Order Code RS22079
Updated September 12, 2008
The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The Kurdish-inhabited region of northern Iraq is relatively peaceful and prospering
economically, but the Iraqi Kurds’ political autonomy and political strength in post-
Saddam Iraq is causing friction with Arab leaders in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. However the
overall reduction in violence in Iraq, coupled with continued U.S. political engagement,
is likely to prevent any friction from escalating into a destabilization of northern Iraq.
This report will be updated. Also see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam
Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
Pre-War Background
The Kurds, a mountain-dwelling Indo-European people, comprise the fourth largest
ethnic group in the Middle East, but they have never obtained statehood. The World War
I peace settlement raised hopes of Kurdish independence, but under a subsequent treaty
they were given minority status in their respective countries — Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and
Syria — with smaller enclaves elsewhere in the region. (See dark gray area of map).
Kurds now number between 20 and 25 million, with an estimated 4 to 4.5 million in Iraq,
roughly 15 to 20 percent of the Iraqi population. Most are Sunni Muslims and their
language is akin to Persian. Kurds have had more national rights in Iraq than in any other
host country; successive Iraqi governments allowed some Kurdish language use in
elementary education (1931), recognized a Kurdish nationality (1958), and implemented
limited Kurdish autonomy (1974).
For the three decades that preceded the U.S.-led expulsion of Iraqi forces from
Kuwait in 1991, an intermittent insurgency by Iraqi Kurdish militia (“peshmerga”) faced
increasing suppression, particularly by Saddam Hussein’s regime. Kurdish dissidence in
Iraq was initially led by the Barzani clan, headed by the late storied chieftain Mulla
Mustafa Barzani, who founded the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) after World War II.
He rejected Baghdad’s Kurdish autonomy plan in 1974,1 but his renewed revolt collapsed
1 The government’s so-called Law of Self-Rule (No. 33 of 1974) provided for limited governing
(continued...)
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in 1975 when Iran, then led by the Shah, stopped supporting it under a U.S.-supported
“Algiers Accord” with Iraq. Barzani, granted asylum in the United States, died in 1979,
and KDP leadership passed to his son, Masoud. Some years earlier, a younger, more urban
and left-leaning group under Jalal Talabani emerged; it broke with Barzani in 1964 and,
in 1975, became the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Talabani is married to
Hero Ibrahim Ahmad, daughter of Ibrahim Ahmad, a founder of the KDP; she was unhurt
in a May 4, 2008 bombing of her motorcade in Baghdad. The KDP and the PUK remain
dominant among Iraqi Kurds; their differences have centered on leadership, control over
revenue, and the degree to which to accommodate Baghdad. The KDP, generally more
tribal and traditional, is strongest in the mountainous northern Kurdish areas, bordering
Turkey. The PUK predominates in southern Kurdish areas, bordering Iran.
During the first few years of the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi government tried
to accommodate the Kurds in order to focus on the battlefield. In 1984, the PUK agreed
to cooperate with Baghdad, but the KDP remained opposed. During 1987-1989, the height
of the Iran-Iraq war and its immediate aftermath, Iraq tried to set up a “cordon sanitaire”
along the border with Iran, and it reportedly forced Kurds to leave their area in a so-called
“Anfal (Spoils) campaign,” which some organizations, including Human Rights Watch,
say killed as many as 100,000 Kurds. Iraqi forces launched at least two lethal gas attacks
against Kurdish targets in 1988, including at the town of Halabja (March 16, 1988, about
5,000 killed). Iraq claimed the chemical attacks were responses to Iranian incursions in
the area at that time.
In 1991, U.S.-led containment of Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait paved the
way for the Kurds to carve out substantial autonomy. After Iraqi forces suppressed an
initial post-war Kurdish uprising, U.S. and allied forces in mid-1991 instituted a “no-fly
zone” over the Kurdish areas, protecting the Kurds from Iraqi forces. Later in 1991,
Kurdish leaders joined the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a U.S.-backed opposition
group, and allowed it a presence in Iraqi Kurdish territory from which to operate against
Baghdad in the 1990s. The Iraqi Kurds set up an administration in their enclave and held
elections for a 105-member provisional parliament in 1992. The KDP and the PUK each
gained 50 seats; another five went to Christian groups. No candidate received a clear
majority in the concurrent presidential election, and the two main factions agreed to joint
rule. On October 2, 1992, the Kurdish parliament called for “the creation of a Federated
State of Kurdistan in the liberated part of the country,”adding that this would not
undermine Iraq’s territorial integrity of Iraq. Iraq’s Arab leaders feared that Kurdish
demands for a federation masked a quest for full independence; a concern shared by
neighboring states with large Kurdish populations (Turkey, Iran, and Syria).
In early 1994, the uneasy power-sharing arrangement between the KDP and PUK
collapsed, and armed clashes broke out over territorial control and sharing of joint
revenues. The nadir in PUK-KDP relations occurred in mid-1996, when the KDP briefly
sought help from Saddam’s regime in seizing Irbil, the seat of the regional Kurdish
government, which the PUK had captured in 1994. The Kurdish regional authority
effectively split into KDP and PUK entities. However, the United States spearheaded
negotiations that culminated in a September 1998 “Washington Declaration” between the
1 (...continued)
institutions in some Kurdish regions but failed to garner widespread Kurdish support.
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two parties. It was endorsed when the Kurdish parliament reconvened on October 5, 2002,
by which time the Kurds and other oppositionists were preparing for a likely Bush
Administration war to overthrow Saddam Hussein. In February 2003, opposition groups
met in Kurdish-controlled territory to form a “transition preparation committee,” although
these groups were disappointed by a subsequent U.S. decision to set up a post-Saddam
occupation authority rather than immediately turn over governance to Iraqis.
Immediate Post-Saddam Period
There was virtually no combat in northern Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF), the U.S.-led war that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime by April 9, 2003. The
Kurds entered post-Saddam national politics on an equal footing with Iraq’s Arabs for the
first time ever, by participating in a U.S.-led occupation administration (Coalition
Provisional Authority, CPA). Holding several seats on an advisory “Iraq Governing
Council (IGC),” appointed in July 2003, were Barzani, Talabani, and three independent
Kurds. In the transition government that assumed sovereignty on June 28, 2004, a top
Barzani aide, Hoshyar Zebari, formally became Foreign Minister. This government
operated under a March 8, 2004 “Transitional Administrative Law” (TAL) — a
provisional constitution that laid out a political transition process and citizens’ rights. The
Kurds maintained their autonomous “Kurdistan Regional Government” (KRG), with the
power to alter the application of some national laws. Another provision allowed the
Kurds’ militia, the peshmerga (“those who face death”), numbering about 75,000, to
operate. The TAL did not give the Kurds control of Kirkuk/Tamim province,2 instead
setting up a compensation process for Kurds expelled from Kirkuk by Saddam’s regime.
Over the objections of Iraq’s Shiite Muslim leaders, the Kurds succeeded in inserting a
provision into the TAL that allowed any three provinces to vote down, by a two-thirds
majority, a permanent constitution. (The Kurds constitute an overwhelming majority in
Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah provinces, assuring them of veto power, which they did
not use in the referendum that adopted the constitution on October 15, 2005.)
Current Major Issues
There are several major issues of concern to the Kurds, some of which were
addressed to the benefit of the Kurds in the permanent constitution, which the Kurds
supported overwhelmingly in the October 15, 2005 referendum. The constitution was
adopted over Iraqi Sunni Arab opposition. The constitution and post-Saddam politics –
coupled with the Kurdish leaders’ close relations with the United States – have given the
Kurds political strength to the point where Iraq’s neighbors, and Iraq’s Arab leaders, both
Sunni and Shiite, now see the Iraqi Kurds as asserting excessive demands and slowing
the overall process of political reconciliation.
Participation in the Central Government. Although striving for maximum
autonomy, the Kurds view participation in the post-Saddam central government as
enhancing Kurdish interests. The KDP and PUK allied in the two national parliamentary
elections in 2005. In the January 30, 2005, elections, their Alliance won about 26% of the
vote, earning 75 National Assembly seats out of 275; and it won 82 seats in the 111-seat
2 The text of the TAL can be obtained from the CPA website: [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/
TAL.html].
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Kurdish regional assembly. On that strength, Talabani became President of Iraq. Opting
to stay out of national politics and solidify his base in the Kurdish region, on June 12,
2005, the Kurdish regional assembly named Barzani “President of Kurdistan.” The
Alliance showing in the December 2005 elections for a full term government was not as
strong (53 seats), largely because Sunni Arabs participated in the elections. In the four
year government then selected, Talabani remained President; Zebari stayed Foreign
Minister, and a top Talabani aide, Barham Salih (who was “Prime Minister” of the
Kurdish region before Saddam’s ouster) became one of two deputy prime ministers. The
Kurds have been generally aligned politically with the mainstream Shiite Islamist parties
of Prime Minister Nuri Maliki (Da’wa Party) and his ally, the Islamic Supreme Council
of Iraq (ISCI), led by Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim. The Kurds supported Maliki’s decision to
confront Shiite militias loyal to radical young cleric Moqtada al Sadr in Basra in March
2008, which the Kurds said demonstrated Maliki’s increasing even-handedness.
At the same time, the Kurds continue to develop their regional government. The
“prime minister” of the KRG is Masoud Barzani’s 48 year old nephew, Nechirvan, son
of the Kurdish guerrilla commander Idris who was killed in battle against Iraqi forces in
1987. As part of a power-sharing arrangement between the KDP and PUK, Nechrivan
was slated to be replaced in early 2008 by a PUK official (Kosrat Rasoul), but the parties
agreed to extend Nechirvan’s term – in part because of Rasoul’s health. The peshmerga,
as the most pro-U.S. force in Iraq, primarily remain in Kurdish areas to protect Kurdish
inhabitants there. However, some peshmerga and other Kurds have joined coalition-
trained national Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and have served in some mostly Arab
northern cities such as Mosul and Tal Affar. Others served in the 2007 “Baghdad security
plan” that accompanied the U.S. “troop surge.” On May 30, 2007, formal security control
over the three KRG provinces were handed from the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq to ISF
units composed mostly of Kurds and peshmerga fighters. The Kurds reportedly want the
salaries of the peshmerga to be paid out of national revenues, but the government did not
agree to that in the 2008 budget adopted February 13, 2008. That budget maintained the
share for the KRG region at 17% of total revenue, despite Iraqi Arab attempts to cut the
allocation to 13%, although the Kurds agreed to abide by a revenue share determined by
a census that is to be held. The 2008 budget also allocated about $2 billion in capital
investment in the KRG areas, a figure now closer to $3 billion following the August 2008
passage of a 2008 supplemental Iraqi budget.
Autonomy and Independence. The constitution3 not only retained substantial
Kurdish autonomy but also included the Kurds insistence on “federalism” — de-facto or
formal creation of “regions,” each with its own regional government. The constitution
recognizes the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah as a legal
“region” (Article 113) with the power to amend the application of national laws not
specifically under national government purview; to maintain internal security forces; and
to establish embassies abroad (Article 117). Arabic and Kurdish are official languages
(Article 4). Kurdish leaders — possibly at odds with mainstream Kurdish opinion — have
said that, for now, they would not push for independence, substantially easing the
concerns of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Arab Iraq. However, there is concern among these
parties that younger Kurds who will eventually move into key positions in the KRG might
3 The text of the constitution is at [http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/
12/ar2005101201450.htm].
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ultimately seek independence. In September 2007, the Senate endorsed the federalism
concept for Iraq in an amendment to the FY2008 defense authorization bill (P.L. 110-
181), a provision in the final law.
Kirkuk. The Iraqi Kurds’s insistence that Kirkuk and surrounding Tamim Province
are historically Kurdish and should be integrated into the KRG is causing significant
tensions with Iraq’ Arab leaders and with the Turkomen minority in Kirkuk. These
tensions have already delayed the holding of provincial elections that U.S. officials
believe are needed to better integrate Sunni Arabs into the post-Saddam political
structure. At Kurdish insistence, the constitution provided for a process of resettling
Kurds displaced from Kirkuk and the holding of a referendum, to be conducted by
December 31, 2007 (“Article 140 process”), to determine whether its citizens want to
formally join the Kurdistan region. To avoid further escalation of tensions – the Kurds
have been strengthening their position in Kirkuk by pressuring the city’s Arabs, both
Sunni and Shiite, and Turkomans to leave – the Bush Administration persuaded the
Kurds to grudgingly accept a delay of the referendum; no date is now set for it. The Kurds
did accept a temporary compromise under which the U.N. Assistance Mission-Iraq
(UNAMI) is conducting analyses of whether or not to integrate some Kurdish-inhabited
cities into the KRG, including Khanaqin, Sinjar, Makhmour, Akre, Hamdaniya, Tal Afar,
Tilkaif, Shekhan, and Khanaqin.
The Kirkuk dispute caused a presidential veto of the July 22, 2008 COR vote on an
election law needed to hold provincial elections. The draft law, passed despite a Kurdish
walkout from the COR, provided for equal division of power in Kirkuk (between Kurds,
Arabs, and Turkomans) until its status is finally resolved, and for replacement of the
peshmerga with the Iraqi Security Forces in the province. The vote prompted Kurdish
opposition and subsequent communal strife in Kirkuk city. The COR and the major blocs
subsequently held several meetings on August 3, 4, and 5 to try to reach a compromise
on the election law, but no formula was found acceptable to all sides before the COR
ajourned for summer recess on August 6. No deal was struck among the major blocs
during the recess before the COR reconvened on September 9, despite UNAMI’s August
20, 2008 announcement – intended to pave the way for the election law – that UNAMI
would propose, by late October 2008, a “grand deal” on Kirkuk and other dispute
territories. Even if the blocs come to an agreement and an election law is passed,
observers estimate it will take about four months subsequently to hold the elections,
which were originally targeted for October 1, 2008. Also in August 2008, tensions
erupted over the central government’s replacement of the peshmerga with the ISF in
securing several towns of Diyala Province inhabited by significant numbers of Kurds.
The Kirkuk issue is also considered “existential” by Turkey, which fears that
integration of Kirkuk to the KRG would propel a Kurdish drive for independence. Kirkuk
purportedly sits on 10% of Iraq’s overall proven oil reserves of about 112 billion barrels.
Turkey also sees itself as protector of the Turkoman minority in the north.
Control Over Oil Resources/Oil Laws. Control over oil revenues and new
exploration is also a hotly debated issue between Baghdad and the KRG. Revenue earned
from oil fields in the Kurdish region are deposited into the national treasury, but the
Kurds want to keep control of revenues from any new discoveries in the KRG region and
they want to be able to control new investment and exploration. Iraq’s cabinet approved
a draft version of a national hydrocarbon framework law in February 2007, but Kurdish
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officials withdrew support from a revised version passed by the Iraqi cabinet in July 2007
on the grounds that it, and related implementing laws, would centralize control over oil
development and administration. In June 2008, Baghdad and the KRG formed a panel to
try to achieve compromise on the national framework oil law, and the U.S. Embassy
stated in August 2008 that an agreement might be near on a revenue sharing law. An
earlier draft of that law would empower the federal government to collect oil and gas
revenue, and reserve 17% of oil revenues for the KRG. However, the KRG region
continues to sign development deals with foreign firms under its own oil law adopted in
August 2007. Iraq’s Oil Minister has called the Kurdish deals and the KRG oil law
“illegal.” To date, the KRG has signed development deals with: Genel (Turkey), Hunt Oil
(U.S.), Dana Gas (UAE), BP (Britain), DNA Asa (Norway), OMV (Austria), and SK
(South Korea). The Hunt Oil deal has attracted controversy because of the firms’ leaders’
ties to Bush Administration officials and the perception that the deal contradicted the U.S.
commitment to the primacy of the central government. Press reports are mixed over
whether the Administration tacitly blessed the Hunt deal.
Safehaven for Other Kurdish Opposition Fighters. Turkey accuses the Iraqi
Kurds of providing safe haven to the Turkish Kurdish opposition Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK); the accusation is leveled particularly at the KDP, whose strongholds border
Turkey. The PKK is named foreign terrorist organization (FTO) by the United States. The
KRG has, at times, such as the mid 1990s, fought the PKK, but many Iraqi Kurds view
them as brethren and support the PKK struggle against Turkey. In June 2007, Turkey
moved about 100,000 forces to the border after Barzani warned that Iraq’s Kurds could
conduct attacks in Turkey’s Kurdish cities if Turkey were to invade northern Iraq. During
September-October 2007, PKK guerrillas killed about 40 Turkish soldiers. On October
17, 2007 the Turkish government obtained parliamentary approval for a major incursion
into northern Iraq against the PKK, causing stepped up U.S. diplomacy to head off that
threat. U.S. officials reportedly set up a center in Ankara to share intelligence with Turkey
on PKK locations, contributing to Turkey’s apparent decision to limit its intervention to
air strikes and small incursions. A related dispute, which appears to align Iran and
Turkey, is Iran’s shelling of border towns in northern Iraq that Iran says are the sites
where the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), an Iranian Kurdish separatist group,
is staging incursions into Iran.
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. 2/11/2005