Order Code RS21922
Updated August 28, 2008
Afghanistan: Government Formation
and Performance
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The central government’s limited writ and its perceived corruption are helping
sustain a Taliban insurgency and painting President Hamid Karzai as a weak leader.
However, factional and ethnic differences have remained confined to political debate,
the largest regional strongmen have been marginalized, and Karzai is focused on
reversing the perception of security deterioration in the runup to his re-election bid in
the fall of 2009. See CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Post-Conflict Political Transition and Political Landscape
U.S. policy has been to support and extend the authority of Afghanistan’s President
Hamid Karzai and his central government, predicated on the assumption that it is weak
or absent governance that cause some in the population to turn to Taliban insurgents as
a source of stability and justice. Karzai’s is the first fully elected government in Afghan
history, although there were parliamentary elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah
(the last were in 1969). Presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections, and adoption
of a constitution were part of a post-Taliban transition roadmap established by a United
Nations-sponsored agreement of major Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany on
December 5, 2001, (“Bonn Agreement”),1 after the Taliban had fallen. (The subsequent
political transition process is described in the table at the end of this paper.) The elected
Afghan parliament integrates all the various ethnicities and sects, but the cabinet has come
to be dominated by ethnic Pashtuns (who are about 42% of the population and
traditionally have governed Afghanistan). In an attempt to stabilize Afghanistan, a 46,000
troop NATO-led peacekeeping coalition there, to which the United States provides about
14,500 forces (another 19,000 U.S. troops are under direct U.S. command), sometimes
works with local leaders who may buck central government authority, although substantial
local autonomy is a typical pattern of Afghan governance.
1 For text, see [http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm].
CRS-2
Many seats in parliament, particularly the elected lower house (Wolesi Jirga), are
held by personalities and factions prominent in Afghanistan’s recent wars. The lower
house appears to be divided into pro-Karzai, opposition and “independent” deputies that
are not strictly organized according to Afghanistan’s 90 registered political parties. Karzai
opposes forming his own party, but his support base in the Wolesi Jirga includes former
members of the hardline conservative Pashtun-based Hizb-e-Islam party; supporters of
Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf (a prominent Islamic conservative mujahedin party leader who
was defeated for the speakership); and several Karzai clan members including elder
brother Qayyum, cousin Jamil Karzai, and relative by marriage, Aref Nurzai. Also pro-
Karzai are former militia and Taliban leaders, including Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province),
who had gained fame for directing the Afghan assault on the Al Qaeda redoubt at Tora
Bora during the U.S.-led war; Pacha Khan Zadran (Paktia) who, by some accounts, helped
Osama bin Laden escape Tora Bora; Mullah Abdul Salam (“Mullah Rocketi”), from
Zabol; and Mohammad Islam Mohammadi, who ran Bamiyan Province during the
Taliban’s destruction of the large Buddha statues there in March 2001 (he was
assassinated on January 27, 2007). Taliban-era Foreign Minister, Wakil Mutawwakil, ran
but was defeated.
The “opposition,” led by ethnic minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara) of the anti-
Taliban “Northern Alliance,” view as a betrayal Karzai’s firing of many of the non-
Pashtuns from the cabinet (such as former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah,
dismissed in 2006), but the faction maintains ties to Karzai and says it will not resort to
violent opposition. In April 2007, Wolesi Jirga Speaker Yunus Qanooni and former
Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani, both prominent Northern Alliance figures,
organized an opposition bloc called the “National Front.” Also in the bloc are both of
Karzai’s vice presidents; and some Soviet-era security figures such as Sayed Muhammad
Gulabzoi (Khost Province) and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, who chairs parliament’s defense
committee. The bloc advocates amending the constitution to give more power to
parliament and to institute selection of governors and mayors by the elected provincial
councils rather than by the President. The National Front bloc opposes Karzai’s
negotiations with Taliban fighters, which Karzai says is necessary to get them off the
battlefield but which the bloc believes is a plan for further Pashtun consolidation.
The opposition to Karzai first showed its strength in March 2006, following the
December 19, 2005 inauguration of parliament, by requiring Karzai’s cabinet to be
approved individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition leverage. However,
Karzai rallied his support and all but 5 of the 25 nominees were confirmed. One of those
defeated was a female nominee for Minister of Women’s Affairs, a post that had always
been held by a female since it was established in 2002; this also left Afghanistan without
any women ministers. Replacement nominees for those voted down were approved on
August 7, 2006. In May 2006, the opposition compelled Karzai to change the nine-
member Supreme Court, the highest judicial body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic
conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as chief justice. Parliament approved his new Court
choices in July 2006, all of whom are trained in modern jurisprudence.
In May 2007, the National Front achieved a majority in parliament to oust Karzai ally
Rangin Spanta as Foreign Minister. However, Karzai refused to replace him, instead
seeking a Supreme Court ruling that Spanta should remain, on the grounds that his ouster
was related to a refugee issue (Iran’s expulsion of 100,000 Afghan refugees), not a foreign
policy issue. The Court has, to date, supported Karzai, and some National Front members
CRS-3
continue to protest his continuation in office. On November 27, 2007 Qanooni led a
“walkout” of parliament, accusing Karzai of ignoring a parliamentary vote to suspend
officials in Baghlan Province for allegedly failing to fully investigate the November 6,
2007, suicide bombing there that killed 6 parliamentarians and more than 60 others,
mostly children. An internal U.N. report said that jittery guards may have caused some
of the deaths.
Karzai and the National Front often battle for the support of the many “independent”
deputies in the Wolesi Jirga. Among them are several outspoken women, intellectuals,
and business leaders, such as 35-year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), a leading critic
of war-era faction leaders. In May 2007 parliament voted to suspend her for this criticism
for the duration of her term, but she is challenging the expulsion in court. Others in this
camp include Ms. Fauzia Gailani (Herat Province); Ms. Shukria Barekzai, editor of
Woman Mirror magazine; and Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai minister who
champions parliamentary powers. U.S.-based International Republican Institute (IRI) has
helped train independents; the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has assisted the more
established factions.
Karzai has fewer critics in the Meshrano Jirga, partly because of his constitutionally-
allotted 34 appointments (one-third of that body). Karzai engineered the appointment as
Speaker an ally, Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, a noted Islamic scholar who headed the post-
Communist mujahedin government for one month (May 1992) and who now heads the
effort to reconcile with Taliban figures (Peace and Reconciliation Commission, or
“PTSD” program). The deputy speaker is Hamid Gaylani, member of a pro-Karzai family
with five members in parliament. Karzai also appointed Northern Alliance military leader
Muhammad Fahim, perhaps to compensate for his removal as Defense Minister, although
Fahim resigned after only a few months and later joined the National Front. Another
Karzai appointment was Taliban-era religious affairs deputy minister Arsala Rahmani.
There is one Hindu, and 23 women; 17 of the women are Karzai appointees and 6 were
selected in their own right. Although this body is considered more conservative than the
Wolesi Jirga, it has been vocal; in May 2007, after a spate of civilian casualties caused
by U.S. combat, it passed a resolution calling for international forces to coordinate
operations with Afghan authorities. International human rights organizations criticized
the Meshrano Jirga on February 3, 2008 for issuing a statement supporting a death
sentence against 23 year old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing material
critical of Islam; the body subsequently retracted the statement. Kambaksh’s case remains
unresolved, and Karzai is reportedly mulling a pardon if the sentence is upheld. Following
an August 21, 2008 airstrike that some Afghans said killed 90 civilians (the incident is in
dispute), the Meshrano Jirga called for bringing foreign forces under Afghan law,
replacing an 2001 interim “status of forces agreement” with the coalition.
On less contentious issues, the executive and the legislature have worked well. Since
the end of 2007, the Wolesi Jirga has passed and forwarded to the Meshrano Jirga several
laws, including a labor law, a mines law, a law on economic cooperatives, and a
convention on tobacco control. The Wolesi Jirga also during this time confirmed Karzai
nominees for a new Minster of Refugee Affairs, head of the Central Bank, and the final
justice to fill out the Supreme Court. Both houses of parliament, whose budgets are
controlled by the Ministry of Finance, are staffed by about 275 Afghans, reporting to a
“secretariat.” There are 18 oversight committees, each with two staffers. Staff was hired
well before parliament convened, limiting factional influence, and they and the members
CRS-4
were trained by the U.N. Development Program and the State University of New York
(SUNY) under an $8 million USAID contract. There is a research unit and a library.
Government Performance2
U.S. policy has been to help expand Afghan institutions and to urge adoption of
performance criteria based on merit and competence, and not ethnic or factional loyalties.
Afghan ministries are growing their staffs and technologically capabilities, although still
suffering from a low resource and skill base. U.S. officials have generally refrained from
criticizing Karzai when, in the interests of political harmony, he has indulged faction
leaders with appointments and tolerated corruption. Karzai argues that compromises with
faction leaders and tribes are needed to keep the government intact as he focuses on
fighting “unrepentant” Taliban insurgents. However, partly as a result of these
compromises, many Afghans are said to be losing faith in the government. Some such as
former Coordinator for Counter-Narcotics and Justice Reform Thomas Schweich, in a
July 27, 2008 New York Times article, have gone so far as to assert that Karzai, to build
political support, is deliberately tolerating officials in his government who are allegedly
involved in the narcotics trade. The perception has not been altered by Karzai’s decisions
in 2007 to empower two Supreme Court chief justice Abdul Salam Azimi and Attorney
General Abdul Jabbar Sabit to try to reduce corruption, instill confidence in the justice
sector, and enhance government accountability. Karzai also formed an anti-corruption
commission. (Karzai fired Sabit on July 16, 2008 after he declared his intention to run
against Karzai in 2009 presidential elections.)
Some have cited Karzai’s handling of a prominent member of the National Front,
Uzbek leader Abdurrashid Dostam, as evidence of weakness. Dostam is often referred to
as a “warlord” because of his command of partisans in his largely Uzbek redoubt in
northern Afghanistan (Jowzjan and Balkh provinces), and he is widely accused of human
rights abuses of political opponents in the north. To separate him from his militia, in 2005
Karzai appointed him to the post of chief of staff of the armed forces. On February 4,
2008, Afghan police surrounded Dostam’s villa in Kabul in response to reports that his
followers attacked and beat an ethnic Turkmen rival. However, Karzai has not ordered his
arrest for fear of stirring unrest among Dostam’s followers. On the other hand, Karzai
successfully curbed prominent Tajik political leader, former Herat governor Ismail Khan,
by appointing him Minister of Energy and Water. In February 2007 both houses passed
a law giving amnesty to so-called “warlords,” such as Dostam and Khan. Karzai altered
the draft to give victims the right to seek justice for any abuses; Karzai did not sign a
modified version in May 2007, leaving the status unclear. Karzai reportedly might remove
Interior Minister Ahmad Zarrar for failing to act on information about the planned July
7, 2008 suicide attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, in which 60 were killed.
To try to improve local governance, in August 2007 Karzai placed the governor (and
district security officials) selection process in a new Independent Directorate for Local
2 Some information in this section is from the State Department reports on human rights in
Afghanistan for 2007. March 11, 2008 [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100611.htm];
the International Religious Freedom Report, released September 14, 2007.
[http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/2007/90225.htm]; and Defense Department “Report on Progress
Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” June 2008
CRS-5
Governance (IDLG) – and out of the Interior Ministry. In one high profile move, in March
2008 Karzai removed governor of Helmand Asadullah Wafa for his inability to expand
governance or to curb poppy cultivation in that most violent of all provinces; he was
replaced by Gulab Mangal, who is from Laghman Province and is considered an effective
leader, and who the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime said in an August 2008 report is
expected to take effective action against poppy cultivation in the province. That same
report said it was partly because of improving governance in some provinces that there
are now 18 “poppy free” provinces (out of 34), up from 13 in the same report in 2007.
The governor of Qandahar was changed (to former General Rahmatullah Raufi, replacing
Asadullah Khalid) after the August 7, 2008 Taliban assault on the Qandahar prison that
led to the freeing of several hundred Taliban fighters incarcerated there. The IDLG also
has replaced the governor of Ghazni Province, and at least two other governors are slated
to be changed.
On human rights issues, the overall State Department judgment is that the country’s
human rights record remains poor, but primarily because of the continuing insurgency,
and the weakness of and corruption in the central government. The security forces are
widely cited for abuses and corruption, including torture and abuse of detainees. Karzai
dropped a July 2006 proposal to revive, although in a far more circumscribed form, a
“Ministry of Supporting Virtue and Discouraging Vice,” a ministry that was used by the
Taliban to commit major abuses against women. In debate over a new press law, both
houses of parliament have approved a joint version, but Karzai has vetoed it on the
grounds that it gives the government too much control over private media. In the absence
of a law, Afghanistan’s conservative traditions have been ascendant, and are backed by
the advisory Council of Ulema (Islamic scholars). At the same time, press reports say that
there are growing numbers of arrests or intimidation of journalists who criticize the
central government or local leaders. In April 2008 the Ministry of Information and Culture
banned five Indian-produced soap operas on the grounds that they are too risque, although
the programs have been restored as of August 2008. This reportedly has had a chilling
effect on the 40 private radio stations, seven television networks, and 350 independent
newspapers that have opened since the Taliban fell.
Minority religions, including Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and Baha’i’s, often face
discrimination; the Supreme Court declared the Baha’i faith to be a form of blasphemy
in May 2007. In October 2007, Afghanistan resumed enforcing the death penalty after a
four year moratorium, executing 15 criminals. Others note lack of action to prevent sexual
trafficking; Afghanistan was again placed in Tier 2 in the State Department’s June 4, 2008
Trafficking in Persons report for 2008 on the grounds that it does not fully comply with
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons. However, the report says
it is making significant efforts to do so, including by establishing anti-trafficking offices
in the offices of the Attorney General in all 34 provinces.
Funding Issues. USAID has spent about $440 million (FY2002-2007) to build
democracy and rule of law, and assist the elections. A revised request for FY2008
supplemental funding included $100 million to assist with the presidential elections
planned for 2009. For FY2009, $707 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) has been
requested which will be used in part to enable the Karzai government to “extend the reach
of good governance....”
CRS-6
Afghanistan Political Transition Process
Interim
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key security
Administration
positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai reaffirmed as leader by June
2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional Afghan assembly).
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong presidency, a rebuke
to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance presidential power, but gave
parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men and women equal rights under the law,
allows for political parties as long as they are not “un-Islamic”; allows for court rulings according
to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter 7, Article 15). Set out electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if
possible) presidential, provincial, and district elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah
to non-hereditary position of “Father of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential
Elections for President and two vice presidents, for five year term, held October 9, 2004. Turnout
Election
was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia Masud, a Tajik and
brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud, who was assassinated by Al
Qaeda two days before the September 11 attacks, and Karim Khalili, a Hazara) elected with 55%
against 16 opponents. Second highest vote getter, Northern Alliance figure (and Education
Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%). One female ran, got about 1%. Hazara leader Mohammad
Mohaqiq got 11.7%; and Dostam won 10%. Funded with $90 million in international aid,
including $40 million from U.S. (FY2004 supplemental, P.L. 108-106).
Parliamentary
Elections held September 18, 2005 on Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates stood
Elections
as individuals, not part of party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower house (Wolesi
Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elder).
Voting was for one candidate only, although number of representatives varied by province,
ranging from 2 (Panjshir Province) to 33 (Kabul Province). Herat has 17; Nangahar, 14;
Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni, 11 seats each. Target for lower house is 25% women - top two
women vote getters per each of 34 provinces. Upper house appointed by Karzai (34 seats, half of
which are to be women), by the provincial councils (34 seats), and district councils (remaining 34
seats). Because district elections (400 district councils) were not held, provincial councils selected
68 on interim basis. 2,815 candidates for Wolesi Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was 57%
(6.8 million voters) of 12.5 million registered. Funded by $160 million in international aid,
including $45 million from U.S. (FY2005 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 109-13).
Provincial
Provincial elections held September 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections. Exact
Elections/
powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial councils size range
District
from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. 3,185 candidates, including 279 women.
Elections
According to constitution, provincial governors appointed by Karzai, not by the provincial
councils. Some criticize the provincial election system as disproportionately weighted toward
large districts within each province. District elections have not been held due to complexity and
potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Cabinet
Full-term 27 seat cabinet named by Karzai in December 2004. Heavily weighted toward Pashtuns,
and created new Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. Rahim Wardak named Defense Minister,
replacing Northern Alliance military leader Mohammad Fahim. Qanooni not in cabinet,
subsequently was selected Wolesi Jirga Speaker. Northern Alliance figure Dr. Abdullah replaced
as Foreign Minister in March 2006 cabinet appointed after parliamentary elections.
Next
Presidential and provincial elections to be held in fall 2009; parliamentary elections in 2010.
Elections
Karzai said in August 2008 that he is seeking re-election; the two-round election virtually assures
victory by a Pashtun. Possible major anti-Karzai Pashtun contenders include former Interior
Minister Ali Jalali who resigned in 2005 in opposition to Karzai compromises with faction leaders,
or former Finance Minister and Pashtun hardliner Ashraf Ghani. Former Foreign Minister Dr.
Abdullah (Tajik) might run as “Northern Alliance candidate.” Others in this faction, Qanooni and
Rabbani, reportedly leaning against a run. Other contenders include Dostam; Hazara leader
Mohammad Mohaqqeq; Ramazan Bashardost (another Hazara); Sabit (Pashtun, mentioned
above); and Pashtun monarchist figures Pir Gaylani and Hedayat Arsala Amin. Rumors have
abated that U.S. Ambassador to U.N., Afghan-born Zalmay Khalilzad, might himself run, although
some say this issue is still open. Karzai reportedly has an estimated 63% approval rating,
suggesting he draws support not only from Pashtuns. Each election to cost $100 million.