Order Code RL32250
Colombia: Issues for Congress
Updated September 12, 2008
Colleen W. Cook
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Clare Ribando Seelke
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Colombia: Issues for Congress
Summary
In the last decade, Colombia — a key U.S. ally in South America — has made
significant progress in reasserting government control over much of its territory,
combating drug trafficking and terrorist activities by illegally armed groups, and
reducing poverty. Since the development of Plan Colombia in 1999, the Colombian
government, with substantial U.S. support, has stepped up its counternarcotics and
security efforts. Congress has provided more than $6 billion to support Plan
Colombia from FY2000 through FY2008. Since 2002, Congress has granted the
State Department expanded authority to use counternarcotics funds for a unified
campaign to fight both drug trafficking and terrorist organizations in Colombia.
Proponents of the current U.S. policy towards Colombia point to the inroads that
have been made in improving security conditions in Colombia and in weakening the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas. Critics argue that,
despite these security improvements, U.S. policy has not rigorously promoted human
rights, provided for sustainable economic alternatives for drug crop farmers, or
reduced the amount of drugs available in the United States.
President Alvaro Uribe, re-elected in May 2006, has made headway in
addressing Colombia’s 40-year plus conflict with the country’s leftist guerrillas, as
well as the rightist paramilitary groups that have been active since the 1980s. Uribe
enjoys strong popular support, which has not been significantly affected by an
ongoing scandal concerning past government ties to illegal paramilitary groups.
Uribe’s popularity soared after Colombia’s March 2008 raid of a FARC camp in
Ecuador resulted in the killing of a top guerrilla commander and the seizure of his
computer files. It spiked again following the Colombian military’s successful July
2, 2008 rescue of 15 hostages long held by the FARC. Those hostages included three
U.S. defense contractors and a former Colombian presidential candidate. Many
Colombians are calling for President Uribe to seek a third presidential term, a move
that would require a constitutional amendment.
Concerns in the 110th Congress regarding Colombia have focused on funding
levels and U.S. policy regarding Plan Colombia, U.S. hostages, trade, and human
rights. The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161) attempted to
raise the level of U.S. funding provided for economic and social aid closer to that
provided for security-related programs. In 2007, the Senate passed a resolution.
(S.Con.Res. 53) demanding that the FARC release the 3 U.S. contractors that were
being held in Colombia. In July 2008, both the House and Senate passed resolutions
expressing gratitude to the Colombian government for successfully rescuing the U.S.
hostages (H.Con.Res. 389/S.Res. 627). The House also passed an amendment
(H.Amdt. 112 to H.R. 5959) expressing the importance of continuing to provide U.S.
assistance to Colombia. While acknowledging the progress that the Uribe
government has made in improving security conditions in Colombia, some Members
of Congress have expressed concerns about labor activist killings and the para-
political scandal. These issues came to the fore during consideration of the U.S.-
Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CFTA). For more information on CFTA, see CRS
Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Economic and
Political Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal. This report will be updated.

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Contents
Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Political Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The First Uribe Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Second Uribe Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Progress in Addressing Colombia’s Internal Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Roots of the Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
National Liberation Army (ELN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Paramilitaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Remaining Political Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Parapolitical Scandal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Justice and Peace Law and Demobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Human Rights Violations by Colombian Security Forces . . . . . . . . . . 13
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Landmines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Colombia and Global Drug Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Colombia and Regional Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Cross-Border Incursions and Safe Havens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Plan Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP) . . . . . . . . . . 19
Aerial Eradication and Alternative Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Funding for Plan Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Paramilitary Demobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Internal Displacement and Refugee Flows to the United States . . . . . 26
U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
List of Tables
Table 1. UNODC Coca Cultivation in Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Table 2. U.S. ONDCP Coca Cultivation in Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Colombia: FY2007-FY2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Table 4. U.S. Assistance For Plan Colombia, FY2000-FY2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

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Colombia: Issues for Congress
Recent Developments
On September 10, 2008, the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP) reported that while the area under coca cultivation in Colombia increased
slightly in 2007, the productivity of that area fell sharply due to aerial spraying and
manual eradication efforts.
On August 19, 2008, the Colombian Prosecutor General’s office ordered the
release of Mario Uribe, a second cousin and ally of President Alvaro Uribe, stating
that the evidence against him did not merit his imprisonment while he awaits his trial.
Mario Uribe was arrested a few months ago on charges of suspected collusion with
paramilitary groups. Some 69 Colombian legislators, many from pro-Uribe parties,
are under investigation for possible paramilitary ties.
On July 28, 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a certification to
Congress asserting that the Colombian government and armed forces are meeting the
statutory requirements with regard to human rights.
On July 2, 2008, the Colombian military carried out a successful operation to
rescue 15 hostages long held by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) guerrillas. Those hostages included three U.S. citizens — Marc Gonsalves,
Thomas Howes, and Keith Stansell — held since February 2003 and former
Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt held since February 2002.
On May 25, 2008, the FARC confirmed that its leader, Manuel Marulanda, had
died of a heart attack in March.
In mid-May 2008, President Uribe extradited 15 top paramilitary leaders,
including Salvador Mancuso and Carlos Mario Jiménez, to the United States to stand
trial on drug trafficking charges.
On May 15, 2008, Interpol released a report confirming that Colombian officials
did not tamper with computer files seized during a raid of a FARC camp in Ecuador.
On April 10, 2008, the House voted 224-195 in favor of changing the rules that
had allowed the President to “fast-track” trade agreements through Congress,
effectively putting congressional consideration of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade
Agreement (CFTA) on hold.
On March 18, 2008, after extended debate, the OAS adopted a resolution
rejecting, but not condemning, Colombia’s bombing raid of a FARC camp in

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CRS-2
Ecuador and calling for the restoration of diplomatic ties between Ecuador and
Colombia. Those ties have still not fully been restored.
On March 11, 2008, the State Department released its annual human rights
report, which stated that “although serious problems remained, the [Colombian]
government’s respect for human rights continued to improve, which was particularly
evident by progress in implementing the Justice and Peace Law.” (See the full report
at [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/].)
On March 5, 2008, a second member of the FARC’s secretariat, Ivan Rios, was
murdered by his own security agent.
On March 1, 2008, the Colombian military bombed a FARC camp in Ecuador,
killing at least 25 people, among them, Raúl Reyes, the terrorist groups’ second
highest commander. Computer files found on laptops seized during the raid allege
that the government of Hugo Chávez of Venezuela was planning to provide millions
of dollars in assistance to the FARC for weapons purchases.
Introduction
Colombia is a South American nation of roughly 44 million people, the third
most populous country in Latin America. It is an ethnically diverse nation — 58%
of the population is mestizo, 20% white, 18% black, 3% black-Amerindian, and 1%
Amerindian.1 Colombia has one of the oldest democracies in Latin America, yet it
has been plagued by violence and a conflict that has been ongoing for over 40 years.
The country’s rugged terrain historically made it difficult to establish state control
over large swaths of the nation’s territory. High rates of poverty have also
contributed to social upheaval in the country. In 2006, 45% of Colombians lived in
poverty, down from close to 60% in 2000.2 Colombia’s ability to reduce poverty in
recent years is at least partly due to increases in the country’s economic growth rates,
which reached 7.5% in 2007.3 Security improvements and a more stable economy
have likely led to the recent increase in foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI grew
from roughly $6.5 billion in 2006 to some $9 billion in 2007, with the bulk of new
investments occurring in the oil, manufacturing, and mining sectors. Despite the
1 U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Colombia,” March 2008.
2 These statistics are taken from the Colombia National Planning Department as cited by the
U.S. Department of State. See U.S. Department of State, “Charting Colombia’s Progress,”
March 2008. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean’s (ECLAC) Social Panorama 2006 data also showed a decline in both poverty
and indigence rates since 1999. ECLAC reported that 55% of Colombians lived in poverty
in 1999, with 27% living in indigence. By 2005 those poverty and indigence rates fell to
47% and 20%, respectively. No new data on poverty rates in Colombia were included in
ECLAC’s Social Panorama 2007.
3 “Country Report - Colombia,” Economist Intelligence Unit, August 2008.

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CRS-3
Colombian government’s success in reducing poverty levels, income inequality and
land concentration are still significant problems.4
Drug trafficking has helped to perpetuate Colombia’s conflict by providing
earnings to both left- and right-wing armed groups. The two main leftist guerrilla
groups are the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN), both of which have
kidnapped individuals for ransoms, committed serious human rights violations, and
carried out terrorist activities. Most of the rightist paramilitary groups were
coordinated by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which disbanded
in 2006 after more than 30,000 of its members demobilized. Members of the AUC
have been accused of gross human rights abuses and collusion with the Colombian
Armed Forces in their fight against the FARC and ELN.
Colombia is a democratic nation with a bicameral legislature. The Liberal and
Conservative parties, which dominated Colombian politics from the 19th century
through much of the 20th century, have been weakened by their perceived inability
to resolve the roots of violence in Colombia. In 2002, Colombians elected an
independent, Alvaro Uribe, as President, largely because of his aggressive plan to
reduce violence in Colombia. The major political parties currently represented in the
Colombian Congress include the Liberal, Conservative, Alternative Democratic Pole,
National Unity, and Radical Change parties, as well as several smaller political
movements. The legitimacy of the Colombian Congress has been seriously called
into question as roughly a fifth of its members, many from pro-Uribe parties, have
either been jailed or placed under investigation for allegedly having ties to illegal
paramilitary groups.5
Political Situation
The First Uribe Administration
During his first term (2002-2006), President Uribe took steps to fulfill his
campaign promises to address the paramilitary problem, defeat leftist guerrilla
insurgents, and combat narcotics trafficking.6 President Uribe took a hard-line
approach to negotiations with illegally armed groups, declaring that the government
would only negotiate with those groups who are willing to give up terrorism and
agree to a cease-fire, including paramilitary groups with which former President
Pastrana had refused to negotiate. Negotiations with the AUC paramilitaries resulted
4 ECLAC reports that Colombia is now the fourth most unequal society in Latin America
and the Caribbean, after Bolivia, Brazil, and Honduras. Colombia also has one of the most
unequal land tenure patterns in Latin America, with 0.4% of land holders owning 61% of
registered rural property. See ECLAC, Social Panorama 2006; J.D. Jaramillo, El Recurso
Suelo y la Competividad del Sector Agrario Colombiano, 2004.
5 Frank Bajak, “Head of Colombian Governing Party Arrested for Alleged Paramilitary
Ties,” Associated Press, July 25, 2008.
6 See CRS Report RS21242, Colombia: The Uribe Administration and Congressional
Concerns, by Nina M. Serafino.

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CRS-4
in a July 15, 2003 agreement in which the AUC agreed to demobilize its members
by the end of 2005. President Uribe endorsed a controversial Justice and Peace Law
that was designed to provide a framework for those demobilizations. At the same
time, Uribe sought to build up the size and strength of the Colombian military and
police, whose forces stepped up their counternarcotics operations and activities
against the FARC. High public approval ratings, likely due to reductions in violence
that had occurred largely as a result of his security policies, prompted Colombia to
amend its constitution in 2005 to permit Uribe to run for re-election.
The Second Uribe Administration
On August 7, 2006, Alvaro Uribe was sworn into his second term as president.
Pro-Uribe parties won a majority of both houses of congress in elections held in
March 2006, giving President Uribe a strong mandate as he started his second term.
The domination of pro-Uribe parties, most of them new, appears to have further
weakened the traditionally dominant Liberal and Conservative parties. Nevertheless,
there is not a high level of unity among the pro-Uribe parties.
Two years into his second presidential term, President Uribe retains widespread
support in Colombia. His popularity derives from the progress his government has
made in improving security situation in Colombia, demobilizing the AUC, and
defeating the FARC and ELN. According to U.S. State Department figures,
kidnappings in Colombia have declined by 83%, homicides by 40%, and terrorist
attacks by 76% since Uribe first took office in 2002. Police are now present in all of
Colombia’s 1,099 municipalities, including areas from which they had been
previously ousted by guerrilla groups.7 President Uribe has also overseen the
demobilization and disarmament of more than 31,000 AUC paramilitaries, although
the demobilization process has been criticized for failing to provide adequate
punishments for perpetrators and reparations to victims of paramilitary violence.8 On
March 1, 2008, the Colombian military successfully carried out a raid of a FARC
camp in Ecuador that resulted in the killing of a top FARC leader and the capture of
his computer files. This was followed by a successful operation on July 2 that
resulted in the rescue of 15 hostages long held by the FARC, including three U.S.
defense contractors and a former Colombian presidential candidate.
Despite this progress, Colombia continues to face serious challenges. While its
numbers have been dramatically reduced in the last year or so, the FARC still has
thousands of fighters capable of carrying out terrorist attacks, kidnappings, and other
illicit activities. Not all paramilitaries demobilized, and still others have returned to
paramilitary activities since demobilizing. Moreover, there are credible reports that
a new generation of paramilitaries is forming that is much more criminal than
political in nature.9 Further concern has focused on the ability of the government to
7 U.S. Department of State, “Charting Colombia’s Progress,” March 2008.
8 Latin American Working Group, “The Other Half of the Truth,” June 2008.
9 Those concerns are cited in the U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices 2007, March 2008. See also: International Crisis Group (ICG),
(continued...)

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CRS-5
re-incorporate ex-fighters into law-abiding civilian life and to provide some type of
restitution to their victims.10 Although President Uribe has not been personally
implicated, the Colombian Supreme Court is pursuing ongoing investigations into
possible links between Colombian politicians, many from pro-Uribe parties, and
paramilitary groups. Ongoing peace talks with the ELN have yet to yield any
tangible results. Since the 2006 elections, there have several scandals involving
some Colombian military officials and lingering concerns exist about extrajudicial
killings committed by Colombian security forces.11 Drug production and trafficking
continue to generate millions of dollars annually for illicit groups. While ONDCP
recently reported large declines in Colombia’s coca production potential, a June 2008
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report found that, although yields were
down, the coca acreage planted in Colombia increased by 27% in 2007. Additionally,
as a result of the ongoing conflict and drug-related violence, Colombia now has one
of the largest populations of internally displaced persons in the world, with some
250,000 people displaced in 2007.
President Uribe’s high approval ratings have led many of his supporters to urge
him to seek a third presidential term. In order for Uribe to be re-elected, the
Colombian constitution would have to be amended (as it was in 2005) to allow him
to seek a second term. Uribe’s supporters have delivered a petition with five million
signatures to Colombian election authorities urging them to convoke a referendum
on whether to reform the constitution to allow a third Uribe term. The petition must
now be debated in the Colombian legislature and reviewed by the country’s
Constitutional Court. President Uribe has yet to publicly comment on whether or not
he wishes to run again. Many Colombian and international observers have urged
Uribe not to seek another term out of respect for the integrity of Colombian
democracy. Some have expressed concerns about his past conflicts with Colombian
democratic institutions and his authoritarian tendencies.12
Progress in Addressing Colombia’s Internal Conflict
Roots of the Conflict. Colombia has a long tradition of civilian, democratic
rule, yet has been plagued by violence throughout its history. This violence has its
roots in a lack of state control over much of Colombian territory, and a long history
of poverty and inequality. Conflicts between the Conservative and Liberal parties led
to two bloody civil wars — The War of a Thousand Days (1899-1903) and The
Violence (1946 to 1957) — that killed hundreds of thousands of Colombians. While
9 (...continued)
“Colombia’s New Armed Groups,” May 2007; Chris Kraul, “In Colombia, Paramilitary
Gangs Control Much of Guajira State,” Los Angeles Times, August 31, 2008.
10 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), “Post-Election Colombia: Careful
Monitoring of the Paramilitary Demobilization Process Should be Top Priority of
Congress,” May 30, 2006; ICG, “Colombia: Towards Peace and Justice?,” March 14, 2006.
11 “Amnesty Says all Sides in Colombia Have Bloody Hands,” EFE, May 28, 2008; Chris
Kraul, “Colombia Military Atrocities Alleged,” Los Angeles Times, August 20, 2008.
12 Patricia Markey, “Colombia’s Uribe Mulls Re-election, but Will he run?” Reuters, August
22, 2008; “Editorial: Mr Uribe’s Choice,” New York Times, August 22, 2008.

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CRS-6
a power sharing agreement (the so-called National Front pact) between the Liberal
and Conservative parties ended the civil war in 1957, it did not address the root
causes of the violence. Numerous leftist guerrilla groups inspired by the Cuban
Revolution formed in the 1960s as a response to state neglect and poverty. Right-
wing paramilitaries were formed in the 1980s to defend landowners, many of them
drug traffickers, against guerrillas. The shift of cocaine production from Peru and
Bolivia to Colombia in the 1980s increased drug violence, and provided a new source
of revenue for both guerrillas and paramilitaries. The main paramilitary organization,
the AUC, began demobilization in 2003 and disbanded in 2006. Major armed groups
today are the FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the new generation
of paramilitary groups.
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The FARC can
trace its roots to armed peasant self-defense groups that had emerged during “the
Violence” of the 1940-50s. By the 1960s, those groups, located in the remote,
mountainous regions between Bogotá and Cali, had developed into a regional
guerrilla movement. In 1966, the guerrillas announced the formation of the FARC.13
The FARC is the oldest, largest, and best-equipped and financed guerrilla
organization in Latin America. It mainly operates in rural areas, but has shown its
ability to strike in urban areas, including Bogotá. It conducts bombings, murders,
mortar attacks, kidnappings, extortion, and hijackings mainly against Colombian
targets. The FARC is fully engaged in the drug trade, including cultivation, taxation
of drug crops, and distribution, from which it reaps significant profits. In recent
years, the FARC has increased it activities along Colombia’s borders with Ecuador
and Venezuela.
During the Pastrana Administration, the FARC entered into peace negotiations
under which it was granted control of a Switzerland-size territorial refuge while the
peace process was underway. With continued FARC military activity, including the
kidnapping of a Colombian senator, President Pastrana halted the negotiations and
ordered the military to retake control of the designated territory. During the
inauguration of President Uribe on August 7, 2002, the FARC launched a mortar
attack on the Presidential Palace that killed 21 residents of a nearby neighborhood.
In mid-2003, the Colombian military’s Plan Patriota, a campaign to recapture
FARC-held territory, began operations in what was largely seen as a successful effort
to secure the capital and environs of Bogotá. In 2004, military operations, conducted
by up to 17,000 troops, turned to regaining FARC territory in the southern and
eastern regions of the country. The FARC initially responded with a tactical
withdrawal of forces, but launched a new counter-offensive in February 2005. The
conflict with the FARC has, however, largely remained in the countryside and the
FARC was unable to disrupt President Uribe’s August 7, 2006, inauguration. In
2006 the FARC controlled an estimated 30% of Colombian territory.14 The
Colombian government maintains that Plan Patriota enabled it to reduce FARC
13 See Mark Chernick, “FARC-EP: From Liberal to Marxist to Post-Cold War Guerrillas,”
in Terror, Insurgency, and the State, edited by Marianne Heiberg, et al., Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007.
14 “Colombia: Executive Summary,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, August 24, 2006.

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CRS-7
ranks, recapture land held by the FARC, and confiscate large amounts of materials
used to process cocaine. Despite these advances, critics pointed out that large
numbers of civilians were displaced during the campaign.
Colombia’s Raid of a FARC Camp in Ecuador. On March 1, 2008, the
Colombian military bombed a FARC camp in Ecuador, killing at least 25 people,
among them, Raúl Reyes, the terrorist groups’ second highest commander whose real
name is reportedly Luis Edgar Devia Silva, four Mexican students visiting the camp,
and one Ecuadorian citizen reportedly tied to the FARC.15 This mission marked the
first time in the Colombian military’s 44-year struggle against the leftist FARC
insurgency that it has been able to kill a member of the FARC’s seven-member ruling
secretariat. A few days later, Ivan Rios, another member of the FARC’s secretariat,
was murdered by his own security agent. Many assert that these high-level killings
dealt a significant blow to the FARC, particularly following a FARC announcement
in May 2008 that its top commander, Manuel Marulanda, had died in March of a
heart attack.
During the raid, the Colombian military captured three laptop computers that
allegedly belonged to Reyes. Computer files on those laptops allege that the
government of Hugo Chávez of Venezuela was planning to provide millions of
dollars in assistance to the FARC for weapons purchases. As a result, some
Members of Congress called for the Bush Administration to include Venezuela on
the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list; the Administration began an inquiry into the
matter in March. The files also allege that President Raphael Correa of Ecuador
received campaign donations from the FARC in 2006. Both Chávez and Correa
vigorously reject these claims. Venezuelan officials have dismissed the data as
having been fabricated even though Interpol verified in May 2008 that the files had
not been tampered with since they were seized. In a welcome turn of events on June
8, 2008, President Chávez called for the FARC to release all hostages
unconditionally and to cease military operations, maintaining that guerrilla warfare
“has passed into history,” signaling a major change in his public stance.16
Hostage Releases, Escapes, and the July 2nd 2008 Hostage Rescue.
Since 2007, prisoner escapes, hostage deaths, and later hostage releases have focused
international attention on the plight of hundreds of hostages held by the FARC. In
April 2007, Colombian police office Jhon Frank Pinchao escaped after eight years
in FARC custody. In June 2007, eleven departmental deputies who had held since
2002 were reportedly executed by the FARC.17 In August 2007, President Uribe
authorized leftist Senator Piedad Córdoba and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez
to conduct dialogue with the FARC to secure the release of some 45 high-profile
hostages, including the three American contractors held since 2003. Negotiations
stalled in November due to the FARC’s failure to provide proof of life of the
15 Simon Romero, “Files Released by Colombia Point to Venezuelan Bid to Arm Rebels,”
New York Times, March 30, 2008.
16 “Analysis: Chávez Reverses FARC Stance, Domestic Moves Ahead of Elections,” Open
Source Center, June 19, 2008.
17 U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007, March 11,
2008.

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CRS-8
hostages and allegations that President Chávez inappropriately contacted the head of
the Colombian Army. However, the Colombian government did find over a dozen
proof of life videos, including videos of the three American contractors, in a
November 2007 raid on the FARC. In December 2007, Fernando Araujo, a former
Minister of Development, escaped from the FARC after being held as a hostage for
more than six years. From February through July 2008, Araujo served as Colombia’s
Foreign Minister.
Six hostage releases occurred during early 2008. In January 2008, two hostages
were released to a delegation led by President Chávez and the Colombian
government was able to successfully reunite one of the hostages with a son born to
her in captivity that the FARC had turned over to the Colombian foster care system
more than two years ago. A day after the two hostages’ release, Chávez’s called for
the international community to no longer label the FARC and the ELN as terrorist
groups prompted widespread condemnation. Nevertheless, his role in the release of
hostages continued. On February 27, 2008, the FARC released four former members
of the Colombian Congress to Venezuelan officials in Colombian territory.
On July 2, 2008, after months of planning and tracking the FARC, the
Colombian military successfully tricked the FARC into releasing 15 of their prized
hostages. Those hostages included three U.S. defense contractors — Marc Gonsalves,
Thomas Howes, and Keith Stansell — held since February 2003 and former
Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt held since February 2002. The
success of the bloodless hostage rescue has been widely cited as an example of the
Colombian military’s increasing professionalism and intelligence capabilities, which
has occurred largely as a result of years of the U.S. training and security assistance
programs provided through Plan Colombia.18 Some press reports indicate that the
United States provided millions of dollars to help Colombia find and rescue the
hostages, including tactical support and training provided by the U.S. military and
technical assistance supplied by a unit of planners, intelligence analysts, and hostage
negotiators based in Bogotá.19
Many analysts have hailed the recent hostage rescue as evidence that the FARC
is disintegrating, but others think it may be too premature to draw that conclusion.
This year the FARC has lost three of its top commanders and suffered a series of
humiliating defeats at the hands of the Colombian military. Their communications
systems have been infiltrated, their leadership is in disarray, and reports indicate that
many guerrilla units are running short on supplies.20 By mid-June 2008, more than
1,506 FARC guerrillas had voluntarily demobilized. Many rebels reportedly hoped
to take advantage of the Colombian government’s offer to allow the Justice and
18 “Colombian Officials Recount Rescue Plan; Commandos Took Acting Classes to
Prepare,” Washington Post, July 6, 2008.
19 “U.S. aid was a key to the Hostage Rescue,” New York Times, July 13, 2008.
20 Patrick McDonnell and Chris Kraul, “Colombian Rebels Splintering,” Los Angeles Times,
July 5, 2008; “After the War in Colombia,” El Pais, July 10, 2008.

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Peace Law’s provisions to apply to those who surrender.21 Although the FARC, now
led by Alfonso Cano, is still unwilling to negotiate with the Uribe government, their
position is much weaker than it was just months ago.
National Liberation Army (ELN). The smaller ELN was formed in 1965,
inspired by the ideas of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. With a membership of about
3,000, it is less active than the FARC, but has still been able to carry out a number
of high profile kidnappings and bombings. In addition to the rural civilian
population, the ELN has also targeted the country’s infrastructure, especially its oil
and electricity sectors. Its operations are mainly located in the rural areas of the
north, northeast, the Middle Magdalena Valley, and along the Venezuelan border.
The ELN earns funds from the taxation of illegal crops, extortion, attacks on the
Caño-Limón pipeline, and kidnapping for ransom. Its size and military strength have
been dramatically reduced since the late 1990s.22
In recent years, the ELN has shown more of a willingness to attempt peace
negotiations with the government. In December 2003, President Uribe revealed that
he had met with an ELN leader to discuss possible peace initiatives, but a subsequent
ELN statement ruled out any possibility of demobilization. However, in 2004, the
ELN and the Colombian government accepted an offer from Mexican President
Vicente Fox to facilitate peace negotiations. In June 2004, Mexico named Andres
Valencia, a former Mexican ambassador to Israel, as its facilitator. Meetings with
Valencia and the ELN occurred, but the rebel group rejected Uribe’s offer of a cease-
fire.23 In April 2005, the ELN rejected further Mexican facilitation after Mexico
voted to condemn Cuba at the U.N. Human Rights Commission. The Colombian
government and the ELN held several rounds of exploratory talks in Havana, Cuba
between December 2005 and August 2007, but those talks resulted in no concrete
agreements. In June 2008, the ELN announced that it would not continue negotiating
with the Uribe government for the time being. President Uribe responded by
ordering the Colombian military to step up its operations against the ELN.24
Paramilitaries. Paramilitary groups trace their origins to the 1980s when
wealthy ranchers and farmers, including drug traffickers, organized armed groups to
protect them from kidnappings and extortion plots by the FARC and ELN. The
largest paramilitary organization, the AUC, was formed in 1997 as an umbrella
organization for a number of local and regional paramilitary groups operating in the
country. As discussed in more detail below, the AUC disbanded in 2006. Not all
paramilitary groups joined the AUC umbrella. The AUC conducted massacres and
assassinations of suspected insurgent supporters and directly engaged the FARC and
21 “Closing the net on the FARC, Striking at the ELN,” Latin American Security and
Strategy Review, July 2008.
22 International Crisis Group, “Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN?” October 11,
2007.
23 Kate Joynes, “ELN Rebels Rebut Colombian Government’s Peace Pledge,” WMRC Daily
Analysis, July 12, 2004.
24 “Closing the net on the FARC, Striking at the ELN,”Latin American Security and Strategy
Review, July 2008.

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CRS-10
ELN in military battles. The Armed Forces of Colombia have long been accused of
turning a blind eye to these activities. The AUC, like the FARC, earned most of its
funding from drug trafficking. Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism estimated
that in 2006 paramilitaries handled 40% of Colombian cocaine exports.25
On July 15, 2003, the AUC reached an agreement with the Colombian
government to demobilize its troops by the end of 2005. At that time, the State
Department estimated that there were between 8,000 and 11,000 members of the
AUC, although press reports used numbers ranging up to 20,000. The
demobilization process begun in 2004 officially ended in April 2006. As of that
time, over 30,000 AUC members had demobilized and turned in over 17,000
weapons.26 AUC leaders remained at large, however, until August 2006 when
President Uribe ordered them to surrender to the government to benefit from the
provisions of the Peace and Justice Law.27 It remains to be seen how Uribe’s May
2008 decision to extradite 15 paramilitary leaders to the United States to stand trial
for drug trafficking charges will affect ongoing investigations into the “para-
political” scandal, as well as efforts to ensure that victims of paramilitary violence
receive compensation for their suffering.
Not all paramilitaries demobilized, and still others have returned to paramilitary
activities since demobilizing. Moreover, there are credible reports that a new
generation of paramilitaries has formed and may be recruiting demobilized
paramilitaries. Membership in the new paramilitary organizations is estimated at
3,000 to 9,000. Some former AUC members continue to be active in the drug trade.28
There are reports that the AUC continues to take part in drug trafficking, in spite of
the demobilization process. Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism reports that
since demobilization the AUC’s purpose has shifted from combating the FARC and
ELN to protecting drug trafficking networks and preventing the extradition of leaders
wanted on drug trafficking charges in the United States. The State Department and
U.N. both note that the new illegal groups do not share the political ideology of the
AUC, which sought to defeat leftist guerrillas. Despite their ad-hoc nature, the new
illegal groups pose a threat to Colombian civilians and the Uribe government is
taking steps to combat them.29
25 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, and, “Autodefensas
Unidas de Colombia,” Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, August 10, 2006.
26 “Only 2% of 30,150 Demobilized Paramilitaries to Stand Trial,” Associated Press, April
18, 2006.
27 Vicente Castaño, brother of AUC founder Carlos Castaño, remains at large. Vicente
Castaño is under investigation by Colombian authorities for ordering the 2004 murder of his
brother who reportedly planned to turn paramilitary leaders over for extradition to the
United States as part of peace negotiations.
28 International Crisis Group, Colombia’s New Armed Groups, May 10, 2007; WOLA,
Captive States: Organized Crime and Human Rights in Latin America, October 2007.
29 United Nations General Assembly - Human Rights Council, “Report of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia,”
February 29, 2008; U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum of Understanding Concerning
(continued...)

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CRS-11
Remaining Political Challenges
Parapolitical Scandal. A scandal involving alleged paramilitary ties to
politicians, including current members of the Colombian Congress, erupted in
November 2006. Paramilitary leaders claimed to control 35% of the congress in
2005. On November 9, 2006, the Colombian Supreme Court ordered the arrest of
three congressmen for their alleged role in establishing paramilitary groups in the
Caribbean state of Sucre. Since the scandal broke, several Colombian politicians,
including several past and current members of the Colombian Congress, have been
charged with ties to paramilitary groups. Former Foreign Minister Maria Consuelo
Araujo was forced to resign due to the investigation into her brother’s and father’s
connections to the paramilitaries and their involvement in the kidnaping of Alvaro
Araujo’s opponent in a Senate election. In December 2007, Congressman Erik
Morris was sentenced to six years in prison for his ties to the paramilitaries, making
him the first Member of Congress to be sentenced in the ongoing scandal. In
February 2008, the former head of Colombia’s Department of Administrative
Security (DAS), Jorge Noguera, was formally charged with collaborating with
paramilitaries, including giving paramilitaries the names of union activists, some of
whom were subsequently murdered by the paramilitaries. In April 2008, Mario Uribe,
a former senator, second cousin, and close ally of President Alvaro Uribe, was
arrested for colluding with the paramilitaries. As of early August 2008, some 70
legislators were under investigation for possible ties with the paramilitaries.30
The parapolitical scandal has increased tensions between President Uribe and
the Supreme Court, which is charged with investigating the politicians accused of
having paramilitary ties, many of whom are from pro-Uribe parties. In July 2008,
representatives from the two branches met in a series of meeting to discuss President
Uribe’s concern that the paramilitary investigations were advancing too quickly.
Despite those meetings, the Supreme Court ordered the arrest of Senator Carlos
Garcia, head of Uribe’s main coalition party, in late July. Tensions escalated again
in August when press reports announced that two of President Uribe’s advisers had
met with representatives of Don Berna, the top paramilitary leader, at the presidential
palace in April.31 Government critics have questioned whether President Uribe’s
decision in May 2008 to extradite key paramilitary figures to the United States may
have been done, at least partially, in order to thwart ongoing investigations into
government-paramilitary ties. They have also questioned the motives behind a
judicial reform package recently submitted by Uribe to the Congress that would
remove the supreme court’s power to investigate legislators.32
29 (...continued)
Human Rights Conditions with Respect to Assistance for the Colombian Armed Forces,”
July 28, 2008, available at [http://justf.org/files/primarydocs/080728cert.pdf].
30 “Saving Congress at a Cost to the Courts,” Latin American Andean Group Report, August
7, 2008.
31 “Uribe Squares up to Supreme Court and Liberals as Parapolitical Scandal Deepens,”
Latin American Weekly Report, August 28, 2008.
32 Juan Forero, “U.S. Extraditions Raise Concerns in Colombia,” Washington Post, August
(continued...)

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CRS-12
The Justice and Peace Law and Demobilization. As part of the
paramilitary demobilization process, President Uribe introduced a Justice and Peace
Law granting conditional amnesties to illegal combatants, which would mean that the
law could also apply to FARC and ELN fighters if they decide to enter into
negotiations with the government. Colombia’s congress approved the legislation in
2005. The Justice and Peace Law called on demobilized fighters to provide a
voluntary account of their crime and to forfeit illegally acquired assets in exchange
for an alternative penalty of up to eight years’ imprisonment. If the accused was
subsequently found to have intentionally failed to admit to a crime, the alternative
penalty could be revoked and the full sentence imposed. Critics contended that the
penalties provided for in the law were too lenient and amount to impunity. The Uribe
Administration argued that without the inducement of the new law, paramilitary
leaders and fighters would be unwilling to demobilize and a spiral of violence would
continue in Colombia.
In July 2006, Colombia’s Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of
the law. In the same ruling, however, the Constitutional Court limited the scope
under which demobilizing paramilitaries can benefit from the reduced sentences.
Paramilitaries who commit crimes or fail to fully comply with the law will have to
serve full sentences. The ruling also stipulates that paramilitaries must confess all
crimes and make reparations to victims using both their legally and illegally obtained
assets. Paramilitary leaders reacted by stating that they would not comply with the
law. In response, President Uribe ordered paramilitary leaders to turn themselves in.
By October 2006 all but 11 paramilitary leaders had complied with this order.33
The merits of the Justice and Peace Law have been fiercely debated both in
Colombia and the United States. Supporters believe it is an effective means to end
paramilitary activities. The Bush Administration has expressed support for the law,
noting that it has facilitated the demobilization of more than 31,000 paramilitary
members. Supporters of the law maintain that paramilitaries must act in good faith
and avoid further participation in illegal activities in order to benefit from the peace
process. The Uribe administration has removed some demobilized paramilitaries,
including Carlos Mario “Macaco” Jiménez, from the Justice and Peace process due
to their continued participation in illegal activities. In May 2008, Uribe extradited
Jiménez, Salvatore Mancuso, and 13 other paramilitary leaders who had violated the
terms of the law to the United States where to stand trial on drug trafficking charges.
Despite these results, the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in
Colombia and other observers have expressed concern about the institutional frailty
of the Justice and Peace process. Human rights groups are also concerned that the
paramilitaries have not been held accountable for their illegal activities and, that by
32 (...continued)
19, 2008; Human Rights Watch, “Colombia: Proposal Threatens ‘Parapolitical’
Investigations,” August 4, 2008.
33 “Country Report - Colombia,” Economist Intelligence Unit, October 2006; Human Rights
Watch, “Colombia: Court’s Demobilization Ruling Thwarts Future Abuses,” July 19, 2006;
“Gobierno colombiano abrirá debate público sobre decretos reglamentarios de ley de
Justicia y Paz,” El Tiempo, August 29, 2006.

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CRS-13
under reporting illegally obtained assets, have failed to provide adequate reparation
to their victims.34 Other observers have expressed concerns that many paramilitaries
have elected not to participate in the Justice and Peace process. Of the more than
31,000 paramilitary members that had demobilized as of June 2008, just 3,297 had
been found eligible to receive benefits under the Justice and Peace Law’s framework.
In response to concerns that the Justice and Peace Unit tasked with investigating and
prosecuting the paramilitaries was severely understaffed, the Uribe government
issued a decree this spring that authorizes tripling the size of its staff.35 The
International Criminal Court is monitoring the investigations and prosecutions of
former paramilitaries to ensure that those who guilty of human rights abuses are held
accountable for their crimes.36
Human Rights Violations by Colombian Security Forces. In its 2008
State of the World’s Human Rights report, Amnesty International asserted that,
between June 2006 and June 2007, at least 280 civilians were extrajudicially killed
by Colombian security forces and that many of them were subsequently presented by
those forces as guerrillas killed in conflict. The State Department’s Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices for Columbia covering 2007 stated that “while the
government’s overall respect for human rights continued to improve...there were
periodic reports that members of the security forces committed extrajudicial killings.”
In a February 2008 report, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
acknowledged that, although it continued to receive complaints of extrajudicial
killings by security officers, Colombian military and civilian officials have developed
new directives to deal with allegations of abuses by security officials. However, this
year human rights groups have continued to document extrajudicial killings by some
Colombian military forces.37
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Colombia has one of the largest
internally-displaced populations in the world, with indigenous and Afro-Colombians
disproportionately represented among those displaced. There is some discrepancy
over the current rate of displacement. The Colombian government registered over
250,000 IDPs in 2007, a decline of about 8,000 from 2006. Some IDPs do not
register with the Colombian government out of fear and procedural barriers. As such,
estimates of new displacements put forth by NGOs tend to be higher than
government figures. For example, the Consultancy for Human Rights and
Displacement (CODHES), a Colombian NGO, estimated that some 305,000 people
were displaced in 2007, about 27% higher than the number CODHES recorded in
2006. Although still concerned by the overall numbers of individuals displaced,
international NGOs found that the rate of mass displacements decreased in 2007.
Colombian government assistance to IDPs increased by 10% in 2007, with total
34 Latin America Working Group Education Fund, The Other Half of the Truth, June 2008.
35 U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Human Rights
Conditions with Respect to Assistance for the Colombian Armed Forces,” July 28, 2008.
36 “International Criminal Court not to Allow Colombian Paramilitary Members Impunity,”
Noticias Financieras, August 31, 2008.
37 “Amnesty Says all Sides in Colombia Have Bloody Hands,” EFE, May 28, 2008;
“Activists say Army Killing Civilians to Gain Points,” Irish Times, March 25, 2008.

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CRS-14
assistance provided estimated at $500 million.38 This year the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has expressed particular concern about new
displacements occurring along southern Colombia’s Pacific Coast.39
Landmines. Landmines appear to be an ongoing problem in Colombia. The
International Committee to Ban Landmines reports that Colombia had the highest
number of landmine casualties in the world in 2006, with 1,106 in 2006, down from
1,112 in 2005. Landmine casualties increased nearly 25% in 2005. Afghanistan and
Cambodia continue to have higher rates of landmine casualties than Colombia. Both
Human Rights Watch and the International Committee to Ban Landmines report that
the vast majority of landmines are laid by the FARC and ELN.40
Colombia and Global Drug Trends
Colombia’s prominence in the production of cocaine and heroin is cited as
justification for the U.S. focus on anti-narcotics efforts in the Andean region.
According to various sources, Colombia produces 60% of the world’s cocaine.41 It
is the source of over 90% of cocaine consumed in the United States. Even though
Colombia produces only a small fraction of global heroin production, it is the leading
supplier of heroin in the eastern United States, according to the State Department’s
2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.
The world’s supply of cocaine is produced by just three countries: Peru, Bolivia,
and Colombia. Until the mid-1990s, Peru and Bolivia were the two major producers.
Colombia eclipsed Bolivia in 1995 and Peru in 1997, the result of increased
eradication programs in those two countries and the displacement of coca cultivation
to Colombia. Cocaine production in Colombia increased fivefold between 1993 and
1999. UNODC recently reported a 27% increase in coca cultivation in Colombia in
2007, with smaller increases of 5% and 4% reported in Bolivia and Peru
respectively.42
Global production of the opium poppy, from which heroin is produced,
increased 17% in 2007, largely due to production increases in Afghanistan and
Burma (Myanmar). Its principal source countries are Afghanistan (82%) and Burma
(Myanmar) (11%). Most heroin consumed in the United States, however, comes
from Mexico and Colombia. In 2007, the U.N. found that opium poppy cultivation
38 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007, March 2008
39 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Thousands Displaced in Southern
Colombia,” August 22, 2008.
40 International Committee to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2007 and Human Rights
Watch, Maiming the People, July 2007.
41 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Coca Cultivation in the Andean
Region, June 2008.
42 Ibid.

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CRS-15
in Colombia fell to about 714 hectares, whereas cultivation in Mexico increased to
19,147 hectares.43
In recent years, the Colombian government, with significant U.S. assistance, has
stepped up its eradication efforts, with manual eradication accounting for an
increasing percentage of total eradication efforts. In 2007, the Colombian
government eradicated over 219, 529 hectares of elicit coca crops, up from 215,421
hectares eradicated the previous year. Aerial eradication accounted for 70% of the
coca crops destroyed in 2007.44 ONDCP has credited ongoing aerial spraying and
manual eradication programs with recent declines in the cocaine productivity of the
coca currently cultivated in Colombia.45 The Colombian Ministry of Defense has
recently asserted that, due to recent declines in U.S. security assistance, its forces will
probably only be able to spray about 100,000 hectares this year (as compared to the
roughly 153,000 hectares they eradicated through aerial spraying in 2007).46
After a long period of stable prices, purity, and availability of illegal drugs in the
United States, evidence indicated that the price of cocaine rose in the first nine
months of 2007. On November 8, 2007, the U.S. Office of National Drug Control
Policy announced that cocaine prices rose 44% in the first nine months of 2007 and
purity was down 15% during the same period. The supply of drugs is often judged
by changes in price, with higher prices signifying decreased supply. Declining purity
is also used as a measure indicated decreased availability. ONDCP Director John
Walters attributed this increase to regional counternarcotics efforts, including U.S.
funded programs in Colombia. However, information contained in the National
Drug Threat Assessment 2008 released in early November cast doubt on the
likelihood that this trend will continue. The report, published by the Department of
Justice’s National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) stated that cocaine shortages are
unlikely to continue because “cocaine production in South America appears to be
stable or increasing.”47
Some observers have expressed caution in interpreting the ONDCP figures on
price, purity, and availability. They maintain that short-term fluctuations are not
uncommon and may not be sustainable.48 Still others express caution because
cocaine production levels have not fallen. Another possible explanation for the
declining cocaine supply in the United States is that cocaine is being diverted to
43 UNODC, World Drug Report 2008.
44 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control and Strategy Report (INCSR)
2008.
45 U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Official U.S. Colombia Survey Reveals
Sharp Decline in Cocaine Production,” September 10, 2008.
46 Republic of Colombia, Ministry of National Defense (MOD), “Colombian MOD
Observations to U.S. Security Assistance for 2009,” July 2008.
47 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat
Assessment 2008, October 2007.
48 “U.S. Drug Czar Claims Cocaine Prices Fall,” Associated Press, November 8, 2007.

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CRS-16
Europe where drug traffickers can earn more money, presumably because of the
strong euro.49
Colombia and Regional Security
Another justifications of current U.S. policy in the Andean region is that drug
trafficking and armed insurgencies in Colombia have a destabilizing effect on
regional security. With porous borders amid rugged territory and an inconsistent
state presence, border regions are seen as particularly problematic. Colombia shares
a 1,367 mile border with Venezuela, approximately 1,000 miles each with Peru and
Brazil, and much smaller borders with Ecuador and Panama. The conflict in
Colombia and its associated drug trafficking have led to spillover effects in
Colombia’s neighboring countries.
Cross-Border Incursions and Safe Havens. Colombia’s relations with
its neighbors have been strained by the spillover from Colombia’s civil war,
including cross-border military activity. Colombia has asked both Venezuela and
Ecuador for assistance in patrolling border areas where the FARC is strong. Press
accounts in 2006 and 2007 reported numerous FARC attacks in Colombia along its
border with Venezuela. The State Department’s 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism
report states that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s “ideological sympathy for the
FARC and ELN limited Venezuelan cooperation with Colombia in combating
terrorism.” The FARC and ELN use Venezuelan territory as safehavens, and to
transship arms and drugs, secure logistical supplies, and commit kidnappings and
extortion. Splinter groups of the FARC also operate in Venezuela where they
participate in drug trafficking.
Opponents of President Chávez regularly accuse him of harboring FARC
guerrillas. While the FARC uses Venezuelan territory as a safe haven, the State
Department notes, “it remained unclear to what extent the Venezuelan Government
provided material support to Colombian terrorist organizations. However, limited
amounts of weapons and ammunition, some from official Venezuelan stocks and
facilities, have turned up in the hands of Colombian terrorist organizations”50
President Chávez’s comments that the FARC and ELN should be considered
belligerent groups, not terrorist organizations, following the January 2008 release of
two hostages held by the FARC increased tension between Colombia and Venezuela.
Tensions with Ecuador have also increased, with accusations of incursions by
Colombian troops chasing FARC units across the border. Colombia is concerned
that the FARC are using Ecuadorean territory to launch attacks. Leftist Ecuadorean
President Rafael Correa opposes U.S. involvement in Colombia and has indicated
that he will not renew the United States’ lease on the Manta air bast when it is up for
renewal in 2009. Ecuador is also concerned that aerial spraying of coca crops in
49 Ibid and Chris Kraul, “U.S. Says War on Narcotics is Working,” Los Angeles Times,
November 9, 2007; “Editorial: Not Winning the War on Drugs,” New York Times, July 2,
2008.
50 Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on
Terrorism 2006.

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CRS-17
southern Colombia is reaching into Ecuador potentially damaging licit Ecuadorean
crops. Jane’s Intelligence Digest reports that the FARC are producing cocaine in
laboratories based in Ecuador. Other concerns between the countries relate to
refugees from Colombia’s conflict.51
Crisis in the Andes and Efforts at Resolution. In March 2008,
Colombia’s unauthorized raid on a FARC camp in Ecuador prompted one of the most
serious diplomatic crises that the Andean region has faced in recent years. President
Correa responded to the raid by breaking diplomatic ties with Colombia and sending
additional troops to the Ecuador-Colombia border. In a show of solidarity with
Ecuador, President Chávez broke diplomatic and trade ties with Colombia and sent
10 battalions of troops to Venezuela’s border with Colombia.
While some feared that the diplomatic crisis might escalate into a military
conflict, those concerns were allayed after a Rio Group summit held in the
Dominican Republic on March 7. At the Rio summit, Uribe, Chávez, and Correa
each had a chance to voice his concerns, which resulted in heated exchanges that
lasted some six hours. President Uribe publicly apologized for the incursion and
vowed that it would never happen again. President Chávez appeared to accept the
apology and called for an end to the crisis, but President Correa remained angered by
the affair. The Rio Group issued a resolution that rejected Colombia’s incursion of
Ecuadorian territory, but acknowledged Uribe’s apology.52
The Rio Group summit was followed by a March 17-18 OAS Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held at the organization’s headquarters
in Washington D.C. On March 18, after extended debate, the OAS adopted a
resolution rejecting, but not condemning, the bombing raid and calling for the
restoration of diplomatic ties between Ecuador and Colombia.53 While Colombia and
the United States reportedly view the raid as justified within the context of
Colombia’s longstanding battle against terrorist groups, most countries reject it as a
violation of Ecuador’s national sovereignty per Article 21 of the OAS Charter.54
Tensions between Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela continued throughout the
spring of 2008, particularly after Interpol published a report in May confirming that
Colombian officials did not tamper with computer files seized at the FARC camp in
Ecuador. Those files allege that the government of Hugo Chávez of Venezuela was
51 “Border Clashes Boost Crime in Colombia,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, May 29, 2007 and
“Ecuador Moves Colombians from Border,” LatinNews Daily, August 28, 2007.
52 “How Diplomacy Silenced the Drums of War in Less Than a Week,” Latin American
Security and Strategic Review, March 2008; Francis Robles, “Ecuador Rages, Colombia and
Venezuela Make Up,” Latinnews Daily, March 14, 2008; “Leaders Defuse South American
Crisis,” Miami Herald, March 8, 2008.
53 Report of the Organization of American States (OAS) Commission That Visited Ecuador
and Colombia, Washington D.C., March 17, 2008; Resolution of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Washington D.C., March 17, 2008.
54 “OAS Resolution Stops Short of Condemning Colombia,” Latin America Weekly Report,
March 19, 2008; “Latin America: Insecurity Raises Sovereignty Fears,” Oxford Analytica,
March 25, 2008.

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CRS-18
planning to provide millions of dollars in assistance to the FARC for weapons
purchases and that the Correa government received campaign contributions from the
FARC. Venezuelan and Ecuadorian officials have dismissed the data as having been
fabricated. Whereas Venezuela has restored diplomatic relations with Colombia,
Ecuador has yet to do so.
Issues for Congress
Recent debate on U.S. policy toward Colombia has taken place in a context of
concern over the sheer volume of illegal drugs available in the United States and
elsewhere in the world. The United States approved increased assistance to
Colombia as part of a six-year plan called Plan Colombia in June 2000, and has
provided over $6 billion in assistance from FY2000 to FY2008. The United States
now provides assistance to Colombia on an annual basis through the Andean
Counterdrug Program(ACP) account, formerly known as the Andean Counterdrug
Initiative (ACI), and other aid accounts.
In addition to the larger debate over what role the United States should play in
supporting Colombia’s ongoing struggle against drug trafficking and illegally armed
groups, Congress has repeatedly expressed concern with a number of specific policy
issues. These include continuing allegations of human rights abuses; the health and
environmental consequences of aerial eradication for drug control; the progress of
alternative development to replace drug crops with non-drug crops; judicial reform
and rule of law programs; and the level of risk to U.S. personnel working in
Colombia. Prior to the release of the three U.S. hostages held by the FARC in early
July 2008, securing the release of those hostages was also a key issue of
congressional concern.
Proponents of the current U.S. policy towards Colombia point to the progress
that has been made in improving security conditions in Colombia and in weakening
the FARC guerrillas. They favor maintaining the current level of security assistance
to Colombia in order to help Colombian security forces continue to combat the
FARC and ELN, solidify their control throughout rural areas, and eradicate illicit
narcotics. They also believe that guerrilla forces regularly cross borders using
neighboring countries’ territory for refuge and supplies, and that this has a potentially
destabilizing effect in the region.
Opponents of current U.S. policy in Colombia respond that the counterdrug
program uses a repressive approach to curbing drug production which could provoke
a negative popular reaction in rural areas. They argue for halting aerial fumigation
of drug crops, limiting aid to the Colombian military, and stressing interdiction rather
than eradication so that the direct costs to peasant producers is less. Some critics of
U.S. policy would support a policy that focuses largely on economic and social aid
to combat what they consider to be the conflict’s root causes, curbs human rights
abuses by paramilitary groups and security forces, provides vigorous support for a

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negotiated end to the fighting, and emphasizes illicit drug demand reduction in the
United States.55
Plan Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP)
Plan Colombia was developed by former President Pastrana (1998-2002) as a
plan to end the country’s 40-year old armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and
promote development. The initial plan was a $7.5 billion three-year plan, with
Colombia providing $4 billion of the funding and requesting $3.5 billion from the
international community. The U.S. Congress approved legislation in support of Plan
Colombia in 2000, as part of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2001
(P.L.106-246) providing $1.3 billion for counternarcotics and related efforts in
Colombia and neighboring countries. Plan Colombia was never authorized by
Congress and subsequent funding has been approved annually. President Bush has
continued support for the plan under the ACP aid account. The ACP account also
fund counternarcotics programs in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and, until
recently, Venezuela. Because narcotics trafficking and the guerrilla insurgency have
become intertwined problems, in 2002 Congress granted the Administration
flexibility to use U.S. counterdrug funds for a unified campaign to fight drug
trafficking and terrorist organizations.56
Through the ACP and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) accounts, the United
States supports the eradication of coca and opium poppy crops, the interdiction of
narcotics shipments, and the protection of infrastructure through training and material
support for Colombia’s security forces. U.S. assistance also supports alternative crop
development and infrastructure development to give coca and opium poppy farmers
alternative sources of income, and institution building programs to strengthen
democracy. Alternative development (AD) programs were shifted from the ACP
account to the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account in FY2008. U.S. assistance
includes human rights training programs for security personnel in response to
Congressional concerns about human rights abuses committed by Colombian security
forces. Congress has prohibited U.S. personnel from directly participating in combat
missions and has capped the number of U.S. military and civilian contractor
personnel that can be stationed in Colombia in support of Plan Colombia at 800 and
600 respectively.57
55 Julia E. Sweig, Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the
Region, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action, January 2004.
56 The State Department and the Department of Defense explain expanded authority as
providing them with flexibility in situations where there is no clear line between drug and
terrorist activity.
57 The FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4200; P.L. 108-375) raised the
military cap from 400 to 800 and the civilian cap from 400 to 600. The cap does not apply
to personnel conducting search and rescue operations, or to U.S. personnel assigned as part
of their regular duties to the U.S. embassy. According to the State Department, military
personnel levels in 2007 varied from 194 to 563, while civilian personnel levels varied
between 257 and 440.

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CRS-20
The United States also supports the interdiction of drug shipments through the
Air Bridge Denial (ABD) Program. The Air Bridge Denial program began as a joint
interdiction effort between the United States, Peru, and Colombia that sought to
identify possible drug flights and to interdict them by forcing them to land, and if
necessary to shoot down the aircraft. The program was suspended in 2001 after a
flight carrying American missionaries was shot down over Peru. Following the
establishment of new safeguards against accidental shootdowns, the program was
renewed in Colombia in 2003. The State Department credits the ABD program with
reducing the number of illegal flights over Colombia by some 73% since 2003.58
This year the U.S. government has begun to transfer control of the ABD program to
the Colombian government.
Aerial Eradication and Alternative Development.59 Upon taking office,
President Uribe announced that aerial eradication, along with alternative crop
development, would form a significant basis of the government’s efforts. The Plan
Colombia eradication spraying program began in December 2000 with operations by
the U.S.-funded counternarcotics brigade in Putumayo. It should be noted, however,
that spraying does not prevent, although it may discourage, the replanting of illicit
crops. During 2007, the Colombian government sprayed 153,000 hectares of coca
and poppy and manually eradicated 66,000 hectares of coca and poppy.60
The United Nations and United States use different methodologies to estimate
annual coca cultivation levels in Colombia. The different methodologies yield results
that not only show different levels of cultivation, but different trends as well. Table
1 and Table 2 include United Nations and United States data on coca cultivation in
Colombia since 2000. The area of cultivation is measured in hectares. For 2007, the
United Nations reported a 27% increase in coca cultivation to 99,000 hectares.61 U.S.
data from the ONDCP showed a % increase in coca cultivation in 2007. Some of the
9% increase in cultivation that ONDCP reported for 2006 may be attributed to the
fact that the area surveyed increased significantly from the previous year.
Table 1. UNODC Coca Cultivation in Colombia
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Area
163,000 145,000 102,000 86,000
80,000
86,000
78,000
99,000
% change
—
-11%
-30%
-16%
-7%
8%
-9%
27%
58 U.S. Department of State, INCSR 2008.
59 Also see CRS Report RL33163, Drug Crop Eradication and Alternative Development in
the Andes, by Connie Veillette and Carolina Navarette-Frias.
60 U.S. Department of State, INCSR 2008.
61 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2008; and “Coca
Cultivation in the Andean Region,” June 2008.

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CRS-21
Table 2. U.S. ONDCP Coca Cultivation in Colombia
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Area
136,200 169,800 144,450 113,850 114,100 144,000 157,200 167,000
% change
—
25%
-15%
-21%
0.2%
26%
9%
6.2%
Aerial eradication has been controversial both in Colombia and the United
States. Critics charge that it has unknown environmental and health effects, and that
it deprives farmers of their livelihood, particularly in light of a lack of coordination
with alternative development programs.62 With regard to environmental and health
consequences, the Secretary of State, as required by Congress, has reported that the
herbicide, glyphosate, does not pose unreasonable health or safety risks to humans
or the environment. In consultation for the certification, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency confirmed that application rates of the aerial spray program in
Colombia are within the parameters listed on U.S. glyphosate labels. However, press
reports indicate that many Colombians believe the health consequences of aerial
fumigation are grave, and many international non-governmental organizations
criticize the certification for being analytically inadequate.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funds alternative
development programs to assist illicit crop farmers in the switch from illicit to licit
crops, and provides assistance with infrastructure and marketing. Through 2007, the
United States has supported the cultivation of 158,000 hectares of licit crops and
completed 1, 179 social and productive infrastructure projects. These programs have
benefitted more than 135,000 families in 17 departments.63
The success of alternative development in Colombia has been limited both by
security concerns and the limited scope of the program. Security concerns were
blamed for the planned withdrawal of USAID assistance to five departments where
coca production was increasing, according to a USAID memo leaked to the press in
October 2006. UNODC reported in June 2006 that alternative development programs
have been successful, but only reach 9% of Colombian coca growers and called for
a tenfold increase in international donor support for alternative development
programs. In 2007, UNODC reported a disparity in spending on alternative
development programs. The departments of Norte de Santander, Antioquia, and
Santander received 65% of ongoing alternative development project funding, yet coca
cultivation in these three departments is about 10% of the national total. In contrast,
40% of current coca cultivation is in the departments of Meta, Caqueta, Guaviare,
and Vichada, which receive just 10% of ongoing alternative development project
funding. Proponents of U.S. policy argue that both eradication and alternative
development programs need time to work. USAID has argued that alternative
development programs do not achieve drug crop reduction on their own, and that the
62 “Chemical Reactions: Spreading Coca and Threatening Colombia’s Ecological and
Cultural Diversity,” Washington Office on Latin America, February 2008.
63 U.S. Department of State, INCSR 2008.

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CRS-22
Colombia program was designed to support the aerial eradication program and to
build “the political support needed for aerial eradication efforts to take place.”64
Funding for Plan Colombia. From FY2000 through FY2008, U.S. funding
for Plan Colombia and its follow-on, the Strategy for Strengthening Democracy and
Promoting Social Development, totaled over $6 billion in State Department and
Defense Department programs. Most U.S. assistance is provided through the ACP
account. In FY2008 Congress funded eradication and interdiction programs through
the ACP account, and funded alternative development and institution building
programs through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account. In previous years,
alternative development and institution building were funded through the ACP
account. In addition, support for aerial eradication programs is provided from the
State Department’s Air Wing account. The Defense Department requests a lump
sum for all counternarcotics programs worldwide under Sections 1004 and 1033, and
under Section 124, of the National Defense Authorization Act. DOD can reallocate
these funds throughout the year in accordance with changing needs. While not
considered a formal component of the ACP Program, the Defense Department has
provided Colombia with additional funding for training and equipment for a number
of years, as well as the deployment of personnel in support of Plan Colombia.
Recently there has been significant debate in Congress over the proper level and
components of U.S. assistance to Colombia. While some Members support the Bush
Administration’s emphasis on security-related assistance to Colombia, others have
expressed concerns that the Administration has put too much of an emphasis on so-
called “hard-side” security assistance, rather than traditional development and rule
of law programs. Many Members have expressed a desire to see a more rapid transfer
of responsibility for the military operations associated with Plan Colombia from the
United States to Colombia. The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-
161) reduced interdiction, eradication, and military aid to Colombia by roughly $104
million to about $305 million and increased funds for alternative development,
human rights, and institution building programs by some $84 million to $236
million.65 Table 3 details how U.S. aid to Colombia shifted from FY2007 through
the FY2009 request. Table 4 at the conclusion of this report provides a more detailed
breakdown of U.S. assistance to Colombia from FY2000 through the FY2009
request. The FY2008 changes reflected an attempt to raise the level of U.S. funding
64 Ibid, Joshua Goodman, “U.S. Pulling Economic Aid from Colombia’s Coca Infested
South,” Associated Press, October 12, 2006; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC), “Coca Cultivation in Andes Stabilizes in 2005,” June 20, 2006; UNODC, Coca
Cultivation in the Andean Region, June 2006; and, UNODC, Colombia Coca Cultivation
Survey, June 2007.
65 For FY2007, security assistance is calculated by adding relevant portions of the Andean
Counterdrug Program (ACP) account, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International
Military Education and Training (IMET), and Non-proliferation, Terrorism, Demining and
Related Programs aid totals. Economic and social aid in FY2007 is calculated by adding the
alternative development and rule of law portions of ACP to the P.L. 480 food aid total. For
FY2008, security assistance is calculated by adding ACP, FMF, IMET, and NADR.
Economic social aid includes Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid and International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement (INCLE) aid provided to support the Colombian justice sector,
primarily the Attorney General’s Office.

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CRS-23
provided for economic and social aid closer to that provided for security-related
programs. These changes were criticized by Bush Administration officials.
The Colombian Ministry of Defense has asked Congress to consider restoring
a higher level of security assistance in the FY2009 budget at levels that are similar
to the Bush Administration’s FY2009 request. Although Congress has yet to
complete action on the FY2009 foreign operations legislation, the Senate
Appropriations Committee report (S. 3288, S.Rept. 110-425) would, as in FY2008,
cut security-related assistance to Colombia from the levels requested by the
Administration.
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Colombia: FY2007-FY2009
(in millions $)
FY2008 Est.
FY2008
Compared to
FY2009
Program
FY2007
Estimate
FY2007
Request
!80.40
Andean Counterdrug
325.10
244.62
329.56
Program (ACP)-
Interdiction/Eradication
ACP-
139.90
0.00
Alternative Development
Economic Support Funda
0.00
194.41
54.51b
142.37
International Narcotics and
0.00
41.91
41.91
0.00
Law Enforcement
Non-Proliferation,
4.09
3.72
!0.37
3.15
Antiterrorism, Demining,
and Related Programs
Foreign Military Financing
85.50
55.05
!30.0
66.39
International Military
1.65
1.43
!0.22
1.40
Education and Training
P.L. 480 (Food Aid)
4.86
0.00
!4.86
0.00
Total DOS
561.10
541.14
!19.96
542.87
Defense Department
na
na
Counternarcotics Aid
(Section 1004/1033)
Source: U.S. Department of State Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justifications,
FY2008-FY2009; DOD “Counterdrug Activity” Reports to Congress for FY2005-FY2007.
a. In FY2008, the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) was renamed the Andean Counterdrug
Program (ACP). Until FY2008, ACI funds were divided between programs that supported drug
eradication and interdiction efforts and those focused on alternative development and democratic
institution building. In FY2008 funding for alternative development programs and institution building
were requested from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) rather than the ACP account.
b. This column compares Alternative Development figures from FY2008 and FY2007.

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CRS-24
Paramilitary Demobilization
The 110th Congress will likely want to monitor the developing scandal involving
paramilitary ties to Colombian politicians. Some Members of Congress have
expressed concern about both the AUC demobilization process and the overall
demobilization framework under the Justice and Peace Law approved by the
Colombian Congress in 2005. The FY2006 Foreign Operations Act (P.L. 109-102)
provided $20 million to assist in the demobilization of former members of foreign
terrorist organizations, provided that the Secretary of State certified that the
assistance only went to individuals who had verifiably renounced and terminated
membership in the FTO; that the Colombian government was cooperating with the
United States on extradition; that the Colombian government was working to
dismantle FTO structures; and that the funds would not be used to make cash
payments to individuals. A foreign operations appropriations measure was not
enacted for FY2007 and funding remained at FY2006 levels under a continuing
resolution (P.L. 110-5). The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-
161) provided just over $11 million to assist the demobilization of former members
of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), pending a certification from the Secretary
of State that was issued on August 28, 2008. In that certification, she certified the
following to Congress:
! that assistance will be provided only for individuals who have
verifiably renounced and terminated any affiliation or involvement
with FTOs, and are meeting all the requirements of the Colombia
Demobilization program, including disclosure of past crimes; the
location of kidnap victims and bodies of the disappeared; and,
knowledge of FTO structure, financing, and assets.
! that the Colombian government is fully cooperating with the United
States in extraditing FTO leaders and members who have been
indicted in the United States for murder, kidnapping, narcotics
trafficking, and other violations of U.S. law; and is extraditing
former paramilitary leaders who have been indicted in the United
States and have breached the terms of the demobilization process;
! that the Colombian government is not knowingly taking steps to
legalize titles of land or other assets illegally obtained by FTOs, their
associates, or their successors; and that the Colombian government
has established effective procedures to identify such land and assets;
! that the Colombian government is implementing a concrete and
workable framework for dismantling the organizational structures of
FTOs; and
! that funds will not be used to make cash payments to individuals,
and funds will only be available for any of the following activities:
verification, reintegration (including training and education), vetting,
recovery of assets for reparations for victims, and investigations and
prosecutions.

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CRS-25
Human Rights
Debate in Congress has continued to focus on allegations of human rights
abuses by the FARC and ELN, paramilitary groups, and the Colombian Armed
Forces. In its 2008 State of the World’s Human Rights report, Amnesty International
asserted that, between June 2006 and June 2007, at least 280 civilians were
extrajudicially killed by Colombian security forces and that many of them were
subsequently presented by those forces as guerrillas killed in conflict. The State
Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Columbia covering
2007 stated that “while the government’s overall respect for human rights continued
to improve...there were periodic reports that members of the security forces
committed extrajudicial killings.” In a February 2008 report, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights acknowledged that, although it continued to receive
complaints of extrajudicial killings by security officers, Colombian military and
civilian officials have developed new directives to deal with allegations of abuses by
security officials. However, this year human rights groups have continued to
document extrajudicial killings by some Colombian military forces.66 In February
2008, Senators Dodd and Feingold reportedly sent a letter to Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice expressing their concern over reports that civilian killings by
Colombian army forces appear to have increased in recent years.
Congress has annually required that the Secretary of State certify to Congress
that the Colombian military and police forces are severing their links to the
paramilitaries, investigating complaints of abuses, and prosecuting those who have
had credible charges made against them. Congress has made funding to the
Colombian military contingent on these certifications. In the latest certification,
issued on July 28, 2008, the Secretary of State asserted that the Colombian
government and armed forces are meeting the statutory requirements with regard to
human rights. The Secretary noted that “while the Government of Colombia needs
to do more to address serious human rights problems that persist, we see encouraging
signs, including concrete examples of progress: the suspension, arrest, or conviction
of military violators of human rights, including several general officers; greater
civilian access and handling of human rights cases involving the military; and
credible investigations of dozens of politicians who allegedly collaborated with the
paramilitaries.”67
Congress has also regularly included the so-called Leahy amendment in foreign
operations appropriations legislation that denies funds to any security force unit for
which the Secretary of State has credible evidence of gross human rights violations.
The Secretary may continue funding if she determines and reports to Congress that
the foreign government is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members
of these security forces to justice. According to a State Department official,
Congress just released its last hold on FY2006 funds in mid-August 2008, but $52.5
66 “Amnesty Says all Sides in Colombia Have Bloody Hands,” EFE, May 28, 2008;
“Activists say Army Killing Civilians to Gain Points,” Irish Times, March 25, 2008.
67 U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Human Rights
Conditions with Respect to Assistance for the Colombian Armed Forces,” July 28, 2008,
available at [http://justf.org/files/primarydocs/080728cert.pdf].

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CRS-26
million in FY2007 funds and $16.5 million in FY2008 funds for the Colombian
military remain on hold.68 Despite these actions, human rights organizations claim
that the U.S. government often turns a blind eye to questionable activities of
Colombian security forces.
Internal Displacement and Refugee Flows to the United States. In
addition to the more than three million internally-displaced persons in Colombia,
there are nearly 500,000 Colombian refugees and asylum seekers outside the country.
The vast majority of Colombian refugees and asylum seekers are in Ecuador (over
200,000) and Venezuela (over 200,000). UNHCR has also reported that there are
also 20,000 indigenous Colombians living in refugee-like conditions in the Amazon
region of Brazil.69
The United States began resettling Colombian refugees in 2002. Admissions
peaked at 577 in FY2004, but declined to 323 in FY2005 due to provisions of the
REAL ID Act which bar the admission of persons who have provided material
support to terrorist groups.70 In 2005, the UNHCR stopped referring as many
Colombians as before for resettlement to the United States, partially because of this
issue. The State Department reports that 54 Colombian refugees were admitted to
the United States in FY2007. H.R. 5918, introduced in the House on July 27, 2006,
would amend the Immigration and Nationality Act so that persons who have
provided material support to a terrorist organization under duress or coercion can be
admitted to the United States. On September 6, 2007, the Department of Homeland
Security issued a memorandum to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) to permit USCIS to exempt certain individuals who provided material
support to the FARC under duress from the material support bar to admission. In
December 2007, a similar directive was issued concerning individuals who provided
material support to the ELN under duress. This exemption applies to all applications
for admission (including refugees), permanent residence, and asylum, but does not
apply to naturalization applications. It is not clear how this discrepancy will affect
adjudication of naturalization applications submitted by individuals who have
benefitted from the exemption.71
68 Information provided by State Department official, August 18, 2008.
69 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Global Appeal 2008-2009:
Colombia Situation,” December 1, 2007; U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee
Survey 2007; Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional,
“Tabulados Generales de la Población Desplazada,” December 31, 2007; and, Agencia
Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional, “Gerencia de Sistemas
de Información de Población Desplazada,” July 31, 2006.
70 Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, “Refugee
Admissions Program for Latin America and the Caribbean,” May 9, 2006.
71 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Question and Answer: USCIS National
Stakeholder Meeting,” January 29, 2008; and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
“Fact Sheet: USCIS Implements Authority to Exempt Certain Persons who Provided
Material Support under Duress to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),”
September 26, 2007.

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CRS-27
U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement72
In 2003, the Bush Administration announced its intentions to begin negotiating
an Andean region free trade agreement (FTA) with Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and
Bolivia. In its announcement, the Administration asserted that an FTA would reduce
and eliminate foreign barriers to trade and investment, support democracy, and fight
drug activity. After regional talks broke down, the United States pursued bilateral
trade agreements with Colombia and Peru. The United States and Colombia signed
the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement on November 22, 2006, now called
the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CFTA); the agreement must now be
ratified by both nations’ congresses. Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru currently
benefit from the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA).73 On February 14, 2008 the
House Committee on Ways and Means voted to extend ATPA preferences (H.R.
5264) until December 31, 2008. The ATPA authorizes the President to grant duty-
free treatment to certain products, with more than half of all U.S. imports in 2004
from the Andean countries entering under these preferences.
Critics of the free trade agreement are concerned about the status of labor rights
in Colombia, as well as the ongoing para-political scandal. An issue of contention
is the level of violence against labor activists in Colombia. Killings of labor activists
declined under President Uribe, but increased in 2006. Data on the number of labor
leaders murdered in any given year vary widely. In 2002, the Colombian government
estimated that 99 labor activists were killed, while the National Labor School (ENS,
a Colombian NGO) estimated that 178 labor activists were killed. In 2006, the
Colombian government estimated that 60 labor activists were killed, while ENS
estimated that 72 labor activists were killed. One reason for the discrepancy is that
the Colombian government counts deaths of unionized teachers separately from other
labor union deaths.
Another point of contention is whether or not labor activists were killed because
of their union activity. Very few investigations have been completed — of the 470
union murders that have occurred since President Uribe first took office in 2002, 97%
remain unsolved. More than 2,000 killings between 1991 and 2006 remain unsolved.
In January 2007, the Colombian attorney general’s office set up a unit of 13
prosecutors and 78 investigators to investigate 200 priority cases. In 2007, 36 people
were convicted on charges related to the murder of union members, more than were
convicted from 2004 through 2006.74
On April 8, 2008, President Bush submitted implementing legislation to
Congress for the (CFTA). The 2002 Trade Promotion Authority procedures
stipulated that Congress must vote on that implementing legislation within 90
72 See CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Economic and
Political Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
73 See CRS Report RS22548, ATPA Renewal: Background and Issues, by M. Angeles
Villarreal.
74 Frank Bajak, “U.S. Unionists Alarmed by Colombia Woes,” Miami Herald, February 13,
2008; and “Trade, Death and Drugs,” The Economist, May 19, 2007.

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CRS-28
legislative days of its introduction. But on April 10, 2008, the House voted 224-195
in favor of changing those procedures, effectively putting congressional consideration
of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) on hold.

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CRS-29
Table 4. U.S. Assistance For Plan Colombia, FY2000-FY2009
(in millions $)
ACI
ESF
FMF
IMET
INCLE
NADR
AirWing
DOD
Total
FY2000
60.1
—
—
—
—
—
38.0
128.5
226.6
P.L.106-246
832.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
100.7
932.7
FY2001
48.0
—
—
—
—
—
38.0
190.2
276.2
FY2002
379.9a
—
—
—
—
25.0
38.2
119.1
562.2
FY2003
580.2b
—
17.1
1.2
—
3.3
41.5
165.0
808.3
FY2004
473.9
—
98.5
1.7
—
.2
45.0
122.0
741.3
FY2005
462.8
—
99.2
1.7
—
5.1
45.0
200.0
813.8
FY2006
464.8
—
89.1
1.7
—
—
45.0
112.0
712.6
FY2007 465.0
—
85.5
1.6
—
4.1
na
na
556.2
FY2008 (est)
244.6
194.4
55.1
1.4
41.9
3.7
na
na
541.1
FY2009 (req)
329.6
142.4
66.4
1.4
—
3.2
na
na
543.0
Total
4,340.9
336.8
510.9
10.7
41.9
44.6
290.7
1,137.5
6,714.0
Sources: Figures are drawn from the annual State Department Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justifications for fiscal years 2002 through 2009; the State Department’s
Washington File, “U.S. Support for Plan Colombia, FY2000 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations,” July 5, 2000; the FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, P.L. 109-102,
and conference report, H.Rept. 109-265; and the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161) and Division J Joint Explanatory Statement.
Notes: For FY2000 and thereafter, Plan Colombia funds are assigned to the State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL) or the Andean Counterdrug
Initiative (ACI). The State Department transfers funds to other agencies carrying out programs in Colombia, of which USAID has received the largest portion. Defense Department
funding is from is Counter Narcotics account. DOD requests one sum for programs around the world and adjusts its regional allocations as needed.
a. Includes $6 million appropriated to FMF but transferred to the ACI account.
b. Includes $93 million in FMF regular appropriations and $20 million in FMF supplemental funds that were transferred to the ACI account.

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CRS-30
Figure 1. Map of Colombia
Aruba
Oranjestad
(Neth.)
Caribbean Sea
Willemstad
Bonaire
Curacao
Netherlands Antilles
Golfo de
(Neth.)
Venezuela
Caracas
Lago de
Maracaibo
Panama
Panama
Venezuela
Golfo
De
Panama
Medellin
Pacific
Ocean
Bogota
Cali
Colombia
Quito
Ecuador
Brazil
Peru
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (K.Yancey 2/6/04)

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