Funds FY2006 democracy
and human rights funding for Cuba. The Administration requested $15 million in
ESF assistance for democracy activities for Cuba. Neither the House nor the Senate
versions addressed this issue, and the conference report did not include a specific
earmark for Cuba.
P.L. 109-108 (H.R. 2862). FY2006 Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act. Reported by Appropriations Committee
(H.Rept. 109-118). House passed June 16, 2005. Senate passed September 15, 2005.
Conference report (H.Rept. 109-272) filed November 7, 2005. House approved
conference November 9; Senate approved conference November 16, 2005. Signed
into law November 22, 2005. The report to the House bill included a committee
recommendation of $27.9 million for Cuba broadcasting, $10 million below the
Administration’s request, and did not provide funding for an aircraft to transmit
Radio and TV Marti programming. Senate action on appropriations for Cuba
broadcasting were included in the Senate version of H.R. 3057 rather than H.R. 2862,
and fully funded the Administration’s request of $37.7 million. The conference
report fully funded the Administration’s request of $37.7 million for Broadcasting
to Cuba under the International Broadcasting Operations account.
H.R. 5384 (Bonilla). FY2007 Agriculture Appropriations bill. Introduced and
reported by House Appropriations Committee May 12, 2006; passed House May 23,
2006. Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version June 22, 2006 (S.Rept.
109-266). The Senate version contained a provision, Section 755, providing for travel
to Cuba under a general license for travel related to the sale of agricultural and
medical goods to Cuba. Currently such travel is provided under a specific license
issued by the Treasury Department on a case-by-case basis. Final action was not
completed by the end of the 109th Congress.
H.R. 5522 (Kolbe). FY2007 Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related
Programs. Introduced June 5, 2006, and reported by the House Appropriations
Committee (H.Rept. 109-486); House passed (373-34) June 9, 2006. The Senate
Appropriations reported its version of the bill July 10, 2006 (S.Rept. 109-277). With
regard to Cuba democracy programs, the Senate-reported version recommended $2.5
million in ESF, $6.5 million less than the request, while the House report to the bill
recognized the work of USAID in promoting democracy and humanitarian assistance
for Cuba and urged the agency to continue to promote its Cuba program. With regard
to counternarcotics cooperation with Cuba, the House-passed bill, in Section 570,
CRS-62
would have provided that no International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) funds may be made available for Cuba, while the Senate-reported version,
in Section 551(e), would have provided $5 million in INCLE funds for preliminary
work to establish cooperation with Cuba. The money would not be available if the
President certified that Cuba did not have in place appropriate procedures to protect
against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection with the
interdiction of illegal drugs and there was evidence of involvement of the Cuban
government in drug trafficking. The Senate-reported version also would have funded
Cuba broadcasting, with the Senate report to the bill recommending full funding of
the Administration’s $36.279 million request. The House would have funded Cuba
broadcasting in H.R. 5672, the FY2007 Science, State, Justice, Commerce and
Related Agencies appropriations bill, described below. Final action was not
completed before the end of the 109th Congress.
H.R. 5576 (Knollenberg). FY2007 Transportation, Treasury, Housing and
Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent
Agencies Appropriations Act. Introduced June 9, 2006; reported by House
Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-495). House passed (406-22) June 14,
2006. Reported by Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 109-293) July 26,
2006. Both the House and Senate versions of the bill include a provision (Section 950
in the House version and Section 846 in the Senate version) that prohibits funds from
being used to implement tightened restrictions on financing for U.S. agricultural
exports to Cuba that were issued in February 2005. In the House bill, the provision
was added by H.Amdt. 1049 (Moran, Kansas), approved by voice vote during floor
consideration on June 14, 2006. Final action on the measure was not completed by
the end of the 109th Congress.
H.R. 5672 (Wolf). FY2007 Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related
Agencies appropriations. Introduced June 22, 2006; reported by House
Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-520). House passed June 29, 2006. As
approved, Cuba broadcasting is to be funded under the International Broadcasting
Operations account. The report to the bill recommends $36.102 million for Cuba
broadcasting, including $2.7 million to improve transmission capabilities via aerostat
for broadcasting TV Marti. Final action on the measure was not completed before
the end of the 109th Congress.
Human Rights Resolutions
H.Con.Res. 81 (Menendez). Expresses the sense of Congress regarding the
two-year anniversary of the human rights crackdown in Cuba. Introduced March 2,
2005; approved by the House Committee on International Relations March 9, 2005.
House passed (398-27, 2 present) April 27, 2005.
H.Res. 193 (Diaz-Balart, Mario). Expresses support of the House of
Representatives to the organizers and participants of the May 20, 2005, meeting in
Havana of the Assembly to Promote Civil Society. Introduced April 6, 2005;
approved by the Committee on International Relations April 27, 2005. House passed
(392-22, 1 present) May 10, 2005.
CRS-63
H.Res. 388 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln). Expresses the sense of the House of
Representatives regarding the Cuban government’s extreme repression against
members of Cuba’s pro-democracy movement in July 2005; condemns gross human
rights violations committed by the Cuban regime; calls on the Secretary of State to
initiate an international solidarity campaign on behalf of the immediate release of all
Cuban political prisoners; calls on the European Union to reexamine its current
policy toward the Cuban regime; and calls on the U.S. Permanent Representative to
the United Nations and other international organizations to work with member
countries of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) to ensure a strong
resolution on Cuba at the 62nd session of the UNCHR. Introduced July 26, 2005.
House passed (393-31) September 29, 2005.
S.Res. 140 (Martinez). Expresses support of the Senate for the May 20, 2005
meeting in Havana of the Assembly to Promote Civil Society. Introduced May 12,
2005; Senate approved by unanimous consent May 17, 2005.
S.Res. 469 (Lieberman). Condemns the April 25, 2006, beating and
intimidation of Cuban dissident Martha Beatriz Roque. Introduced May 8, 2006;
Senate passed May 25, 2006, by unanimous consent.
CRS-64
For Additional Reading
Active CRS Reports
CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by Mark
P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raúl Castro, by
Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL34523, Financial Services and General Government (FSGG):
FY2009 Appropriations, coordinated by Garrett Hatch.
CRS Report RS22094, Lawsuits Against State Sponsors of Terrorism, by Jennifer K.
Elsea.
CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by
Jennifer K. Elsea.
CRS Report RL32014, WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in
Pending Cases, by Jeanne J. Grimmett.
Archived CRS Reports
CRS Report RS20450, The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal Basics, by Larry M. Eig.
CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy
Approaches, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL31740, Cuba: Issues for the 108th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL30806, Cuba: Issues for the 107th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan and
Maureen Taft-Morales.
CRS Report RL30628, Cuba: Issues and Legislation in the 106th Congress, by Mark
P. Sullivan and Maureen Taft-Morales.
CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959 -1999,
by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS20468, Cuban Migration Policy and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
CRS-65
CRS Report RL33499, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S.
Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation, by Remy Jurenas.
CRS Report RS22094, Lawsuits Against State Supporters of Terrorism: An
Overview, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
CRS Report RL32826, The Medical Device Approval Process and Related
Legislative Issues, by Erin D. Williams.
CRS Report 94-636, Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and
Issues Through 1994, by Susan B. Epstein and Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS21764, Restricting Trademark Rights of Cubans: WTO Decision and
Congressional Response, by Margaret Mikyung Lee.