Order Code RS21922
Updated September 23, 2008
Afghanistan: Government Formation
and Performance
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The central government’s limited writ and perceived corruption are helping sustain
a Taliban insurgency and painting President Hamid Karzai as a weak leader. However,
ethnic disputes have been confined to political debate and competition, enabling Karzai
to focus on reversing the security deterioration and on his re-election bid in the fall of
2009. See CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and
U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Post-Conflict Political Transition and Political Landscape
U.S. policy has been to support and extend the authority of Afghanistan’s President
Hamid Karzai and his central government, predicated on the assumption that it is weak
or absent governance that cause some in the population to turn to Taliban insurgents as
a source of stability and justice. Karzai’s is the first fully elected government in Afghan
history, although there were parliamentary elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah
(the last were in 1969). Presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections, and
adoption of a constitution were part of a post-Taliban transition roadmap established by
a United Nations-sponsored agreement of major Afghan factions signed in Bonn,
Germany on December 5, 2001, (“Bonn Agreement”),1 after the Taliban had fallen. (The
subsequent political transition process is described in the table at the end of this paper.)
The elected Afghan parliament integrates all the various ethnicities and sects, but the
cabinet has come to be dominated by ethnic Pashtuns (who are about 42% of the
population and traditionally have governed Afghanistan). In an attempt to stabilize
Afghanistan, a 46,000 troop NATO-led peacekeeping coalition there, to which the United
States provides about 14,500 forces (another 19,000 U.S. troops are under direct U.S.
command), sometimes works with local leaders who may buck central government
authority, although substantial local autonomy is a typical pattern of Afghan governance.
1 For text, see [http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm].

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Many seats in parliament, particularly the elected lower house (Wolesi Jirga), are
held by personalities and factions prominent in recent wars. The lower house is divided
into pro-Karzai, opposition and “independent” deputies that are not strictly organized
according to Afghanistan’s 90 registered political parties. Karzai opposes forming his own
party, but his support base in the Wolesi Jirga includes former members of the hardline
conservative Pashtun-based Hizb-e-Islam party; supporters of Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf
(a prominent Islamic conservative mujahedin party leader who was defeated for the
speakership); and several Karzai clan members including elder brother Qayyum, cousin
Jamil Karzai, and relative by marriage, Aref Nurzai. Also pro-Karzai are former militia
and Taliban leaders, including Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who had gained fame for
directing the Afghan assault on the Al Qaeda redoubt at Tora Bora during the U.S.-led
war; Pacha Khan Zadran (Paktia) who, by some accounts, helped Osama bin Laden escape
Tora Bora; Mullah Abdul Salam (“Mullah Rocketi”), from Zabol; and Mohammad Islam
Mohammadi, who ran Bamiyan Province during the Taliban’s destruction of the large
Buddha statues there in March 2001 (he was assassinated on January 27, 2007).
The “opposition,” led by ethnic minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara) of the anti-
Taliban “Northern Alliance,” view as a betrayal Karzai’s firing of many of the non-
Pashtuns from the cabinet (such as former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah,
dismissed in 2006). However, the faction says its disputes with Karzai will remain
political and peaceful. In April 2007, Wolesi Jirga Speaker Yunus Qanooni and former
Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani, both prominent Northern Alliance figures,
organized an opposition bloc called the “National Front.” Also in the bloc are both of
Karzai’s vice presidents; and some Soviet-era security figures such as Sayed Muhammad
Gulabzoi (Khost Province) and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, who chairs parliament’s defense
committee. The bloc advocates amending the constitution to give more power to
parliament and to institute selection of governors and mayors by the elected provincial
councils rather than by the President. The National Front bloc opposes Karzai’s
negotiations with Taliban fighters, which Karzai says is necessary to get them off the
battlefield but which the bloc believes is a plan for further Pashtun consolidation.
The opposition to Karzai first showed its strength in March 2006, following the
December 19, 2005 inauguration of parliament, by requiring Karzai’s cabinet to be
approved individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition leverage. However,
Karzai rallied his support and all but 5 of the 25 nominees were confirmed. One of those
defeated was a female nominee for Minister of Women’s Affairs, a post that had always
been held by a female since it was established in 2002; this also left Afghanistan without
any women ministers. Replacement nominees for those voted down were approved on
August 7, 2006. In May 2006, the opposition compelled Karzai to change the nine-
member Supreme Court, the highest judicial body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic
conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as chief justice. Parliament approved his new Court
choices in July 2006, all of whom are trained in modern jurisprudence.
In May 2007, the National Front achieved a majority in parliament to oust Karzai ally
Rangin Spanta as Foreign Minister. However, Karzai refused to replace him, instead
seeking a Supreme Court ruling that Spanta should remain, on the grounds that his ouster
was related to a refugee issue (Iran’s expulsion of 100,000 Afghan refugees), not a foreign
policy issue. The Court has, to date, supported Karzai, and Spanta remains in office.

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Karzai and the National Front often battle for the support of the many
“independent” deputies in the Wolesi Jirga. Among them are several outspoken women,
intellectuals, and business leaders, such as 35-year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), a
leading critic of war-era faction leaders. In May 2007 parliament voted to suspend her for
this criticism for the duration of her term, but she is challenging the expulsion in court.
Others in this camp include Ms. Fauzia Gailani (Herat Province); Ms. Shukria Barekzai,
editor of Woman Mirror magazine; and Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai
minister who champions parliamentary powers. U.S.-based International Republican
Institute (IRI) has helped train independents; the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has
assisted the more established factions.
Karzai has fewer critics in the Meshrano Jirga, partly because of his constitutionally-
allotted 34 appointments (one-third of that body). Karzai engineered the appointment as
Speaker an ally, Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, a noted Islamic scholar who headed the post-
Communist mujahedin government for one month (May 1992) and who now heads the
effort to reconcile with Taliban figures (Peace and Reconciliation Commission, or
“PTSD” program). The deputy speaker is Hamid Gaylani, member of a pro-Karzai family
with five members in parliament. Karzai also appointed Northern Alliance military leader
Muhammad Fahim, perhaps to compensate for his removal as Defense Minister, although
Fahim resigned after only a few months and later joined the National Front. Another
Karzai appointment was Taliban-era religious affairs deputy minister Arsala Rahmani.
There is one Hindu, and 23 women; 17 of the women are Karzai appointees and 6 were
selected in their own right. International human rights organizations criticized the
Meshrano Jirga on February 3, 2008 for issuing a statement supporting a death sentence
against 23 year old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing material critical
of Islam; it later retracted the statement. Kambaksh’s remains in jail pending appeal,
Karzai said he would likely pardon him if the sentence is upheld.
On less contentious issues, the executive and the legislature have worked well. Since
the end of 2007, parliament has passed a labor law, a mines law, a law on economic
cooperatives, and a convention on tobacco control. It also confirmed Karzai nominees
for a new Minster of Refugee Affairs, head of the Central Bank, and the final justice to
fill out the Supreme Court. Both houses of parliament, whose budgets are controlled by
the Ministry of Finance, are staffed by about 275 Afghans, reporting to a “secretariat.”
There are 18 oversight committees, a research unit and a library.
Government Performance2
U.S. policy has been to help expand Afghan institutions and to urge adoption of
performance criteria based on merit and competence, and not ethnic or factional loyalties.
Afghan ministries are growing their staffs and technologically capabilities, although still
suffering from a low resource and skill base. U.S. officials have generally refrained from
criticizing Karzai when, in the interests of political harmony, he has indulged faction
2 Some information in this section is from the State Department reports on human rights in
Afghanistan for 2007. March 11, 2008 [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100611.htm];
the International Religious Freedom Report, released September 19, 2008.
[http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/2007/90225.htm]; and Defense Department “Report on Progress
Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” June 2008

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leaders with appointments and tolerated corruption. Karzai argues that compromises with
faction leaders and tribes are needed to keep the government intact as he focuses on
fighting “unrepentant” Taliban insurgents. However, partly as a result of these
compromises, many Afghans are said to be losing faith in the government. Some such
as former Coordinator for Counter-Narcotics and Justice Reform Thomas Schweich, in
a July 27, 2008 New York Times article, have gone so far as to assert that Karzai, to build
political support, is deliberately tolerating officials in his government who are allegedly
involved in the narcotics trade. The perception has not been altered by Karzai’s decisions
in 2007 to empower two Supreme Court chief justice Abdul Salam Azimi and Attorney
General Abdul Jabbar Sabit to try to reduce corruption, instill confidence in the justice
sector, and enhance government accountability. Karzai also formed an anti-corruption
commission. (Karzai fired Sabit on July 16, 2008 after he declared his intention to run
against Karzai in 2009 presidential elections.)
Although Karzai is said to remain relatively popular (about 60% support, suggesting
some support among non-Pashtuns), his popularity is also being undermined by civilian
casualties resulting from U.S./NATO operations. These casualties have caused additional
domestic criticism of Karzai as a U.S. “puppet.” Following an August 21, 2008, airstrike
that some Afghans said killed 90 civilians (the incident is in dispute) near Herat city, the
Afghan cabinet called for bringing foreign forces under Afghan law, replacing an 2001
interim “status of forces agreement” with the coalition. Afghanistan and the United States
have agreed to a joint investigation of the incident.
Karzai has marginalized several major regional strongmen but without confronting
them to the point where their followers go into armed rebellion. This strategy has
allowed Karzai to husband government resources against the Taliban insurgency.
However, some have cited Karzai’s recent handling of a prominent member of the
National Front, Uzbek leader Abdurrashid Dostam, as evidence of political weakness.
Dostam is often referred to as a “warlord” because of his command of partisans in his
largely Uzbek redoubt in northern Afghanistan (Jowzjan and Balkh provinces), and he is
widely accused of human rights abuses of political opponents in the north. To try to
separate him from his militia, in 2005 Karzai appointed him to the post of chief of staff
of the armed forces. Karzai similarly curbed prominent Tajik political leader, former
Herat governor Ismail Khan, by appointing him Minister of Energy and Water. On
February 4, 2008, Afghan police surrounded Dostam’s villa in Kabul in response to
reports that his followers attacked and beat an ethnic Turkmen rival, but Karzai has not
ordered his arrest for fear of stirring unrest among Dostam’s followers. In February
2007, both houses passed a law giving amnesty to so-called “warlords”; Karzai altered the
draft to give victims the right to seek justice for any abuses; Karzai did not sign a
modified version in May 2007, leaving the status unclear.
To try to improve local governance, in August 2007 Karzai placed the governor (and
district security officials) selection process in a new Independent Directorate for Local
Governance (IDLG) — and out of the Interior Ministry. In one high profile move, in
March 2008 Karzai removed governor of Helmand Asadullah Wafa for his inability to
expand governance or to curb poppy cultivation in that most violent of all provinces; he
was replaced by Gulab Mangal, who is from Laghman Province and who the U.N. Office
of Drugs and Crime said in an August 2008 report is expected to take effective action
against poppy cultivation in the province. That same report said it was partly because of
improving governance in some provinces that there are now 18 “poppy free” provinces

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(out of 34), up from 13 in the same report in 2007. The governor of Qandahar was
changed (to former General Rahmatullah Raufi, replacing Asadullah Khalid) after the
August 7, 2008 Taliban assault on the Qandahar prison that led to the freeing of several
hundred Taliban fighters incarcerated there. The IDLG also has replaced the governor of
Ghazni Province, and at least two other governors are slated to be changed. The
governor of Lowgar province was killed in a September 2008 insurgent bombing.

On human rights issues, the overall State Department judgment is that the country’s
human rights record remains poor, but primarily because of the continuing insurgency,
and the weakness of and corruption in the central government. The security forces are
widely cited for abuses and corruption, including torture and abuse of detainees. Karzai
dropped a July 2006 proposal to revive, although in a far more circumscribed form, a
“Ministry of Supporting Virtue and Discouraging Vice,” a ministry that was used by the
Taliban to commit major abuses against women. In debate over a new press law, both
houses of parliament have approved a joint version, but Karzai has vetoed it on the
grounds that it gives the government too much control over private media. In the absence
of a new law, Afghanistan’s conservative Council of Ulema (Islamic scholars) has been
ascendant. With the Council’s backing, in April 2008 the Ministry of Information and
Culture banned five Indian-produced soap operas on the grounds that they are too risque,
although the programs have been restored as of August 2008. This reportedly had a
chilling effect on the 40 private radio stations, seven television networks, and 350
independent newspapers that have opened since the Taliban fell. At the same time, press
reports say that there are growing numbers of arrests or intimidation of journalists who
criticize the central government or local leaders.
The September 2008 International Religious Freedom report says the Afghan
government took limited steps during the year to increase religious freedom. Still,
members of minority religions, including Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and Baha’i’s, often
face discrimination; the Supreme Court declared the Baha’i faith to be a form of
blasphemy in May 2007. In October 2007, Afghanistan resumed enforcing the death
penalty after a four-year moratorium, executing 15 criminals. Afghanistan was again
placed in Tier 2 in the State Department’s June 4, 2008, Trafficking in Persons report for
2008 on the grounds that it does not fully comply with minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking in persons. However, the report says it is making significant
efforts to do so, including by establishing anti-trafficking offices in the offices of the
Attorney General in all 34 provinces.
Funding Issues. USAID has spent about $440 million (FY2002-2007) to build
democracy and rule of law, and assist the elections. A revised request for FY2008
supplemental funding included $100 million to assist with the presidential elections
planned for 2009. For FY2009, $707 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) has been
requested which will be used in part to enable the Karzai government to “extend the reach
of good governance....”

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Afghanistan Political Transition Process
Interim
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key security positions
Administration dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai reaffirmed as leader by June 2002 “emergency
loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional Afghan assembly).
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong presidency, a rebuke to
Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance presidential power, but gave parliament
significant powers to compensate. Gives men and women equal rights under the law, allows for political
parties as long as they are not “un-Islamic”; allows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam
(Chapter 7, Article 15). Set out electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential, provincial,
and district elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-hereditary position of “Father of
the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential
Elections for President and two vice presidents, for five year term, held October 9, 2004. Turnout was
Election
80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia Masud, a Tajik and brother of
legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud, who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days
before the September 11 attacks, and Karim Khalili, a Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents.
Second highest vote getter, Northern Alliance figure (and Education Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%).
One female ran, got about 1%. Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq got 11.7%; and Dostam won 10%.
Funded with $90 million in international aid, including $40 million from U.S. (FY2004 supplemental,
P.L. 108-106).
Parliamentary
Elections held September 18, 2005 on Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates stood as
Elections
individuals, not part of party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House
of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elder). Voting was for one
candidate only, although number of representatives varied by province, ranging from 2 (Panjshir
Province) to 33 (Kabul Province). Herat has 17; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni, 11 seats
each. Target for lower house is 25% women - top two women vote getters per each of 34 provinces.
Upper house appointed by Karzai (34 seats, half of which are to be women), by the provincial councils
(34 seats), and district councils (remaining 34 seats). Because district elections (400 district councils)
were not held, provincial councils selected 68 on interim basis. 2,815 candidates for Wolesi Jirga,
including 347 women. Turnout was 57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5 million registered. Funded by $160
million in international aid, including $45 million from U.S. (FY2005 supplemental appropriation, P.L.
109-13).
Provincial
Provincial elections held September 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections. Exact powers
Elections/
vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial councils size range from 9 to the
District
29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. 3,185 candidates, including 279 women. According to
Elections
constitution, provincial governors appointed by Karzai, not by the provincial councils. Some criticize the
provincial election system as disproportionately weighted toward large districts within each province.
District elections have not been held due to complexity and potential tensions of drawing district
boundaries.
Cabinet
Full-term 27 seat cabinet named by Karzai in December 2004. Heavily weighted toward Pashtuns, and
created new Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. Rahim Wardak named Defense Minister, replacing Northern
Alliance military leader Mohammad Fahim. Qanooni not in cabinet, subsequently was selected Wolesi
Jirga Speaker. Northern Alliance figure Dr. Abdullah replaced as Foreign Minister in March 2006 cabinet
appointed after parliamentary elections.
Next Elections
Presidential and provincial elections to be held in fall 2009; parliamentary elections in 2010. Karzai said
in August 2008 that he is seeking re-election; the two-round election virtually assures victory by a
Pashtun. Anti-Karzai Pashtuns attempting to coalesce around one challenger, possibly former Interior
Minister Ali Jalali (who resigned in 2005 over Karzai’s compromises with faction leaders), or former
Finance Minister and Pashtun hardliner Ashraf Ghani. Former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah (Tajik)
might run as “Northern Alliance candidate” after Karzai failed to recruit him to run as his first vice
presidential running mate. Others in the Northern Alliance faction, Qanooni and Rabbani, reportedly
leaning against a run. Other contenders include Dostam; Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqqeq; Ramazan
Bashardost (another Hazara); Sabit (Pashtun, mentioned above); and Pashtun monarchist figures Pir
Gaylani and Hedayat Arsala Amin. Rumors have abated that U.S. Ambassador to U.N., Afghan-born
Zalmay Khalilzad, might himself run, although some say this issue is still open. Karzai’s reported 63%
approval rating, suggests re-election is still likely. Each election to cost $100 million.

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