Order Code RL34387
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches,
Results, and Issues for Congress
Updated September 22, 2008
Catherine Dale
Specialist in International Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches,
Results, and Issues for Congress
Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was launched on March 20, 2003, with the
immediate stated goal of removing Saddam Hussein’s regime and destroying its
ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists.
Over time, the focus of OIF shifted from regime removal to the more open-ended
mission of helping the Government of Iraq (GoI) improve security, establish a system
of governance, and foster economic development.
Over time, an insurgency gained strength in Iraq and violence escalated. In
January 2007, the Bush Administration announced a new strategy, the “new way
forward,” which included both a troop surge and new counter-insurgency approaches
that emphasized population security and reconciliation. The last surge brigade
redeployed from Iraq without replacement in July 2008.
Most observers agree that security conditions in Iraq have improved markedly
since mid-2007. In August 2008, then-Commanding General of Multi-National
Force-Iraq, General David Petraeus, noted that there had been “significant progress”
but argued that it was “still not self-sustaining.”1 On September 9, President Bush,
calling the decision a “return on success,” announced that about 8,000 additional U.S.
troops would redeploy from Iraq without replacement by February 2009.
The next major OIF development is likely to be the conclusion of a U.S.-Iraqi
Status of Forces-like agreement (SOFA) that establishes a legal basis for the presence
of U.S. forces in Iraq after the expiration of the current United Nations mandate on
December 31, 2008. Constraints imposed by the SOFA are expected to have a
bearing on the conduct of U.S. military operations in Iraq.
Near-term issues include determining how best to build on recent security gains;
assessing “how much U.S. help is enough” in terms of funding, personnel, and other
assistance, to support the GoI but also to encourage its independence; establishing the
criteria for further troop drawdowns; and continuing to revise the organization and
focus of the Iraqi Security Forces training and advisory mission.
Longer-term Iraq strategy and policy considerations include clarifying long-term
U.S. strategic objectives related to Iraq and shaping a more traditional future bilateral
relationship with Iraq; defining U.S. policy toward Iranian intervention in Iraq; and
assessing the implications of OIF “lessons learned” for the future of U.S. military
forces and for U.S. government inter-agency collaboration in general.
This report is designed to provide an assessment of current OIF developments,
in the context of relevant background, in order to support congressional consideration
of these short-term and long-term strategy and policy issues.
1 Rod Nordland, “No Victory Dances,” interview with General David Petraeus, Newsweek,
August 21, 2008.

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Contents
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Current Situation: Strategic and Operational Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Operational Dynamics: Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Strategic Dynamics: Potential “Spoilers” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Diminishing U.S. Leverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Next Steps: Policy Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
U.S. Troop Drawdowns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Legal Basis for U.S. Troop Presence in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
How Much Help Is Enough? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Further Troop Drawdowns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Future of the Iraqi Security Forces Training Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Future of the U.S. Forces Footprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Coordination on Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Civil-Military Roles and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Strategic Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Clarifying and Updating U.S. Strategic Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Shaping a Long-Term U.S. Presence in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Defining U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Intervention in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . 19
Assessing the Implications of OIF Lessons for the Future of
the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Applying OIF Lessons to Interagency Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Options Available to Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Structure and Aim of the Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Decision to Go to War in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Antecedents in the 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Bush Administration Strategy and Role of the United Nations . . . . . . . . . . 24
Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
War Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Strategic Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Military Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Planning for Major Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Post-War Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Inter-Agency Post-War Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Military Post-War Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Organizational Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Major Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Early Infiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
The Launch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
The Ground Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Iraqi Contributions to Major Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
End of Major Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Post-Major Combat: Basis and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

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Legal Basis for Coalition Presence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Formal Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Iraqi Request for a Multinational Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Status of Forces Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Coalition Command Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Post-Major Combat: The Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Structure and Footprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Headquarters Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Provincial Iraqi Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
U.S. Forces in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Coalition Partner Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Post-Major Combat: Security Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Major Sources and Forms of Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Sunni Extremism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Shi’a Extremism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Nature of Sectarian Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Criminality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Other Security Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Post-Major Combat: Military Strategy and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Nomenclature: Characterizing the Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Military Strategy and Operations During Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Operation Phantom Fury (Fallujah II) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Counter-Insurgency in Tal Afar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
“Clear, Hold, Build” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Operation Together Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
New Way Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
“New Way Forward” National Strategy: Theory of the Case . . . . . . . 72
Surge Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Surge Military Strategy: Theory of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Surge Operations in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Military Operations in 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Counter-IED Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Special Operations Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Air Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Requirement for New Iraqi Security Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
ISF Training Efforts During the Formal Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Unity of Effort: Creation of Multi-National Security Transition
Command-Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
ISF Training: Theory of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
ISF Training: Organizational Structure and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . 93
ISF Training: Transition Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Interior Ministry Transition Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Defense Ministry Transition Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
ISF Training: Unit Partnering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Iraqi Security Forces: The Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

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Iraqi Security Forces: Evaluating the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Iraqi Security Forces as a Whole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Iraqi Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Iraqi Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Iraqi Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Iraqi Special Operations Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Iraqi Police Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Iraqi National Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Department of Border Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Ministry of the Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Ministry of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Iraqi Population: “Reconciliation” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Coalition Outreach to the Disaffected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
“Awakening” Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Origins of the Awakening Movement in Al Anbar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Spread of the Awakening Movements to the North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Spread of the Awakening Movements to the South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Security Volunteers and “Sons of Iraq” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Who the “Sons of Iraq” (SoIs) Are . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Origins of the “Sons of Iraq” Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
How the “Sons of Iraq” System Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Security Volunteers in Al Anbar: Provincial Security Force . . . . . . . 127
Iraqi Government and Other Views of the “Sons of Iraq” . . . . . . . . . 128
“Sons of Iraq” Integration into Permanent Jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
GoI Assumption of Responsibility for the SoIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Detainee Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
“COIN Inside the Wire” Detainee Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Detainee Releases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Civil/Military Partnership in Governance and Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Civil/Military Partnership in Iraq: Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Provincial Reconstruction Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Coordination Between PRTs and Military Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Military Role in Governance and Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Assessing the Results to Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Security Situation by the Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Overall Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Iraqi Civilian Deaths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Weapons Caches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
High-Profile Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Explaining the Security Gains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Additional CRS Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

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List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
List of Tables
Table 1. Iraqi Security Forces as of July 31, 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

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Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies,
Approaches, Results, and Issues
for Congress
Overview
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) — the U.S.-led coalition military operation in
Iraq — is ongoing, and Members of Congress, practitioners, and observers have been
debating the United States’ next steps in Iraq. One key decision concerns which U.S.
national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq and the region, should guide further
U.S. engagement. A second key decision concerns the timing, pace, and nature of
the transition of the U.S. effort in Iraq from counter-insurgency operations to a more
traditional bilateral relationship.
Background
OIF was launched on March 20, 2003. The immediate goal, as stated by the
Bush Administration, was to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime, including destroying
its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists.
The broad, longer-term objective included helping Iraqis build “a new Iraq that is
prosperous and free.”2 In October 2002, Congress had authorized the President to
use force against Iraq, to “defend the national security of the United States against the
continuing threat posed by Iraq,” and to “enforce all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”3
After the initial combat operations, the focus of OIF shifted from regime
removal to the more open-ended mission of helping an emerging new Iraqi leadership
improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic
development. Over time, challenges to the emerging Iraqi leadership from
homegrown insurgents and some foreign fighters mounted. Sectarian violence grew,
catalyzed by the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra.
Accordingly, the character of the war evolved from major combat operations to a
multifaceted counter-insurgency (COIN) and reconstruction effort.
2 See “President Bush Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003,” the televised speech that
included a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html].
3 See “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,” H.J.Res.
114, Section 3(a), signed into law on October 16, 2002, (P.L.107-243). The Senate vote was
77-23, and the House vote 296-133.

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CRS-2
In January 2007, in an attempt to reverse the escalation of violence, President
Bush announced a new strategic approach, the “New Way Forward,” including a
“surge” of additional U.S. forces. The troop surge included five Army brigade
combat teams (BCTs), a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and two Marine
battalions. More importantly, most observers agree, the surge institutionalized COIN
approaches on the ground, designed to promote population security, such as living
among the local population at small outposts.
Over the course of the surge, observers generally agree, security conditions on
the ground improved markedly. In August 2008, outgoing Commanding General of
Multi-National Force-Iraq, General David Petraeus, agreed that there had been
“significant progress” but argued that it was “still not self-sustaining.” “We’re not
celebrating,” he commented, and there are “no victory dances in the end zone.”4
Practitioners and observers have identified a number of factors that may have
contributed to these improvements, including the additional surge forces; new and
institutionalized counter-insurgency approaches concerning population security and
reconciliation; the application of high-end technological capabilities by Special
Operations Forces (SOF) and closer integration between SOF and conventional
forces; the accumulated experience of U.S. leaders at all levels after multiple tours
in Iraq; the growing numbers and capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces; the
ground-up rejection of violence and support for the coalition by many Sunni Arabs;
and the ceasefire declared by young Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and the
abandonment of violence by many of his followers.
While conventional, force-on-force wars tend to end with the unequivocal defeat
of one party, the parameters for “mission success” in counter-insurgency efforts like
OIF tend to be less definitive and more subject to qualitative interpretation. OIF
remains more likely to end with a policy decision by the U.S. or Iraqi government,
or both, than with a decisive military victory on the battlefield.
Current Situation: Strategic and Operational Dynamics
Operational Dynamics: Transitions. From an operational perspective, the
year 2008 to date has witnessed several major but uneven transitions. First, the
substantial security improvements achieved over the course of the “surge” have
continued to hold and have grown further, with some fluctuations during combat
operations in specific regions.5 Second, most experts believe that the operational
capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have continued to grow, reflected in —
and catalyzed by — ISF operational experiences in Basra, Sadr City, Amarah, Mosul,
and Diyala. According to U.S. commanders, the March 2008 ISF operations in
Basra, targeting Shi’a militias, were poorly planned and required a strong rescue
effort by coalition forces. The August operations in Diyala, targeting affiliates of Al
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) were planned by the Iraqis in advance, but still required coalition
4 Rod Nordland, “No Victory Dances,” interview with General David Petraeus, Newsweek,
August 21, 2008.
5 Interviews with MNF-I officials, August and September 2008.

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CRS-3
forces to provide enablers and to help hold areas once they were cleared.6 Some U.S.
officials suggest that the ultimate success of these operations, facilitated by the
coalition, has given Iraqi leaders disproportionate confidence in the capabilities of
the ISF7.
A third transition is that formal Government of Iraq (GoI) responsibility for
security has grown, as additional provinces have transitioned to “provincial Iraqi
control” (PIC). In practice, PIC arrangements vary from province to province, and
some coalition officials suggest that the move of western Anbar province to PIC, on
September 1, 2008, may have been premature.8 Fourth, as the ISF’s basic capabilities
have improved, the coalition’s approaches to training and partnering with the ISF
have evolved substantially though unevenly across Iraq. In terms of substance, many
embedded “transition teams” have shifted the training focus toward more advanced
skills. In terms of organization, the use of unit-to-unit partnering, complementing the
work of transition teams, has grown substantially. Fifth, the geographical focus of
U.S. forces in Iraq is shifting somewhat from north to south, in part in anticipation
of future challenges, and in part in response to the withdrawal and expected future
drawdowns of coalition partner forces. Sixth and finally, as civilian-led Provincial
Reconstruction Teams have grown, they have taken the lead in some efforts formerly
led by the U.S. military. Nevertheless, the military’s extensive presence on the
ground at district and local levels, compared with the limited number of U.S. civilian
experts, means that in practice, the military continues to play a strong “supporting”
role in helping Iraqis develop civil capacity.
Strategic Dynamics: Potential “Spoilers”. The operational evolutions
outlined above have unfolded against a backdrop of several key strategic challenges
— potential “spoilers” — that could disrupt not only security conditions on the
ground but also progress toward a unified and stable Iraq. One major challenge is
resolving the political status of the multi-ethnic and oil-rich city of Kirkuk, together
with other “disputed territories” along the Green Line that divides the Kurdistan
Regional Government from the rest of Iraq. While Kirkuk itself has been relatively
calm, coalition and Iraqi officials in Kirkuk note with concern that outside players
with strong vested interests, including ethnically based Iraqi political parties and
supporters of Iraqi Turkmen in Iraq’s neighboring state Turkey, sometimes use
inflammatory language to stir up tensions in the city.9
A second major challenge concerns how effectively Sunni Arabs, who are
concentrated in western and central Iraq, are incorporated socially, economically, and
politically into the Iraqi polity. A particular concern is the future of the Sons of Iraq
6 Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008.
7 Interviews with civilian and military U.S. officials, Baghdad, August 2008.
8 Interviews with commanders serving under MNF-I, August 2008.
9 Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, and with the Governor of
at Ta’amin province (of which Kirkuk is the capital), August 2008. U.S. commanders
describe a summer 2008 visit to Kirkuk by the Iraqi Minister of Defense, who was
reportedly surprised to discover, in contrast to information he had received, that there were
not “two Kurdish pesh merga divisions” in Kirkuk.

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CRS-4
(SoI) “community watch” program — a majority of whose participants are Sunni
Arab, including some former insurgents. Key Shi’a officials in the GoI have long
been wary of the SoIs, and while some formal mechanisms are in place to integrate
them into security and civilian jobs, the process has been very slow. The GoI has
announced its intention to assume responsibility for the SoI program as of October
1, 2008. Coalition officials have expressed concerns about the possible security
repercussions if the GoI were to shut down the program and fail to secure alternative
employment for its participants.10
A third major challenge is the potential for violence in “the south,” home to a
long-standing and growing competition for power and resources between well-
established Shi’a political factions backed by militias that have sometimes used
violence, and also to tribal Shi’a who may be just beginning to find a public voice.
Against that volatile backdrop in southern Iraq, both U.S. and Iraqi officials remain
concerned about Iranian interventions — economic, social, and sometimes “military”
in the form of munitions and activities by proxies.11
Diminishing U.S. Leverage. Meanwhile, U.S. practitioners in Iraq, both
civilian and military, suggest that the appetite of GoI officials to be mentored,
advised, or guided by U.S. officials is diminishing. Over time, and particularly
recently, as Iraqi capacity and capabilities have grown, and as Iraqi confidence in
those capabilities has increased, GoI officials have demonstrated growing
assertiveness and less inclination to consult with U.S. officials before taking action.12
That approach was manifested, for example, in the decision by Prime Minister Nouri
al Maliki to launch military operations in Basra, and the GoI’s stated intent to
accelerate its assumption of full responsibility for Sons of Iraq. It may indicate that
the ability of the U.S. government to apply leverage, to shape the course of events in
Iraq, is diminishing.
Next Steps: Policy Decisions
The next steps for the U.S. military operations in Iraq are likely to be shaped by
policy decisions concerning two key issues: further U.S. troop drawdowns and the
future legal basis for the U.S. force presence in Iraq. While the first may be primarily
a U.S. decision, the second depends on both the U.S. and Iraqi governments.
U.S. Troop Drawdowns. In testimony to the Congress during spring 2008,
General David Petraeus, then-Commanding General of the Multi-National Force-Iraq
(MNF-I), noted that following the redeployment of the final “surge” brigades, he and
his team would evaluate the situation on the ground across Iraq, with a view to
offering recommendations, through his chain of command, concerning possible
10 Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008.
11 Interviews with U.S. civilian and military officials in Baghdad, Najaf, Diwayniyah, Basra;
with UK officials in Basra; and with Iraqi officials in Najaf, Diwayniyah, Basra.
12 Interviews with U.S. civilian and military officials, Baghdad, August 2008.

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CRS-5
future troop drawdowns.13 Such recommendations were expected to be balanced by
input from U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for the entire region,
including ongoing operations in Afghanistan; from the Military Departments, through
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose U.S. Code Title X responsibilities to “organize, man,
train and equip” the force encourage a concern with sustainability over time,
including recruiting and retaining the force; and from the Department of Defense as
a whole, with responsibility to balance the strategic imperatives of OIF with
preparations to meet all current and likely future security threats to the United States.
On September 9, 2008, speaking at the National Defense University, President
Bush announced further troop redeployments from Iraq without replacement: “over
the next several months” about 3,400 combat support forces are scheduled to
redeploy; by November, a Marine battalion; and by February 2009, an Army brigade
combat team. The President described these drawdown decisions as a “return on
success” — while progress on the ground was “still fragile and reversible,” the gains
had achieved a “degree of durability.” He did not name the specific criteria, or their
relative priority, that helped determine the numbers or kinds of forces that could be
withdrawn over this timeline, nor did he describe exactly what impact these
drawdowns would have on the U.S. forces footprint in Iraq. He did not name a
timeline for decisions concerning possible further drawdowns, but he added, “If
progress in Iraq continues to hold, General Petraeus and our military leaders believe
additional reductions will be possible in the first half of 2009.”14
The following day, September 10, 2008, in testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, elaborating on the
President’s announcement, called the drawdowns an “acceptable risk” and noted that
the U.S. effort in Iraq had entered the “endgame,” although the situation in Iraq
remained “fragile.”15
On September 16, 2008, GEN Petraeus relinquished command of MNF-I to
Army General Raymond Odierno, a former Commanding General of Multi-National
Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), the operational-level command under MNF-I whose area of
responsibility includes all of Iraq. On October 31, 2008, GEN Petraeus is scheduled
to assume command of U.S. Central Command.
Legal Basis for U.S. Troop Presence in Iraq. Meanwhile, U.S.-Iraqi
negotiations are ongoing concerning the future basis for the U.S. troop presence in
13 See hearing transcripts, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 8, 2008; Senate
Armed Services Committee, April 8, 2008; House Foreign Affairs Committee, April 9,
2008; House Armed Services Committee, April 9, 2008; and Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing on the Petraeus and Odierno hearings, May 22, 2008. On May 22, 2008,
GEN Petraeus said, “My sense is that I will be able to make a recommendation at that time
for some further reductions.”
14 President George W. Bush, Remarks at National Defense University, Washington, D.C.,
September 9, 2008, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/09/
20080909.html].
15 Robert M. Gates, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, September 10,
2008.

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CRS-6
Iraq (a Status of Forces Agreement-like document) and the bilateral relationship in
general (a Strategic Framework Agreement).16 The current United Nations mandate
for the presence of the multi-national force in Iraq expires on December 31, 2008,
and the Government of Iraq has indicated that it does not intend to request an
extension.17 Should no deal be reached, U.S. forces would have to withdraw from
Iraq — a process that would take some time. If a deal is reached, the provisions are
likely to place additional constraints on U.S. operations in Iraq, and thus to shape the
options available for further U.S. strategies and approaches. Key elements at issue
in the negotiations process reportedly include criminal jurisdiction — U.S. or Iraqi
— over U.S. citizens working in Iraq; coordination on military operations; authority
over Iraqi air space; and the rules and procedures governing detainee operations.18
Operational Considerations
The current debates about the “way forward” in Iraq raise a number of key
operational considerations for U.S. practitioners, policy makers, and Members of
Congress.
How Much Help Is Enough? Civilian and military U.S. officials in
Baghdad are seriously discussing a fundamental question: how much U.S. help is
enough? During the formal occupation of Iraq, from 2003 to 2004, the coalition was
responsible for all facets of Iraqi public life. In the early post-occupation days, the
coalition’s general approach was to do everything possible to get Iraqi institutions up
and running, limited primarily by resources and personnel available to implement
the efforts. As Iraqi capacity has grown, the role of Iraqi officials and institutions has
shifted, to varyious degrees, from sharing responsibilities to leading, with some
support or back-up from the coalition.
A number of U.S. officials, both civilian and military, argue that, in the words
of one military commander, “it’s time to take the training wheels off,” that it is okay
to “let the Iraqis fail.” Taking a step back, they argue, is not only a key to reducing
the U.S. commitment over time — it may also be the best way to reduce the risk of
Iraqi dependence on U.S. help, and to encourage Iraqis to assume more responsibility
and to learn to solve problems themselves. The premise might apply to both military
capabilities, in the form of independent operations by Iraqi security forces, and to
civil capacity — for example, in the form of independent efforts by provincial
governments to seek the funding they need from the central government and to craft
and execute their own budgets. Other officials point out that the advisability of
loosening the reins may depend on the location and the circumstances. For example,
16 The Strategic Framework Agreement talks are based in part on a “Declaration of
Principles”signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki in November 2007. See
“Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship
Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America,” November 26, 2007,
available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071126-11.html].
17 UN Security Council Resolution 1790 (2007), December 18, 2007, available at
[http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/650/72/PDF/N0765072.pdf?Open
Element].
18 Interviews with U.S. government officials, August 2008.

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CRS-7
U.S. commanders note, the March 2008 Iraqi-launched military operations in Basra
would likely not have been a success without substantial enablers provided by the
coalition. In that case, since the Prime Minister himself had launched the operation,
the political consequences of failure were likely to have been great, so it was
important for the coalition not to let the Iraqi effort fail.19
Other U.S. officials in Iraq caution that progress to date notwithstanding, it is
important “not to declare victory too soon.” They stress that it is the U.S. presence
and support that have made improvements possible, and while further drawdowns
may continue to be possible, that is different from a full departure. One U.S. military
commander observed, “If we left today, it would be a significant problem. If we left
ten months from now, it would also be a significant problem.”20
Further Troop Drawdowns. Almost all observers and practitioners agree
that the likely future trajectory of the U.S. presence in Iraq, following the
redeployment of the last surge brigade in July 2008, includes further troop
drawdowns. The general consensus concerning that broad trajectory is based in part
on improved security conditions on the ground and on the growing capabilities of the
Iraqi Security Forces. However, serious debates continue regarding the appropriate
timing and nature of further drawdowns.
Troop Drawdown Considerations. A number of other considerations —
in addition to security conditions and ISF capabilities — may be germane to the
“future drawdowns” debate. First, further U.S. withdrawals from Iraq may be shaped
in part by the forthcoming SOFA-like agreement, which may establish firm or target
dates for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops, or some category of them. Such future
markers could shape the pace and nature of preceding drawdowns.
Second, forthcoming political milestones in Iraq may shape both U.S. and Iraqi
thinking. Iraq is tentatively scheduled to hold provincial-level elections in late 2008,
and national-level elections in 2009. Some U.S. officials in Iraq, and some outside
observers, suggest that the potential security risks of these events argue for sustaining
a sizable U.S. troop presence through the elections.21 Some GoI officials, too, might
have an interest in maintaining sufficient U.S. forces to help provide security through
the elections. Other GoI officials, on the other hand, might have an interest, for
election purposes, in playing the nationalism card and publicly calling for an early
drawdown of U.S. forces.
Third, the drawdown debates may be affected by the redeployment, and
projected further drawdowns, of coalition partner troops, depending on the assessed
need to backfill those battle spaces. In August 2008, the 2,000-strong Georgian
contingent redeployed suddenly, with U.S. assistance, to respond to military
19 Interviews with U.S. Embassy, MNF-I, and MNC-I officials, and with subordinate
commands, Baghdad and Basra, August 2008.
20 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, Baghdad, August 2008.
21 Interviews with U.S. civilian and military officials, Baghdad, August 2008. See for
example Stephen Biddle, Michael O’Hanlon, Kenneth M. Pollack, “How to Leave a Stable
Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2008 Vol.87, No.5.

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CRS-8
contingencies at home. The Georgians had served primarily in southern Wasit
province, along the border with Iran. By October 2008, the remaining Polish
contingent plans to redeploy from Qadisiyah province south of Baghdad, where they
lead the headquarters of Multi-National Division-Center South. Following his visit
to Iraq in July 2008, United Kingdom Prime Minister Gordon Brown indicated that
a “fundamental change of mission” was likely for the remaining UK troops in Iraq,
during “the first months of 2009,” which suggested a drawdown from their current
troop strength of about 4,000.22 The UK currently leads Multi-National Division-
Southeast, based in southern Basra province. The expiration of the UN mandate
authorizing a multi-national force in Iraq applies to all other coalition partner
countries, as well as the United States, and the draft US-Iraqi SOFA-like agreement
reportedly will not apply automatically to other coalition members.23 Some coalition
partners may elect to withdraw from Iraq rather than face tough negotiations with the
GoI about their troop presence.
Fourth, the high demand for forces for the ongoing commitments in Iraq and
Afghanistan has meant, for many servicemembers, repeated deployments, extended
deployments, and/or short “dwell times” at home between tours. Military
Departments, responsible in accordance with Title 10, U.S. Code, for “organizing,
manning, training and equipping” the force, are concerned about the stress these
demands have placed on the force. Over time, DOD has introduced a series of
policies designed to manage that stress — for example, limiting active duty Army
deployments to 12 months for those deploying after August 1, 2008. Such stress on
the force, and the personnel policies designed to manage it, may help shape future
Iraq drawdown decisions.
Fifth, further drawdown decisions may be affected by competing strategic
demands, for example, requirements for additional U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen has publicly stated the
need for more forces in Afghanistan and underscored the connection between the
ability to meet that need and the troop requirement in Iraq.24 On September 10,
testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, DOD senior leaders
explained that the President’s decision, announced on September 9, concerning
drawdowns in Iraq and additional deployments to Afghanistan, was based on a
“comparative risk assessment” of the two operations.25
22 See “Brown signals Iraq troops withdrawal,” The Guardian, July 22, 2008.
23 Interviews with U.S. government officials, August 2008.
24 See for example DOD News Briefing with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM
Michael Mullen, July 2, 2008, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4256]. There, ADM Mullen stated, “I’ve made no secret of my
desire to flow more forces, U.S. forces, to Afghanistan just as soon as I can, nor have I been
shy about saying that those forces will not be available unless or until the situation in Iraq
permits us to do so.”
25 See transcript, House Armed Services Committee, “Stability and Security in Iraq and
Afghanistan,” September 10, 2008.

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CRS-9
Sixth and finally, any future withdrawal plans will be shaped in part by several
sets of practical constraints, including available ground and air transportation for
withdrawing personnel and equipment from Iraq, and both the willingness and
capacity of neighboring states to provide access and transit.
Troop Drawdown Schools of Thought. Against this backdrop, there are
two major schools of thought about the basic logic of further troop drawdown
decisions. One school argues for a “conditions-based” approach, and the other for
a phased withdrawal according to a timeline.
The conditions-based approach calls for carrying out continual assessments of
the situation on the ground, and initiating further troop drawdowns as conditions
allow. The relevant “conditions” might include security conditions on the ground,
ISF capabilities, and the capacity of Iraqi governing institutions at all levels.26
This approach is generally favored by commanders on the ground, and it is also
supported by the Bush Administration. Speaking at the Pentagon in March 2008, on
the fifth anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, President Bush indicated
that further drawdowns of the “surge” brigades would be conditions-based: “Any
further drawdown will be based on conditions on the ground and the
recommendations of our commanders — and they must not jeopardize the hard-
fought gains our troops and civilians have made over the past year.”27 In his
September 9, 2008, announcement of further troop drawdowns, President Bush made
clear that the reductions were a response to improved conditions on the ground, and
that further reductions would depend on future conditions — whether “progress in
Iraq continues to hold.”28
The conditions-based approach is highly dynamic. MNF-I expects a continued
progression over time in its relationships with ISF partners — from “leadership” to
“partnership” to tactical and then operational “overwatch,” with the caveats that the
progression is unlikely to be steady, and that it will vary from area to area, and even
26 In April 2008 testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, GEN Petraeus noted
that the criteria included “security and local governance conditions, the enemy situation, the
ability of Iraqi security forces to take on more of a load ... the ability...of the local authorities
to carry on and perform tasks that in some cases we were helping perform.” See transcript,
House Armed Services Committee, “House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on
the Crocker/Petraeus Iraq Report,” April 9, 2008. The Supplemental Appropriations Act,
2008, §9204(c)(1)(G), extending an existing reporting requirement on stability and security
in Iraq for another fiscal year, required the Secretary of Defense to report, inter alia, on “the
criteria the Administration will use to determine when it is safe to begin withdrawing United
States forces from Iraq.”
27 See “President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror,” March 19, 2008, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/03/print/20080319-2.html].
28 President George W. Bush, Remarks at National Defense University, Washington, D.C.,
September 9, 2008, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/09/
20080909.html].

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CRS-10
within areas.29 A December 2007 description of the approach by out-going
Commander of Multi-National Division-Baghdad still applies:
The plan that we believe makes the most sense at this point, and that we’re
embarking upon, is one of simply thinning the ranks, if you will, in areas that are
going well, retaining some coalition presence there to continue to work with the
Iraqi security forces and these security volunteers ... so that there’s tactical
overwatch or operational overwatch, if you will, and retaining [U.S. troop]
strength in the areas where we’re still working hard.30
Some proponents argue that this approach supports well-informed decision-
making, and that it is more responsive than other approaches to changing
circumstances on the ground, since decisions are made close to the time of execution
rather than a long time in advance. As three key observers who support this approach
wrote, “Any schedule for withdrawal will be subject to the inherent uncertainty of a
conflict as complex as the one in Iraq.”31 Others argue that, in the words of some
commanders, the approach would help avoid the danger of “going too quickly.” In
this view, a too-hasty withdrawal, unguided by conditions on the ground, could allow
AQI affiliates or Shi’a renegade militias to reassert themselves and attempt to regain
lost ground, before Iraqi security forces have sufficient capabilities to counter such
efforts, and before Iraqi governing institutions have sufficient capacity to orchestrate
and lead such responses.
The primary charge against this approach, by those who oppose it, is that a
“conditions-based” approach is inherently open-ended. It does not provide leverage,
they charge, for pressing Iraqi leaders to assume greater responsibility. Further, its
inherent uncertainty makes it difficult for the U.S. military to plan to meet other
global security requirements.
The other major school of thought, the phased troop withdrawal approach, calls
for establishing a fixed timeline as the basis for further drawdowns. Advocates of
this approach might call, for example, for the withdrawal of one brigade combat team
per month. Alternatively, they might start by naming a month and year by which all
U.S. combat forces — or all U.S. forces — must be withdrawn from Iraq and,
working backwards from that date, propose periodic preceding redeployments.
For some proponents of this school of thought, the primary objective is simply
to end the U.S. commitment in Iraq, on the grounds that the mission simply should
not be a top U.S. national priority. A timetable approach meets that objective by
definition.
29 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, and subordinate commanders, August 2008.
See also General David Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, House Foreign
Affairs Committee website, [http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/pet091007.pdf].
30 See Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Joseph Fil, December 17,
2007, [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4107].
31 Stephen Biddle, Michael O’Hanlon, Kenneth M. Pollack, “How to Leave a Stable Iraq,”
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2008 Vol.87, No.5, p.57.

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CRS-11
Other proponents of a scheduled withdrawal stress that the U.S. troop and dollar
commitments in Iraq are detracting from the United States’ ability to prepare to meet
other security challenges. Some point in particular to stress on the ground forces —
the Army and the Marine Corps — and argue that a near-term drawdown would
relieve that stress, help guarantee the availability of forces for Afghanistan and other
contingencies, and make it easier for the Services to recruit and retain.32
And some other timetable proponents base their support at least in part on the
view that the U.S. troop presence in Iraq — and the antipathy that may be generated
among the Iraqi population by the presence of a de facto occupier — could be
hindering further progress. They suggest in turn that announced troop withdrawal
plans could spur progress by encouraging Iraqi leaders to accelerate their own efforts
to assume more responsibility and make progress toward reconciliation, and by
urging international partners to increase their constructive involvement.33
One practical advantage of the timetable option is the clarity and certainty it
would provide concerning costs, timelines, and requirements. U.S. military planners
could plan each step with reasonable fidelity, U.S. diplomats could work well in
advance with neighboring countries on access needed to support the withdrawal, and
Iraqi leaders and security forces could plan in detail how to adjust.
Some opponents of this option suggest that its deliberateness could prove
advantageous to various adversaries in Iraq, who might take advantage of the
predictability to target U.S. forces as they redeploy. Alternatively, such adversaries
might simply choose to lie low until U.S. forces redeploy, making them more
difficult to target and leaving the bulk of the challenge for Iraqis to face on their own.
Other opponents of this option argue that its primary strategic drawback is that it
could consign the Iraq mission itself to failure — that Iraqi institutions are simply not
all ready to assume full responsibility, and so a too-early withdrawal of U.S. forces
from Iraq could prove destabilizing and could place Iraq’s future in jeopardy.
Future of the Iraqi Security Forces Training Mission. Supporting the
development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is a critical focus of U.S. military
operations in Iraq. Together with security, and helping build civil capacity, it is one
of the three lines of operation of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), the operational-
level command under MNF-I with geographic responsibility for all of Iraq. The
coalition’s efforts to train, equip, and mentor the ISF have always varied across the
32 For example, in a December 2007 assessment, retired General Barry McCaffrey, who
advocated not a complete withdrawal but rather drawing down to 12 brigade combat teams
(BCTs) by January 2009, commented that “The Army is starting to unravel,” pointing to
current recruiting campaigns that are bringing on board “those who should not be in
uniform” due e.g. to drug use or criminality; to the loss of mid-career officers and NCOs;
and to the “stretched and under-resourced” Reserve Component. See General Barry R.
McCaffrey, “After Action Report, Visit Iraq and Kuwait 5-11 December 2007,” December
18, 2007, submitted as a Statement for the Record for the HASC O&I Subcommittee hearing
on January 16, 2008.
33 See for example Kevin Benson, “Shift the Debate on Iraq from ‘When’ to ‘How,’”
Atlanta Journal-Constitution, August 12, 2007. Colonel Benson was the lead OIF planner
for CFLCC.

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“battle space” of Iraq, in terms of organization and focus, depending on the
conditions on the ground, the level of development of the locally based ISF, and the
availability of coalition forces for training missions. In 2008, several discernible
transitions in the training mission are underway, if unevenly, across Iraq. A key
operational consideration is the future direction of the ISF training mission, including
its focus, its organization, and its relative share of the overall U.S. effort.
Transition Teams. The “standard” approach to training the ISF is the use of
embedded “transition teams” that typically live and work with their host unit. A key
point of variation over time has been the size of these teams. Transition teams
working with the Iraqi Army, for example, typically include between 11 and 15
members, depending on the size of the Iraqi unit they embed with. In practice,
however, the numbers vary — for example, in western Anbar province, Multi-
National Force-West (MNF-W), led by U.S. Marines, consistently used larger teams,
with between 30 and 40 members.34 One key development, in the view of coalition
leaders on the ground and many experts, has been an overall improvement in the
quality and effectiveness of the transition teams — in part a reflection of
standardization and improvements in the training “pipelines” used by the Military
Departments to produce the trainers.35
In 2008, as the basic operational capabilities of the ISF have grown, the use of
embedded transition teams has shifted toward higher-level ISF headquarters,
including brigades and divisions. The substantive efforts of the teams have also
shifted, from basic skills like patrolling to leadership and enablers. For example,
teams working with the Iraqi Army are increasing their focus on staff functions and
logistics, and teams working with the Iraqi Police are increasing the emphasis on
specialized skills like forensics. While logistics experts in the U.S. military are well-
placed to share that expertise with Iraqi Army counterparts, U.S. Military Police
(MPs) generally do not have the requisite specialized policing skills and thus rely on
collaboration with civilian International Police Advisors, who are in short supply.
Unit Partnering. In 2008, in addition to transition teams, coalition forces
throughout Iraq have made increasing use of various forms of “unit partnering,” in
which coalition maneuver units work side-by-side with Iraqi units of equal or larger
size. Commanders on the ground stress the value of unit partnership as an effective
way to “show” rather than just “tell” ISF unit leaders how they might most effectively
organize their headquarters, lead their troops, and manage staff functions.36
34 Interviews with MNC-I, MNSTC-I, and MNF-I subordinate commands including MNF-W,
August 2008.
35 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, and subordinate commands, August 2008.
In the view of many experts, one issue shaping the quality of the transition teams has been
individual incentive to serve on such teams, based on the degree to which promotion boards
favorably regard such service. Some DOD officials note that the incentives, based on
personnel rules, are improving, while some practitioners note anecdotally that training
missions tend not to be as highly regarded as more traditional combat assignments.
36 Interviews with MNC-I officials, and subordinate commanders, August 2008.

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Where conditions have permitted, commanders have extended unit partnering
beyond the Iraqi Army to Ministry of the Interior (MoI) forces, including the Iraqi
Police and the Department of Border Enforcement. That outreach to the MoI is more
common in Multi-National Division-Center, south of Baghdad, and in Multi-National
Force-West in Anbar, than in Multi-National Division-North, which is still actively
engaged in combat operations, together with ISF counterparts, in Diyala and Ninewah
provinces.
Unit partnership is not envisaged as a permanent arrangement — any individual
unit partnership is designed to be temporary — a catalyst to the development of that
Iraqi unit. Should circumstances allow, commanders note that “unit partnership”
could still be constructively used for some time, since some ISF units are still at early
stages of maturity, and the Government of Iraq is still in the process of adding new
units to its total force.
Capacity-Building. Coalition forces also provide substantial support to the
“capacity-building” of the key security institutions of the Government of Iraq — the
Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Counter-Terrorism Bureau.
This support, led by the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
(MNSTC-I), part of MNF-I, includes mentoring Iraqi senior leaders in leadership and
management skills, as well as providing technical assistance to ministry personnel.
Coalition officials stress the growing importance of maximizing such capacity-
building efforts while Iraqis are still receptive to receiving such training. With
appropriate leadership skills, they argue, Iraqi senior leaders in the security sector
could make substantially greater and more effective contributions to the development
of the ISF, gradually reducing the need for U.S. advice and support. Coalition
commanders also underscore the importance of utilizing the right personnel for the
mission, including senior “mentors” with enough leadership experience and stature
to carry weight with their Iraqi counterparts.37
Role of ISF Training in the Overall U.S. Effort. Some key observers
argue that the overall focus of the U.S. effort in Iraq should shift away from combat
and toward training and advising Iraqi forces and the ministries that govern them.
In December 2007, for example, retired General Barry McCaffrey proposed
strengthening the emphasis on ISF training and “massively resourcing the creating
of an adequate Iraqi Security Force.”38 In September 2008, Iraq watchers John Nagl,
Colin Kahl, and Shawn Brimley called for a reorientation of the military mission
toward advising, in which “embedded military advisers would provide just enough
37 Interviews with MNF-I and MNSTC-I officials, August 2008. For example, some argue,
a U.S. Army Colonel simply has not held high enough leadership positions within his own
Department of Defense to be an appropriate advisor to an Iraqi Minister.
38 See General Barry R. McCaffrey, “After Action Report, Visit Iraq and Kuwait 5-11
December 2007,” December 18, 2007, submitted as a Statement for the Record for the
HASC O&I Subcommittee hearing on January 16, 2008.

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help to give Iraqis what they need on the battlefield, but not so much that it stymies
their development and perpetuates a view of Western occupation.”39
In theory, improvements in security conditions, and a corresponding decline in
requirements for combat operations, could continue to make more forces available
to play training and advisory roles for the ISF, even in the context of further U.S.
troop drawdowns. One key consideration would be making sure that those U.S.
forces tasked with training and advisory missions would have adequate resources to
draw on, with fewer U.S. combat forces close by. The U.S. maneuver units that
partner with Iraqi units in the “unit partnering” model are self-sustaining, but further
troop drawdowns would reduce the units available for such missions. In the various
transition team models, in turn, the teams depend on nearby maneuver units for key
logistics and life support. They also rely on outside support to provide Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), as well as Close Air Support (CAS) during
operations by their partner Iraqi units.
Future of the U.S. Forces Footprint. Some reports suggest that the
forthcoming SOFA-like agreement may include a requirement that U.S. forces in Iraq
withdraw from cities and consolidate at large Forward Operating Bases outside urban
areas. In urging the inclusion of this provision, GoI officials have reportedly
expressed interest in ensuring the appearance as well as the substance of Iraqi
sovereignty.40 The key operational issue is the impact that such a change might have
on security conditions on the ground.
Top U.S. commanders in Iraq argue that “living where we work” is what has
made the counter-insurgency effort a success to date. This phrase refers to
establishing a security presence in cities and towns, including small command
outposts of U.S. forces, and Joint Security Stations that include both U.S. and various
Iraqi forces. That presence, commanders note, allows ongoing collaboration between
U.S. and Iraqi forces, making those partnerships more effective, and frequent
interaction with the local population, building trust and confidence. Looking ahead,
U.S. commanders favor “thinning” the ranks in cities and towns, that is, using a
progressively lighter but still dispersed U.S. footprint, as ISF gradually assume
responsibility for providing the “presence” in each area.
What is not clear is how the pace of future “thinning” might correspond with
any deadlines established by a U.S.-Iraqi agreement. It is possible that an
agreement’s target dates for U.S. troop consolidation outside cities might correspond,
in practice, to the appropriate time frame, in the judgment of commanders on the
ground, for handing off the remaining “presence” mission to ISF counterparts.
Coordination on Operations. The forthcoming SOFA-like agreement is
reportedly likely to place some constraints on U.S. military operations in Iraq,
39 John Nagl, Colin Kahl, Shawn Brimley, “How to Exit Iraq,” New York Times, September
5, 2008.
40 See for example Alissa J. Rubin and Steven Lee Myers, “Deal on a Security Agreement
is Close, Iraqis Say,” The New York Times, July 31, 2008.

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including in the areas of ground operations, air operations, and detainee operations.41
U.S. commanders on the ground suggest, further, that the agreement itself is likely
to be relatively broad, and therefore its provisions may need to be further elaborated
and clarified in implementing agreements or arrangements.42 A key issue is the
impact these measures will have on U.S. operations.
In general, the GoI position is based on the premise of full Iraqi sovereignty,
including GoI approval of the activities conducted by U.S. forces in Iraq. In practice,
according to commanders on the ground, the vast majority of U.S. operations are
already closely coordinated with the GoI. Further, most of those operations are
already “combined” with Iraqi forces. The Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) process has
facilitated a transition in the way U.S. forces do business, since PIC arrangements
— which may vary by province — generally require coordination on U.S. operations.
In addition, in some cases, the GoI has agreed in advance that U.S. forces may carry
out certain categories of activities, or may take action against certain targets.
Looking ahead, the premise for U.S. operations, according to MNC-I, is to “figure
out how to get it done through Iraqis.”43 The greatest challenge, in a post-SOFA
environment, may be securing Iraqi approval for some time-sensitive missions by
Special Operations Forces.
Debates concerning the use of Iraqi air space, critically important to U.S.
operations in Iraq, are shaped in part by the fact that the capabilities of the Iraqi Air
Force are still in the very early stages of development. Officials estimate that it takes
at least several years to build an air force, and the focused Iraqi Air Force training
effort only got started in early 2007. In addition, that training is focusing, first of all,
on skills relevant to the ongoing counter-insurgency (COIN) fight, such as moving
troops and supplies, and providing some ISR. Iraqi officials and commanders on the
ground, aware that they still lack key COIN capabilities such as sufficient ISR and
CAS, and that they do not yet have the ability to defend Iraqi airspace, are reportedly
eager to retain the support of U.S. air assets.44
According to those familiar with the negotiations, the SOFA-like agreement is
likely to return the formal control of Iraqi airspace to the GoI, as a clear mark of Iraqi
sovereignty. In that case, experts note, a number of options would be available to
facilitate U.S. operations, including requests by the GoI that U.S. forces temporarily
assume responsibility for all or part of Iraqi airspace.45
To date, the SOFA process reportedly has not addressed a parallel concern,
related to operational coordination: Iraqi coordination with U.S. forces concerning
41 Interviews with U.S. government officials, August 2008.
42 Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008.
43 Interviews with MNC-I officials, August 2008.
44 Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008.
45 Interviews with U.S. government officials, and with MNF-I officials, August 2008.

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ISF operations.46 U.S. commanders on the ground report that the ISF sometimes have
informed U.S. forces only after they have carried out local operations; some
commanders add that these are positive developments in terms of growing ISF
capabilities and initiative.47 At the same time, it could be helpful for U.S. forces to
know in advance about significant ISF operations, for two reasons: first, the ISF
might call on U.S. forces suddenly, during such operations, to provide key enablers;
second, such operations could have an impact on U.S. force protection.
The forthcoming SOFA-like agreement will also reportedly have a major impact
on detainee operations, including the procedures by which U.S. forces may take
Iraqis into physical custody, and the rules for adjudicating the cases of those
detainees currently held by coalition forces.48 As of mid-August 2008, there were
just over 20,000 “legacy” detainees, of whom about 2,000 were already scheduled for
release.49 For commanders on the ground, that “legacy” detainee population raises
several concerns. In many cases, the coalition lacks releasable evidence with legal
sufficiency in Iraqi courts. Scrupulous collection of evidence — such as
photographs, diagrams, eye-witness accounts — common in civilian law
enforcement, has not always been an integral part of coalition combat operations in
Iraq. Such legacy detainees may pose real security threats to the Iraqi population, or
to the coalition, but it is not clear that there will be any provisions that allow either
the United States or the GoI to continue to hold them. Some coalition officials are
also concerned that the GoI adjudication of legacy detainee cases, whether or not
legally sufficient evidence exists, may evince a sectarian bias — in particular, a
tendency to treat Shi’a Arabs more leniently than Sunni Arabs.50
Civil-Military Roles and Responsibilities. Over the course of Operation
Iraqi Freedom, the balance of U.S. civilian and military roles and responsibilities has
shifted. As a rule, the military has played the preponderant role, including in non-
traditional fields such as governance and reconstruction, although civilian
contributions have grown over time. Looking forward, a key operational question is
the most effective future balance of U.S. civilian and military effort in Iraq.
As security conditions on the ground in Iraq have improved, civilian and
military officials all point to increased opportunities for civilian assistance initiatives,
particularly capacity-building at all levels. As one U.S. commander argued,
“Embassy people should be out more every day now, like we are.”51 Some provincial
Iraqi officials, for their part, appear eager to welcome additional U.S. civilian
expertise.52
46 Interviews with U.S. government officials, August 2008.
47 Interviews with MNC-I and subordinate commands, August 2008.
48 Interviews with U.S. government officials, and MNF-I officials, August 2008.
49 Interviews with MNF-I officials, August 2008.
50 Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008.
51 Interview with Multi-National Division commander, August 2008.
52 Interviews with the Governor of Najaf, the Governor of Basra, August 2008.

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One future option, as U.S. troops draw down, would be to increase the U.S.
civilian effort in Iraq in terms of personnel and resources, to support civil capacity
building at the national, provincial, and local levels. The primary constraint on a
possible “civilian surge,” to follow the military surge, may be the limited capacity of
the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other
civilian agencies to deploy significant numbers of personnel.
One consideration would be how well Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
are able to function without a substantial nearby coalition military presence. Good
test cases for this scenario already exist. In May 2008, the personnel of the PRTs for
Najaf and Karbala provinces, who had been operating from a remote base in Hillah,
in Babil province, relocated to their respective areas of operation. Najaf and Karbala
are both PIC provinces, with limited U.S. military presence. In Najaf, for example,
the PRT, including a small U.S. military team that provides them with movement, is
based at a small Forward Operating Base (FOB), together with a U.S. Army
transition team that works with the local Iraqi Army battalion and a small U.S.
military “mayor’s cell” that manages the installation.53 A team of private security
contractors from Triple Canopy provides static security.
Some key steps have been taken to amplify civilian assistance efforts at the
provincial level, including the addition of 66 civilian subject matter experts, in
technical fields including agriculture and business development, to work with the
PRTs.54 However, U.S. Embassy officials note that it is likely that peak PRT staffing
levels in Iraq have already been reached. The Embassy — in response to direction
from Congress — is working on “PRT strategic drawdown” plans.55
Meanwhile, the U.S. military remains the de facto default option, though
military officers are usually the first to note that they lack the requisite expertise.56
One key role of the U.S. military in Iraq is supporting civilian-led efforts to provide
Iraqis with governance mentorship, and in particular, to build linkages among the
national, regional, and local levels. As MNC-I officials noted, “Our job at Corps is
to establish the connective tissue between the center and the provinces.”57 In many
instances, while PRTs focus on governance at the provincial level, military units,
with far more boots on the ground, work regularly to foster governance at the district
and local levels, including linkages with higher levels of Iraqi government.58 The
U.S. military continues to provide some support for small-scale reconstruction
initiatives, though unevenly across Iraq. Some commanders continue to facilitate the
53 Interviews with U.S. civilian and military officials at the Najaf FOB.
54 Interview with the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA), U.S. Embassy, August 2008.
When PRT leaders were asked how many subject matter experts they would like to receive,
they reportedly requested a total of 170.
55 Interviews with U.S. Embassy officials, August 2008.
56 Interviews with Multi-National Division commanders, August 2008. As one noted, “What
you see is the U.S. military, but we don’t have the expertise.”
57 Interviews with MNC-I officials, August 2008.
58 Interviews with U.S. military officials and PRT members, August 2008.

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reopening of small business — and to use the number of reopened businesses as a
metric of economic progress — while others have decided to “give back,” that is,
“not spend,” their CERP funds, in order to encourage Iraqis to budget and spend their
own money.59
Strategic Considerations
OIF experience to date, and the current debates about the “way forward” in Iraq,
suggest several broader strategic considerations for U.S. practitioners, policy makers,
and Members of Congress.
Clarifying and Updating U.S. Strategic Objectives. As Iraq’s de facto
exercise of sovereignty grows, as the role of the United States evolves
correspondingly, and as further U.S. troop drawdowns are contemplated, it may be
useful — particularly for an incoming Administration — to confirm or update the
short list of critical U.S. national interests regarding Iraq, and the key strategic
objectives that, at a minimum, it is important for the United States to achieve in Iraq.
Such broad objectives might address both Iraq itself and the region, and might
include the following elements:
! U.S. interests in Iraq’s domestic political arrangements. Some might
argue that a democratic or broadly representative and inclusive Iraqi
polity is essential as a key to Iraq’s stability, while others might
argue that the nature of Iraq’s domestic political arrangements is
much less important than simply a unified and stable Iraq.
! U.S. interests in Iraq’s role in the fight against global terrorist
networks. Some might argue that the most important goal is simply
ensuring that Iraq does not serve as a safe haven for terrorists.
Others might stress the importance of active intelligence-sharing
with the United States. Still others might argue that it is in U.S.
interests that Iraq couple the counter-terrorism skills it is currently
developing as part of its domestic counter-insurgency effort, with
expeditionary capabilities, so that it could participate in future
regional counter-terrorist activities.
! U.S. interests in the regional balance of power. Some might argue
that Iraq’s strength, relative to that of its neighbors, is important.
Others might simply stress the importance of an absence of conflict
— that is, as a long-stated U.S. goal puts it, an “Iraq at peace with
its neighbors.”
! U.S. interests in Iraq compared with those in Afghanistan. Some
observers argue that the U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan face a
zero-sum competition for resources and personnel, as well as time
59 Interviews with Multi-National Division commanders and subordinate commanders,
August 2008.

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CRS-19
and attention of senior leaders. They add that hard choices about the
relative priority of the two missions may continue to be necessary.
Shaping a Long-Term U.S. Presence in Iraq. Another strategic
consideration, in addition to U.S. strategic objectives, concerns the kind of long-term
relationship the United States wants to have with Iraq, and the kind of U.S. presence
in Iraq that would be required to support such a relationship. On September 10,
2008, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates argued that “... we should expect to be involved in Iraq for
many years to come, although in changing and increasingly limited ways.”60 Issues
for the Congress regarding a future U.S. military presence in Iraq could include costs,
and policy oversight of integrated efforts by Department of State and the Department
of Defense personnel.
In theory, one option would be establishing permanent U.S. military bases in
Iraq, to support broader U.S. policy in the region, possibly on the model of those in
Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Italy. This option does not appear to enjoy
support from the Bush Administration, Members of Congress, or from the
Government of Iraq.
Another option would be a particularly robust Office of Security Cooperation
(OSC), responsible for training and mentoring Iraqi security forces and building the
capacity of Iraqi security ministries. Following the usual pattern, the OSC would be
responsible to both the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and to the Commander of U.S.
Central Command. One possible model might be the U.S. Military Training Mission
to Saudi Arabia, which operates on the basis of a bilateral Memorandum of
Understanding and serves to train, advise and assist the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces.
Defining U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Intervention in Iraq. It is not
clear to what extent U.S. “Iran policy” factors in current and potential Iranian
activities in southern Iraq. In the context of growing potential for U.S. military
confrontations with Iranian proxies in southern Iraq, it may be important to consider
scenarios in which tactical-level developments might escalate into strategic-level
concerns.
According to U.S. and Iraqi officials, Iraq, particularly in the south, continues
to face a potential threat from Special Groups trained by Iran’s Al Quds forces.61
Meanwhile, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) is in the process of shifting its focus
somewhat from north to south in Iraq, including increasing the U.S. troop presence
in southern Iraq as coalition partner troops withdraw or draw down. According to
commanders on the ground, the growing U.S. footprint in southern Iraq is not likely
60 Robert M. Gates, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, September 10,
2008.
61 Interviews with U.S. civilian and military officials, Baghdad, August 2008, and with Iraqi
civilian and military officials, August 2008.

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to be lost on Iran.62 In this context, the U.S. may find itself increasingly engaged in
“shadow-boxing” with Iranian proxies at the tactical level in southern Iraq.
Assessing the Implications of OIF Lessons for the Future of the
Force. How Military Departments fulfill their Title 10 responsibilities to organize,
man, train, and equip — how they make decisions about endstrength and capabilities
required — may depend in part on lessons drawn from OIF, and on how applicable
those lessons are deemed to be to potential future engagements. For example,
lessons might be drawn from OIF concerning how to most effectively train foreign
security forces and to prepare U.S. forces for that mission; how increasing the
intelligence assets available to commanders on the ground affects their ability to
identify and pursue targets; how “dwell time” policies for the Active and Reserve
Components can best be implemented; and how closer operational integration
between Special Operations Forces and conventional forces might affect their
requirements.
For the Department of Defense as a whole, in turn, OIF experiences may be used
to help frame future discussions about the Department’s force planning construct —
a shorthand description of the major contingencies the Department must be prepared
to execute simultaneously — which is used to shape the total force. Analytical
challenges include deciding what kind of contingency OIF represents, how likely it
is to be representative of future contingencies, and which chronological “slice” of
OIF requirements (given the great variation in troop strength and equipment) to use
to represent the effort.
Applying OIF Lessons to Interagency Coordination. A further strategic
consideration concerns how lessons are drawn from OIF regarding U.S. government
coordination in complex contingencies, including both decision-making and
execution. Just as the executive branch’s responsibilities in this area are divided
among different agencies, congressional oversight responsibilities are divided among
different committees of jurisdiction, such that achieving full integration can be a
challenge for both branches of government.
One set of questions prompted by OIF experience concerns the decision-making
process about whether to go to war and if so, how to do so. Key issues include the
rigor of the inter-agency debates, the effectiveness of the provision of “best military
advice” to key decision-makers, and the thoroughness of congressional input
concerning the use of force and the exercise of congressional oversight in general.
Another set of questions raised by OIF concerns the balance of roles,
responsibilities, resources, and authorities among U.S. government agencies to
support implementation of activities such as security forces training, local
governance work, and economic reconstruction.63 In security forces training, OIF
62 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, August 2008. Furthermore, it is conceivable
that the planned increase in U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, across Iran’s eastern border,
may magnify the sense of uneasiness of some Iranian leaders.
63 On interagency reform, see CRS Report RL34455, Organizing the U.S. Government for
(continued...)

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experiences from the formal occupation to the present have included several different
patterns for the distribution of responsibilities between the Departments of Defense
and State. In governance and economic reconstruction work, OIF also provides at
least two potentially instructive organizational models — Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs), and cooperation between PRTs and partner military units.64
Options Available to Congress
A number of tools are available to Congress to help shape U.S. government
policy toward Iraq, and the execution of that policy.65 One tool is limiting or
prohibiting funding for certain activities. For example, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 stated that no funding appropriated pursuant
to authorizations in the Act could be used “to establish any military installation or
base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States
Armed Forces in Iraq,” or “to exercise United States control of the oil resources of
Iraq.”66 Both the House and Senate defense authorization bills for FY2009 repeat
this language.67
Congress may also make some funding contingent on achievement of certain
milestones. For example, in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-
252), Congress required that funding under Chapter 4 of the Act, “Department of
State and Foreign Operations,” be made available for assistance to Iraq “only to the
extent that the Government of Iraq matches such assistance on a dollar-for-dollar
63 (...continued)
National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates, by Catherine Dale, Nina
Serafino and Pat Towell. On the role of DOD in foreign assistance activities, including
security forces training and reconstruction activities, see CRS Report RL34639, The
Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues and Options
for Congress, by Nina Serafino et al. On the capabilities of U.S. government civilian
agencies, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background
and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities, by Nina Serafino and Martin Weiss.
64 The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Armed Services
Committee has hosted a series of hearings about PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the
potential implications for future U.S. inter-agency coordination and organization. The
Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has conducted
interviews with PRT participants and published initial observations. See “PRT Playbook:
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures,” Center for Army Lessons Learned, No. 07-34,
September 2007.
65 On options available to the Congress, their constitutionality, and their possible impact,
see CRS Report RL33837, Congressional Authority to Limit U.S. Military Operations in
Iraq, by Jennifer Elsea, Michael Garcia, and Thomas Nicola. For examples of tools
available to Congress in general for shaping U.S. military operations, see CRS Report
RL33803, Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam, Cambodia,
Laos, Somalia, and Kosovo: Funding and Non-Funding Approaches, by Amy Belasco,
Lynn Cunningham, Hannah Fischer, and Larry Niksch.
66 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. 110-181, January 28,
2008, §1222.
67 See H.R. 5658 §1211, and S. 3001 §2913.

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basis.”68 More broadly, in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina
Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007, Congress established
18 benchmarks for the performance of the Government of Iraq, and provided that
further U.S. strategy in Iraq would be conditioned on the Iraqi government’s meeting
those benchmarks.69
Another tool is holding oversight hearings, to ask Administration officials to
account for the progress and results to date of policy implementation. For example,
on September 10, 2008, the House Armed Services Committee invited Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael
Mullen to testify at a hearing entitled “Security and Stability in Afghanistan and Iraq:
Developments in U.S. Strategy and Operations and the Way Ahead.”
Congress may also shape policy by establishing reporting requirements. For
example, in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252), Congress
required the Secretary of Defense to provide to Congress, every 90 days beginning
not later than December 5, 2008, until the end of FY2009, a “comprehensive set of
performance indicators and measures for progress toward military and political
stability in Iraq.” The Act lists detailed reporting requirements in two areas, stability
and security in Iraq, and the training and performance of Iraqi security forces, and
also required an assessment of “United States military requirements, including
planned force rotations, through the end of calendar year 2009.”70
Structure and Aim of the Report
This report is designed to support congressional consideration of future policy
options for Iraq by analyzing strategies pursued and outcomes achieved to date, by
characterizing current dynamics on the ground in Iraq, and by identifying and
analyzing key strategic and operational considerations going forward. The report will
be updated as events warrant. Major topics addressed include the following:
! Analysis of future strategic and operational considerations.
! OIF war planning, including stated objectives, key debates in the
major combat and post-major combat planning efforts, and the
impact of apparent short-comings in the planning efforts on post-war
developments.
68 Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, P.L. 110-252, June 30, 2008, §1402(e).
69 See U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability
Appropriations Act of 2007, P.L. 110-28, May 25, 2007, §1314(b)(1)(A), which lists the 18
benchmarks. In §1314(c)(1), the Act specified that no funding appropriated for Iraq might
be obligated or expended unless and until the President certified that Iraqi is making
progress on each of the benchmarks.
70 Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, P.L. 110-252, June 30, 2008, §9204. The
requirement was a continuation of a requirement from Fiscal Year 2008, articulated in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 110-161, December 26, 2007,§609.

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! Major combat operations, including both successes and challenges
encountered.
! Post-major combat military activities — combat operations, Iraqi
security forces training, and an array of “reconciliation,” governance,
and economic reconstruction efforts — including analysis of
evolutions over time in strategy and approaches.
! Assessments of the results of strategy and operations to date.
Decision to Go to War in Iraq
The Administration’s decision to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom had
antecedents stretching back to the 1991 Gulf War and its aftermath.
Antecedents in the 1990s
In the 1990’s, the United States shared with other countries a concern with the
Iraqi government’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Iraq had
demonstrated a willingness to use WMD against its neighbors during the 1980-1988
Iran-Iraq war, and against its own citizens, as it did, for example, against Iraqi Kurds
in Halabja in 1988. U.S. policy after the Gulf War supported the United Nations-led
weapons inspection regime and the economic sanctions imposed to encourage Iraq’s
compliance with that regime. Before they were withdrawn in 1998, U.N. weapons
inspectors located and destroyed sizable quantities of WMD in Iraq.
U.S. post-Gulf War policy also included containment initiatives — “no fly”
zones — imposed by the United States together with the United Kingdom and,
initially, France. The northern “no fly” zone, Operation Northern Watch was
designed to protect the Iraqi Kurdish population in northern Iraq and international
humanitarian relief efforts there. Operation Southern Watch was designed to protect
the Shi’a Arab population in southern Iraq.
These containment measures were periodically marked by Iraqi provocations,
including troop build-ups and attempts to shoot down allied aircraft, and by allied
responses including attacks on targets inside Iraq.71 In December 1998, the United
States and the United Kingdom launched Operation Desert Fox, whose stated
purpose was to degrade Iraq’s ability to manufacture or use WMD.
Also during the late 1990s, a policy climate more conducive to aggressive action
against the Iraqi regime began to take shape in Washington, D.C., as some policy
71 Overall, some 300,000 sorties were flown. In 2002 for example, Iraqi forces fired on
coalition aircraft 500 times, prompting 90 coalition air strikes against Iraqi targets. See
Suzann Chapman, “The War Before the War,” Air Force Magazine, February 2004.
Chapman cites Air Force General John Jumper as noting in March 2003 that between June
2002 and March 2003, the U.S. Air Force flew about 4,000 sorties against Iraq’s air defense
system, surface-to-air missiles, and command and control.

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experts began to advocate actively fostering Iraqi resistance, in order to encourage
regime change.72 In 1998, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, authorizing
support to Iraqi opposition organizations.73 Some supporters of this policy approach
gained greater access, and in some cases office, under the Bush Administration after
the 2000 presidential elections.
Bush Administration Strategy and Role of the United Nations
For many U.S. policy makers, the September 11, 2001, attacks catalyzed or
heightened general concerns that WMD might fall into the hands of terrorists.
Reflecting those concerns, the first National Security Strategy issued by the Bush
Administration, in September 2002, highlighted the policy of preemptive, or
anticipatory, action, to forestall hostile acts by adversaries, “even if uncertainty
remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”74
Throughout 2002, the stated position of the Administration was to aggressively
seek Iraqi compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions concerning the
inspections regime, while holding out the possibility of U.N Chapter VII action if
Iraq did not comply.75 In September 2002, addressing the U.N. General Assembly,
President Bush stated: “The Security Council Resolutions will be enforced ... or
action will be unavoidable.” On that occasion, President Bush also articulated a list
of conditions that Iraq must meet if it wanted to avoid retaliatory action: give up or
destroy all WMD and long-range missiles; end all support to terrorism; cease
persecution of its civilian population; account for all missing Gulf War personnel and
accept liability for losses; and end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program.76
On November 8, 2002, following intensive negotiations among its “Permanent
5” members,77 the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 1441. In it, the Council
72 See the December 1, 1997, issue of the Weekly Standard, with a series of articles, under
the heading “Saddam Must Go,” including “Overthrow Him,” by Zalmay Khalilzad and Paul
Wolfowitz.
73 The Iraq Liberation Act, P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998, authorized support to “Iraqi
democratic opposition organizations”and included provisions concerning how to identify
such organizations.
74 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p.15,
available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/pdf].
75 Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations authorizes the U.N. Security Council
to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression” (Article 39), and should the Council consider other specified measures
inadequate, to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security” (Article 42), see Charter of the United Nations,
available at [http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/].
76 President Bush’s Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002,
New York, NY, available at the White House website [http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html].
77 China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States. Each of the 15
(continued...)

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decided that Iraq remained in “material breach” of its obligations; that the Council
would afford Iraq “a final opportunity to comply”; that failure to comply would
“constitute a further material breach”; and that in that case, Iraq would “face serious
consequences.”78
This language, though strong by U.N. standards, was not considered by most
observers to imply “automaticity” — that is, that Iraqi non-compliance would
automatically trigger a U.N.-authorized response under Chapter VII.
While the Iraqi government eventually provided a large quantity of written
materials, the Administration deemed Iraqi compliance to be insufficient. The
Administration chose not to seek an additional U.N. Resolution explicitly authorizing
military action under Chapter VII, reportedly due to concerns that some Permanent
Members of the Council were prepared to veto it.
Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein
The Administration’s intent to take military action against Iraq was formally
made public on March 17, 2003, when President Bush issued an ultimatum to
Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq within 48 hours. “Their refusal to do so,”
he said, would “result in military conflict.”79
War Planning
As the Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz wrote, war planning
includes articulation of both intended goals and how they will be achieved.80 In the
case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Administration goals included both short-term
military objectives and longer-term strategic goals. To meet that intent, the
Administration planned — though apparently in unequal measure — for both combat
operations and the broader range of operations that would be required on “the day
after” regime removal.
77 (...continued)
Council members has one vote. Procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of at
least 9 of the 15. Substantive matters require nine votes, including concurring votes from
the 5 permanent members. See [http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp].
78 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, 8 November 2002, paragraphs 1, 2,
4, and 13.
79 President Bush Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html].
80 Clausewitz made the point more forcefully: “No one starts a war, or rather, no one in his
senses ought to do so, without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that
war and how he intends to conduct it.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and
Peter Paret, eds., Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

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Strategic Objectives
The Administration’s short-term goal for OIF was regime removal. As
President Bush stated in his March 17, 2003, Address to the Nation, “It is too late for
Saddam Hussein to remain in power.” In that speech, he promised Iraqis, “We will
tear down the apparatus of terror ... the tyrant will soon be gone.”81
In his March 2003 speech, President Bush declared that in the longer term, the
United States would help Iraqis build “a new Iraq that is prosperous and free.” It
would be an Iraq, as he described it, that would not be at war with its neighbors, and
that would not abuse its own citizens.82 Those were the basic “endstate” elements
typically used by war planners. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) OIF
campaign plan, for example, described the strategic objective this way: “A stable
Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact and a broad-based government that renounces
WMD development and use and no longer supports terrorism or threatens its
neighbors.”83
Over time, the Administration’s longer-term strategic objectives were fine-
tuned. In the November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, the
Administration stated the long-term goal for Iraq this way: “Iraq is peaceful, united,
stable, and secure, well-integrated into the international community, and a full
partner in the global war on terrorism.”84
In January 2007, at the time the “surge” was announced, the White House
released an unclassified version of the results of its late 2006 internal review of Iraq
policy. That document states: “Our strategic goal in Iraq remains the same: a
unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain
itself, and is an ally in the war on terror.”85
And in June 2008, in its regular quarterly update to the Congress, the
Department of Defense used the same language almost verbatim: “The strategic goal
of the United States in Iraq remains a unified, democratic and federal Iraq that can
govern, defend and sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror.”86
81 President Bush Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html].
82 Ibid.
83 Information from CENTCOM, CFLCC and V Corps planners, 2002 and 2003. From July
2002 to July 2004, the author served as the Political Advisor (POLAD) to the Commanding
General (CG) of U.S. Army V Corps. That service included deploying with V Corps in
early 2003 to Kuwait and then Iraq. In Iraq, the author served as POLAD to the CG of the
Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), and then the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I).
84 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, November 30, 2005, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf].
85 “Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review” slides, National Security Council, January 2007,
available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf].
86 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, submitted
(continued...)

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Military Objectives
To support the stated U.S. strategic objectives, CENTCOM, as it planned
military operations in Iraq, defined the OIF military objectives this way: “destabilize,
isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime and provide support to a new, broad-based
government; destroy Iraqi WMD capability and infrastructure; protect allies and
supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks; destroy terrorist networks in Iraq, gather
intelligence on global terrorism, detain terrorists and war criminals, and free
individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime; and support international efforts
to set conditions for long-term stability in Iraq and the region.”87
Planning for Major Combat
From a military perspective, there are theoretically many different possible ways
to remove a regime — using different capabilities, in different combinations, over
different timelines. The 1991 Gulf War, for example, had highlighted the initial use
of air power in targeting key regime infrastructure. The more recent war in
Afghanistan had showcased a joint effort, as Special Operations Forces on the ground
called in air strikes on key targets. Key debates in OIF major combat planning
concerned the size of the force, the timelines for action, and the synchronization of
ground and air power.
According to participants, throughout the planning process, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld played an active role, consistently urging the use of a
streamlined force and a quick timeline.88 Secretary Rumsfeld reportedly came into
office with a vision of defense transformation, both operational and institutional.89
A basic premise of that vision, captured in the 2002 National Security Strategy, was
that “... the threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must our
force.”90 In general, that meant transitioning from a military “structured to deter
massive Cold War-era armies,” to a leaner and more agile force. At issue in the OIF
planning debates was not only how to fight the war in Iraq, but also — implicitly —
how to organize, man, train and equip the force for the future.
For military planners, the guidance to use a streamlined force reflected a
fundamental shift away from the Powell Doctrine, named after the former Chairman
86 (...continued)
in accordance with Section 9010, Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, P.L.
109-289, as amended by Section 1308 of P.L. 110-28.
87 Information from CENTCOM, CFLCC and V Corps planners, 2002, 2003, and 2008.
88 Interviews with planners who participated in the process, 2002 and 2003. Bob Woodward
cites Secretary Rumsfeld as saying, at a December 4, 2001, planning session, “I’m not sure
that that much force is needed, given what we’ve learned coming out of Afghanistan.” Bob
Woodward, Plan of Attack, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.
89 Conversations with Office of the Secretary of Defense officials, 2005 and 2006.
90 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p.29,
available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/pdf].

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of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which stressed that force, if used, should be
overwhelming.91
The planning effort started early. Just before Thanksgiving, 2001, President
Bush asked Secretary Rumsfeld to develop a plan for regime removal in Iraq, and
Secretary Rumsfeld immediately gave that assignment to the commander of U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM), General Tommy Franks.92
The planning effort for combat operations was initially very “close hold,”
involving only a few key leaders and small groups of trusted planners at each level.
As the effort progressed, the number of people involved grew, but key elements of
the plans remained compartmentalized, such that few people had visibility on all
elements of the plans.93
The starting point for the planning effort was the existing, “on the shelf” Iraq
war plan, known as 1003-98, which had been developed and then refined during the
1990’s. That plan called for a force of between 400,000 and 500,000 U.S. troops,
including three Corps (or Corps equivalents), with a long timeline for the deployment
and build-up of forces beforehand. When General Franks briefed Secretary Rumsfeld
on these plans in late November 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld reportedly asked for a
completely new version — with fewer troops and a faster deployment timeline.94
In early 2002, General Franks briefed Secretary Rumsfeld on the “Generated
Start” plan. That plan called for very early infiltration by CIA teams, to build
relationships and gain intelligence, and then the introduction of Special Operations
Forces, particularly in northern Iraq and in Al Anbar province in the west. The main
conventional forces effort would begin with near-simultaneous air and ground
attacks. The force would continue to grow up to about 275,000 troops.95
91 The “Powell Doctrine,” generally acknowledged as the basis for the first Gulf War, was
a collection of ideas, not a written document. Other key elements included force should
only be used as a last resort, when there is a clear threat; there must be strong public support
for the use of force; there must be a clear exit strategy. The Powell Doctrine derived in part
from the Weinberger Doctrine, named after former Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger, Powell’s one-time boss, which had been based on some Vietnam “lessons
learned.”
92 Interviews with planners, 2002 and 2003. See also Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, New
York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.
93 Information from CENTCOM and CFLCC planners, and Office of the Secretary of
Defense officials, 2002 and 2003.
94 Interviews with planners, 2002 and 2003. See also Michael R. Gordon and General
Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story and the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq,
New York: Vintage Books, 2006; and Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, New York: Simon
and Schuster, 2004.
95 Interviews with planners and slide review, 2002 and 2003. See “Top Secret Polo Step”
collection, “Compartmented Planning Effort, 15 August 2002” CENTCOM brief, obtained
through the Freedom of Information Act and posted by the National Security Archive, The
George Washington University, available at [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/

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CENTCOM’s air component — the Combined Force Air Component Command
(CFACC) — reportedly urged modifying the plan to include a 10- to 14-day air
campaign at the start, to target and hit Iraq’s missile, radar, command and control,
and other leadership sites, on the model of the Gulf War.96 But the early introduction
of ground forces — rather than an extended exclusively-air campaign — was
apparently intended to take Iraqi forces by surprise.97
Later in the spring of 2002, CENTCOM and subordinate planners developed an
alternative plan called “Running Start,” which addressed the possibility that the Iraqi
regime might choose the war’s start time through some provocation, such as the use
of WMD. “Running start” called for a smaller overall force and a shorter timeline.
It would still begin with infiltration by CIA teams, followed by the introduction of
SOF. Air attacks would go first, and as ground forces flowed into theater, the ground
attacks could begin any time after the first 25 days of air attacks. The ground war
might begin with as few as 18,000 ground forces entering Iraq.98
In the summer of 2002, planners developed a so-called “hybrid” version of these
two plans,99 which echoed key elements of the “Running Start” plan — beginning
with an air campaign, and launching the ground war while other ground forces still
flowed into theater. Specifically, the plan called for: Presidential notification 5 days
in advance; 11 days to flow forces; 16 days for the air campaign; the start of the
ground campaign as ground forces continued to flow into theater; and a total
campaign that would last up to 125 days. This plan, approved for action, continued
to be known as the “5-11-16-125” plan even after the numbers of days had
changed.100
By January 2003, at the CENTCOM Component Commanders Conference
hosted by General Franks in Tampa, the plans had coalesced around a modified
version of “Generated Start.” They featured a very short initial air campaign,
95 (...continued)
NSAEBB214/index.htm].
96 Gordon and Trainor note that this issue was debated at the March 2002 CENTCOM
Component Commanders Conference. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor,
Cobra II: The Inside Story and the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, New York: Vintage
Books, 2006.
97 Information from planners, 2002, 2003, and 2008.
98 Interviews with planners and slide review, 2002 and 2003. See “Top Secret Polo Step”
collection, “Compartmented Planning Effort, 15 August 2002” CENTCOM brief, obtained
through the Freedom of Information Act and posted by the National Security Archive, The
George Washington University, available at [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB214/index.htm]. See also Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E.
Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story and the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, New York:
Vintage Books, 2006.
99 “Hybrid” simply referred descriptively to the plan — it was not the formal name of a plan
— although some senior leaders later seemed to use “Hybrid” as a proper noun.
100 Interviews with planners and slide review, 2002, 2003 and 2008; “Compartmented
Planning Effort”; and Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II.

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including bombs and missiles — a couple of days, rather than a couple of weeks.
The ground campaign would begin with two three-star-led headquarters — U.S.
Army V Corps, and the I Marine Expeditionary Force — and some of their forces
crossing the line of departure from Kuwait into Iraq, while additional forces
continued to flow into theater. Meanwhile, the 4th Infantry Division would open a
northern front by entering Iraq from Turkey.
The number of forces that would start the ground campaign continued to be
adjusted, generally downward, in succeeding days. On January 29, 2003, Army
commanders learned that they would enter Iraq with just two Divisions — less than
their plans to that point had reflected. At that time, V Corps and its subordinate
commands were at a training site in Grafenwoehr, Germany, rehearsing the opening
of the tactical-level ground campaign at an exercise called “Victory Scrimmage.”
During that exercise, commanders and staff concluded that should they be required
to “secure” cities in southern Iraq, they would have insufficient forces to do so.101
The V Corps Commander at the time, then-Lieutenant General William Scott
Wallace, reflected after the end of major combat in Iraq: “I guess that as summer
[arrived] I wasn’t real comfortable with the troop levels.”102
Post-War Planning
Most observers agree that the Administration’s planning for “post-war” Iraq —
for all the activities and resources that would be required on “the day after,” to help
bring about the strategic objective, a “free and prosperous Iraq” — was not nearly as
thorough as the planning for combat operations.
For the U.S. military, the stakes of the post-war planning efforts were very high.
In theory, civilian agencies would have the responsibility for using political,
diplomatic, and economic tools to help achieve the desired political endstate for Iraq,
while the Department of Defense and its military forces would play only a supporting
role after the end of major combat operations. But by far the greatest number of
coalition personnel on the ground in Iraq at the end of major combat would be U.S.
military forces, and the U.S. military was very likely to become the default option for
any unfilled roles and any unanticipated responsibilities.
A number of participants and observers have argued that the Administration
should have sent a larger number of U.S. troops to Iraq, to provide security in the
post-major combat period. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, who served as the
Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) throughout the formal
occupation of Iraq, leveled this criticism after departing Iraq. Asked what he would
have changed about the occupation, he replied: “The single most important change
101 Information from V Corps leaders and staff, 2003.
102 William S. Wallace, Interview, Frontline, Public Broadcasting System, February 26,
2004, available at [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/
interviews/Wallace.html]. He quickly added, “But I was comfortable with the degree of
training of those forces that were available to us.”

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— the one thing that would have improved the situation — would have been having
more troops in Iraq at the beginning and throughout.”103
A logical fallacy in the number-of-troops critique is that “How many troops do
you need?” is not an especially meaningful question, unless what those troops will
be expected to do is clarified. By many accounts, the OIF post-war planning process
did not provide commanders, before the start of combat operations, with a clear
picture of the extent of their assigned post-war responsibilities.104
Inter-Agency Post-War Planning. A primary focus of the interagency post-
war-planning debates was who would be in charge in Iraq, on “the day after.” For the
military, decisions by the Administration about who would do what would help
clarify the military’s own roles and responsibilities. Before making such decisions
— in particular, what responsibilities would be carried out by Iraqis — the
Administration cultivated Iraqi contacts.
Based on months of negotiations, in conjunction with the government of the
United Kingdom, the Administration helped sponsor a series of conferences of Iraqi
oppositionists, including expatriates and some Iraqis — notably Iraqi Kurds — who
could come and go from their homes. The events included a major conference in
London in December 2002, and a follow-on event in Salahuddin, Iraq, in February
2003.105 At these events, Iraqi oppositionists agreed on a political statement and self-
nominated a “leadership council,” but the events did not directly produce U.S. policy
decisions about post-war roles and responsibilities.106
During the same time frame, the Departments of State and Defense were locked
in debate about post-war political plans for Iraq. The State Department supported a
deliberate political process, including slowly building new political institutions,
based on the rule of law, while, in the meantime, Iraqis would serve only in advisory
capacities. Through the second half of 2002, the State Department’s “Future of Iraq”
project brought together Iraqi oppositionists and experts, in a series of working
groups, to consider an array of potential post-war challenges. While a tacit goal of
the project was to identify some Iraqis who might serve in future leadership
positions, it was not designed to produce a slate of leaders-in-waiting.107 The project
103 See Robin Wright and Tom Ricks, “Bremer Criticizes Troop Levels,” Washington Post,
October 5, 2004. Ambassador Bremer’s remarks were quoted from a nominally off-the-
record talk he gave at DePauw University on September 17, 2004.
104 Information from CENTCOM, CFLCC, V Corps, and Division Commanders, 2003, 2004
and 2008, and from Office of the Secretary of Defense officials, 2003 and 2004.
105 Interviews with event organizers, 2002 and 2003. See Michael Howard, “Conference
Delegates Vie for Political Role in New Iraq,” The Guardian, December 16, 2002; and
Judith Miller, “Ending Conference, Iraqi Dissidents Insist on Self-Government,” The New
York Times, March 3, 2003.
106 Information from Department of State and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials,
2002 and 2003.
107 Interviews with State officials responsible for the project, 2002 and 2003, and
(continued...)

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was also not designed to produce formal plans. However, some of the ideas it
generated did reportedly help operational-level military planners refine their efforts,
and the project might have had a greater impact had more of its output reached the
planners.108
The Department of Defense (DOD) — more specifically and accurately the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) — favored putting Iraqis in charge of Iraq,
in some form, as soon as possible, based loosely on the model of Afghanistan. A
“real” Iraqi leadership with real power, some officials believed, might find favor with
the Iraqi people and with neighboring states, and might shorten the length of the U.S.
commitment in Iraq.109 As Secretary Rumsfeld reportedly told President Bush in
August 2002, “We will want to get Iraqis in charge of Iraq as soon as possible.”110
In the fall of 2002, no clear decision emerged about the role of Iraqis in
immediate post-war Iraq. Discussions among senior leaders apparently focused on
the concept of a U.S.-led “transitional civil administration” that would govern, or
help govern, Iraq. However, no agreement was reached at that time about what
authority such a body would have, what its responsibilities would be, how long it
would last, or which Iraqis would be involved.111
In January 2003, Administration thinking coalesced around a broad post-war
political process for Iraq, captured in what was universally known at the time as the
“mega-brief.” The approach favored the State Department’s preference for a
deliberate process that would give Iraqi post-Saddam political life a chance to
develop organically, but it also acknowledged DOD’s concern to provide a visible
Iraqi leadership — though very weakly empowered — as soon as possible. The
“mega-brief” process would include creating a senior-level Iraqi Consultative
Council (ICC) to serve in an advisory capacity; dismissing top Iraqi leaders from the
Saddam era but welcoming most lower-ranking officials to continue to serve;
creating an Iraqi judicial council; holding a national census; conducting municipal
elections; holding elections to a constitutional convention that would draft a
107 (...continued)
participation in some project sessions.
108 Information from CFLCC planners, 2003 and 2008.
109 Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi opposition umbrella group Iraqi National Congress,
was one key figure with whom OSD maintained contact, and some practitioners and
observers have maintained that OSD sought primarily to “crown Chalabi.” However,
according to OSD officials, the “theory of the case,” that is, introducing a new Iraqi
leadership as soon as possible, was more important part of the argument than individual
personalities. Information from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and
Department of State officials, 2002 and 2003.
110 Tommy Franks, American Soldier, New York: Regan Books, 2004, p.393. Franks
reports that the remarks were made at a 5 August 2002 session of the National Security
Council.
111 Interviews with officials from the NSC, State Department, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and the Joint Staff, 2002 and 2003.

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constitution; carrying out a constitutional referendum; and then holding national
elections. It was envisaged that the process would take years to complete.112
The “mega-brief” approach — which gained currency just as U.S. troops were
conducting final rehearsals for the war — implied that many governance tasks would
need to be performed by coalition (non-Iraqi) personnel, whether civilian or military,
for some time to come.113
Military Post-War Planning. Military commanders and planners typically
base operational plans on policy assumptions and clearly specify those assumptions
at the beginning of any plans briefing. For OIF planners, the critical policy
assumptions concerned who would have which post-war roles and responsibilities.
OIF preparations reversed the usual sequence, in that military planning began long
before the key policy debates, let alone policy conclusions.
During their planning process, military commanders apparently sought to elicit
the policy guidance they needed by briefing their policy assumptions and hoping for
112 Information from NSC staff, and Department of State and Office of the Secretary of
Defense officials, 2003 and 2008. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, on February 11, 2003, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith,
who favored “putting Iraqis in charge,” describing the possible post-Saddam political
process, named the key elements of the “mega-brief,” including the Iraqi Consultative
Council, the judicial council, the drafting of a constitution followed by a referendum, and
early local elections. See Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the
Dawn of the War on Terrorism. New York: Harper, 2008, p.369.
113 During the spring of 2003, while combat operations commenced and U.S. commanders
on the ground were wholly occupied with the fight, inter-agency wrangling concerning post-
Saddam governance apparently continued. Former Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith
writes that in March 2003, his office, OSD (Policy), drafted a concept that called for the
early appointment of an Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA) that would share leadership
responsibilities with the coalition — that is, it would be less than an interim government,
but more than a merely consultative body. Feith writes that the IIA concept was approved
by President Bush at a session of the National Security Council on March 10, 2003. (See
Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on
Terrorism. New York: Harper, 2008, p.408.) During his brief tenure in Iraq, with a view
to identifying Iraqis to play interim roles, Jay Garner, leader of the Organization for
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) hosted two “big-tent” meetings of
Iraqi expats and community leaders, on April 15, 2003, in Nasariyah, and on April 28, 2003,
in Baghdad. In early May 2003, just before President Bush announced that a new Coalition
Provisional Authority, led by Ambassador L. Paul “Jerry” Bremer would supercede ORHA,
Garner stated publicly that a “nucleus” of a “temporary” Iraqi leadership would emerge by
later that month. After his arrival, Bremer slowed the process and, in July 2003, created the
Iraqi Governing Council — an interim body like both the ICC and IIA concepts, with
relatively little authority. Bremer has argued that at the time of his own appointment to
head CPA in early May, the President’s direction to him was not to hurry, but to “take the
time necessary to create a stable political environment.” See L. Paul Bremer III, “Facts for
Feith: CPA History,” National Review Online, March 19, 2008. It is possible that despite
some broad presidential direction, key senior practitioners failed to reach a single, shared
understanding of the role that an interim Iraqi body would play and the authority it would
exercise.

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a response.114 In December 2001, in his first OIF brief to President Bush, General
Franks included as one element of the mission: “establish a provisional Iraqi
government,” but this measure was neither confirmed nor rejected. General Franks
wrote later that as he briefed this to the President, he had in mind the Bonn
Conference for Afghanistan.115 In August 2002, still without a policy decision about
post-war responsibilities, CENTCOM included in its war plans briefing the
assumption: “DoS [Department of State] will promote creation of a broad-based,
credible provisional government prior to D-Day.”116
Unable to determine what Iraqi civilian structure they would be asked to
support, the military sought to elicit guidance about the coalition’s own post-war
architecture and responsibilities. According to General Franks, the CENTCOM war
plans slides briefed to President Bush and the National Security Council on August
5, 2002, included the intentionally provocative phrase, “military administration,” but
no decision about post-war architecture was made at that time.117
Two months later, the OIF plans slides included, for the first time, a full wiring
diagram of the coalition’s post-war structure, describing post-war responsibilities in
a “military administration.” A “Joint Task Force” would be responsible for security,
a civilian “High Commissioner” would be responsible for all other functions; and
both would report to CENTCOM. This chart still failed to prompt a decision,
although Office of the Secretary of Defense staff reportedly spent the ensuing weeks
considering “High Commissioner” candidates, just in case.118
By late 2002, in the absence of detailed policy guidance, military commanders
at several levels had launched “Phase IV” planning efforts, to identify and begin to
prepare for potential post-war requirements. In January 2003, based on a
recommendation that came out of the “Internal Look” exercise conducted in Kuwait
in December 2002, Brigadier General Steve Hawkins was named to lead a new “Task
Force IV.” TFIV, an ad hoc organization, was tasked to conduct post-war planning,
and to prepare to deploy to Baghdad as the nucleus of a post-war headquarters. TFIV
was dispatched immediately to Kuwait, to work under the operational control of the
Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) — the ground forces
component of CENTCOM — and its commanding general, Lieutenant General David
114 Information from CENTCOM planners, 2003 and 2006.
115 Tommy Franks, American Soldier, New York: Regan Books, 2004.
116 “Compartmented Planning Effort, 15 August 2002” brief, part of “Top Secret Polo Step”
collection, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and posted by the National
Security Archive, The George Washington University, available at [http://www.gwu.edu/
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB214/Tab%20I.pdf].
117 Tommy Franks, American Soldier, New York: Regan Books, 2004.
118 Interviews with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the
Department of State, and the NSC staff, 2002 and 2003.

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McKiernan.119 TFIV thus provided skilled labor, but no connectivity to the still on-
going Washington policy debates about the post-war division of responsibilities.
In March 2003, CFLCC launched a dedicated post-war planning effort of its
own, led by Major General Albert Whitley (UK), who was part of the CFLCC
leadership. His more comprehensive effort — known as Eclipse II — benefitted
from close connectivity with its sister-effort, CFLCC’s combat operations planning,
but lacked direct access to the broader Washington policy debates.
In addition to lacking policy guidance about post-war roles and responsibilities,
these operational-level planning efforts lacked insight into key aspects of the current
state of affairs in Iraq. For example, planning assumed that Iraqis, in particular law
enforcement personnel, would be available and willing to resume some civic duties
on the “day after.” Also, plans did not recognize the deeply degraded status of Iraqi
infrastructure, such as electricity grids.
Organizational Decisions. On January 20, 2003, by National Security
Presidential Directive 24, the President created the Organization for Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), to serve first as the post-war planning office
in the Pentagon, and then to deploy to Iraq. Throughout, ORHA would report to the
Department of Defense. Retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, who had led
Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq after the Gulf War, was appointed to lead
ORHA. He quickly brought on board a team of other retired Army general officers
to serve in key leadership positions.120
ORHA held its founding conference on February 20 and 21, 2003, at the
National Defense University. Participants included the fledgling ORHA staff,
representatives of civilian agencies that would contribute to the effort, and
representatives of the military commands — long since deployed to Kuwait — that
would become ORHA’s partners.
As briefed at NDU, ORHA would be responsible for three pillars of activity in
post-war Iraq — Civil Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs, and Reconstruction — while
the military would be responsible for security. Those ORHA efforts would
commence in each area as soon as major combat operations ended. The most
important constraint was time — the civilian agencies were not organized or
resourced to be able to provide substantial resources or personnel by the start of
major combat operations.
ORHA’s command relationships with other Department of Defense bodies were
initially a topic of dispute. During ORHA’s “post-war planning office” days inside
119 Interviews with TFIV leaders and members, and with CFLCC staff, 2003. See also
Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story and the
Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, New York: Vintage Books, 2006.
120 They included Lieutenant General Ron Adams, Lieutenant General Jerry Bates, Major
General Bruce Moore, and Brigadier General Buck Walters. The initial leadership team also
included one senior leader from the Department of State, Ambassador Barbara Bodine, a
noted Arabist and regional expert.

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the Pentagon, General Garner reported directly to Secretary Rumsfeld. It was
generally agreed that, once in the field, ORHA would fall under CENTCOM.
CFLCC insisted that ORHA would also fall under CFLCC, but ORHA resisted that
arrangement.121
Shortly after the founding conference at NDU, ORHA deployed to Kuwait with
a skeleton staff and limited resources, and set up its headquarters at the Kuwait
Hilton.
Major Combat Operations
Major combat operations in Iraq, launched in March 2003, roughly followed the
course that had been outlined at the CENTCOM Component Commanders
Conference in January that year. The coalition force was both joint — with
representatives from all the U.S. military services — and combined — with
participants from coalition partner countries.122
Early Infiltration
As long planned, the effort had actually begun before the full-scale launch, with
early infiltration into Iraq by the CIA, including the so-called Northern and Southern
Iraq Liaison Elements (NILE and SILE), whose task was to gather intelligence, form
relationships, and lay the groundwork for the early entry of Special Operations Forces
(SOF).123
SOF, in turn, had also entered Iraq before the formal launch. Among other
missions, SOF secured bases in Al Anbar province in western Iraq, secured suspected
WMD sites, pursued some of the designated “high-value targets,” and worked closely
with Iraqi Kurdish forces in northern Iraq — the pesh merga — to attack a key
stronghold of the designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, Ansar al-Islam.124
Special operations forces in OIF, like the conventional forces, were both joint and
combined — including contingents from the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland.
121 Information from ORHA senior leaders, and CENTCOM and CFLCC staff, 2003.
122 The U.S. Coast Guard, the only military service that reports to the Department of
Homeland Security rather than the Department of Defense, contributed personnel to conduct
maritime-interception operations and to conduct coastal patrols.
123 See Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004, pp.208-212;
Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story and the
Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, New York: Vintage Books, 2006, pp.156-157, 188-189,
388; and “Top Secret Polo Step” collection, “Compartmented Planning Effort, 15 August
2002” CENTCOM brief, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and posted by
the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, available at
[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB214/index.htm].
124 Information from CENTCOM, CFLCC and V Corps planners, 2003. See also Andrew
Krepinevich, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment,” Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, 2003.

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Defense expert Andrew Krepinevich estimated that “nearly 10,000” SOF took part
in OIF major combat.125
The Launch
The visible public launch of OIF took place on March 20, 2003, shortly after the
expiration of President Bush’s 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons
(see above, “Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein”).126 After months of debate about the
sequencing of the air and ground campaigns, the planned sequence shifted in two
major ways at the last minute.
By early 2003, the plans called for beginning with a short air-only campaign,
followed by the ground invasion. However, late-breaking evidence gave rise to
stronger concerns that the Iraqi regime would deliberately destroy its southern oil
wells, so the timing of the ground forces launch was moved up, ahead of the
scheduled air campaign launch.
Then, even closer to launch time, the CIA obtained what seemed to be
compelling information about Saddam Hussein’s location — at Dora Farms near
Baghdad. In the early hours of March 20, just as the ultimatum expired, a pair of F-
117 fighters targeted the site. That attack narrowly followed a barrage of Tomahawk
missiles, launched from ships at key leadership sites in Baghdad.
That night, coalition ground forces crossed the line of departure from the
Kuwaiti desert into southern Iraq. The following day, March 21, 2003, brought the
larger-scale “shock and awe” attacks on Iraqi command and control and other sites,
from both Air Force and Navy assets. Early Iraqi responses included setting a few
oil wells on fire, and firing a few poorly-directed missiles into Kuwait, most of which
were successfully intercepted by Patriot missiles.127
The Ground Campaign
The ground campaign was led by Army Lieutenant General David McKiernan,
the Commanding General of the Combined Forces Land Component Command
(CFLCC), the ground component of CENTCOM. The strategy was a quick, two-
pronged push from Kuwait up through southern Iraq to Baghdad.
125 Andrew Krepinevich, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment,” Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003.
126 Some discrepancies in contemporary press coverage and later accounts are due to the
eight-hour time difference between Washington D.C., where President Bush issued the 48-
hour ultimatum on the evening of March 17; and Baghdad, where that ultimatum expired in
the early morning of March 20. The timeline of operations, described here, is based on the
time in Baghdad.
127 Information from V Corps leaders and staff, 2003. The basic facts of the case, during
the initial days of OIF, were extremely well-documented by the international press. For one
clear account, see Romesh Ratnesar, “Awestruck,” Time, March 23, 2003. See also
Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story and the
Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, New York: Vintage Books, 2006.

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Under CFLCC, the ground “main effort” was led by U.S. Army V Corps, under
Lieutenant General William Scott Wallace. V Corps was assigned the western route
up to Baghdad, west of the Euphrates River.128 Meanwhile, the 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force (IMEF), led by Lieutenant General James Conway, was assigned
the eastern route, closer to the border with Iran. From a tactical perspective, for both
the Army and the Marines this was a very long projection of force — over 600
kilometers from Kuwait up to Baghdad, and more for those units that pushed further
north to Tikrit or to Mosul. Those long distances reportedly strained capabilities
including logistics and communications.
The Marines were assigned the eastern route up to Baghdad — with more urban
areas than the Army’s western route. The basic strategy still called for a quick drive
to Baghdad. Just across the border into Iraq, IMEF took the far southern port city of
Umm Qasr.
The UK First Armored Division, which fell under IMEF, was tasked to take
Basra, Iraq’s second largest city. The UK Division faced resistance from members
of the paramilitary force Saddam Fedayeen and others still loyal to the Ba’ath Party.
To limit casualties in the large urban area, rather than enter the city immediately in
full force, the Division used a more methodical elimination of opponents, combined
with outreach to the population to explain their intentions. IMEF supported the
Division’s use of a slow and deliberate tempo. After several weeks of gradual
attrition, the Division pushed into Basra on April 6, 2003.
The main IMEF force encountered some resistance as they pushed north, in
particular at the town of Nassiriyah, a geographical choke-point. At Nassiriyah,
“there were a number of things that seemed to hit us all about the same time, that
dented our momentum,” LtGen Conway later noted. There, the Marines suffered
casualties from a friendly fire incident with Apaches. As widely reported, the
Army’s 507th Maintenance Company lost its way in the area and stumbled into an
ambush, in which some personnel were killed and others, including PFC Jessica
Lynch, were taken hostage. The area was blanketed by fierce desert sandstorms.
And the Saddam Fedayeen put up a determined resistance — “not a shock, but a
surprise,” as LtGen Conway later reflected. Evidence suggested that additional Iraqi
fighters, inspired by the ambush carried out by the Fedayeen, came from Baghdad to
Nassiriyah to join the fight.129 After the defeating the resistance at Nassiriyah, the
Marines pushed up to Baghdad along their eastern route.
In the west, the Army faced a longer distance but a less-populated terrain. V
Corps began combat operations with two divisions under its command, the Third
128 For an in-depth description from the tactical level of the Army’s role in OIF through
major combat operations, commissioned by the Army and written by participants, see
Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005.
129 Interviews with participants, 2003. See also PBS Frontline, “Interview: Lt.Gen. James
Conway,” February 26, 2004, at [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/
interviews/conway. html#marines].

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Infantry Division (3ID), under Major General Buford Blount, and the 101st Airborne
Division (101st), under Major General David Petraeus.
The 3ID rapidly led the western charge to Baghdad, moving speedily through
the south and reaching Saddam International Airport on April 4. The division
launched its first “thunder run” — a fast, armored strike — into Baghdad on April
5, and the second on April 7. The purpose of the first, according to the Brigade
Commander in charge, Colonel David Perkins, was “to create as much confusion as
I can inside the city.” The purpose of the second was “to make sure, in no uncertain
terms, that people knew the city had fallen and we were in charge of it.”130
The 101st followed the 3ID up the western route through southern Iraq, clearing
resistance in southern cities and allowing the 3ID to move as quickly as possible.
Soldiers from the 101st faced fighting in key urban areas — Hillah, Najaf, Karbala.
Just after mid-April, the division arrived and set up its headquarters in Mosul, in
northern Iraq.131
Like the Marines, the Army was somewhat surprised by the resistance they
encountered from the Saddam Fedayeen. LTG Wallace apparently caused some
consternation at higher headquarters levels with his candid remarks to the press in
late March: “The enemy we’re fighting is different from the one we’d war-gamed
against.” He explained, “The attacks we’re seeing are bizarre — technical vehicles
with .50 calibers and every kind of weapon charging tanks and Bradleys.”132 Coupled
with major sand storms, these attacks posed challenges to the ground forces’ long
supply lines — “lines of communication” — running up from Kuwait over hundreds
of miles through southern Iraq.133
In the north, on March 26, 2003, about 1,000 soldiers from the 173rd Airborne
Brigade, part of the Army’s Southern European Task Force based in Italy, parachuted
into northern Iraq. They began their mission by securing an airfield so that cargo
planes carrying tanks and Bradleys could land. Once on the ground, the 173rd,
working closely with air and ground Special Operating Forces and with Kurdish pesh
merga forces, expanded the northern front of OIF.
130 PBS Frontline, “Interview: COL David Perkins,” February 26, 2004, at
[http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/perkins.html#
thunder].
131 See Press Conference with Major General David Petraeus, May 13, 2003, at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2601]. For an account
from the perspective of a battalion commander in the 101st Airborne Division, see
Christopher Hughes, War on Two Fronts: An Infantry Commander’s War in Iraq and the
Pentagon, Drexel Hill, PA: Casemate, 2007.
132 Rick Atkinson, “General: A Longer War Likely,” Washington Post, March 28, 2003.
Asked whether this suggested the likelihood of a much longer war than forecast, LTG
Wallace replied, “It’s beginning to look that way.” Asked later that day for his reaction to
these comments, Secretary Rumsfeld noted, “Well, I didn’t read the article — I saw the
headline.” See DOD Press Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld, March 28, 2003, available at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2180]s].
133 Information from V Corps staff, 2003.

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Initial coalition plans had called for the heavy 4th Infantry Division (4ID) to open
the northern front by crossing into Iraq from Turkey. The intended primary mission
was challenging Iraqi regular army forces based above Baghdad. A more subtle
secondary mission was to place limits on possible Kurdish ambitions to control more
territory in northern Iraq, thus providing some reassurance to the Government of
Turkey and discouraging it from sending Turkish forces into Iraq to restrain the
Kurds.
By early 2003, 4ID equipment was sitting on ships circling in the eastern
Mediterranean Sea, waiting for an outcome of the ongoing negotiations with the
Turkish government. But on March 1, 2003, the Turkish parliament rejected a
proposal that would have allowed the 4ID to use Turkish territory.
Iraqi Contributions to Major Combat
Iraqi opposition fighters made a very limited contribution to coalition major
combat efforts. Before the war, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had launched
an ambitious program to recruit and train up to 3,000 Iraqi expats, to be known as the
“Free Iraqi Forces.” Training, by U.S. forces, took place in Taszar, Hungary.
Ultimately, the number of recruits and graduates was much lower than originally
projected. Most graduates did deploy to Iraq, where they served with U.S. forces
primarily as interpreters or working with local communities on civil affairs
projects.134
Meanwhile, in late March 2003, Iraqi expatriate oppositionist Ahmed Chalabi
contacted U.S. officials with a request to send a group of his own fighters from
northern to southern Iraq to join the fight. After some discussion, agreement was
reached and a U.S. military flight was arranged. In early April, Chalabi and 600
fighters stepped off the plane at Tallil air base in southern Iraq. The forces were
neither equipped nor well-organized. Accounts from many observers, in succeeding
months, suggested that some members of the group engaged in lawless behavior.135
End of Major Combat
On April 9, 2003, the statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos square in Baghdad
was toppled. Two days after the second 3ID “thunder run,” this event signaled for
many observers, inside and outside Iraq, that the old Iraqi regime had ended.
Consistent with the war plans from “Generated Start” onward, U.S. forces
continued to flow into Iraq. The 4th Infantry Division (4ID), diverted from its original
northern front plans, had re-routed its troops and equipment to Kuwait. 4ID forces
began entering Iraq on April 12, 2003. The 1st Armored Division (1AD) also began
134 Information from Office of the Secretary of Defense officials, and CFLCC and CJTF-7
officials, 2003.
135 Information from CENTCOM and V Corps officials, 2003. Curiously, Chalabi and the
fighters, apparently viewing themselves as a stronger incarnation of the Taszar training
program, adopted the name “Free Iraqi Forces.” To distinguish them from the Taszar-
trained Iraqis, the Department of Defense called them the “Free Iraqi Fighting Force.”

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CRS-41
arriving in April 2003. According to the planning, the 1st Cavalry Division (1CD)
was scheduled to be next in line. However, in April 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld, in
coordination with General Franks, made the decision that 1CD was not needed in
Iraq at that time — a decision that apparently caused consternation for some ground
commanders.136
As soon as it became apparent that the old regime was no longer exercising
control, widespread looting took place in Baghdad and elsewhere. Targets included
government buildings, and the former houses of regime leaders, but also some private
businesses and cultural institutions. Leaders of the Iraqi National Museum in
Baghdad reported, for example, that “looters had taken or destroyed 170,000 items
of antiquity dating back thousands of years.”137 Looters and vandals also targeted
unguarded weapons stockpiles largely abandoned by former Iraqi security forces.138
Some observers and coalition participants suggested that the coalition simply did not
have enough troops to stop all the unlawful behavior.139
Meanwhile, U.S. senior leadership attention had turned to Iraq’s political future.
In April, the President’s “Special Envoy for Free Iraqis,” Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad, chaired two “big tent” meetings of Iraqis. The first was held on April 15,
2003, at the ancient city of Ur, near Tallil air base, and the second was held on April
28, at the Baghdad Convention Center. Participants include expatriate opposition
leaders and Iraqi Kurds, together with a number of in-country community leaders
who had been identified by the CIA and other sources. The sessions focused on
discussion of broad principles for Iraq’s future, rather than specific decisions about
Iraqi leadership roles.140
On May 1, 2003, President Bush, standing aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln,
declared an end to major combat operations in Iraq. He stated, “In the battle of Iraq,
136 See Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, “Dash to Baghdad left top U.S. Generals
Divided,” The New York Times, March 13, 2006.
137 “Looters ransack Baghdad museum,” BBC News, April 12, 2003. See also John Burns,
“A Nation at War: The Iraqis, Looting and a Suicide Attack as Chaos Grows in Baghdad,”
The New York Times, April 11, 2003. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described the
dynamic as “untidiness,” and a manifestation of “pent-up feelings that may result from
decades of repression” directed against the old regime. See Department of Defense News
Briefing, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, April 11, 2003, available at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2367]
138 See an assessment by an OIF participant: Colonel Mark Klingelhoefer, “Captured
Enemy Ammunition in Operation Iraqi Freedom and its Strategic Importance in Post-
Conflict Operations,” U.S. Army War College, March 18, 2005, available at
[http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil72.pdf].
139 See John Burns, “A Nation at War: The Iraqis, Looting and a Suicide Attack as Chaos
Grows in Baghdad,” The New York Times, April 11, 2003, who quotes a Marine on guard
in Baghdad as saying, “we just don’t have enough troops.”
140 Information from Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense and
CENTCOM officials, and participant observation, 2003.

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the United States and our allies have prevailed.”141 At that point, the old Iraqi
regime, though not completely dismantled, was no longer able to exercise control
over Iraq’s territory, resources, or population. Saddam Hussein was captured later,
on December 13, 2003, by units of 4ID, outside his hometown Tikrit.
Post-Major Combat: Basis and Organization
This Report uses the term “post-major combat” to refer to the period from the
President’s announcement of the end of major combat, on May 1, 2003, to the
present. This period has not been monolithic — it has included evolutions in
national and military strategy, and in the specific “ways and means” used to pursue
those strategies on the ground, as described below. From a political and legal
perspective, the major marker after May 1, 2003, was the June 28, 2004, transition
of executive authority from the occupying powers back to Iraqis. From a military
perspective, the period after May 1, 2003, has included a continuation of combat
operations as well as the introduction of many new missions.
Legal Basis for Coalition Presence
Formal Occupation. From the time of regime removal until June 28, 2004,
the coalition was formally an occupying force. Shortly after the end of major combat,
in May 2003, the United Nations Security Council recognized the United States and
the United Kingdom as “occupying powers,” together with all the “authorities,
responsibilities, and obligations under international law” that this designation
entails.142 Somewhat belatedly, in October 2003, the United Nations authorized a
“multi-national force under unified command to take all necessary measures to
contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.”143 That language
referred to the coalition military command in Iraq at the time — the Combined Joint
Task Force-7 (“CJTF-7”).
Iraqi Request for a Multinational Force. As the deadline for the “transfer
of sovereignty” — June 30, 2004 — approached, U.S. and new interim Iraqi officials
negotiated the terms for the presence and activities in Iraq, after that date, of the
newly re-organized multi-national force, now called the Multi-National Force-Iraq
(“MNF-I”).
Agreement was reached to reflect the terms of that presence in the unusual form
of parallel letters, one from U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, and one from Iraqi
Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, to the President of the UN Security Council. Those
141 “President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended,” May 1,
2003, at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html].
142 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003), 22 May 2003, Preambular
Section.
143 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003), 16 October 2003.

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letters were appended to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, issued on June 8,
2004.144
That U.N. Resolution reaffirmed the authorization for the multi-national force
and extended it to the post-occupation period — on the grounds that it was “at the
request of the incoming Interim Government of Iraq.”145 It repeated the authorization
language used in the October 2003 Resolution, with an important qualifier: the force
was now authorized to “take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance
of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to this
resolution.”146
The U.S. letter spelled out the tasks the multi-national force would undertake,
including combat operations, internment, securing of weapons, training and
equipping Iraqi security forces, and participating in providing humanitarian
assistance, civil affairs support, and relief and reconstruction assistance.
Some of the early U.S.-Iraqi discussions had considered the possibility that Iraqi
forces might, in some cases, fall under the command of the multinational force.147
However, the U.N. Resolution and the appended letters made clear that the
command-and-control relationship between the Iraqi government and the multi-
national force would be strictly one of coordination, not command. The Resolution
called the relationship a “security partnership between the sovereign Government of
Iraq and the multinational force.”148
Both letters described coordination modalities to help ensure unity of effort.
Both stated the intention to make use of “coordination bodies at the national,
regional, and local levels,” and noted that multi-national force and Iraqi officials
would “keep each other informed of their activities.”
Further parameters of the MNF-I presence in Iraq were spelled out in a revised
version of Order 17 of the Coalition Provisional Authority, issued on June 27, 2004.
The document addressed issues including legal immunities, communications,
transportation, customs, entry and departure, for government civilians and contractors
as well as military forces. Issued by the legal executive authority of Iraq at the time,
the Order was to remain in force “for the duration of U.N. Resolution mandates
144 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004), 8 June 2004 (letters).
Subsequently, the U.N. mandate was extended annually.
145 Ibid., para. 9.
146 Ibid., para. 10.
147 The ceremony marking the establishment (Full Operational Capability) of the Multi-
National Force-Iraq, in May 2004, included a parade of representatives of each coalition
partner country. An Iraqi General participated in the parade like all the other coalition
members — and then brought the house down when, unscripted, he kissed the Iraqi flag.
148 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004), 8 June 2004 (letters).

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including subsequent Resolutions, unless rescinded or amended by Iraqi
legislation.”149
Status of Forces Agreement. The legal basis for the presence of U.S.
forces in Iraq is expected to change by the beginning of 2009. The current U.N.
authorization, issued on December 18, 2007, extends through December 31, 2008.
In requesting it, in a letter appended to the UN Resolution, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki made clear that this would be the final request by the Government of Iraq
for an extension of the current mandate. The Iraqi Government, he wrote, “expects,
in future, that the Security Council will be able to deal with the situation in Iraq
without the need for action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations.”150
Since spring 2008, U.S.-Iraqi negotiations have been underway on a new set of
parameters to replace the UN mandate. One document under discussion is a Strategic
Framework Agreement (SFA), to outline the broad parameters of the future U.S.-
Iraqi bilateral relationship. The SFA is expected to be modeled on a “Declaration of
Principles” signed by President Bush and Prime Minister al-Maliki on November 26,
2007. That declaration stated the “aim to achieve, before July 31, 2008, agreements
between the two governments with respect to the political, cultural, economic, and
security spheres.”151
The second document at issue in the single-track negotiations process is based
on a standard Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) typically signed with each foreign
country that hosts U.S. forces, to define the laws, rules and procedures governing the
presence and activities of those forces. In this case, the agreement is expected to
have special features providing authorities necessary for U.S. forces to operate and
carry out essential missions. Nomenclature has been a source of dispute, with Iraqi
officials reportedly preferring the terms “Memorandum of Agreement,” or “Binding
Implementing Agreement,” to the term “SOFA.”
From an operational perspective, key issues reportedly under discussion in the
SOFA negotiations include coordination requirements for U.S. operations; the
control of Iraqi air space; the rules and procedures for detainee operations; and legal
jurisdiction governing Department of Defense military and civilian personnel and
149 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17 (revised), “Status of the Coalition Provisional
Authority, MNF-Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq,” available at
[http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition
__Rev__with_Annex_A.pdf].
150 UN Security Council Resolution 1790 (2007), December 18, 2007, available at
[http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/650/72/PDF/N0765072.pdf?Open
Element].
151 “Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship
Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America,” November 26, 2007,
available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071126-11.html].

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contractors. The SOFA-like agreement will reportedly not apply automatically to
coalition partner countries.152
The Bush Administration has maintained that the agreements under negotiation
will not contain any binding agreement to defend Iraq, or any other security
commitments that would require the advice and consent of the Senate.153
Nevertheless, Members of Congress have urged the Administration to consult with
the Congress in more detail regarding the negotiations, and some Members, in
various formulations, have proposed requiring the Administration to seek
congressional approval before signing the agreements.154
Coalition Command Relationships
Since the declared end of major combat operations, the formal relationships
among U.S. military and civilian organizations operating in Iraq have shifted several
times, in important ways.
The period of formal occupation was characterized by multiple, somewhat
confusing relationships.155 In late April 2003, LTG McKiernan, Commanding
General of the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), issued a
proclamation stating: “The coalition alone retains absolute authority within Iraq.”156
CFLCC, the military face of the coalition in Iraq, maintained a small headquarters
presence in Baghdad, at the Al Faw Palace at Camp Victory, while the majority of
its staff remained in their pre-war location at Camp Doha, Kuwait.
The civilian face of the coalition in Iraq, in that time frame, was the
Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), whose small
staff had arrived in Baghdad in late April. The basic civil-military division of labor
was clear — CFLCC was responsible for security, while ORHA focused on
152 Information from U.S. government officials, August 2008.
153 See Testimony of Ambassador David M. Satterfield, Coordinator for Iraq, Department
of State, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcomittees on the Middle East and
South Asia, and on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight, March 4,
2008, available [http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/sat030408.htm], and Adam Graham-
Silverman, “Democrats Don’t Buy Administration’s Assurances on Iraq Agreements,”
Congressional Quarterly Today, March 5, 2008.
154 For a detailed discussion of congressional responses, see CRS Report RL34568, U.S.-
Iraq Strategic Framework and Status of Forces Agreement: Congressional Response, by
Matthew Weed.
155 For an account of the year of formal occupation from one of the key protagonists, see L.
Paul Bremer III with Malcolm McConnell, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future
of Hope, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006. For an account of that year by a journalist
who spent considerable time at CPA headquarters, see Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life
in the Emerald City, New York: Vintage Books, 2006. For a hard-hitting critique of both
civilian and military mistakes during the occupation, see Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The
American Military Adventure in Iraq, New York: The Penguin Press, 2006.
156 Information from CFLCC and V Corps staff, 2003.

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reconstruction and humanitarian issues. The command relationship between the two,
debated before the war, was never clearly resolved during the very short duration of
their partnership on the ground in Iraq.
In early May 2003, President Bush announced his intention to appoint a senior
official to serve as Administrator of a new organization, the Coalition Provisional
Authority, which would serve as the legal executive authority of Iraq — a much more
authoritative mandate than ORHA had held. On May 9, 2003, Ambassador L. Paul
“Jerry” Bremer arrived in Baghdad with a small retinue, to take up the assignment.
By mandate, Ambassador Bremer reported through the Secretary of Defense to the
President. Later, in fall 2003, the White House assumed the lead for coordinating
efforts in Iraq, and Ambassador Bremer’s direct contacts with the White House
became even more frequent.
On June 15, 2003, the headquarters of U.S. Army V Corps, now led by
Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, assumed the coalition military leadership
mantle from CFLCC — and the new body was named the CJTF-7.157 CJTF-7
reported directly to CENTCOM, and through it to the Secretary of Defense. At the
same time, CJTF-7 served in “direct support” to CPA.158 In the view of many
observers, that dual chain of command and accountability was not a recipe for
success — particularly when the CENTCOM Commanding General and the CPA
Administrator disagreed with each other. In May 2004, CJTF-7 separated into a
higher, strategically-focused headquarters, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I),
still led by LTG Sanchez, and a lower, operationally-focused headquarters, the Multi-
National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). MNF-I retained CJTF-7’s “direct support”
relationship with CPA until the end of the formal occupation.
CJTF-7 itself was a combined force, including a UK Deputy Commanding
General, and many key staff members, as well as contingents, from coalition partner
countries. As a rule, those representatives maintained direct communication with
their respective capitals. CPA, too, was “combined,” including a senior UK official
who shared the leadership role, though not executive signing authority, with
Ambassador Bremer, and who maintained a regular and full channel of
communication with the UK government in London.
On June 28, 2004, at the “transfer of sovereignty,” the Coalition Provisional
Authority ceased to exist. The new U.S. Embassy, led by Ambassador John
Negroponte, inherited none of CPA’s executive authority for Iraq — like other U.S.
157 The previous day, June 14, The V Corps Commanding General who led V Corps during
OIF major combat, LTG Wallace, handed command of the Corps to LTG Sanchez. LTG
Sanchez had come to Iraq several weeks earlier as the Commanding General of 1st Armored
Division. The few CFLCC staff still remaining in Baghdad redeployed to Kuwait.
158 The phrase, borrowed from field artillery, does not necessarily translate smoothly into
bureaucratic relationships. CPA tended to assume that the military command in Iraq simply
worked for CPA. In May 2003, at his first meeting with the V Corps Commander,
discussing whether their organizations would retain separate headquarters, Ambassador
Bremer pointed his finger at the General’s chest and said, “It is my commander’s intent that
you co-locate with me.” Participant observation, 2003.

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CRS-47
Embassies around the world, it simply represented U.S. interests in Iraq. The
relationship between the Embassy and MNF-I — led by General George Casey
beginning on July 1, 2004 — was strictly one of coordination.
Post-Major Combat: The Force
The Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), like its predecessor CJTF-7, is a joint,
combined force. It includes some Department of Defense civil servants, and it is
supported by civilian contractors.
Structure and Footprint
Headquarters Organization. The MNF-I headquarters, located in Baghdad,
is the strategic-level headquarters, currently led, as of September 16, 2008, by U.S.
Army General Raymond Odierno. The position of MNF-I Deputy Commanding
General (DCG) has always been filled by a general officer from the United Kingdom
— since March 2008, Lieutenant General John Cooper has served simultaneously as
MNF-I DCG and Senior British Military Representative to Iraq. The MNF-I staff is
an ad hoc headquarters, including senior leaders and staff provided individually by
the U.S. military services and by coalition partner countries.
The Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), also located in Baghdad, is the
operational-level headquarters, reporting to MNF-I.159 Its role is synchronizing
coalition forces actions throughout Iraq. MNC-I is built around a U.S. Army Corps.
As of February 2008, the nucleus of MNC-I is the XVIII Airborne Corps, led by
Army Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin, which replaced III Corps, led by then-
Lieutenant General Odierno. In each rotation, the Army Corps staff is augmented by
additional U.S. and coalition partner senior leaders and staff.
The structure and staffing of both MNF-I and MNC-I have evolved significantly
from the early days of OIF. When U.S. Army V Corps became the nucleus of CJTF-
7, in June 2003, its pre-war planning and exercising, and its OIF wartime experience,
had been focused on the tactical-level ground campaign. Its senior staff positions
were filled by Colonels; those senior positions were only gradually filled by General
Officers over the course of summer and fall 2003.
Under the command of MNC-I, Divisions or their equivalents are responsible
for contiguous areas covering all of Iraq. The boundaries of the divisional areas of
responsibility have shifted somewhat over time, to accommodate both shifting
security requirements and major changes in deployments by coalition partner
countries.
159 The 2004 split of CJTF-7 into a higher, four-star HQ, and a lower, three-star HQ, was
strongly recommended, in order to give the commanders time to focus full-time on two very
large portfolios — strategic work with U.S. and Iraqi leadership, and supervising operations
throughout Iraq. As of January 2008, MNF-I and MNC-I staff were reportedly beginning
to plan a re-merger of the two headquarters, perhaps to take effect at the following Corps
rotation, to avoid apparent duplication of effort by some staff sections.

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Provincial Iraqi Control.
The type of coverage varies geographically. In provinces under “Provincial Iraqi
Control” (PIC) — 11 of Iraq’s 18 provinces — the Government of Iraq, represented
by the Governor, has the lead responsibility for security. Conventional coalition
forces may have little or no continual presence, and as a rule they are required to seek
Iraqi approval to carry out operations.
The PIC designation is the result of a high-level decision process, based on a set
of criteria, with input from Iraqi Government, MNF-I, and U.S. and UK officials, and
a final decision by Iraq’s Ministerial Committee on National Security, which is
chaired by the Prime Minister.160 As DOD has pointed, out, there is “... no clear,
post-PIC assessment process for determining the degree to which a transitioned
province has achieved sustainable security and the conditions necessary for continued
economic growth and stability.”161 Security conditions on the ground vary among
PIC provinces, for example, between calm Sulaymaniyah province in the north to
recently restive Basra province in the south — so the PIC designation may indicate
more about security responsibilities than security conditions.
U.S. Forces in Iraq
The total number of U.S. forces in Iraq peaked early, during major combat
operations, at about 250,000 troops. Since then, the number has varied greatly over
time, in response to events on the ground, such as Iraqi elections, and to strategic-
level decisions, such as the 2007 surge. The peak surge level of U.S. troops was
about 168,000, in October 2007, up from a relative low of 135,000 troops in January
2007 just before surge forces began to arrive.
As of September 2008, the total number of U.S. troops in Iraq was about
143,000. The lower total, compared to October 2007, reflects the redeployment from
Iraq without replacement of all five of the Army’s “surge” brigades: the 2nd brigade
combat team (BCT) of the 82nd Airborne Division; the 4th BCT of the 1st Infantry
Division; the 3rd BCT of the 3rd Infantry Division; the 4th BCT of the 2nd Infantry
Division; and the 2nd BCT of the 3rd Infantry Division.
Well before the surge, by many accounts, the demand for forces in Iraq had
placed some stress on both the active and reserve components. The operational
benefits of maintaining continuity, and keeping forces in place long enough to gain
understanding and develop expertise, competed against institutional requirements to
160 As of August 2008, PIC provinces and their dates of designation include Muthanna, July
2006; Dhi Qar, September 2006; An Najaf, December 2006; Maysan, April 2007; Irbil,
Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk, May 2007; Karbala, October 2007; Basrah, December 2007;
Qadisiyah, July 2008; Anbar, September 2008. See MNF-I Provincial Iraqi Control page
at [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1469&Itemid
=78].
161 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2007, p.
27.

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maintain the health of the force as a whole, including the ability to recruit and retain
personnel.
An additional challenge was that pre-war assumptions only very incompletely
predicted the scope and scale of post-war mission requirements, which meant in
practice, especially early in OIF, that individuals and units deployed without certainty
about the length of their tours. U.S. Army V Corps, for example, was not specifically
given the mission, before the war, to serve as the post-war task force headquarters,
let alone a timeline for that commitment. As the press widely reported after the end
of major combat operations, some members of the 3rd Infantry Division (3ID), which
had led the Army’s charge to Baghdad, publicly stated their desire to redeploy as
soon as possible. Major General Buford Blount, the 3ID Commanding General,
commented: “You know, a lot of my forces have been over here since September,
and fought a great fight and [are] doing great work here in the city. But if you ask the
soldiers, they’re ready to go home.”162
Sometimes, changes in the security situation on the ground — rather than
anticipated political events like Iraqi elections — have prompted decisions to extend
deployments. The earliest and possibly most dramatic example took place in April
2004. The young Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his militia, the Jaish al-Mahdi
(Mahdi Army), staged uprisings in cities and towns throughout Shi’a-populated
southern Iraq, just as the volatile, Sunni-populated city of Fallujah, in Al Anbar
province, simmered in the wake of the gruesome murders of four Blackwater
contractors. The 1st Armored Division (1AD), which had served in Baghdad for one
year, and was already in the process of redeploying, was extended by 90 days — and
then executed a remarkable series of complex and rapid troop deployments to
embattled southern cities.
In early 2007, in an effort to provide greater predictability if not lighter burdens,
the Department of Defense, under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates, announced new rotation policy goals. Active units would deploy for not more
than 15 months, and return to home station for not less than 12 months.163 Reserve
Component units would mobilize for a maximum of 12 months, including pre- and
post-deployment responsibilities, rather than 12 months of “boots on the ground,”
with the goal of five years between deployments.164
162 Department of Defense News Transcript, MG Buford C. Blount III from Baghdad, May
15, 2003, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
2608].
163 Department of Defense News Briefing with Secretary Gates and General Pace from the
Pentagon, April 11, 2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.
aspx?transcriptid=3928]. Secretary Gates clarified that the current expectation was that “not
more than 15 months” would generally mean “15 months.”
164 Department of Defense Press Release, “DoD Announces Changes to Reserve Component
Force Management Policy,” January 11, 2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/
releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10389]. The policy is based on unit rotations; individuals
who transfer between units may find themselves out of synch with the rotation policy goals.
See for example John Vandiver, “Families want answers about deployments and dwell
(continued...)

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In April 2008, partly in anticipation of some reduction of stress on the force
from the redeployment of the surge brigades, President Bush announced that active
component Army units deploying after August 1, 2008, would deploy for 12 months,
rather than 15. The President also recommitted to “...ensur[ing] that our Army units
will have at least a year at home for every year in the field.”165
Coalition Partner Forces166
Since its inception, OIF has been a multinational effort, but the number, size,
and nature of contributions by coalition partner countries has varied substantially
over time. Some of those contributions have been constrained by national caveats.
Four countries provided boots on the ground for major combat — the United
Kingdom, Australia, and Poland, in addition to the United States. Coalition forces
contributions then reached their peak, in terms of the number of both countries and
troops contributed, in the early post-major combat period. After that period, some
countries withdrew their forces altogether. A number of other countries have
withdrew the bulk of their contingents, but left a few personnel in Iraq to serve in
headquarters staff positions.
Past decisions to draw down forces may have been shaped, in some cases, by a
perception that the mission had been accomplished. However, far more frequently,
decisions seem to have been informed by domestic political considerations,
sometimes coupled with apparent pressure from extremists seeking to shape those
decisions. Most notable was the Spanish troop withdrawal, catalyzed by the March
11, 2004, commuter train bombings in Madrid, which killed nearly 200 people. The
attacks took place just days before scheduled Spanish parliamentary elections, in
which the ruling party of Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar Lopez, who had
supported OIF, was voted out of office. The new Prime Minister, Jose Luis
Rodriguez Zapatero, gave orders, within hours after being sworn into office, for
Spanish troops to come home from Iraq.
At the expiration of the United Nations mandate for the presence of the multi-
national force in Iraq, on December 31, 2008, it is expected that some coalition
partner countries will choose to withdraw their forces from Iraq, rather than face
tough bilateral negotiations with the Iraqi government on the terms and conditions
for a continued troop presence. As of September 2008, most of the remaining major
troop-contributing partner nations were in the process of redeploying or drawing
down their contingents.
164 (...continued)
time,” Stars and Stripes, May 11, 2007.
165 White House, “Fact Sheet: The Way Forward in Iraq,” April 10, 2008, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/04/20080410-4.html].
166 For more detailed information about foreign contributions to Iraq, including coalition
forces, see CRS Report RL32105, Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Stabilization and
Reconstruction, by Christopher Blanchard and Catherine Dale.

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! The United Kingdom continues to lead Multi-National Division-
Southeast, headquartered in Basra, with about 4,100 troops on the
ground as of August 15, 2008.167 Iraqis formally assumed security
responsibility for Basra province in December 2007. A few months
earlier, in August 2007, UK forces had pulled back to the Basra
airport, thus maintaining a less visible presence throughout the city
and province, and had shifted their focus from combat operations to
training Iraqi security forces. After coming to office in June 2007,
UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown initiated a draw-down of UK
forces from about 5,500 in summer 2007, to a projected 2,500 by
spring 2008.168 In late March 2008, amidst heavy fighting in Basra
between Iraqi security forces and extremist militias, the rest of the
drawdown was temporarily put on hold. But in July 2008, Brown
announced plans for a “fundamental change of mission” for UK
forces, in “the first months of 2009,” suggesting that further,
significant troop drawdowns were envisaged.169
! In March 2007, Georgia increased its troop contribution from 850 to
roughly 2,000 troops, a full combat brigade. The contribution was
substantial for a country with a population just over four and a half
million, and it was widely believed to be an indirect part of the
Georgian government’s bid to join NATO. In Iraq, the Georgian
troops were based in Wasit province, where many of them manned
check-points with a particular view to controlling movement from
neighboring Iran. The Georgian brigade served under Multi-
National Division-Center (MND-C). U.S. commanders in Iraq
praised the efforts of the Georgian brigade and noted with approval
that the Georgians are unconstrained by national caveats.170 In
August 2008, after Russian troops invaded Georgia, the Georgian
contingent redeployed home from Iraq, with U.S. logistical support.
! Australia initially sent about 2,000 combat troops to Iraq, including
Special Operations Forces, and had about 1,500 troops in and around
Iraq as of February 2008.171 Following elections held in November
2007, new Prime Minister Kevin Rudd stated that Australia’s
combat forces — about 550 troops — would leave Iraq by mid-
2008. In June 2008, Australia did withdraw its battle group, which
167 Interview with MND-SE officials, August 2008.
168 See, for example, Adrian Croft, “UK Brown on unannounced visit to troops in Iraq,”
Reuters, December 9, 2007.
169 “Brown signals Iraq troops withdrawal,” The Guardian, July 22, 2008; and interviews
with MND-SE officials, August 2009.
170 Conversation with Major General Rick Lynch, Commanding General, Multi-National
Division-Center, January 2008. A “national caveat” is a restriction, often in formal written
form, imposed by a government on the use of its forces.
171 See Fred W. Baker III, “U.S., Australia Reinforce Defense Relationships,” American
Forces Press Service, February 23, 2008.

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CRS-52
had been based at Tallil Air Base in Nasariyah province, in southern
Iraq. Other Australian troops continued to serve in and around Iraq,
including providing maritime surveillance, intelligence assistance,
and logistics operations.172
! The Republic of Korea leads Multi-National Division-North East,
based in Irbil and responsible for the largely Kurdish-populated
northern provinces of Iraq. The division focuses primarily on
reconstruction. Korean troops arrived in Iraq in 2004 — a sizable
contingent of about 3,600, albeit with some caveats. In December
2007, the Korean parliament voted to extend their mandate for
another year.173 As of spring 2008, the contingent included about
650 troops.174
! Poland plans to withdraw its remaining contingent of about 900
soldiers from Iraq in October 2008. Poland was one of four
countries to participate in major combat operations, and from 2003
through December 2004, Poland maintained about 2,500 troops in
Iraq. That number was reduced to about 1,700 in January 2005.175
In September 2003, Poland assumed command of Multi-National
Division-Center South (MND-CS) from the 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force — at that time, the MND-CS area of
responsibility included five provinces south of Baghdad, extending
to Iraq’s borders with Iran and Saudi Arabia. Later, the MND-CS
area was reduced to the single province of Qadisiyah. On December
21, 2007, Polish President Lech Kaczynski approved a plan to
withdraw the remaining 900 Polish troops from Iraq by the end of
October 2008.176
For outside observers, determining the total number of non-Iraqi, non-U.S.
troops in Iraq can be a somewhat complicated process. The actual number is
constantly in flux, as contingents deploy and redeploy, contributing countries decide
to change the size of their contingents, and some individual numbers vary due to
injury or absence. The Department of Defense maintains constantly updated records,
but those records are classified due to requests by some contributors.
Further, foreign troops in Iraq serve in several different organizations — MNF-I
itself; the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I, which falls under the dual
172 See “Australia withdraws troops from Iraq,” Reuters, June 1, 2008; and “Australia ends
combat operations in Iraq,” CNN, June 2, 2008; and interviews with MNF-I officials,
August 2008.
173 See AS. Korea extends Iraq deployment,” BBC News, December 28, 2007, and “S. Korea
approves one-year extension in Iraq,” USA Today, December 28, 2007.
174 “Seoul to dispatch 212 replacement troops to Iraq,” Korea.net, March 18, 2008.
175 Information from the Embassy of Poland, Washington DC, October 11, 2007.
176 “Poland to pull troops from Iraq,”United Press International, December 22, 2007; and
“Polish troops to exit Iraq this year,” CNN, January 31, 2008.

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supervision of MNF-I and NATO); and the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Iraq (UNAMI). Some of those countries that have been listed as part of the coalition
have deployed troops that directly supported MNF-I but were based outside Iraq —
for example, Japan and Singapore.177
According to the September 17, 2008, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” published
by the Department of State, 24 countries other than the United States had a total of
about 6,900 forces serving in MNF-I. Those countries include Albania, Armenia,
Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, El
Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Tonga, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.178
The change from a total of 9,233 troops reported in the August 6, 2008, “Iraq Weekly
Status Report,” reflects the redeployment of the 2,000-strong Georgian contingent in
August.179 In addition, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Turkey
contribute directly to the NTM-I but not to MNF-I.180 Separately, New Zealand and
Fiji had forces in Iraq providing security support to (UNAMI).
Post-Major Combat: Security Situation
The security situation in Iraq is multi-faceted, geographically varied, and
constantly evolving. In a society where the rule of law is not completely established,
politics — the struggle for power, resources and influence — more readily and
frequently takes the form of violence. Iraqi people are often faced with imperfect,
pragmatic decisions about who is best suited to protect them and their interests. As
a general trajectory, after a brief period of relative quiet in 2003 following major
combat operations, forms of violent expression grew in variety, intensity, and
frequency, hitting peaks in 2005 and 2006. By 2008, indicators of violence had
tapered off to markedly lower levels.
Major Sources and Forms of Violence
Sunni Extremism. One major form of violence that has been practiced in
post-Saddam Iraq is terrorism carried out by Sunni Arabs with stated Islamic
extremist goals. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has been the most prominent named
177 200 Japan Air Self-Defense Forces, based in Kuwait, have provided airlift between
Kuwait and Iraq. Information from the Embassy of Japan, Washington, D.C., October 10,
2007. While Singapore has never provided “boots on the ground,” it has provided air and
naval support, including deployments of Landing Ship, Tank (LSTs), KC-135 tanker
aircraft, and a C-130 transport aircraft. Information from the Embassy of
Singapore,Washington, D.C., October 11, 2007.
178 “Iraq Weekly Status Report, September 17, 2008,” available at
[http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/110068.pdf].
1 7 9 “Iraq Weekly Status Report, August 6, 2008,” available at
[http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/108114.pdf] .
180 See NATO Training Mission-Iraq website, at [http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_
Missions/NTM-I/NTMI_part.htm].

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organization, but the threat may be better characterized as a loose network of
affiliates, including both Iraqis and foreign fighters. Within the networks, assigned
roles range from financiers, and planners of coordinated attacks, to unskilled labor
recruited to emplace improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Their efforts to recruit
primarily young males have capitalized on Iraq’s widespread under-employment,
which can make the prospect of one-time payments appealing,181 and general
disaffection spurred by a perceived lack of opportunities in the new Iraq. The
infrastructure used by AQI and its affiliates has included safe houses and lines of
communication reaching, especially, through central and northern Iraq.182
The network has capitalized on Iraq’s porous borders. In early 2008, U.S.
military commanders confirmed that the flow of foreign fighters continued, from
Syria into Iraq.183 In its June quarterly report to the Congress, the Department of
Defense stated, “Considerable numbers of foreign terrorists still cross from Syria into
Iraq, and Iraqi extremists still use Syria as a safe haven to avoid Iraqi and Coalition
forces.”184
Over time, the AQI network has demonstrated adaptability, quickly shifting its
tactics and its footprint as circumstances change. Pushed out of urban areas, they
typically have sought refuge and an opportunity to re-group in deep rural settings.
As surge operations pushed AQI and its affiliates out of Baghdad in late 2007, they
sought new bases of operation to the east and to the north, in the Diyala River Valley
in Diyala province, and in the northern Tigris River Valley in Ninewah province.185
In early 2008, some AQI elements attempted to regroup in Mosul, but coalition and
Iraqi operations pushed AQI elements out of the city and deeper into rural areas.186
As of August 2008, U.S. commanders in Iraq assessed that AQI was in disarray
but still capable of conducting spectacular attacks. AQI was making increasing use
of “surgical” attacks, such as sniper attacks, and using intimidation tactics, which
may require fewer resources and less coordination that large-scale catastrophic
attacks. In western Anbar province, where significant security progress was achieved
earlier than in the north, commanders note — borrowing from Mao — that there’s
no longer a sea for the AQI fish to swim in; that is, popular support for AQI has so
sharply diminished that they are forced to operate clandestinely.187
Shi’a Extremism. Some Shi’a militias have been another major source of
violence in post-Saddam Iraq. A central figure since the days of major combat
181 Based on accounts from detainees and others, MNF-I leaders assess that
underemployment, more often than unemployment, is a prime motivation for those recruited
to place an IED in return for a one-time cash payment.
182 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, January 2008.
183 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials and subordinate commanders, January 2008.
184 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq”, June 2008, p.22.
185 Interviews with MNF-I, MNC-I, and MND-North officials, January 2008.
186 Interviews with MNC-I and subordinate commanders, August 2008.
187 Interviews with MNC-I and MNF-W commanders and other officials, August 2008.

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operations has been the young Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, the head of the Office
of the Martyr Sadr political organization and its armed militia, the Jaish al-Mahdi
(“JAM”). During the year of formal occupation, al-Sadr frequently delivered Friday
sermons at mosques, using a hardline nationalist message to condemn the coalition
and its Iraqi partners and to call for action against them. In April 2004, his followers
staged coordinated, violent uprisings in cities throughout southern Iraq, which were
put down by coalition forces.
While continuing to voice staunch opposition to the U.S. force presence in Iraq,
in August 2007, al-Sadr declared a ceasefire to which most of JAM adhered., and he
repeated the call in February 2008. By the summer of 2008, al-Sadr was reportedly
making efforts to shift the focus of his base organization to social, cultural and
political activities. At the end of July, he issued a statement pledging his support and
that of his followers to the Government of Iraq, if the GoI would refrain from signing
any security agreement with the United States. He also urged his followers to refrain
from any actions that would harm Iraqi civilians, or disrupt the provision of
government services.188
Meanwhile, rogue elements of JAM — known euphemistically as “special
groups” or “special groups criminals” — defied al-Sadr’s August 2007 ceasefire call
and continued to practice violence. The Office of the Martyr Sadr, insisting that
JAM itself is an “army of believers,” has described such elements as criminal
infiltrators who find it useful to have the cover of the JAM name.189
In official reports, the Department of Defense states that some JAM special
groups and other Shi’a extremist groups receive funding and support from Iran.190
The Iranian government has reportedly pledged to help stop the flow of lethal aid into
Iraq, but reports suggest there has been no marked diminution.191 According to
officials from the Multi-National Divisions that border Iran, the cross-border flow
188 Interviews with U.S. civilian and military officials, August 2008. See for example
Nicholas Spangler and Mohammed al Dulaimy, “Al-Sadr would back Iraqi government for
a price,” Arizona Daily Star, July 31, 2008.
189 See Sabrina Tavernise, “A Shiite Militia in Baghdad sees its power wane,” New York
Times, July 27, 2008.
190 In a December 2007 quarterly report, DOD assessed that, compared to September 2007:
“There has been no identified decrease in Iranian training and funding of illegal Shi’a
militias in Iraq. Tehran’s support for Shi’a militant groups who attack Coalition and Iraqi
forces remains a significant impediment to progress towards stabilization.” Department of
Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2007. In its June 2008
report, DOD stated: “The Government of Iran also continues to facilitate large-scale
trafficking of arms, ammunition and explosives and [to] fund, train, arm, and guide
numerous networks that conduct wide-scale insurgency operations,” see Department of
Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.22.
191 Interviews with MNF-I officials, Baghdad, January and August 2008. During the
February 2008 state visit to Baghdad by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iranian
and Iraqi officials reportedly signed an agreement on the renovation of border posts along
their shared land and maritime borders. See “Iran, Iraq Emphasize Need for Renovation of
Border Posts,” Tehran IRNA agency in English, February 20 2008.

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varies geographically over time, tending to seek the path of least resistance. The
deployment of the Georgian full brigade to Wasit province, for example, made that
province harder to traverse and pushed traffic north and south.192 As of August 2008,
a key locus of cross-border smuggling — not only of lethal aid but also of consumer
goods — was the border along Maysan province, where Marsh Arabs historically
have traded good for centuries.193
Meanwhile, the Iranian government apparently continues to seek influence
among Iraqi Shi’a through the exercise of “soft power,” for example by purchasing
a power plant in the Shi’a-populated Sadr City section of Baghdad.194
According to U.S. and Iraqi commanders on the ground, the series of Iraqi-led
military operations in southern Iraq, which began in Basra in March 2008, had the
effect of isolating some special groups members and forcing others to flee across the
border into Iran. U.S. and Iraqi commanders note, however, that in Iran, al-Quds
forces continue to train some Iraqi Shi’a extremists, including former special groups
members. They add that some infiltrations continue, with the goal of carrying out
assassinations or planting improvised explosive devices. They suggest that special
groups may attempt to reassert themselves in Iraq, with help from Iran. As one Iraqi
commander noted, “Sadly, our neighbors are not friendly.” Some U.S. and Iraqi
commanders comment that a special groups re-emergence might take the form of a
streamlined, well-trained terrorist network with a cellular structure, operating under
cover, rather than a mass movement with popular support.195
JAM and JAM “special groups” activities in southern Iraq and Baghdad take
place against the backdrop of a deeply-rooted intra-Shi’a struggle for power and
resources. Some observers assess that, more than the Sunni-based insurgency or any
other issue, the struggle for the Shi’a-populated south may shape Iraq’s future.196 The
other main protagonist is the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI, formerly known
as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), which is backed by its
Badr militia and which, like JAM, provides people with goods and services in an
effort to extend its influence. The power struggle also includes smaller Shi’a political
parties backed by militias, such as Fadila al-Islamiyah (Islamic Virtue) which is
active in the major southern city and province of Basra.
192 Interviews with MNF-I subordinate command officials, January 2008.
193 Interviews with MNC-I and subordinate command officials, August 2008.
194 Interviews with MNF-I officials, January 2008.
195 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, and subordinate commanders, and with Iraqi
commanders, August 2008. See also “US: Quds, Hezbollah training hit squads in Iran,”
Associated Press, August 16, 2008. The author, citing a “senior U.S. military intelligence
officer in Iraq,” writes that Iraqis are being trained in Iran in reconnaissance, the use of
small arms and improvised explosive devices, assassination techniques, and terrorist cell
operations and communications.
196 See for example, “Shiite Politics in Iraq: the Role of the Supreme Council,” International
Crisis Group, November 15, 2007, available at [http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.
cfm?id=5158]. This view is shared by some key strategists at MNF-I, interviews, January
and August 2008.

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Relatively new to the power struggle are the ground-up voices of southern tribal
leaders, most of whom stayed in Iraq through the Saddam period, unlike many Iraqi
Shi’a political party leaders who spent years in Iran. Recognizing the largely
untapped potential political power of southern tribal Shi’a, in 2008 Prime Minister
Maliki sought to form consultative “tribal support councils” in southern provinces,
which are supposed to articulate tribal needs to the provincial councils. Some U.S.
officials note that the role of these tribal councils is still not completely clear. In at
least one case, Babil province, the governor sought to form a competing provincial
tribal council.197
Key political markers, including regionalization and provincial elections, have
the potential to exacerbate the contest for political power and influence in the south.
In April 2008, an 18-month moratorium expired on the implementation of a 2006 law
on federalism, which included provisions for the creation of “regions” based on one
or more provinces. “Regional” status could prove important because it affects the
distribution of economic resources and political power. Major Shi’a groups in the
south have called for various approaches to regionalization, based on their popular
bases of support.198 Iran, too, has reportedly expressed interest in how southern Iraq
might be regionally grouped. As of August 2008, local political parties and
organizations in Basra had taken the first steps to seek regionalization of Basra
province, by filing an initial petition; the full process would include a broader-based
collection of signatures, and a popular referendum.199
The Provincial Powers Act passed in February 2008 and approved by the
Presidency Council, after some reluctance, in March, named October 1, 2008, the
deadline for holding provincial elections.200 However, in July 2008, work on a new
elections law, a prerequisite for holding provincial elections, foundered over the
inability of political leaders to reach agreement on a process for resolving the
political status of Kirkuk.201 As of fall 2008, the holding of provincial elections has
been postponed. Some Iraqi provincial political leaders and security forces
commanders in southern Iraq have suggested that the elections carry the potential for
violence, in part because many current office-holders recognize that they may not
have enough popular support to be elected. Others have stressed the importance of
197 Interviews with MNF-I subordinate officials, and PRT officials, 2008.
198 Interviews with U.S. Embassy officials, August 2008.
199 Interviews with the Governor of Basra, and with U.S. and UK military and civilian
officials in Basra, August 2008.
200 See Amit R. Paley, “Iraqi Leaders Veto Law on Elections,” Washington Post, February
28, 2008. The Provincial Powers Act was passed as part of a “package deal,” together with
the National Budget and an Amnesty Law. Vice President Abd al-Mehdi initially objected
to a provision of the Provincial Powers Act concerning modalities for the removal of
provincial governors.
201 Interviews with U.S. Embassy officials, with the Governor of Kirkuk, and with U.S.
civilian and military officials in Kirkuk, August 2008.

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those elections, as a safety valve for popular opinion, but suggested that a
postponement of several months was not likely to have malign consequences.202
Nature of Sectarian Violence. Less a source than a type of violence, Iraq
has struggled for years with sectarian violence, particularly along the fault lines
between populations predominantly of different sectarian groups. Those fault lines,
some observers suggest, are where local populations are likely to feel most
vulnerable, and might in some cases be most open to assurances of protection from
one organized armed group or another.
Sectarian violence skyrocketed in February 2006, following the bombing of the
Golden Mosque in Samarra, one of Shiite Islam’s holiest shrines. That attack
prompted Shi’a reprisals targeting Sunnis and Sunni mosques in a number of cities.
AQI responded in some locations by staging a series of further attacks.203
The sectarian-based displacement of many Iraqis from their homes, and the
resulting greater segregation in urban areas, reduced the number of fault lines
somewhat.204 Displacement and resettlement are dynamic issues — while the GoI
does not yet have a well-resourced, comprehensive plan for the resettlement of
refugees and internally displaced persons, some resettlement initiatives are
underway.205 In many instances, the usual challenges of displacement are
compounded by both sectarian and class-based differences, between those who have
fled, and those who have moved into the “abandoned” homes.206
Criminality. Another major category of violence is opportunistic criminality,
practiced with a view to sheer material gain rather than political or ideological goals.
The inchoate status of Iraq’s judicial system and law enforcement organizations has
left room for opportunists to steal, loot, smuggle, kidnap and extort.
Other Security Challenges
In addition to the primary adversaries during major combat operations — the
regime’s forces and security structures — and the primary sources of violence in the
period after major combat, coalition forces in Iraq have had to contend with the
202 Interviews with Governors of Najaf, Basra; and Iraqi commanders in Diwaniyah and
Basra, August 2008.
203 See press accounts including Ellen Knickmeyer and K.I. Ibrahim, “Bombing Shatters
Mosque in Iraq,” Washington Post, February 23, 2006; and Robert F. Worth, “Muslim
Clerics Call for an End to Iraqi Rioting,” The New York Times, February 25, 2006.
204 To be clear, as human rights groups stress, displacement is not a “solution.” As a rule,
in most situations, people are far more vulnerable in displacement than they are in their
homes.
205 Interviews with Iraqi officials responsible for resettlement in parts of Baghdad, August
2008.
206 Ibid. For example, in some Baghdad neighborhoods, Shi’a extremists from the Jaish al-
Mahdi reportedly forced affluent Sunni Arabs to flee their homes, and then offered those
“empty” homes, for a very nominal rent, to much less affluent Shi’a Arabs.

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presence of two groups, designated by the Department of State as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, which are largely unrelated to the rest of the fight but of deep interest
to some of Iraq’s neighbors. Both cases have consumed substantial time and energy
from MNF-I staff in Iraq as well as senior leaders in Washington, D.C., and both
have had the potential to destabilize the broader security environment.
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The first group is the Kurdistan Workers
Party — the PKK, also known over time as KADEK, Kongra-Gel, and the KCK.
The PKK is based in southeastern Turkey, but maintains a presence in northern Iraq
and reportedly uses that area to rest and re-group from its operations inside Turkey.
The PKK’s stated goal is the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, and it
has practiced terror to that end, targeting Turkish security forces and civilian
officials.
Since 2003, the Turkish government has pushed for action against PKK
members in northern Iraq. The U.S. and Iraqi governments have both strongly
supported the Turkish government’s stand against terrorism and the PKK in
principle. In the past, both the Iraqi government and MNF-I reportedly expressed
concerns that military action against the PKK in Iraq could open a new northern
front, taxing their already thinly-stretched forces.207
In 2007, the Government of Turkey received a one-year Turkish parliamentary
authorization to conduct cross-border actions against the PKK, set to expire in
October 2008. In December 2007, the Turkish Air Force launched a series of air
strikes, targeting presumed PKK positions in northern Iraq, followed in February
2008 by a week-long series of coordinated air and ground attacks.208 Initially, Iraqi
government officials objected, stressing the need to respect the sovereignty of its
territory and air space. U.S. senior leaders, reportedly informed in advance of the
February attacks about Turkish intentions, publicly called on the government of
Turkey to keep the operation as short as possible.209 In July 2008, the Turkish Air
Force conducted another series of air strikes on presumed PKK positions in northern
Iraq.210 U.S. officials have reportedly facilitated diplomatic consultations with Iraqi
and Turkish officials, aimed at a comprehensive solution to deal with the PKK
issue.211
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK). During the year of formal occupation, the
leadership of CJTF-7 and CPA, and senior officials in Washington, D.C., spent
considerable time focused on the disposition of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (“MeK”).
207 Information from CJTF-7, MNF-I, DOD, and Iraqi officials, 2003 and 2004.
208 See for example “Turkish jets in fresh Iraq strike,” BBC America, December 26, 2007.
209 See Alissa J. Rubin and Sabrina Tavernise, “Turkish Troops Enter Iraq in Pursuit of
Kurdish Militants,” The New York Times, February 23, 2008; Lolita Baldor, “Gates: Turkey
Raid Won’t Solve Problems,” Washington Post, February 23, 2008; Yochi Dreazen, “U.S.
Knew of Turkey’s Plan to Hit PKK, Didn’t Object,” Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2008.
210 See “Turkey strikes PKK headquarters in Kandil,” Turkish Daily News, July 28, 2008.
211 See Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008,
pp.29-30.

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Formed by students in Iran in the 1960’s, in leftist opposition to the Shah and his
regime, the MeK later stepped into opposition against what it calls the “mullah
regime” that took power after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Over time, the MeK has
sought opportunistic alliances, including moving its operational headquarters to Iraq,
and making common cause with the Iraqi government, during the Iran-Iraq war in the
1980s.
Although the MeK is a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, some U.S.
officials reportedly have considered the possibility of using the MeK as leverage
against Tehran. Several times, some Members of Congress — reportedly some 200
in the year 2000 — signed letters expressing their support for the cause advocated by
the MeK.212
This awkward policy history was magnified by awkward events on the ground
during OIF major combat operations, when, on April 15, 2003, members of the U.S.
Special Operations Forces signed a ceasefire agreement with MeK leaders.
Subsequently, Department of Defense issued guidance through CENTCOM to forces
on the ground to effect a MeK surrender. Following a series of negotiations with
MeK leaders, the several thousand MeK members were separated from their well-
maintained heavy weapons and brought under coalition control. The key operational
concern, in the early stages, was that MeK non-compliance could generate large-scale
operational requirements, effectively opening another front. Efforts have been
underway since that time, in coordination with the Iraqi government and the many
countries of citizenship of the MeK members, to determine appropriate further
disposition.
As of fall 2008, the Government of Iraq had initiated steps to transition
responsibility for control of the MeK camp from U.S. to Iraqi security forces.213 In
a public statement in September 2008, Minister of Defense Abdul Qadr noted that
the sovereign government of Iraq should be responsible for any such group inside the
country — “The Iraqi government is entitled to be the guard around the borders of
the camp.”214
Post-Major Combat: Military Strategy
and Operations
Over time, U.S. military strategy for Iraq — and thus also operations on the
ground — have been adapted to support evolving U.S. national strategy. In turn,
national strategy has directly drawn some lessons from OIF operational experience.
212 Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, “Terror Watch: Shades of Gray,” Newsweek,
October 17, 2007.
213 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, August 2008. Early indications of GoI
intent were reportedly causing anxiety for members of the MeK.
214 Multi-National Force-Iraq press conference, Mr. Abdul Qadr al-Mufriji, Minister of
Defense, and LTG Frank Helmick, Commanding General, Multi-National Security
Transition Command-Iraq, September 10, 2008.

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Given the scope and scale of the mission, and its lack of precise historical precedents,
there has been ample need and opportunity for learning and adaptation.
The Administration’s basic national strategic objectives have remained roughly
consistent over time. So have the major categories of activities (or “lines of
operation”) — political, economic, essential services, diplomatic — used to help
achieve the objectives. What have evolved greatly over time are the views of
commanders in the field and decision-makers in Washington, D.C., about the best
ways to achieve “security” and how that line of operation fits with the others.
This section highlights key episodes and turning-points in the theory and
practice of OIF military operations, including early operations during formal
occupation, “Fallujah II,” COIN operations in Tal Afar, Operation Together Forward,
the operations associated with the 2007 “New Way Forward,” and surge follow-on
operations in 2008. The review suggests that the application of counter-insurgency
(COIN) theory and practice grew over time, but by no means steadily or consistently.
Nomenclature: Characterizing the Conflict
Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz argued: “The first, the supreme,
the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to
make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking.”215 In theory,
how the “kind of war” is identified helps shape the tools selected to prosecute it. In
the case of OIF after major combat operations, it proved difficult for senior Bush
Administration officials and military leaders to agree on what “kind of war” OIF was
turning out to be.
On July 7, 2003, General John Abizaid, an Arabic speaker who had served
during OIF major combat as the Deputy Commanding General of CENTCOM,
replaced General Tommy Franks as CENTCOM Commander. At his first press
conference in the new role, GEN Abizaid referred to the challenge in Iraq as a
“classical guerrilla-type campaign.” Slightly more carefully but leaving no room for
doubt he added, “I think describing it as guerrilla tactics is a proper way to describe
it in strictly military terms.”216
The Pentagon pointedly did not adopt that terminology. Two weeks later, asked
about his reluctance to use the phrase “guerrilla war,” Secretary Rumsfeld noted: “I
guess the reason I don’t use the phrase ‘guerrilla war’ is because there isn’t one, and
it would be a misunderstanding and a miscommunication to you and to the people of
the country and the world.” Instead, he argued, in Iraq there were “five different
things”: “looters, criminals, remnants of the Ba’athist regime, foreign terrorists, and
those influenced by Iran.”217
215 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Princeton NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976, p.88.
216 See BBC, “US faces Iraq guerrilla war,” July 16, 2003, available at
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3072899.stm].
217 Department of Defense News Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers,
(continued...)

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In his account of that year, CJTF-7 Commanding General LTG Sanchez wrote
that by July 2003, he and GEN Abizaid, his boss, had recognized that what they faced
was an insurgency.218 A UK officer serving as Special Assistant to LTG Sanchez
drafted a paper outlining the concepts of insurgency and counter-insurgency and their
possible application to Iraq. The paper’s ideas, and its nomenclature, gained traction
and helped inform the command’s planning.219
However, for years afterward, the Pentagon also resisted the terminology of
“insurgency.” At a November 2005 press conference, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff General Peter Pace, speaking about the adversary in Iraq, said, “I have to use
the word ‘insurgent’ because I can’t think of a better word right now.” Secretary
Rumsfeld cut in — “enemies of the legitimate Iraqi government.” He added, “That
[using the word “insurgent”] gives them a greater legitimacy than they seem to
merit.”220
Military Strategy and Operations During Occupation
During the formal occupation of Iraq from 2003 to 2004, the military command
in Iraq, CJTF-7, was responsible for “security,” while the civilian leadership, the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), was responsible for all other governance
functions.221 In the views of the CJTF-7 leadership, establishing “security” required
more than “killing people and breaking things” — it required simultaneous efforts
to achieve popular “buy-in,” for example by rebuilding local communities and
engaging Iraqis in the process.222
Accordingly, CJTF-7 built its plans around four basic lines of operation, or
categories of effort — political (governance), economic, essential services, and
217 (...continued)
June 30, 2003, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=2767]. When a reporter read the DOD definition of guerrilla war — “military
and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular,
predominantly indigenous forces” — and asked whether that described the situation in Iraq,
Secretary Rumsfeld replied, “It really doesn’t.”
218 Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story, New York: Harper, 2008, pp.231-
232.
219 Information from that officer and senior CJTF-7 staff, 2003 and 2004.
220 News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Peter Pace,
November 29, 2005, DOD website, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1492].
221 Neither CPA nor CJTF-7 was responsible for the search for possible weapons of mass
destruction. That mission was assigned to the Iraq Survey Group, which reported jointly to
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and
which carried out its work from June 2003 to September 2004. The group’s final Report,
“Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,” and commonly
known as the Duelfer Report, was published on September 30, 2004, and is available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html.
222 Information from CJTF-7 leaders, and participant observation, 2003 and 2004.

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security — which differed only slightly from the categories in use in early 2008.
Those lines of operation were echoed in the plans of CJTF-7’s subordinate
commands. CJTF-7 would lead the “security” line, and support CPA efforts in the
other areas.
Beginning in 2003, CJTF-7’s basic theory of the case was that the lines of
operation, pursued simultaneously, would be mutually reinforcing. Major General
Peter Chiarelli, who commanded the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad from 2004 to
2005, argued after his tour that it was not effective to try to achieve security first, and
then turn to the other lines of operation. He wrote: “... if we concentrated solely on
establishing a large security force and [conducting] targeted counterinsurgent combat
operations — and only after that was accomplished, worked toward establishing a
sustainable infrastructure supported by a strong government developing a free-market
system — we would have waited too long.”223
In the “security” line of operation, military operations under CJTF-7 included
combat operations focused on “killing or capturing” the adversary. Aggressive
operations yielded large numbers of Iraqis detained by the coalition — the large
numbers, and frequent difficulties determining whether and where individuals were
being held, were an early and growing source of popular frustration. In April 2004,
the unofficial release of graphic photos of apparent detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib
generated shock and horror among people inside and outside Iraq. Some observers
have suggested that these developments may have helped fuel the insurgency.224
CJTF-7 military operations also included early counter-insurgency (COIN)
practices for population control. Those practices included creating “gated
communities” — including Saddam’s home town of al-Awja — by fencing off a
town or area and strictly controlling access through the use of check-points and ID
cards. To make military operations less antagonistic, when possible, to local
223 Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick Michaelis, “Winning the Peace:
The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” Military Review, July-August 2005,
available at [http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/
chiarelli.pdf]. The authors characterized the lines of operation as “combat operations, train
and employ security forces, essential services, promote governance, and economic
pluralism.” Echoing the views of CJTF-7 leaders, the authors added, “Further, those who
viewed the attainment of security solely as a function of military action alone were
mistaken.”
224 In January 2004, when abuse allegations were brought forward, CJTF-7 issued a press
release noting that the command had ordered an inquiry into alleged detainee abuses. Abu
Ghraib events prompted a number of investigations and reports. For one account of events
and the policies that shaped them, see the Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review
DoD Detention Operations, chaired by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and
commissioned by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld “to provide independent
professional advice on detainee abuses, what caused them, and what actions should be taken
to preclude their repetition,” available in book form, Department of Defense, The
Schlesinger Report: An Investigation of Abu Ghraib, New York: Cosimo Reports,
November 15, 2005. For a detailed, critical account of Abu Ghraib events and their
antecedents and impact, see Seymour Hersch, Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to
Abu Ghraib, New York: Harper Perennial, 2005.

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residents, units substituted “cordon and knock” approaches for the standard “cordon
and search.”225
The security line of operation also included early partnerships with nascent Iraqi
security forces, including mentoring as well as formal training. Where troop strength
so permitted, for example in Baghdad and in Mosul, Army Military Police were
assigned to local police stations as de facto advisors.226 GEN Abizaid’s theory was
that the very presence of U.S. forces in Iraq was an “antibody” in Iraqi society.227
Therefore, to remove the possibility that insurgents could leverage the presence of
an occupation force to win popular support, a key goal was to move quickly to an
“overwatch” posture. Doing so would require an accelerated stand-up of Iraqi
security forces. That approach shared with later COIN approaches the premise that
U.S. forces alone could not “win” — that success in the security sphere would
require acting by, with and through Iraqis. It differed sharply from later COIN
approaches, however, in terms of implications for the U.S. forces footprint, size of
presence, and many activities.
While the military command did not have the lead role for the non-security lines
of operation, it made contributions to those efforts. To address the most pressing
“essential services” concerns, the military command created Task Force Restore Iraqi
Electricity, and Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil, which were later consolidated into the
Gulf Region Division, under the Army Corps of Engineers.
To help jumpstart local economies — and to provide Iraqis with some visible
signs of post-war “progress” — the military command launched the Commanders
Emergency Response Program (CERP). As initially crafted, CERP provided
commanders with readily available discretionary funds to support small-scale
projects, usually initiated at the request of local community leaders.
In the “governance” field, commanders needed Iraqi interlocutors to provide
bridges into local communities, and advice concerning the most urgent reconstruction
and humanitarian priorities. Since official Iraqi agencies were no longer intact, and
since the CPA did not yet have a sufficient regional presence to help build local
governments, commanders helped select provincial and local councils to serve in
temporary advisory capacities.228
By most accounts, by the end of the year of formal occupation, in June 2004, the
security situation had worsened — catalyzed in April by the simultaneous unrest in
Fallujah and al-Sadr-led uprisings throughout the south. Many observers have
suggested that none of the lines of operation — whether civilian-led or military-led
— was fully implemented during the year of formal occupation, due to a lack of
225 Information from CJTF-7 and Division leaders, 2003 and 2004.
226 Information from CJTF-7, 1AD, and 101st leaders, and participant observation, 2003 and
2004.
227 Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story, New York: Harper, 2008, p.232.
228 These efforts continued an initiative to help form district and neighborhood advisory
councils in Baghdad, launched by ORHA but discontinued by CPA.

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personnel and resources. In particular, GEN Abizaid’s goal of diminishing the
presence of U.S. “antibodies” in Iraq society was not realized, since highly inchoate
Iraqi security forces training efforts, led by CPA, had not had time to yield results.
The basic assumption of CJTF-7 — that establishing security required simultaneous
application of all the lines of operation — may never have been fully put to the test.
Operation Phantom Fury (Fallujah II)
One of the first very high-profile military operations after major combat was
Operation Phantom Fury, designed to “take back” the restive city of Fallujah in the
Al Anbar province. In November 2004, Phantom Fury — or “Fallujah II” —
highlighted the intransigence of the emerging Sunni Arab insurgency, early coalition
military efforts to counter it, and the complex intersection of political considerations
and “best military advice” in operational decision-making.229
During major combat operations and the early part of the formal occupation, the
military command practiced first an “economy of force” approach to Al Anbar
province, and then a quick shuffling of responsible military units, which left little
opportunity to establish local relationships or build expertise.230 Building
relationships with the population is critical in any counter-insurgency, and it may
have been particularly important in Al Anbar, where social structure is based largely
on complex and powerful tribal affiliations.
Coalition forces in Al Anbar during major combat were primarily limited to
Special Operations Forces. After CJTF-7 was established, the first unit assigned
responsibility for the large province was the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment —
essentially a brigade-sized formation. In fall 2003, the much larger 82nd Airborne
Division and subordinate units arrived in Iraq and were assigned to Al Anbar, but
their tenure was brief — after six months they handed off responsibility to the 1st
Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF).231
The city of Fallujah, like the rest of Al Anbar, is populated largely by Sunni
Arabs. Under the old Iraqi regime, Fallujah had enjoyed some special prerogatives
and had produced a number of senior leaders in Iraq’s various security forces. Many
residents therefore had some reason to be concerned about their place in the post-
Saddam Iraq.
On March 31, 2004, four American contractors working for Blackwater, who
were driving through Fallujah, were ambushed and killed — and then their bodies
were mutilated and hung from a bridge. Photos of that grisly aftermath were rapidly
229 For a detailed account of the military operations, and the political and military events that
led up to them, see Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for
Fallujah, New York: Bantam Books, 2005.
230 Al Anbar province, in western Iraq, covers about one-third of Iraq’s territory but is
relatively lightly populated.
231 IMEF headquarters and the 1st Marine Division returned to Iraq in spring 2004, after a
short stay at home after major combat operations.

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transmitted around the world — riveting the attention of leaders in Baghdad,
Washington, and other coalition country capitals.
What followed, in April 2004, was a series of highest-level deliberations in
Baghdad and Washington concerning the appropriate response. Some key
participants in the debates initially favored immediate, overwhelming military action,
but those views were quickly tempered by concerns about the reactions that massive
military action — and casualties — might produce. Several key Sunni Arab
members of the Iraqi leadership body, the Iraqi Governing Council — threatened to
resign in the event of an attack on Fallujah.232 And some senior U.S. officials
expressed concerns about the reactions of other governments in the region, and of
Sunni Arabs elsewhere in Iraq.233
The Administration’s guidance, after the initial debates, was to respect the
concerns of Iraqi leaders and to avoid sending U.S. military forces into Fallujah.
What followed, instead, was a series of “negotiations” by CPA and CJTF-7 leaders
with separate sets of Fallujah community representatives, some of them brokered by
Iraqi national-level political leaders. And what emerged was a “deal” initiated by
IMEF with a local retired Iraqi Army General and a group of locally-recruited
fighters, who formed the “Fallujah Brigade” and pledged to restore and maintain
order.234
When the Fallujah Brigade collapsed that summer, the city of Fallujah had not
been “cleared” by either the Brigade or IMEF. Over the summer, insurgents
reportedly strengthened their hold on the city.
Decisive military action — Operation Phantom Fury — was launched by IMEF
in November 2004. Several factors may have shaped the timing of the Operation.
By November, the new interim Iraqi government, led by Prime Minister Ayad
Allawi, had had some time to establish its credibility — perhaps enough to help quell
citizens’ concerns in the event of large-scale military action. Key Iraqi elections were
scheduled for January 2005, and eliminating a hotbed of insurgency beforehand
might increase voter participation. And earlier in November, President Bush had
been re-elected, which may have reassured some Iraqi leaders that if they agreed to
the military operation, the U.S. government — and coalition forces — would be
likely to continue to provide support to deal with any aftermath.
The Marines began the Fallujah operations by setting conditions — turning off
electrical power, and urging the civilians of Fallujah to leave the city. The vast
232 The Iraq Governing Council (IGC) was a critical part of the U.S. strategy for
transitioning responsibility and authority to Iraqi leaders. The plans, articulated in the
Transitional Administrative Law approved in March 2004, called for the IGC to relinquish
its advisory role to a new, appointed Iraqi Interim Government, to which CPA, in turn,
would return full governing authority by June 30, 2004. An IGC collapse, it was considered,
could disrupt or delay the plans.
233 Information from CPA and CJTF-7 officials, and participant observation, 2004.
234 Information from CJTF-7 and IMEF leaders, 2004. See also Bing West, No True Glory:
A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah, New York: Bantam Books, 2005.

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majority of residents did depart — leaving about 500 hardcore fighters, who
employed asymmetrical tactics against a far larger, stronger force. That coalition
force included one UK battalion, three Iraqi battalions, six U.S. Marine battalions and
three U.S. Army battalions. The operation reportedly included 540 air strikes, 14,000
artillery and mortar shells fired, and 2,500 tank main gun rounds fired. Some 70 U.S.
personnel were killed, and 609 wounded. In Fallujah, of the city’s 39,000 buildings,
18,000 were damaged or destroyed.235
In the aftermath, coalition and Iraqi forces established a tight security cordon
around the city, with a system of vehicle searches and security passes for residents,
to control movement and access. Fingerprints and retinal scans were taken from
male residents. Observers noted that by spring 2005, about half the original
population, of 250,000, had returned home — many of them to find essential services
disrupted and their property damaged.236 The scale of destruction was criticized by
some observers inside Iraq and in the Middle East region more broadly.
The effects of the comprehensive “clearing” were not lasting. Al Qaeda
affiliates gradually returned and made Fallujah a strong-hold and base of operations.
Counter-Insurgency in Tal Afar
Military operations in the town of Tal Afar, in 2005, marked an early, multi-
faceted, and successful application of counter-insurgency (COIN) approaches, and
successful results, in OIF. In Washington, “Tal Afar” gave birth to a new Iraq policy
lexicon, and in Iraq — though not immediately — to the expanded use of COIN
practices.
Tal Afar is located in Ninewah province, along the route from the provincial
capital of Mosul to Syria. Its mixed population of about 290,000 includes Sunni
Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and Yezidis. From April 2003 until early 2004, the 101st
Airborne Division had responsibility for Ninewah and Iraq’s three northern, largely
Kurdish-populated provinces. Because the north was relatively quiet, due in part to
the effectiveness of the Kurdish pesh merga forces, the 101st was able to concentrate
primarily on Ninewah — a relatively high troops-to-population ratio. In early 2004,
when the 101st redeployed, responsibility for the area passed to a much smaller
Stryker brigade. That brigade, in turn, was periodically asked to provide forces for
operations elsewhere in Iraq, so the coalition force footprint in Ninewah was
substantially reduced. Tal Afar — with a convenient trade route location, and a
mixed population “perfect” for fomenting sectarian strife — become a base of
operations for former regime elements and Sunni extremists, including suicide
bombers.
In May 2005, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3ACR), now commanded by
Colonel H.R. McMaster, arrived in Tal Afar. COL McMaster was familiar with OIF
235 Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah, New York:
Bantam Books, 2005.
236 See for example Richard Beeston, “At home in the rubble: siege city reborn as giant
gated community,” The Times Online, May 19, 2005.

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issues from his previous service as the Director of GEN Abizaid’s Commander’s
Action Group at CENTCOM.237 At CENTCOM, he had helped the command to
think through the nature of the Iraqi insurgency, and to craft appropriate responses
including targeted engagements with key leaders. As the author of a well-known
account of Vietnam decision-making, COL McMaster could also readily draw key
lessons from that earlier complex engagement.238
In early 2005, the 3ACR began their deployment preparations at home in Fort
Carson, Colorado — studying COIN approaches, training and exercising those
approaches, and learning conversational Arabic. Later, in Iraq, COL McMaster
described the Regiment’s mission in the classical COIN lexicon of “population
security”: “...the whole purpose of the operation is to secure the population so that
we can lift the enemy’s campaign of intimidation and coercion over the population
and allow economic and political development to proceed here and to return to
normal life.”239
In practice, that meant taking “a very deliberate approach to the problem,”
beginning with months of preparatory moves. Those preparatory steps included
beefing up security along the Syrian border to the west, and targeting and eliminating
enemy safe havens out in the desert. They also included constructing a dirt berm
ringing Tal Afar, and establishing check points to control movement in and out of the
city.
Before the launch of full-scale operations in September 2005, the Regiment
urged civilians to leave Tal Afar. Then 3ACR cleared the city deliberately — block
by block. After the clearing operations, 3ACR had sufficient forces to hold the city,
setting up 29 patrol bases around town, every few blocks.240
Basing coalition forces among the population was an unusual approach at the
time. Though common in the early days of OIF, by 2005, most coalition forces in
Iraq had been pulled back to relatively large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), secure
and separate from the local population. That strategy was driven in part by the theory
237 A Commander’s Action — or Initiatives — Group, is small group of smart thinkers,
hand-selected by the commander to serve as his personal, in-house “think-tank.”
238 His book Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Lies that led to Vietnam (published by Harper Perennial, 1998) is widely read in U.S.
military educational programs and elsewhere.
239 Department of Defense Press Briefing, H.R. McMaster, September 13, 2005, available
at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2106].
240 See Thomas E. Ricks, “The Lessons of Counterinsurgency,” Washington Post, February
16, 2006; “The Insurgency: Interview with COL H.R. McMaster,” Frontline, PBS, February
21, 2006, available at [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/insurgency/interviews/
mcmaster/html]; and George Packer, “Letter from Iraq: The Lesson of Tal Afar,” The New
Yorker, April 10, 2006.

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that the visible presence of coalition forces — and their weapons and their heavy
vehicles — could antagonize local communities.241
3ACR’s COIN approaches also included working closely with their Iraqi
security forces counterparts — the 3rd Iraqi Army Division. COL McMaster credited
that partnership as essential to the strategy: “What gives us the ability to ... clear and
hold as a counterinsurgency strategy is the capability of Iraqi security forces.”242 The
key to the success in Fallujah, he added — and the major difference from “Fallujah
II” — was popular support: “we had the active cooperation of such a large
percentage of the population.”
COL McMaster’s use of the phrase “clear and hold” was not accidental — it had
been the name of the counter-insurgency approach introduced in Vietnam by General
Creighton Abrams, following years of General William Westmoreland’s “search and
destroy” approach.243
“Clear, Hold, Build”
A short time later, the Administration adopted and expanded on the “clear,
hold” lexicon to describe the overall strategy in Iraq.244 In October 2005, in
testimony about Iraq before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice began by stating: “Our political-military strategy has to be
clear, hold, and build: to clear areas from insurgent control, to hold them securely,
and to build durable, national Iraqi institutions.”245 About three weeks later, in a
major Veterans Day speech, President Bush echoed Secretary Rice’s “clear, hold,
build” language almost verbatim.246
241 Information from CENTCOM and CJTF-7 leaders, 2004.
242 Department of Defense Press Briefing, H.R. McMaster, September 13, 2005, available
at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2106].
243 Ibid.
244 David Ignatius wrote in the Washington Post that in 2005, a number of key Iraq decision-
makers and practitioners, including COL McMasters’ former boss at CENTCOM General
Abizaid, were reading Lewis Sorley’s book, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and
the Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt, 1999), which
favorably describes General Abrams’ “clear and hold” approach. See David Ignatius, “A
Better Strategy for Iraq,” Washington Post, November 4, 2005.
245 Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Opening Remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, October 19, 2005, available at [http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/
55303.htm]. To be clear, “strategy” refers in general to a set of “ways and means,” linked
with the “ends” they are intended to achieve. “Clear, hold, build” referred to a new set of
approaches — of “ways and means” — but the Administration’s broad stated goals had not
changed.
246 He said, “Our strategy is to clear, hold, and build. We’re working to clear areas from
terrorist control, to hold those areas securely, and to build lasting, democratic Iraqi
institutions through an increasingly inclusive political process.” See “President
commemorates Veterans Day, Discusses War on Terror,” November 11, 2005, Tobyhanna,
(continued...)

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The following month, November 2005, the Administration issued a new
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. The Strategy argued — roughly consistent
with the military’s long-standing lines of operation — that success required three
major tracks, security, political and economic. Consistent with the basic theory of
the case since 2003, these tracks were to be pursued simultaneously, and would be
“mutually reinforcing.” As the Strategy states, “Progress in each of the political,
security, and economic tracks reinforces progress in the other tracks.”247
The new Strategy prominently adopted the “clear hold build” lexicon, with a
twist. “Clear, hold, build” was now the prescribed set of approaches for the security
track alone. The political and economic tracks were also each based on a trinitarian
set of approaches. In the security track, “build” now referred specifically to the Iraqi
security forces and local institutions. “Build” also appeared in the other two tracks
— capturing the focus on national-level institutions from the earlier public statements
by President Bush and Secretary Rice.248
By March 2006, a complete, official narrative had emerged, in which Tal Afar
operations had tested and confirmed both the “clear, hold, build” strategy, and the
interdependence of the three major tracks. As a White House Fact Sheet, titled
“Clear, Hold, Build,” stated, “Tal Afar shows how the three elements of the strategy
for victory in Iraq — political, security, and economic — depend on and reinforce
one another.”249
Operation Together Forward
In June 2006, Iraqi and Coalition forces launched “Operation Together
Forward,” officially based on “clear, hold, build” and aimed at reducing violence and
increasing security in Baghdad. Baghdad was chosen as the focus because it was “the
center that everybody [was] fighting for — the insurgents, the death squads ... the
246 (...continued)
Pennsylvania, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/print/
20051111-1.html].
247 The Strategy describes the security mandate to “clear, hold, build” this way: “Clear areas
of enemy control by remaining on the offensive, killing and capturing enemy fighters and
denying them safe haven; hold areas freed from enemy influence by ensuring that they
remain under the control of the Iraqi government with an adequate Iraqi security force
presence; and build Iraqi Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver
services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society.” See National Strategy for
Victory in Iraq, November 30, 2005, p. 2, available at White House website,
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf]
248 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
249 White House Fact Sheet: “Strategy for Victory — Clear, Hold, Build,” March 20, 2006.

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government of Iraq.”250 The Operation was predicated on basic counter-insurgency
principles — “to secure the citizens’ lives here in Baghdad.”251
Together Forward included some 48 battalions of Iraqi and coalition forces —
about 51,000 troops altogether, including roughly 21,000 Iraqi police, 13,000 Iraqi
National Police, 8,500 Iraqi Army, and 7,200 coalition forces.252 Iraqi forces were
in the lead, supported by the coalition. The effort included clearing operations, as
well as a series of new security measures including extended curfews, tighter
restrictions on carrying weapons, new tips hotlines, more checkpoints, and more
police patrols.253
Together Forward theoretically included the other major tracks of the November
2005 National Strategy — political and economic efforts, as well as security,
although the coalition’s primary focus was security. As MNF-I spokesman Major
General William Caldwell noted in July 2006, “It’s obviously a multi-pronged
approach ... but those [other tracks] are mostly the government of Iraq side of the
house.”254
MNF-I stated publicly from the start that Together Forward was expected to take
months, not weeks. For several months after the operation was launched, the levels
of violence in the capital rose. As MG Caldwell explained in October 2006, “the
insurgent elements, the extremists, are in fact punching back hard.” Once the Iraqi
and coalition forces cleared an area, the insurgents tried to regain that territory, so the
Iraqi and coalition forces were “constantly going back in and doing clearing
operations again.”255
Many observers attributed that circle of violence to a lack of sufficient forces
— whether coalition or Iraqi — to “hold” an area once it was “cleared.” The vast
majority of participating forces were Iraqi, and at that juncture, some observers
suggest, their capabilities were limited. MNF-I Spokesman MG Caldwell noted in
250 Operations Update with Major General William B. Caldwell, Multi-National Forces-
Iraq, July 24, 2006, available at [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=1201&Itemid=131].
251 MNF-I spokesman MG Caldwell attributed that phrase to Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-
Maliki, see Operations Update with Major General William B. Caldwell, Multi-National
Forces-Iraq, July 20, 2006, available at [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=1027&Itemid=30].
252 Operations Update with Major General William B. Caldwell, Multi-National Forces-
Iraq, July 20, 2006, available at [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=1027&Itemid=30].
253 Press Conference of the President, the Rose Garden, June 14, 2006, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060614.html].
254 Operations Update with Major General William B. Caldwell, Multi-National Forces-
Iraq, July 20, 2006, available at [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=1027&Itemid=30].
255 Press Briefing by Major General William B. Caldwell, Multi-National Force-Iraq,
October 19, 2006, available at [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=6585&Itemid=131].

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July 2006: “We are by no means at the end state, at the place where the Iraqi security
forces are able to assume complete control of this situation.”256
By October 2006, MNF-I admitted that Together Forward had not achieved the
expected results — it had “not met our overall expectations of sustaining a reduction
in the levels of violence.”257 In the event, from the experiences of Tal Afar,
Operation Together Forward had applied the principle of close collaboration with
host-nation forces, but only the “clear” element of the “clear, hold, build” mandate.
New Way Forward
By late 2006, senior diplomats and commanders in Iraq had concluded that the
approaches in use were not achieving the intended results — indeed, levels of
violence were continuing to climb. Several strategic reviews were conducted in
parallel, some input from key observers was solicited, options were considered, and
a decision was made and announced by the Administration — to pursue a “New Way
Forward” in Iraq.258
“New Way Forward” National Strategy: Theory of the Case. While
the Administration’s basic long-term objectives for Iraq did not change, the New
Way Forward introduced a fundamentally new theory of the case. Until that time,
Iraq strategy had assumed that the major tracks of effort — security, political,
economic — were mutually reinforcing, and should therefore be implemented
simultaneously.
The New Way Forward agreed that all of the tracks — plus a new “regional”
track — were important, but argued that security was a prerequisite for progress in
the other areas.259 As a White House summary of the results of the strategy review
stated, “While political progress, economic gains and security are all intertwined,
political and economic progress are unlikely absent a basic level of security.”260 And
as President Bush stated in his address to the nation on this topic, in January 2007,
“The most urgent priority for success in Iraq is security.”261
256 Operations Update with Major General William B. Caldwell, Multi-National Forces-
Iraq, July 20, 2006, available at [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=1027&Itemid=30].
257 Press Briefing by Major General William B. Caldwell, Multi-National Force-Iraq,
October 19, 2006, available at [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=6585&Itemid=131].
258 For a detailed account of theory and practice under the New Way Forward strategy, see
Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way
Out of Iraq, New York: PublicAffairs, 2008.
259 See “Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq,” January 10, 2007, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-3.html].
260 “Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review,” National Security Council, January 2007,
available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf].
261 President’s Address to the Nation, January 10, 2007, available at White House website,
(continued...)

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This thinking, though new as the premise for U.S. Iraq strategy, was not new to
practitioners on the ground. As early as 2003, some U.S. practitioners in Iraq had
suggested that substantial political and economic progress could not be expected,
absent basic security conditions that allowed Iraqis to leave their homes, and civilian
coalition personnel to engage with local communities.262 The New Way Forward
institutionalized that view.
The theory of the case was that security improvements would open up space and
opportunities for the Iraqi government to make improvements in other areas. As
General David Petraeus described it in March 2007, one month into his tour as the
MNF-I Commander, if security improves, “commerce will return and local
economies will grow.” And at the same time, “the Iraqi government will have the
chance it needs to resolve some of the difficult issues it faces.”263
By early 2008, the basic premise had met with broad if not universal support
among practitioners and observers. For example, in October 2007, Commandant of
the Marine Corps General James Conway told a think-tank audience, “Certainly you
have to have a level of security before you can have governance.”264 Retired Marine
Corps General James Jones, who led a congressionally mandated review of Iraqi
Security Forces in 2007, described it differently. He suggested that the relationship
between two major components of politics and security — national reconciliation and
sectarian violence — is more complex: “It’s a little bit of a chicken-and-egg
question.... The real overall conclusion is that the government of Iraq is the one that
has to find a way to achieve political reconciliation, in order to enable a reduction in
sectarian violence.”265
Surge Forces. In his January 10, 2007, address to the nation, President Bush
announced that to help implement the New Way Forward, the United States would
deploy additional military units to Iraq, primarily to Baghdad. Their mission, a
paraphrase of the “clear, hold, build” language, would be “to help Iraqis clear and
secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure
261 (...continued)
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-7.html].
262 Conversations with ORHA, CPA and CJTF-7 staff, 2003 and 2004.
263 Press Briefing by GEN David Petraeus, March 8, 2007, available at [http://www.mnf-
iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10475&Itemid=131].
264 He added, “I think you have to have governance and security before you can have a
viable economics plan.” See “Remarks by General James T. Conway, Commandant of the
Marine Corps,” Center for a New American Security, October 15, 2007.
265 Remarks by General James Jones, Meeting of the Atlantic Council of the United States,
Washington, D.C., September 12, 2007. General Jones led the Independent Commission on
the Security Forces of Iraq, required by U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina
Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007, Public Law 110-28, Section
1314. The Report is available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf], and
discussed below.

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that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad
needs.”266
The surge forces would grow to include five Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs),
an Army combat aviation brigade, a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), two Marine
infantry battalions, a Division headquarters, and other support troops. The number
of U.S. forces in Iraq reached a peak of about 168,000 U.S. troops in October 2007.
The surge effort also included a civilian component — increasing the number
of civilian-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the size of their staffs.
A White House Fact Sheet stated, “PRTs are a key element of the President’s ‘New
Way Forward’ Strategy.”267
Surge Military Strategy: Theory of the Case. The fundamental premise
of the Iraqi and coalition surge operations was population security. This marked an
important shift from previous years, when the top imperative was transitioning
responsibility to Iraqis.268 The two efforts were not considered mutually exclusive
— during the surge, efforts would continue to train, mentor and equip Iraqi security
forces to prepare for transitioning increasing responsibilities to them. But the relative
priority of the “population security” and “transition” efforts was adjusted.
In early 2008, close to the height of the surge, some Division Commanders
commented that their guidance from their higher headquarters — MNC-I — was to
practice patience, not to be in too much of a hurry to move to an overwatch posture
or to transition responsibility to Iraqi security forces.269 The January 2008 mission
statement of one division provides a good illustration of the new priorities —
population security first, with a view to laying the groundwork for future transition.
The division, “in participation with Iraqi security forces and the provincial
government, secures the population, neutralizes insurgents and militia groups, and
defeats terrorists and irreconcilable extremists, to establish sustainable security and
set conditions for transition to tactical overwatch and Iraqi security self-reliance.”270
The surge aimed to provide “population security” not merely with greater troop
strength, but also by changing some of the approaches those troops used. One major
emphasis was population control — including the extensive use of concrete barriers,
266 President’s Address to the Nation, January 10, 2007, available at White House website,
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-7.html].
267 See “Fact Sheet: Helping Iraq Achieve Economic and Political Stabilization,” January
8, 2008, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080108-4.html].
268 A famous quote by T.E. Lawrence — “Lawrence of Arabia” — appears frequently in
briefings and on office walls, of coalition forces in Iraq: “Do not try to do too much with
your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their
war, and you are there to help them, not to win it for them.” The quote, although still
popular, more closely reflects an emphasis on “transition” than on “population security.”
269 Conversations with Division Commanders, January 2008.
270 Mission statement of one Multi-National Division, January 2008.

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checkpoints, curfews, and biometric technologies for identification including
fingerprinting and retinal scans.
In April 2007, some key Baghdad neighborhoods were entirely sealed off using
these approaches, prompting the use of the moniker “gated communities.” In an Op-
Ed piece, Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray Odierno
explained that the gated communities were “being put up to protect the Iraqi
population by hindering the ability of terrorists to carry out the car bombings and
suicide attacks.”271 As counter-insurgency expert Dave Kilcullen described it, “once
an area is cleared and secured, with troops on the ground, controls make it hard to
infiltrate or intimidate ... and thus [they] also protect the population.”272
Some initial press coverage took note of some citizens’ dismay at the tighter
controls that gated communities brought.273 By early 2008, coalition and Iraqi leaders
reported anecdotally that Iraqi residents were pleased at the added protection the
“gated community” measures provided them — by “keeping the bad guys out.”274
Another key set of population security approaches involved troop presence —
including not only increasing the number of troops but also changing their footprint.
From late in the formal occupation through 2006 — including Operation Together
Forward — coalition forces in Iraq had been consolidated at relatively large Forward
Operating Bases (FOBs). Surge strategy called for getting troops off of the FOBs and
out into local communities, to live and work among the population.
As Major General James Simmons, III Corps and MNC-I Deputy Commanding
General until February 2008, stated, “You have to get out and live with the
people.”275 Multi-National Force-West leaders agreed that the key is “living with the
population,” because “it makes Iraqis see us as partners in the fighting and
rebuilding.”276 As MNF-I Commanding General David Petraeus commented in July
271 Ray Odierno, “In Defense of Baghdad’s Walls,” Los Angeles Times, April 25, 2007.
272 Dave Kilcullen, “The Urban Tourniquet — Gated Communities in Baghdad,” April 27,
2007, at Small Wars Journal, [http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/04/the-urban-
tourniquet-gated-com/]. Dr. Kilcullen has served at MNF-I in Baghdad as an advisor to
GEN Petraeus.
273 See for example Karin Brulliard, “‘Gated Communities’ for the War-Ravaged,”
Washington Post, April 23, 2007. See also Tim Kilbride, “Coalition Positioned to Break
Iraq’s Cycle of Violence,” American Forces Press Service, May 25, 2007, available at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=46184]).
274 Information from Division and Brigade Commanders, January 2008.
275 Interview, January 2008, Baghdad. MG Simmons brought to bear considerable
comparative perspective. He held the post of III Corps DCG for over four and a half years,
and thus also served as MNC-I DCG on the Corps’ first tour in Iraq as the nucleus of MNC-
I, from 2004 to 2005.
276 Conversation with MNF-West leaders, January 2008.

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2008, explaining surge approaches: “The only way to secure a population is to live
with it — you can’t commute to this fight.”277
Accordingly, coalition forces established scores of small combat outposts
(COPs) and joint security stations (JSSs) in populated areas. A JSS includes co-
located units from coalition forces, the Iraqi police, and the Iraqi Army. Each
component continues to report to its own chain of command, but they share space
— and information. A COP is coalition-only, usually manned by a “company-
minus.” As of January 2008, for example, Multi-National Division-Center had
established 53 such bases in their restive area south of Baghdad.
Senior commanders at all levels have stressed the critical role JSSs and COPs
played during the surge. General Petraeus noted in March 2007 that they allowed the
development of relationships with local populations.278 Multi-National Division-
Baghdad leaders called the creation of these outposts the “biggest change over time”
in coalition operations in Iraq.279
Surge strategy still called on Iraqi and coalition forces to “clear, hold, build.”
Administration and coalition leaders admitted that in the past — in Operation
Together Forward in 2006 — insufficient forces had been available to “hold” an area
once it was cleared. The surge was designed to correct that.
As the President noted in his January 10, 2007, address to the nation, “In earlier
operations, Iraqi and American forces cleared many neighborhoods of terrorists and
insurgents, but when our forces moved on to other targets, the killers returned. This
time,” he added, “we’ll have the force levels we need to hold the areas that have been
cleared.”280 General Petraeus confirmed the approach, and the contrast with past
operations, in March 2007: “Importantly, Iraqi and coalition forces will not just clear
neighborhoods, they will also hold them to facilitate the build phase of the
operation.”281 Key outside observers agreed. Retired General Jack Keane, a strong
surge advocate, noted, “We’re going to secure the population for the first time. What
we’ve never been able to do in the past is have enough forces to stay in those
neighborhoods and protect the people.”282
President Bush announced one other major change which would make surge
military operations different from those of the past — the lifting of political
277 David Petraeus, Interview with Charles Gibson, World News, ABC, July 28, 2008.
278 Press Briefing by GEN David Petraeus, March 8, 2007, available at [http://www.mnf-
iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10475&Itemid=131].
279 Interviews with MNF-I subordinate commanders, January 2008.
280 President’s Address to the Nation, January 10, 2007, available at White House website,
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-7.html].
281 Press Briefing by General David Petraeus, March 8, 2007, available at [http://www.mnf-
iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10475&Itemid=131].
282 Adam Brookes, “Bush Iraq plan likely to cost dear,” BBC news, January 11, 2007,
available at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6250657.stm].

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restrictions on operations, which had been imposed in the past by an Iraqi leadership
concerned about its own fragility. In the past, President Bush noted, “political and
sectarian interference prevented Iraqi and American forces from going into
neighborhoods that are home to those fueling the sectarian violence.” But this time,
Iraqi leaders had signaled that Iraqi and coalition forces would have “a green light”
to enter those neighborhoods.283
Surge Operations in 2007. Enabled by the greater availability of U.S. and
Iraqi forces in 2007, U.S. military commanders launched a series of major
“combined” operations with their Iraqi security forces counterparts.
Baghdad Security Plan. In February 2007, just as surge forces began to
flow into Iraq, U.S. and Iraqi forces launched Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, often
referred to as the Baghdad Security Plan. Its primary emphasis was population
security, and the primary geographical focal point was Baghdad, broadly defined.284
As then-MNC-I Commander LTG Odierno put it, “The population and the
government are the center of gravity.”285
The basic theory of the case was another paraphrase of “clear, hold, build.” At
the outset of operations, Major General Joseph Fil, Commander of 1st Cavalry
Division and the Multi-National Division-Baghdad, described the plan as “clear,
control, and retain.” That meant, he explained, clearing out extremists, neighborhood
by neighborhood; controlling those neighborhoods with a “full-time presence on the
streets” by coalition and Iraqi forces; and retaining the neighborhoods with Iraqi
security forces “fully responsible for the day-to-day security mission.”286
The specific targets of the Operation included Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its
affiliates, and rogue Shi’a militia elements including the Jaish al-Mahdi “special
groups.”
“Baghdad” was defined to include the surrounding areas, or “belts,” which had
been providing bases of operation and transit points, with access into the capital, for
both Sunni and Shi’a extremists. LTG Odierno’s guidance to his subordinate
commanders was to stop the flow of “accelerants of the violence” through those areas
into Baghdad.287
Operating in the “belts” required shifting the footprint of coalition forces to
cover all the major supply lines leading into Baghdad. Coalition presence in many
283 President’s Address to the Nation, January 10, 2007, available at White House website,
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-7.html].
284 “Baghdad” is the name of both the capital city and the province where it is located.
285 See Department of Defense Press Briefing with Lieutenant General Odierno, May 31,
2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
3973].
286 See Department of Defense press briefing, Major General Joseph Fil, February 16, 2007,
available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3891].
287 Information from Division Commanders and staff, January 2008.

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of the belt areas had previously been very light. During the spring of 2007, incoming
surge brigades were deployed into Baghdad and its belts. April 1, 2007, a new
division headquarters was added — the Multi-National Division-Center, initially led
by 3rd Infantry Division — to cover parts of Baghdad province and other provinces
just south of Baghdad.288
“Phoenix” Series of Corps-Level Operations. Beginning in June 2007,
once all the coalition surge forces had arrived in Iraq, coalition forces, in
coordination with Iraqi counterparts, launched a series of operations: Phantom
Thunder, followed by Phantom Strike, and then Phantom Phoenix. As “Corps-level
operations,” these were sets of division- and brigade-level actions coordinated and
integrated across Iraq by MNC-I. They included close coordination with U.S. Special
Operations Forces as well as with Iraqi military and police forces.
The city of Baghdad was the most complex battle space in Iraq, due to the strong
presence of both AQI and JAM special groups, the many potential fault lines among
different neighborhoods, and a security “temperature” that can vary on a block-by-
block basis. In the series of Corps-level operations, the Multi-National Division-
Baghdad, led by the 4th Infantry Division since December 2007, focused first on
clearing the city, and then on establishing a strong presence to hold each
neighborhood.289
The area just south of Baghdad and along the Tigris River, with its mixed Shi’a/
Sunni population, had long provided safe havens and a gateway to Baghdad for AQI
and its affiliates from Al Anbar and Iraq’s western borders, and for Shi’a extremists
coming from southern Iraq or from Iraq’s border with Iran. As part of the Corps-
level operations, Multi-National Division-Center, led by 3ID, focused on clearing
these restive areas, narrowing down to more specific pockets of resistance, including
Salman Pak and Arab Jabour, as progress is made.
To the north, Multi-National Division-North, led by 1st Armored Division,
focused on clearing and then holding those areas where AQI affiliates sought refuge
as they were pushed out of Baghdad.290 Many AQI affiliates, pushed out of Baghdad
by surge operations, initially relocated to Baquba, the capital city of Diyala province
east of Baghdad. Reports suggested they had renamed it the new “capital of the
Islamic State of Iraq.”291 As operations by MND-North and Iraqi security forces
pushed AQI out of that city, some AQI moved east up the Diyala River Valley, into
the so-called “breadbasket” of Iraq near the city of Muqtadiyah — a focal point for
288 Information from MNC-I and Division officials, January 2008. See also Kimberly
Kagan, “The Real Surge: Preparing for Operation Phantom Thunder,” Iraq Report, The
Institute for the Study of War and The Weekly Standard, February 14, 2007-June 15, 2007,
available at [http://www.understandingwar.org/IraqReport/IraqReport05.pdf].
289 Information from MND-Baghdad, January 2008.
290 Retired Army Major General Scales provides a clear description of the early stages of
these operations, based on a visit to Iraq in Robert H. Scales MG (ret), “Petraeus’s Iraq,”
Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2007.
291 Information from MND-North, January 2008.

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the Division’s operations in January 2008. Working in Diyala in partnership with the
Iraqi 5th Army Division, the combined forces uncovered a number of major weapons
caches, and had “some very tough fights.”292
In Al Anbar province to the west, the Multi-National Force-West, led by II
Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), working closely with Iraqi counterparts,
focused its operations on a pocket of AQI concentration around Lake Thar Thar,
northwest of Baghdad. As AQI was pushed out of major population centers
including Ramadi and Fallujah, they tended to attempt to regroup in the desert, so
another major coalition and Iraqi focus in Al Anbar has been targeting the AQI
remnants in rural areas.293
Military Operations in 2008. Coalition and Iraqi military operations in 2008
have been characterized by growing ISF capabilities, and growing assertiveness of
the GoI in employing the ISF. Operations have been carried out against both Al
Qaeda in Iraq affiliates in north-central Iraq, and against extremist Shi’a militia
members in the south and Baghdad.
The Fight Against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) Elements in the North. By
the beginning of 2008, Corps-level operations had pushed AQI out of Anbar and
Baghdad to the east and north. Operations by Multi-National Division-North in
January 2008, in Diyala province, pushed AQI out of Diyala’s capital city Baqubah
and further up the Diyala River Valley. Some members of AQI sought to establish
the northern city of Mosul as their last stronghold — their “center of gravity.”294
In 2007, through the height of the surge, Ninewah province and its capital city
Mosul had been an “economy of force” area for both U.S. and Iraqi forces, as
additional forces were sent south to Baghdad and nearby areas.295 Ninewah province
offered AQI affiliates some geographic advantages, including land routes out to
Iraq’s porous western border. It also offered a volatile mixed population, including
governing structures largely controlled by Kurds, a sizable Sunni Arab population
that felt disenfranchised, and Christian, Yazidi, and other minority groups.
On January 25, 2008, Prime Minister Maliki announced that there would a
major new Iraqi and coalition offensive against AQI in Mosul and stated that it would
292 See Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Mark Hertling, January 22,
2008, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
4124].
293 See Department of Defense News Briefing, Maj.Gen. Walter Gaskin, December 10,
2007, [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4103].
294 Interviews with MNC-I and MND-North officials, January and August 2008.
295 Interviews with MNC-I and MND-N officials, August 2008. See also Solomon Moore,
“In Mosul, New Test of Rebuilt Iraqi Army,” New York Times, March 20, 2008; Moore
reports that at one point, the demands of the surge in Baghdad left only 750 U.S. Soldiers
in Mosul, and 2,000 in Ninewah altogether.

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be “decisive.”296 The Prime Minister established a new Ninewah Operations
Command (NOC), designed to coordinate operations by all ISF. The NOC was
scheduled to reach full operating capacity in May 2008, but as one senior U.S.
commander noted, “they just weren’t ready.” Nevertheless, ISF did launch some
clearing operations and took steps to secure Mosul including setting up check points
and maintaining a presence at combat outposts.297 MNC-I noted its intent, once
progress in Diyala province allows, to go back and complete the effort in Mosul, to
“get it set.”
According to U.S. commanders, operations in Mosul have benefitted from an
initiative by Multi-National Corp-Iraq (MNC-I) in the Jazeera desert, west of Mosul.
MNC-I formed a task force around a military intelligence brigade headquarters, based
it in the desert, and tasked it to coordinate intelligence fusion, drawing on sources
from the U.S. Marines in the west, and U.S. and Iraqi SOF, in addition to its own
assets. Commanders note that the approach has facilitated identifying and
interdicting fighters coming across the desert toward Mosul.298
Meanwhile, in January 2008, operations in Diyala province, east of Baghdad,
had driven AQI affiliates out of major population centers into rural areas. One U.S.
military commander, emphasizing AQI’s lack of cohesive structure, described them
as “a bunch of gangs under the Al Qaeda rubric.”299
In late July 2008, ISF, supported by coalition forces, launched operations against
AQI in Diyala. Before the operations began, Prime Minister Maliki publicly stated
the intention to launch operations, and as a result, according to U.S. commanders,
many of the “bad guys” simply ran away.300 In the view of one U.S. commander, that
approach may have “pushed the problem down the road,” but on the other hand, he
added, it might allow time for ISF capabilities to develop further. U.S. support to the
operations included conducting blocking operations, to try to catch AQI affiliates
attempting to flee,301 as well as providing air support, some logistics, and engineering
support.302
296 See for example “Iraq to Go After Al-Qaeda in Mosul,” Associated Press, Washington
Post, January 25, 2008.
297 Interviews with MND-N officials, August 2008. See Department of Defense, “Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.20.
298 Interviews with MNC-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008. The Corps-
level operation in this region is called Operation DAN (Defeat Al-Qaeda in the North).
299 Interview with MNF-I subordinate commander, August 2008.
300 See Multi-National Force-Iraq press conference, Major General Mohammed al-Askari,
Iraqi Ministry of Defense Spokesman, and Brigadier General David Perkins, MNF-I
Spokesman, July 30, 2008.
301 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, and subordinate commanders, August 2008.
302 See Multi-National Force-Iraq press conference, Major General Mohammed al-Askari,
Iraqi Ministry of Defense Spokesman, and Brigadier General David Perkins, MNF-I
Spokesman, July 30, 2008.

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According to U.S. commanders, the Diyala operations were the first to include
rehearsals by the ISF and joint planning with Multi-National Corps-Iraq. Iraqi
officials noted that the Diyala operations more than two Iraqi Army divisions, and
more than one division from the Ministry of Interior.303 U.S. commanders add that
while the Iraqi Army demonstrated some proficiency in “clearing,” it has been harder
for the Iraqis to figure out how to “hold” cleared areas — Iraqi planning for the
“hold” portion of the operations was insufficient and hampered by a lack of Iraqi
police.304
The Fight Against Shi’a Extremists in the South. On March 25, 2008,
based on direction from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Iraqi security forces
launched a major operation, Sawlat al-Fursan (Charge of the Knights) in Basra, with
the stated aim of targeting criminals operating under religious or political cover.305
Some Muqtada al-Sadr loyalists apparently viewed the matter differently, and
accused the government of using its armed forces, many of which are strongly
influenced by the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI), to attack a political rival.
International Crisis Group expert Joost Hiltermann characterized the operations as
“a fairly transparent partisan effort by the Supreme Council [ISCI] dressed in
government uniforms to fight the Sadrists and Fadila.”306
Prior to the operations, by many accounts, key militias in Basra controlled local
councils and much of the flow of daily life on the streets of the city.307 In 2007, the
UK-led Multi-National Division- Southeast (MND-SE), responsible for Basra, had
determined that “the UK presence in Basra was a catalyst for violence.” In August
of that year, UK forces consolidated at the airport, outside the city, and assumed an
overwatch posture.308 In an apparent attempt at reconciliation, the division reportedly
made an accommodation with the Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM), agreeing to limit its own
presence in the city.309
The launch of the “Charge” was, by many accounts, precipitate. In March 2008,
Iraqi forces in Basra, assisted by UK advisors, had been preparing a staged plan to
303 See Multi-National Force-Iraq press conference, Major General Mohammed al-Askari,
Iraqi Ministry of Defense Spokesman, and Brigadier General David Perkins, MNF-I
Spokesman, July 30, 2008.
304 Interviews with MNC-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008.
305 Maliki stated publicly that the operation was going after “criminals, terrorist forces, and
outlaws.” See Alexandra Zavis, “Iraqi Shiites Clash in Basra,” Los Angeles Times, March
26, 2008.
306 Quoted by Alexandra Zavis, “Iraqi Shiites Clash in mBasra,” Los Angeles Times, March
26, 2008. See also “Iraq: Al-Basrah Clashes Could Prove Ominous,” Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty, March 26, 2008; Sholnn Freeman and Sudarsan Raghavan, “Intense Fighting
Erupts in Iraq,” Washington Post, March 26, 2008; Michael Kamber and James Glanz,
“Iraqi and U.S. Forces Battle Shiite Militia,” The New York Times, March 26, 2008.
307 Interviews with MNC-I subordinate commanders, and with head of the Basra Operations
Command, August 2008.
308 Interviews with MND-SE officials, August 2008.
309 Interviews with UK military official, August 2008.

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take back Basra, including setting conditions first, and then launching operations in
June. According to Iraqi civilian and military officials in Basra, and U.S. and UK
military officials, the Iraqi operation was not well-planned. Some officials, who were
directly involved, note that when the Prime Minister arrived in Basra in March, he
had been prepared only for a “limited operation” and was surprised by the magnitude
of the challenge.310 Some observers suggest that Maliki was emboldened by progress
against AQI in the north, and somewhat over-confident in the abilities of the ISF.
The ISF applied considerable forces to the effort, including 21 Iraqi Army
battalions and 8 National Police battalions — reportedly some 30,000 Iraqi forces
altogether, including special operations and conventional army forces, as well as
police.311 Extremists in Basra mounted fierce resistance — including simultaneous
attacks on 25 Iraqi police stations by JAM-affiliated forces.312 Iraqi Minister of
Defense Abdel Qadr Jassim was quoted as saying, “We supposed that this operation
would be a normal operation, but we were surprised by this resistance and have been
obliged to change our plans and our tactics.”313
U.S. military officials report that without substantial assistance from the
coalition, the operation would have been in jeopardy. As one senior U.S. commander
explained it, Prime Minister Maliki had staked his reputation on the operation — if
the operation failed, the government might collapse, so, he added, “We made sure
that it would be successful.”314 Coalition support included the advice and support of
embedded transition teams, air strikes, and air lift.315
According to coalition officials, while many of the ISF performed competently,
some — as widely reported — did not. One newly formed Iraq Army brigade, the
52nd, which had no combat experience, seemingly collapsed under the pressure. In
April 2008, the GoI noted that more than 1,000 members of the ISF had laid down
their weapons during the fight. Accordingly, some 500 Iraqi Army Soldiers, and 421
members of the Iraqi Police in Basra, were fired.316
In the aftermath of the Basra operations, coalition and Iraqi commanders
reported that the security situation had improved markedly. Accordingly to MND-
310 Interviews with UK and Iraqi officials, Basra, August 2008.
311 Interviews with UK military officials, Basra, August 2008.
312 Interview with UK military official, Basra, August 2008.
313 See “U.S. Forces Drawn Deeper Into Iraq Crackdown,” Reuters, March 28, 2008.
314 Interview with MNC-I official, August 2008.
315 Interviews with MNC-I officials, August 2008. See also MNF-I Press Conference, Major
General Kevin Bergner, March 26, 2008. In August 2008, reports emerged that UK ground
forces did not enter the city during the heavy fighting, due to the prior accommodation with
Moqtada al-Sadr, which provided that UK combat forces could not enter Basra without
permission from the UK Minister of Defence. See Deborah Haynes and Michael Evans,
“Secret Deal Kept British Army Out Of Battle for Basra,” London Times, August 5, 2008.
316 See Stephen Farrell and Qais Mizher, “Iraq Dismisses 1,300 After Basra Offensive,”
New York Times, April 14, 2008.

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SE, the ISF regained freedom of movement throughout the city.317 According to an
Iraqi Army commander, security was much better, and the main challenge now was
to act against criminals and outlaws.318
In March 2008, as operations in Basra commenced, some JAM elements stepped
up attacks targeting coalition and Iraqi forces in Baghdad. The attacks included
significant targeting of the International Zone, primarily from the direction of Sadr
City, a stronghold of supporters of Moqtada al-Sadr and the Sadr family.
To quell the attacks, U.S. and Iraqi forces launched operations, first of all
targeting the southern part of Sadr City where many rocket attacks were originating.
According to a senior U.S. military official, the Iraqi security forces, perhaps focused
on the ongoing Basra operations, were reluctant to engage — he added, “We had to
drag them to the fight.”319 U.S. forces, while largely remaining outside Sadr City
itself, brought to the fight air weapons teams and substantial layered ISR.320
After simmering for nearly two months, with continual pressure applied by
coalition and Iraqi forces, the fight in Sadr City ended in May 2008 with a deal struck
between Moqtada al-Sadr and the GoI. The arrangements reportedly allowed the ISF
full access to the area. They called for an end to the launching of rockets and mortars
from Sadr City, and for the removal of any explosives that had been laid down. They
did not require the disbanding or disarming of JAM forces — and JAM affirmed that
it did not possess any medium or heavy weapons.321 In the aftermath of the fighting
in Sadr City, U.S. officials confirmed that ISF freedom of movement had been
restored, and local residents reportedly confirmed that the grip of control by Shi’a
militias over the local economy and public services had relaxed.322
In June 2008, the ISF launched clearing operations in Amarah, capital city of
Maysan province just north of Basra. While little resistance was encountered, ISF
found a number of weapons caches, assisted by information from the local
population. The ISF followed by providing humanitarian assistance in the form of
hot meals, and coalition forces introduced a temporary employment program, hiring
317 Interview with MND-SE officials, August 2008. The officials noted that the situation in
Basra, post-operations, was “a lot like Cairo.”
318 Interview with Iraqi Army commander, August 2008.
319 Interview with senior U.S. commander, August 2008.
320 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, August 2008. See also Department of
Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.22.
321 See Howard Lafranchi, “Hasty truce with Moqtada al-Sadr tests his sway in Baghdad
stronghold,” Christian Science Monitor, May 12, 2008. See also “Text of Sadr Ceasefire
Agreement,” posted by the Institute for the Study of War, translated by Nathaniel Rabkin,
available at [http://www.understandingwar.org/text-sadr-cease-fire-agreement].
322 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, August 2008. See Sabrina Tavernise, “ A
Shiite Militia in Baghdad Sees its Power Wane,” New York Times, July 27, 2008.

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local residents to remove trash and debris from city streets. U.S. commanders noted
that the Amarah operations may have been the first that the ISF carefully planned.323
Counter-IED Efforts. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are the enemy’s
“weapon of choice” in Iraq. Usually made with technologically simple, off-the-shelf
materials, they generally do not require deep expertise to construct. As of early 2008,
over 78% of those detained by coalition forces were interned based on suspicion of
some IED-related activity.324 IEDs are the leading cause of coalition casualties in
Iraq — and over time, they have driven changes in coalition operations, including an
increased reliance on air lift for transportation of personnel and cargo.
Recognizing the threat from these asymmetric weapons, both the Department
of Defense and the military command on the ground in Iraq have made countering
IEDs a top priority.325 At DOD, the Joint IED Defeat Organization, based in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and led since December 2007 by Lieutenant
General Tom Metz, is mandated to facilitate the rapid development, production and
fielding of new technologies and approaches.
In the field, the premise of the counter-IED efforts has been to “attack the
network.” That involves not just capturing the IED emplacers, usually hired for a
one-time payment, but also, in the words of one Division Commander, “influencing
the decisions of those who place IEDs.”326 More broadly, it includes mapping the
relationships among emplacers, financiers, and overall strategists, including the
support they receive from outside Iraq.
To help execute those efforts, Multi-National Corps-Iraq and its subordinate
multi-national divisions created dedicated counter-IED cells, reinforced by experts
provided by JIEDDO. Their efforts include information-sharing about the latest
enemy tactics, techniques and procedures, distributing and providing training for the
latest counter-IED technology, training the force to recognize how the network
operates, and integrating all available intelligence assets to better define — and target
— the networks.327 MNC-I also includes a task force of technical experts who collect
and analyze all found IEDs.328
MNF-I and MNC-I officials point to a dramatic decrease in enemy IED use,
from September 2007 to September 2008, from about 110 incidents per day to about
26 incidents per day. Most of those incidents involved relatively unsophisticated
323 Interviews with MNC-I officials, August 2008. See also Department of Defense News
Briefing, Colonel Charlie Flynn (USA), 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, June 26, 2008.
324 Interviews with Task Force-134 officials, Baghdad, January 2008.
325 Interviews with LTG Odierno, and MNC-I staff, January 2008.
326 Interview with Division Commander, January 2008.
327 At the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint IED Defeat Organization, led since
December 2007 by Lieutenant General Tom Metz, is mandated to facilitate the rapid
development, production and fielding of new technologies and approaches.
328 Interviews with MNC-I officials, August 2008.

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devices, with key exceptions. According to U.S. officials, enemy IED use seems to
follow cycles of innovation.329 In late 2007, a key IED concern was the explosively
formed penetrator (EFP), able to target vehicles with a particularly powerful blast,
but EFP trend lines diminished markedly after January 2008. In late 2007, another
worrisome form of IED appeared, the improvised rocket-assisted mortar (IRAM) —
a rocket with a propane tank and ball bearings. IRAMs take a long time to build, and
they have indiscriminate and catastrophic effects. The first two IRAM incidents took
place in November 2007, and a total of 13 incidents had taken place by August 2008.
In mid-2008, the use of “building-borne IEDs” — houses wired to explode —
became more common.330
Carrying out IED attack requires, to some extent, the ability to operate within
a local population. U.S. commanders note that the most fundamental factor in
explaining the successes to date in the counter-IED effort is that “the Iraqi population
has turned against the IED effort.”331
Special Operations Forces. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have
played an integral role throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom, including targeting key
enemy leaders. MNF-I leaders note that as of 2008, SOF and conventional forces
work in a much more closely integrated way than they did earlier in OIF. SOF is
particularly well-suited to infiltrate difficult areas to reach key individual targets. But
according to MNF-I and MNC-I leaders, SOF often rely, for targeting information,
on conventional units’ detailed, daily familiarity with their battle space, based on
their long-standing relationships with local Iraqi counterparts. Further, commanders
stress, after a SOF action, it is the conventional forces — in partnership with Iraqi
forces — that stay to “hold” the area.332
Air Power. Most press coverage of the counter-insurgency effort in Iraq has
focused on the role of ground forces — the Army and the Marine Corps — including
the number of troops on the ground, the approaches they have used, and the stress on
those two Military Services.333 Air power has also been an integral element of the
OIF counter-insurgency (COIN) effort — providing critical Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and facilitating mobility — particularly given
329 As one official observed, “It’s like R&D,” interview with MNC-I official, August 2008.
330 Interviews with MNC-I officials, August 2008.
331 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, January and August 2008.
332 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, January and August 2008.
333 Indeed, the ground Services themselves may tend to view counter-insurgency primarily
as a ground forces effort. In his provocative monograph, “Shortchanging the Joint Fight?,”
Air Force Major General Charles Dunlap noted that the new Army and Marine Corps COIN
doctrine, FM 3-24, devotes only a 5-page appendix to the role of air power in COIN, and
argued for a “genuinely joint approach” that takes account of “the full potential of today’s
airpower capabilities.” See Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap, “Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An
Airman’s Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine,”
Air University monograph, December 2007, available at [http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/
121007dunlap.pdf].

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the lack of mass transit of troops by ground.334 Importantly from an analytical
perspective, the role of air power in Iraq has evolved over time.
One major shift over the course of OIF has been in the kinetic use of air power.
Defense expert Anthony Cordesman has pointed to its “steadily more important role
over time.”335 In November 2007, Major General Dave Edgington, then the MNF-I
Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) Director, confirmed a sharp spike,
once all the surge troops had arrived in Iraq, in the number of weapons dropped from
fighters and bombers.336
Statistics released in January 2008 by the Combined Force Air Component
Command (CFACC), the air component of CENTCOM, provided further detail about
the upswing in the use of weapons. The yearly number of close air support (CAS)
strikes, with munitions dropped, in OIF, rose from 86 in 2004, to 176 in 2005, to
1,770 in 2006, to 3,030 in 2007. During 2007, the monthly number of CAS strikes
rose from 89 in January, then 36 in February, to 171 in June, 303 in July, and 166 in
August, before dropping back to double-digits for the rest of the year.337
In January 2008, Maj. Gen. Edgington explained that close air support — or
“on-call” support — is the type of kinetic air power that has been most in demand in
Iraq. Coordinated air/ground operations during the first several months after the
arrival of the full surge force produced the heaviest CAS requirements, but afterward
the demand tapered off. The significantly higher demand for CAS, he noted, was less
a reflection of a deliberate strategy to use more air power, than a natural result of a
significantly larger number of U.S. troops, working significantly more closely with
Iraqi counterparts and in local neighborhoods, and getting better information that
made target identification much easier. As of January 2008, in a shift from mid-
2007, the majority of weapons dropped were targeting deeply buried IEDs.338
Some counter-insurgency specialists have questioned the use of kinetic air
power in counter-insurgency operations because it risks civilian casualties that could
fuel the insurgency. For example, Kalev Sepp has written, “These killings drive
334 For a discussion of air operations in support of OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom
in Afghanistan, including the widespread use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, see Mark
Benjamin, “Killing ‘Bubba’ from the Skies,” Slate.com, February 15, 2008, available at
[http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2008/02/15/air_war/].
335 Anthony H. Cordesman, “US Airpower in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2004-2007,” Center
for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2007.
336 MNF-I press briefing, Major General Dave Edgington, MNF-I Air Component
Coordination Element Director, November 4, 2007, available at [http://www.mnf-
iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15033&Itemid=128].
337 “2004-2007 Combined Forces Air Component Commander Airpower Statistics,” U.S.
CENTAF Combined Air and Space Operations Center, January 3, 2008.
338 Interview with Maj. Gen. Edgington, Baghdad, January 2008.

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family and community members into the insurgency and create lifelong antagonisms
toward the United States.”339
Commanders stress, in turn, that although there is always a chance of accidental
civilian casualties, the likelihood has greatly diminished with the development of
precision capabilities. Further, the decision cycle before a weapon is dropped
includes a series of decision points that give commanders the opportunity to stop an
action if new and better information becomes available about a civilian presence in
the target area.340 In his December 2007 assessment of the use of air power in Iraq
and Afghanistan, Anthony Cordesman concludes that “considerable restraint was
used in both wars.”341
Another major shift in the use of air in OIF, according to U.S. commanders, has
been the growing availability of greater air assets — for example, significantly more
full-motion video assets.342 In 2008, U.S. air assets — ISR, kinetic, and mobility —
proved essential to the increasingly “combined” coalition and Iraqi operations on the
ground. In the Basra operations in March 2008, U.S. transition teams embedded with
Iraqi units relied on ISR and some kinetic air as key enablers, and the coalition also
provided some essential airlift.
U.S. and Iraqi military operations in the Sadr City section of Baghdad, in spring
2008, presented some specific challenges — a geographic area largely denied to
legitimate Iraqi security forces but densely populated by civilians, serving as a
launching pad for frequent attacks on Iraqi and coalition targets, in the middle of the
nation’s capital. In the judgment of some U.S. commanders, what helped make the
U.S.-Iraqi Sadr City operations a success was pushing the control of air assets to
lower levels in the U.S. chain of command.343 Commanders on the ground had
access to layered inputs from manned and unmanned sensors, and multiple options
— both ground- and air-based — for taking out targets, if the decision was to “kill”
rather than “follow and exploit.”
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
As of 2008, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) consisted of three major groups: the
Army, Navy and Air Force under the Ministry of Defense (MoD); the Iraqi Police
Service, the National Police, and the Department of Border Enforcement under the
Ministry of Interior (MoI), as well as the Facilities Protection Service that was still
339 See “The Insurgency: Can it be Defeated?” Interview with Kalev Sepp, PBS Frontline,
February 21, 2006, available at [http://www/pbs.org/wgbh.pages/frontline/insurgency/can/].
Other observers question the use of kinetic air power simply on the grounds that any risk of
inadvertent civilian loss of life is unacceptable.
340 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I leaders, January 2008.
341 Anthony H. Cordesman, “US Airpower in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2004-2007”, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2007.
342 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, August 2008.
343 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, and subordinate commanders, August 2008.

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being consolidated under the MoI; and the Iraqi Special Operations Forces that report
to the Counter-Terrorism Bureau, under the office of the Prime Minister.
Developing the ISF and the security Ministries that oversee them is a critical
component of the role of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq — a role that has evolved
over time in response to events on the ground and changes in U.S. strategy.
Requirement for New Iraqi Security Forces
The scope of the challenge has been extensive, since none of Iraq’s pre-war
security forces or structures were left intact or available for duty after major combat
operations.
U.S. pre-war planning had foreseen an immediate and practical need for law
enforcement, and for security more broadly, after major combat — particularly since
some challenges to law and order might reasonably be expected after the collapse of
the old regime. Planning had also stressed the need for security providers to have an
“Iraqi face,” to calm and reassure the Iraqi people.
However, pre-war planning had erroneously assumed that Iraqi local police
forces would be available, as needed, to help provide security for the Iraqi people.
Instead, in the immediate aftermath of major combat, coalition forces found that
civilian law enforcement bodies had effectively disappeared.
Meanwhile, military pre-war planning had also assumed that Iraqi military units
would be available for recall and reassignment after the war, as needed. Military
plans counted on the “capitulation” of Iraqi forces, and included options for using
some of those forces to guard borders or perform other tasks.344
Instead, on May 23, 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) issued
CPA Order Number 2, which dissolved all Iraqi military services including the Army.
That decision foreclosed the option of unit recall to support security or reconstruction
activities, or to serve as building blocks for a new, post-Saddam army.345
Post-war Iraq was not, however, a blank slate in terms of trained and organized
fighters. The Kurds in northern Iraq had long maintained well-trained and well-
equipped forces — the pesh merga — which had worked closely with coalition
forces during major combat. Somewhat more equivocally, a major Shi’a Arab
political party, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, later
344 Information from CFLCC and V Corps planners, 2002 and 2003. See also Michael R.
Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story and the Invasion and
Occupation of Iraq, New York: Vintage Books, 2006.)
345 See CPA Order 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” available at [http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Entities_with_Annex_A.pdf]. Note
that the date of the Order is given incorrectly on the CPA website table of contents, but is
correctly printed on the Order itself.

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ISCI), maintained its own militia, the Badr Corps,346 which had been trained in Iran
during the Iran-Iraq war. Like the pesh merga, Badr members were trained and
equipped, but unlike them, they had no history of cooperation with coalition forces
in Iraq. In the early days of the formal occupation, in various contexts, both militias
offered their services to help provide security. The coalition — then the executive
authority of Iraq — thus faced the additional challenge of whether and how to
incorporate these militias into official Iraqi security structures.
ISF Training Efforts During the Formal Occupation
During the year of formal occupation, Iraqi security forces training was led and
primarily executed by the Coalition Provisional Authority. Particularly in the earliest
days, the efforts were characterized by limited long-term strategic planning, and by
resources too limited for the scope and scale of the tasks.
Police training began as a function of the CPA “Ministry of the Interior” office,
initially under the leadership of former New York Police Commissioner Bernard
Kerik. He was supported by a skeleton staff in Baghdad, and by some resources from
the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs (INL). Based on priorities articulated by Washington, the team focused
initially on the capital city, including rebuilding the Baghdad Police Academy. The
office also launched a limited call-back and re-training effort for former Iraqi police
officers, but the effort was constrained by limited resources and staff — including a
very limited presence outside Baghdad.347
Meanwhile, military units throughout Iraq had recognized an immediate need
for some Iraqi law enforcement presence on the ground in their areas of
responsibility. To the frustration of some CPA officials,348 military commanders
launched police re-training initiatives in their areas, initially in the form of three-
week courses, with the goal of quickly fielding at least temporary Iraqi security
providers. Ambassador Bremer eventually instructed CJTF-7 to cease police
recruiting.349
346 Previously the “Badr Brigade,” subsequently the “Badr Organization.”
347 Regarding funding for the Iraqi civilian law enforcement system, Ambassador Bremer
writes that CPA began with $25 million from the State Department to assess the Iraqi
criminal justice system, and Ambassador Bremer allocated an additional $120 million from
Iraqi government funds for training and equipping Iraqi police. See Ambassador L. Paul
Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope, New York: Simon
and Schuster, 2006.
348 Personal communications from CPA officials, 2003. Also, in his Iraq memoir,
Ambassador Bremer minces no words. He quotes Doug Brand, the U.K. Constable who
replaced Kerik, as saying, “The Army is sweeping up half-educated men off the streets,
running them through a three-week training course, arming them, and then calling them
police. It’s a scandal, pure and simple.” See Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006, page
183.
349 In his memoir, Ambassador Bremer recalls an October 2003 meeting with CJTF-7
(continued...)

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CPA also initially had responsibility for rebuilding Iraq’s Army, under the
supervision of Walt Slocombe, the CPA Senior Advisor for National Security, and
a former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In an August 2003 Order, CPA
directed the creation of the New Iraqi Army (NIA).350 The training effort, led day-to-
day by Major General Paul Eaton, focused on recruiting and training Iraqi soldiers,
battalion-by-battalion. The plan was to create higher headquarters later on — and in
particular, once an Iraqi civilian leadership was in place to provide civilian control
of the military. The initial, ambitious goal was the creation of 27 battalions in two
years, which was adjusted to the even more ambitious goal of 27 battalions in one
year.351
In early September 2003, as a stop-gap measure, at the urging of CJTF-7 with
backing from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, CPA announced the
establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). The ICDC would be a
trained, uniformed, armed “security and emergency service agency for Iraq.”352 In
accordance with the Order he signed, establishing the ICDC, Ambassador Bremer
delegated responsibility for its development to the senior military commander in Iraq
— LTG Sanchez. Under CJTF-7’s authority, Division Commanders launched ICDC
recruiting and training programs, supporting the efforts in part with their own organic
assets, and in part with CERP funding.
Unity of Effort: Creation of Multi-National Security Transition
Command-Iraq
In 2003 and early 2004, the various ISF training efforts — for the police, the
NIA and the ICDC — proceeded in parallel, led by separate entities within the
coalition, with little opportunity for integrated strategic planning and resourcing.
The military command in Iraq had sought for some time to be assigned
responsibility for the entire ISF training mission, based on the view that CPA did not
have the capacity to accomplish all of it, or to coordinate its many elements in a
349 (...continued)
Commander LTG Sanchez, when he instructed CJTF-7 to stop recruiting police. The
incident underscored the difficult position in the chain of command of CJTF-7 (see above),
which was in direct support of CPA, but still reported to CENTCOM — which had
instructed CJTF-7 to recruit and train police. Communications from CJTF-7 officials, 2003,
and Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of
Hope, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006.
350 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 22, “Creation of a New Iraqi Army,” 18 August
2003, available at [http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030818_CPAORD_22_
Creation_of_a_New_Iraqi_Army.pdf].
351 See Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future
of Hope, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006.
352 See Coalition Provisional Authority Order 28, “Establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense
Corps,” 3 September 2003, available at [http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20030903_CPAORD_28_Est_of_the_Iraqi_Civil_Defense_Corps.pdf].

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single strategy. Ambassador Bremer resisted this design, based on the view that the
military was not trained to train police forces.353
On May 11, 2004, President Bush issued National Security Presidential
Directive (NSPD) 36, which assigned the mission of organizing, training and
equipping all Iraqi security forces (ISF) to CENTCOM. This included both directing
all U.S. efforts, and coordinating all supporting international efforts. It explicitly
included Iraq’s civilian police as well as its military forces.354
CENTCOM, in turn, created the Multi-National Security Transition Command-
Iraq (MNSTC-I), a new three-star headquarters that would fall under the Multi-
National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), to bring together all Iraqi security forces training under
a single lead in Iraq.355
Since December 2004, in keeping with the original NSPD mandate concerning
international contributions, the MNSTC-I Commanding General has been dual-hatted
as the Commander of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I). NTM-I provides
training, both inside and outside Iraq, to Iraqi security forces; assistance with
equipping; and technical advice and assistance. As of August 2008, its permanent
mission in Iraq included 133 personnel from 15 countries. Major initiatives have
included helping the Iraqi Army build a Non-Commissioned Officer Corps; helping
establish and structure Iraqi military educational institutions; and — with a strong
contribution from Italy’s Carabinieri — helping update the skills and training of
Iraq’s National Police.356
On October 1, 2005, MNSTC-I was given the additional responsibility of
mentoring and helping build capacity in the Ministries of Defense and Interior.357
353 Conversations with CPA and CJTF-7 leaders, 2003 and 2004. In his memoir,
Ambassador Bremer describes a September 2003 meeting at which GEN Abizaid and LTG
Sanchez proposed that CJTF-7 take over the police training mission. He observes in his
memoir: “I didn’t like it.... Although our soldiers were the best combat troops in the world,
they had been trained and equipped for fast-moving operations where they killed the enemy,
not for community policing and criminal investigations.” See Ambassador L. Paul Bremer
III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope, New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2006, pp.168-169.
354 See National Security Presidential Directive 36, “United States Government Operations
in Iraq,” May 11, 2004, available at Federation of American Scientists website,
[http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd051104.pdf].
355 The first MNSTC-I Commanding General was then-LTG David Petraeus. In May 2004,
CJTF-7 split into a higher, four-star headquarters, MNF-I, and a lower, three-star
headquarters, MNC-I, (see above).
3 5 6 I n t e r v i e w s w i t h M N S T C - I o f f i c i a l s , A u g u s t 2 0 0 8 . S e e
[http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Missions/NTM-I/NTM-I.htm].
357 See for example LTG Martin Dempsey, Statement before the House Armed Services
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, June 12, 2007, available at HASC website,
[http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI061207/Dempsey_Testimony061207.pdf]. The US
Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Embassy’s Iraq Transition Assistance
(continued...)

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ISF Training: Theory of the Case
At the heart of the ISF training mission is the practice of embedding coalition
forces and other advisors and experts — now called “transition teams” — with Iraqi
military or civilian units, to train, mentor and advise them.
That practice, though it has grown over time, is not new. In early 2004, under
CJTF-7, some Army units embedded teams with the newly-generated New Iraqi
Army battalions. Under Commanding General George Casey, MNF-I initiated a
more aggressive embedding strategy, and the effort expanded still further in scope
when GEN Petraeus assumed command of MNF-I in February 2007.358
One thing that has changed over time is the strategic intent of the training
mission. As the word “transition” in MNSTC-I’s name suggests, the initial stated
goal of MNSTC-I and the ISF training effort in general was to transition security
responsibility to Iraqis. The sooner the Iraqis were capable of providing security for
themselves, the sooner U.S. and other coalition forces could go home.359
Accordingly, embedded teams worked with their Iraqi counterparts with a view to the
earliest possible independence of those Iraqi units.
In early 2007, in keeping with the Administration’s New Way Forward strategy
and the surge emphasis on “population security” as a prerequisite for complete
transition, the emphasis of the training and embedding mission shifted. The ultimate
goal was still to transition security responsibility to Iraqis, but the timeline was
relaxed. The primary focus, in the near term, would be working with Iraqi units to
help them better provide population security. Working closely with U.S.
counterparts on real-world missions, Iraqi units would be practicing the skills they
would need to operate independently.360
357 (...continued)
Office, share responsibility for facilitating the development of all other Iraqi Ministries.
358 See Major General Carter F. Ham, “Transition Team’s Role in Iraq,” Military Training
Technology, Vol.12, Issue 1, April 10, 2007, available at [http://www.military-training-
technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1972]. In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group had
recommended sharply enhancing the embedding program — down to the company level in
the Iraqi Army — and “paying” for this increase in embedded troops with reductions in the
number of troops assigned to combat brigades. See The Iraq Study Group Report, James
A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, December 6, 2006, Recommendation 44, p.
51, available at [http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/iraq_study_
group_ report.pdf].
359 In his memoir, Ambassador Bremer provides a clear example of the early focus of ISF
training on transition, citing verbatim a memorandum from Secretary Rumsfeld to himself
and General Abizaid: “Our goal should be to ramp up the Iraqi numbers, try to get some
additional international forces and find ways to put less stress on our forces, enabling us to
reduce the U.S. role. The faster the Iraqi forces grow, the lower the percentage will be of
U.S. forces out of the total forces.” Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The
Struggle to Build a Future of Hope, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006, pp. 162.
360 Conversations from MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I officials, Baghdad, January 2008.

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ISF Training: Organizational Structure and Responsibilities
Under MNF-I, several key subordinate bodies share responsibilities for training
and advising Iraqi Security Forces and their respective headquarters institutions.
MNSTC-I’s broad mandate is to generate and replenish the ISF, improve their
quality, and support the institutional capacity development of the security ministries
— the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Counter-Terrorism
Bureau. Looking forward, U.S. military officials and outside experts project that
MNSTC-I may evolve into a large version of a typical Office of Security
Cooperation, focused on mil-to-mil partnership activities, capacity-building in the
security ministries, and foreign military sales.361
In practice, MNSTC-I shares some of these responsibilities with the Multi-
National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), the three-star operational command that also reports
directly to MNF-I. In working with the ISF, MNC-I’s focus is operational, managing
transition teams that embed with the Iraqi Army, the Department of Border
Enforcement and the National Police, while MNSTC-I’s focus includes both
operational and institutional issues.
Under MNC-I, the Iraq Assistance Group (IAG), a one-star command created
in February 2005, is the “principal coordinating agency for the Iraqi Security Forces”
within MNC-I. Originally, the IAG “owned” the transition teams that embed with
Iraqi units, but a major change was made in mid-2007. At that time, transition teams,
while still assigned to the IAG, were attached to the brigade combat teams, also
under MNC-I, which were responsible, respectively, for the areas in which the teams
were working. As previous IAG commander Brigadier General Dana Pittard
explained, the change provided “unity of effort and unity of command in a brigade
combat team’s area of operations.”362
The IAG continues to serve as the executive agent for transition teams
throughout Iraq, ensuring they have the training and support they need. This includes
synchronizing the curricula at the transition team training sites inside and outside
Iraq, providing the teams with equipment and related training, and supporting the
teams’ Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) as they arrive
in Iraq. The IAG also directly supports transition teams working with three Iraqi
headquarters staffs: the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, the National Police
headquarters, and the Department of Border Enforcement headquarters. And the IAG
361 Interviews with MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and MNC-I officials, August 2008.
362 U.S. Central Command Press Release, “Iraq Assistance Group Supports the Feature
Performance,” May 17, 2007, available at [http://www2.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom2
/FrontPage%20Stories/Iraq%20Assistance%20Group%20Supports%20the%20Feature%
20Performance.aspx]. The IAG has been led since June 2008 by Brigadier General Keith
Walker, Assistant Deputy Commander (Operations) for the 1st Infantry Division.

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is helping spearhead the creation of an Iraqi Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO)
Corps — including training Iraqi NCOs to run a new NCO training course.363
ISF Training: Transition Teams
Transition teams have been called the “linchpin of the training and mentoring
effort.”364 The teams vary in size, composition and focus, based on the needs of the
Iraqi forces they partner with and the specific local circumstances, but the theory of
the case is consistent: the teams simultaneously “advise, teach, and mentor,” and
“provide direct access to Coalition capabilities such as air support, artillery, medical
evacuation and intelligence-gathering.”365 They also provide continual situational
awareness to coalition forces about the status of the ISF.
Transition teams work with units in each of the Iraqi military and police
services, with key operational headquarters, and with the security ministries. Due to
resource constraints, coverage of Iraqi units by training teams has not been one-to-
one.
In 2008, as ISF capabilities grew, several shifts were underway, if unevenly
across Iraq, in the focus of the embedded transition teams: from basic skills to more
sophisticated capabilities, from lower-level units to higher-level headquarters, and
from training to advising.366
In general, the embedded advisory effort is highly dynamic — work with any
Iraqi unit is expected to be temporary. According to U.S. military officials, as of fall
2008, the embedded training effort was far from completed — while many Iraqi units
had already “graduated” from the need for embedded advisors, others Iraqi units had
just entered that form of partnership, and other units were still being generated by the
Government of Iraq.367
Interior Ministry Transition Teams. For Ministry of Interior forces, the
Department of Defense reported that as of June 2008, there were 27 border transition
teams (BTTs) working with about two-thirds of Department of Border Enforcement
units at battalion-level or above; and 40 National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs)
which were partnering with about 80% of National Police units at battalion-level or
above. For the Iraqi Police, there were 251 Police Transition Teams (PTTs) working
363 Interviews with IAG officials, January 2008.
364 See Major General Carter Ham, “Transition Team’s Role in Iraq,” Military Training
Technology, Vol.12, Issue 1, April 10, 2007, available at [http://www.military-training-
technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1972]. Then-MG Ham wrote this piece while serving
as the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, which was assigned responsibility for
preparing transition teams to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan. LTG Ham now serves as the
Joint Staff Director for Operations (J3).
365 Ibid.
366 Interviews with MNC-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008.
367 Interviews with MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and MNC-I officials, and subordinate commanders,
August 2008.

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with Iraqi police at local, district and provincial levels. DOD reported that as of June
2008, “17% of the required number of transition teams for MoI forces” were not yet
established.368
The Police Training Team mission is supported by a U.S. Military Police
brigade, complemented by civilian International Police Advisors (IPAs) who provide
expertise in criminal investigation and police station management. The IPA contracts
are funded by DOD and managed by the Department of State. As of August 2008,
MNSTC-I noted that about 400 IPAs were deployed in Iraq, at academies and with
some units. Some contemporary observers have suggested — echoing the CPA’s
Ambassador Bremer — that military forces, including MPs, are not optimally suited
to train civilian law enforcement personnel, and have urged the expansion of the IPA
program.369 Some U.S. military officials, while strongly supporting the IPA program,
caution that some IPAs have more relevant backgrounds than others — a police
officer from a relatively quiet U.S. town with a 30-member police force may not have
the background to train and mentor “big city cops” preparing for a counter-
insurgency fight.370
Approaches to police training have varied over time, and by U.S. battle space
in Iraq. In Anbar province, for example, Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W), led
by the Marines, decided early in the effort to triple or quadruple the normal size of
the embedded PTTs. As one commander noted, “You need to be able to leave
Marines at the police station while others are out on patrol.” But by mid-2008,
based on analysis of 109 police stations, MNF-W concluded that around-the-clock
PTT presence at the level of the local station was no longer necessary.371
In general, by mid-2008, the focus of the police training effort had shifted, in
many locations, from basic policing to the professionalization of the force. As local
police mastered basic skills such as carrying out patrols, PTTs increasingly
emphasized higher-end skills, including police intelligence and forensics. To help
with this new focus, for example, in summer 2008, MNF-W brought in experts from
the Royal Irish Constabulary.372
Defense Ministry Transition Teams. For Ministry of Defense forces, the
Iraqi Navy is supported by a Maritime Strategic Transition Team (MaSTT) advising
368 See Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.43.
369 See for example the Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of
Iraq, September 6, 2007, p.18, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
The Commission noted: “U.S. military officers rather than senior civilian law enforcement
personnel lead the Coalition training effort for the Iraqi Police Service; this arrangement has
inadvertently marginalized civilian police advisors and limited the overall effectiveness of
the training and advisory effort.” “... The number of civilian international police advisors
is insufficient.” DOD apparently agrees — and refers to the low level of funding for, and
availability of, IPAs.
370 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.
371 Interviews with MNF-W officials, January and August 2008.
372 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, and MNF-I subordinate commanders, August 2008.

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the headquarters, and a Naval Transition Team (NaTT) embedded with sailors at the
Umm Qasr Naval Base. The Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT) provides
advisory teams to the Iraqi Air Staff, Air Operations Center, and individual
squadrons.
For the Iraqi Army, as of June 2008 there were 176 Military Transition Teams
(MiTTs) working with Iraqi units from battalion to division level.373 At the Iraqi
division level, the standard pattern calls a 15-member team led by a Colonel (or
equivalent); at the brigade level — a 10-member team led by a Lieutenant Colonel;
and at the battalion level — an 11-member team led by a Major. The teams, though
small, include a wide array of specializations — including intelligence, logistics,
maneuver trainers, effects, communications, and medical expertise.374
The MiTTs — like the PTTs — have varied, over time and by battle space, in
number and composition. MNF-W consistently chose to use larger MiTTs — with
30 to 40 people.375 In some instances, U.S. Army MiTTs have also been augmented
to form larger teams.
In 2008, one major transition in the Iraqi Army training effort was a shift of
focus from basic skills to enablers. MNC-I Commanding General LTG Austin made
ISF logistics a top priority. To that end, MNC-I created Logistics Transition
Assistance Teams (LTATs), drawing on Corps assets, to help jumpstart the
development of Iraqi Army logistics capabilities. In mid-2008, U.S. commanders
also stressed the Iraqi Army’s continuing need for combat enablers, such as ISR, and
the ability to call forward and adjust fires.376
A second major transition was a shift of focus from lower-level to higher-level
Iraqi headquarters. Both U.S. Army- and Marine-led multi-national divisions are
shifting some of their advisory efforts to the Iraqi brigade and division level, focusing
on leadership and staff organization.377
A third transition was the shift, in the rhetoric of U.S. commanders, from
“training” to “advising.” In practice, that can mean decreasing the rank of the
373 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.53.
374 IAG and other officials note that it would be difficult to streamline the teams any further,
given their small size and the array of expertise they include.
375 Interviews with MNF-W officials, January and August 2008. The Marines argue that this
approach to training helps explain the success to date of the “two best Iraqi Army divisions”
— the 1st and the 7th, which were established in Anbar province.
376 Interviews with MNC-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008.
377 Interviews with MNC-I subordinate commanders, August 2008. MNF-W noted that as
early as February or March 2008, based on the improved capabilities of the Iraqi Army, they
wanted to “de-MiTT,” that is, withdraw their teams, from the battalion and brigade level.
One commander said, “It’s time to take the training wheels off of everything Iraqi, to get
them off of the driveway and on to the street.”

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members of the embedded U.S. teams, and assigning them “liaison” rather than
structured training functions.378
The methodology for forming the MiTTs and preparing them for their
assignments has evolved significantly over the short duration of the program.
Initially, in the push to field trainers quickly, teams were pulled together from
individual volunteers and trained at seven different locations in the United States,
without specific standards.
Subsequently, the Army consolidated a training program for Army, Navy, and
Air Force transition team members, under the auspices of the 1st Infantry Division at
Ft. Riley, Kansas. The program included 72 days at Ft. Riley, including 12 days of
inprocessing and 60 days of training, followed by a theater orientation at Camp
Buehring, Kuwait, and then by further counter-insurgency training and hands-on
equipment training at the Phoenix Academy at Camp Taji, Iraq. The program sent
new team leaders out to the field for a brief visit, at the very beginning of their
training at Ft. Riley, and it solicited “lessons learned” from Transition Team
members both mid-tour and at the end of their tours in Iraq.
While the program of preparation improved markedly, the participants were still
individual volunteers, who could come from any occupational specialty. As one
program leader commented, the curriculum at Ft. Riley includes a measure of “move,
shoot, and communicate” skills, as a refresher for all the “professors and protocol
specialists” who volunteer.379
The Marine Corps created a separate program to prepare trainers — the Marine
Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG). Its mission is to “coordinate, form,
train and equip Marine Corps advisor and training teams for current and projected
operations.”380 According to a senior Marine commander in Iraq, the individuals
selected for the program are the “first team,” with recent experience in command or
in combat jobs such as battalion operations officer.381
The majority of MiTTs in Iraq are “external” teams — that is, they come out of
the Ft. Riley and MCTAG systems. However, to help meet demand, about 20% of
the MiTTs are “taken out of hide,” or “internal” — that is, their members are pulled
from U.S. units already serving in Iraq.382
378 For example, MNF-W, led by the Marines, had previously assigned Colonels to lead
teams embedded with Iraqi divisions, but dropped the seniority to Lieutenant Colonel.
379 Conversation with training official, January 2008.
380 See Corporal Margaret Hughes, “USMC Forms MCTAG, Consolidates Reconnaissance
Training,” Marine Corps News, November 14, 2007, available at [http://www.marines.mil/
marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/ad983156332a819185256cb600677af3/2e2ee9165ebacf9a8525
7395006859a2?OpenDocument].
381 Interview with MNF-W official, August 2008.
382 The balance varies both by area and over time — for example, in January 2008, in MND-
Center, a much higher percentage of training teams had been “taken out of hide.” In August,
(continued...)

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The experiences with providing large-scale training to indigenous security
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan prompted debates within the Department of the Army
and DOD more broadly about likely future requirements to provide such training in
general, and, more specifically, the best ways to continue to source the Transition
Team mission in Iraq.383
ISF Training: Unit Partnering
In 2008, in addition to the work of embedded transition teams, the practice of
“unit partnering” — that is, a one-to-one matching between a U.S. unit and an ISF
unit of similar larger size — grew substantially. Unit partnering is an opportunity for
U.S. units to provide an example of how a headquarters functions, how decisions are
made, and how efforts are coordinated. The “lessons” are provided by fellow combat
units that, like their Iraqi partners, practice the “curriculum” daily. Many U.S.
commanders in Iraq describe unit partnering as the opportunity to “show,” not just
“tell.”384 In August 2008, one commander observed that there was “greater energy
from partnering, than from the transition teams.”385
While unit partnering became much more widely institutionalized in 2008, the
practice had been used by some U.S. units in the past. In 2007, for example, in the
turbulent area of Mahmudiyah and Yusufiyah south of Baghdad, Colonel Mike
Kershaw, Commander of the 2nd Brigade of 10th Mountain Division, tasked his entire
field artillery battalion to embed with the 4th Brigade of the 6th Iraqi Army Division
and its battalions. The de facto transition team — 350 soldiers, staff, and all of their
enablers — was far more robust than a MiTT, and had the added value of providing
a visible example of how a U.S. battalion is organized and functions. The results in
terms of Iraqi operational capabilities were apparently positive. Near the end of the
brigade’s tour, COL Kershaw reported, “We really conduct almost no operations
where we do not have Iraqi forces either embedded with us, or where they are in the
lead.”386
382 (...continued)
in its area of responsibility, MND-B had 83 transition teams, of which 53 were external and
30 were internal.
383 Interviews with MNF-I officials, January 2008. The “Iraq” training debate has helped
fuel a larger, on-going debate about sourcing the full array of future training requirements.
Most provocatively, Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl has proposed that the Army create
a permanent, standing Advisor Corps, of 20,000 combat advisors, to develop the security
forces of international partners. The three-star-led Corps would be responsible for doctrine,
training, and employment, and would be prepared to deploy as needed. See John A. Nagl,
“Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps,” The Future
of the U.S. Military Series, Center for a New American Security, CNAS website
[http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?145].
384 Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008.
385 Interview with MNC-I subordinate commander, August 2008.
386 Department of Defense Press Briefing, Colonel Mike Kershaw, Pentagon, October 5,
2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=

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Unit partnering is most common — and the closest “fit” — with the Iraqi Army.
In mid-2008, for example, both Multi-National Division-Center and Multi-National
Division-North assigned a brigade to partner with each Iraqi Army division in their
respective battle spaces.387 Some brigades, in turn, such as the 1st BCT of 10th
Mountain Division in Kirkuk, assigned one battalion to partner with each Iraqi Army
brigade.388 As of mid-2008, across Iraq, some U.S. units were also partnering with
units from other Iraqi security forces — a brigade in Baghdad, for example, described
a growing partnership with the Iraqi police.389 However, unit partnering is both time-
and personnel-intensive, and in some cases operational requirements have not
permitted U.S. forces to unit-partner with all of the ISF in their battle space.390
Like ISF training in general, unit partnering is a dynamic endeavor — it is
designed to boost the capabilities of Iraqi units, and at some stage of improvement
a unit’s need for a close partnership diminishes. As of fall 2008, ISF units had
reached quite varied stages of development — some, in the views of U.S.
commanders, were very proficient, while others had just been formed, and the
Government of Iraq has stated the intention to form still others.
More so than the use of embedded teams, unit partnership requires a robust U.S.
forces presence, and it will become more difficult to practice as U.S. forces in Iraq
draw down. It seems that U.S. commanders, in more widely institutionalizing unit
partnerships in 2008, decided to make maximum use of time and presence remaining
in Iraq — whatever that might be. As one senior commander noted, “If we partner
with the Iraqis for the next six to nine months, then maybe they will be good
enough.”391
386 (...continued)
4053].
387 Interviews with MNC-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008. For a
description of a unit partnership with the Iraqi Army, see Department of Defense News
Briefing, Colonel Tom James, February 22, 2008. COL James’ brigade, the 4th BCT of the
3rd Infantry Division, in northern Babil province under MND-Center, established a robust
partnership with the 8th Iraqi Army Division, with regular leadership contacts at brigade and
division level, in addition to the work of the embedded MiTT teams.
388 Interviews with 1st BCT/10th Mountain officials, August 2008.
389 Interviews with 2nd BCT/101st Airborne Division officials, August 2008.
390 For example, in August 2008, MND-North noted that it would be useful to extend unit
partnering to forces from the Department of Border Enforcement, but that operational
requirements — including ongoing combat operations in Diyala and Ninewah provinces —
had so far made that difficult.
391 Interview with U.S. commander under MNF-I, August 2008.

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Iraqi Security Forces: The Numbers
MNF-I noted that as of August 2008, there were about 592,000 assigned
members of the Iraqi Security Forces.392 The Department of Defense reported that
as of March 19, 2008, the following numbers of Iraqi Security Forces, by category,
had been “authorized” by the Government of Iraq, “assigned” based on payroll data,
and “trained.”393
Table 1. Iraqi Security Forces as of July 31, 2008
Component
Authorized
Assigned
Trained
Ministry of the Interior
Police
333,324
299,170
192,028
National Police
44,263
39,739
50,184
Border Enforcement
47,750
43,073
34,370
Total MoI
425,337
381,982
276,582
Ministry of Defense
Army
171,262
180,296
224,970
Support Forces
15,583
22,069
21,144
Air Force
3,311
1,887
2,246
Navy
1,893
1,872
1,494
Total MoD
192,049
206,124
249,854
Counter-Terrorism Bureau
Special Operations
4,733
3,589
4,564
Total ISF
622,119
591,695
531,000
Source: Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” September 17, 2008.
The three categories — authorized, assigned, and trained — are not a
continuum. Some of those “trained” may not currently be “assigned” — on the
payroll — for example due to casualties, or having left the service for other reasons.
Further, in some cases the numbers “assigned” have outstripped the numbers
“authorized.” In some cases, this due to hirings at the provincial level not yet
approved at the national level.
392 Information from MNF-I, August 2008.
393 The chart does not include Ministry staff. The chart also does not reflect the Facilities
Protection Service (FPS), an armed, uniformed service with about 100,000 members that
provides critical infrastructure protection for ministries and other government organizations.
An anticipated FPS Reform Law is expected to direct the consolidation of the FPS under
the Interior Ministry, but accordingly to MNSTC-I, the consolidation process was
incomplete as of August 2008.

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The overall numbers of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue to grow, driven by
revised estimates by the Government of Iraq of the forces required to provide
security; by provincial-level requests for more police forces; and by the consolidation
of forces from other ministries under the Defense and Interior Ministries.
MNSTC-I and MNF-I estimate that the ISF numbers are likely to grow further
in the future. According to MNSTC-I in August 2008, the GoI’s target size for the
ISF is between 600,000 and 650,000, by the end of 2010.394
Iraqi Security Forces: Evaluating the Results
The total numbers of ISF alone provide only a partial gauge of progress toward
the broadly recognized ultimate goal of independent and self-sustaining Iraqi security
forces. Recent qualitative assessments of capabilities and gaps, by current officials
and outside experts, provide a more complete picture.
Iraqi Security Forces as a Whole. Both internal and external assessments
of the ISF point to growing evidence of demonstrated operational capabilities, but
raise some questions about some institutional capabilities, and thus about how close
Iraqi forces and their oversight ministries are to completely independent and
competent functioning.
Over a year ago, one of the most comprehensive external assessments of the ISF
was carried out by the congressionally mandated Commission on the Security Forces
of Iraq, led by retired Marine Corps General James Jones (the “Jones
Commission”).395 The commission benefitted from the participation of many senior
leaders with years of experience in policing as well as military matters, and from
spending considerable time in Iraq with the ISF. In its September 2007 Report, the
commission concluded, somewhat pessimistically, that “... in the next 12 to 18
394 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008. In its June report, DOD reported that
the ISF was projected to grow to between 601,000 and 646,000 by 2010, see Department of
Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.36.
395 See The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq,
September 6, 2007, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf]. The Report
was required by the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007, Public Law 110-28. Section 1314(e)(2)(A)
mandated DOD to commission an “independent private sector entity” to assess three things:
(i) the readiness of the ISF to assume responsibility for maintaining the territorial integrity
of Iraq, denying international terrorists a safe haven, and bringing greater security to Iraq’s
18 provinces in the next 12 to 18 months, and bringing an end to sectarian violence to
achieve national reconciliation; (ii) the training, equipping, command control and
intelligence capabilities, and logistics capacity of the ISF; and (iii) the likelihood that, given
the ISF’s record of preparedness to date, following years of training and equipping by U.S.
forces, the continued support of U.S. troops would contribute to the readiness of the ISF to
fulfill the missions outlined in clause (i).

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CRS-102
months, there will be continued improvement in their [ISF] readiness and capability,
but not the ability to operate independently.”396
Later that year, retired General Barry McCaffrey concluded that the picture had
improved somewhat, and that the ISF were making operational contributions. He
wrote after the trip that while the Iraqi police were “a mixed bag,” and “much
remains to be done” in the Iraqi Army, overall, the Iraqi Security Forces were “now
beginning to take a major and independent successful role in the war.”397
By early 2008, U.S. commanders on the ground in Iraq were describing an
operationally increasingly competent Iraqi force. As one leader with multiple tours
in Iraq noted, improved ISF capabilities were the single biggest difference between
January 2008 and several years earlier.398 Operationally, another leader observed,
“The Iraqis are holding their ground, responsible for their own turf.”399 Every day,
at MNC-I’s Battle Update Assessment, Division Commanders described to the
MNC-I Commander operations carried out unilaterally, or with coalition tactical
overwatch, by Iraqi forces.
By fall 2008, U.S. commanders on the ground in Iraq were consistently praising
the tactical-level capabilities of their Iraqi counterparts.400 The Department of
Defense argued in June 2008 that in operations in Basra, Mosul and Sadr City, the
ISF “demonstrated their capability to conduct simultaneous extensive operations in
three parts of the country.”401 One senior commander noted, “They can move
themselves around the battlefield.”402
Among Iraqis themselves, there appeared to be a range of views concerning the
readiness of the ISF to operate independently. According to MNC-I, Iraqi operational
commanders stress that they still want a close partnership with U.S. forces.403 In
August 2008, one Iraqi Army division commander asserted that the United States
should maintain combat forces in Iraq for another five years, to work with Iraqi
counterparts.404 In contrast, according to some U.S. officials, the perception of some
senior Iraqi civilian officials is that the ISF are ready, or very nearly ready, to
maintain security independently. At a press conference in September 2008,
seemingly striking a middle path, Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir noted that the
396 Ibid, p. 12.
397 General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (ret), “Visit to Iraq and Kuwait, 5-11 December 2007,
After Action Report,” December 18, 2007.
398 Communication from an MNC-I leader, January 2008.
399 Communication from an MNC-I leader, January 2008.
400 Interviews with MNC-I officials, and subordinate commanders, August 2008.
401 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008.
402 Interview with MNC-I official, August 2008.
403 Interviews with MNC-I officials, August 2008.
404 Interview with Iraqi Army Division Commander, August 2008.

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CRS-103
Government of Iraq expects to have a security force completely able to provide
security to the Iraqi people on its own, by 2011 or the beginning of 2012.405
In the views of many coalition advisors, the biggest long-term challenges faced
by the Iraqi Security Forces as a whole may be institutional, rather than operational.
These include improving ministerial capacity and effectiveness; clarifying chains of
command; and crafting long-term, integrated force modernization plans for personnel
and equipment.
In early fall 2008, MNF-I and MNSTC-I officials stressed the critical
importance of civilian ministerial capacity. The practical challenges of growing and
developing the Iraqi force are likely to continue for many years, they noted. But if
the right, able civilian leadership is in place, they will be able to make needed
decisions and solve problems as they arise.406
Current de facto chains of command within and among the Iraqi Security Forces
reflect the exigencies of the GoI’s ongoing counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts. To
help coordinate the efforts of the various ISF in given geographical areas, the GoI
created regional operations commands that report up directly to the office of the
Prime Minister.407 For some observers, the Prime Minister’s direct access to the
operations commands has raised concerns about potential misuse of the ISF for
personal or even sectarian purposes.
In some cases, the operations command arrangements have created tensions with
provincial-level officials, who would ordinarily exercise greater control over some
provincial-level security forces.408 The arrangements have also created some tensions
with parent ministries in Baghdad — and in particular with the Interior Ministry,
which apparently views the operations commands as “MoD-centric.”409 The
commands also create some practical confusion, since units still rely on their parent
organizations for supplies and logistical support. For example, Baghdad is divided
405 Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir, Multi-National Force-Iraq press conference,
September 10, 2008.
406 Interviews with MNF-I and MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.
407 As a rule, the operations commands cover a single province. An exception is the Samarra
Operations Command, responsible only for the city of Samarra in Salah ad Din province,
which was created in the wake of the Golden Mosque bombing.
408 In August 2008, MNF-W officials noted that in al Anbar province, both the Governor and
members of the Provincial Council were frustrated by their loss of direct influence, after the
Anbar Operations Command was established. MND-N reported similar tensions with
northern province Governors. Also in August 2008 — after the seemingly successful
operations in March of that year — the Governor of Basra expressed frustration that security
control had been taken away from provincial officials. Interviews, August 2008.
409 Interviews with MNC-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008. In August
2008, MND-N, for example, noted that in practice, the Ninewah Operations Command
definitely commanded Iraqi Army forces in the province, but that its relationship with MoI
forces was “less clear.” In Baghdad, since the establishment of the Baghdad Operations
Command, which formally has command over Interior Ministry forces in Baghdad, U.S.
commanders have reported tensions between the BOC and the MoI.

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CRS-104
into two area commands: “Karkh” and “Rusafa.” Under each are two Iraqi Army
(IA) divisions and one National Police (NP) division. Each division staff includes
representative of the IA, NPs, and the Iraqi Police. Both IA and NP brigades fall
under both IA and NP division headquarters. U.S. commanders who work closely
with these Iraqi units report that this Iraqi experiment with jointness works well at
the tactical level, but becomes complicated when units turn to their respective
ministries for support.410
Long-term force modernization planning and execution is another challenge for
the ISF. The current force continues to train and prepare for the ongoing counter-
insurgency fight against Sunni and Shi’a extremists. Eventually, it is envisaged that
the force will shift into a more typical division of labor — and train and equip
themselves accordingly — in which MoD forces focus externally, and the Iraqi
police, backed up by the National Police, provide domestic security.
For civilian and military leaders of the ISF, one major challenge is balancing
near-term security challenges with long-term requirements. In August 2008, Iraqi
ground commanders were focused completely on the current fight, while senior
civilian ministry officials were looking out toward the future division of labor.411 At
a press conference in September 2008, Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir, speaking
about the Iraqi police, stated that “it is their job to protect the citizen and our job to
protect the frontier.”412
By mid-2008, the Iraqi MoD had demonstrated keen interested in buying
equipment for a future, outward-looking force — including tanks and fighter aircraft.
Senior U.S. advisors have expressed concerns about still-nascent Iraqi abilities to
effectively identify, fund, and contract for future requirements. Some add that the
approach of some Iraqi officials appears to be based on traditional “bazaar culture,”
in which the goal is getting the lowest price, with little consideration for long-term
maintenance or interoperability.413
Some coalition advisors have noted that one of the greatest challenges for the
ISF may be overcoming lingering sectarianism. The ISF as a whole is one of the
most powerful national-level Iraqi institutions. A resurgence of sectarianism in the
ranks could potentially turn key tools of the Iraqi government — the capabilities of
its security forces — into potential threats to the unified whole state.414
Some Iraqi government officials, in turn, have expressed concerns about the size
and scope of the ISF compared to other Iraqi government institutions. The more
410 Interviews with MND-B officials, August 2008.
411 Interviews with Iraqi Army commanders, August 2008.
412 Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir, Multi-National Force-Iraq press conference,
September 10, 2008.
413 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.
414 Conversations with coalition advisors, January 2008. See CRS Report RS22093 The
Iraqi Security Forces: The Challenges of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences, by Jeremy
Sharp.

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CRS-105
resources dedicated to the ISF, the more powerful the ISF will become, and the fewer
resources that will be available for other government institutions. One provincial
Governor added, “I fear the ISF. They are recruiting too many people. They are a
big draw on the state budget and they have too much power.”415
Iraqi Army. Both the size and the overall capabilities of the Iraqi Army (IA)
continue to grow. The Department of Defense reported that as of May 1, 2008, the
Iraqi Army had 139 combat battalions conducting operations, with an additional 22
battalions currently planned or in force generation.416 MNSTC-I noted that as of
August 2008, altogether, the IA had 12 division headquarters, 49 brigades, and 170
battalions.417
In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group provided a very cautious overall
assessment of the Army’s capabilities, noting: “The Iraqi Army is making fitful
progress toward becoming a reliable and disciplined fighting force loyal to the
national government.”418 Nine months later, in September 2007, the Jones
Commission noted more positively that the Iraqi Army was increasingly effective at
COIN, and increasingly reliable in general, but that progress among units was
uneven.419
By the end of 2007, coalition commanders in Iraq pointed to further
improvements Iraqi Army operational capabilities. In December 2007, Major
General Joseph Fil, the out-going commander of Multi-National Division-Baghdad
(MND-B), commented on the status of the Baghdad Operational Command, which
has responsibility for Baghdad province and the two Iraqi Army divisions then under
its command. MG Fil noted, “They are making good tactical decisions. They are
planning true operations that involve multiple forces, combined operations that are
frequently intelligence-driven.”420 In January 2008, the Commanding General of
Multi-National Division-North (MND-N), noted that the four different Iraqi Army
divisions he partnered with were “growing in size and capacity every day.” He
commented, “Where we can’t be, they can be, and in many cases we’re conducting
operations with them.”421
415 Interview with Iraqi provincial Governor, August 2008.
416 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.38.
417 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.
418 See James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report,
December 6, 2006, p.12, available at [http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/
report/1206/iraq_study_group_report.pdf].
419 The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September
6, 2007, p. 14, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
420 Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Joseph Fil, December 17, 2007,
available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4107].
421 Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Mark Hertling, January 22, 2008,
available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4124].

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CRS-106
By early 2008, some IA units had also developed the ability to move themselves
across Iraq. As part of Operation Phantom Phoenix, the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Iraqi
Army Division deployed independently, with less than a week’s notice, from Al
Anbar province in the west to Diyala in the east to support combat operations in the
Diyala River Valley.422 According to MNF-I leaders, while not as attention-grabbing
as combat operations, the move demonstrated a different but very important set of
capabilities that Iraqi units will need to master, to operate independently in the
future.423
In August 2008, U.S. commanders noted that most of the IA units that had
participated in operations in Basra, Sadr City, Amarah, Diyala, and Mosul had
performed very well at the tactical level.424 The Commanding General of Multi-
National Force-West (MNF-W), in Anbar province, using a phrase common among
U.S. forces, stated that the IA was not just “Iraqi good enough” — it was “Iraqi very
good.”425
The list of the major developmental challenges faced by the Iraqi Army —
building a strong leadership cadre, and developing key enablers such as logistics —
has remained relatively consistent over time, although commanders and advisors on
the ground point to specific incremental marks of progress in each area.426
Like all the other Iraqi security forces, the Iraqi Army has faced the challenge
of quickly developing a capable leadership cadre. As many U.S. military
commanders in Iraq point out, a basic problem is that leadership abilities depend in
part on experience — their production cannot easily be “accelerated.” The IA’s
leadership challenge may be more acute than that faced by the other security forces,
since it is both large and, unlike the Iraqi Police, a nationally-based service whose
leaders must be able to command diverse mixes of soldiers in all regions of Iraq.
In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group pointed out simply that the Iraqi
Security Forces lacked leadership.427 In September 2007, the Jones Commission also
noted that the Army was “short of seasoned leadership at all levels,” and pointed in
particular to “marginal leadership at senior military and civilian positions both in the
422 See Press Briefing, Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, January 17, 2008, available at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4122].
423 Conversations with MNF-I leaders, January 2008.
424 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, and subordinate commanders, August 2008.
425 Interview with MNF-W, August, 2008.
426 Concerning the consistency of the challenges, see Department of Defense Press Briefing,
Colonel H.R. McMaster, September 13, 2005, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2106]. COL McMaster, describing his partnership
with Iraq Army units in Tal Afar in September 2005, commented that the Iraqi army needed
“... the ability to command and control operations over wide areas ... greater logistical
capabilities ... more experienced and effective leadership....”
427 James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report,
December 6, 2006, available at [http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/
report/1206/ iraq_study_group_report.pdf].

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CRS-107
Ministry of Defense and in the operational commands.”428 In congressional
testimony in January 2008, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Mark Kimmitt
indicated that the most important gap was in mid-level leadership429 — non-
commissioned officers and field grade officers, who are required in far greater
numbers than senior leaders. To help redress the situation, the Iraqi Army launched
several initiatives, including accelerated officer commissioning for university
graduates, waivers to time-in-grade or time-in-service promotion requirements, and
recruitment of former Army officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs).430
It is possible that it will prove easier to generate leaders “on paper,” than to accelerate
generation of leadership qualities.
In practice, the quality of IA leadership varies somewhat. MND-N noted in
August 2008 that the Commanding Generals of the four IA divisions in their area of
responsibility were “very good.”431 One of the more impressive IA leaders, according
to U.S. officials, is Major General Oothman, the Commanding General of the 8th IA
Division, headquartered in Diwaniyah, in Qadisiyah province. In August 2008,
echoing U.S. military counter-insurgency thinking — and helping institutionalize it
in the IA — MG Oothman stated, “Today’s fight is a 360-degree battlefield,” and
explained that “once you clear an area, you have to put in Iraqi Police, the Iraqi Army
and coalition forces to hold it.”432
On the other hand, MND-B officials noted that leadership selection processes
varied in quality. In August 2008, the newly selected commanding general of the
newly formed 17th IA division was a well-regarded, competent brigade commander
— a good choice. But in some other cases, MND-B officials noted, the choices have
been “terrible” — reflections not of competence but of political connections that
make the selected leaders “untouchable” by their military chains of command.433
Another major challenge to the continued progress of the Iraqi Army is
developing key enablers, ranging from intelligence to logistics — which are
absolutely essential to an Army’s ability to operate independently.434
428 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.14 and p.9, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
429 Mark Kimmitt, Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, January 17, 2007.
430 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.51.
431 Interview with MND-N, August 2008.
432 Interview with MG Oothman, August 2008.
433 Interview with MND-B officials, August 2008.
434 Virtually every famous military commander in history has made note of the crucial role
of logistics — some of them quite memorably. Alexander the Great is credited with
observing, “My logisticians are a humorous lot — they know that if my campaign fails, they
are the first ones I will slay.”

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CRS-108
In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group pointed out that the Iraqi Army lacked
logistics and support to sustain their own operations.435 Later, in September 2007,
the Jones Commission called logistics the Army’s “Achilles’ heel,” and observed:
“The lack of logistics experience and expertise within the Iraqi armed forces is
substantial and hampers their readiness and capability.”436 The Commission further
concluded that the Army would continue to rely on coalition forces for combat
support and combat service support — though the Commission did not estimate for
how long that reliance would continue.
Testifying before Congress in January 2008, then-MNSTC-I Commander LTG
Dubik agreed that the Army “... cannot fix, supply, arm or fuel themselves
completely enough at this point.”437 As of March 2008, the Army was able to feed
itself — a key component of life support. As of June 2008, the Army’s maintenance
backlog continued, but the backlog had been “stabilized” and the IA had better
visibility than previously on what needs to be repaired.438 As of August 2008, the IA
was continuing to develop a national-level maintenance and supply system, including
the new National Depot at Taji, to serve as the “centerpiece” for national supply and
maintenance services. The Depot is scheduled to be completed by mid-2009 — a
target date that has slipped several times.439
In June 2008, MNC-I Commanding General Lieutenant General Austin
confirmed that the IA still had substantial room for improvement:
There are still some things that need to be done, and those things include
developing combat enablers that will enable them to do things like call for and
adjust fires and integrate those fires into their formation, support themselves
logistically, use their own intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to
create intelligence and then be able to use that intelligence to plan operations.
So there’s some work to be done yet.440
Iraqi counterparts agree with this assessment. In August 2008, MG Oothman
stated flatly, “I see no progress in logistics.” He explained that the Iraqi Army started
building its forces by concentrating first on operations, not on logistics or other
435 James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report,
December 6, 2006, available at [http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/
1206/iraq_study_group_ report.pdf].
436 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.14 and p.13, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
437 Lieutenant General James Dubik, testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, Washington, D.C., January 17, 2008.
438 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.51.
439 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.39.
4 4 0 See DOD News Br i ef i ng, LT G Aust i n, J une 2 3 , 2 0 0 8,
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4248].

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enablers, such as repairing HMMWVVs, or providing spare parts, or building
military hospitals.441
Iraqi Air Force. As of July 31, 2008, the Iraqi Air Force had 1,887 personnel
on its payrolls, up from 1,300 in March 2008, out of 3,300 authorized personnel.442
According to MNSTC-I, the plan is for the Air Force to grow to 6,000 personnel by
December 2009.443
As of August 2008, the small Iraqi fleet included 74 aircraft: 16 UH-1HP
“Huey-II” helicopters and 15 Ukrainian Mi-17 helicopters for battlefield mobility;
3 C-130E “Hercules” aircraft and 1 King Air 350 light transport aircraft, for airlift;
3 Cessna Grand Caravans, 8 CH-2000 aircraft, and 2 King Air 350’s for ISR; and 8
Cessna 172’s, 3 Cessna 208’s, 5 Bell Jet Rangers and 10 OH-58A/C’s for training.
The Iraqi Air Force plans to have a fleet of 123 aircraft by December 2009.444
By any measure, the Iraqi Air Force is still a fledgling institution in the early
stages of recruiting, training, and development. The effort to develop the Iraqi Air
Force in earnest began at the start of 2007, and coalition advisors note that it takes
three to five years to train pilots, air traffic controllers, and maintenance personnel
— longer than it takes to train ground forces.
The initial — and exclusive — focus of Iraqi Air Force training was counter-
insurgency, including first of all battlefield mobility. In September 2007, the Jones
Commission assessed that the Air Force was “well designed as the air component to
the existing counterinsurgency effort, but not for the future needs of a fully capable
air force.”445 By August 2008, MNSTC-I noted that Air Force training had expanded
to include “kinetic air to ground attack capability,” and ISR capabilities.446
In August 2008, the Iraqi Air Force was flying about 230 sorties per week, up
from about 150 sorties per week one year earlier. The number had fallen slightly
from a peak of over 300 sorties per week, in April and May of 2008, due to a
441 Interview with MG Oothman, August 2008. MG Oothman tells a story about the
consequences of the lack of military hospitals: During military operations in al Kut, against
Shi’a extremist militias, a young Army Lieutenant was wounded in the fight. He was sent
to the local community hospital in al Kut. But the loyalties of that hospital staff were
apparently not with the national government. They picked up the Lieutenant and put him
on the floor, without treating him, so that they could tend to a wounded militia member. The
Lieutenant died.
442 Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” September 17, 2008.
443 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.
444 Interviews with MNSTC-I, August 2008.
445 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.9,15, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
446 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.

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combination of weather, sustainment challenges, and the grounding of Cessna 172s
used for training.447
In 2008, regular Air Force training was augmented by real-world experience
supporting Iraqi Army operations. During the Basra operations in March 2008, the
Iraqi Air Force flew 353 missions, transporting personnel and cargo, dropping
leaflets providing information to the local population, and helping provide ISR.448
An open question for the future is what sort of air force — with what
capabilities, personnel, and equipment — the Iraqi Ministry of Defense will
determine it needs, to meet its full spectrum of security requirements. In February
2008, then-Commander of the Coalition Air Force Transition Team, Air Force Major
General Robert Allardice, noted that like all of Iraq’s MoD forces, the Iraqi Air
Force is eventually expected to turn its attention to external threats. The final stage
of development would include the use of jet aircraft to defend Iraq’s air space. He
estimated that Iraqis could have a self-sustaining Air Force with that capability “in
about the 2011 or 2012 timeframe,” depending on the investments they make.449
Other senior U.S. officials have raised questions about the capabilities that a
future, externally focused Iraqi Air Force might really need. One official suggested
that air defense capabilities may be more important than fighter aircraft. One
challenge, he added, is that Iraqi Air Force senior leaders are former fighter pilots
eager to have a fleet of fighter aircraft.450
A number of senior U.S. officials point out that most senior Ministry of Defense
officials have an Army background — the Minister of Defense himself is a former
tanker. That background, officials argue, together with the exigencies of the ongoing
COIN fight, leaves them with relatively little time and attention for guiding the long-
term development of their air and maritime services.451
Iraqi Navy. Like the Iraqi Air Force, the Iraqi Navy is still in the early stages
of development. As of July 31, 2008, the Iraqi Navy included 1,872 assigned
personnel, of 1,893 authorized.452 That number includes 499 former Iraqi Army
soldiers, who joined the Iraqi Navy to form the 2nd Iraqi Navy Marine Battalion. The
small Navy is based primarily in the southern port city of Umm Qasr, and includes
447 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.
448 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, pp.56-7.
449 Brig. Gen. Robert R. Allardice, Council on Foreign Relations, interview by Greg Bruno,
February 5, 2008, audio tape available at [http://www.cfr.org/publication/15421/allardice.
html?breadcrumb=%2Fregion% 2F405%2Firaq].
450 Interview with MNF-I official, August 2008. The initial interest expressed by Iraqi MoD
officials in F-16’s, in summer 2008, seemed to reflect this perspective.
451 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.
452 Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” September 17, 2008.

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an operational headquarters, one squadron afloat, one support squadron, and two
battalions of Marines.453
The missions of the Iraqi Navy as a whole include protecting Iraq’s coastline
and offshore assets. One of the Marine battalions provides port security at Um Qasr
and Az Zubayr. The other Marine battalion provides oil platform security and
conducts vessel boarding and search and seizure. As of July 2008, the Iraqi Navy
was conducting a total of 42 patrols per week. As of August 2008, the fleet included
15 vessels — 5 small patrol boats, and 10 fast assault boats. The Iraqi Navy expects
to acquire an additional 21 vessels in 2009-2010.454
One challenge the Iraqi Navy faces, according to MNSTC-I officials, is
conducting the preparations required to more than double its fleet — ensuring that
the infrastructure is in place, and the proper training conducted.
A longer-term challenge for the Iraqi Navy, and the MoD, is crafting a realistic
and appropriate “future force vision” for the Navy. U.S. advisors note that, like the
Air Force, the Navy faces the challenge of working for a Ministry that does not see
their Service as a high priority, and that may not be “sophisticated enough” to define
requirements and build a Navy. Iraqi Navy officials themselves are reportedly eager
to continue working with coalition advisors, and do not want to build a force that
would be likely to lead them into conflict.455
Iraqi Special Operations Forces. Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF)
were an early priority for Iraqi and coalition forces leaders. As of July 31, 2008,
ISOF included 3,589 assigned personnel, of 4,733 authorized.456 As of August 2008,
the single ISOF brigade included one counter-terrorism battalion and five commando
battalions, as well as support units. Four regional commando battalions are currently
in generation, to be based in Basra, Mosul, Diyala, and Al Asad.457
According to both U.S. commanders in Iraq and outside assessments, the ISOF
are extremely competent.458 Since ISOF’s inception, the selection process has
reportedly been very competitive, and training — conducted by U.S. SOF — highly
demanding.459 In September 2007, the Jones Commission reported, “The Special
453 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.55.
454 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.
455 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.
456 Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status Report, September 17, 2008.
457 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.
458 Communications from MNC-I leaders and Division Commanders, January 2008.
459 See for example Monte Morin, “Turning Iraqi Recruits into Commandos,” Stars and
Stripes, March 14, 2006.

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Operations brigade is highly capable and extremely effective.”460 In August 2008,
a senior MNSTC-I official confirmed, “ISOF is very capable, and increasingly so.”461
ISOF has its own chain of command, separate from the Ministry of Defense.
It reports to the Counter-Terrorism Command (CTC), an operational-level command
that reports, in turn, to the Counter-Terrorism Bureau (CTB), the ministerial-level
body under the Prime Minister that sets policy. Although this is not an uncommon
arrangement in the region, one possible issue for Iraqi leaders in the future will be
ensuring adequate integration of the ISOF and Iraqi conventional forces. Other
observers have expressed concern that the ISOF, despite its several layers of
headquarters, might be used by the Prime Minister for personal or political ends.
Looking ahead, the next practical challenges for the ISOF include continuing to
improve its capabilities. U.S. advisors note that the ISOF is eager to have access to
the assets they have seen U.S. SOF counterparts employ, including specialized rotary
air assets, ISR, and signals intelligence (SIGINT). One official noted in August
2008, “They’re more conscious than others of how much they need US enablers.”462
Iraqi Police Service. The Iraqi Police Service includes three categories —
patrol police, station police, and traffic police. All are based on the principle of local
recruitment and local service. The GoI’s broad future vision is that the Iraqi Police
(IPs) will eventually assume responsibility for providing internal security, backed up
by the National Police, while the Iraqi Army turns its focus toward external security
challenges.
As of July 31, 2008, 299,170 Iraqi Police (IPs) were assigned, of 333,324
authorized. At that date, 192,028 personnel had been trained, leaving a training
backlog of over 100,000.463 (The backlog could be greater, since not all of those
trained are necessarily still serving as IPs.) The backlog has real-world implications
— for example, a shortage of IPs, in August 2008, to help “hold” areas of Diyala
province that had been cleared by Iraqi and coalition forces. As one senior U.S.
official noted, “We’ve overwhelmed the system.”464
According to MNSTC-I, the GoI intent is to catch up on the training backlog by
July 2009. One approach has been to condense required training into a shorter period
— the 240 hours of IP training usually take eight weeks but have been compressed
into four weeks. In addition, recruits who already have a degree in another field are
offered an accelerated process.465
460 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.16, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
461 Interview with MNSTC-I official, August 2008.
462 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.
463 Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status Report, September 17, 2008.
464 Interview with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.
465 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.

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In terms of IP capabilities, in September 2007, the Jones Commission concluded
that the IPs were improving at the local level, particularly when the IPs were locally
recruited from relatively ethnically homogenous neighborhoods.466 In December
2007, General McCaffrey similarly observed that “many local units are now
effectively providing security and intelligence penetration of their neighborhoods.”467
In early 2008, a number of U.S. military commanders in Iraq described recent
examples of specific operations planned and carried out in their areas of
responsibility by Iraqi Police, stressing that these capabilities to plan and act
independently — and successfully — had emerged relatively recently. Commanders
also stressed the importance of the visible presence of the IPs at police stations and
on patrol in local neighborhoods, and together with Iraqi Army and coalition forces
at joint security stations, in helping provide population security.468
By early fall 2008, U.S. commanders noted that in general, the IPs were
competent in basic skills — enough that the focus of embedded training and advisory
efforts, and unit partnering, was shifting from basic policing skills to the
professionalization of the force.469 In Baghdad, the GoI and MND-B were in the
process of handing over security responsibility, neighborhood by neighborhood, to
the IPs. As one U.S. commander observed in August 2008, using common coalition
parlance, the IPs are “Iraqi good enough.”470
For their part, in early fall 2008, Iraqi Army commanders recognized the
importance of the IPs as part of the total effort, but still had some doubts about their
capabilities. As one IA commander observed, “Without coordination between the
IA and the IPs, there would be no security. But,” he added, “the soldiers are more
effective than the police.”471
One long-standing concern of practitioners and observers, still unresolved, is
infiltration of the IPs. In September 2007, the Jones Commission noted that the IPs
were “... incapable today of providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi
neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence,” in part because they were
466 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.9, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
467 General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (ret), “Visit to Iraq and Kuwait, 5-11 December 2007,
After Action Report,” December 18, 2007.
468 Information from U.S. commanders, January 2008. In one example, the local IP
commander briefed the multi-national division commander in detail on the IPs’ plans for the
upcoming Ashura holiday. The plans included some coalition ISR assets — requested at the
initiate of the IPs.
469 Interviews with MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I officials, and subordinate commanders,
August 2008.
470 Interview with MNC-I subordinate commander, August 2008.
471 Interview with Iraqi division commander, August 2008.

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“compromised by militia and insurgent infiltration.”472 In June 2008, DOD stated
that “militia and criminal intimidation and influences” were among the serious
challenges still faced by the IPs.473 In August 2008, U.S. military officials confirmed
that “there’s some terrorist and some nationalist infiltration” of the IPs.474
Iraqi National Police. The Iraqi National Police (NPs), unlike the IPs, are
intended to be a national asset, not a regionally-based one. While they initially
focused on Baghdad, the Interior Ministry’s plan is that the NPs will “regionalize,”
eventually establishing a presence in every province, where they will provide backup
for the IPs.475 DOD reported in June 2008 that Prime Minister Maliki had directed
the formation of a new, third NP division, to be based in Salah ad Din province.476
As of early fall 2008, the NPs were still generally based in Baghdad, under the
Baghdad Operations Command.
The Department of Defense reported that as of June 2008, 44 NP battalions were
operational, of which11 were judged to be “capable of planning, executing, and
sustaining operations with coalition support.”477 As of July 31, 2008, there were
39,739 National Police assigned, of 44,263 authorized. Somewhat confusingly,
50,184 National Police had been trained — this number may include some who were
removed from service or are no longer serving for other reasons.478
Particularly in their early days, the NPs more consistently prompted concerns
about competence, corruption, and sectarian bias, than any other Iraqi security force.
In June 2007, out-going MNSTC-I Commander Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey
testified to Congress that the NPs were “the single organization in Iraq with the most
sectarian influence and sectarian problems.”479 In September 2007, the Jones
Commission stated flatly: “The National Police have proven operationally
ineffective. Sectarianism in its units undermines its ability to provide security; the
force is not viable in its current form.”480
Outside experts suggested several possible remedies. The Iraq Study Group
recommended moving the NPs from the Interior Ministry to the Ministry of Defense,
472 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.18,10, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
473 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008.
474 Interview with MNC-I subordinate commander, August 2008.
475 Information from MNSTC-I officials, January and August 2008.
476 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.45.
477 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.38.
478 Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” September 17, 2008.
479 Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, testimony to the House Armed Services
Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, June 12, 2007, audio transcript
available at [http://www.house.gov/hasc/hearing_information.shtml].
480 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.20, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].

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and giving them closer supervision.481 The Jones Commission recommended
disbanding the NPs altogether.482
The Iraqi leadership opted for a different approach. One step was replacing NP
senior leaders. Between late 2006 and January 2008, both of the NP division
commanders, all 9 brigade commanders, and about 18 of 28 battalion commanders
were replaced.483 The other major step was retraining — or “re-bluing” — both
leaders and ranks, with the help of Italy’s Carabinieri, under the rubric of the NATO
Training Mission-Iraq.
In early 2008, some U.S. commanders in Iraq confirmed that there had been
serious problems with the NPs, and suggested that the leadership changes and re-
education had so far produced mixed results. As one Brigade Commander noted,
“The National Police have been terrible!”484 One Division Commander praised the
work of one NP brigade in solving problems in his area of responsibility, while
noting that another NP brigade actually is the problem.485 One coalition leader
credits Iraqi National Police Commander Major General Hussein with recognizing
the challenges the NPs faced and with making this remark: “The National Police has
two enemies — the insurgency, and our own reputation.”486
In August 2008, MNSTC-I noted that the re-bluing process had been accelerated
by boosting capacity from 450 to 900 students at a time. MNSTC-I added that the
new NP commander is a “tremendous officer.”487 U.S. commanders in Baghdad
added that the NPs were being used very much like the Iraqi Army forces. One
official added that the NPs were “pretty damned good!”488
Looking ahead, one future challenge for the Iraqi National Police will be
transitioning from an Army-like counter-insurgency role to a high-end policing
function.
Department of Border Enforcement. The Department of Border
Enforcement (DBE) faces the daunting task of protecting Iraq’s 3,650 kilometers of
481 See James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report,
December 6, 2006, available at [http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/
report/1206/iraq_study_group_ report.pdf].
482 See Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September
6, 2007, p.20, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
483 Lieutenant General James Dubik, testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, Washington, D.C., January 17, 2008. LTG Dubik pointed out that “ten out of
nine” brigade commanders were replaced, since two changes were made to one brigade’s
command.
484 Information from Brigade Commander, Baghdad, January 2008.
485 Information from Division Commander, January 2008.
486 Information from MNF-I staff, January 2008.
487 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.
488 Interviews with MND-B officials, August 2008.

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land borders, some of it rugged and mountainous, against apparent infiltration by
extremists from some neighbor countries, as well as controlling the usual flow of
cross-border traffic.
As of July 31, 2008, the DBE had 43,073 assigned personnel, of 47,750
authorized, and of whom only 34,370 had been trained.489 They were organized into
12 brigades with 44 total battalions. The training gap — and the relatively low level
of training in general — impinge on the DBE’s effectiveness.490 Given the ratio of
distances to personnel, and the current capabilities of those personnel, the DBE —
as DOD put it in December 2007 — is “stretched thin.”491 The Jones Commission
stated it more flatly in September 2007: “Iraq’s borders are porous.”492 The numbers
and capabilities of the DBE do not appear to have progressed substantially since that
time.
The Iraqi Government’s proposed way forward, over three years, includes
constructing up to 684 border forts, to establish a line-of-sight perimeter, and
increasing the use of biometric scan systems and personal information databases.493
Some U.S. officials complain that the MoI does very little to support the DBE
and that, in the words of one U.S. commander, the DBE is “grossly under-funded.”
For example, in al Anbar province, instead of giving the DBE fuel, the MoI provided
money to buy fuel. But at the long, remote border, the only fuel available for
purchase was from the black market, which cost double the market price.494
Both coalition advisors and outside assessments have pointed out that the DBE
continues to face additional challenges from corruption. In early 2008, coalition
officials in Iraq agreed with the assessments by the Jones Commission that the DBE
is infiltrated by outside interests, and that some members are apparently involved in
cross-border smuggling.495
Ministry of the Interior. Both coalition advisors and outside assessments
have consistently pointed to two serious shortcomings in the Ministry of Interior
(MoI) itself: a lack of capacity and corruption.
Capacity challenges apparently plague most of the Ministry’s activities. The
Department of Defense reported in June 2008: “Coalition advisors continue to report
489 Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status Report, September 17, 2008.
490 Information from coalition advisors, January 2008.
491 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2007.
492 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.20, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
493 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.45.
494 Interviews with MNC-I officials, subordinate commanders, August 2008.
495 Information from MNF-I officials, January 2008, and Report of the Independent
Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6, 2007, p.20, available at
[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].

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steady but uneven improvement in the MoI’s ability to perform key ministry
functions, such as force management, personnel management, acquisition, training,
logistics and sustainment, and the development and implementation of plans and
policies.”496
One particularly serious constraint, according to coalition officials, is that the
Ministry of Interior lacks sufficient capacity to process the large and growing demand
for personnel — to screen recruits, to train them, and to continue to account for
them.497 To address this shortcoming, the Ministry is expanding the capacity of its
training base to include 12 new training centers and the expansion of eight existing
ones; rapidly generating officers through a recall and training program for former
army and police officers; and improving personnel accountability in part with a
proposed new automated pay system.498 According to MNSTC-I, an additional
pressure on the MoI training system was the absorption, in early 2008, of the “oil
police,” whose training to guard pipelines did not, in the words of one official, turn
them into “LA cops.”499
Corruption — and the perception of corruption — may be the even more
difficult challenge for the MoI to eradicate. In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group
concluded flatly that the MoI was corrupt. In September 2007, the Jones
Commission assessed that “... sectarianism and corruption are pervasive in the MoI,”
and that the Ministry is “... widely regarded as being dysfunctional and sectarian.”500
In January 2008, one coalition advisor stated bluntly that the MoI is filled with “card-
carrying gangsters.”501
The MoI has apparently taken some steps to battle internal corruption. The
Department of Defense reported that in 2007, the MoI had opened 6,652
investigations of ministry personnel. Of these, 6,159 were closed during 2007,
including 1,112 that resulted in firings, 438 in disciplinary actions, and 23 in forced
retirement.502
496 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.40.
497 Interviews with coalition advisors, January and August 2008.
498 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.43.
499 Interview with MNSTC-I official, August 2008.
500 See James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report,
December 6, 2006, available at [http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_
report/report/1206/iraq_study_group_report.pdf], and Report of the Independent
Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6, 2007, p.17, available at
[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
501 Comment by coalition advisor, January 2008.
502 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008. During
the first six months of 2008, DOD reported, the MoI Directorate of Internal Affairs opened
2,329 cases. During the first quarter of 2008, it closes 2,523 cases, from which 377
employees were fired, and 297 were disciplined, see DOD, “Measuring Stability and
Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.40.

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Ministry of Defense. In September 2007, the Jones Commission concluded
that the Ministry of Defense (MoD) suffered from “bureaucratic inexperience,
excessive layering, and over-centralization.”503 In June 2008, the Department of
Defense noted some progress: “The MoD shows continued, but slow, progress to
refine and institutionalize its internal processes, eliminate corruption, strengthen
cross-MoD/JHQ [Joint Headquarters] relationships and more effectively engage with
other Iraqi ministries and other countries.” But DOD concluded that “the MoD needs
to do more to be fully self-reliant.”504
In early 2008, MNF-I officials suggested that compared to other Iraqi ministries,
the MoD is a model of progress — it has not faced the magnitude of corruption
endemic at the MoI, and with close advisory support from the coalition, it has made
substantial progress in both management and strategic planning.505
One major future challenge for the Ministry of Defense is likely to be clarifying
and rationalizing the chain of command. As the Jones Commission stated in
September 2007: “Parallel lines of direct communication to military units have been
established under the control of the Prime Minister. He is perceived by many as
having created a second, and politically-motivated, chain of command.”506 U.S.
military officials confirmed this assessment in August 2008, and DOD noted in June
2008 that “the lines of authority remain confused and do not fully allow for full unity
of command.”507
As of early fall 2008, Iraqi Army divisions reported to the Iraqi Ground Forces
Command, which reported to the Joint Headquarters, which reported in turn to the
MoD. However, some forces, from both the MoD and the MoI, fall under provincial
Operations Commands, usually led by a General Officer from the Iraqi Army, which
may report in practice directly to the office of the Prime Minister. Both ministries
and uniformed operational headquarters, according to U.S. commanders in Iraq, are
sometimes left out of the de facto chain of command.
Operations Commands are in theory a temporary measure, designed to closely
integrate the counter-insurgency efforts by all of the ISF in a given geographical area.
Commands have been established in the provinces of Baghdad, Basrah, Karbala,
503 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, pp.9,12, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
504 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008, p.48.
505 Conversations with MNF-I officials, January 2008.
506 Conversations with MNF-I officials, January 2008, and Report of the Independent
Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6, 2007, pp.13, available at
[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
507 Interviews with MNF-I and MNSTC-I officials, and subordinate commanders, August
2008, and Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2008,
p.48.

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Anbar, Ninewah, Diyala, and (as an exception) in the city of Samarra.508 Some U.S.
and Iraqi commanders have suggested the possibility that Operations Commands
might evolve into three-star Army Corps headquarters, perhaps with a geographic
reach wider than a single province.509 As of early fall 2008, no plans were in place
for such a transition. Further, while the “Corps” concept might be appropriate to the
current internal counter-insurgency fight, an externally focused Army would not
ordinarily “own battle space” domestically.
Another challenge for the MoD to resolve, according to MNSTC-I officials, is
centralized decision-making. As of August 2008, the vast majority of decisions were
channeled personally to the Minister, which hinders efficient functioning. A
MNSTC-I official noted that the premise seems to be, “If you don’t make a decision,
you can’t get in trouble.”510
One further challenge, according to MNSTC-I officials, is the MoD’s difficulty
in identifying requirements, budgeting for them, and obligating and spending the
required funds. In 2006 and 2007, GoI spending on the ISF exceeded spending by
the Iraqi Security Forces Fund, and that trend is projected to continue. The MoD
remains hampered, according to MNSTC-I, by the fact that their “direct contracting
capability is not fully developed.”511
Iraqi Population: “Reconciliation”
A central tenet of counter-insurgency is reaching out to the local population and
securing at least their acceptance, if not their active support.
In Iraq, a number of U.S. military commanders have pointed to changes in the
attitudes and behavior of the Iraqi population as the most important difference
between 2008 and earlier periods. In December 2007, for example, the out-going
commander of Multi-National Division-Baghdad, Major General Joseph Fil, noted:
“I attribute a great deal of the security progress to the willingness of the population
to step forward and band together against terrorist and criminal militia.”512
508 Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008.
509 Interviews with U.S. and Iraqi military officials, August 2008. The commander of the
Basra Operations Command mused that the BaOC might evolve into a Corps headquarters
for the adjoining provinces of Muthanna and Maysan as well as Basra but noted that this
was just an idea.
510 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.
511 Interviews with MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.
512 Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Joseph Fil, Pentagon, December
17, 2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
4107]. His comments echoed H.R. McMaster’s assessment of the role of local population
in 3ACR’s successful COIN operations in Tal Afar in 2005.

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Coalition and Iraqi government efforts to reach out to the Iraqi population have
increasingly fallen under the broad semantic rubric of “reconciliation.” As of 2008,
the term is very broadly used — from U.S. national strategy, to congressional
legislation, to the names of Iraqi government structures and of offices and job titles
in coalition headquarters.513 The term is variously used, but in the broadest sense, it
refers to a multi-lateral reconciliation among all sub-groups and members of Iraqi
society, except the self-designated truly “irreconcilables” and those who may have
disqualified themselves by some egregious action.
In practice, “reconciliation” in Iraq has taken a number of forms, several of
which, discussed below, have played critical roles in shaping the security climate.
Coalition Outreach to the Disaffected
Early in OIF, coalition forces recognized the importance of reaching out to
disaffected Iraqi communities, but coalition efforts were constrained by lack of
expertise, limited resources, and — initially — policy decisions.
In 2003, some CPA and CJTF-7 leaders recognized the importance and the
complexity of tribal dynamics in Iraq.514 As coalition forces commanders on the
ground throughout Iraq frequently engaged with local tribal leaders, it rapidly became
apparent that the coalition lacked detailed expertise in tribal history and dynamics.
The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) — the first national-level advisory body,
established by CPA in July 2003 — included very little tribal representation.515
In summer 2003, coalition forces launched a concerted outreach effort to Sunni
Arab communities in the restive “Sunni Triangle” in central and north-central Iraq.
On August 7, 2003, CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid convened
community leaders from throughout the region to urge them to cease all tacit support
for insurgents, in exchange for future assistance with reconstruction needs, political
representation, and other concerns.516 However, for most of the rest of that year, the
very limited presence of coalition civilian experts in these provinces, and limited
resources for reconstruction, made it difficult to fully implement the proposed
“bargain.”
By early 2004, CPA established an outreach office, to engage directly with both
tribal leaders and leaders of other disaffected groups, including some religious
513 At the national level in Iraq, the key agency is the Implementation and Follow-up
Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR), appointed by Prime Minister Maliki.
514 For information about Iraqi tribes, see CRS Report RS22626, Iraq: Tribal Structure,
Social and Political Activities (archived), by Hussein Hassan.
515 Some members of CPA admitted that gaining a complete understanding of tribal
dynamics and capturing them adequately in the IGC, in a very short time frame, was simply
too complex, and the risks of error too great. Conversations with CPA officials, 2003.
516 See Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story, New York: Harper, 2008,
see pp.238-9. Sanchez describes joining Abizaid to meet with tribal leaders and other
community leaders, province by province.

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extremists. Also in early 2004, U.S. national leadership crafted a series of “Sunni
engagement strategies” that included “carrots” such as greater political
representation, economic assistance, and detainee releases.
By 2005, coalition leaders in Iraq began to pursue more direct contacts with
insurgents and their supporters — in coordination with, and often brokered by, Iraqi
leaders. As a rule, those talks were reportedly based on a familiar theme — a
cessation of violent action against Iraqis and the coalition, in exchange for benefits
that might include amnesty for some detainees, and improved opportunities to
participate politically or economically in Iraqi society.517
Some critics have suggested that “negotiating” with known or suspected
perpetrators of violence is an ethically ambiguous practice that, moreover, is unlikely
to succeed because it depends for its success on commitments by those who have
violated the rule of law.
Coalition leaders confirm that they understand who these interlocutors are. In
December 2007, MNF-I official Major General Paul Newton, a UK officer leading
the outreach effort, commented, “Do we talk to people with blood on their hands? I
certainly hope so. There is no point in us talking to people who haven’t.”518 As an
MNC-I senior official with considerable experience in Iraq described it in early 2008,
“You reconcile with your enemy, not with your friend.”519
In the view of some participants and observers, what may have distinguished the
2007 outreach from earlier efforts was a change in the perceptions of insurgents and
would-be insurgents about their own prospects. As the MNC-I senior official added,
“You can only reconcile with an enemy when he feels a sense of hopelessness.”520
As MNF-I officials described it in 2008, “At some point, fatigue sets in, and
expediency brings them to the table.”
By 2008, as described by senior MNF-I officials, the outreach effort included
not only Sunni insurgents, the main focus, but also Shi’a extremists. The levers
available to the coalition to offer included possible restoration of stipends, possible
restoration of a post in the ISF, or agreements that the person agreeing to “reconcile”
will not be killed. The GoI is “part of the management” of the reconciliation
initiatives. One of the challenges to the effort, MNF-I officials note, is the possibility
that some members of the Iraqi population will misinterpret the initiatives as signs
517 See for example Rory Carroll, “US in talks with Iraqi insurgents,” The Guardian, June
10, 2005; Ned Parker and Tom Baldwin, “Peace deal offers Iraq insurgents an amnesty,”
The Times, June 23, 2006; and Colin Freeman, “British general to talk to Iraqi insurgents,”
Telegraph, December 11, 2007.
518 See Colin Freeman, “British general to talk to Iraqi insurgents”, Telegraph, December
11, 2007.
519 Communication from MNC-I official, January 2008.
520 Communication from MNC-I official, January 2008.

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of sectarian favoritism. Another challenge, officials report, is that coalition influence
is simply diminishing — “Iraqis listen much less than in the past.”521
Meanwhile, MND-North launched a similar but apparently separate
reconciliation initiative, which started in the Sunni insurgent stronghold town of
Hawija, in At Ta’amin province. The program’s key targets were “economic
insurgents” — those who were in it to make money, rather than ideologues. The
program offers them “negotiated surrender,” including being moved to a “no-target
list,” and participants must clear a Board that includes representatives of GoI civilian
leadership, the ISF, and coalition forces. U.S. forces and PRT counterparts have used
several funding sources to try to find civilian jobs for the program’s “graduates.” As
of August 2008, the program had had over 2,100 participants across MND-North.
MND-North officials have described participants as coming forward and saying
effectively, “I don’t want to fight anymore. I’m tired of running. I want to sleep in
my own home at night.”522
“Awakening” Movements
In the views of many practitioners and observers, “awakening” movements have
powerfully reshaped the security climate as well as the political climate in many parts
of Iraq. While they all have “ground-up” origins — and borrow from one another’s
experiences — they vary greatly in character, and in likely impact, by region.
Origins of the Awakening Movement in Al Anbar. The movements got
their start in Al Anbar province. As described by Multi-National Force-West leaders,
in the aftermath of regime removal, Al Anbar was a “perfect storm”: The region was
traditionally independent-minded, and relatively secular, but dependent on the central
government for key resources. After the old regime collapsed, the province’s big
state-owned enterprises closed, state pensions were not being paid, De-
Ba’athification policies meant lost jobs, and many Anbaris felt disenfranchised and
left out of national-level politics.523
That context provided fertile ground for Al Qaeda affiliates to infiltrate the
region with promises to “rescue” the population, but their actions proved to be
absolutely brutal — including swift and violent punishment, or even death, for
perceived infractions. One observer has called it a “campaign of murder and
intimidation,” including the murders of prominent local tribal leaders.524
521 Interviews with MNF-I officials, August 2008.
522 Interviews with MND-N and subordinate unit officials, August 2008. See also Multi-
National Force-Iraq press conference transcript, Major General Mark Hertling, Commanding
General, Multi-National Division-North, July 27, 2008.
523 Information from MNF-West leadership, January 2008. Information from coalition
officials, and Al Anbar provincial and community leaders, 2003 and 2004.
524 Bill Roggio, “Anbar Rising,” Long War Journal, May 11, 2007, available at
[http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/05/anbar_rising.php]. See also Mario
Loyola, “Return of the Sheik,” National Review, October 8, 2007.

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The first rising in Al Anbar took place in 2005 — a movement that became
known as the “Desert Protectors.” Members of local tribes in al Qaim and Haditha
volunteered to begin working with some U.S. Special Operations Forces and later
with the Marines.525
The movement that became known as the “awakening” developed later, in Al
Anbar’s capital Ramadi, drawing on the model of the Desert Protectors — including
the premise of an alliance among several key tribes. The initial leading figure of the
awakening was Sheikh Abdul Sattar Buzaigh al-Rishawi, of the Albu Risha tribe,
who was killed on September 13, 2007, by a roadside bomb. In late 2006, he had
spearheaded the signing of a manifesto denouncing Al Qaeda and pledging support
to coalition forces. According to MNF-West, by January 2008, of the eleven sheikhs
who initially stood up to challenge Al Qaeda, six were dead.526 The movement,
initially known as Sahawa al Anbar when it formed around a core from the Albu
Risha tribe, changed its name to Sahawa al Iraq as more tribes joined the cause.527
According to MNF-West, leading sheikhs in the awakening movement describe
their relationship with Al Qaeda as a “blood feud.” The tribal leaders do not want
coalition forces to stay forever — they simply want help killing Al Qaeda.528
Spread of the Awakening Movements to the North. During 2007,
awakenings began to “spread” through the provinces of north-central Iraq —
Ninewah, Salah ad Din, Kirkuk (At Ta’amin), and Diyala — drawing on the Al
Anbar example. Several aspects of the northern “climate” may have encouraged
some Sunni Arabs to self-organize to protect their interests.
As in Al Anbar, there was an Al Qaeda affiliate presence in the north-central
provinces. In the wake of successful surge operations in Baghdad, Al Qaeda
affiliates took up residence in several parts of the region, including Mosul and the
upper Diyala River Valley.529
Sunni Arabs in northern provinces, like those in Al Anbar, already had some
grounds for feeling politically disenfranchised. In Ninewah, for example, Sunni
Arabs, who constitute about 75% of the province’s population, generally did not vote
in provincial elections and were thus under-represented on the current Provincial
Council.530
Across the north (and unique to the region), according to Multi-National
Division-North leaders, de facto Kurdish expansion has extended across the Green
525 Information from MNF-West staff, 2007.
526 Information from MNF-West leadership, January 2008.
527 See William S. McCallister, “Iraqi Islamic Party, Kurds, and the Tribal Awakening,”
January 18, 2008, unpublished paper.
528 Information from MNF-West leadership, January 2008.
529 Information from MNF-I, MNC-I, and MND-North officials, January 2008.
530 Information from MNF-I and MND-North officials, January 2008.

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Line that separates the Kurdistan Regional Government from the rest of Iraq, into
parts of Mosul and oil-rich Kirkuk. In Kirkuk, in particular, many Kurds have taken
up residence — or returned to live — in anticipation of a popular referendum that
will decide Kirkuk’s political future.531 Coalition officials judge that some Sunni
Arabs in the region find this dynamic threatening.532
Spread of the Awakening Movements to the South. Both security
conditions on the ground, and direct exposure to “awakenings” elsewhere in Iraq,
helped generate nascent “awakening” movements among some tribal leaders in
largely Shi’a-populated southern Iraq. These incipient initiatives shared with their
Sunni Arab counterparts their ground-up impetus, based on a desire for security and
opportunity for their families, and a disinclination to be imposed on by outsiders.
The character of the southern movements, however, was distinctly different
from those in north-central Iraq, due to a quite different political and religious
backdrop, and thus quite different “targets” of frustration.533 The most prominent
feature of politics in southern Iraq remains the power struggle between two major
political groupings and the militias that back them: on one hand, the Islamic
Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI, formerly SCIRI) and its Badr militia; and on the other
hand, the Office of the Martyr Sadr, led by Muqtada al-Sadr, and its militia, the Jaish
al-Mahdi (JAM). Schisms in the Jaish al-Mahdi, in the wake of al-Sadr’s declared
ceasefire, produced violent splinter groups — “special groups” — apparently acting
independently of al-Sadr but with reported ties to Iran.534
MNF-I leaders suggested that the southern “awakening” movements were
motivated primarily by growing popular impatience with both of the leading
contenders for political power in the south, and in particular, with their past or
current Iranian connections. ISCI’s Badr forces were trained in Iran, during the Iran-
Iraq War. Muqtada al-Sadr has maintained personal ties with clerics in Iran, and JAM
“special groups” reportedly enjoy Iranian training and support.535
Security Volunteers and “Sons of Iraq”
Military commanders in Iraq have credited the “Sons of Iraq” (SoIs) —
originally known as “concerned local citizens” — with playing an essential and
531 Interviews with Multi-National Division-North officials, January and August 2008, and
interviews with U.S. Embassy officials, August 2008.
532 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, and subordinate commanders, January and
August 2008.
533 For additional and slightly different views about the differences among awakening
movements, see Mohammed Fadhil, “Why Southern Iraq Won’t Awaken Like Anbar,”
November 7, 2007, available at [http://pajamasmedia.com/2007/11/post_252.php].
534 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, January and August 2008.
535 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, January and August 2008. MNF-I notes
that before regime change, 70% of the members of the Ba’ath Party were Shi’a.

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substantial role in the improvement of security in Iraq, beginning in late 2007.536 One
commander noted in August 2008, “This is a cost-effective way to buy security.”537
Both terminology and specific characteristics vary by region, but in general, SOIs are
local residents who have stepped forward, in some organized way, to help protect and
defend their communities.
Who the “Sons of Iraq” (SoIs) Are. MNF-I noted that as of August, 2008,
there were 99,374 SoIs in Iraq altogether; 4,060 on 14 contracts in MNF-West’s area,
Al Anbar province; 29,177 on 275 contracts in MND-North’s area, which includes
the four provinces north and east of Baghdad; 28,754 on 182 contracts in MND-
Baghdad’s area; 35,381 on 267 contracts in MND-Center’s area, which includes four
provinces immediately south of Baghdad; 2,002 on 41 contracts in MND-Center
South’s area, which is Qadisiyah province; and none in MND-Southeast’s area,
which includes the four southernmost provinces.538
The majority of SoIs, but not all of them, are Sunni Arabs. The Department of
Defense reported that as of March 2008, about 71,500 were Sunni and about 19,500
Shi’a.539 Most groups of SoIs — who typically work in the communities they live in
— are relatively homogenous but some are mixed. For example, in January 2008,
in the area of Multi-National Division-Center, a mixed region south of Baghdad, 60%
of the SOI groups were Sunni Arab, 20% were Shi’a Arab, and 20% were mixed.540
U.S. commanders have readily admitted that the SoIs include former insurgents.
One Brigade Commander commented, “There’s no doubt that some of these
concerned citizens were at least tacitly participating in the insurgency before us,” and
one Division Commander stated more boldly: “80% of these guys are former
insurgents.”541 Other commanders noted, in early 2008, that the SoIs included not
only “reformed” insurgents, but also some infiltrators currently affiliated with
extremist groups.542
ISF commanders, too, harbor no illusions about the backgrounds of many SoIs,
and they share with their U.S. counterparts a concern about current infiltration. In
August 2008, Major General Oothman, the Commanding General of the 8th Iraqi
Army Division, expressed concern that AQI could corrupt the SoIs. He noted that
536 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, and subordinate commanders, January and
August 2008.
537 Interview with U.S. brigade commander, August 2008.
538 Information from MNF-I staff, August 2008.
539 Department of Defense, “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq,” March 2008.
540 Interviews with MND-C officials, January 2008.
541 Department of Defense press briefing with Colonel Mike Kershaw, Pentagon, October
5, 2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=4053]; and conversation with a Division Commander, January 2008.
542 Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Mark Hertling, January 22, 2008,
available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4124].

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AQI had already infiltrated the SoIs or, he added, it could be the case that some SoIs
may simply be “playing both sides.”543
Origins of the “Sons of Iraq” Movement. The SOI movement was not
the product of a carefully-crafted strategy by the Government of Iraq or by coalition
forces. Instead, like the “awakenings,” it began from the ground up — in this case,
as a series of ad hoc, neighborhood watch-like initiatives by Iraqis who self-
organized and “deployed” to key locations in their own communities, to dissuade
potential trouble-makers. The response by coalition forces to the dynamic was also
initially ad hoc, as some coalition units provided volunteers in their areas with
equipment, or payments in kind for information, or other forms of support.
Frequently, coalition forces named their new partners — with heroic-sounding names
like the “Ghazaliyah Guardians,” or with NFL team names.
MNF-I leaders and commanders on the ground observed that SoIs initially came
forward only after Al Qaeda affiliates and other threats were eliminated from an area.
Some commanders also pointed out that SoIs volunteered to serve once a coalition
forces presence had been established — they had to be convinced that coalition
forces would actually remain in the area and not pull back to their FOBs.544
How the “Sons of Iraq” System Works. After its ad hoc beginnings, the
SoI system was loosely standardized by coalition forces, in coordination with Iraqi
security forces counterparts.
SoIs are paid by coalition forces, with funding from the Commanders
Emergency Response Program (CERP), based on 90-day renewable contracts. The
money is paid to a single contractor, often a tribal sheikh or other community leader,
who is then responsible for paying the SoIs’ salaries and providing any uniforms,
vehicles or other equipment that may be required. In practice, most SoIs earn about
$300 per month, roughly equivalent to about two-thirds of the total income of a
member of the Iraqi Police.545
Salaries may vary somewhat — in August 2008, Multi-National Division-Center
noted that SoIs each earn about $240 per month. In some cases, U.S. units have
established pay-for-performance systems. For example, in Kirkuk, SoI performance
is reviewed daily. If they do well, they receive a bonus. If they do poorly — such as
the SoI team that propped up a scarecrow at a checkpoint they were supposed to be
manning — their collective contract is docked by $2,000.546
543 Interview with MG Oothman, August 2008.
544 Information from MNF-I and MNC-I leaders, and division commanders, January 2008.
See also Department of Defense News Briefing with Major General Walter Gaskin,
Commanding General, MND-W, IIMEF, December 10, 2007, [http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4103], where Maj. Gen. Gaskin noted that coalition
forces’ elimination of Al Qaeda plays a role in prompting local Iraqis to serve.
545 Interviews with MNC-I officials, January 2008.
546 Interviews with U.S. forces in Kirkuk, August 2008.

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In many cases, U.S. division and brigade commanders on the ground have
reinforced the message that the SoIs “work for” the ISF, while the coalition forces
pay them. In other cases, the understanding on the ground is that the SoIs work
“with” the ISF.547 In practice, however, SoIs are intended to fill the gaps — to
“thicken the ranks” — where ISF presence is limited, so they may be more likely to
have regular interaction with coalition forces counterparts.548
Most SoIs were hired to man check points or to protect critical infrastructure,
and to provide information about suspicious activity. In August 2008, for example,
Multi-National Division-Center noted that the SoIs in its area maintain 2,159 check
points, and had turned in 668 IEDs between June 2007 and August 2008.549 MNF-I
leaders and commanders on the ground have stressed that SoI contributions have
directly saved lives and equipment — as a rule, when an SoI group is established in
an area, the level of IED attacks goes down.550 Some commanders have wryly
admitted that part of the reason may be that some SOIs themselves were formerly
IED emplacers.
One new development in 2008 was the formation of some groups of “Daughters
of Iraq.” Like the SoIs, they are security volunteers from local neighborhoods. Their
job, after receiving training, is to work with the ISF to screen female Iraqis, to show
respect for Iraqi culture and traditions.551
Security Volunteers in Al Anbar: Provincial Security Force. Multi-
National Force-West leaders noted in the past that “‘concerned local citizen’ was not
a term of art in Al Anbar province,” where security volunteers have been organized
in several alternative ways.
In Al Anbar, early tribal offers to provide volunteers were channeled into the
formation of “provincial security forces” (PSF) — a gateway step to joining the Iraqi
security forces in a more permanent capacity. Members of the PSF, who received 80
hours of training from the Marines, formally became personnel of the Ministry of
547 U.S. military officials in Kirkuk, for example, noted that the SoIs in the area certainly did
not work for the ISF. Moreover, periodic tensions had arisen between the local ISF, whose
leadership is primarily Kurdish, and the largely Sunni Arab SoIs. Interviews, August 2008.
548 Participant observation, and interviews with division and brigade commanders, January
2008.
549 Interviews with MND-C officials, August 2008.
550 Conversations with MNF-I, MND-Baghdad, MND-Center and MND-North leaders,
January and August 2008. See also Department of Defense Press Briefing with COL Mike
Kershaw, October 5, 2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.
aspx?transcriptid=4053]. COL Kershaw notes that in his battle space, SOIs had established
their own check points and secured those roads. He adds that, since the SOIs began
working, IED attacks were down, and the SOIs had turned in, or given information about,
“over 85 terrorists.”
551 See Multi-National Force-Iraq press conference transcript, Brigadier Geneeral David
Perkins, MNF-I Spokesman and MG Mohammed al Askari, MoD Spokesman, July 30, 2008.

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Interior, and the MoI pays their salaries.552 Other local residents in Al Anbar have
self-organized into neighborhood watch-style organizations.553
Iraqi Government and Other Views of the “Sons of Iraq”. From its
inception, the SoI movement raised some concerns among both Iraqis and some
outside observers.
Some Iraqi Government officials, and representatives of official and unofficial
groups in Iraq, who might otherwise have extraordinarily little in common, shared
a concern that the SoIs could return to violence, form new militias, or otherwise pose
a threat to the authority or influence they currently enjoy.554
Key Shi’a leaders of the Government of Iraq apparently had concerns about a
potential ground-up challenge to their leadership, based on Shi’a tribal organizations,
which could theoretically grow out of SoI groups in the south. Prime Minister Maliki
named a very close associate, a Shi’a Arab, to head the Implementation and Follow-
up Committee on National Reconciliation (IFCNR), the body responsible, among
other matters, for facilitating the integration of SoIs into Iraqi government
structures.555 In turn, neither supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr nor members of the
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq — or the militias that support them — were
apparently eager to face competition for influence in Shi’a-populated southern Iraq.
Meanwhile, a leading Sunni Arab political party, the Iraqi Islamic Party,
reportedly viewed the SoIs and related awakening movements as potential organized
competitors for support among Sunni Arab Iraqis. Some observers suggested that
northern Kurds, in turn, might be reluctant to see the rise of more organized Sunni
Arab constituencies, including armed potential fighters, in politically contested cities
such as Kirkuk.
In December 2007, at a session of the Ministerial Committee on National
Security (MCNS), Iraqi government and coalition leaders reached an agreement
confirming the ground rules for the SoI program. Those rules included a cap on the
total number of SoIs nationwide, of 103,000, as well as a complete prohibition
against SoI recruitment and hiring in Multi-National Division-Southeast’s area —
Iraq’s four southernmost, largely Shi’a-inhabited, provinces. The rules also
stipulated, for example, that SoIs could not represent political parties, that SoI groups
552 Information from MNF-West staff, 2007.
553 See Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Walter Gaskin, December 10,
2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=4103].
554 Assessments by MNF-I and MNC-I leaders and staff, January 2008. See also William
S. McCallister, “Iraqi Islamic Party, Kurds, and the Tribal Awakening,” January 18, 2008,
unpublished paper.
555 Information from MNF-I and MNC-I leaders and staff, including some who have worked
personally with IFCNR, January 2008.

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must reflect the demographic balance in their area, and that coalition forces could not
arm the SoIs.556
Following the December MCNS session, key Iraqi leaders — including Prime
Minister Maliki, his National Security Advisor Mowaffaq al-Rubbaie, and ISCI
leader Abdul Aziz Hakim — all publicly expressed support for the SOI program.
Meanwhile, outside observers expressed concerns that the SoI movement may
be creating an alternative — and a potential future challenge — to the national
government’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, by empowering new
forces that may or may not support the central government in the future. “At worst,”
one observer commented, “it will perpetuate a fractured and fractious Iraq.”557
“Sons of Iraq” Integration into Permanent Jobs. From the outset, the
Government of Iraq (GoI) and coalition forces shared the view that the SoI program
would be temporary. The “way forward” agreed to in December 2007 included, in
principle, integrating some SoIs — roughly 20% — into the Iraqi security forces, and
facilitating employment for the rest in the public or private sector. In either case, the
plans included getting the SoIs off of the CERP payroll; the initial goal was July
2008.558 In March 2008, the Department of Defense expressed concern at the “lack
of a cohesive plan to transition the Sons of Iraq to the Iraqi forces and civilian
employment.”559
By any measure, transition of SoIs into permanent jobs has proceeded slowly.
Accurately recording the data has sometimes proven difficult, since the SoI
population has not been static — new members were being recruited as some old
members were “transitioned.” MNF-I noted that between December 2, 2007, and
August 16, 2008, 5,189 SoIs transitioned to the Iraqi Police, 53 SoIs transitioned into
other Iraqi security forces, and 2,515 SoIs transitioned into “non-security” jobs.
During that time, an additional 3,547 SoIs quit, were killed in action, went missing,
or were dismissed for disciplinary reasons. Previously, in 2007 before the December
2 decision, approximately 3,900 “concerned local citizens” were hired by the Iraqi
Police.560
For most of the SoIs interested in joining the ISF, the top choice is the Iraqi
Police, which would allow them to continue to serve in their local communities.561
556 Information from MNF-I and MNC-I staff, January 2008.
557 Anthony Bubalo, “Lawrence of Arabia is out of place in Iraq,” Financial Times,
November 11, 2007. See also, for example, Interview with Toby Dodge, Foreign Policy
Online, September 2007, available at [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?
story_id=3982].
558 Information from MNF-I and MNC-I staff, January 2008.
559 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.
560 Interviews with MNF-I officials, August 2008.
561 In June 2008, somewhat unusually, a brigade in Multi-National Division-Center reported
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An application process is in place for SoIs seeking to become IPs, but it is
cumbersome. After the SoI declares his interest, local-level screenings are carried
out by coalition forces, local civilian officials, local tribal sheikhs, and appropriate
ISF representatives. The review process considers, among other issues, an
applicant’s background, proof of residency, and any special skills the applicant may
have, as well as the area’s demographic balance. Formal ISF requirements also
include literacy, a physical fitness test, and a medical check. Those candidates who
pass through these reviews are referred to the Implementation and Follow-up
Committee on National Reconciliation (IFCNR), attached to the office of the Prime
Minister, for approval. Candidates approved by IFCNR are forwarded to the
Ministry of Interior for vetting, selection and — if successful — the issuing of hiring
orders. Applications do not specifically state that a candidate is a SoI.562 One major
constraint on the incorporation of SoIs into the Iraqi Police is that the MoI’s
personnel and training systems are overloaded and cannot easily absorb a large influx
of new personnel. Another constraint is the reported reluctance on the part of some
MoI officials to bring SoIs on board.563
For those SoIs not incorporated into the ISF, the broad intent of the government
of Iraq and the coalition forces is to facilitate their transition into civilian jobs —
ideally, jobs that are both sustainable and actually productive.564 One major
constraint remains the absence of a thriving and diverse private sector, so most
proposals and programs to date have focused on potential state sector jobs.
In 2008, the Coalition has been working with several Iraqi ministries to
implement the Joint Technical Education and Reintegration Program (JTERP), which
was launched in two pilot locations on March 23, 2008.565 The program was
designed to include vocational training, on-the-job training, and job placement, with
priority to SoIs and recently released detainees.566 In August 2008, U.S. commanders
561 (...continued)
that it was going through a “recruiting drive” to get SoIs to join the Iraqi Army, and had met
with some success. See Department of Defense News Briefing, Colonel Terry Ferrell, 2nd
Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, June 19, 2008, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4247].
562 Information from MNF-I, MNC-I, and commanders, January 2008.
563 Interviews with MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I officials, August 2008.
564 The U.S. Agency for International Development, for example, runs a Community
Stabilization Program, which typically pays relatively low salaries — approximately $90 per
month — in exchange for tasks such as garbage collection. For SOIs’ transition into the
civilian world, the goal is to find, where possible, more directly productive employment.
565 The two pilots are located in Tikrit and Mahmudiyah. The second phase is scheduled to
include two larger pilots, in Kirkuk and Fallujah. Information from MNF-I, March 2008
566 See Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008; and
information from MNF-I, January and March 2008.

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on the ground reported that little progress had been made — that the program, in the
words of one commander, had “stalled.”567
Another initiative in 2008, launched by MNC-I based on the recommendation
of commanders on the ground, proposed the creation of “Civil Service Departments”
(CSDs), as part of a new Civil Services Corps, modeled loosely on the New Deal-era
Civilian Conservation Corps.568 As planned, the CSDs would provide essential
services such as electricity, sewage, and sports, to complement, not replace, those
already provided by existing Iraqi government bodies. In early 2008, MNC-I
launched a pilot CSD project in the Ar Rashid district of Baghdad, including 390
employees drawn in part from former SoIs, and in August 2008, a CSD with about
500 employees opened in Kirkuk.
MNC-I planned to provide some initial funding for the project with the goal of
transferring full funding responsibility to the Iraqi government some time in calendar
year 2009. The theory, explained one Brigade Commander, was “build it and they
will come” — that is, once the new structure demonstrated its worth, the Iraqi
government would fully embrace the initiative.569 For its part, IFCNR expressed
initial support, encouraging increasing both the size and number of the proposed
CSDs, and reportedly agreeing to pay the salaries of CSD employees, while the
coalition provided equipment and training costs.570
In August 2008, however, MNC-I officials noted that progress on establishing
the CSDs was very slow. One commander on the ground stated, “Frankly, we’re not
getting anywhere — there’s no apparent way forward for the program.”571 By late
summer 2008, MNC-I officials began to consider alternatives, including a “rapid
employment initiative,” a temporary measure that would put people back to work —
for example, cleaning the streets — and provide them with some income.572
GoI Assumption of Responsibility for the SoIs. In September 2008, the
Government of Iraq announced that it planned to assume responsibility for the Sons
of Iraq as of October 2008, far ahead of the long-standing rough timeline. In
testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on September 10, 2008,
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman confirmed DOD’s
understanding that as of October 1, the GoI would assume responsibility, and as of
November 1, the GoI would begin to pay the SoIs’ salaries.
At a September 2008 press conference, Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir
explained that the Sons of Iraq are “our sons, our citizens,” so it was perfectly natural
567 Interviews with MNC-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008.
568 Information about the CSD initiative, including the Jihad pilot, from MNC-I officials,
January 2008.
569 Interview with Brigade Commander, January 2008.
570 Information from MNF-I and MNC-I, March 2008.
571 Interviews with MNC-I officials, and MND-B official, August 2008.
572 Interviews with MNC-I officials, August 2008.

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for the GoI to assume responsibility for them. He noted that the SoIs had contributed
to security, and the GoI would be “loyal” to them. He added, however, that all Iraqi
citizens are subject to the law, and so “the government might arrest or detain some
elements” of the SoIs. In that case, he noted, Iraqi ministries would be responsible
for protecting the detained SoIs from attack or harassment by elements of AQI or the
former ruling Ba’ath Party.573
U.S. civilian and military officials in Iraq expressed concerns about the GoI
initiative, including the possibility that the GoI would use the assumption of
responsibility to disband the SoIs without providing adequate follow-on employment.
According to U.S. commanders on the ground, some SoIs themselves had long been
hearing rumors about a possible transfer of authority to the GoI and had expressed
concerns that they would soon be detained or at best unemployed. Meanwhile, U.S.
officials speculated that some SoIs might choose to return to emplacing IEDs, to
make money.574
Detainee Operations
The broad “reconciliation” intent extends to an additional subset of the Iraqi
population — those who have been detained by coalition forces.
Accountability. By the beginning of 2008, coalition detainee operations had
evolved markedly from the days of the formal occupation, when they were
characterized by under-staffing, limited facilities, and — due to ongoing aggressive
military operations — a large and quickly growing detainee population. In the early
days, it was common to find local communities frustrated first by detentions they
perceived to be groundless, and then by the difficulty of determining the location and
status of those detained.575
One important, gradual change, according to coalition officials, was much better
accountability, based on the introduction of biometrics, better information-sharing
throughout the detention system, and simply better cultural familiarity with the multi-
part names commonly used in the region.576
“COIN Inside the Wire” Detainee Program. A second major change,
introduced by MNF-I beginning in late 2007, was a set of “COIN inside the wire”
573 See Multi-National Force-Iraq press conference transcript, Minister of Defense Abd al-
Qadir, September 10, 2008. One can imagine that not all Sons of Iraq would necessarily
find the Minister’s words reassuring.
574 Interviews with U.S. Embassy officials, and MNF-I and MNC-I officials, and with
subordinate commanders, August 2008.
575 Information from CPA and CJTF-7 officials, 2003 and 2004.
576 Information from MNF-I officials, January 2008.

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practices, designed to identify and separate the true “irreconcilables” from the rest
of the detainees.577
These approaches were based partly on a better understanding of the detainee
population, which apparently includes far more opportunists than ring-leaders — for
example, under-employed young men who agree to emplace an IED in exchange for
a one-time payment. The pervasiveness of “opportunism” as a motive seems to be
corroborated by the low recidivism rate — about 9 out of 100, as of January 2008.578
According to coalition officials, in the past, the coalition used its theater
internment facilities simply to “warehouse” detainees. Those facilities effectively
served as “jihadist universities” where detainees with extremist agendas could recruit
and train followers.
As part of “COIN inside the wire,” the coalition isolated the hard-core cases in
higher-security compounds, removing their influence. Meanwhile, the coalition
cultivated the majority of the detainee population by providing detainees with
voluntary literacy programs, to the grammar school level, for illiterate detainees.
Vocational training programs, and opportunities to earn a small income during
detention were introduced, including a brick factory at Camp Bucca where detainees
earn money by making bricks, which are stamped with the inscription, in Arabic,
“rebuilding the nation brick by brick.” Imams visit the facilities to provide detainees,
on a voluntary basis, with religious education. A family visitation program has
allowed about 1,600 visits per week.579 According to a senior coalition official, “Now
detainees themselves point out the trouble-makers.”580
Detainee Releases. A third initiative is a series of detainee releases, an
effort given additional impetus by ongoing U.S.-Iraqi negotiations over a Status of
Forces Agreement-like document, which is expected to establish new rules and
procedures for detention operations. According to Task Force-134, the organization
under MNF-I that is responsible for detainee operations, after January 1, 2009, there
will be no more “security internees.” There may be conditions under which U.S.
forces may retain physical custody of Iraqis, but the Government of Iraq will have
legal custody.581
TF-134 officials noted in August 2008 that for about 9% of detainees at that
time, U.S. forces had “releasable evidence with legal sufficiency in Iraqi courts.” Of
577 Information from MNF-I officials, January 2008.
578 Over 78% of those detained by coalition forces are interned based on suspicion of some
IED-related activity. The recidivism rate is based on numerical data. The under-employment
assessment is based on accounts from detainees. Information from Task Force-134,
Baghdad, January 2008.
579 Information from MNF-I officials, January and April 2008, and see Donna Miles, “Anti-
Insurgency Tactics Succeeding in Iraqi Detention Facilities,” American Forces Press
Service, March 12, 2008.
580 Information from Task Force-134, Baghdad, January 2008.
581 Interview with TF-134 official, August 2008.

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concern to U.S. civilian and military officials are the members of the rest of the
“legacy” population” of detainees, for whom no such evidence exists, but who may
pose security risks to the Iraqi population or to U.S. forces in Iraq.582
To help streamline the problem — and to further the cause of reconciliation —
MNF-I, through TF-134, launched an accelerated, targeted detainee release program.
Releases are based on reviews by the MNF-I Review Committee. Detainees
themselves are given the opportunity to present their side of the story, and good
behavior during detention is taken into consideration. TF-134 noted in August 2008
that word had apparently got back to detainees that good behavior counts, and can
accelerate the parole date.
In the past, some U.S. ground commanders had expressed concerns about the
practical implications of the program, wondering in particular how jobs would be
found for the released detainees, and what would restrain them from low-level,
opportunistic criminality if full-employment jobs were not found.583 Partly to help
allay such concerns, representatives of the “battle space owners” were included as
participants in the board deliberations and decisions.
The release program makes use of a guarantor system, in which tribal sheikhs
and other local leaders may vouch for, and accept responsibility for, the future good
conduct of detainees released back to their communities.584 Release ceremonies are
formal events, and former detainees swear an oath to Iraq.
During 2007, the detainee population grew from about 14,000 at the start of the
year to a peak of 26,000 in November, due to surge operations and better incoming
information from Iraqi sources. As of September 2008, there were about 19,000
detainees in coalition theater internment facilities. During the month of Ramadan,
which coincided with September 2008, the coalition scheduled 3,000 releases.585
Civil/Military Partnership in Governance
and Economics
From the earliest days after major combat operations, civilian and military
coalition leaders in Iraq recognized the central importance of the governance and
economics “lines of operation” — indeed, military commanders have consistently
582 Interviews with U.S. Embassy officials, MNF-I and MNC-I officials, and TF-134, August
2008.
583 Conversations with ground commanders, January 2008. One commander, asked for his
views about the process, simply exclaimed, “Don’t go there!”
584 The use of a “guarantor system” for targeted detainee releases was initially applied in
Iraq in 2004, Information from CJTF-7, 2004.
585 Information from Task Force-134, Baghdad, January 2008, and from MNF-I, March and
August 2008. See also Multi-National Force-Iraq Press Release 080908, “433 Detainees
Released by Coalition Forces During Ramadan,” September 8, 2008.

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viewed them as essential counterparts to security. The 2007 surge “theory of the
case” adjusted the sequencing — improved security would now lay the groundwork
for progress in governance and economics — but all three lines of operation
remained essential to long-term success. The Iraqi government would have the lead
role in governance and economics, but the coalition, including civilian and military
personnel, would support their efforts.
The key tension over time has centered on the balance of civilian and military
roles and responsibilities in these areas. While all practitioners agreed that civilian
agencies are best placed, by training and experience, to lead the governance and
economics lines of operation, civilian efforts have been hampered by the relatively
limited resources of their agencies, and by delayed and limited staffing. Military
forces, with far greater numbers of “boots on the ground,” have sometimes stepped
in to spearhead these efforts, and have consistently played at least a supporting role.
The 2007 surge included a revitalization of the civilian/military Provincial
Reconstruction Team effort. At the same time, as security conditions on the ground
improved, in 2007 and 2008, military units turned a greater share of their own
attention to governance and economic activities.
Civil/Military Partnership in Iraq: Background
The idea to apply coordinated civilian and military capabilities at the provincial
level in Iraq dates from before the start of the formal occupation. Throughout, that
“coordination” has had two important aspects: coordination within civil/military
teams assigned to the provinces, and coordination between those teams and their
military unit counterparts.
Early military operational-level post-war plans called for provincial-level
“Governorate Support Teams,” led by State Department personnel and including
military Civil Affairs officers and representatives of the U.S. Agency for
International Development.586
Under the Coalition Provisional Authority, those plans began to be realized,
with some delays and in slightly modified form. The State Department (and some
coalition partner countries) provided Foreign Service Officers to serve as
“Governorate Coordinators,” who were eventually supported by small, civil/military
staffs. In August 2003 — before most provinces were staffed — CPA and CJTF-7
launched what became a regular series of regional meetings, bringing Division
Commanders and CPA Coordinators from Iraq’s provinces to Baghdad, to share
concerns and lessons learned.587
At the end of the formal occupation — and thus the tenure of the CPA — the
new U.S. Embassy established several Regional Embassy Offices to provide consular
services, but the provincially-based “GC” system was disestablished.
586 Information from CFLCC and V Corps planners, 2003.
587 Information from CPA and CJTF-7 staff, and participant observation, 2003.

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Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), per se, were established in Iraq in
2005, as provincially-based offices led by State Department officials, with mixed
civilian/military staffs. The term “PRT” was borrowed from Afghanistan, where
PRTs, primarily military-staffed, take a wide variety of forms, depending in part on
which coalition country leads them. As of 2008, the stated purpose of the PRTs in
Iraq was as follows: “To assist Iraq’s provincial and local governments’ capacity to
develop a transparent and sustained capability to govern, while supporting economic,
political, and social development and respect for the rule of law.”588
In 2007, as part of the surge, the PRT effort was expanded in scale, on the
premise that increased security would create growing opportunities for meaningful
economic and governance work at the provincial level. In June 2007, President Bush
praised the effort, noting: “Much of the progress we are seeing is the result of the
work of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These teams bring together military
and civilian experts to help local Iraqi communities pursue reconciliation, strengthen
moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi self-reliance.”589
PRTs are based on a Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of
State and the Department of Defense, signed on February 22, 2007, and retroactively
applicable to previously-established PRTs. The Memorandum named PRTs “a joint
DoS-DoD mission,” which falls “under joint policy guidance from the Chief of
Mission and the Commander of MNF-I.” By mandate, the Department of State leads
the PRTs, the PRTs report to the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) at the U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad, and the Chief of Mission “provides political and economic
guidance and direction to all PRTs.” Brigade Combat Team commanders partnered
with PRTs exercise authority only for “security and movement of personnel.”590
As of August 2008, there were 31 PRT-like structures in Iraq, with about 800
total staff. These teams “cover” all of Iraq — but that coverage is uneven. The 31
teams included 14 full PRTs; 13 smaller “embedded PRTs” (ePRTs) partnered with
Brigade Combat Teams; and 4 non-self-sustaining “provincial support teams” which
are based with a full PRT but cover another location — that is, personnel based in
Irbil cover Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk in northern Iraq, and personnel based in Dhi Qar
cover Muthanna and Maysan in southern Iraq.591
588 Information from the Office of Provincial Affairs, U.S. Embassy Baghdad, January 2008.
589 Cited in “Iraq PRTs” brochure, U.S. Agency for International Development, September
2007.
590 “Memorandum of Agreement,” dated February 22, 2007, signed by Deputy Secretary of
State Negroponte and Deputy Secretary of Defense England.
591 Information from Office of Provincial Affairs, August 2008. As of August 2008, the
ePRTs included 8 in Baghdad, 3 in Anbar, 1 in Diyala, and 1 in northern Babil. In August
2008, MND-Center officials noted their intent to push a full PRT out to Maysan province,
to co-locate with a U.S. battalion; PRT members had been operating as a PST out of Dhi Qar
province, a 45-minute flight away.

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The size and composition of the various forms of PRTs varies substantially.
The embedded PRTs may be as small as a four- or six-person core staff. Full PRTs
may range from the streamlined staff of 16 in Najaf, to 53 in Mosul and about 70 in
Kirkuk.592 While PRTs typically work closely with U.S. military Civil Affairs teams,
those CA are not typically counted as working “for” the PRTs. Human Terrain
Teams (HTTs) may also work closely with — but not for — PRTs; HTTs include
highly trained social scientists recruited to help maneuver units map the cultural
environment.
In January 2008, the single largest group of PRT personnel was “locally engaged
staff.” Of the 798 personnel on duty, 73 were State Department Foreign Service
Officers, and 25 were USAID Foreign Service Officers. The U.S. Departments of
Agriculture and Justice provided specific, critical expertise in small numbers — 16
and 6, respectively. Contractors and Department of Defense personnel — civilian
and military — filled many of the remaining slots.593
By August 2008, OPA noted that about “85% of the DoD civilians” who were
sent in, in 2007, to backfill vacant positions, had been replaced by “Department of
State hires” — either “3161’s” or outside contractors.594 Some of those hires
provided highly specialized skills. For example, the ePRT that covers the part of
Baghdad that includes the zoo includes an epidemiologist. The PRT in Najaf, where
a new commercial airport opened in 2008, includes a retired Air Force pilot who ran
a commercial airport in Arizona.595
Also in August 2008, in addition to military individual augmentees provided by
DOD, some maneuver units on the ground in Iraq had contributed personnel directly
to their partner PRTs, to help shore up their efforts. MND-Baghdad officials noted
that they had provided 20 personnel to the Baghdad PRT. An MNF-West official
noted that, as of October 15, MNF-West itself was “getting out of the civil-military
operations business,” and would instead contribute 30 or 40 Marines to work directly
for the PRT. “The time is right,” an MNF-West official noted, “to transition the
whole effort” to the PRT.596
Within PRTs, the civil/military balance of responsibilities varies by location.
At the Baghdad PRT, for example, as of January 2008, members of the U.S. military
had the lead responsibility for PRT operations, and for all infrastructure projects and
half of the rule of law efforts (including police, detainees, and prisons). They shared
responsibility with civilian counterparts for economics and governance initiatives.597
592 Interviews with OPA and PRT officials, August 2008.
593 Interviews with OPA officials, January and August 2008.
594 Interviews with OPA officials, August 2008.
595 Interviews with Baghdad ePRT and Najaf PRT officials, August 2008.
596 Interviews with MND-Baghdad officials and MNF-West official, August 2008.
597 Information from Office of Provincial Affairs, January 2008.

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Coordination Between PRTs and Military Units
Perhaps more important in terms of current impact than civil/military
coordination within PRTs, is civil/military coordination between PRTs and the
military units they partner with. In Iraq in August 2008, these relationships varied
a great deal.
Each ePRT is co-located and partnered with a Brigade Combat Team (BCT).
Some ePRTs have their own transportation and force protection assets, and thus are
able to operate independently. Others — including some of the smallest ePRTs in
Baghdad — rely on their partner BCT to support their operations. In August 2008,
the head of one particularly small ePRT noted that his usual practice is to accompany
the BCT commander on his daily movements around the battle space.598
In August 2008, OPA confirmed that the ePRTs formally report up through their
respective provincial PRTs to the Office of Provincial Affairs at the U.S. Embassy.
The ePRTs have a “coordination” relationship with their partner BCTs. For example,
members of one ePRT noted that when they write a cable, they show it to the BCT
commander, not for “clearance” but simply for input. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that in some cases, BCT commanders request information and point out areas where
ePRTs could help. In August 2008, officials at one multi-national division noted that
in practice, ePRT members “take direction from the BCT commander.” Some ePRTs
may thus function more like a BCT staff section than a partner organization.599
The much-larger full PRTs typically operate much more independently. There
is great variation in the type of military units PRTs are partnered with, which range
from a BCT that has responsibility for the same province, as in north central Iraq; to
a single two-star headquarters, as in the partnership with MNF-West in Al Anbar
province; to, in the case of the Baghdad PRT, two Division headquarters (MND-
Baghdad, responsible for the city, and MND-Center, responsible for other parts of the
province).
U.S. military commanders on the ground typically praise their collaboration with
the ePRTs. The staff of one BCT in Baghdad, pleased with their ePRT, reportedly
praise them by saying, “You can’t tell they’re civilians!” U.S. military attitudes
toward, and patterns of cooperation with, the full PRTs are more varied. In August
2008 in Kirkuk, leaders of the 1st brigade of 10th Mountain Division and its partner
PRT unanimously underscored the closeness of their working relationship — their
integrated organization and regular collaboration were evident in their descriptions
of the shared challenges they faced and initiatives to meet those challenges. In
another region in August 2008, a multi-national division official, asked about their
relationship with PRT partners, replied with emphasis, “We like our ePRTs....”600
598 Interviews with ePRT officials, January and August 2008.
599 Interviews with MND, BCT and PRT officials, January and August 2008.
600 Interviews with BCT and PRT officials, Kirkuk, and with a multi-national division
official, August 2008.

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In general, military commanders in Iraq have stressed the need for far more of
the PRTs’ expertise and presence, particularly once the security climate began to
improve. Some commanders have asked, “Where’s the civilian surge?” while some
officials at MNF-I put it more bluntly: “Get State out here!”601
Looking ahead, one division commander noted in August 2008, “This is a
window of opportunity with the lowest attack rates ever. Embassy people should be
out more every day now, like we are.” Another senior commander on the ground
suggested that “ePRTs could become the main effort,”and that even as some BCTs
redeploy, their partner ePRTs could remain to continue their work.602
OPA officials, in turn, stressed in early 2008 that the current PRT presence was
the civilian surge.603 In August 2008, U.S. Embassy officials noted that the current
PRT footprint would likely be the “high-water mark,” and that — based in part on
congressional direction — the Embassy had already begun a “PRT strategic
drawdown plan.” Some Embassy officials commented that in some locations, the
PRT presence might already be too heavy and cumbersome — as one official
observed, with 53 people in Mosul, “it’s not clear there’s a full day’s work for
everyone.” Some suggested that for the future, as the number of civilian personnel
diminishes, it would be helpful to target PRT efforts on particular areas of need, such
as agriculture, public health, and local governance capacity.604
Some civilian officials have expressed concern that as U.S. military forces in
Iraq draw down, there might not be sufficient military resources to provide
movement and force protection for PRTs. As of mid-2008, PRTs relied variously on
military forces or private security contractors for such support; the contractor teams
were reportedly quite costly, and should the forthcoming new SOFA regime fail to
provide legal immunity for contractors, as expected, the contractors’ availability and
cost could change. In August 2008, one division commander noted that if the
security climate continued to improve, it would be possible to dedicate more military
assets to directly supporting the PRTs — perhaps providing each one with a full
Company.605
Some OPA and PRT officials, meanwhile, have expressed frustration with the
military in Iraq for trying to do too much governance and economic work, instead of
leaving those missions to far better qualified civilian experts. As one civilian official
expressed in early 2008: “The military needs to start transitioning governance and
601 Interviews with Division and BCT Commanders, and MNF-I officials, January 2008.
It has been a common practice, throughout OIF, for military commanders to use “State” as
a somewhat misleading shorthand to refer to civilian expertise from multiple agencies.
602 Interviews with multi-national division commanders, August 2008.
603 Interview with OPA, January 2008.
604 Interviews with U.S. Embassy officials, August 2008. The U.S. Regional Embassy
Office in Basra raised similar concerns — its 200 members, based at the Basra airport,
rarely leave the office compound, Interviews with U.S. Embassy and REO officials, August
2008.
605 Interview with multi-national division commander, August 2008.

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economics to other agencies.”606 Apparently most military commanders would agree
— many have noted that they would readily transition responsibilities whenever
civilians are available to receive them. As one division commander noted in August
2008, “We don’t have thee right expertise.”607
Many practitioners and outside observers have noted that institutional cultural
differences help shape the PRT/military relationships. One civilian official in Iraq
commented, only partly tongue in cheek, that it is a case of “sit back and reflect”
versus “take that hill!”608 For example, in 2007, one Division, frustrated by delays
in the arrival of ePRTs, launched a campaign to “recruit” ePRT members from its
own staff and subordinate units. Officials of OPA, to which PRTs and ePRTs report,
viewed that initiative as stepping on their prerogatives.609
Other practitioners stress that individual personalities play the key role. As one
civilian official commented in early 2008: “It’s mostly about personalities — it’s not
something you can just fix.”610
Some civilian and military officials have suggested that more appropriately-
targeted training might better prepare civilians for PRT service, particularly those
scheduled to work closely with military units. Some current civilian PRT members
note that their pre-deployment visit to Ft. Bragg, and their counter-insurgency
training at the Phoenix Academy at Camp Taji, Iraq, were invaluable, primarily for
the exposure they provided to military culture and organization.611
Military Role in Governance and Economics
While civilian and military officials generally agree that governance and
economics-related tasks might in theory be better performed by civilian experts, as
of early fall 2008, coalition forces in Iraq continued to play significant roles in those
fields.
Governance. The Office of Provincial Affairs briefing materials state: “PRTs
serve as the primary U.S. government interface between U.S., coalition partners, and
provincial and local governments throughout all of Iraq’s 18 provinces.”612 It might
be more accurate to say that PRTs play the “lead” role in governance, rather than the
606 Interview with PRT member, January 2008.
607 Interviews with Division and Brigade Commanders, January 2008.
608 Interview with OPA official, January 2008.
609 Interviews with Division staff, and with OPA and PRT officials, January 2008.
610 Interview with PRT official, January 2008.
611 Interviews with PRT officials, January and August 2008.
612 “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” brief, Office of Provincial Affairs, January 2008.

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“primary” one, given the sheer magnitude of ongoing interaction by coalition forces
with Iraqi provincial and local officials.613
In Baghdad, for example, the full Baghdad PRT interacts with the Governor, the
Mayor, and the Provincial Council Chair, while ePRTs are tasked to work with the
district- and neighborhood-level councils. A small ePRT, with responsibility for a
given district, might work closely with that district council, but due to personnel and
resource constraints, the ePRT might have difficulty working equally closely and
frequently with all of the subordinate neighborhood councils within that district.
Military units are likely to have far more frequent interactions with Iraqi
officials. Battalion commanders meet regularly with neighborhood councils, Civil
Affairs units and other military staff work continually with local officials on essential
services and other public works projects, and Captains and their staffs at Joint
Security Stations — and their ISF counterparts — meet often with local officials who
use the JSSs as community meeting sites.614
In August 2008, for example, PRT and BCT officials described their division
of labor: the BCT commander engages the provincial governor, battalion
commanders engage the district councils, and company commanders engage sub-
district councils and groups of local mukhtars. The PRT, in turn, focuses on the
provincial government, helping tie it more closely into the national government. The
PRT also mentors young military officers in governance work.615
A central and long-standing focus of coalition governance efforts is helping
Iraqis achieve connectivity between the top-down national ministries and their
appointed representatives for each province, on one hand, and the ground-up
provincial and local governments chosen by local populations, on the other. Military
commanders in every region have attested that provincial officials have no authority
over — and little relationship with — the ministerially-appointed representatives for
their province.616 In August 2008, one division commander explained, “Where the
military can help is in building informal bridges among tribal councils, the Iraqi
613 Coalition military “governance” efforts in 2008 are very similar to those in 2003. In
2003, faced with a very limited civilian presence, commanders “leaned forward” and
worked with Iraqis to form provincial and local councils, to help Iraqis articulate,
prioritize, and represent their concerns.
614 Interviews with BCT commanders, BN commanders, CA personnel, and PRT officials,
January and August 2008.
615 Interviews with BCT and PRT officials, Kirkuk, August 2008.
616 Interviews with commanders and staff in MNF-West, MND-North, MND-Baghdad, and
MND-Center, January and August 2008. The problems were in part legacies of the
centrally-controlled old regime, including Iraq’s 1969 Law of Governorates, based on a
“strong center” model, which named specific authorities that provincial governments could
exercise — for example, “consulting on ministerial regional appointments,” and “promoting
sanitation and public health.”

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Security Forces, and local government — and it still needs a forcing function at the
national level.”617
As described by Colonel Tom James, commander of the 4th BCT of 3rd Infantry
Division, stationed south of Baghdad in early 2008, “One of the things we really
focused on is linkages, making sure that local governments are representative of the
people, and they they’re linked to higher governments so that we can process,
prioritize, and resource the people that need things.”618
Current governance efforts by coalition forces include fostering connectivity
among the levels of government by mentoring Iraqi interlocutors at each level. For
example, in one town south of Baghdad, community leaders were apparently
frustrated because they felt disconnected from the deliberations of the nearest local
council. The Army Captain leading the JSS in the city started bringing local
community leaders together regularly, helping them to articulate and prioritize their
concerns. Coalition forces then connected that informal body with the Iraqi officials
formally chosen to represent that area. That mentoring was then backed up by higher
levels of the Captain’s chain of command, on their frequent visits.619
In one area of Baghdad, a Brigade Commander and representatives of his
subordinate units regularly reviewed the membership of all the local councils, based
on the units’ frequent interactions with them, checking for vacancies, for the presence
of “outsiders” from outside a given neighborhood, and for roughly accurate
reflections of the demographic balance. Where local councils fell short, the units that
regularly engaged them pointed out the concerns to them and urged improvement.620
In the views of many commanders, PRTs and ePRTs are simply not robust
enough to conduct the governance mission comprehensively. As one Division staff
member framed the issue, in early 2008, “The Division needs to help the PRTs help
establish governance.”621
Economics. Military commanders in Iraq confirm that for U.S. personnel,
economic policy guidance is provided by the U.S. Embassy, and that PRTs have the
lead role in the economic line of operation. As in the field of governance, since the
earliest post-major combat days, the U.S. military has played a role in the economic
reconstruction of Iraq.
The military role in economic reconstruction has typically focused on local-level
initiatives. In 2008, one economic focus for the military was neighborhood economic
revitalization — usually measured in terms of the number of small shops opened.
617 Interview with multi-national division commander, August 2008.
618 See Department of Defense News Briefing, Colonel Tom James, February 22, 2008.
619 Interviews with Division, Brigade, Battalion and Company Commanders, and participant
observation, January 2008.
620 Conversations with Brigade staff, January 2008.
621 Conversation with Division staff, January 2008.

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The first shops to reopen in a neighborhood, as security improves, typically included
fruit and vegetable stands, and shops selling convenience foods like bottles of soda.
To facilitate that process, commanders sometimes sought a local Iraqi partner to
serve as the primary contractor for reconstruction in a neighborhood, and to
encourage other local entrepreneurs to come onboard.622 By January 2008, in
addition, military commanders, were tasked to keep an eye open for potential
“medium-sized businesses” to support.623
Commanders have also been able to make available micro-grants, through a
Department of Defense program, which allowed them to provide fledgling Iraqi
businesses with start-up funds ranging from several hundred to several thousand
dollars, to purchase equipment or raw materials. For example, in early 2008, a
micro-grant enabled one man in Baghdad to buy power saws and raw wood to
jumpstart his furniture-making business.624
In August 2008, one BCT commander noted, “We’ve had great success
reopening small businesses!” But both civilian and military officials in Iraq note that
the number of open shops may be a better gauge of the security climate in a
community — how safe the local population feels — than of economic revitalization.
Longer-term, sustainable development, civilian and military officials note, requires
not just local shops but also production — which in turn requires sustainable and
secure systems of supply and distribution, as well as a customer base. Civilian
development experts in Iraq caution that this will simply take time.625
In August 2008, U.S. Embassy officials explained that imposing economic
policy discipline in the regions — among PRTs as well as military units — is a
challenge.626 This may help explain what some called the “great poultry debate” of
2008. In mid-2008, as part of the search for sustainable economic activity, some
military and PRT officials proposed supporting the development of domestic poultry
and egg farming. Some argued that such a business required relatively low start-up
costs, and would provide both employment and income for local families. Officials
at the U.S. Embassy, and some civilian and military practitioners in the field,
countered that such efforts stood little chance of being profitable — it cost $2 to buy
622 In January 2008, coalition forces in the Ar Rashid district of southwest Baghdad were
working closely with Iraqi cardiac surgeon and local resident, Dr. Moyad, on the
revitalization of the 60th Street market area. Dr. Moyad had already successfully facilitated
revitalization of another nearby market area.
623 In the midst of a discussion with subordinates about possible medium-sized business
opportunities in their area, one Brigade Commander sensibly interrupted, “Somebody tell
me what a medium-sized business is!” Some civilian officials question the role of the
military in developing medium-sized businesses.
624 Conversations with brigade and battalion commanders, January 2008.
625 Interviews with MNF-I, BCT and PRT officials, January and August 2008. The head
of one ePRT stated bluntly, “There’s no manufacturing.”
626 Interviews with U.S. Embassy officials, August 2008. One official noted: “It’s hard
enough to keep the Embassy on the same page, on economic policy, but it’s really hard to
impose that on PRTs...and then the Divisions!”

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a chicken to eat from Brazil, while a domestic Iraqi chicken would cost much more
than that, given the costs of importing feed and cooling the chickens and their eggs.
One BCT commander noted, “poultry farming is a big deal for us,” while a senior
Embassy official countered, “There’s no business plan.”627
Meanwhile, military commanders have continued to make use of the
Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), which provides brigade
commanders with discretionary funding for a wide array of projects. As of mid-2008,
the majority of CERP funding was being used to support essential services, and other
sustained initiatives such as the Sons of Iraq program. Anecdotally, in some
instances, CERP may have lost some of its initial flexibility — in the accounts of
several BCT commanders, who earlier had been free to spend CERP funds at their
own discretion, they had recently been required to seek approval from their Division
headquarters to spend CERP money.
As of August 2008, there was no formal requirement for military units to
coordinate CERP spending with Iraqi officials or with PRT or ePRT counterparts,
and some OPA and PRT officials have raised concerns about insufficient
civil/military coordination. Division, Brigade and Battalion Commanders have noted
that most projects nominated for CERP support are initially put forward by local Iraqi
officials and residents. Further, although it is not mandated, the military typically
cross-walks proposed initiatives with the existing plans of local Iraqi councils.628 In
Kirkuk, BCT and PRT officials noted that they share all project information and
coordinate with Iraqis “at stage one of any project.” In Baghdad, one PRT and its
ePRT partner noted that they coordinate on all projects and select the most expedient
source of funding, and that they coordinate all projects with the appropriate Iraqi
body — the right Ministry, district council, or neighborhood council.629
In 2008, some Members of Congress expressed frustration with the extensive
use of CERP on projects either that might not be necessary, or that the Iraqis might
be able to pay for themselves. Some civilian officials in Baghdad shared the concern
about the use of CERP. Too-liberal use of CERP funding, some have argued, could
counteract the broad policy goal of encouraging Iraqis to solve as many problems as
possible by themselves. As an example, one official, pointing to a summer 2008
proposal by one division to spend $62 million on an electrification project, noted,
“We’re getting out of that kind of business.” The big problem, one official observed
in August 2008, is that “we’re not giving Iraqis the freedom to fail.” Some military
627 Interviews with U.S. Embassy officials, BCT officials, PRT officials, August 2008. One
can imagine that market forces may eventually resolved this “great debate”.
628 Interviews with Brigade and Battalion Commanders, January and August 2008. For
example, residents of one town approached coalition forces at a JSS with a request for an
ambulance. Checking with the local council, the unit found there were no immediate plans
to meet that need, so the unit sought CERP funding to support the request. On the other
hand, when the same local residents sought funding to renovate local schools, the unit
discovered that the responsible Iraqi council had already formulated — though not yet
implemented — prioritized school renovation plans, so the coalition unit did not seek CERP
support for the schools.
629 Interviews with BCT and PRT officials, August 2008.

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commanders on the ground shared that concern — one noted in August 2008,
“We’ve wasted a lot of CERP money in the past.”630 In September 10, 2008,
testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy Eric Edelman noted that DOD was in the process of reviewing and refining
the criteria for the use of CERP.631
Meanwhile, in 2008, some transitions in the use of CERP were underway, due
in part to the GoI’s introduction of Iraqi CERP (I-CERP) — GoI funds that U.S.
forces may help Iraqi counterparts spend. Multi-National Force-West officials noted
in August 2008 that they were “giving CERP money back,” a conscious decision to
help make the Iraqi system work. Instead of CERP, the Marines were spending I-
CERP. MND-Baghdad officials suggested, meanwhile, that using I-CERP might be
“teaching the Iraqis bad habits,” that is, that when civilian channels are not fast
enough, the military takes charge.632
Assessing the Results to Date
Strategically-based decision-making about the United States’ next steps in Iraq
and its future relations with that country requires a clear assessment of trends to date
in security conditions, and a clear evaluation of the factors that produced those
changes.
Security Situation by the Metrics
Multi-National Force-Iraq leaders use a series of quantitative metrics to track
and describe both snapshots of the security situation and trajectories over time. The
qualitative significance of the metrics is open to some interpretation, but overall, as
of early fall 2008, the metrics suggested a marked though not steady improvement
in the security situation.
Overall Attacks. The metric usually described first is “overall attacks” —
including attacks against Iraqi infrastructure and government facilities; bombs found
and exploded; small arms attacks including snipers, ambushes, and grenades; and
mortar, rocket and surface-to-air attacks.
According to MNF-I, overall attacks grew from a low point in early 2004, when
records begin, to a peak of over 1,500 weekly attacks in June and July 2007, just as
the final surge units arrived in Iraq and Operation Phantom Thunder was launched.
That gradual growth was punctuated by sharp upward spikes at key Iraqi political
junctures, including the January 2005 elections and the October 2005 constitutional
referendum, and, less sharply, during Ramadan each year. After July 2007, the
630 Interviews with U.S. Embassy, military, OPA and PRT officials, January and August
2008.
631 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman, testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee, September 10, 2008.
632 Interviews with MNF-W and MND-B officials, August 2008.

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overall level of attacks declined sharply, punctuated by a spike during Iraqi and
coalition operations in Basra and Sadr City, in March 2008. By summer 2008, the
level of attacks had fallen to below 300 per week, levels last witnessed in early
2004.633
Commanders on the ground point out that a low level of attacks in a given
geographical area does not necessarily mean that no adversaries remain there. It
could also indicate that a place — such as Arab Jabour south of Baghdad, in late
2007 — was being used as a sanctuary.634 In turn, a high level of attacks is generally
expected, at least temporarily, during major operations in an area, as extremist groups
attempt to push back.635
Iraqi Civilian Deaths. Another key metric tracked by MNF-I is the number
of Iraqi civilian deaths due to the actions of extremists.636 The number of monthly
deaths peaked in late 2006 — at just over 1,500 per month according to coalition
data, and about 3,750 per month according to combined Iraqi and coalition data.
MNF-I reports that beginning in July and August 2007, after all the “surge” forces
had arrived in Iraq, the level of civilian deaths fell sharply and then continued to
decline through January 2008, a decline of over 72%, before rising slightly in
February 2008. Iraqi sources record a spike in civilian deaths in late March 2008,
during the military operations in Basra and Sadr City. Both coalition, and combined
Iraqi and coalition data indicate a reduction to less than 500 in July 2008.637
Weapons Caches. A further metric regularly recorded and tracked is the
number of weapons caches found and cleared. That number skyrocketed from 1,833
in 2004 (the first year of full, available records), to 6,956 in 2007, and 6,487 in 2008
as of the first week of August 2008.638
The cache numbers alone, however, tell an incomplete story, first of all because
the size and contents of the caches are not indicated. In addition, there is no way to
confirm the discovery success rate by comparing the number of caches found with
the total number of weapons caches in Iraq at any given point. Larger numbers of
found caches could indicate that the problem is growing — for example, that more
633 Multi-National Force-Iraq summary slides, “Security Incidents,” provided by MNF-I,
August 9, 2008.
634 Observation from MND-C, January 2008.
635 MNF-I and MNC-I observations, January and August 2008.
636 MNF-I tracks Iraqi civilian deaths by compiling coalition forces’ reports of “significant
acts”; by reviewing Iraqi reports from the Coalition Intelligence Operations Center which
may be unverified; and then by checking where possible for redundancies. Reporting
depends on coverage on accounts received by coalition or Iraqi personnel — and may not
be comprehensive.
637 Multi-National Force-Iraq summary slides, “Civilian Deaths,” provided by MNF-I,
August 9, 2008.
638 Multi-National Force-Iraq summary slides, “Caches Found and Cleared,” provided by
MNF-I, August 9, 2008.

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weapons are coming into Iraq. Larger numbers could also simply reflect more
aggressive — and more successful — operations, based on better information from
Iraqi sources about cache locations.
High-Profile Attacks. MNF-I also tracks the category of “high profile
attacks” — including explosions involving the use of car bombs, suicide car bombs,
and individuals wearing suicide vests. In 2007, the monthly total reached a peak of
about 130 in March before falling, unevenly, to about 40 in December. MNF-I noted
that erecting barriers and hardening sites, as well as kinetic operations against would-
be perpetrators, had helped lower the total of vehicular attacks.639 After a gradual rise
during the first two months of 2008, high-profile attacks spiked in March, during
military operations in Basra and Sadr City. By summer 2008, the level of high-
profile attacks had fallen to below 40 per month.640
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). MNF-I tracks improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) based on two metrics — the number of IED explosions, and
the total number of IED incidents including explosions, IEDs found and disarmed,
and IED hoaxes. The second metric can be viewed as a broader measure of adversary
intent.
MNF-I reports that the total number of IED explosions reached a high point of
in June 2007, just before the start of the series of Corps-level offensives, and fell to
a low point in November 2007, before rising slightly in December. The number of
total IED incidents followed a similar trajectory over that time period.641 The
incidence of IED explosions, relatively level at the beginning of 2008, spiked in late
spring during offensive operation in Basra and Sadr City, and in Diyala and Ninewah
provinces in the north.642 As of August 2008, MNC-I noted that there were about 26
IED incidents per day.
IED use can also be evaluated qualitatively, as well as quantitatively. In late
2007, one of the deadliest forms of IEDs in use was the explosively formed
penetrator (EFP), supplied as a rule from Iran. EFP use declined in late 2007 but
experienced a brief upsurge in early 2008, before declining again. In November
2007, a new and very deadly threat appeared — improvised rocket-assisted mortars
(IRAMs). Built from a rocket, a propane tank, and ball bearings, IRAMs are
indiscriminate and powerful in their effects. In August 2008, MNC-I reported 13
attacks altogether, most recently in July 2008.
By the end of 2007, less sophisticated forms of IEDs — such as command wire-
and pressure plate-detonated devices — had become the most common, possibly
indicating a degradation in the supply networks or ability to coordinate and operate
639 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, January 2008.
640 Multi-National Force-Iraq summary slides, “High Profile Attacks (Explosions),”
provided by MNF-I, August 9, 2008.
641 Information from MNF-I and MNC-I staff, January 2008.
642 Multi-National Force-Iraq summary slides, “IED Explosions Incidence,” provided by
MNF-I, August 9, 2008.

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of the adversary. In August 2008, the most recent IED “innovation” was the use of
building-borne IEDs, that is, buildings wired to explode.643
Explaining the Security Gains
In 2008, as consensus grew that security gains had been achieved on the ground
in Iraq, some debates developed concerning which factors, or combination of factors,
had contributed, or contributed most, to those improvements. From a social science
perspective, the results are “un-testable” — the “experiment” cannot be repeated
holding one or more variables constant.
MNF-I leaders and commanders on the ground have attributed the
improvements in the security situation not just to one or two key factors, but to a
compendium of factors. Moreover, commanders note, those factors were made
particularly effective by their interaction effects — for example, coalition personnel
with previous service in Iraq, making use of more sophisticated technologies.
The most fundamental factor may have been what GEN Petraeus has called a
shift in the “intellectual construct” from an emphasis on transition — a quick hand-
over to Iraqis — to a counter-insurgency (COIN) focus on achieving population
security. Another key COIN component of that intellectual construct was
recognizing the need to separate the irreconcilables from the reconcilables — as GEN
Petraeus observed, “You’re not going to kill your way out of an insurgency.”644
Additional key factors frequently cited by commanders in Iraq include targeted
operations by special operations forces; operations and much greater presence by
conventional coalition forces; operations, presence, and greatly improved capabilities
of Iraqi Security Forces; the rejection of extremists by the “awakening” movements;
efforts by the Sons of Iraq and other security volunteers, and Muqtada al-Sadr’s
ceasefire and separation from the violent “special groups” wings of his
organization.645
In addition, according to commanders, in recent years, far more intelligence
assets became available in-country, and at lower levels of command, greatly
improving commanders’ ability to make decisions and respond in a timely way. New
technologies — particularly rapidly fielded counter-IED equipment and approaches
— helped coalition forces against the adversaries’ deadliest weapons and saved
lives.646
643 Interviews with MNC-I officials, January and August 2008.
644 See Rob Norland, “No Victory Dances,” interview with General David Petraeus,
Newsweek, August 21, 2008. See also Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General
David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq, New York: PublicAffairs, 2008.
Also, personal communications from GEN Petraeus, 2008.
645 Interviews with MNF-I leaders, MNC-I leaders, and Division Commanders, January
and August 2008.
646 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, and Division and Brigade Commanders,
(continued...)

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Not only did various components of force contribute to the fight, their efforts
were far better integrated than they were several years ago, and that integration also
helps explain security improvements to date. For example, commanders note that the
air component increased the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
assets available to ground commanders, to support and inform their operations. The
greater ground forces presence, and the better information from Iraqis that it
generated, in turn, made possible the more frequent and more effective use of air
strikes.
Commanders on the ground have noted that the increasingly sophisticated
technologies available to SOF have strengthened their efforts to kill or capture high-
value targets. Commanders have stressed, however, that “you can’t get Al Qaeda
by just using SOF.” MNF-I officials have noted that coalition forces tried the SOF-
only approach in Ramadi for four years, but it ultimately proved insufficient. They
add that SOF is most effective when it draws on conventional forces’ intimate
knowledge of local communities, based on the close contacts conventional forces
have with ISF, SOIs, and local tribes. Then, following SOF actions, conventional
forces play the essential role of “holding” the area, with a strong, visible presence.647
Finally, as many practitioners on the ground have pointed out, by the time of the
surge, force leaders, staff, commanders, and troops in the field typically brought
significant previous Iraq experience to the mission. Most leaders and commanders
have served at least one previous tour in Iraq, and their familiarity with Iraqi
governing structures, basic laws, and customs, is markedly greater than the limited
knowledge the first coalition teams brought to Iraq.648 Leaders also point out that
they have had time to absorb the lessons from their earlier tours, including absorbing
the 2006 COIN manual that captured lessons from recent operational experience.649
Additional CRS Reports
For further information about Iraq-related issues, see CRS Report RL31339,
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report
RL32105, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff; CRS Report RL33110,
The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Global War on Terror Operations since
9/11, by Amy Belasco; CRS Report RL34568, U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework and
Status of Forces Agreement: Congressional Response, by Matthew Weed; CRS
Report RL34064, Iraq: Oil and Gas Legislation, Revenue-Sharing, and U.S. Policy,
by Christopher Blanchard; CRS Report RL33834, Defense Contracting in Iraq:
646 (...continued)
January and August 2008.
647 Conversations with MNF-I leaders and staff, January 2008.
648 Participant observation 2003 and 2004, and conversations with coalition leaders, staff,
and commanders, 2008.
649 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, available at [http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/
Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf].

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Issues and Options for Congress, by Valerie Grasso; CRS Report RL34278, FY2008
Supplemental Appropriations for Global War on Terror Military Operations,
International Affairs, and Other Purposes, by Stephen Daggett et. al.; CRS Report
RL34362, Congressional Oversight and Related Issues Concerning the Prospective
Security Agreement Between the United States and Iraq, by Michael John Garcia and
R. Chuck Mason; and CRS Report RS22449, U.S. Forces in Iraq, by JoAnne
O’Bryant and Michael Waterhouse.

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Figure 1. Map of Iraq
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.

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