Order Code RL34645
The Manhattan Project, the Apollo Program, and
Federal Energy Technology R&D Programs:
A Comparative Analysis
September 3, 2008
Deborah D. Stine
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

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The Manhattan Project, the Apollo Program, and
Federal Energy Technology R&D Programs:
A Comparative Analysis
Summary
Some policymakers have concluded that the energy challenges facing the United
States are so critical that a concentrated investment in energy research and
development (R&D) should be undertaken. The Manhattan project, which produced
the atomic bomb, and the Apollo program, which landed American men on the moon,
have been cited as examples of the success such R&D investments can yield.
Investment in federal energy technology R&D programs of the 1970s, in response to
two energy crises, have generally been viewed as less successful than the earlier two
efforts. This report compares and contrasts the three initiatives.
In 2007 dollars, the cumulative cost of the Manhattan project over 5 fiscal years
was approximately $21 billion; of the Apollo program over 14 fiscal years,
approximately $96 billion; of post-oil shock energy R&D efforts over 35 fiscal years,
$115 billion. A measure of the nation’s commitments to the programs is their
relative shares of the federal outlays during the years of peak funding: for the
Manhattan program, the peak year funding was 1% of federal outlays; for the Apollo
program, 2.2%; and for energy technology R&D programs, 0.5%. Another measure
of the commitment is their relative shares of the nation’s gross domestic product
(GDP) during the peak years of funding: for the Manhattan project and the Apollo
program, the peak year funding reached 0.4% of GDP, and for the energy technology
R&D programs, 0.1%.
Besides funding, several criteria might be used to compare these three initiatives
including perception of the program or threat, goal clarity, and the customer of the
technology being developed. By these criteria, while the Manhattan project and the
Apollo program may provide some useful analogies for thinking about an energy
technology R&D initiative, there are fundamental differences between the forces that
drove these historical R&D success stories and the forces driving energy technology
R&D today. Critical differences include (1) the ability to transform the program or
threat into a concrete goal, and (2) the use to which the technology would be put. On
the issue of goal setting, for the Manhattan project, the response to the threat of
enemy development of a nuclear bomb was the goal to construct a bomb; for the
Apollo program, the threat of Soviet space dominance was translated into a specific
goal of landing on the moon. For energy, the response to the problems of insecure
oil sources and high prices has resulted in multiple, sometimes conflicting, goals.
Regarding use, both the Manhattan project and the Apollo program goals pointed to
technologies primarily for governmental use with little concern about their
environmental impact; for energy, in contrast, the hoped-for outcome depends on
commercial viability and mitigation of environmental impacts from energy use.
Although the Manhattan project and the Apollo program may provide some
useful analogies for funding, these differences may limit their utility regarding energy
policy. Rather, energy technology R&D has been driven by at least three not always
commensurate goals — resource and technological diversity, commercial viability,
and environmental protection — which were not goals of the historical programs.

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Contents
The Manhattan Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Apollo Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Energy Technology Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Comparative Analysis of the Manhattan Project, the Apollo Program, and Federal
Energy Technology R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Threat Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Goal Clarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Technology Customer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Implications for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
List of Figures
Figure 1. Comparison of Consumer Transportation Oil Cost and DOE Energy
Technology R&D Funding, 1973-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Figure 2. Annual Funding for Manhattan Project, Apollo Program, and DOE Energy
Technology R&D Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
List of Tables
Table 1. Cumulative and Annual Average Program Year Funding for the Manhattan
Project, the Apollo Program, and DOE Energy Technology R&D Program . 7

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The Manhattan Project, the Apollo Program,
and Federal Energy Technology R&D
Programs: A Comparative Analysis
Some policymakers have concluded that the energy challenges facing the United
States are so critical that a concentrated investment in energy research and
development (R&D) should be undertaken.1 The Manhattan project, which produced
the atomic bomb, and the Apollo program, which landed American men on the moon,
have been cited as examples of the success such R&D investments can yield.
Investment in federal energy technology R&D programs of the 1970s, in response to
two energy crises, have generally been viewed as less successful than the earlier two
efforts. This report compares and contrasts the goals of, and the investments in, the
three initiatives, which may provide useful insights for Congress as it assesses and
debates the nation’s energy policy.
The Manhattan Project
The Manhattan project took place from 1942 to 1946.2 Beginning in 1939, some
key scientists expressed concern that Germany might be building an atomic weapon
and proposed that the United States accelerate atomic research in response.
Following the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941, the United States entered
World War II. In January 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave secret,
tentative approval for the development of an atomic bomb. The Army Corps of
Engineers was assigned the task and set up the Manhattan Engineer District to
manage the project. A bomb research and design laboratory was built at Los Alamos,
New Mexico. Due to uncertainties regarding production effectiveness, two possible
fuels for the reactors were produced with uranium enrichment facilities at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, and plutonium production facilities at Hanford, Washington. In
1 Examples in the 110th Congress include bills such as the New Manhattan Project for
Energy Independence (H.R. 6260); the PROGRESS Act (H.R. 1300); the Gas Price
Reduction Act of 2008 (S. 3202); the Apollo Energy Independence Act of 2008 (H.R. 6385);
the Comprehensive Energy Exploration, Price Reduction, and Renewable Energy Investment
Act of 2008 (H.R. 6412); and the New Apollo Energy Act of 2007 (H.R. 2809). For a
further discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL34621, Capturing CO2 from Coal-Fired
Power Plants: Challenges for a Comprehensive Strategy, by Larry Parker, Peter Folger, and
Deborah D. Stine.
2 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of History and Heritage Resources, “The Manhattan
Project: An Interactive History,” [http://www.cfo.doe.gov/me70/manhattan/1939-1942.htm].
F.G. Gosling, The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb, January 1999 edition (Oak
Ridge, TN: Department of Energy).

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CRS-2
December 1942, Roosevelt gave final approval to construct a nuclear bomb. A bomb
using uranium as fuel was successfully tested south of Los Alamos in July 1945. In
August 1945, President Truman decided to use the bomb against Japan at two
locations. Japan surrendered a few days after the second bomb attack. At that point,
the Manhattan project was deemed to have fulfilled its mission, although some
additional nuclear weapons were still assembled. In 1946, the civilian Atomic
Energy Commission was established to manage the nation’s future atomic activities,
and the Manhattan project officially ended.
According to one estimate, the Manhattan project cost $2.2 billion from 1942
to 1946 ($21 billion in 2007 dollars), which is much greater than the original cost and
time estimate of approximately $148 million for 1942 to 1944.3 General Leslie
Groves, who managed the Manhattan project, has written that Members of Congress
who inquired about the project were discouraged by the Secretary of War from asking
questions or visiting sites.4 After the project was under way for over a year, in
February 1944, War Department officials received essentially a “blank check” for the
project from Congressional leadership who “remained completely in the dark” about
the Manhattan project, according to Groves and other experts.5
The Apollo Program
The Apollo program, FY1960 to FY1973, encompassed 17 missions, including
six lunar landings.6 NASA was created in response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik
3 Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., A History of the United States Atomic
Energy Commission: The New World, 1939/1946, Volume I, (University Park, PA: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962). Appendix 2 provides the annual Manhattan
project expenditures. These costs were adjusted to 2007 dollars using the price index for
gross domestic product (GDP), available from the Bureau of Economic Affairs, National
Income and Product Accounts Table webpage, Table 1.1.4, at [http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/
nipaweb/].
4 Leslie R. Groves, Now it Can be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1962).
5 Ibid., Kevin O’Neil, “Building the Bomb,” Chapter 1 in Stephen I. Schwartz (ed.), Atomic
Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 1998), pp. 58-59.
6 Richard Orloff, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Apollo By The
Numbers: A Statistical Reference, NASA SP-2000-4029, 2004 web update at
[http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4029/Apollo_00_Welcome.htm]. There is some difference of
opinion regarding what activities comprised the Apollo program, and thus when it began and
ended. For example, two different cost figures are provided on NASA’s website. This is
probably because some analysts include the first studies for Apollo, Skylab, and the use of
Apollo spacecraft in the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. The Orloff analysis includes the first
studies of Apollo, but not Skylab (1973-74) or Soyuz (1975) activities. Another NASA
analysis provides the cost as $25.4 billion, but provides no details as to how the cost were
determined. See Roger D. Launius, NASA, The Legacy of Project Apollo at
[http://history.nasa.gov/ap11-35ann/legacy.html].

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CRS-3
in 1958 and began operation in 1959.7 Although preliminary discussions regarding
the Apollo program began in 1960, Congress did not decide to fund it until 1961 after
the Soviet Union became the first nation to launch a human into space. The goals of
the Apollo program were
! To land Americans on the Moon and return them safely to Earth;
! To establish the technology to meet other national interests in space;
! To achieve preeminence in space for the United States;
! To carry out a program of scientific exploration of the Moon; and
! To develop man’s capability to work in the lunar environment.8
The program included a three-part spacecraft to take two astronauts to the Moon
surface, support them while on the Moon, and return them to Earth.9 Saturn rockets
were used to launch this equipment. In July 1969, Apollo 11 achieved the goal of
landing Americans on the Moon and returning them safely to Earth. The last lunar
landing took place in December 1972.
The Apollo program was only one part of NASA’s activities during this period.
NASA’s peak funding during the Apollo program occurred in FY1966 when its total
funding was $4.5 billion (in current dollars), of which $3.0 billion went to the Apollo
program.10 According to NASA, the total cost of the Apollo program for FY1960-
FY1973 was $19.4 billion ($95.7 billion in 2007 dollars).11 The activities with the
greatest cost were the Saturn V rockets ($6.4 billion) followed by the Command and
Service Modules ($3.7 billion), the Lunar Modules ($2.2 billion), and Manned Space
Flight Operations ($1.6 billion).
7 For more information, see CRS Report RL34263, U.S. Civilian Space Policy Priorities:
Reflections 50 Years After Sputnik, by Deborah D. Stine.
8 NASA, Kennedy Space Center, “Project Apollo,” webpage, at
[http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/history/apollo/apollo.htm]. A list of the top ten
Apollo scientific discoveries as determined by the Smithsonian Institution is at
[http://www.nasm.si.edu/collections/imagery/apollo/apollotop10.htm].
9 NASA, Kennedy Space Center, “Project Apollo,” webpage, at
[http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/history/apollo/apollo.htm]. The three parts were the
command module (CM), the crew’s quarters and flight control section; the service module
(SM) for the propulsion and spacecraft support systems (when together, the two modules
are called CSM); and the lunar module (LM).
10 The funding data is available at [http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4214/app2.html#1965]. It is
based on information in NASA, The Apollo Spacecraft - A Chronology, NASA Special
Publication-4009, at [http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4009/contents.htm].
This data is from Volume 4, Appendix 7, at [http://www.hq.nasa.gov/
office/pao/History/SP-4009/v4app7.htm].
11 Richard Orloff, Apollo By The Numbers: A Statistical Reference, NASA SP-2000-4029,
2004 web update, at [http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4029/Apollo_00_Welcome.htm]. The
funding data is available at [http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4029/Apollo_18-16_Apollo_
Program_Budget_Appropriations.htm]. It is based on information in NASA, The Apollo
Spacecraft - A Chronology, NASA Special Publication-4009, at [http://www.hq.nasa.gov/
office/pao/History/SP-4009/contents.htm].

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CRS-4
Energy Technology Research and Development

The Arab oil embargo of 1973 (the “first” energy crisis) put energy policy on the
national “agenda.” At that time, Americans began to experience rapidly rising prices
for fuel and related goods and services.12 Until then, energy R&D had been focused
on the development of nuclear power under the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).
After the Manhattan project ended, Congress had established the AEC to manage
both civilian and military projects in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-585).13
In response to the energy crisis, Congress subsumed the AEC, including the
Manhattan project facilities, and other energy programs, into the Energy Research
and Development Administration (ERDA), which became the focus for federal
energy technology R&D, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as part of
the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-438).14
In the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977 (P.L. 95-91), Congress
decided to combine the activities of ERDA with approximately 50 other energy
offices and programs in a new Department of Energy (DOE), which began operations
on October 1, 1977.15 In 1979, the Iranian Revolution precipitated the “second”
energy crisis that took place from 1978-1981. High oil prices and inflation lasted for
several years. An ensuing recession curbed demand and oil prices fell markedly by
1986. The scale of funding for most of DOE’s energy R&D programs dropped
steadily during the 1980s (see Figure 1).
The large energy technology demonstration projects funded during the late
1970s and early 1980s were viewed by some as too elaborate and insufficiently
linked to either existing energy research or the marketplace.16 A well known example
is the Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC).17 The goal of SFC was to support large-
scale projects that industry was unwilling to support due to the technical,
environmental, or financial uncertainties. The program ended in 1986 due to a
12 Energy Information Administration, “25th Anniversary of the 1973 Oil Embargo,” at
[http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/25opec/anniversary.html].
13 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of History and Heritage Resources, “The Manhattan
Project: An Interactive History,” “Civilian Control of Atomic Energy” webpage at
[http://www.cfo.doe.gov/me70/manhattan/civilian_control.htm].
14 Department of Energy, “Energy Research and Development Administration,” webpage
at [http://www.ch.doe.gov/html/site_info/energy_research.htm].
15 Although DOE did not begin operating until 1977, the term “DOE Energy Technology
R&D Program” in this report is defined as encompassing DOE programs funded beginning
in 1977 as well as energy R&D activities that occurred prior to 1977 that were managed by
the organizations it subsumed.
16 See, for example, Bruce L.R. Smith, American Science Policy Since World War II
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990).
17 The Synthetic Fuels corporation was established by the United States Synthetic Fuels
Corporation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-294), and its operation was discontinued by the Synthetic
Fuels Corporation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-272).

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CRS-5
combination of lower energy prices, environmental issues, lack of support by the
Reagan Administration, and administrative challenges.18
Figure 1. Comparison of Consumer Transportation Oil Cost and DOE
Energy Technology R&D Funding, 1973-2005
25
Transportation Oil Cost ($/million BTU)
rs
20
lla
o
D
7
15
0
0
2
nt
10
a
DOE Energy Technology Research and Development (Billion $)
onst
5
C
0
3
7
3
7
3
7
197
1975 197
1979 1981 198
1985 198
1989 1991 199
1995 199
1999 2001 2003 2005
Source: Congressional Research Service. Transportation oil costs are from transportation/petroleum
column of Table 3.4 Consumer Price Estimates for Energy by End-Use Sector, 1970-2005 in Energy
Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2007, Report No. DOE/EIA-0384(2007), Posted:
June 23, 2008, at [http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/finan.html]. DOE data is from CRS Report RS22858,
Renewable Energy R&D Funding History: A Comparison with Funding for Nuclear Energy, Fossil
Energy, and Energy Efficiency R&D, by Fred Sissine. Dollars for both transportation oil costs and
DOE energy R&D were adjusted to 2007 dollars using the information from Bureau of Economic
Analysis, Table 1.1.4. Price Indexes for Gross Domestic Product at [http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/
nipaweb/index.asp].
Oil prices began to rise substantially in 2004, but funding for energy technology
R&D has not increased as it did during the energy crisis of the late 1970s to early
1980s. With oil prices reaching nearly $150 per barrel in July 2008, some believe
that the nation is in another energy crisis, while others believe that oil prices will
moderate.19 In the 110th Congress, the policy debate regarding the magnitude and
priorities for energy R&D continues — in response both to oil prices and to concerns
about climate change, as energy-related activities are a major source of greenhouse
gas emissions.20
18 National Academy of Sciences, The Government Role in Civilian Technology: Building
a New Alliance (Washington, DC: National Academy Press 1992).
19 See CRS Report RL33521, Gasoline Prices: Causes of Increases and Congressional
Response, by Carl E. Behrens.
20 For more information, see CRS Report RL34513, Climate Change: Current Issues and
Policy Tools, by Jane A. Leggett.

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CRS-6
Comparative Analysis of the Manhattan Project, the
Apollo Program, and Federal Energy Technology
R&D
A general understanding of driving forces of and funding histories for the
Manhattan project and Apollo program, and a comparison of these two initiatives to
Department of Energy (DOE) energy technology R&D programs, may provide useful
insights for Congress as it assesses and determines the nation’s energy R&D policy.
Four criteria that might be used to compare these programs are funding, perception
of threat, goal clarity, and technology customer. Each is discussed in more depth
below.
Funding
Table 1 provides a comparison of the total and annual average program costs
for the Manhattan project, Apollo program, and federal energy technology R&D
program since the first energy crisis. Annual average long-term (1974-2008) DOE
energy technology R&D funding was approximately $3 billion (in 2007 constant
dollars) as is the FY2008 budget and the FY2009 budget request.21 In comparison,
the annual average funding (in 2007 constant dollars) for the Manhattan project was
$4 billion and for the Apollo program and the DOE energy technology program at its
peak (1975-1980) was $7 billion.
At the time of peak funding, the percentage of federal spending devoted to DOE
energy technology R&D was half that of the Manhattan project, and one-fifth that of
the Apollo program. From an overall economy standpoint, the percentage of the
gross domestic product (GDP) spent on DOE energy technology R&D in the peak
funding year was one-fourth that spent on either the Manhattan project or the Apollo
program.
As shown in Figure 2, although cumulative funding for the DOE energy
technology R&D program is greater than for the Manhattan project or the Apollo
program, the annual funding for each of the historical programs was higher than that
for energy technology R&D which occurred over a greater number of years. This is
an important distinction: the Manhattan project and the Apollo program were specific
and distinct funding efforts whereas the national energy R&D effort has been
ongoing over a longer period of time. In all three cases, a rapid increase in funding
was followed by a rapid decline.
21 For information on the DOE energy technology R&D budget, see CRS Report RL34448,
Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2009, coordinated by John F. Sargent.

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CRS-7
Table 1. Cumulative and Annual Average Program Year Funding
for the Manhattan Project, the Apollo Program, and DOE Energy
Technology R&D Program
Annual
Percent of
Average
Percent of
Cumulative
Federal
Funding Per
GDP
Funding
Number
Outlays
Program
During
(in billions
of Fiscal
During
Year (in
Year of
of 2007
Years
Year of
billions of
Peak
dollars)
Peak
2007
Funding
Funding
dollars)
The
$21
5
$4
1.0
0.4
Manhattan
Project
(1942-1946)
The Apollo
$96
14
$7
2.2
0.4
Program
(1960-1973)
DOE
$41
6
$7
0.5
0.1
Energy
Technology
Programs
(1975-1980)
[Peak
Funding]
DOE
$115
35
$3
0.5
0.1
Energy
Technology
Program
(1974-2008)
[Long-Term
Funding]
Source: Congressional Research Service. Manhattan Project data: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E.
Anderson, Jr., A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission: The New
World,1939/1946,Volume I. Apollo program data: Richard Orloff, Apollo By The Numbers: A
Statistical Reference, NASA SP-2000-4029, 2004 web update. DOE data: CRS Report RS22858,
Renewable Energy R&D Funding History: A Comparison with Funding for Nuclear Energy, Fossil
Energy, and Energy Efficiency R&D, by Fred Sissine. Federal Outlay and Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) data: Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States
Government FY2009. Peak year of funding (in current dollars) for Manhattan project was 1946, for
Apollo program, 1966, and for DOE Energy Technology R&D programs, 1980. The greatest annual
funding (in constant dollars) for DOE energy technology programs took place from 1975-1980.

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Figure 2. Annual Funding for Manhattan Project, Apollo Program,
and DOE Energy Technology R&D Program
18
16
14
rs
a 12
ll
o 10
f D
o
s
8
n
io
ill
6
B
4
2
0
Manhattan
Apollo Program
DOE Energy Technology Programs (FY1974-FY2008)
Project
(FY1960-FY1973)
(FY1942-FY1946)
Current Dol ars
Constant 2007 Dol ars
Source: Congressional Research Service. Manhattan Project data: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E.
Anderson, Jr., A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission: The New World,
1939/1946,Volume I. Apollo program data: Richard Orloff, Apollo By The Numbers: A Statistical
Reference, NASA SP-2000-4029, 2004 web update. DOE data: CRS Report RS22858, Renewable
Energy R&D Funding History: A Comparison with Funding for Nuclear Energy, Fossil Energy, and
Energy Efficiency R&D, by Fred Sissine.
Threat Perception
The Manhattan project and Apollo project were both responses to perceived
threats, which compelled policymaker support for these initiatives. The Manhattan
project took place during World War II. Although the public might have been
unaware of the potential threat of Germany’s use of nuclear weapons and the
Manhattan project, the President and Members of Congress could feel confident
about public support for the war effort of which the Manhattan project was a part.
Similarly, the Apollo program took place during the Cold War with the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). When the USSR launched the Sputnik satellite
and first man into space, the U.S. public felt threatened by the potential that the
USSR might take leadership in the development of space flight technology, and
potentially greater control of outer space. President Jimmy Carter said that
With the exception of preventing war, this [energy crisis] is the greatest
challenge that our country will face during our lifetime ... our decision about
energy will test the character of the American people and the ability of the
President and the Congress to govern this Nation. This difficult effort will be the

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‘moral equivalent of war,’ except that we will be uniting our efforts to build and
not to destroy.”22
The threat to which investment in energy technology R&D responds, however, is
largely economic rather than military. In addition, the threat posed by climate
change, which is related to energy consumption, will likely be gradual and long-
term.23
Goal Clarity
Another issue is the degree to which there is clarity and consensus on the
program goal. The Manhattan project had a clear and singular goal — the creation
of a nuclear bomb. For the Apollo program, the goal was also clear and singular —
land American astronauts on the moon and return them safely to Earth. In the case
of energy technology R&D, however, the overall goal of clean, affordable, and
reliable energy is multi-faceted. While “energy independence” has from time to time
been a rallying cry, energy technology R&D has in fact, been driven by at least three
not always commensurate goals: resource and technological diversity, commercial
viability, and environmental protection. To help reduce the risk of dependence on
a single energy source, diversity of resources and energy technologies have always
been seen as a goal of the energy R&D program. Second, unlike the Manhattan
project or the Apollo program, the DOE energy technology R&D program seeks
ultimately to be commercially viable. Third, the energy R&D program must meet
environmental goals, including reducing the impact of energy-related activities on
land, water, air, and climate change.
Technology Customer
Another comparison criterion is the customer for technologies that may result
from the R&D. The government was the customer for both the Manhattan project
and Apollo program. The private sector is the ultimate customer for any energy
technology developed as a result of federal energy R&D programs. Therefore, the
marketability of any technologies developed will be a key determinant of the degree
to which the program is successful. Moreover, the inherent involvement of the
private sector raises a number of issues related to the appropriateness of different
government roles. Some believe that focusing R&D on one particular technology
versus another may result in government, instead of the marketplace, picking
“winners and losers.”24 Some experts believe that the most important driver for
private sector deployment or commercialization is not the need for new technologies,
22 President Jimmy Carter, “Address to the Nation on Energy,” speech, April 18, 1977. A
video and text is at [http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3398].
23 CRS Report RL34513, Climate Change: Current Issues and Policy Tools, by Jane A.
Leggett.
24 For more discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33528, Industrial Competitiveness
and Technological Advancement: Debate Over Government Policy, by Wendy H. Schacht.

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CRS-10
but regulation or economic incentives.25 Others, however, believe that without
government support and intervention, the private sector is unlikely to conduct the
R&D necessary to achieve the public goal of clean, affordable, and reliable energy,
and that current technologies are insufficient to achieve this goal.26
Implications for Congress
When the Manhattan project and the Apollo program are used as analogies for
future DOE energy technology R&D, the following points may be important to
consider:
! To be equivalent in annual average funding, DOE energy technology
R&D funding would need to increase from approximately $3 billion
in FY2008 to at least $4 billion per program year to match the
Manhattan project funding, or $7 billion per program year to match
Apollo program funding levels or DOE energy technology R&D
funding at its peak. To be equivalent of peak year funding would
require even greater increases. In terms of federal outlays, energy
technology R&D funding would need to increase from 0.5% to 1%
(Manhattan project) or 2.2 % (Apollo program) of federal outlays.
As a percentage of GDP, this funding would need to increase from
0.1% to 0.4% of GDP (for both the Manhattan project and the
Apollo program).
! Both the Manhattan project and the Apollo program had a singular
and specific goal. For the Manhattan project, the response to the
threat of enemy development of a nuclear bomb was the goal to
construct a bomb; for the Apollo program, the threat of Soviet space
dominance was translated into a specific goal of landing on the
moon. For energy, however, the response to the problems of
insecure oil sources and high prices has resulted in multiple,
sometimes conflicting goals.
! Both the Manhattan project and the Apollo program goals pointed
to technologies primarily for governmental use with little concern
about their environmental impact; for energy, in contrast, the hoped
for outcome depends on commercial viability and mitigation of the
environmental impacts of the energy technologies developed.
Although the Manhattan project and the Apollo program may provide some
useful analogies for funding, these differences may limit their utility regarding energy
policy. Rather, energy technology R&D has been driven by at least three not always
25 See for example, David Goldston, “Misspent Energy,” Nature, 447:130, May 10, 2007 at
[http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v447/n7141/pdf/447130a.pdf].
26 See, for example, The National Academies, Rising Above the Gathering Storm:
Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future (Washington, DC:
National Academy Press, 2007).

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commensurate goals — resource and technological diversity, commercial viability,
and environmental protection — which were not goals of the historical programs.

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