Order Code RS21968
Updated September 3, 2008
Iraq: Reconciliation and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Iraq’s political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, continues
to be riven by sectarianism and ethnic and factional infighting. The Administration
asserts that the passage of key laws in 2008 will help heal remaining rifts and continue
to reduce violence. Others see the schisms widening as Iraqi leaders wrangle over
unresolved issues that are complicating the holding of provincial elections. See CRS
Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
After about one year of occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to an
appointed Iraqi government on June 28, 2004. In line with a March 8, 2004, “Transitional
Administrative Law” (TAL), the first post-Saddam election was held on January 30, 2005,
for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly (which formed an executive), four-year term
provincial councils in all 18 provinces (41 seats per council; 51 for Baghdad), and a
Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). The election system was proportional
representation (closed list): voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a coalition
of parties, or persons); 111 entities were on the national ballot, of which nine were multi-
party coalitions. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population) boycotted, winning only 17
Assembly seats, and only one seat on Baghdad’s council. Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada
Al Sadr, then at odds with U.S. forces, also boycotted, leaving his faction under-
represented on provincial councils in the Shiite south and in Baghdad. The resulting
government placed Shiites and Kurds in the most senior positions — Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani was President and Da’wa (Shiite party) leader
Ibrahim al-Jafari was Prime Minister. Sunnis were Assembly speaker, deputy president,
a deputy prime minister, and six ministers, including defense.
Permanent Constitution. The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by
August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-
thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On May 10, 2005, a 55-member drafting
committee was appointed, but with only two Sunni Arabs (15 Sunnis were later added as

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full members and 10 as advisors). In August 2005, the talks produced a draft, providing
for: a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk (Tamim
province) will join the Kurdish region (Article 140); designation of Islam “a main source”
of legislation;1 a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47); families choosing which
courts to use for family issues (Article 41); making only primary education mandatory
(Article 34); and having Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the federal supreme
court (Article 89). Many women opposed the two latter provisions as giving too much
discretion to male family members. It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation
authority (Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA) applicable until amended (Article 126),
and established a “Federation Council” (Article 62), a second chamber with its size and
powers to be determined by subsequent law (not adopted to date).
The major disputes — still unresolved — centered on regional versus centralized
power. The draft permitted two or more provinces together to form new autonomous
“regions” — reaffirmed in passage of an October 2006 law on formation of regions.
Article 117 allows “regions” to organize internal security forces, legitimizing the fielding
the Kurds’ peshmerga militia (allowed by the TAL). Article 109 requires the central
government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields” in proportion to
population, and gave regions a role in allocating revenues from new energy discoveries.
Disputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage of national hydrocarbons
legislation — Sunnis dominated areas of Iraq have few proven oil or gas deposits, and
favor centralized control of oil revenues. The Kurds want to maintain maximum regional
control of their own burgeoning oil sector.
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-
85%) to try to defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11,
2005) providing for a panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-
December 15 election government took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another
two months (under the same rules as the October 15 referendum.) The Sunni provinces
of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the constitution
was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55% “no,” missing the threshold for
a “no” vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.
December 15, 2005 Elections. In the December 15, 2005 elections for a four-
year government (in line with the schedule laid out in the TAL), each province
contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR) —
a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were
allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that would have won
additional seats had the constituency been the whole nation. There were 361 political
“entities,” including 19 multi-party coalitions, competing. As shown in the table, voters
chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the Shiites and Kurds again emerged
dominant. The COR was inaugurated on March 16, 2006, but wrangling ensued and
Kurdish and other opposition caused the main Shiite bloc, the “United Iraqi Alliance”
(UIA) to agree to another Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime Minister. On
April 22, the COR approved Talabani to continue as president. His two deputies are
Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq
al-Hashimi, leader of the Consensus Front (Iraqi Islamic Party). Another Consensus
1 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].

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figure, the hardline Mahmoud Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), is COR
speaker. Maliki won a COR vote for a 37-member cabinet (including himself and two
deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots (Defense, Interior, and National
Security) were not filled permanently until June 2006, due to infighting. Of the 37 posts,
there were 19 Shiites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; and 1 Christian. Four were women.
Iraqi Performance on Benchmarks and Reconciliation
The elections did not resolve the grievances among Iraq’s communities over their
new positions in the post-Saddam power structure. In August 2006, the Administration
and Iraq agreed on a series of “benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, might
achieve political reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress” on eighteen political and security benchmarks —
as assessed in Administration reports due by July 15, 2007 and then September 15, 2007
— were required for the United States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds
(ESF) to Iraq. The President used the waiver provision. The law also mandated an
assessment by the GAO, by September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks
have been met, as well as an outside assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).
The Administration, as expressed in the April 8 and 9, 2008, testimony of U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and a May 2008 informal, non-mandated
Administration update on progress on the benchmarks, sees movement toward
reconciliation, facilitated by a reduction in violence attributed largely to the U.S. “troop
surge.” The February 13, 2008 passage (unanimously, with 206 members voting) of two
significant laws (amnesty law and provincial powers law) and the 2008 national budget
represented breakthroughs, although U.S. officials say that the effects will depend on
implementation. However, other assessments, including a June 2008 study by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO-08-837) say that these legislative moves have
had limited effect in healing the rifts in Iraqi politics.
The Administration has been counting on the provincial elections, which were
planned for October 1, 2008, to continue the progress seen in 2008, particularly in the
dramatic reduction in Sunni-Shiite violence. Those elections have been delayed, probably
until early 2009, by Kurdish restiveness over Kirkuk, which the Kurds insist be integrated
into the Kurdish controlled region. The Kirkuk dispute caused a presidential veto of the
July 22, 2008 COR vote on the election law needed to hold provincial elections; the draft
law provided for equal division of power in Kirkuk (between Kurds, Arabs, and
Turkomans) until its status is finally resolved, prompting Kurdish opposition and
subsequent communal strife in Kirkuk city. The Administration also believes that the
provincial elections can narrow the growing split within the Sunni community between
the established political parties and the tribal leaders (“Awakening Councils”) who, along
with their 100,000 “Sons of Iraq” fighters, cooperate with U.S. forces against Al Qaeda
in Iraq and help stabilize Sunni regions, such as Anbar Province (which was turned over
to Iraqi control on September 1, 2008). There is also a concern that sectarian violence
will return as a result of Sunni resentment of the Maliki government’s refusal to integrate
more than 20% of the Sons of Iraq fighters into the official security forces.
Maliki’s growing perceived strength has helped him rebuild his government. The
pullout of the Consensus Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime Minister
Iyad al-Allawi in 2007 left the cabinet with about 13 vacant seats out of a 37 seat cabinet.

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The return of the Consensus Front to the cabinet and the simultaneous filling of former
Sadrist cabinet seats with independent Shiites in July 2008, leaves the cabinet with only
one remaining vacancy (ministry of Justice). All blocs are participating in the COR. At
the same time, Administration officials and outside experts are concerned that Maliki’s
new confidence could lead to reversals, for example by refusing to integrate the Sons of
Iraq, and by demanding a timetable for U.S. forces to withdraw from Iraq as part of a
U.S.-Iraq strategic agreement in the final stages of negotiation.
Another key factor in Maliki’s political rise was his confrontation of fellow Shiites,
in this case the Sadr faction. In late March 2008, Maliki sent about 30,000 Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) to Basra to defeat Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi, or JAM, militia, as well as
militias from the Fadhila Party, and Tharallah, in the oil export hub. Major fighting
ended with a reported Iran-brokered ceasefire on March 30, 2008. Critics viewed the
action as Maliki’s attempts to defeat Sadr in advance of the provincial elections.
Subsequently, Basra and environs have been mostly normalized, Sunnis and Kurds rallied
to support Maliki, Sadr announced he would not field a separate election list but instead
support Sadrists on other lists, and he recast the JAM as a social and cultural movement.

Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Seats
Seats
Bloc/Party
(Jan. 05)
(Dec. 05)
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). Now 85 seats after departure of
Fadilah (15 seats) and Sadr faction (28 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme
140
128
Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has 30; Da’wa Party (25 total:
Maliki faction, 12, and Anizi faction, 13); independents (30).
Kurdistan Alliance - KDP (24); PUK (22); independents (7)
75
53
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni
40
25
parties for Dec. vote.
Iraq Consensus Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi
—
44
Islamic Party (IIP, Tariq al-Hashimi, 26 seats); National Dialogue Council of
Khalaf Ulayyan (7); General People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi (7);
independents (4).
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh al-
—
11
Mutlak) Not in Jan. 2005 vote.
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
2
5
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
—
0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
5
—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2
—
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Umar al-Jabburi, Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million
in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/
December: 75% (12 million).

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Table 2. Assessments of the Benchmarks
July 12
Sept. 14
Subsequent Actions and Assessments - May 2008 Administration report, June
GAO
Benchmark
Admin.
Admin.
2008 GAO report, International Compact with Iraq Review in June 2008, and
(Sept. 07)
Report
Report
U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Reports (and various press sources)
1. Forming Constitutional Review
(S)
unmet
S
CRC continues debating 50 amendments regarding federal vs. regional powers and
Committee (CRC) and completing review
satisfactory
presidential powers; Kurds want Kirkuk issue settled before finalizing amendments.
Sunnis want presidential council to have enhanced powers relative to prime minister.
Some progress on technical, judicial issues. Deadlines for final recommendations
repeatedly extended, now beyond latest May 2008 deadline.
2. Enacting and implementing laws on
(U)
unmet
S
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12, 2008. Allows about 30,000 fourth
De-Baathification
unsatisfact.
ranking Baathists to regain their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists in top three party ranks would
receive pensions. But, could allow for judicial prosecution of all ex-Baathists and to firing
of about 7,000 ex-Baathists in post-Saddam security services, and bars ex-Saddam
security personnel from regaining jobs. Some reports suggest some De-Baathification
officials using the new law to purge political enemies or settle old scores.
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws
U
unmet
U
Framework and three implementing laws stalled over Kurd-Arab disputes; only
that ensure equitable distribution of
framework law has reached COR to date. Revenue being distributed equitably, and 2008
resources
budget adopted February 13, 2008 maintains 17% revenue for KRG. Kurds and central
government setting up commission to resolve remaining disputes; U.S. Embassy says it
expects near-term progress on revenue sharing law (an implementing law).
4. Enacting and implementing laws to
S
partly met
S
Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low threshold (petition by 33% of
form semi-autonomous regions
provincial council members) to start process to form new regions, but main blocs agreed
that law would take effect April 2008. August 2008: petition being circulated among
some Basra residents (another way to start forming a region) to begin process of
converting Basra province into a single province “region.
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law
S on (a)
overall
S on (a) and
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments (and elections by October 1,
to establish a higher electoral
and U on
unmet; (a)
(c)
2008) adopted February 13, 2008, took effect April 2008. Election law required to
commission, (b) provincial elections law;
the others
met
implement elections not adopted due to Kurdish opposition to proposed interim
(c) a law to specify authorities of
arrangements for Kirkuk power sharing, as well as Arab attempt to replace peshmerga
provincial bodies, and (d) set a date for
in Kirkuk with ISF. Agreement apparently reached to use “open list” (vote for candidates)
provincial elections
voting system, favored by Sadrists. About 4 months preparation (registration, candidate
vetting, ballot printing) needed after law is passed.
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
conditions
unmet
Same as
Law to amnesty “non-terrorists” among 25,000 detainees held by Iraq, passed on
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
do not
July
February 13, 2008. Of 17,000 approved for release (mostly Sunnis and Sadrist Shiites),
allow a
only about 1,600 released to date due to slow judicial process. Does not affect 25,000
rating
detainees held by U.S.
7. Enacting and implementing laws on
conditions
unmet
Same as
Basra operation, discussed above, viewed by Bush Administration as move against
militia disarmament
do not
July
militias. On April 9, 2008, Maliki demanded all militias disband as condition for their
allow
parties to participate in provincial elections. Law on militia demobilization stalled.
rating

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July 12
Sept. 14
Subsequent Actions and Assessments - May 2008 Administration report, June
GAO
Benchmark
Admin.
Admin.
2008 GAO report, International Compact with Iraq Review in June 2008, and
(Sept. 07)
Report
Report
U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Reports (and various press sources)
8. Establishing political, media,
S
met
met
No change. “Executive Steering Committee” works with U.S.-led forces.
economic, and services committee to
support U.S. “surge”
9. Providing three trained and ready
S
partly met
S
No change. Eight brigades were assigned to assist the surge.
brigades to support U.S. surge
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with
U
unmet
Mixed: S to
No significant change. Still some, although diminishing, U.S. concern over the Office of
authorities to make decisions, without
pursue
the Commander in Chief (part of Maliki’s office) control over appointments to the ISF -
political intervention, to pursue all
extremists U
favoring Shiites. Still, some politically-motivated leaders remain in ISF. In the past
extremists, including Sunni insurgents
on political
year, the commander of the National Police has fired over 5,000 officers for sectarian or
and Shiite militias
interference
politically-motivated behavior, and Ministry of Interior said to have been purged of
sectarian administrators and their bodyguards. More Sunnis now in command jobs.
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
U.
unmet
Mixed. S on
Administration interpreted Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce law even-
providing even-handed enforcement of
military, U
handedly, but acknowledges continued militia influence and infiltration in some units.
law
on police
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in
S
partly met
S
No change. Administration sees ISF acting against JAM in Sadr City, and ethno-sectarian
Baghdad will not provide a safe haven
violence has fallen sharply in Baghdad.
for any outlaw, regardless of sectarian
affiliation
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and
Mixed. S
unmet
same as July
Sectarian violence continues to drop, but militias still armed, despite Basra operation.
(b) eliminating militia control of local
on (a); U
12
103,000 Sunni “Sons of Iraq,” but still distrusted as potential Sunni militia forces. Iraq
security
on (b)
government will assume payment of 54,000 Sons as of October 1, but opposes integrating
more than about 20% into the ISF.
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security
S
met
S
No change. Over 50 joint security stations operating, more than the 33 planned.
stations
15. Increasing ISF units capable of
U
unmet
U
Continuing but slow progress training ISF. U.S. officials say ISF likely unable to secure
operating independently
Iraq internally until 2009-2012; and against external threats not for several years
thereafter. Basra operation initially exposed continued factionalism and poor leadership
in ISF, but also ability to rapidly deploy.
16. Ensuring protection of minority
S
met
S
No change. Rights of minority parties protected by Article 37 of constitution.
parties in COR
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion
S
partly met
S
About 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for capital projects was spent. Another $22
in 2007 capital budget for reconstruction
billion is in 2008 Iraqi budget, including August 2008 supplemental portion.
projects.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not
U
unmet
U
Some governmental recriminations against some ISF officers still observed.
making false accusations against ISF
members

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