Order Code RL34639
The Department of Defense Role in Foreign
Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and
Options for Congress
August 25, 2008
Nina M. Serafino, Coordinator
Catherine Dale, Richard F. Grimmett, Rhoda Margesson,
John Rollins, Tiaji Salaam-Blyther, Curt Tarnoff, Amy F. Woolf,
Liana Sun Wyler, and Steve Bowman
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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The Department of Defense Role in Foreign
Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and
Options for Congress
Summary
The Department of Defense (DOD) has long played a role in U.S. efforts to
assist foreign populations, militaries, and governments. The use of DOD to provide
foreign assistance stems in general from the perception that DOD can contribute
unique or vital capabilities and resources because it possesses the manpower,
materiel, and organizational assets to respond to international needs. Over the years,
Congress has helped shape the DOD role by providing DOD with its mandate for
such activities through a wide variety of authorities.
The historical DOD role in foreign assistance can be regarded as serving three
purposes: responding to humanitarian and basic needs, building foreign military
capacity and capabilities, and strengthening foreign governments’ ability to deal with
internal and international threats through state-building measures. The United States
and the U.S. military benefit from DOD foreign assistance activities in several ways.
U.S. diplomacy benefits from the U.S. military’s capacity to project itself rapidly into
extreme situations, such as disasters and other humanitarian emergencies, enhancing
the U.S. image as a humanitarian actor. Humanitarian assistance, military training,
and other forms of assistance also provide opportunities to cultivate good relations
with foreign populations, militaries, and governments. U.S. military personnel have
long viewed such activities as opportunities to interact with foreign militaries as part
of their professional development. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States of
September 11, 2001, DOD training of military forces and provision of security
assistance have been an important means to enable foreign militaries to conduct
peacekeeping operations and to support coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
DOD’s perception of the appropriate non-combat role for the U.S. military has
evolved over time. Within the past few years, the perceptions of DOD officials,
military officers, and defense analysts have coalesced around a post-9/11 strategy that
calls for the use of the U.S. military in preventive, deterrent, and preemptive
activities. This strategy involves DOD in the creation of extensive international and
interagency “partnerships,” as well as an expanded DOD role in foreign assistance
activities. Critics point to a number of problems with an expanded DOD role in
many activities. Indeed, a key DOD document acknowledges that state-building
tasks may be “best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals.”
Nevertheless, although reluctant to divert personnel from combat functions, DOD
officials believe that the U.S. military must develop its own capacity to carry out such
activities in the absence of appropriate civilian forces.
In the second session of the 110th Congress, Members have faced several choices
regarding the DOD role in foreign assistance. The Bush Administration has proposed
legislation to make permanent two controversial DOD authorities. It has also
proposed legislation to enable U.S. government civilian personnel to perform some
of the tasks currently carried out by the U.S. military, as well as to form a civilian
reserve corps for that purpose. Congress may also consider options to improve DOD
coordination with civilian agencies on foreign assistance activities.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Overview: DOD’s Evolving Response to Perceived Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Responding to Humanitarian and Basic Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Evolution of Humanitarian Programs, Authorities, and Funding Since
the 1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Disaster Relief and Related Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance in the Context of Military Training
and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
New DOD Health Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Commander’s Emergency
Response Program Funds in Afghanistan and Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Funding Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Perspectives on Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Building Military Capacity and Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Evolution of Military Assistance Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Perspectives on Building Foreign Military and Other Security
Force Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Strengthening Foreign Governments Against Internal and International
Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Historical Precedents and Current Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Perspectives on State-Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Major Issues and Options for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
What Are the Effects of DOD Activities on U.S. Foreign Relations and
Foreign Policy Goals? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Summary of Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Summary of Critiques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Relative Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Can Current DOD and State Department Coordination Be Improved? . . . . 25
Congress’s Role in Specifying Interagency Coordination . . . . . . . . . . 25
Interagency Coordination in Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Current Initiatives to Improve Interagency Coordination . . . . . . . . . . 28
Further Considerations and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Should Civilian Capabilities to Carry Out Foreign Assistance Activities
Be Enhanced? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
DOD Manpower and Budget Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Possible Options to Enhance U.S. Government Civilian
Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Need to Examine Other Civilian Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Appendix A. Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance, Including
Civic Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
DOD Roles and Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
DOD Disaster and Other Humanitarian Emergency Relief and
Recovery Assistance: Activities and Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
DOD Humanitarian Assistance in the Context of Military Operations
and Military Exercises: Activities and Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

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Section 401 Humanitarian and Civic Action Activities, Conditions,
and Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Section 401 Origins and Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Appendix B. DOD Global Health Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
DOD Role and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Origins and Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
The Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response
System (GEIS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Appendix C. Department of Defense Humanitarian Mine Action Program . . . . 50
DOD Role and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Activities and Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Appendix D. Foreign Military Sales and Financing Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
DOD Role and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Origins and Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Appendix E. International Military Education and Training Program . . . . . . . . . 56
DOD Role and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Origins and Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Appendix F. Counternarcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
DOD Roles and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Recent Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Colombia and the Andean Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Appendix G. Foreign Anti-Terrorism and Counterterrorism Train and
Equip Assistance and Education Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
DOD Role and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Origins and Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Regional Strategic Initiatives (RSI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
DOD Counterterrorism Fellowship Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Appendix H. Foreign Military Capacity Building Section 1206 Authority . . . . . 73
DOD Role and Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Origins and Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

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Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Appendix I. Global Peace Operations Initiative Train and Equip Program . . . . . 78
DOD Role and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Origins and Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Appendix J. The Department of Defense in Nonproliferation: The Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
DOD Role and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
An Evolving Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Appendix K. DOD in Iraq and Afghanistan Economic Reconstruction and
State-Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
DOD Roles and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Evolution of DOD’s Role in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Economic Reconstruction and Assistance in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Provincial Reconstuction Teams (PRTs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Afghanistan PRTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Iraq PRTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Appendix L. Foreign Security Assistance Initiatives for Afghanistan and Iraq . . 92
DOD Roles and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Origins and Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Train and Equip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Coalition Partner Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
List of Tables
Table 1. Congressional Action on Selected DOD-Requested New or Expanded
Authorities for FY2009 Relevant to Foreign Assistance
Referenced Above . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Table A1. Section 401 Humanitarian Assistance and Civic Action: Costs,
Number of Projects, and Number of Countries, by Fiscal Year . . . . . . . . . 45
Table A2. Geographical Distribution of Section 401 Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance Activities: Number of Countries, by Region and
Fiscal Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Table B1. DOD Funding for Global HIV/AIDS Prevention Programs, by
Fiscal Year, FY2000-FY2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Table C1. DOD Humanitarian Mine Action Funds Expended, by
Fiscal Year, FY2000-FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

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Table C2. Countries Assisted with DOD HMA Funding, by Fiscal Year,
FY2000-FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Table F1. Timeline of Major Congressional Authorities and Executive
Directives Related to CN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Table F2. DOD CN Funding by U.S. Combatant Command, FY2005 and
FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Table F3. Top 10 DOD CN Assistance Recipients, FY2005 and FY2006 . . . . . 62
Table I1. GPOI Funding, by Fiscal Year, FY2005-FY2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
This report was originally prepared at the request of Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and is made available for
general congressional distribution with permission.

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The Department of Defense Role in Foreign
Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and
Options for Congress
Introduction1
The Department of Defense (DOD) has long played a role in U.S. efforts to
assist foreign populations, militaries, and governments. The use of DOD to provide
foreign assistance stems in general from the perception that DOD can contribute
unique or vital capabilities and resources because it possesses the manpower,
materiel, and organizational assets to respond to international needs. Over the years,
Congress has shaped the DOD role through a wide variety of authorities contained
in the Foreign Relations and Intercourse (Title 22 U.S. Code) and Armed Services
(Title 10 U.S. Code) statutes, and through annual legislation. To some analysts, the
DOD role has been in effect a product of Congress’s willingness to fund defense
rather than foreign affairs budgets. In some instances, the activities in which DOD
participates serve an institutional purpose for the U.S. military, providing U.S.
soldiers and sailors with opportunities for military training, for cultivating military-
to-military contacts, and for gathering information on foreign countries where they
may someday be called to operate.
The historical DOD role in foreign assistance can be regarded roughly as serving
three purposes:
! Responding to humanitarian and basic needs. Since at least the
19th century, U.S. military forces have provided urgent assistance to
foreign populations in time of disasters, such as earthquakes and
floods. More recently, U.S. military forces have also provided aid
in humanitarian crises such as famines and forced population
movements. DOD aids foreign populations under authorities to
conduct humanitarian assistance in a variety of other circumstances,
including as an adjunct to military training and exercises with and as
part of military operations.
! Building foreign military capacity and capabilities. DOD
provides military equipment, weapons, training, and other assistance
to build up the military capacity and capabilities of friendly foreign
countries. Such support is provided to augment military capacity to
1 The introduction and overview were prepared by Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in
International Security Affairs. These sections draw on the appendices at the end of the
report by several CRS analysts from the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.

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CRS-2
perform counternarcotics, counterterrorism, internal defense, border
defense, and other missions, and as part of post-conflict state-
building. The origins of current programs date to the early years
after World War II, when the United States sought to help rebuild
Europe.
! Strengthening foreign governments. Besides building foreign
military capacity, DOD plays a role in U.S. efforts to help foreign
governments secure their territories against internal and international
threats with a variety of non-military tools. These include state-
building efforts, such as strengthening police forces, and bolstering
the legitimacy of foreign governments by undertaking small-scale
economic, health, and social projects (and in the case of conflict
zones, political projects), generally in areas outside capital cities.
Although such efforts were carried out sporadically as early as the
19th century, the post-World War II U.S. occupations in Germany
and Japan are regarded as state-building models. More recently,
DOD support for border protection and nuclear non-proliferation
initiatives strengthens foreign governments by curbing international
threats.
During the past few years, Congress has provided DOD with new, non-combat
authorities to prosecute the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and to conduct
counterterrorism2 activities elsewhere. Congress granted these authorities in response
not only to the immediate needs of U.S. military operations in conflict zones, but also
to the Bush Administration’s efforts, in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United
States of September 11, 2001 (9/11), to redirect and reshape U.S. government
capabilities in a new strategic environment. As a result, some analysts believe that
DOD is playing an increasing role in assisting foreign populations, militaries, and
governments. Critics view this role as potentially detrimental to U.S. foreign policy,
citing a perceived lack of strategic coordination between DOD and the State
Department (and other agencies where applicable), a failure to ensure that DOD
programs are sustainable, and a militarization of the United States’ image abroad.
These analysts call for greater clarity and reforms in defining DOD’s foreign
assistance role and responsibilities.3 This report provides Congress with historical
2 The term counterterrorism in this report refers to offensive measures taken to prevent,
deter, and respond to terrorism.
3 Several recent reports reflect these perceptions. Two of these are congressional reports:
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Embassies as Command Posts in
the Anti-Terror Campaign. Washington, D.C., December 2006 (hereafter referred to as
2006 SFRC Report) and U.S. Congress, House, Conference Report on the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2008 to accompany H.R. 1585, S.Rept. 110-447, Section 952,
December 6, 2007. Two were produced by Washington, D.C.-based think tanks: Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Integrating 21st Century Development and
Security Assistance, Final Report of the Task Force on Non-Traditional Security Assistance,
CSIS Report, December 2007 (hereafter referred to as CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007);
and Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, The Pentagon and Global Development: Making
Sense of the DOD’s Expanding Role, Center for Global Development, Working Paper no.
(continued...)

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CRS-3
context and current information and perspectives regarding DOD’s role and
responsibilities in a range of foreign assistance activities.
In an overview and appendices, this report provides background information on
and discusses issues related to the DOD’s role in providing U.S. foreign assistance
and undertaking foreign assistance-type activities. Topics include the types of
assistance DOD provides, the authorities under which DOD conducts its programs,
and coordination and cooperation mechanisms between DOD and other agencies.
The report begins with a brief introduction to the three areas in which DOD plays a
role in foreign assistance and to Congress’s part in authorizing that role. Next, the
report briefly discusses the general evolution of DOD’s role and the Department of
State’s current perception of that role based on current national security needs. The
report then provides an overview of the evolution of the DOD role and current
activities in the three areas cited above, with a snapshot of the varying perspectives
on the DOD roles in these areas. Finally, the report discusses issues that Congress
may wish to consider. The appendices provide more detailed information on the
current and most significant foreign assistance programs in which DOD plays a role.
This report refers to a Department of Defense role in foreign assistance rather
than a U.S. military role because DOD may use either military troops or civilian
contractors, or both, to implement programs. The term U.S. military is used only for
activities in which U.S. troops are used exclusively.
Overview: DOD’s Evolving Response to
Perceived Needs
DOD’s perception of the appropriate non-combat role for the U.S. military has
evolved over time. During the years in which the United States’ primary national
security threats were posed by other States, there were differing perspectives within
DOD on the use of the military in non-combat roles. With the fall of the Soviet
Union, these differences sharpened. Within the past few years, the perceptions of
DOD officials, military officers, and defense analysts have coalesced around a post-
9/11 strategy that calls for the use of the U.S. military in preventive, deterrent, and
preemptive activities. This strategy involves DOD in the creation of extensive
international (and interagency) “partnerships,” as well as an expanded DOD role in
foreign assistance activities.
3 (...continued)
131, November 2007 (hereafter referred to as The Pentagon and Global Development).
Another was produced by an international organization: Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development, The United States: Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
Peer Review, 2006, p. 15, (hereafter referred to as the DAC Peer Review 2006). Another
was produced by a group of non-governmental organizations: George Withers, Adam
Isacson, Lisa Haugaard, Joy Olson, and Joel Fyke, Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy, a joint
publication of the Center for International Policy, the Latin America Working Group
Education Fund, and the Washington Office on Latin America, March 2008.

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The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) is the first key
document that reflects the evolution of DOD thinking as it grapples with the
implications of 9/11 for U.S. national security and U.S. defense policy.4 The
assertion of top U.S. defense officials and military leaders that DOD needs “new and
more flexible” authorities to operate in the current strategic environment forms the
rationale for DOD’s request for new authorities,5 especially to advance a new
“Partnership Strategy.”6
As outlined in the 2006 QDR, the Partnership Strategy is one of DOD’s key
tools for the United States’ “long war” against a new threat — that is, the
decentralized networks of “violent extremists who use terrorism as their weapon of
choice,” who “will likely attempt to use” weapons of mass destruction “in their
conflict with free people everywhere.”7 Countering such networks, as well as the
rogue powers that may sponsor them, will require “long-duration, complex
operations involving the U.S. military, other government agencies and international
partners,” which are waged simultaneously in multiple countries.8 To do so will also
require that the United States “assist others in developing the wherewithal to protect
their own populations and police their own territories, as well as to project and
sustain forces to promote collective security.”9
In the 2006 QDR, as elsewhere, DOD maintains that developing the foreign
“wherewithal” to enhance domestic and collective security requires a “whole of
government” approach. Through the November 2005 DOD Directive 3000.05,
entitled the Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, defense leaders mandated that DOD “be prepared
to conduct and support” civilian agencies in conducting SSTR operations, but also
4 U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. February 6, 2006.
(Hereafter referred to as 2006 QDR.) The QDR is a congressionally mandated report (Title
10 U.S.C. Section 118) produced every four years that delineates a national defense strategy
consistent with the President’s most recent National Security Strategy, based on the
perceived threats to U.S. interests, and defines the necessary force structure, modernization
plans, infrastructure, budget, and other elements to carry out that defense strategy. The 2002
National Security Strategy, the most recent before the 2006 QDR, sets forth eight tasks for
the U.S. government, among them four which directly involve DOD: (1) “strengthen
alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends”;
(2) “work with others to defuse regional conflicts”; (3) “prevent our enemies from
threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction”; and (4)
“transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities
of the twenty-first century.” pp. 1-2.
5 Ibid., p. 83. The full quote states: “The ability to wage irregular and unconventional
warfare and the skills needed for counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction,
‘military diplomacy’ and complex interagency coalition operations are essential — but in
many cases require new and more flexible authorities from the Congress.”
6 2006 QDR, op. cit. The previous QDR, although published in late September 2001, was
written and cleared before the 9/11 attacks.
7 Ibid., p. v.
8 Ibid., p. 23.
9 Ibid., p. 20.

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indicated doubt that civilian agencies will create the needed capabilities to carry out
state-building tasks. Thus, while DOD acknowledges that state-building tasks may
be “best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals,” it also sees
a need to develop its own capability to perform “all tasks necessary to establish or
maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”10 As reflected in the 2006 QDR, DOD
is placing a new emphasis on the utility of non-combat foreign assistance activities
and expects to continue to play an important, if not a proportionately expanding, role
in U.S. foreign assistance in the developing world.
DOD subsequently reiterated these points. In October 2007, Defense Secretary
Robert Gates referred to this new perception of the DOD role: “And until our
government decides to plus up our civilian agencies like the Agency for International
Development [USAID], Army soldiers can expect to be tasked with reviving public
services, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting good governance. All these so-
called ‘nontraditional’ capabilities have moved into the mainstream of military
thinking, planning, and strategy — where they must stay.”11 This theme was once
again repeated in the June 2008 National Defense Strategy, which found that U.S.
forces had “stepped up to the task of long-term reconstruction, development, and
governance” and that the “U.S. Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain
these capabilities,” while noting that “this is no replacement for civilian involvement
and expertise.”12
In a report to Congress in mid-2007, the State Department had argued in favor
of new permanent DOD authorities. It viewed such authorities, including several
mentioned below, as a means “to provide a flexible, timely, and effective whole-of-
government approach to today’s security environment that is well coordinated in the
10 The November 2005 DOD Directive 3000.05, the Directive on Military Support for
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. (Hereafter referred
to as DOD Directive 3000.05.) This directive discusses state-building tasks as part of
stability operations. It is the first DOD document to designate stability operations as “a core
U.S. military mission.” The state-building tasks it specifically lists are helping to rebuild
indigenous institutions, including security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial
systems; reviving or building the private sector, and developing representative governmental
institutions. This directive may be accessed at [http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/html/300005.htm]; last accessed July 22, 2008. For more on this topic, see CRS
Report RL33557, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military
Involvement, by Nina M. Serafino.
11 U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to the
Association of the United States Army, Washington, D.C., October 10. 2007. Accessed
through [http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches]; last accessed July 22, 2008.
12 U.S. Department of Defense. National Defense Strategy, June 2008, p. 17. In the same
paragraph, this document stated: “Greater civilian participation is necessary both to make
military operations successful and to relieve stress on the men and women of the armed
forces. Having permanent civilian capabilities available and using them early could also
make it less likely that military forces will need to be deployed in the first place.”

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interagency [coordination process] both in Washington at the policy level and in the
field at the operational level, and with appropriate, relevant oversight by Congress.”13
The following sections discuss DOD’s traditional and current responsibilities
in disaster assistance and humanitarian activities, assistance to foreign militaries, and
assistance in other state-building areas. They also discuss recent proposals for
enhanced authorities as spelled out in the QDR and related legislation submitted to
Congress.
Responding to Humanitarian and Basic Needs
DOD engagement in U.S. government disaster relief and humanitarian
assistance activities is longstanding, with U.S. military forces playing an important
role in U.S. disaster assistance since at least the 19th century.14 DOD also plays a
role in other humanitarian emergency situations, such as providing aid and protection
for relief workers in cases of famine or forced population movements. More routine
humanitarian assistance activities and civic action programs abroad date back at least
to the turn of the 20th century; these usually take place in the context of U.S. training
exercises or military operations.
Evolution of Humanitarian Programs, Authorities, and Funding
Since the 1980s. Beginning in the mid-1980s, Congress provided specific DOD
authorities for humanitarian aid as the Reagan Administration’s civilian leadership
sought means to support its allies in conflicts in Central America and Afghanistan.
During that period, Congress provided specific authority to DOD to (1) provide
nonlethal excess property and supplies from the DOD stocks when requested by the
State Department and for distribution by the State Department; (2) provide space-
available military transportation for private donors to send supplies and food to needy
foreign populations; and (3) carry out civic assistance programs that involve small-
scale construction, reconstruction, and maintenance projects, and provide limited
medical attention to rural populations. (See Appendices A and C.)
Since then, Congress has somewhat modified and expanded DOD disaster
response and humanitarian programs, incorporating aid to mitigate environmental
disasters and demining training, and has introduced separate health programs. (See
Appendices A, B, and C.) Thus, DOD disaster and humanitarian aid now
encompasses a broader range of potential assistance than the basic humanitarian
relief of food and emergency supplies provided by non-governmental organizations.
13 U.S. Department of State. Report to Congress: Section 1206(f) of the 2006 National
Defense Authorization Act. Released by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. July 3,
2007. Hereafter referred to as the Section 1206(f) 2006 NDAA Report. This report is
available through the Department of State website: [http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/spec/
90867.htm]; last accessed July 22, 2008.
14 Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 63.

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In 1994, Congress established the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid
(OHDACA) DOD budget account to fund many of these programs.15
Disaster Relief and Related Humanitarian Assistance. The DOD role
in providing disaster relief to foreign populations when natural and manmade
disasters strike serves both foreign affairs and military needs. The lead authority for
disaster response is the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and
DOD participation is conducted on the direction of the President or at the request of
the State Department, through the appropriate U.S. ambassador. Nevertheless, DOD
is often the first U.S. agency to respond to foreign disasters and other humanitarian
crises because of its readily deployable resources. DOD international emergency
responses allow the United States to contribute effectively in alleviating suffering
abroad and enhancing the country’s international image, as well as the U.S. domestic
and foreign image of the U.S. military. (See Appendix A.) Such activities are also
undertaken for strategic or foreign policy reasons. A famous post-World War II
example of such motivation was the 1948-1949 Berlin airlift, when U.S. Air Force
and [British] Royal Air Force flights of relief supplies to Soviet-blockaded West
Berlin demonstrated a U.S. and U.K. commitment to a strategically important area.
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance in the Context of Military
Training and Operations. Humanitarian and civic assistance programs, as
currently conducted, usually take place in the context of training exercises and
military operations. In that context, they are carried out as much for the U.S. military
to gain situational awareness and the support of local populations as to alleviate
suffering. When provided under Title 10 U.S. Code (10 U.S.C. 401), the primary
purpose of the program must be to train U.S. armed forces. In addition, the
assistance must not duplicate any other assistance, and it must meet the security
interests of both the United States and the host country. Section 401 authority has
been often used for training exercises for the National Guard, and for military reserve
personnel and active duty personnel in certain specialties, especially medical
personnel. U.S. Special Operations Forces also conduct humanitarian assistance
activities as an adjunct to military training exercises with foreign militaries and as an
integral part of stability and counterinsurgency operations. The Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET) exercises with friendly foreign militaries are conducted
under 10 U.S.C. 2011, primarily for the benefit of training the Special Operations
Forces, but humanitarian assistance programs such as medical and veterinary visits
may be added to cultivate goodwill among local populations and as part of the
training for foreign troops.
U.S. humanitarian and civic assistance activities also can be an integral part of
military operations. During the Korean and Vietnam conflict eras, military civic
action programs that included medical assistance were an integral part of military
efforts. Now, in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, teams of U.S.
Special Operations Forces work together with foreign militaries on small-scale
humanitarian and civic action projects. The primary purposes of humanitarian and
15 Section 1411, P.L. 103-337, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
Year 1995. The account was first authorized at $86 million. It was established to cover
activities under 10 U.S.C. 401, 402, 404 (newly established by that bill), 2547, and 2551.

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civic assistance in such operations are to extend the reach of the national government,
enhance its legitimacy among local populations, and cultivate relationships and trust
that may lead to information sharing on terrorists’ locations and planned activities.16
New DOD Health Programs. Recently, Congress has added new health
programs to the humanitarian assistance portfolio of the U.S. military. Beginning in
FY2000, Congress has provided funds through the Defense Health Program to
educate foreign military forces in HIV prevention activities in conjunction with U.S.
military training exercises and humanitarian assistance activities in Africa.
Subsequently, other DOD health programs have been added. (See Appendix B.)
Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Commander’s Emergency
Response Program Funds in Afghanistan and Iraq. Congress provides
special funding and authorities for programs with a humanitarian assistance
component in the war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq. The DOD-lead Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and State Department-led units in Iraq,
for which DOD provides security, are central to U.S. efforts to promote host
government authority and stability to areas outside the capitals in those countries.
These integrated civilian and military teams count humanitarian assistance among
their tools to provide stability in difficult areas, extend the reach of the central
government, strengthen local governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, and stimulate
local economies. In addition, commanders on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq use
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, which Congress
appropriates, to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs.17
(See Appendix K.)
Funding Accounts. For many years, prior to operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq, funding for DOD disaster response and humanitarian assistance projects was
appropriated annually in the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Assistance
(OHDACA) Account. This account covers disaster response and a variety of other
16 Authors’ interview with DOD officials, January 2008.
17 CERP was created in 2003 by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. It initially used
Iraqi funds for use in that country. Subsequently, Congress has provided CERP funding
for use in Afghanistan and Iraq. Congress first provided up to $180 million for the
Commander’s Emergency Response Program in the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations for Defense and the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, P.L. 108-
106, Section 1110, November 6, 2003. (Hereafter referred to as the FY2004 Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act.) Congress subsequently provided additional funds: up
to $854 million in FY2005, up to $500 million each for FY2006 and FY2007, and up to
$500 million thus far for FY2008. (See the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Yar 2005,
P.L. 108-375, Section 1201, as amended by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror and Tsunami Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-12, Section
1006; the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109-163, Section 1202; and the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008, P.L. 110-161, Section 606(a)). Note that the spelling for the first
word in the name of this program is not consistent; it is sometimes spelled Commanders’.
This report uses the spelling first used in legislation.

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humanitarian assistance programs codified under six Title 10 authorities.18 Congress
gradually increased appropriations for OHDACA from $49.7 million in FY2002 to
$63.204 million in FY2007.19 These funds were available for one fiscal year. For
FY2008, Congress appropriated $40 million in that account specifically for disaster
relief and response, to be available for two fiscal years (i.e., through FY2009), and
an additional $63.3 million to be available for those purposes for three fiscal years
(i.e., through FY2010). The Administration’s FY2009 OHDACA request is for
$83.273 million in new money.
The Bush Administration is seeking monies for humanitarian purposes under
a longstanding DOD account, the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF),
that provides funds to combatant commanders for a variety of purposes. In its
FY2009 budget request, the Bush Administration asked for $100 million for the
CCIF specifically to meet unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs.
Over the past decade at least, Congress has appropriated $25 million in annual DOD
appropriation bills for the CCIF, and additional amounts in FY2005-FY2007
supplemental appropriations legislation, but thus far the CCIF does not appear to
have been used extensively for humanitarian projects.20 (The Senate version of the
National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] for Fiscal Year 2009, S. 3001, would
18 These are 10 U.S.C. 401, 402, 404, 407, 2557, and 2561 (previously 2551). Section 401
authorizes DOD to carry out humanitarian and civic assistance activities in host nations in
conjunction with military operations. Section 402, popularly referred to as the Denton
Amendment, authorizes the Secretary of Defense to transport, without charge, humanitarian
supplies (as well as supplies that respond to serious threats to the environment if other
transport is not available) that have been provided by a non-governmental source to any
country on a space available basis. Section 404 authorizes the President to direct the
Secretary of Defense to provide international disaster assistance to prevent the loss of lives
or serious harm to the environment. Section 407 provides authority for humanitarian
demining assistance. Section 2557 authorizes providing nonlethal excess DOD supplies for
humanitarian relief. Section 2561 provides additional authority for the transport of
humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide, as well as authority to
transport supplies to respond to or mitigate serious harm to the environment.
19 The amounts in the intervening years were $58.4 million for FY2003, $59.0 million for
each FY2004 and FY2005, and $61.546 million for FY2006. Figures from annual DOD
appropriations acts.
20 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification,
February 4, 2008, p.103. When codified in 1991 (Title 10 U.S.C. Section 166a), the CCIF
(then known as the CINC Initiative Fund), provided funds for exercises and military
education and training of foreign personnel, and for “humanitarian and civil assistance.”
A 2006 amendment changed “civil assistance” to “civic assistance, to include urgent and
unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance,” and made the latter a
priority category, “particularly in a foreign country where the armed forces are engaged in
a contingency operation.” (John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, P.L. 109-364, Section
902.) To this point, this fund may not have been used for extensively for humanitarian
programs. In response to a Congressional Research Service request for information in 2007,
DOD stated that just under $1 million had been used for humanitarian purposes from
FY2005 through FY2007. (Information provided by the Office of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, e-mail correspondence of November 7, 2007.)

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authorize $75 million for the CCIF, for use worldwide except in Iraq and Afghanistan
as long as the CERP is available in those countries.)21
Perspectives on Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance. U.S.
officials state that DOD has instructed military commanders to look more broadly
than in the past at humanitarian assistance, employing it as a component of U.S.
security cooperation with foreign nations.22 Guidance to U.S. combatant
commanders has stated that DOD regards humanitarian assistance as “foremost a tool
for achieving U.S. security objectives,” which can also serve several “complementary
security goals.”23 The “complementary” goals cited are “improving DOD visibility,
access, influence, interoperability, and coalition-building with military and civilian
host nation counterparts; building/reinforcing security and stability in a host nation
or region; generating positive public relations and goodwill for DOD that will
enhance our ability to shape the regional security environment; bolstering host nation
capacity to respond to disasters ... and promoting specific operational readiness skills
of US military personnel.”24 The 2006 QDR places humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief operations under the rubric of “humanitarian and early preventive
measures” and claims that the use of such measures can “prevent disorder from
spiraling into wider conflict or crisis.”25
State Department officials welcome the U.S. military’s ability to deliver
disaster and humanitarian relief assistance in a timely fashion. They also tend to
favor routine humanitarian assistance and civic action projects, albeit as a matter of
necessity, because such projects allow the U.S. government to provide supplies and
medical services to needy populations, and to construct schools and clinics in
underserved areas, where funds are not otherwise available. These projects can
create goodwill and personal contact for the United States, often in areas where U.S.
diplomats would otherwise not venture.
DOD and U.S. military personnel attitudes toward disaster response and
humanitarian relief vary. Attitudes tend to be favorable for immediate disaster
response and for training exercises, particularly for National Guard and Reserve
troops. Attitudes become ambivalent when U.S. military personnel are used for
prolonged periods for humanitarian assistance in conventional operations.
Over the years, observers have raised a variety of concerns regarding
humanitarian and civic assistance in non-emergency situations. Analysts have long
21 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2009, report to Accompany S. 3001, 110th Congress, 2nd session, S.Rept.
110-335, pp. 317-318.
22 Authors’ interview with DOD officials, December 2006.
23 Joint message from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) and the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA), providing policy and program management direction for FY2005
OHDACA planning and execution. Section 3 (General Guidance) A and B.
24 Ibid., Section 3B.
25 2006 QDR, op. cit., p. 12.

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faulted such assistance for sometimes being short-sighted and producing ill will when
projects are not well selected.26 In the 1990s, Congress scrutinized U.S. humanitarian
and civic action activities in Central America.27 Critics continue to view some
projects as ill-conceived and at odds with sound development policy; for instance,
schools built in areas where there are no teachers to staff them undermine the
credibility of the United States and the host nation government, or assistance that,
albeit inadvertently, benefits one ethnic group over another exacerbates ongoing
conflicts.28 (See Appendix A.) The Bush Administration has recently created new
coordination mechanisms that may address such concerns. (See the section on DOD
interaction with other agencies, below.)
Building Military Capacity and Capabilities
Since the early years after World War II, U.S. military assistance programs to
train and equip foreign military forces have been an important component of U.S.
foreign assistance, and DOD has played a major role in those programs. Even though
the major train and equip efforts are conducted under State Department programs,
DOD has long been responsible for carrying out most of the work involved in
building foreign military capacity and capabilities. Sizable military assistance
programs put in place soon after World War II served the primary purpose of
bolstering the defense capabilities of major allies against the Soviet Union, but in
subsequent years, military assistance programs also began increasingly to serve
political and diplomatic, as well as military, ends. For the past several decades,
military assistance — carried out through the State Department’s Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) and International Military and Education Training (IMET) programs —
has become an important tool of bilateral relations, intended to strengthen and
cement relations with foreign governments, reward allies, and cultivate new partners.
A recently added State Department program to train and equip foreign peacekeepers
and a DOD program to train and equip foreign military forces for both
counterterrorism missions and stability operations reflect the intention to develop
capable international partners in quelling conflict and curbing terrorism. For many
years, DOD training of foreign military forces was carried out by Special Operations
Forces, but now DOD officials describe it as a key mission for the U.S. military as
a whole.29
Evolution of Military Assistance Authority. The Mutual Defense
Assistance Act (MDAA) of 1949 was the legal forerunner to all major post-World
War II military assistance programs. Congress passed the MDAA to provide weapons
26 See especially John W. DePauw, “Understanding Civic Action,” in Winning the Peace:
The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990, pp. 1-7. This book presents critical views of civic
action from a sympathetic perspective.
27 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, Role of the DOD in Humanitarian Assistance, hearing , 103rd Cong., 2nd sess.,
April 19, 1994, H.A.S.C. No. 103-49 (Washington: GPO, 1995).
28 The Pentagon and Global Development, op. cit.
29 Secretary of Defense Gates’ October 2007 speech, op. cit.

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and military equipment to the newly established North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and to a number of other countries.30 The MDAA’s successors, the Military
Security Act (MSA) of 1951 and the MSA of 1954,31 were the major vehicles for
U.S. foreign assistance until the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
which stands today as current law. The MSA of 1951 created the Mutual Security
Agency in the Executive Office of the President. The MSA Director was responsible
for the “continuous supervision, general direction, and coordination of all foreign aid
— military, economic, and technical assistance.”32 Thus, during the early part of the
1950s, DOD administered the military assistance programs under the White House’s
policy direction and guidance.33 Congress subsequently moved responsibility for
non-military aid to the State Department (P.L. 81-329, 63 Stat. 714), whose officials
were charged with coordinating with DOD regarding military aid.34 As described by
the forerunner of the Congressional Research Service in 1959, the purpose of the
State Department coordination of military aid (identified as “an important instrument
of U.S. foreign policy”) with other forms of aid was “to help achieve the basic policy
goals decided upon by the President with the advice of the National Security
Council” (NSC).35
Origins of State Department Programs and Oversight. As economic
and development assistance became the U.S. government’s preferred tool for
countering Soviet influence in the developing world, Congress entrusted the State
Department with the leadership role for foreign assistance, including military
assistance, when it passed the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961.36 Since then,
30 The MDAA (P.L. 81-329, 63 Stat. 714) authorized military aid to the original NATO
nations (Canada and 10 European nations) and to Turkey, Greece, Korea, Iran, the
Philippines, and Taiwan. CRS Report 85-91 F, An Overview of United States Military
Assistance Programs, by Richard F. Grimmett. This archived report is available from the
author.
31 P.L. 82-165 (65 Stat. 373) and P.L. 83-665 (68 Stat. 832).
32 The Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, U.S. Foreign Aid: Its Purposes,
Scope, Administration and Related Information, February 27, 1959, pp. 139-140. Hereafter
referred to as “U.S. Foreign Aid.”
33 With the creation of a Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) in 1953 to administer
economic aid and technical assistance, the Secretary of Defense was also subject to
coordination with and supervision by the FOA Director, who reported directly to the
President. Congress divested the FOA director of responsibility for supervising military aid
in 1954. U.S. Foreign Aid, ibid., pp. 141-142.
34 In 1955, Congress established the International Cooperation Administration within the
State Department, among whose functions was coordinating nonmilitary aid with DOD-
administered military aid. Congress moved coordination responsibility to a higher level, the
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, when it created that post in 1958. U.S.
Foreign Aid, op. cit., p. 142.
35 U.S. Foreign Aid, op. cit., p. 130.
36 As now stated in the FAA of 1961, as amended, Section 622(c) (22 U.S.C. 2382) states
that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, “shall be responsible for the
continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance,
(continued...)

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with the exception of the period inclusive of the Vietnam War in the mid-1960s to
the mid-1970s, the major foreign military assistance programs — the Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, and the
International Military Education Training (IMET) program — have been carried out
under State Department oversight and guidance.37 These programs are implemented,
however, by a DOD agency: the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
under the DOD Under Secretary for Policy, and its predecessor.38 (See Appendices
D and E.) In 2005, Congress created a third State Department train and equip
program, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), to provide training in
peacekeeping skills and related equipment to foreign militaries. (See Appendix I.)
DOD Education and Training Programs. In addition to the major
programs to build foreign military capacity under State Department authority,
Congress authorizes and funds DOD to conduct a wide variety of smaller military-to-
military education and training programs. These offer foreign military personnel the
opportunity to attend U.S. military education and training programs, in addition to
those funded under IMET, as well as conferences and meetings. They also provide
the U.S. military with important opportunities to cultivate relations with foreign
military officers. Congress generally requires all such activities to be conducted with
the approval of the Secretary of State.39 Combatant commanders may also use up to
36 (...continued)
and military education and training programs, including but not limited to determining
whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military education
and training program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are
effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States
is best served thereby.” The original, 1961 language of Section 622(c) stated that the
section applied to “assistance programs authorized by this Act....” A 1976 amendment
deleted this limitation. (International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, P.L.
94-329, Section 543(b)(2)(B)). The Arms Export Control Act, which as of 1968 authorizes
the FMS/FMF program, similarly mandates that the Secretary of State, under the direction
of the President, be responsible for “the continuous supervision and general direction of
sales, leases, financing, cooperative projects, and exports under this chapter....” (P.L. 90-
629, as amended, Chapter 1, Section 2(b), 22 U.S.C. 2752.)
37 Foreign Military Financing, as well as Foreign Miltary Sales, are carried out under the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended (P.L. 90-629). Section 2(a) of that Act (22
U.S.C. 2752) states that nothing contained in the Act “shall be construed to infringe upon
the powers or functions of the Secretary of State.” Section 2(b) states that the Secretary of
State, under the direction of the President, “shall be responsible for the continuous
supervision and general direction of sales, leases, financing, cooperative projects, and
exports under this Act....”
38 The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) became the DSCA in 1999. In 2000,
DOD Directive 5105.65 expanded the responsibilities originally carried out by the DSAA.
Among other tasks, DSCA helps develop, coordinate, and implement security and
cooperation assistance plans and programs, including FMS, FMF, IMET, humanitarian
assistance, humanitarian civic action, mine action training, and other programs. More
information is available on its website, at [http://www.dsca.osd.mil]; last accessed July 22,
2008.
39 Numerous DOD educational institutions offer education and training to foreign students.
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$5 million from the CCIF in any fiscal year “to provide military education and
training (including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses) to
military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries....”40
DOD Counternarcotics Train and Equip Support. Under Title 10 U.S.
Code (10 U.S.C. 124), DOD is the lead U.S. government agency on the detection and
monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal narcotics into the United States,
but it falls under the oversight of the Secretary of State, who is charged with
coordinating counternarcotics assistance (22 U.S.C. 2291). Since the 1990s, DOD
has provided training and related support to foreign militaries and law enforcement
authorities for counternarcotics purposes under authorities that Congress extends
regularly in annual defense authorization legislation. (See Appendix F.) Under
“Section 1004” authority, first established in 1990 to enable DOD to support
counterdrug agencies and currently extended through FY2011,41 DOD may provide
training and other support to improve foreign counternarcotics capabilities at the
request of any U.S. federal department or agency, or of any U.S. state, local, or
foreign law enforcement agency. Under “Section 1033” authority, first established
in 1997 and currently extended through FY2008,42 DOD may provide patrol, boats,
vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment to designated foreign governments and
maintain and repair those items. Originally provided for Colombia and Peru, this
authority now covers 16 more countries. Human rights concerns have figured
prominently in congressional consideration of the DOD role in counternarcotics
programs. Largely in response to such concerns, in 1998, Congress placed a
restriction in the DOD appropriations bill prohibiting U.S. training of foreign military
units for which credible evidence exists of gross violations of human rights.43 This
39 (...continued)
The military service schools offer such opportunities, as do the DOD regional centers for
security studies (i.e., the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the
Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic
Studies [the last three of which are at the National Defense University]). The Political-
Military Bureau at the State Department publishes an annual report entitled Foreign Military
Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest, as required by the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended, Section 656 (22 U.S.C. 2416). The State Department publishes
the unclassified portions of the report on its website.
40 10 U.S.C. 166a(e)(C).
41 NDAA for Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 101-510, Section 1004 (10 U.S.C. 374 note); last
extended and amended by the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, P.L. 109-364,
Section 1021.
42 NDAA for Fiscal Year 1998, P.L. 105-85, Section 1033, last amended and extended
through legislation including the FY2007 John Warner NDAA, P.L. 109-364, Section 1022.
43 Department of Defense Appropriations, 1999, P.L. 105-262, Section 8130 and restated in
annual defense appropriations acts thereafter, most recently in, DOD Appropriations, 2008
(P.L. 110-116, Section 8062). The latest version of the “Leahy Amendment” states that
none of the funds made available by the Act “may be used to support any training program
involving a unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of Defense has
received credible information from the Department of State that the unit has committed a
(continued...)

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restriction has been extended annually but is less restrictive than the provision in
foreign operations appropriations, first enacted in 1997 and codified in 2007, which
prohibits the use of State Department funds for any assistance to military units for
which credible evidence is found of gross violations of human rights.44
DOD “Section 1206” Military Capacity Building Authority for
Counterterrorism and Stability Operations. In 2005, Congress provided
DOD with authority and funds for a major DOD-run train and equip program.
Established by Section 1206 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006 as a temporary “pilot
program,” this “Foreign Military Capacity Building” authority allows DOD to
transfer funds to train and equip foreign militaries to enable those forces to better
conduct counterterrorism operations or to “participate in or support military and
stability operations in which the United States Armed Forces” participate.45
Currently in effect through FY2008, this “Section 1206” authority has provided up
to $200 million in FY2006 and up to $300 million in FY2007 and FY2008 to meet
needs that emerged after the planning cycle for the regular budget submission. This
authority is subject to strict conditionality. The original FY2006 legislation required
a presidential initiative to initiate a program; in FY2007, this was changed to permit
the Secretary of Defense to authorize a program with the concurrence of the Secretary
of State. Although the legislation does not require the Secretary of State’s
“approval,” DOD and the State Department currently interpret “concurrence” to mean
“approval.”46 (See Appendix H.)
43 (...continued)
gross violation of human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.” The
Secretary of Defense may waive this provision if he determines that “such a waiver is
required by extraordinary circumstances.” The earlier version forbid the use of funds “if a
member of” a potential recipient unit had committed such a violation.
44 The comprehensive version of the human rights provision popularly known as the Leahy
Amendment (i.e., the ban on any foreign operations assistance to foreign security forces for
which credible evidence was found of gross violations of human rights) was first enacted
as Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1998 (P.L. 105-118), and in annual foreign operations appropriations
thereafter. Earlier versions of this restriction had applied to specific countries, programs,
or funding accounts; e.g., such a restriction was placed on counternarcotics assistance in
the section on the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control account, P.L. 104-
208, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997. Section 651 of Division
J, P.L. 110-161, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, codifies this restriction at
Section 620J (22 U.S.C. 2378d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. This
provides that no assistance shall be furnished under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms
Export Control Act “to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary
of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human
rights.” An exception is made if the Secretary of State determines and certifies to Congress
that the government of a country “is taking effective measures to bring the responsible
members of the security forces unit to justice.”
45 NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109-163, Conference Report H.Rept. 109-360,p. 801,
and the FY2007 John Warner NDAA Conference Report H.Rept. 109-702, p. 833.
46 A DOD FY2009 budget document states that under the “dual-key” approval system
developed for Section 1206 programs, U.S. embassies and the military combatant commands
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DOD Desire for Permanent Foreign Military and Police Capacity
Building Authority. In 2007, Congress denied a DOD request to significantly
expand Section 1206 authority to train and equip foreign military forces, substantially
increase the funding, and make it permanent. In May 2007, DOD had proposed
legislation for “Building the Partnership Capacity of Foreign Military and Other
Security Forces” that would provide a new, permanent DOD authority to spend (or
to transfer to the Department of State or other federal agency) up to $750 million per
year to train and equip foreign military and security forces to conduct
counterterrorism operations or to participate in or support military and stability
operations. There would be no requirement, as in Section 1206, that training for
military and stability operations be tied to operations in which the U.S. military
participated. The extension would permit DOD to train and equip gendarmerie,
constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland
defense, coast guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces. Rejecting the
strict conditionality of Section 1206, DOD proposed that the Secretary of State be
permitted to waive any restrictions that might apply. In 2007, the House Armed
Services Committee (HASC) expressed skepticism regarding an extension of the
program “in the absence of ... an established record of success.”47
In its FY2009 budget request, the Bush Administration asked Congress to codify
an expanded version of Section 1206 that would increase the annual authorization to
$750 million and include a broad array of security forces in addition to military
forces. The House version of the bill would extend current authority through
FY2010 (Section 1206, H.R. 5658, the Duncan Hunter NDAA for FY2009). The
Senate version of the NDAA for FY2009 (Section 1204, S. 3001) would extend
Section 1206 authority through FY2011, increasing the annual authorization to $400
million. It would also authorize the use of funds for security forces whose primary
mission is counterterrorism, subject to the police training restrictions of 22 U.S.C.
2420. (See the section below on civilian capabilities for substantive objections to
such authority.)
Perspectives on Building Foreign Military and Other Security Force
Capacity. DOD views training for foreign military and other security forces as an
expanding area, and seeks expanded authorities for DOD programs. The 2006 QDR
46 (...continued)
are encouraged to jointly formulate programs and the responsible embassy and command
“must approve each program explicitly in writing.” U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal
Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, February 4, 2008, p. 103.
47 In its report on the NDAA for FY2008, HASC stated that it had provided DOD with the
limited Section 1206 authority over the past two years, despite the State Department’s
historical responsibility for foreign military capacity building, because of DOD’s expression
of “strong interest” in the program. Congress, however, according to HASC, “has clearly
and strongly discouraged further legislative proposals to expand or make permanent DOD’s
‘train and equip’ authorities in the absence of this required report and an established track
record of success.” U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, report of the Committee of Armed Services on H.R.
1585 together with additional views, 110th Cong.,1st sess., H.Rept. 110-146, part 1
(Washington: GPO, 2007), p. 401. Hereafter referred to as HASC.Report 110-146 on the
FY2008 NDAA.

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calls for DOD to “improve and increase IMET-like opportunities targeted at shaping
relationships and developing future foreign leaders.”48 More specifically, it
recommends the expansion of DOD and State Department authorities “to train and
equip foreign security forces best suited to internal counter-terrorism and counter-
insurgency operations,” noting that these “may be non-military law enforcement or
other security forces....”49 In late 2007, Secretary of Defense Gates identified “the
standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police” as “a key mission for the
military as a whole.”50
In the post-9/11 environment, some defense analysts have urged policy makers
to develop more expeditious mechanisms for the United States to provide military
training and military support. DOD officials argue that the routine planning
processes through the traditional State Department “train and equip” authorities are
too cumbersome and time-consuming, reflecting political rather than operational
military needs, with the planning, budgeting, and implementation cycle taking two
to three years. On the other hand, some Members of Congress have faulted Section
1206 for lacking enough added value to justify making permanent a major train and
equip program outside the State Department’s authority. In a December 2006 report,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated its concern that the program was used
largely to fund areas where the U.S. military sought to enhance military-to-military
relations rather than to meet emerging needs.51 The committee recommended that all
security assistance, including that administered under Section 1206, be placed under
State Department control.
Similarly, in line with a 2006 QDR recommendation52 and the desire for more
flexibility in providing assistance to allies and friendly states, DOD has also sought
broader reimbursement authority for coalition support forces and expanded logistics
48 2006 QDR, op. cit., p. 91.
49 2006 QDR, op. cit., p. 90.
50 He suggested that this is in contrast to the past, when only Special Operations Forces
focused on training missions, but the inclusion of “police” — historically the province of
other agencies — may be telling. See U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary
of Defense Robert M. Gates, the “Landon Lecture” delivered at Kansas State University,
Manhattan, Kansas, November 26, 2007. Accessed through [http://www.defenselink.mil/
speeches]; last accessed July 22, 2008.
51 2006 SFRC Report, op. cit. “Section 1206 assistance, with the exception of Lebanon and
Pakistan, is not addressing threats to the United States that are so immediate that ... [they]
cannot be included in normal budget processes. The Secretary of State should insist that all
security assistance, including Section 1206 funding, be included under his/her authority in
the new process for rationalizing and prioritizing foreign assistance.” p. 3.
52 2006 QDR, op. cit. The recommendation is to expand DOD authority to provide logistics
support, supplies and services to allies and coalition partners, without reimbursement if
necessary, to enable them to participate in operations with U.S. armed forces. Two related
recommendations are to “Establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to fund, and, as
appropriate, stockpile routine defense articles such as helmets, body armor and night vision
devices for use by coalition partners” and to “Expand Department authority to lease or lend
equipment to allies and coalition partners for use in military operations in which they are
participating with U.S. forces.” pp. 89-90.

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support to other States “partnering” with the United States. Congress has been more
responsive to these requests. (See Appendix L.)
Strengthening Foreign Governments Against Internal and
International Threats
DOD has supported foreign governments’ efforts to counter internal and
international threats with assistance that goes beyond help to foreign military forces.
In many situations, and currently in Afghanistan and Iraq, DOD has played a
significant, if not a leading, role in tasks related to nation-building or state-building.
Such tasks include helping establish or strengthen rule of law capabilities (police,
judicial, and prison institutions and facilities), reinforcing the administrative capacity
of central governments, strengthening local governments in rural areas, and
bolstering national economies. Such state-building support is now widely perceived
as a means to deter or control internal and international threats. Although U.S.
military personnel carry out this role most often in combat situations, where the
presence of untrained, unarmed civilians may be a liability, they may also carry out
this role because of a shortage of trained civilian personnel. Because the
circumstances have varied greatly, such assistance has usually been carried out under
a mix of authorities and programs.
Historical Precedents and Current Activities. The most notable example
of U.S. military involvement in state-building occurred in the post-World War II
military occupations of Germany and Japan, although there are earlier examples, such
as the U.S. military occupation of the Philippines around the turn of the 20th century.
In the 1990s, DOD personnel provided such assistance in peacekeeping and post-
conflict operations as part of military operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.
Sometimes DOD provides such assistance to foreign governments as part of military
counterterrorism, internal defense, and counterinsurgency efforts. Special operations
forces teams carry out a variety of state-building activities, to strengthen local leaders
and defuse ethnic and other rivalries, as part of their civic assistance projects.
Congress also provides DOD with authority to train and otherwise assist foreign law
enforcement officials to perform counternarcotics operations, although there is no
standard source for determining the degree to which DOD provides such support.
Activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq and Afghanistan, Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) carry out state-building political and economic
activities, in addition to civic assistance and humanitarian activities. Although no
data are available on the extent to which state-building activities are directed or
conducted by U.S. military personnel, soldiers may be involved when there are not
enough civilian members of a PRT.
U.S. military field commanders in those countries carry out reconstruction
projects with CERP funds, with each major subordinate commander authorized to
approve grants up to $500,000. Originally intended to help military commanders
establish stability in hostile areas, CERP has now become a main source of funding

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for infrastructure development.53 (See Appendix K on DOD in Iraq and Afghanistan
Economic Reconstruction.) Congress has thus far denied Administration requests to
extend CERP funding authority for DOD use on a worldwide basis.54
In Iraq, DOD’s large role in infrastructure reconstruction has been unusual.
While the State Department and USAID were tapped to manage early economic
assistance programs in Iraq, DOD was called on in 2004 to carry out the largest
infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, DOD’s own Army Corps of Engineers (ACE)
also was initially found insufficient to manage the task, and DOD contracted the job
directly with private companies. ACE was subsequently tapped for a management
role. Although the State Department assumed responsibility in 2005 for setting
priorities for most aid programs, DOD developed, and Congress funded, a DOD
program to rehabilitate some 200 Iraqi firms that had been state-owned under the
Hussein regime, without either State Department or USAID input. (See Appendix
K.)
Perspectives on State-Building. Much of DOD’s state-building activities
have thus far been carried out within the context of military operations. For many
years, DOD and U.S. military leaders rejected a nation-building role, arguing that it
was not appropriate for U.S. military forces and detracted from combat readiness.
As defense analysts and military personnel began to perceive state-building as
essential to the success of peacekeeping and related operations, attitudes began to
shift about the desirability of the U.S. military role in state-building. In 2005, DOD
Directive 3000.05 identified state-building as key to the success of stability
operations and stated that “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks
necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”55
Critics find DOD state-building activities marred by a lack of both strategic
planning and application of economic development “best practices,” by the absence
of civilian input and integration with civilian efforts, and by insufficient oversight.
Some critics, however, recognize that the context in which some of these activities
are undertaken can justify their ad hoc nature, short-term objectives, and lack of
civilian expertise, and note that DOD has made efforts to improve soldiers’ ability
to carry out such tasks.56 Concerns focus on the extension of state-building activities
to non-conflict situations; for example, extending CERP authority worldwide, as
requested by the Administration, without more State Department control, or
activities of combatant commands, especially AFRICOM, might lead to perceptions
that the United States is “militarizing” its foreign policy.
53 Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Review of the Effectiveness
of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, 07-015, October 18, 2007, pp. 23-
34. Hereafter referred to as SIGIR Review of PRT Effectiveness.
54 The HASC, in its report on the FY2008 NDAA, stated that current DOD authority for
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance under Title 10 U.S.C. Chapter 20 and 10 U.S.C.
2561 can be used by field commanders without bureaucratic obstacles. HASC Report 110-
146 on the FY2008 NDAA, op. cit., p. 399.
55 DOD Directive 3000.05, op. cit., p. 2.
56 For example, see 2006 CSIS Task Force Report, op. cit., pp. 12-20.

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Defense experts implicitly acknowledged a factual basis for at least some
criticisms of its state-building role by expressly stating in 2005 DOD Directive
3000.05 that civilians would be better suited to accomplish political, social, and
economic tasks in many circumstances. Nevertheless, DOD officials regard the
United States as faced with a strategic imperative to undertake such activities in the
new global environment, and the U.S. military as charged with performing them
where civilians cannot. DOD officials are currently grappling with the many issues
and tradeoffs involved in better preparing military forces to carry out a wide variety
of political, social, and economic tasks for stabilization and reconstruction, as well
as other activities, alone or in conjunction with civilian personnel, in the absence of
civilian personnel.57 An important part of this task for DOD, the State Department,
USAID, and other civilian agencies is to determine and prioritize an appropriate
civil-military division of labor in non-combat areas.
With DOD’s renewed request in 2008 to expand Section 1206 to allow training
of foreign police and related security forces (including gendarmerie, constabulary,
internal defense, and infrastructure) in addition to military forces, Congress is faced
with a sensitive issue. Since at least the 1970s, Congress has been concerned with
the possible human rights implications of U.S. assistance to foreign police forces in
general, and DOD assistance in particular.58 Nevertheless, many analysts argue that
many more foreign police personnel are needed, especially gendarmes trained in both
police and military skills, for post-conflict operations,59 and some might prefer that
57 A May 2006 DOD memo on implementing the 2006 QDR strategy states that DOD “must
be prepared to grow a new team of leaders and operators, who are comfortable working in
remote regions of the world, dealing with local and tribal communities, adapting to foreign
languages and cultures, working with local networks, operating alongside or within United
Nations organizations, and working alongside non-governmental organizations to further US
and partner interests through personal engagement, persuasion, and quite influence — rather
than through military force alone. To support this effort, new approaches to education
assignments and career incentives, as well as new authorities are needed.” Deputy Secretary
of Defense, Memorandum on Quadrennial Defense Review Building Partnership Capacity
(BCP) Execution Roadmap (unclassified), May 22, 2006. p. 6.
58 Congress has limited the assistance that U.S. government agencies can provide to foreign
police forces since the 1970s, when such assistance was provided to police forces that were
perceived of as violating human rights. Over the years, Congress has loosened restrictions
by adding statutory exceptions to the codified prohibition on police training (Section 660
of the 1961 FAA, 22 U.S.C. 2420) for certain situations and providing exceptions for
assistance to certain countries and situations elsewhere in law. Currently, the U.S.
government provides assistance through the State Department and the Justice Department
to foreign police forces in many countries. In addition, as mentioned above, since the 1990s,
Congress has authorized DOD to provide training and other assistance to police forces and
other law enforcement officials for counternarcotics purposes.
59 The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) has published several works pointing to this
gap. Recent publications include one on building U.S. police capacity to fill the gap, while
another discusses the work of an Italian school to train constabulary police. See Robert M.
Perito, “U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations,” USIP Special Report 191, August
2007, and Michael Dziedzic and Colonel Christine Stark, “Bridging the Public Security Gap:
The Role of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Contemporary
(continued...)

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DOD provide personnel to fill that training gap, especially in major post-conflict
zones.
Major Issues and Options for Congress
What Are the Effects of DOD Activities on U.S. Foreign
Relations and Foreign Policy Goals?
DOD is involved in a broad range of foreign assistance activities. U.S. military
personnel deploy as first responders to foreign disasters and provide humanitarian
relief and basic needs assistance in other urgent situations. U.S. military personnel
also provide medical and veterinary assistance and civic support (such as the
construction or repair of small educational and medical facilities) as a routine part of
their training and as part of military operations. U.S. troops routinely train foreign
military forces and are authorized to train police forces for counternarcotics missions.
Recently, in the context of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
elsewhere, they have provided humanitarian assistance and taken on state-building
tasks related to political and economic development. For the past several years, DOD
has worked to enhance its own capabilities to carry out state-building and to draw on
civilian advice. It has also urged Congress to enhance the capabilities of civilian
agencies to form partnerships with DOD in those activities.
DOD stresses a national security imperative for its activities in the foreign
assistance area. Critics, however, most often judge DOD involvement in foreign
assistance activities in terms of its effect on foreign relations and foreign policy
goals. The following sections recapitulate the perceived benefits and liabilities of
that involvement.
Summary of Benefits. The United States and the U.S. military benefit from
DOD foreign assistance activities in several ways. U.S. diplomacy benefits from the
U.S. military’s capacity to project itself rapidly into extreme situations, such as
disasters and other humanitarian emergencies, promoting the image of the United
States as an humanitarian actor.60 Especially in conflict situations, military forces can
provide needed security, intelligence and aerial reconnaissance, command and
control and communications capabilities, and maritime support.61 Humanitarian
59 (...continued)
Peace Operations,” USIPeace Briefing, June 2006. Both last accessed through
[http://www.usip.org], July 22, 2008.
60 While the military can move quickly once authorized to deploy, one author points out that
“The decision-making processes that activate them [i.e., military personnel] may reduce
their respective advantage.” Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, Soldiers to the Rescue:
Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, 1966, p. 151. Hereafter referred to as Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda.
61 This list of benefits is taken from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development/Development Assistance Committee, (OECD/DAC) Task Force on Conflict,
(continued...)

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assistance also provides a means to cultivate good relations with foreign populations,
militaries, and governments. For U.S. diplomacy, military training and other security
assistance can be a potent tool to cultivate or cement relations with foreign
governments.
U.S. military personnel view humanitarian assistance and military training and
education and other opportunities to interact with foreign militaries as part of their
professional development. Such opportunities help soldiers enhance their skills to
operate in a variety of foreign environments and establish contacts with foreign
military personnel that may serve them in future operations. Since 9/11, DOD
training of military forces and provision of security assistance have been an important
means to enable foreign militaries to conduct peacekeeping operations under the
aegis of the United Nations and regional organizations and to participate with the
United States in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Summary of Critiques. Observers have advanced several critiques of the
DOD role. These deal with the effects on humanitarian activities of non-
governmental organizations; the implications for foreign policy objectives, including
counterterrorism, economic development, and state-building and democracy
promotion; and the relative effectiveness of civilian versus military personnel.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that carry out humanitarian missions
hold mixed views on DOD humanitarian assistance activities. They generally do not
criticize the use of the U.S. military in first response disaster relief operations. Some
are critical, however, of the use of U.S. military forces in a broad range of
“humanitarian and basic needs” activities in conflict areas. Although military forces
can provide needed security in unstable environments, in some situations, military
involvement in humanitarian assistance can be problematic. Especially when
military personnel are directly involved in providing humanitarian assistance and
other humanitarian acts, military assistance can be viewed as jeopardizing the lives
and work of NGO personnel by stigmatizing them as participants in a military effort.
These criticisms were provoked by the U.S. military’s humanitarian role in
Afghanistan, where non-governmental humanitarian aid workers felt their neutrality
was compromised by soldiers in civilian dress who distributed humanitarian aid as
part of military operations. Since then, DOD has made an effort to engage non-
governmental aid workers and to develop means to work together. While some
humanitarian relief NGOs now welcome the security that military forces can provide
in hostile areas, others still feel that their lives are endangered by the proximity of
soldiers engaged in humanitarian activities. In areas without U.S. military
61 (...continued)
Peace and Development Co-operations, Civilian and Military Means of Providing and
Supporting Humanitarian Assistance During Conflict: Comparative Advantages and Costs,
Paris: OECD, 1998, pp. 12-15. (Hereafter cited as OECD/DAC Comparative Advantages
and Costs.) This document also lists a military advantage providing a response to a possible
future use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons (p. 15).

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involvement, local populations may also take the use of military personnel for such
activities as a prelude to military action or intervention.62
The use of military forces may also impede the advancement of foreign policy
goals. For instance, the December 2006 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report,
Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign, viewed the use of DOD
personnel for counterterrorism programs as an obstacle: “In Latin America,
especially, military and intelligence efforts are viewed with suspicion, making it
difficult to pursue meaningful cooperation on a counterterrorism agenda.”63 As
pointed out in Appendix F on counternarcotics cooperation, Mexico has resisted
counternarcotics assistance that would involve the U.S. military. One analyst claims
that “African publics and governments have already begun to complain that U.S.
engagement is increasingly military.”64
In the area of economic development, some analysts question whether the U.S.
military objectives in carrying out small-scale infrastructure projects in conjunction
with exercises and operations respond to short-term exigencies rather than abiding
by development “best practices” to accomplish long-term structural reforms.65 In the
cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, some analysts point out that “some normal
development practices will inevitably take a back seat to operational realities.”66 In
the case of humanitarian and civic action activities in non-conflict areas, however,
a lack of integration with long-term development plans can raise expectations of
economic growth and development that cannot be fulfilled with the limited resources
available.
The use of U.S. military personnel in state-building activities may convey mixed
signals in activities where the objective is to promote democracy and enhance
civilian control. While the use of U.S. military forces is seen as appropriate in state-
building efforts that involve the training of foreign militaries, some analysts believe
that it may undermine that objective when used in other state-building activities by
reinforcing stereotypes in underdeveloped nations — such as that military forces are
more competent than civilians — or legitimize the use of military forces for civilian
governmental responsibilities. Further, some analysts believe that DOD has failed
62 2006 SFRC Report, op. cit., states that there is evidence that some host country nationals
question “the increasingly military component of America’s profile overseas. In Uganda,
a military civil affairs team went to the northern part of the country to help local
communities build wells, erect schools and carry out other small development projects to
help mitigate the consequences of a long-running regional conflict. Local NGOs questioned
whether the military was there to take sides in the conflict.” p. 12.
63 2006 SFRC Report, op. cit., p. 12.
64 Gerald Loftus, “Speaking Out: Expeditionary Sidekicks? The Military-Diplomatic
Dynamic,” Foreign Service Journal, December 2007, p. 16. (Hereafter referred to as
“Expeditionary Sidekicks?”)
65 The Pentagon and Global Development, op. cit., p. 13.
66 Ibid.

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to strengthen institutional mechanisms for civilian control in its dealings with foreign
militaries.67
The lack of expertise within the military to carry out coherent plans for
economic and political development in foreign nations is also considered
problematic. While the placement of USAID officers within combatant commands
may alleviate some of the worst problems, some analysts believe that their presence
may not be sufficient to ensure that best practices are routinely applied.68
Civilians are cited as enjoying an overall advantage in many humanitarian and
state-building tasks. Military forces are, however, recognized as possessing a
decided advantage in some humanitarian mission tasks, such as providing security
and air support, particularly in hostile situations. Despite that military advantage,
however, one study judged civilian personnel more effective in carrying out a wide
range of humanitarian tasks in conflict situations. These tasks are acquiring the
supplies necessary for humanitarian assistance operations, assessing and utilizing
local resources, interacting with the local population, providing the most suitable
medical response, managing refugee camps, and providing water and sanitation.69
Another study judged that although most multinational military personnel assisting
with the Rwanda crisis in 1994 were “skilled in their own areas, [they] had no unique
competence in such matters as refugee camp construction, community health and
disease control, or shelter management. Moreover, their security preoccupations —
for example, the prohibition against U.S. forces from leaving the Kigali airport, the
reluctance of the Japanese to work in refugee camps — also circumscribed what the
troops themselves were able to achieve.”70
Relative Costs. There is a widespread presumption that using military forces
for many humanitarian missions, military support, and state-building activities costs
more than using civilian personnel for the same tasks, but analysts note the absence
of reliable studies on relative costs. One 1998 study on the use of international
military forces for humanitarian assistance in conflict situations judged that the use
of the military is “generally more costly than civilian means” and “will far exceed the
costs of providing the aid itself.” The study attributed the greater costs to the military
emphasis on making its activities “fail-safe” rather than cost-effective, building into
its procedures “safeguards, redundancies, and limitations that often do not exist with
67 The Pentagon and Global Development, op. cit. According to this report: “While the
Pentagon conducts training programs to promote professionalism and civilian control of ...
foreign militaries, it gives relatively less attention to broader security sector report (SSR)
— including the effort to ensure that military, police, and intelligence services and
ministries are accountable to democratically-elected governments.” pp. 14-15.
68 Among the findings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff delegation that
compiled the 2006 SFRC report was “that country teams in embassies with USAID presence
are far more capable of ensuring sufficient review of military humanitarian assistance
projects than those that have no USAID office. Budgetary cutbacks at USAID, affecting
both personnel and programs, are repeatedly cited as a deficiency in the U.S. campaign
against extremism in susceptible regions of the world.” p. 9.
69 OECD/DAC Comparative Advantages and Costs, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
70 Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda, op. cit., p. 150.

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civilian means.... Civilian and commercial means are, in general, leaner and less
redundant.”71 The study cautioned, however, that its general conclusions were
“presented as hypotheses.”72
Relative costs can vary according to the circumstances. For instance, according
to the 1998 study cited above, when “military assets are already deployed (either for
humanitarian assistance or for peacekeeping), the marginal cost of using these
personnel and resources will be low. In these areas, then, the military can be a cost-
effective means of delivering and supporting humanitarian assistance.”73 A variety
of other factors can influence relative costs. The military’s economies of scale and
shared costs may reduce the price tag on the use of military forces; on the other hand,
the degree of force protection in the field and the amount of equipment with which
the military deploys can raise costs.
For some analysts, cost considerations are beside the point, as there are certain
situations where military forces are indispensable and certain places where few
civilians will go. Decisions on the most appropriate division of labor between
military and civilian personnel are better made on the basis of comparative advantage
in each situation.
Can Current DOD and State Department Coordination
Be Improved?
A key to ensuring that DOD plays an effective role in foreign assistance may be
improving interagency coordination in planning and implementing such activities.
DOD and the State Department recently have created new coordination mechanisms,
but some analysts believe the imbalance between DOD and State Department
resources may be a continuing problem, especially for activities that take place in the
context of military operations.
Congress’s Role in Specifying Interagency Coordination.74 In
approving legislation governing the DOD role in foreign assistance, Congress can
mandate the type and degree of interaction between DOD and civilian agencies. It
can maintain or strengthen the leadership role that the State Department has
traditionally had in foreign assistance activities. Or it can respond to the concerns of
some defense officials and analysts that DOD lacks appropriate authority and
flexibility to carry out foreign assistance activities expeditiously, and enhance the
DOD role.
Since at least the early 1960s, Congress has made the Secretary of State the lead
U.S. government official regarding oversight of foreign assistance, including military
assistance, and assigned U.S. Ambassadors or other officials carrying out the
71 OECD/DAC Comparative Advantages and Costs, op. cit., p. 16.
72 OECD/DAC Comparative Advantages and Costs, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
73 Ibid.
74 This section was prepared in conjunction with R. Chuck Mason, Legislative Attorney,
American Law Division, CRS.

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responsibilities of a chief of a United States diplomatic mission a lead role in
coordinating military assistance with foreign policy. Section 622 of the 1961 FAA
(22 U.S.C. 2382), entitled Coordination with Foreign Policy, contains these
provisions.
Section 622(c) of the original version of the 1961 FAA provided that the
Secretary of State “shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general
direction of the assistance programs authorized by this Act, including but not limited
to determining whether there shall be a military assistance program for a country and
the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at
home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.”
(Section 622(c).)
In 1976, Congress amended that provision,75 deleting the limitation that made
it applicable solely to programs in the 1961 FAA, as amended. Section 622(c) now
charges the Secretary of State with responsibility for “the continuous supervision and
general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education
and training programs, including but not limited to determining whether there shall
be military assistance (including civic action) or a military education and training
program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are
effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United
States is best served thereby.” The 1961 FAA, as amended, does not define military
assistance or civic action. It does, however, define “military education and
training.”76
The Chief of Mission’s responsibility was contained in Section 622(b). Under
that provision, the Ambassador (or other responsible official) exercises leadership,
under procedures prescribed by the President, over ensuring coordination regarding
foreign assistance programs among U.S. government representatives in each country.
Section 622(b) specifically ties this role to military assistance. The original language
reads: “The Chief of the diplomatic mission shall make sure that recommendations
of such representatives pertaining to military assistance are coordinated with political
and economic considerations, and that his comments shall accompany such
recommendations if he so desires.” Congress later amended this language to specify
that civic action and military education and training programs were covered by this
section.77
75 This amendment was contained in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act, P.L. 94-329, Section 543(b)(2)(B).
76 Section 644(n) defines military education and training to include”formal or informal
instruction of foreign students in the United States or overseas by officers or employees of
the United States, contract technicians, contractors (including instruction at civilian
institutions), or by correspondence courses, technical, educational, or information
publications and media of all kinds, training aids, orientation, and military advice to foreign
military units and forces.”
77 Section 302(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-583) inserted civic
action; Section 106(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act
of 1976 (P.L. 94-329) inserted military education and training.

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Section 623 (22 U.S.C. 2383) charges the Secretary of Defense with several
responsibilities regarding the provision of military equipment, as well as “the
supervision of the training of foreign military and related civilian personnel.”
Through legislation, Congress often has required that the Department of State
approve an activity. Some of the temporary authorities for Iraq and Afghanistan, for
instance, require the concurrence (i.e., the approval) of the Secretary of State. Under
pre- 9/11 legislation, DOD needs to secure the concurrence of the Secretary of State
for programs regarding the educational programs, capacity building, and logistic
support for allies. Other Title 10 U.S. Code programs under DOD authority require
the Secretary of Defense to secure the approval of the Secretary of State for military
to military contacts and the approval of both the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General for certain counternarcotics and counterterrorism activities (i.e., support for
law enforcement officials outside the United States).
In other cases, however, Congress had mandated that DOD coordinate or consult
with the State Department and other relevant agencies. DOD must develop certain
counternarcotics and counterterrorism activities in consultation with the Secretary of
State. DOD and State Department officials report that whatever the statutory
language, these departments now develop a consensus about foreign assistance- type
activities before proceeding.78
Interagency Coordination in Practice. Despite these legislative
mandates, the actual degree and type of interagency coordination and consultation
appear to have varied greatly over time, and from program to program. There are
established mechanisms for coordinating projects, but at least in the past there have
been occasions when they appear to have broken down. Factors identified as causing
interagency coordination to lull or lapse include individual personalities, a lack of
State Department personnel to perform coordinating tasks, a blurred division of
labor, and the routinization of tasks. (See Appendices G, J, and K.)
For many years, much of the formal coordination has been carried out by the
DOD Defense Security Cooperation Agency for established programs. The DSCA
receives project proposals from combatant commanders. In many cases, these
proposals require the approval of the U.S. ambassador in the country in which
programs will be conducted, although ambassadorial approval is not required for
regional programs or in war zones. DSCA then coordinates the approval process in
Washington, D.C., as required by statute or policy guidance, for both State
Department programs (i.e., security assistance, IMET, and GPOI) and DOD
humanitarian assistance and other programs. The DSCA Security Affairs Officers
(SAOs) located at U.S. embassies worldwide bear a large part of the responsibility
for implementing these programs.
Within the State Department, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
coordinates the Department’s position on military assistance. The bureau is also the
lead State Department office for interagency coordination. It coordinates the
78 Authors’ interviews with DOD and State Department officials in November and
December 2007.

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interagency response (State Department, USAID, DOD, and NSC) to requests by
foreign governments for humanitarian demining and other humanitarian assistance.
It also coordinates the State Department response to plans for military exercises in
politically sensitive areas, as required by National Security Presidential
Determination 42. In addition, it coordinates the vetting of foreign forces that receive
counternarcotics training and that participate in JCETs.79
Current Initiatives to Improve Interagency Coordination. Over the
past few years, DOD and the civilian agencies have created new mechanisms for
planning and coordinating DOD foreign assistance activities. These include new
arrangements in combatant commands, as well as new offices in USAID and the
State Department.
! DOD has created new interagency groups or new posts for civilian
agency representatives in its institutions, particularly at four
geographical combatant commands that plan and carry out combat
operations and non-combat activities in their “areas of
responsibility.”80 Regional combatant commands host a “Joint
Interagency Coordinating Group” (JIACG) composed of military
personnel from all services and civilian personnel from a variety of
agencies that act as an advisory body to the combatant command.
! Combatant commands also are beginning to integrate personnel from
civilian agencies in greater numbers. The U.S. Southern Command
reportedly has already incorporated civilians into its structure, as has
the Special Operations Command.81 The newly planned Africa
Command (currently being created to handle all of Africa, which is
now split between EUCOM and CENTCOM) will also incorporate
a significant number of diplomats and development experts.82
79 Authors’ interviews with DOD officials, December 2007. The Federation of American
Scientists, which compiles available public information on presidential directives, lists
NSPD 42 under the title On Significant Military Exercise Briefs (SMEB), dated January 26,
2005. No other information is listed.
80 These commands are comprised of personnel from all four branches of the U.S. military
services that are responsible for carrying out assigned missions, including combat and non-
combat operations and activities. (Current combatant commands are the U.S. European
Command [EUCOM], the U.S. Central Command [CENTCOM], the U.S. Southern
Command [SOUTHCOM], and the U.S. Pacific Command [PACOM].)
81 As of early 2008, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) included seven people
from U.S. civilian agencies: three from the Department of State, one from USAID, one from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, one from the Department of Energy, and one from the
Department of Transportation. (E-mail correspondence from SOCOM, February 1, 2008.)
82 For more information on AFRICOM, see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S.
Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch. Based on
interviews by the author of that report, early plans called for up to a quarter of AFRICOM
personnel to be non-DOD civilians, to date, according to her June 19, 2008 interview, less
than 10 non-DOD civilians are on board. According to a recent Foreign Service Journal
(continued...)

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! In 2005, USAID established a new USAID Office of the Military
Advisor, which provides USAID officials to the regional combatant
commands, as well as the Special Operations Command, where they
help plan for and oversee all foreign assistance activities.
! Within the State Department, the Director of Foreign Assistance has
instituted new interagency groups to plan and vet DOD foreign
assistance activities.
Further Considerations and Options. Despite the increasing number of
mechanisms for civil-military coordination on DOD foreign assistance activities,
some analysts are concerned that the State Department lead has eroded, and that the
new DOD mechanisms provide an inappropriate subordinate role for the State
Department.83 This can be a disadvantage in planning for, implementing, and
overseeing these activities, even when the State Department’s approval is required.
The answer for some is to increase the DOD role in such activities in general, while
others argue for increasing the State Department and USAID ability to plan, oversee,
and coordinate activities. One often-mentioned factor impeding the latter option is
the lack of adequate numbers of State Department and USAID personnel at U.S.
embassies and in Washington, D.C. A recent CSIS report details recommendations
to increase civilian staff for counterterrorism, post-conflict, and humanitarian
operations.84 Another option would be for Congress to reinforce the role of U.S.
ambassadors as the top U.S. government official in all countries by requiring that
U.S. ambassadors approve all foreign assistance-type activities of all U.S. military
personnel or DOD contractors operating in their countries, regardless of the statutory
authorities under which they operate. A third possibility for enhancing State
Department control, in the view of some analysts, would be to create new regional
mechanisms for State Department coordination, both among embassies and with the
U.S. military.
One of DOD’s primary advantages in planning and carrying out foreign
assistance activities is its regional organization, with four geographic combatant
commands. Some analysts believe that this regional focus combined with a regional
field presence allows for better foreign assistance planning, compared with the State
Department’s traditional bilateral focus, with foreign assistance planning in each
country initiated and overseen by U.S. ambassadors reporting to the Department’s
Washington, D.C.-based regional bureaus. The DOD regional arrangement may also
place some DOD foreign assistance activities beyond the purview of U.S.
ambassadors, as regional DOD activities may not necessarily be cleared with
ambassadors and ambassadors lack sufficient civilian staff to manage all military
82 (...continued)
article, diplomats and development experts would comprise up to a third of AFRICOM
headquarters personnel. Also see Expeditionary Sidekicks?, op. cit., p. 15.
83 Expeditionary Sidekicks?, op. cit., p. 15.
84 CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007, op. cit., pp. 33-43.

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activities.85 Congress could provide funding for the State Department to hold regular
meetings of regional ambassadors and other senior interagency personnel for
discussions of regional issues together with regional combatant commanders and
other military personnel, along the lines of the counterterrorism Regional Strategic
Initiative.86 More ambitiously, it could locate abroad the regional Assistant
Secretaries or special offices of regional bureaus to provide a venue for such
meetings and for daily coordination with the combatant commands, or provide
another means for regional coordination. As part of its oversight role, Congress
might also urge the executive branch to take steps to ensure that ambassadors
exercise greater control over activities in their countries.87
Some defense officials, on the other hand, argue for greater DOD autonomy in
planning and carrying out foreign assistance activities in order to expedite urgent
operations. In addition to the new DOD authorities requested in recent years —
especially a permanent Title 10 U.S. Code train and equip authority and a permanent
fund for field commanders to carry out humanitarian assistance activities — some
analysts have argued for other changes that would accomplish those ends. Among the
options posited by one analyst are several that could be the subject of congressional
action: (1) increase the budgets and discretionary spending authority of the
geographic combatant commands to meet emerging political-military needs; (2)
expand Section 1206 authority to include state-building activities and activities to
develop “future capacity for employment on operations as a U.S. partner”; and (3)
expand the scope and authorities of the JIACG by enabling the JIACG to coordinate
85 At least in the past, there have been reports that Special Operations Forces have not
informed ambassadors of SOF activities in their countries, and given the classified nature
of many SOF activities, it is not clear whether this is still true. (See CRS Report RL30034,
Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and Human Rights: Background and Issues for
Congress, by William C. Story, Jr., June 26, 1999, p. 5. ) Although in early 2007 the GAO
noted coordination for Section 1206 activities had improved over time, the GAO reported
at that time that poor coordination was more common for regional programs. See, for
instance, GAO 07-416R, Section 1206 Security Assistance Programs: Findings on Criteria,
Coordination, and Implementation, February 28, 2007, p. 24, and 2006 SFRC Report, op.
cit., p. 13.
86 Under the RSI, senior interagency personnel, including ambassadors, regional assistant
secretaries and personnel from combatant commands, in eight geographical regions meet on
a regional basis twice a year to deliberate counterterrorism strategic responses. The 2006
SFRC report recommended that the Secretary of State “regularize and expand the
Department’s Regional Strategic Initiative ...” and that meetings should be held “at the most
senior level possible, with ambassadors themselves actively engaged and involved.” op. cit.,
p. 4.
87 The 2006 SFRC Report suggests regularizing the presence of military personnel in foreign
countries by “specifically placing them under the ambassador’s authority....” National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 38 of June 2, 1982, “Staffing at Diplomatic Missions
and their Overseas Posts,” requires Chief of Mission approval for any proposed change in
in the size, composition, or mandate staff under Chief of Mission authority. (This directive
is accessible through [http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd38.htm], last accessed July 22,
2008.) The 2006 SFRC Report noted that DOD objected to that suggestion because some
of the military personnel present in embassies are serving under a regional combatant
command. op. cit., p. 11.

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combatant commands’ security cooperation activities, thus facilitating “proactive
conflict-prevention tasks” and empowering JIACG members “to make decisions and
coordinate regional interagency security cooperation activities.”88
Should Civilian Capabilities to Carry Out Foreign Assistance
Activities Be Enhanced?
Many consider DOD to have a marked advantage in planning and carrying out
a variety of activities in the foreign assistance area because of the greater number of
personnel and its large budget. This resource advantage sometimes has created
friction between State Department and DOD officials over the use of DOD resources.
As DOD begins to implement its “Partnership Strategy,” its resource advantages are
once again highlighted. DOD officials have made clear, however, that they believe
that Congress should provide the State Department and USAID with the resources
to build their capacity to carry out foreign assistance duties. In a recent speech, the
Secretary of Defense Gates urged the United States “to harness ‘the full strength of
America,’” by strengthening these civilian agencies. “It has become clear,” he said,
“that America’s civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been
chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long — relative to what we
spend on the military, and more important, relative to the responsibilities and
challenges our nation has around the world.”89
DOD Manpower and Budget Advantages. In addition to its regional
advantage, DOD enjoys two other advantages: greater planning and execution
capabilities, and substantially greater budgetary resources. DOD can muster more
manpower than any other agency. While U.S. military personnel may be stretched
in wartime, there still exist substantial reserves of personnel that can be tapped to
plan and carry out activities. The combatant commands enjoy considerably more
personnel than do individual embassies, and their personnel are oriented toward
planning activities, whereas State Department personnel are oriented toward
collecting information and furthering U.S. policy through diplomacy, such as person-
to-person contact. Despite waging a war in Iraq, CENTCOM created a new Joint
Task Force in the Horn of Africa (CJT-HOA) of roughly 2,000 U.S. military
personnel (the number fluctuates regularly) to plan and carry out efforts in the Horn
of Africa that include much foreign assistance activity. In Iraq, DOD temporarily
provided military personnel to fill about 100 State Department PRT posts, until the
State Department could contract persons with the needed expertise to fill them.
88 Thomas P. Galvin, “Extending the Phase Zero Campaign Mindset,” Joint Force
Quarterly, Issue 45, 2nd quarter, 2007, pp. 49-50.
89 U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to the
U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, Washington, D.C., July 15, 2008. Accessed through
[http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches]; last accessed July 22, 2008. Secretary Gates also
stated that while he could not “pretend to know the right dollar amount — I know it’s a good
deal more than the one percent of the federal budget than it is right now” and, given that “the
budgets we are talking about are relatively small compared to the rest of government, a steep
increase of these capabilities is well within reach — as long as there is the political will and
wisdom to do it.”

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Congress also grants considerable funding to DOD to carry out foreign
assistance-type activities. For example, Congress funded DOD’s OHDACA
appropriation at roughly $60 million a year for FY2005-FY2007 and provided for
FY2008 a total of $103.3 million, of which part is multiple year money. These sums
represent more funding than the State Department provides annually to many
individual countries receiving U.S. foreign assistance. In addition, these amounts are
but a small part of the actual cost of the activities undertaken under OHDACA
authorities. OHDACA funding does not cover the total cost of an activity, but only
its incremental cost (i.e., the amount above the normal peacetime cost of a soldier).
In terms of historical spending, the FY2009 request for $83.6 million in new money
is about the same, in nominal terms, as the $86 million (current dollars) that
Congress authorized for OHDACA when the account was created in 1994.
Some analysts believe that Congress has given DOD an advantage by increasing
DOD allocations for foreign assistance-type activities, because such funds are more
easily included in the defense budget than in the foreign assistance budget.90 In
particular, these funds include the CERP for Afghanistan and Iraq, and an increase
in discretionary money in the CCIF, which can be used for a variety of purposes in
addition to humanitarian relief.
Although DOD enjoys greater resources, these resources do not necessarily
provide DOD with the needed competence and expertise to carry out foreign
assistance activities. For instance, for many years, some defense analysts have stated
that the U.S. military civil affairs speciality does not have an adequate number of
personnel to carry out the wide variety of state-building tasks needed; with a recent
increase in the number of civil affairs personnel, one analyst’s concern now focuses
on whether civil affairs personnel are properly organized, trained, educated, and
provided the resources to fulfill their mission.91 In some U.S. embassies, U.S.
civilian personnel interviewed criticized some military personnel as “poorly trained
in information gathering” and “rarely” possessing regional or linguistic expertise.92
90 The CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007 finds a “continued neglect of critical non-military
components of national power and influence” and views the use of DOD for non-traditional
security assistance as “defaulting to reliance on the military.” p. IX.
91 Colonel Christopher Holshek, “The Scroll and the Sword: Synergizing Civil-Military
Power,” in Alexander Woodcock, George Rose, and David Davis, eds., The Cornwallis
Group XI: Analysis for Civil-Military Transitions, Clementsport, Nova Scotia, Canada: The
Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2007, p. 127. In this work, written in 2006, Col. Holshek
stated that Civil Affairs (CA) personnel are “hard pressed to support both the burgeoning
CMO [Civil Military Operations] mission and CAO [Civil Affairs Operations] support to
interagency nation-building.” He states that Civil Affairs personnel’s “traditional
comparative advantage” in language and cultural knowledge, as well as nation-building
functional specialist proficiency, has eroded over time, although he notes recent initiatives
may work to reverse some of the problem. His current concerns were stated in an e-mail of
April 1, 2008.
92 2006 SFRC Report, op. cit., p. 11. The report states that “Rotational tours of only six
months limit expertise acquired on-the-job. In several countries, embassy officials say that
the time required to bring military personnel up to speed, monitor their activities, and
prevent them from doing damage is not compensated for by contributions they make to the
(continued...)

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DOD Directive 3000.05 points to a need to develop personnel qualified to engage in
state-building and economic reconstruction activities. DOD is still deliberating
whether to devote funding and time to develop a cadre with the necessary range of
expertise to plan and carry out such activities on its own.93 DOD Directive 3000.05
points out that civilians are often better suited to carry out such tasks.
Possible Options to Enhance U.S. Government Civilian Capabilities.
DOD officials join many other analysts in urging Congress to augment the ability of
civilian federal agencies to carry out the state-building and economic measures that
will prevent and deter conflicts, stabilize nations in transitions from conflict, and
foster economic recovery and democratic institutions during the post-conflict
period.94 For many analysts, one indication of the urgency of increasing the number
of federal civilian personnel to perform such tasks was the State Department’s
inability to supply when needed more than 100 specialized, skilled personnel to staff
the PRTs in Iraq, which DOD had to staff temporarily until the State Department
could locate contractors. Many analysts also cite a need for a significant number of
USAID permanent staff. They note that USAID permanent staff now number
approximately 2,000, down from some 15,000 during the Vietnam war, and that most
USAID work is currently carried out by contractors.
DOD has strongly supported the development of the State Department Office
of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to plan and
coordinate such preventive, transitional, and post-conflict activities.95 Under
authority provided by Congress, DOD has transferred funds during FY2006 and
FY2007 to S/CRS for such activities. Nevertheless, some analysts have criticized
S/CRS for failing to fully perform its assigned functions. Some fault a lack of top-
92 (...continued)
embassy team.” Ibid.
93 For more information, see CRS Report RL34333, Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum
Force or Specialized Units? Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
94 A May 22, 2006 DOD memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the
secretaries of the military departments, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
combatant commanders, and many other DOD officials called for DOD to develop plans to
support State Department efforts to obtain resources for S/CRS operations and to establish
a Civilian Reserve Corps and a Conflict Response Fund, as well as to support USAID and
other civilian agencies efforts to obtain resources to deploy civilian experts to security,
stabilization, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. Memorandum on the
Quadrennial Defense Review Building Partnership Capacity Execution Roadmap, signed
by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England.
95 Soon after S/CRS was created, then Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard B. Myers, in
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), cited the creation of
S/CRS as “an important step” in helping “post-conflict nations achieve peace, democracy,
and a sustainable market economy.” “In the future, provided this office is given appropriate
resources, it will synchronize military and civilian efforts and ensure an integrated national
approach is applied to post-combat peacekeeping, reconstruction and stability operations.”
U.S. Congress. Senate Armed Services Committee, Posture Statement of General Richard
B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee
Hearing, February 17, 2005, 109th Cong. 1st sess., p. 31. Accessible through the SASC
website [http://www.armed-services.senate.gov]; last accessed July 22, 2008.

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level State Department commitment to its mission and bureaucratic infighting within
the State Department. Others judge that Congress has not provided the State
Department with the level of funding necessary to adequately staff and otherwise
provide for this office’s operations.96
In February 2008, the Bush Administration presented Congress with a $248.6
million request to fund a Civilian Stabilization Initiative that would strengthen U.S.
civilian capabilities to respond to unanticipated conflict in foreign countries. The
initiative’s centerpiece would be a civilian response corps consisting of civilian
federal government employees from several departments (250 members of an active
response corps and 2,000 members of a standby response corps) and a reserve
component of 2,000 citizens from outside the federal government. This corps would
include people with a wide variety of state-building and economic reconstruction
capabilities. Congress appropriated $50 million in seed money for the corps in
supplemental State Department appropriations for 2007, but Congress has not yet
approved a specific authorization for the corps as required by the appropriation bill.97
(As it passed the House, the Duncan Hunter NDAA for FY2009, H.R. 5658, provides
this authority in Title XVI.)
An area of particular interest to DOD is an increase in U.S. government capacity
to train and equip foreign military and police forces. Some argue that DOD needs to
increase its own training capacity — even if DOD remains in a supporting role.
Others argue that Congress should provide the funds and personnel needed to
increase the State Department’s ability to train and equip such forces worldwide and
in the event of future challenges on the scale of Afghanistan or Iraq. (See Appendix
L.)
Need to Examine Other Civilian Capabilities. Current debate in
Congress has centered on the development of U.S. government civilian capabilities.
Nevertheless, some analysts urge further examination of the uses and relationships
of private sector civilian personnel to DOD missions. While DOD has attempted
over the years to improve its ability to work in the field with non-profit NGOS,
including publishing guidelines jointly with InterAction and the U.S. Institute of
Peace in July 2007,98 some analysts suggest that further improvements are necessary.
Some also point to a need to reexamine the potential role of for-profit contractor
personnel in augmenting or replacing U.S. military forces in humanitarian and state-
building activities.
96 For more information on S/CRS, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping and Conflict
Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities, by Nina M.
Serafino (hereafter referred to as CRS Report RL32862).
97 This funding was appropriated by Section 3810, P.L. 110-28, U.S. Troop Readiness,
Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations, 2007. For more
information, see CRS Report RL32862, ibid.
98 Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental
Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments, issued July 7,
2007 by the U.S. Institute of Peace, InterAction, and DOD. See [http://www.usip.org/pubs/
guidelines.html]; last accessed July 22, 2008.

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Table 1. Congressional Action on Selected DOD-Requested New or Expanded Authorities for FY2009 Relevant to
Foreign Assistance Referenced Above
House Action on the FY2009 NDAA
Senate Action on the FY2009 NDAA
Proposal for the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
(H.R. 5658)
(S. 3001)
Building the Partnership Capacity of Foreign Miltary and Other Security Forces. Section 1206 would extend current authority Section 1204 would extend authority through
Make permanent the Section 1206 train and equip authority of the FY2006 NDAA (as through FY2010.
FY2011 and would increase the annual
amended by the John Warner FY2007 NDAA). Increase authorized funding from
authorization to $400 million. It would
$300 million to $750 million. Expand specified purposes to (1) allow assistance to
authorize the use of funds for security forces
non-military security forces, (2) to train foreign forces to participate in or to support
whose primary mission is counterterrorism,
military and stability operations that are consistent with U.S. security interests, and
subject to the police training restrictions of 22
(3) to build the capacity of security foreces in a country where U.S. forces are
U.S.C. 2420 (Section 660 of the 1961 FAA, as
deployed in large-scale stability operations.
amended.)
Making Permanent and Global the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program No similar provision.
In lieu of the Administration proposal, S. 3001
for Urgent Humanitarian and Reconstruction Needs in the Field. Codify CERP
would authorize $75 million for the Combatant
authority at 10 U.S.C. Chapter 20. Authorize the use of annually appropriated CERP
Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF), 10 U.S.C.
funds for the CEERP program in Iraq and a similar program in Afghanistan, and for
166a. (Senate Rept. 110-335, accompanying
a similar program to assist the people of a developing country where United States
S. 3001.) In its FY2009 DOD budget request,
forces are operating. Authorize the Secretary of Defense to waive any provision of
the Administration requested $100 million in
law not contained in this authority. Provide for DOD and the Department of State to
the CCIF specifically to meet unanticipated
jointly develop procedures for the exercise of this authority in order to provide for
humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs.
“expeditious coordination” between DOD and the State Department.
Support for Special Operations to Combat Terrorism. Expand, and indefinitely Section 1208 would codify this authority at 10 Section 1203 would extend this authority
extend, authority for Special Operations Forces to support foreign forces, irregular U.S.C. 127e, raise the spending limit to $35 through FY2011, raise the limit on annual
forces, groups, or individuals when such recipients are facilitating or acting in support million, and require the Secretary of Defense to funding to $35 million, and add a requirement
of operations conducted by U.S. Special Operations Forces. [ Section 1208 of the notify the congressional defense committees for the concurrence of the relevant Chief of
Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for FY2005 (P.L. 108-375) as amended by Section 1202 within 48 hours of the use of such an authority. Mission.
of the FY2008 NDAA (P.L. 110-181).] Increase authorized funding limit from $25
million to $35 million, and require the concurrence of the relevant Chief of Mission.

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Appendix A. Disaster Relief and Humanitarian
Assistance, Including Civic Action99
DOD Roles and Responsibility
Disaster relief and humanitarian assistance have long been considered
traditional, albeit secondary, DOD roles. DOD is one of the three principal U.S.
government departments that provides disaster and other humanitarian assistance
overseas.100 DOD humanitarian relief in disasters and other emergency and recovery
situations is often carried out in coordination with or under the direction of U.S.
government civilian agencies. The U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) takes the lead in disaster
assistance; the State Department takes the lead in assisting refugees.
DOD humanitarian assistance also takes place in the context of military
operations, some of which are conducted solely for humanitarian purposes and others
in which humanitarian activities are carried out as a strategic supplement to combat
operations or military training exercises. In many situations, DOD also cooperates
and coordinates with international organizations, such as the United Nations and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and a wide variety of non-
governmental organizations.
The following sections discuss DOD authorities for and the specific DOD role
in humanitarian assistance. There is a particular emphasis on DOD humanitarian
assistance and related civic action under 10 U.S.C. 401. As used by the U.S.
government, the term “humanitarian assistance” is vague, and the types of assistance
provided under that rubric are broader than the humanitarian assistance provided by
non-governmental relief agencies.
99 Prepared by Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, and Rhoda
Margesson, Specialist in Humanitarian Policy. Also see CRS Report RL33769,
International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance, Budget Trends, and
Issues for Congress, by Rhoda Margesson.
100 The USAID and the Department of State provide disaster relief and humanitarian
assistance through four main programs: USAID’s International Disaster and Famine
Assistance; the State Department’s, Migration and Refugee Assistance and Emergency
Refugee and Migration Assistance; and P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid. In addition, although
not the focus of this report, other parts of the U.S. government that support humanitarian
assistance include the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service, the U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS), the Department of Health and Human Services (HSS), the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). These agencies
contribute technical assistance to the OFDA as needed in response to humanitarian
emergencies.

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DOD Disaster and Other Humanitarian Emergency Relief and
Recovery Assistance: Activities and Authorities
DOD is often the first U.S. government agency to respond in cases of natural or
manmade disasters, providing the initial organizational effort for further action by
civilian agencies. The DOD role is most often carried out under the President’s
broad authority to provide emergency assistance for foreign disasters, rather than
Title 10 U.S. Code authority to provide disaster relief.101 DOD provides assistance
in coordination with the Administrator of the USAID, who is charged with
responsibility for coordinating U.S. government and private sector foreign assistance
in cases of disaster.
DOD provides assistance in humanitarian emergencies and recovery efforts
under several Title 10 U.S. Code authorities added in the 1980s and 1990s. DOD
provides transportation and or/funding for humanitarian assistance under 10 U.S.C.
2561 and 402, and humanitarian demining assistance under 10 U.S.C. 407. (The
latter is covered separately in Appendix C.)
! 10 U.S.C. 2561 — added in 1992 (with its original section number
of 2551) and last amended in 2003 — is DOD’s primary authority
to transport humanitarian supplies. It allows DOD to use
appropriated funds for humanitarian assistance “for the purpose of
providing transportation of humanitarian relief and for other
humanitarian purposes worldwide.” The Secretary of State
determines that this provision should be used and requests DOD to
respond with specific assistance such as helicopter transport,
provision of temporary water supplies, or road and bridge repair. If
possible, military personnel join the USAID OFDA assessment team
to help determine the type of aid DOD can provide. Under this
provision, DOD generally limits its activities to those that stabilize
the emergency situation, such as road or bridge repair, but generally
does not undertake projects that include rebuilding. The law
requires an annual report to Congress on the use of funds. Donated
goods can also be shipped on commercial vessels using Section 2561
funds.
101 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151 et. seq.), as amended,
authorizes the United States to participate in disaster relief efforts and gives the President
great flexibility to respond to disasters with a wide range of government-funded
humanitarian assistance. It allows the President to provide disaster assistance,
“notwithstanding any other provision of this or any other Act” that would otherwise prohibit
or restrict aid and gives the President the flexibility to decide what specific type of aid to
provide. (Sections 491-493; 22 U.S.C. 2292-2292b.) The decision as to what assistance
is considered humanitarian is often made on a case-by-case basis. 10 U.S.C. 404 provides
DOD with authority to conduct disaster assistance but, according to DOD lawyers, is
generally not used because of conditions that inhibit a flexible response. For further
information, see CRS Report RL33769, International Crises and Disasters: U.S.
Humanitarian Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress, by Rhoda Margesson.

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! 10 U.S.C. 402 — the “Denton Amendment”102 added in 1987 and
last amended in 2003 — authorizes shipment of privately donated
humanitarian goods, including privately donated disaster assistance,
on U.S. military aircraft and ships on a space-available basis. The
donated goods must be certified as appropriate for the disaster or
other situation by USAID’s OFDA and can be bumped from the
transport if other U.S. government aid must be transported.
! 10 U.S.C. 2557 — added in 1985 and last amended in 2001 —
authorizes the Secretary of Defense to make nonlethal excess DOD
supplies available for humanitarian relief.
DOD also provides substantial emergency humanitarian relief assistance in a
wide variety of other circumstances. Sometimes in cooperation with and under the
authorities of other agencies, DOD provides humanitarian assistance, including food,
shelter and supplies, medical evacuation, refugee assistance, logistical and
operational support, and rehabilitation services. DOD supplies can be provided for
humanitarian relief under presidential authority.103
DOD Humanitarian Assistance in the Context of Military
Operations and Military Exercises: Activities and Authorities
In addition to its emergency relief and recovery efforts, DOD conducts
humanitarian activities in the context of military operations and training exercises.
The specific purpose of some military operations is to provide humanitarian relief.
Examples of this from the early 1990s are Operation Provide Comfort to provide
humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish population in northern Iraq, and Operation
Provide Relief, to deliver humanitarian supplies to Somalis, as well as the follow-on
Operation Provide Hope, to assist and protect humanitarian workers in Somalia.
Currently, DOD provides humanitarian assistance as part of military operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. (See Appendix K.)
Special Operations Forces (SOF) carry out humanitarian activities as part of
their operations, as well as part of their training exercises with foreign forces under
102 Named after former Senator Jeremiah Denton.
103 The President has the authority to draw down defense equipment and direct military
personnel to respond to disasters. Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, (22 U.S.C. 2318) allows the draw down of defense equipment and services to a
limit of $100 million in any fiscal year if the President determines that an unforseen
emergency exists that requires immediate military assistance to a foreign country or
international organization, and the requirement cannot be met under any other provision.
Before this provision can be used, the President must notify the Speaker of the House, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Appropriations Committees of both chambers,
in writing by issuing a presidential notification. This request is handled by the Department
of State and the National Security Council. Section 506(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, as amended, also provides a special drawdown authority for up to $200 million in
defense articles and services for international disaster relief and migration and refugee act
assistance (in addition to counternarcotics assistance).

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10 U.S.C. 2011, according to the United States Special Operations Command
(SOCOM). Section 2011 authorizes the SOCOM commander and the regional
combatant commanders to spend money and to deploy SOF teams to train with
foreign military forces if the primary purpose is to train U.S. SOF. Recent
authoritative published information is not available on an unclassified basis.104
In 2006, Congress provided DOD with new authority for small-scale
humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance by clarifying and expanding the
existing Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund (CCIF). When first authorized in
1991 (10 U.S.C. 166a), the CCIF (then known as the Commanders-in-Chief or CINC
Initiative Fund), provided funds for exercises and military education and training of
foreign personnel, and for “humanitarian and civil assistance.” A 2006 amendment
changed civil assistance to “civic assistance, to include urgent and unanticipated
humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance,” and made the latter a priority
category, “particularly in a foreign country where the armed forces are engaged in a
contingency operation.”105
To this point, it appears that the CCIF has not been used extensively to fund
humanitarian assistance. In response to a Congressional Research Service request
in 2007, DOD stated that just under $1 million had been used for humanitarian
purposes from FY2005 through FY2007.106 In its FY2009 DOD budget request, the
104 Section 2011 authority was codified in 1991 by the NDAA for Fiscal Years 1992 and
1993 (P.L. 102-190, Section 1052), and amended in 1998 by the Strom Thurmond NDAA
for Fiscal Year 1999 (P.L. 105-261, Section 1062) to require prior approval of the Secretary
of Defense for exercises under this section. Section 2011 requires an annual report to
Congress, but only the report covering FY1997 was unclassified. In 1999, a controversy
developed over allegations that JCET training missions — then costing some $15.2 million
for exercises in over 100 countries — were conducted with foreign militaries accused of
human rights violations. See CRS Report RL30034, Joint Combined Exchange Training
(JCET) and Human Rights: Background and Issues for Congress, by William C. Story, and
U.S. General Accounting Office, Management and Oversight of Joint Combined Exchange
Training, GAO/NSIAD-99-173, July 1999.
105 FY2007 John Warner NDAA, P.L. 109-364, Section 902. Over the past decade at least,
Congress has appropriated $25 million in annual DOD appropriation bills for the CCIF, and
additional amounts in FY2005-FY2007 supplemental appropriations legislation. Three
FY2005-FY2007 supplemental appropriations bills provided $25 million each in CCIF funds
for use in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (i.e., Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami
Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-13, hereafter referred to as FY2005 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations); Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War
on Terrorism, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, P.L. 109-234; and the U.S. Troop Readiness,
Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Act, 2007, P.L. 110-28.
106 Information provided by the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, e-mail
correspondence of November 7, 2007. The DOD Joint Staff surveyed the combatant
commands at CRS’s request and found that CCIF funds used for these purposes in the last
three fiscal years had been limited: the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) used just
over $900,000 for medical and veterinary assistance in Haiti in FY2005 and $90,000 to help
fund the travel of medical personnel in conjunction with the USNS Comfort’s calls in 12
South and Central American nations. The USNS Comfort is a medical ship that serves U.S.
(continued...)

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Administration is requesting $100 million in CCIF funds for urgent humanitarian
relief and reconstruction.107
Section 401 Humanitarian and Civic Action Activities, Conditions,
and Coordination. Section 401, added to Title 10 U.S. Code in 1986108 and
amended several times, authorizes the U.S. military to perform specific humanitarian
and civic action assistance projects. These projects are (1) medical, surgical, dental,
and veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural or are underserved,
and related education, training, and technical assistance; (2) construction of
rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well-drilling and construction of
basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public
facilities.
Section 401 establishes several conditions for the projects. They must serve the
basic economic and social needs of the people in the recipient country, and must
complement, not duplicate, other U.S. social or economic assistance. They cannot
benefit any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary
activity. They must promote the security interests of the United States and the host
nation, and contribute to the operational readiness skills of participating members of
the U.S. armed forces. Moreover, they must be provided in the context of authorized
military operations, exercises, and training deployments.
Section 401 activities are largely carried out under the aegis of the combatant
commands as part of authorized military overseas operations, readiness exercises,
and training deployments. The statute stipulates that the Secretary of State “must
specifically approve” providing humanitarian and civic assistance. In addition, DOD
instructions regulating this section require prior approval from the Department of
State, USAID, and any other relevant civilian agencies for all Section 401
activities.109
106 (...continued)
military personnel that also provides medical services to foreign populations when training
abroad with foreign medical personnel.
107 DOD Summary Budget Justification, op. cit., p.13.
108 Added by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1987, P.L. 99-661, Section 333. The NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109-163, Section 1201, amended the section to include surgical care
and a provision for related education, training, and technical assistance.
109 The drafting of regulations for 10 U.S.C. 401 was mandated by P.L 103-160, the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 1994. In response, DOD issued Directive 2205.2, Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance (HCA) Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations, October 6, 1994, and
Instruction Number 2205.3, Implementing Procedures for the Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance (HCA) program, January 27, 1995. Instruction section E(1)(d) states that before
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy issues final approval of Unified Combatant
Commanders’ annual HCA activity plans, the Under Secretary shall “obtain the approval
of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development (AID), and other
Government Agencies, as appropriate.”

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As spelled out in the FY2007 Section 401 report to Congress,110 a host nation
government proposes a project, which the U.S. embassy then endorses and forwards
to the combatant commanders for consideration. Combatant commanders file annual
proposal lists and proposals to meet emergency requirements with the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which coordinates an interagency review to
ensure compliance with U.S. policy and relevant legislation. This review involves
representatives from the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the
DOD General Counsel’s office, the Department of State, and USAID. The project
must be approved by the U.S. ambassador to the country where the activity will occur
and by the Secretary of State.111
Section 401 Origins and Evolution. DOD has long carried out abroad a
wide variety of small-scale humanitarian programs, often in the context of military
civic action (MCA) programs that also involve construction and reconstruction
projects. Experts trace the Army’s experience with MCA to 18th- and 19th-century
engineering and medical activities in the United States and abroad. “By the time of
World War II, a propensity toward military civic action was already part of the fabric
of the U.S. soldier,” according to one study, which then identifies the MCA program
in Korea after the Korean War as the “first sustained and concerted U.S. military
civic action plan.”112 This program set forth a dominant model in military civic
action aimed at small-scale construction and reconstruction projects, in which U.S.
military forces assist, but host nation troops do most of the work. MCA gained
prestige as part of the U.S. military occupation of the Philippines at the turn of the
20th century and was later endorsed by President John F. Kennedy, who viewed it as
an appropriate nation-building tool.113 Although military assistance had been carried
out as part of security assistance programs prior to the 1960s, in 1965, Congress
responded to concerns about its role in international development by placing the first
restrictions on the use of such projects “to prevent overlap” with USAID when that
agency was established in 1961 and legislating interagency coordination that would
involve USAID.114 MCA became controversial during the 1960s, when, because of
110 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense, Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance and Humanitarian Mine Action Programs, Fiscal Year 2007, February 2008, p.
2. Section 401 requires that DOD provide an annual report, due March 1, to the four armed
services and foreign affairs committees regarding the activities undertaken under that
authority during the previous fiscal year.
111 In practice, adherence to this procedure has varied. For instance, U.S. officials
sometimes suggest possible activities to host nation government officials for their proposal.
112 John W. DePauw and George A. Luz, eds., “The Role of the Total Army in Military
Civic Action and Humanitarian Assistance: A Synopsis,” in Winning the Peace: The
Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990, p. 10. Hereafter referred to as The Role of the
Total Army. The $22 million MCA program in Korea after the Korean War (through 1962)
emphasized schools, hospitals, civic buildings, land reclamation, and improvement of public
health and transportation facilities, according to this source.
113 Ibid.
114 “The Role of the Total Army,” op. cit., p. 11. The requirement for interagency
coordination on civic action was added by Section 302 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA)
(continued...)

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its linkage with counterinsurgency in Vietnam, Congress became reluctant to fund
it.115 Nevertheless, Congress did fund some MCA projects abroad after Vietnam that
were not linked to counterinsurgency campaigns, in particular an Africa program in
the 1980s. That program was funded at almost $5 million in FY1985, but funding
dropped to just under $2 million by FY1989.116
During the 1980s, controversy over MCA in Central America, where the United
States was supporting the Salvadoran government’s counterinsurgency campaign, led
Congress to authorize specific activities through a new statute. When Congress
added Section 401 to Title 10 U.S. Code in 1986, it set parameters for humanitarian
and civic assistance activities in foreign nations by specifying activities and
establishing conditions, but it also provided DOD with greater flexibility by granting
Title 10 authority for such assistance. Previously, at least some MCA, in particular
the Africa program, was carried out under authorities that put the State Department
in the lead, according to one source.117
The number of countries in which these activities have occurred has remained
fairly constant, while the regional balance has shifted somewhat. A comparison of
FY1995 and FY2006, two years where humanitarian and civic action activities took
place in 43 countries under Section 401 authority, shows that the number of Western
Hemisphere, Middle East/Arab, and Asia/Pacific recipient countries decreased, while
the number of countries in Africa and Greater Europe grew. Two new African
countries and four new European locations were selected for Section 401 activities.
In FY2007, when the number of countries rose to 46, three new countries from
Europe and the former Soviet Union were selected.
114 (...continued)
of 1965 (P.L. 89-171) which amended the FAA of 1961. In addition, Section 201 of the
1965 FAA amended 1961 in an attempt to both codify under the FAA and limit the use of
civic action. This provision, now codified as Section 502 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended (22, U.S.C. 2302) authorizes the U.S. government to provide assistance
to “foreign military forces in less developed friendly countries ... to construct public works
and to engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social development of such
friendly countries.” Section 201of the 1965 FAA also expressed the sense of Congress that
“such foreign military forces should not be maintained or established solely for civic action
activities and that such civic action activities not significantly detract from the capability of
the military forces to perform their military missions and be coordinated with and form part
of the total economic and social development effort.”
115 Captain Craig L. Smith. “Military Civic Action,” in The DISAM Journal of International
Security Assistance Management. Vol. 8, No. 1, Fall 1985, p. 85.
116 Ken H. Butts, “The Africa Civic Action Program,” in Winning the Peace: The Strategic
Implications of Military Civic Action, John W. DePauw and George A. Luz, eds. and co-
authors (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990),
p. 30. Hereafter referred to as The Africa Civic Action Program.
117 The Africa Civic Action Program, op. cit., p. 28. In 1965, Congress amended the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to include civic action as one of the types of assistance for
which the Secretary of State is charged with providing “continuous supervision and general
direction....” (P.L. 87-195, Section 622(c), as amended by P.L. 89-171 Section 302.)

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The greatest change has been the substantial increase in the number of projects.
From the early 1990s to FY2007, the number of projects multiplied almost eightfold.
From FY2005 through FY2007, the number more than doubled, from 197 to 480.
Section 401 costs over the past 14 years for which data are consecutively available
(FY1993-FY2006) has ranged from a low of $4.7 million in FY1998 to a high of
$11.03 million in FY2007. Costs have risen over the past two fiscal years, but not
at the same pace as the number of projects, that is, from $7.67 million in FY2005 to
$11.03 million in FY2007. (These data are taken from the tables at the end of this
appendix, which are compiled from the Section 401 annual reports.)
Issues
DOD humanitarian assistance often draws praise when provided in emergency
relief situations, such as natural and manmade disasters, as it is the most flexible
operational and policy tool that can be quickly brought to bear to relieve human
suffering. Controversy has arisen, however, when U.S. military troops provide
humanitarian and civic assistance for the longer term (i.e., in non-emergency or
conflict recovery situations). Such longer-term assistance occurs in the course of
military operations and deployments, or when training exercises are conducted
extensively in an area over a prolonged period of time. Then, humanitarian and civic
assistance is often used for political purposes, including maintaining contact with a
country, region, or local population; mitigating tensions; cultivating allies; and
promoting democracy.
In the case of humanitarian infrastructure projects and other civic assistance,
there are longstanding concerns about suitability and costs that date back to the
1960s.118 Critics, and even some proponents, of such assistance have found that
projects do not always meet the most urgent needs of the host country or long-term
development goals, and are not sustainable, and thus may represent a poor use of
U.S. funds. Nevertheless, to some analysts, civic action projects fill a gap where no
other U.S. assistance is available.
The use of U.S. military forces to carry out large-scale humanitarian
interventions in Somalia and the Balkans in the 1990s aroused concern both within
the military and among civilian humanitarian aid workers. Many in both camps also
were troubled when the military, as the major presence on the ground, became
involved in humanitarian and state-building projects, and questioned the suitability
and desirability of using U.S. military personnel for such activities. Many asserted
that humanitarian and state-building tasks could have been better performed by
experienced civilians with subject area expertise and knowledge about local culture.
Military leaders themselves questioned whether military personnel were the most
appropriate personnel to carry out such activities, particularly as many believed that
such activities diverted time and personnel from the military’s primary functions.
Another concern was a lack of effective coordination. Military culture clashed with
the ethos and modes of operations of the civilian personnel involved from a multitude
118 See, for instance, Edward Bernard Glick, Peaceful Conflict: The Non-Military Use of the
Military (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1967), as well as Winning the Peace: The
Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action, op .cit.

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of agencies — the United Nations and other international organizations, national
governments, and from non-governmental humanitarian groups — and the resulting
distrust and disagreement impeded cooperation.
The concerns raised during the interventions of the 1990s have resurfaced in the
context of Iraq and Afghanistan, along with new issues regarding the effect of the use
of military forces on the work and safety of civilian humanitarian workers in the
field. The use of military personnel for humanitarian and civic assistance projects
in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly in the context of the Provincial Reconstruction
teams in Afghanistan, has led to fears that the perception of humanitarian assistance
as an impartial, neutral tool has been jeopardized and that the lives and safety of
civilian humanitarian workers is threatened because they may be perceived as
associated with military efforts. In that context, however, attempts to incorporate
civilians into PRTs have been hampered by the lack of civilian personnel for such
tasks. (See the discussion on PRTs in Appendix K.)
At the same time, concerns again arise as to whether DOD activities are
effective and properly coordinated with civilian agencies to ensure consistency with
U.S. foreign policy objectives. The recent placement of USAID personnel in U.S.
regional combatant commands to scrutinize and help develop proposed humanitarian
and civic assistance projects is intended, among other things, to synchronize USAID
and DOD planning efforts and to produce joint policy documents dealing with
linkages between defense and development.119
A previous concern, which has not surfaced in the current debate, is that the
involvement of military forces in humanitarian aid and small-scale economic projects
weakens civilian control over the military in developing countries by perpetuating
stereotypes that military forces are most effective at meeting basic needs and perhaps
by encouraging the use of military forces to perform functions that more properly
performed by civilians. On the other hand, some argue that the use of U.S. military
forces in such activities provides a democratic role model for local military forces
and an opportunity to improve local civil-military relations.
119 Slide presentation provided by the USAID Office of Military Affairs, October 17, 2007.

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Table A1. Section 401 Humanitarian Assistance and Civic
Action: Costs, Number of Projects, and Number of Countries,
by Fiscal Year
Number of
U.S. $ millions
Projects
Number of
Fiscal Years
(current)
(approx.)
Countries
1990
4.2
not available
38
1991-1992
—
—
—
1993
5.49
64
25
1994
6.21
68
45
1995
5.37
66
43
1996
5.69
169
42
1997
5.30
155
35
1998
4.68
142
44
1999
9.25
221
39
2000
6.96
135
45
2001
7.00
NA
43
2002
7.31
166
45
2003
6.82
175
36
2004
7.18
161
42
2005
7.67
197
48
2006
9.22
320
43
2007
11.03
480
46
Source: Data from 10 U.S.C. Section 401 annual required reports.
Note: Data are not available for FY1991-1992.

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CRS-46
Table A2. Geographical Distribution of Section 401
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Activities: Number of
Countries, by Region and Fiscal Year
Europe
and the
Greater
Middle
Former
Asia/
Sub-
East/
Soviet
Oceana/
Western
Saharan
Arab
Union
Pacific
Fiscal Year
Hemisphere
Africa
States
(FSU)
Islands
Total
FY1990
16
6
3
0
13
38
FY1991-
FY1992
—
—
—
—
—
—
FY1993
18
4
2
1
0
25
FY1994
21
9
2
0
13
45
FY1995
21
7
3
1
11
43
FY1996
21
8
2
0
11
42
FY1997
18
5
2
1
9
35
FY1998
21
6
2
3
12
44
FY1999
17
4
5
4
9
39
FY2000
18
7
3
8
10
45
FY2001
16
8
2
9
8
43
FY2002
15
8
3
11
9
45
FY2003
18
4
2
6
6
36
FY2004
18
8
1
7
8
42
FY2005
18
9
2
8
11
48
FY2006
15
11
2
4
10
43
FY2007a
13
13
3
7
10
46
Source: Data from 10 U.S.C. Section 401 annual required reports.
Note: Data are not available for FY1991-1992.
a. The countries in each of the geographic areas for FY2007 were as follows.
Western Hemisphere: Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Botswana, Central African Republic, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana,
Kenya, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia.
Middle East/Arab States: Djibouti, Morocco, and Yemen.
Europe and the Former Soviet Union: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Moldova,
Mongolia, and Romania.
Greater Asia/Oceana/Pacific Islands: Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Marshall Islands,
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam.

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Appendix B. DOD Global Health Programs120
DOD Role and Responsibilities
Among the many U.S. government global health programs, DOD sponsors a
small number that focus primarily on infectious diseases and human
immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS).
Origins and Evolution
The Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System
(GEIS). Through GEIS, DOD supports broad emerging infectious disease
prevention programs through extensive partnerships among five DOD overseas
laboratories, the military health system, and other U.S. and foreign agencies.121 In
June 1996, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-7, which
established a national policy to address the threat of emerging infectious diseases
through improved domestic and international surveillance, prevention, and response
measures.122 The directive expanded DOD’s mission to include support of global
surveillance, training, research, and response to emerging infectious disease threats.
The DOD Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (DOD-
GEIS), which was developed in response to that directive, facilitates early
recognition and control of diseases that threaten national security.123 DOD-GEIS is
designed to strengthen the prevention of, surveillance of, and response to infectious
diseases that are a threat to military personnel and families, reduce medical readiness,
or present a risk to U.S. national security.
The key objectives of DOD-GEIS are to increase DOD’s emphasis on the
prevention of infectious diseases, strengthen and coordinate DOD’s surveillance and
response efforts, and create a centralized coordination and communication hub to
help organize DOD resources and link them with U.S. and international efforts. For
example, DOD-GEIS partners with Navy and Army laboratories, and with the World
Health Organization’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN)
(described in the “International Response” section), to collect avian influenza isolates
from people around the world and share them with the Centers for Disease Control
120 Prepared by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther, Specialist in Global Health.
121 U.S. Department of Defense, Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response
System, Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2007, p. 2. This document can be accessed through
[http:\\www.geis.fhp.osd.mil/GEIS/aboutGEIS/annualreports/GEIS07AR.pdf]; last accessed
July 22, 2008.
122 Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-7, at [http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/index.html];
last accessed July 22, 2008. NSTC indicates that this presidential directive deals with a
national science and technology matter.
123 For more information on GEIS, see [http://www.geis.fhp.osd.mil/] and U.S. General
Accounting Office, U.S. Agencies Support Programs to Build Overseas Capacity for
Infectious Disease Surveillance, GAO/07-1186, September 2007, at [http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d071186.pdf]; last accessed July 22, 2008.

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and Prevention and world public health officials for molecular analysis and
formulation of influenza vaccines.124
DOD-GEIS’s budget has grown substantially over the past decade, from $2.3
million in FY1997 to $52 million in FY2007, including $40 million for pandemic
and avian influenza surveillance.125 In January 2006, Congress directed DOD-GEIS
to administer $39 million in FY2006 supplemental funding for avian and pandemic
influenza surveillance.126 Congress provided an additional $40 million for DOD-
GEIS avian influenza activities in FY2007.127
Throughout 2007, DOD-GEIS claimed significant advances in disease
surveillance, including
! better understanding of naturally occurring biological threats (e.g.,
avian and pandemic influenza) and to improved vaccination efforts;
! standardization and improvement of malaria diagnostic resources
and strengthening of international efforts to address antimalarial
resistance;
! addressing the reemergence of malaria on the Korean peninsula;
! utilizing disease morbidity and mortality surveillance data to
monitor possible infectious disease deaths in US military forces; and
! strengthening surveillance systems in resource-constrained or
developing countries.
DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program. As an implementing partner of the
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, DOD plays a role in fighting the global
spread of HIV/AIDS. DOD HIV prevention programs develop and implement
military-specific HIV prevention activities. DOD efforts
! help foreign militaries establish HIV/AIDS-specific policies for their
personnel;
! assist foreign militaries in adapting and providing HIV prevention
programs;
! train foreign military personnel to implement, maintain, and evaluate
HIV prevention programs;
124 DOD-GEIS FY2005 Annual Report, [http://www.geis.fhp.osd.mil/GEIS/DODGEIS
News/GEIS_AR_05.pdf]; last accessed July 22, 2008.
125 Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2007, op. cit., p. 6.
126 Ibid., p. 2.
127 Ibid., p. 6.

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CRS-49
! assist foreign countries in developing military-specific interventions
that address high-risk HIV attitudes and behaviors; and
! integrate with and make use of foreign military contacts, other U.S.
government programs, and those managed by allies and the United
Nations.
From FY2000 through FY2008, DOD funds totaled some $66 million for
HIV/AIDS prevention programs. The Department of State transfers additional funds
to DOD through the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative.128
Table B1. DOD Funding for Global HIV/AIDS Prevention
Programs, by Fiscal Year, FY2000-FY2008
(current U.S. $ millions)
FY08
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
(Est.)
Total
10.0
9.9
14.0
7.0
4.3
7.5
5.2
0
8.0
66.0
Sources: DOD HIV Prevention website for the FY2000 figure. Annual appropriations acts for
subsequent figures.
Note: See DOD HIV Prevention website at [http://www.nhrc.navy.mil/programs/dhapp/background/
background.html]; last accessed July 22, 2008.
Issues
There have been no controversial public discussions on DOD’s global health
efforts, though little information is available.
128 For more information on U.S. Department of State transfers to DOD, see CRS Report
RL33771, Trends in U.S. Global AIDS Spending: FY2000-FY2008, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.

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Appendix C. Department of Defense Humanitarian
Mine Action Program129
DOD Role and Responsibilities
The Department of State, USAID, and DOD participate in the DOD
Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Program, through which the United States trains
personnel of other nations to deactivate land mines and other explosive remnants of
war.130 The authority for this program is 10 U.S.C. 407.
HMA falls under two offices administratively. The Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict is responsible for policy,
planning, and oversight. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which
is subordinate to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is responsible for
administrative program management. Program funding is from DOD’s Overseas
Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation. When DOD is
designated to conduct the training, the assistance is provided by U.S. Special
Operations Forces and supervised by the regional military Combatant Commander.
This DOD program complements the efforts of the Department of State’s Office of
Weapons Removal and Abatement,131 which provides financial, technical, and
educational assistance to a wide range of foreign governmental and non-
governmental organizations, and administers federal grants to selected humanitarian
land mine-related projects.
Generally, a nation will request demining assistance through the U.S. embassy
to the State Department. An interagency U.S. Government Policy Coordination
Committee (PCC) Sub-group on Humanitarian Mine Action then conducts an in-
country evaluation and either approves or disapproves the nation’s request to join the
HMA program. The Humanitarian Mine Action Sub-group comprises
representatives from the National Security Council, Department of State, USAID,
Defense Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency. If approved, the PCC
Sub-group designs a demining/land mine education program to meet the requesting
nation’s needs.
Origins
The National Security Council established the U.S. Humanitarian Demining
Program in 1993. In 1995, DOD established its Humanitarian Mine Action Program,
and in 1998, the Department of State followed, creating the Office of Humanitarian
Demining Programs. In October 2003, Congress established the interagency
humanitarian demining program, consolidating previously initiated U.S. demining
programs. These administration and congressional actions were responding to
129 Prepared by Steve Bowman, Specialist in National Defense.
130 For a description of the program, see [http://www.dsca.mil/programs/HA/HA.htm]; last
accessed July 22, 2008.
131 See [http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/]; last accessed July 22, 2008.

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several years of increasing international attention to the toll on civilian populations
from land mines deployed during military operations and never deactivated or
retrieved. To facilitate DOD participation in this program, Congress directed that the
Secretary of Defense
[c]arry out a program for humanitarian purposes to provide assistance to other
nations in the detection and clearance of landmines. Such assistance shall be
provided through instruction, education, training, and advising of personnel of
those nations in the various procedures that have been determined effective for
detecting and clearing landmines.132
In directing this effort, Congress specified that any funds authorized for the
program were to be used for (1) activities to support the clearing of land mines for
humanitarian purposes, including education and technical assistance; (2) providing
equipment and technology by transfer or lease to a foreign government participating
in a land mine-clearing program; and (3) contributions to non-governmental
organizations experienced in land mine clearance. To ensure that DOD’s
humanitarian participation was restricted to training and technical assistance,
Congress further directed that the Secretary of Defense ensure that no member of the
U.S. armed forces participating in this program
engages in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of landmines unless for
the concurrent purpose of supporting a United States military operation ... or a
military operation that does not involve the Armed Forces of the United States.
Activities and Evolution
HMA funds the training of host nation personnel to deactivate mines and also
provides a limited amount of “seed” equipment to enable a nation to develop and
maintain its own demining/mine education efforts.133 These HMA activities are seen
to benefit DOD objectives by contributing to combatant commanders’ regional
cooperation strategies and providing U.S. military personnel unique in-country
training opportunities.134
Through HMA funding, DOD also supports the Humanitarian Demining
Training Center at Ft. Leonard Wood, MO,135 and the Mine Action Information
Center at James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA.136 These facilities provide
132 FY1995 NDAA, P.L. 103-337, Section 1413. This section amended 10 U.S.C. 401,
which covers humanitarian civic assistance, to include the demining program. In 2006,
Congress deleted the demining provisions from section 401 and created a specific section,
407, for the program (FY2007 John Warner NDAA, P.L. 109-364, Section 1203 ).
133 DOD demining equipment transfers have been limited to no more $10 million annually
worldwide.
134 Fact Sheet, “Humanitarian Mine Action Program,” Defense Security Cooperation
Agency.
135 See [http://www.wood.army.mil/hdtc/]; last accessed July 22, 2008.
136 See [http://maic.jmu.edu/]; last accessed. July 22, 2008.

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CRS-52
training and analysis relating to humanitarian demining for both the military and
civilian communities. HMA funding also supports the Humanitarian Demining
Research and Development Program,137 which is managed by the Army Research,
Development, and Engineering Command.
Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 401, no later than March 1 each calendar year, the DSCA
provides a report of activities during the previous fiscal year, including those of the
Humanitarian Mine Action program, to the House Committees on Armed Services
and Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign
Relations.
As the figures below indicate, HMA funding is relatively low compared with
other assistance programs and has decreased significantly since FY2000, although
the number of countries receiving HMA assistance is substantial. Since 2000, HMA
has assisted some 30 countries.138
Table C1. DOD Humanitarian Mine Action Funds Expended,
by Fiscal Year, FY2000-FY2007
(current U.S. $ millions)
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
Total
22.5
10.8
8.4
6.2
2.7
4.2
4.2
4.2
63.1
Source: Annual 10 U.S.C. 401 reports.
Table C2. Countries Assisted with DOD HMA Funding, by Fiscal
Year, FY2000-FY2007
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
19a
15a
13
11
11
8
11
12
Source: Annual 10 U.S.C. 401 reports.
a. Central America is listed as one country.
Issues
DOD’s HMA program has not been a source of controversy.
137 See [http://www.humanitarian-demining.org/]; last accessed July 22, 2008.
138 The countries receiving HMA assistance from FY2000 through FY2007 were Argentina,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia,
Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Oman, Peru,
Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Assistance was also provided to Central American countries; however, DOD does not
enumerate them individually in its annual report. In FY2007, five new countries received
HMA assistance: Angola, Benin, Colombia, Laos, and Senegal.

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CRS-53
Appendix D. Foreign Military Sales and
Financing Program139
DOD Role and Responsibilities
The U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS) is the principal vehicle through
which the U.S. government makes sales of weapons and associated equipment and
training to friendly foreign nations.140 Most of these sales are made on a cash basis
— that is, the purchasing country enters into a contract specifying the price to be paid
for specific items of military equipment being obtained. The U.S. government then
procures the defense items from the U.S. manufacturer (if not provided from Defense
Department stocks), receives the payment from the foreign buyer, and passes it to the
manufacturer in accordance with the terms and deadlines specified in the contract.
The U.S. government monitors the procurement process from the signing of the
contract until the items purchased are all delivered. Purchases through the FMS
program can be provided to individual purchasers with funds requested and
appropriated in the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations legislation. This
element of the FMS program is termed Foreign Military Financing (FMF);141 it
permits loans or forgiven payments to countries that may have difficulty paying for
needed weapons, military equipment, and related items.
The annual budget justification for Foreign Operations is formulated primarily
by the State Department, with input on specific country accounts or prospective arms
sales provided by DOD. From its inception, DOD has handled the implementation
of the FMS cash and credit and an earlier grant Military Assistance Program (MAP),
used essentially before 1976.
Determining which nations are to receive military assistance from either
program, as a matter of national policy, has been primarily the responsibility of the
State Department. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) specifies which conditions
must be met before a country can purchase defense articles from the United States.
In essence, a country must be eligible to purchase under existing U.S. law (i.e., if a
statute forbids sales to a specific country, that country is ineligible to make a
purchase).142 The President also determines a country’s eligibility, taking into
consideration U.S. security interests. If a country is eligible, in the contract for sale
of the items that it may purchase, the country must give binding commitments to use
the articles purchased only for such things as legitimate self-defense and internal
security, and not to retransfer items sold to it to third-parties without prior U.S.
government consent.
139 Prepared by Richard F. Grimmett, Specialist in International Security.
140 Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended (PL. 90-629),
141 AECA, as amended (Section 23), 22 U.S.C. 2763.
142 AECA, as amended (Section 3), 22 U.S.C. 2753.

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CRS-54
The responsibility for implementing FMS programs rests with the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The DSCA Security Assistance Officers
(SAOs) who manage the programs on the ground are located in U.S. embassies.
Origins and Evolution
FMS had its origins in the beginning of the Cold War, primarily as an effort to
help war-torn allied countries in Europe build up their military defenses and thus
support the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) ability to help
contain Soviet Communist expansion in that region. The Mutual Defense Assistance
Act of 1949 (P.L. 81-329) authorized the FMS program, and a grant Military
Assistance Program (MAP), as means to provide needed military equipment and
training to U.S. allies in need of such military support and aid. Much of the
equipment transferred under this original authority was excess stocks of World War
II vintage equipment, which was less expensive but still valuable for helping restore
the military capabilities of key U.S. allies. The core rationales for military assistance
at the inception of the Cold War can be summarized as follows:
! To enhance the ability of allied and friendly countries to defend
themselves against external aggression or internal subversion by
Communist or unfriendly forces.
! To enhance bilateral security relationships to deter aggression
against allied and friendly nations.
! To express tangible U.S. support for political actions of allied and
friendly nations that the United States sought to encourage.
The first rationale was essentially a military one. The other two were both
political and military in nature. Over time, the focus and nature of military assistance
was modified somewhat. As their economies grew, industrialized nations allied to
the United States gradually stopped receiving grant military aid and began to pay
cash for major weapons systems purchased from the United States under the FMS
program, and by the 1970s, the grant MAP program was phased out. Nevertheless,
using the FMS cash program, as well the FMF financing program, to support the
security interests of American friends and allies overseas has remained a constant
theme in justifying this form of military aid. The nature of the threat to U.S. allies
and friendly states around the globe may have changed, but the goal of using arms
sales as an instrument to further U.S. interests through enhancing the military
capabilities and security such countries has not.
Initially, only the more industrialized allies of the United States participated in
the FMS program, while the grant MAP program provided military aid to a much
larger number of less developed and less affluent countries friendly to the United
States throughout the world. The original nations eligible for military assistance
under the 1949 NDAA were NATO members, Turkey, Greece, South Korea, Iran, the
Philippines, and Taiwan. Today most of these same nations, excluding Iran, which
is ineligible for the program, generally pay cash for military purchases under the FMS
program. The principal goals of FMS remain the same, except the number of nations
making purchases has increased, with Middle Eastern nations, in particular major oil-

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CRS-55
producing states, becoming significant buyers from the late 1970s to the present. As
noted above, states such as Israel and Egypt, which reached a U.S.-backed peace
agreement in 1979, have been and continue to be leading recipients of FMS sales and
FMF credits.143
The primary countries to receive the greatest share of FMF since the late 1970s
have been Israel and Egypt. Most recently, in FY2006, for example, Israel received
slightly over $2.257 billion in FMF financing, for which repayment was waived.
During FY2006, Egypt received $1,287 billion in waived FMF financing. The entire
FMF appropriation for FY2006 was about $4.45 billion for all recipients.
Issues
There have not been any significant controversies over the management of the
FMS cash or FMF financing programs between the Defense and State Departments
over the years. There is a clear delineation of responsibilities and authorities, and the
implementation of the programs has generally worked smoothly. Both departments
would generally agree that they would wish more funding to be available to provide
defense articles to countries deemed needy but that may have limited financial
resources with which to purchase U.S. weaponry.
Within the past two years, DOD has argued that traditional State Department
security cooperation programs, such as FMS/FMF, lack the flexibility necessary to
respond to rapidly changing environments. In a FY2009 budget document, DOD
stated that traditional security assistance “takes three to four years from concept to
execution,” indicating that was too long to meet emerging threats and to take
advantage of emerging opportunities.144 The long lead time led DOD to request its
own train and equip authority. (See Appendix I.)
143 In 1954, pursuant to the Mutual Security Act (P.L. 83-665), the United States established
the authority for the Foreign Military Sales program to provide loans and credits to facilitate
the purchase of U.S. military equipment by allied and friendly nations. Previous to that time
sales were made on a cash basis only. In 1961, with the enactment of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), a consolidation of all previous military and economic foreign aid
programs and authorities was achieved, and the original MAP program was placed under
this act’s aegis. Subsequently in 1968, the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-
629), created a separate legislative authority for the Foreign Military Sales program. In
1976, the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-
329) consolidated all authorities relating to U.S. Foreign Military Sales were consolidated
in the Arms Export Control Act, created the authority for a new grant International Military
and Education Program as a distinct military assistance program and placed it within the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and began a phase-out of the original MAP
program.
144 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request: Summary Justification,
February 4, 2008, p. 102.

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CRS-56
Appendix E. International Military Education and
Training Program145
DOD Role and Responsibilities
The International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) falls under
the policy authority of the State Department, is funded through the annual Foreign
Operations Appropriations legislation, and is implemented by DOD through the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Authorized by 22 U.S.C. 2347,146
IMET provides opportunities for foreign military personnel to attend a variety of U.S.
military educational institutions and training courses. The policy decisions regarding
which foreign nations will be permitted to participate in IMET programs, and the
funding levels provided to them, are made primarily by the State Department, with
input from DOD.
Origins and Evolution
IMET was an outgrowth of the original Military Assistance Program (MAP)
created by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (P.L. 81-329).147 In 1976, the
enactment of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of
1976 (P.L. 94-329) created the grant IMET as a program separate from the original
MAP program, which was being phased out, to provide exclusively for various forms
of military training to friendly foreign nations. The 1976 Act also placed IMET’s
statutory authority in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
In 1990, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees initiated a statutory
change based on their view that changing world political-military circumstances
warranted a new direction for the traditional IMET program, one that would bring an
increased emphasis on enhancing the skills and professionalism of both civilian and
military leaders and managers of foreign military establishments. The Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act for FY1991 (P.L. 101-513, signed November 5, 1990)
directed the Defense Department to establish a program within IMET focused, in
particular, on training foreign civilian and military officials in managing and
administering military establishments and budgets; creating and maintaining effective
military judicial systems and military codes of conduct, including observance of
internationally recognized human rights; and fostering greater respect for the
principle of civilian control of the military. Congress earmarked $1 million of the
FY1991 IMET appropriation to establish this program. This initiative is called
Expanded IMET, or E-IMET, and each year the Defense Department has broadened
145 Prepared by Richard F. Grimmett, Specialist in International Security.
146 Section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (P.L. 87-195).
147 The original MAP program was used to provide, on a grant basis, military equipment and
military training to allied and friendly nations to assist them in restoring their military
capabilities in the post World War II period. The grant MAP program was gradually phased
out as more friendly nations were capable of purchasing military equipment and training (as
part of weapons purchases or as an independent item), and as their economies damaged by
World War II were restored to health.

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CRS-57
the program. Although Congress did not earmark IMET funds to support this
program after FY1991, it has in report language noted an expectation that the
financial investment in E-IMET be increased. Congress further broadened the
program to include participation by members of national legislatures who are
responsible for oversight and management of the military, and “individuals who are
not members of a government.” Because E-IMET is a sub-element of the overall
IMET program, it is funded as part of the annual IMET appropriation, contained in
the Foreign Operations Appropriations legislation.
Activities
The IMET program funds a variety of training programs conducted by the
Defense Department at a variety of venues. The Service War Colleges and the
National Defense University’s (NDU’s) National War College programs are attended
by U.S. and foreign senior military and civilian equivalents. These programs focus
on service/national security policy and the politico-military aspects of
Service/Defense policies and programs. The Services and the Joint Staff (for the
NDU) annually provide invitations to the governments of foreign friends and allies
for foreign student participation. The senior service schools remain a significant
element of IMET-sponsored training. The specific schools and their locations are as
follows: National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.; Army War
College, Carlisle Barracks, PA; Navy War College, Newport, RI; and Air War
College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.
The U.S. military services offer numerous programs and courses categorized as
professional military education (PME). Foreign students are assigned to programs
based on their military rank and specific responsibilities in their country’s military.
Programs are conducted at Service Command and Staff Colleges, including basic and
advanced officer training in specialized areas such as finance, ordnance, artillery, and
medicine. For more senior officers, some training may occur at U.S. senior service
schools. A representative listing of the schools involved include the Army Command
and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS; Army Logistics Management College, Fort
Lee, VA; U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA; and Air Force Institute of
Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. PME programs and the senior
service school programs combined account for approximately half of the annual
IMET appropriation.
The majority of IMET-sponsored training is conducted in the United States at
DOD and U.S. military service schools, with U.S. military personnel. Therefore,
English language proficiency is required. To help foreign students improve their
English language skills, DOD has assigned the English language training mission to
the Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC), located at
Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. DLIELC provides resident English language
training in state-of-the art facilities. In addition, DLIELC conducts English language
training surveys to evaluate foreign government programs and will assign instructors
as a “detachment” to the host country to personally assist in the establishment and
maintenance of their English language training program. In FY2006, over 110

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separate countries were participating in some grant IMET training program. During
FY2006, the appropriation for grant IMET was over $81 million.148
The E-IMET initiative is accomplished through educational programs in the
United States offered by DOD and U.S. military service schools, by Mobile
Education Teams visiting host countries, and by funding military participation in
overseas conferences. Although IMET funding can be used for such an initiative
(overseas seminars) under the auspices of the E-IMET program when such activities
are deemed appropriate, the emphasis and preference is for a longer training
experience in the United States that maximizes the students’ exposure to the
American way of life.
Beginning in FY1991, DOD launched E-IMET by refining some existing
programs and initiating new courses through the military departments. Further, new
educational programs were established to address the topics of military justice,
human rights, and civil-military relations. The bulk of this effort is accomplished
through three schools: Defense Resource Management Institute, Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS), Monterey, CA; Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA; and the Naval Justice School, Newport, RI.149
Issues
There have not been any significant controversies over the division of
management tasks of the IMET programs between the Defense and State
Departments over the years. There is a clear delineation of responsibilities and
authorities, and the implementation of the programs has generally worked smoothly.
Both departments generally agree that they wish additional funding could be
available to facilitate providing training to nations allied or friendly to the United
States as a means of broadening military to military contacts between them and the
United States.
As with the Foreign Military Sales/Foreign Military Financing program, DOD
has argued recently that IMET lacks the flexibility necessary to respond to rapidly
changing environments. The DOD global train and equip authority that Congress
provided in Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163), and extended through FY2008,150 was intended to
provide a quicker response in such circumstances. (See Appendix I.)
148 IMET funding data for FY2006 and previous years, by individual country, can be found
at the DSCA website at [http://www.dsca.mil/programs/biz-ops/factsbook/FactsBook
06.pdf]; last accessed July 22, 2008.
149 A detailed series of links to the wide variety of entities that carry out IMET training, and
to frequently asked questions about each of them, can be accessed through the DSCA
website under the heading International Training Management at
[http://www.disam.dsca.mil/itm/home.asp]; last accessed July 22, 2008.
150 The FY2007 John Warner NDAA, P.L. 109-364, Section 1210, amends Section 1206 to
extend the authorization period, among other purposes.

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Appendix F. Counternarcotics151
DOD Roles and Responsibilities
DOD has multiple roles and responsibilities in the area of counternarcotics
(CN). It is the single lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial
and maritime movement of illegal drugs toward the United States and plays a key
role in collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence on illegal drugs with U.S. law
enforcement and international security counterparts. In addition, Congress authorizes
DOD to offer CN assistance to train and equip foreign countries in their efforts to
build institutional capacity and control ungoverned spaces used by drug traffickers.
Although DOD is a provider of international CN assistance, the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 vests responsibility for coordinating all U.S. counter-drug assistance
with the Secretary of State (Section 481, P.L. 87-195, as amended; [22 U.S.C.
2291]). U.S. officials describe interagency coordination between DOD and the State
Department on CN assistance as highly varied, ranging from ad hoc coordination
based on personal networks across agencies to weekly planning meetings formally
chaired by the National Security Council. Differences in interagency coordination
are often attributable to differences in priority of certain countries and issues.
Origins
U.S. concern about the national security implications of narcotics trafficking
first emerged in the late 1960s. In a 1971 press conference, President Richard Nixon
famously coined the term “war on drugs” and identified illicit drugs as “public enemy
number one.” As a result of frustration at the perceived failure of federal anti-
narcotics measures to date, many policy makers, including some Members of
Congress, began to call for the inclusion of the U.S. military in anti-drug efforts in
the 1970s.152 Pressure for U.S. military involvement increased throughout the 1980s,
as U.S. officials grew concerned that law enforcement personnel were unprepared
and ill-equipped to effectively combat well-armed drug cartels and operate in conflict
situations in drug source countries.
Such calls and pressure for DOD involvement in CN activities raised particular
concern among several top DOD officials in the 1980s, including former Secretaries
of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Frank Carlucci, who strongly objected to the U.S.
military’s continued and increasing involvement in drug-related activities.153 Both
officials, whose objections reflected an attitude pervasive throughout DOD,
151 Prepared by Liana Sun Wyler, Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics.
152 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs
in the Andes (Washington, D.C.: 1991). Representative Jack Davis and other Members of
Congress reportedly drew on the term “war on drugs” to demand a greater role for the
military, stating, “When you have a war, who do you call in to fight the war? You call the
military in.”
153 Coletta Youngers, “The War in the Andes: The Military Role in the U.S. International
Drug Policy,” WOLA Briefing Series: Issues in International Drug Policy, Issue Brief #2,
December 14, 1990.

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perceived anti-drug efforts as law enforcement concerns that would be detrimental
to the U.S. military’s primary mission. In 1985, Weinberger reportedly wrote that
“reliance on military forces to accomplish civilian tasks is detrimental to military
readiness and democratic processes.”154 In 1988, Carlucci reportedly stated that
staffing the front line of the country’s drug war “is not the function of the military.”155
Nevertheless, DOD increasingly participated in interdiction operations in the early
1980s and sporadically engaged in training, equipping, and transporting foreign anti-
narcotics personnel in the mid- to late 1980s.
Evolution
In the 1980s, subsequent administrations and Congress greatly expanded DOD’s
authorities and role in CN assistance. (See Table F1.) Under Presidents Ronald
Reagan and George H. Bush, DOD emerged as a prominent actor in U.S. CN
assistance to Latin America. President Reagan issued National Security Directive
221 (NSD-221), which declared narcotics trafficking a U.S. national security
concern, and directed U.S. military forces to “support counter-narcotics efforts more
actively.” President Bush issued National Security Directive 18 (NSD-18), which
explicitly directed the Secretary of Defense to redefine the Pentagon’s mission to
include CN as one of its main priorities.156 Congress provided DOD with its first
major authority in 1989, identifying DOD as the lead federal agency for the detection
and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs (Sec. 1202, P.L. 101-
189; 10 U.S.C. 124).
As U.S. CN engagement in the Andean region continued through the 1990s,
Congress extended DOD’s authorities to include a broad range of train and equip
assistance. Under the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year
1991 (Sec. 1004, P.L. 101-510), Congress authorized DOD to provide CN-related
training and transport of law enforcement personnel to foreign law enforcement
agencies; notably, Section 1004 authorities are not limited to specific countries and
do not establish spending restrictions for these new authorities. Congress also
authorized DOD to equip foreign CN personnel under the NDAA for FY1998 (Sec.
1033, P.L. 105-85).157 Section 1033 currently enables DOD to assist 18 countries’
CN efforts by providing non-lethal protective and utility personnel equipment,
including navigation equipment, secure and non-secure communications equipment,
radar equipment, night vision systems, vehicles, aircraft, and boats.
154 Quoted in “The Pentagon’s War on Drugs: The Ultimate Bad Trip,” The Defense
Monitor, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 1992, and The War in the Andes, op cit.
155 Quoted in Lee Feinstein, “Fighting the Next War,” Mother Jones, July/August 1990.
156 “Defense Chief Imposes a Deadline In Pentagon’s War on Drug Flow,” New York Times,
September 19, 1989.
157 These countries include Colombia, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Ecuador, Pakistan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Guatemala,
Belize, and Panama.

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Table F1. Timeline of Major Congressional Authorities and
Executive Directives Related to CN
Year
Authorities
Description
1986
NSD-221
President Ronald Reagan directs U.S. military forces to “support
counter-narcotics efforts more actively.”
August
NSD-18
President George H. Bush directs the Secretary of Defense to
1989
expand DOD’s support of U.S. CN efforts and to permit DOD
personnel to conduct training for host government personnel and
operational support activities.
November
Sec. 1202,
Congress authorizes DOD to serve as the lead agency of the
1989
P.L. 101-189;
federal government for the detection and monitoring of aerial
10 U.S.C.
and maritime transit of illegal drugs.
124
1990
Sec. 1004,
Congress authorizes DOD to provide certain types of CN
P.L. 101-510;
activities, including foreign assistance training.
10 U.S.C.
374 note
1996
Sec. 1031,
Congress authorizes DOD to provide specified kinds of CN
P.L. 104-201
equipment to Mexico.
1997
Sec. 1033,
Congress authorizes DOD to provide specified kinds of CN
P.L. 105-85
equipment to Peru and Colombia.
2001
Sec. 1021,
Congress amends Section 1004 of P.L. 101-510 (cited above) to
P.L. 107-107
authorize DOD to provide linguistic intelligence analysis
services in support of CN activities.
2002
Sec. 305, P.L.
Congress authorizes DOD to use CN funds designated for
107-206
Colombia to be available for a unified campaign against both
narcotics trafficking and terrorism.
2003
Sec. 1021,
Congress amends Section 1033 of P.L. 105-85 to authorize
P.L. 108-136
DOD to provide additional CN-related train and equip foreign
assistance to Afghanistan, Bolivia, Ecuador, Pakistan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
2003
Sec. 1022,
Congress authorizes DOD to provide counterterrorism support
P.L. 108-136
to law enforcement personnel that are also conducting CN
5 U.S.C. 371
activities.
note
2006
Sec. 1022,
Congress amends Section 1033 of P.L. 105-85 to authorize
P.L. 109-364
DOD to provide additional CN-related train and equip foreign
assistance to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia,
Guatemala, Belize, and Panama.
2008
Sec. 1022,
Congress amends Section 1033 of P.L. 105-85 to authorize
P.L. 110-181
DOD to provide additional CN-related train and equip foreign
assistance to Mexico and the Dominican Republic.

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Congress has also supported efforts to restrict DOD’s role in CN assistance.
Reacting to reports in the 1990s of U.S. CN funds supporting countries with a history
of human rights problems, Senator Patrick Leahy sponsored a provision in the
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act, 1997,158 to
prohibit the State Department from providing international narcotics control
assistance to countries for which the Secretary of State had credible evidence of
committing gross human rights violations. In 1998, Congress approved the Leahy
provision to apply to DOD, and both provisions have been attached to all subsequent
DOD appropriations vehicles. The State Department and DOD provisions, however,
differ notably in the scope of CN assistance covered; whereas the State Department
restriction covers training and assistance programs, the DOD restriction covers only
training programs. This distinction may allow DOD to provide CN assistance to
countries that the State Department may not.159
Table F2. DOD CN Funding by U.S. Combatant Command,
FY2005 and FY2006
(current U.S. $ millions)
Fiscal
Year
AFRICOM CENTCOM EUCOM NORTHCOM PACOM SOUTHCOM
Total
FY2005
1.9
256.2
3.8
2.2
1.8
39.2 305.1
FY2006
2.5
165.3
1.2
3.5
3.7
15.7 191.9
Source: Adapted from Department of Defense, Foreign Counterdrug Activity Report, FY2005 and
FY2006, and Counternarcotics Afghanistan/Central Asia Program Report.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
Table F3. Top 10 DOD CN Assistance Recipients,
FY2005 and FY2006
DOD FY2005
DOD FY2006
Assistance
Assistance
(current U.S. $
(current U.S. $
Country
millions)
Country
millions)
Afghanistan
224.5
Afghanistan
108.1
Netherlands
16.4
Pakistan
28.7
Antilles
Ecuador
14.7
Tajikistan
10.7
Tajikistan
9.6
Colombia
10.4
158 The FY1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 104-208, Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act, 1997, Title II.
159 Center for International Policy, “Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces (The ‘Leahy
Law’),” September 2, 2003, available at [http://www.ciponline.org/facts/leahy.htm]; last
accessed July 22, 2008.

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DOD FY2005
DOD FY2006
Assistance
Assistance
(current U.S. $
(current U.S. $
Country
millions)
Country
millions)
Pakistan
7.7
Kyrgyzstan
8.8
Colombia
5.5
Kazakhstan
6.0
Kyrgyzstan
5.3
Bahamas
3.5
Turkmenistan
4.9
Oman
3.1
Oman
4.2
Ecuador
2.7
United
3.3
Kenya
2.3
Kingdom
Source: Adapted from Department of Defense, Foreign Counterdrug Activity Report, FY2005 and
FY2006, and Counternarcotics Afghanistan/Central Asia Program Report.
Recent Activities
Colombia and the Andean Region.160 DOD continues to provide CN
assistance to Colombia and the Andean region, primarily under Section 1004 and
Section 1033 authorities. Over the years, DOD CN goals in Colombia have evolved
to include combating paramilitary and terrorist groups in conjunction with drug
trafficking organizations. U.S. military assistance to Colombia and the Andean
region, however, has raised several concerns relating to the effectiveness of CN
foreign assistance in reducing drug availability in the United States; the potential
unintended consequences of strengthening Latin American military capabilities; and
the shift, over the years, from a primary focus on halting the flow of drugs to a new
focus on counterterrorism.
Afghanistan.161 DOD CN support, in the form of training, equipment,
intelligence sharing, and transportation, is part of a broader U.S. strategy to combat
drugs and terrorism in Afghanistan. The NDAA for FY2004 (Sec. 1021, P.L. 108-
136) added Afghanistan to the list of countries eligible for transfers of non-lethal
DOD CN equipment under Section 1033 authorizations. The NDAA for FY2007
further extended DOD CN assistance authorizations to include the provision of
individual and crew-served weapons of .50 caliber or less and ammunition for these
weapons for Afghanistan’s CN security forces (Sec. 1022, P.L. 109-364). According
to DOD officials, Afghanistan has benefitted from CN assistance made available by
Section 1022, which allows DOD to provide counterterrorism support in conjunction
with CN activity.
160 For background on Plan Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, see CRS
Report RL32774, Plan Colombia: A Progress Report, and CRS Report RL33370, Andean
Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY2007 Assistance, both by
Connie Veillette.
161 For a detailed discussion of U.S. CN policy in Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL32686,
Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher Blanchard.

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DOD’s role in CN in Afghanistan has generated a variety of critics, ranging
from those who seek to broaden DOD’s CN responsibility to those who view DOD’s
CN activities as a diversion from the U.S. military’s stability and counterterrorism
operations in the country. According to the Senate Report for the NDAA for FY2006
(S.Rept. 109-69), DOD requested authorization from Congress “to provide assistance
in all aspects of counterdrug activities in Afghanistan, including detection,
interdiction, and related criminal justice activities.” Legislation enacted, however,
has yet to authorize DOD to provide CN assistance beyond the scope authorized in
Sections 1004 (1990), 1033 (1997), and 1022 (2003). Further emphasizing
congressional resistance to expanding DOD CN authorities, the House Report for the
John Warner NDAA for FY2007 (H.Rept. 109-542) states that DOD “must not take
on roles in which other countries or other agencies of the U.S. government have core
responsibility.”
Mexico. On October 22, 2007, President George W. Bush and President Felipe
Calderon of Mexico jointly announced plans to begin the Mérida Initiative — a
multi-year, $1.4 billion bilateral commitment to reduce drug trafficking and other
criminal activities in Mexico, as well as to contribute toward strengthening the
institutional capacity of Mexican security forces. In June 2008, Congress
appropriated $400 million of $465 million in FY2008 and FY2009 Merida Initiative
funds for Mexico (Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, P.L. 110-252, Section
1406(a)).162 This funding is in addition to current levels of foreign assistance to
Mexico. According to a 2007 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report,
DOD spent a total of $58 million for equipment and training for CN support to the
Mexican military from 2000 to 2006.163 It remains unclear to what extent the new
Mérida Initiative will affect current levels of DOD CN assistance to Mexico.
Independent of the Administration’s supplemental funding request for the Mérida
Initiative, Section 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 (P.L. 110-181) extends Section 1033(b) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1998 to make available train and equip authorities to Mexico (and
the Dominican Republic).
Issues
As authorities expand, analysts continue to critique DOD’s role in CN
assistance. Proponents of DOD’s expanded role generally argue that narcotics
trafficking poses a national security threat to the United States and that the military
is especially equipped with the resources and skills to help foreign governments
162 Of the $400 million, Congress specified that Mexico could receive up to $352 million in
FY2008 supplemental funds and up to $48 million in FY2009 bridge fund assistance. In its
FY2009 budget request, the Administration asked for $450 million in FY2009 Mérida
Initiative funds for Mexico; Congressional action on the FY2009 budget request is in
progress. For more information on the Mérida Initiative, see CRS Report RS22837, Mérida
Initiative: Proposed U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central
America, by Colleen W. Cook and Clare Ribando Seelke.
163 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped
Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but Tons of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow into the
United States, GAO-07-1018, August 2007.

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counter powerful drug trafficking organizations. Many analysts also acknowledge
that although DOD and civilian agencies have seemingly overlapping and redundant
authorities, the absence of DOD’s participation in CN assistance would be
detrimental to the effectiveness of U.S. programs. Opponents, by contrast, insist that
CN foreign assistance is not a military mission and that the training of military
elements in foreign countries may have serious political and diplomatic repercussions
abroad.
Critics of DOD’s role in CN assistance also fear that the balance between
military and civilian participation in CN may disproportionately favor the military.
For example, longstanding concerns over the perceived reliance on the military to
provide CN assistance have resurfaced, with new plans to remodel by 2018 the U.S.
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), DOD’s regional combatant command for
Central and South America. SOUTHCOM has long played a key role in DOD CN
assistance planning in the Andes region, and in DOD’s new vision, SOUTHCOM’s
participation in non-traditional military activity, including CN assistance, will likely
expand. DOD planners envision a broader interagency role for SOUTHCOM, akin
to the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), which includes building foreign
governments’ security capacity and improving accountable governance as part of its
core mission.164
Supporters of the 2018 plan perceive this change as an opportunity to enhance
interagency coordination of international programs among military and civilian
agencies, rather than a zero-sum game. Other analysts, however, are wary that
SOUTHCOM’s new strategic direction will further militarize U.S. foreign policy in
the region. In addition, an expanded role for DOD in CN assistance may antagonize
U.S. foreign partners. This has already been the case with the government of
Mexico, which reportedly resisted U.S. efforts to place the country under
SOUTHCOM’s (or any other combatant command structure) area of responsibility
(AOR) in order to make the point that it does not want the U.S. military involved in
what it considers to be its internal affairs.165 Only in 2002 was Mexico incorporated
into the newly created NORTHCOM, which also includes the continental United
States, Alaska, Canada, and surrounding waters. Even today, Mexico’s military CN
cooperation under NORTHCOM remains limited; as noted above, the highly
publicized Mérida Initiative does not include a role for direct DOD support.
In addition to concerns about the balance between military and civilian roles in
CN assistance, some analysts have voiced concern over the difficulty in reconciling
DOD and State Department CN policy planning. Some observers claim that DOD’s
CN planning processes differ from the State Department’s and may make cross-
agency policy coordination and evaluation of assistance programs difficult. For
example, unlike the State Department, DOD programming strategies are not
developed on a country-by-country basis; instead, planning is based on capabilities,
because most of DOD’s CN programs (e.g., ROTHRs, CBRNs, and aerial and
164 SOUTHCOM, “Command Strategy 2018,” accessible at [http://www.southcom.mil/
AppsSC/files/0UI0I1177092386.pdf]; last accessed July 22, 2008.
165 Testimony of Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Admiral Thad Allen, before the
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security on September 7, 2006.

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surface platforms) cover geographic regions that span several countries. This
difference in planning strategies is also reflected in the way CN funds are disbursed.
DOD funds are allocated by function rather than by country. The State Department
annually provides Congress with CN assistance program summaries by country and
function; in contrast, no equivalent DOD document is regularly published.

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Appendix G. Foreign Anti-Terrorism and
Counterterrorism Train and Equip Assistance and
Education Programs166
DOD Role and Responsibilities
DOD and the Department of State both devote financial and personnel resources
to assisting foreign governments’ anti-terrorism and counterterrorism activities.167
The foreign counterterrorism assistance goals of these departments seek to enhance
the capability of the host nation to prevent terrorism. The State Department
conducts an Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, through which it trains,
equips, and advises foreign police forces and other security officials.168 DOD
currently plays no role in this program, according to State Department officials.
DOD participates in two counterterrorism programs with the State Department
and other agencies: the State Department-led, interagency Trans-Sahara Counter-
Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the State Department’s Regional Strategic
Initiatives (RSI). DOD also provides counterterrorism assistance through the DOD
Building Global Partnerships Train and Equip Section 1206 authority, which is
discussed in a separate appendix. (See Appendix H.) DOD has its own
Counterterrorism Fellowship Program.
166 Prepared by John Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism and National Security, and Nina M.
Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs.
167 The term anti-terrorism refers to defensive measures taken to minimize vulnerability to
terrorism, while counterterrorism refers to offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and
respond to terrorism.
168 The ATA was established in 1983 in response to the bombings of U.S. Marine barracks
in Beirut, Lebanon. The State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
provides funding and guidance for the program; the State Department Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, Office of Anti-Terrorism Assistance implements and manages program operations.
The ATA’s mission is to assist foreign nations’ anti-terrorism activities by providing
training, equipment, and advice to foreign countries to enhance the anti-terrorism skills and
capabilities of foreign law enforcement and security officials, establish security
relationships between U.S. and foreign officials, and share modern, humane, and effective
anti-terrorism techniques. To accomplish these goals, ATA personnel train foreign civilian
security and law enforcement officials in various anti-terrorism tasks. Terrorism experts
conducting ATA training include U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies;
police associations; and private security firms and consultants. (For more information, see
“Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program,” Department of State website, last accessed July 22,
2008, at [http://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm].) Annual appropriations for the
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program from FY2002 through FY2007 total $756 million. By
fiscal year, this breaks down as follows: $157 million in FY2002; $91 million in FY2003;
$97 million in FY2004; $135 million in FY2005; $131 million in FY2006; and $145 million
in FY2007. These figures include annual appropriations and any applicable funds received
through emergency supplemental funds. Also see U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Department of State: Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
Follow Legal Authority, but Some Activities Need Reassessment, Washington DC, GAO-04-
521, April 30, 2004.

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DOD also supports the counterterrorism activities of civilian agencies under 10
U.S.C. 374, which authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide personnel to
operate equipment and provide transportation to federal law enforcement agencies
in activities in and with foreign nations.169
Origins and Evolution
Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States devoted relatively
few resources to U.S. counterterrorism foreign training and equipping activities, and
most of the assistance was provided to a country after an incident had occurred.
Post-9/11 counterterrorism assistance to foreign governments has significantly
increased and is often provided to countries that have not experienced a catastrophic
terrorist incident.170 Although the U.S. government carries out a wide variety of
counterterrorism activities to support foreign governments, the major State
Department and DOD foreign assistance-type programs focus specifically on various
aspects of detecting, deterring, combating, and solving terrorism-related activities by
training and equipping foreign military and security forces to deal with terrorist
threats. Some of these programs include other components as well. CT programs
sometimes include economic and social components, especially when conducted in
ungoverned areas or weak states where terrorists may seek safe haven or recruit new
members.
DOD participates in at least four CT programs. Three are discussed below. The
Section 1206 program is covered in a separate appendix because that authority can
be used for purposes other than counterterrorism. (See Appendix H.) The U.S.
government also has more broadly focused programs that include a train and equip
counterterrorism component, but these are not covered here.171
Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership. The Trans-Sahara
Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a State Department-led interagency
initiative to deal with the threat of violent extremism and terrorism in the Sahel
region. Its main components include development, military, counterterrorism, and
169 Section 374 was added to Title 10 U.S. Code in 1981 and was subsequently amended
several times. It also permits DOD to provide the specified support to civilian law
enforcement agencies for counternarcotics purposes and for the rendition of terrorist
suspects to the United States. Beginning with the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2004 (P.L. 108-
136, Section 1022), Congress has annually renewed an authorization for the DOD joint task
forces that support law enforcement agencies conducting counterdrug activities to also
support counterterrorism activities.
170 For the purposes of this appendix, counterterrorism assistance is defined as U.S. training
and equipping activities provided to a foreign government for purposes of addressing
international terrorism related issues. This section of the paper does not address the U.S.
counterterrorism training and equipping activities occurring in Iraq or Afghanistan, as these
issues are addressed in a separate section of the report.
171 U.S. programs that are, in part, designed to provide some level of anti-terrorism and
counterterrorism training and equipment include the Iraqi Freedom Fund, the State
Department’s Terrorist Interdiction Program, DOD counternarcotics activities, and other
related activities.

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public diplomacy. Many agencies cooperate on the program. These include DOD;
the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and the Treasury; the Federal
Bureau of Investigation; and USAID. The TSCTP’s goals are to build military and
law enforcement capacity, foster regional cooperation, counter radicalization, and
enhance public diplomacy. A wide variety of programs are used to achieve these
goals, including development programs to, among other objectives, improve health
and education and promote good governance.
TSCTP is a successor program to the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), a U.S. security
assistance program that the State Department administered from 2002 to early 2004,
and funded at about $7.75 million annually. The PSI’s mission was to train and
equip at least one rapid-reaction company of approximately 100 armed forces in each
of the four Saharan nations of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad. U.S. Marines and
Army Special Forces trained these companies of approximately 100 each in basic
marksmanship, planning, communications, land navigation, and patrolling, and the
United States provided participating countries with equipment such as night vision
goggles and specially equipped sports utility vehicles.172 The PSI was succeeded in
2005 by the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), with substantial
DOD support. The TSCTI and, in 2006, the follow-on TSCTP were expanded to
include more Sahel countries and to provide strategic advice and support for
increased U.S. public diplomacy efforts. The program now also includes Algeria,
Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Senegal.173
The DOD component of the TSCTP is named Operation Enduring Freedom —
Trans-Sahara. DOD continues to provide the basic infantry training offered under
the PSI. It has also incorporated “more advanced counterterroism capabilities such
as improving communications systems and developing mechanisms for regional
intelligence sharing.”174 In addition, since the PSI, “the TSCTP has fielded Military
Information Support Teams (MIST) and Civil Military Support Elements (CMSE)”
as part of the public diplomacy effort to “generate support for the United States and
for moderate Islamic viewpoints while reducing sympathy and support for
terrorism....”175
When TSCTP was established in 2007, plans called for DOD and the State
Department to provide an combined estimated budget of $100 million per year.
According to the State Department, these two agencies now contribute a combined
total of approximately $150 million to support TSCTP activities, with DOD
172 Lianne Kennedy Boudali, The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, a paper
published in April 2007 by the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy
at West Point, NY, p. 15. According to another source, PSI training was provided through
a series of Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) missions under Title 10 U.S. Code
authority. CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007, op. cit., p. 3.
173 The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, op.cit, p. 4.
174 The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, op.cit, p. 5.
175 Ibid.

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contributing two-thirds and the State Department and USAID contributing the
remainder. Plans call for this level to remain constant through FY2011.176
Regional Strategic Initiatives (RSI). The State Department’s Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) has developed eight regional interagency
strategy groups to assess the threats posed by terrorists and to develop strategies,
plans, and policy recommendations to counter them. These groups are chaired by
ambassadors. Through these groups, networked interagency country teams develop
a common understanding of the strategic situation in a region. They then design
complementary programs and pool resources to eliminate terrorist safe havens and
to address conditions fostering terrorist recruitment. RSI groups exist for the Eastern
Mediterranean, the Western Mediterranean, East Africa, the Trans-Sahara, Southeast
Asia, Iraq and neighboring states, South Asia, and the Western Hemisphere.177 DOD
contributes to the RSI panoply of programs through Section 1206 authority and the
DOD Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (below), according to the State
Department.178
DOD Counterterrorism Fellowship Program. In January 2002, DOD
established the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) with
$17.9 million appropriated by Congress. The initial program was to fund foreign
military officers’ attendance at U.S. military education institutions and selected
regional centers for non-lethal training.179
In 2003, an authorization for CTFP was codified (10 U.S.C. 2249c), expanding
the program to civilians and other venues, and setting an annual authorization limit
of $20 million. This authorization permitted DOD to pay costs associated with the
attendance of foreign military officers, foreign ministry of defense officials, and
foreign security officials at U.S. military educational institutions, regional centers,
conferences, seminars, and other training programs.180 There is no stipulation in the
Title 10 U.S. Code statute that such education and training be non-lethal. An
amendment to that statute in 2006 raised the authorized limit to $25 million and
extended the range of permitted venues to foreign and civilian institutions, centers,
and events.181
176 E-mail correspondence with the State Department Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, April 11 and May 19, 2008.
177 The East African Regional Security Initiative (EARSI) is the successor to the State
Department’s East African Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), to which DOD contributed
through the DOD Counterterrorism Fellowship Program.
178 E-mail correspondence with the State Department Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, April 11, 2008.
179 Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from
and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002 (P.L. 107-117, Section
8125).
180 FY2004 NDAA, P.L. 108-136, Section 1221. An annual report on the program is
required by December 1.
181 Section 1204, John Warner NDAA for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364).

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The program has four objectives: educating foreign military and civilian
personnel who are directly involved in the war on terrorism; creating and maintaining
a human counterterrorism network with shared values and common language;
providing countries with the intellectual means to create, sustain, and grow
counterterrorism capabilities and capacities; and influencing countries to cooperate
more fully in U.S. and coalition efforts to combat terrorism.182 Through this
program, DOD supports the TSCTP program and Regional Strategic Initiatives.
The changes in the program over time have raised some concerns. Some
question whether enhanced program activities may duplicate other U.S.
counterterrorism efforts, although some argue that the expansion of the program is
a result of the maturation of the mission. Some security analysts question the lack
of specific language regarding non-lethal training in the CTFP permanent authority.
If lethal training activities are now a part of CTFP objectives, some security
observers question how this new focus differs from that of the International Military
Education and Training program. (See Appendix E.)
Issues
An issue of concern is whether the DOD and the State Department (and other
agencies) adequately coordinate their programs. DOD and civilian agencies have
over the past few years developed new means, such as the RSI, to coordinate
programs. Within the State Department, some view cooperation on counterterrorism
as a model for DOD-State Department cooperation.183 Others believe that there is
still considerable room for improvement. Regarding the TSCTP, a recent CSIS
report acknowledges progress in interagency cooperation, particularly in the field, but
finds that such cooperation is “strongly dependent on individual personalities.”184
Impediments to improved coordination and execution of counterterrorism programs
include the separate policy development and implementation by relevant agencies,
combatant commands, U.S. embassies, and USAID missions; differences in
institutional culture among DOD, the State Department, and USAID; and the
differences in perspectives created by the regional focus of the DOD combatant
commands and the bilateral focus of the State Department and U.S. country teams,
according to that report.185
Concerns are also raised that DOD and the State Department share an
overarching strategic framework and strategic priorities. The CSIS report finds “a
lack of coherent strategic vision and authoritative planning” on counterterrorism
182 Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program briefing slides. Accessed at
[http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2005solic/moore.ppt#256,2], Regional Defense Counterterrorism
Fellowship Program (CTFP); last accessed July 22, 2008.
183 E-mail correspondence with the State Department Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, April 11, 2008. Also see Appendix H.
184 CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
185 CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007, op. cit., p. 4.

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matters across DOD, the State Department, and USAID.186 Another report faults the
TSCTP for failing to fulfill its “rhetorical commitment to a holistic, integrated
response” addressing the economic, social, and political sources of instability.
“Although U.S. government players agree that CT strategy should focus eighty
percent on development and governance activities, and only twenty percent on
military effort, actual budgets have been closer to the reverse, making it difficult for
the program to address underlying, chronic sources of underdevelopment and poor
governance.”187
If the counterterrorism assistance programs are not coordinated with respect to
the overarching strategy of the United States, the departments providing services and
advice may inadvertently negatively influence a foreign country’s efforts to support
U.S. national security policies. Other interagency concerns that may have U.S. policy
implications include the commonalities in procedures and training offered by DOD
and State Department training personnel, the sharing of useful national security
information gleaned from host country training activities, and how U.S. foreign
policy goals are conveyed to host country representatives. The training and services
offered have a significant impact on a foreign country’s tactical and strategic
approach to addressing terrorism within its borders and in the surrounding region.
If U.S. federal government counterterrorism organizations are not coordinating with
the ATA’s counterterrorism activities, conflicting U.S. policy signals may be given
to the host country and resources may be used in an inefficient manner.
A lack of transparency for such interagency programs that draw on multiple
authorities and multiple budget accounts may also be a concern. Reporting
requirements for each of the component programs vary and there may be no reporting
requirement for some components. Thus, no one source presents to Congress a
comprehensive account of multiple counterterrorism programs.
186 CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007, op. cit., p. 5.
187 The Pentagon and Global Development, op. cit., p. 10.

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Appendix H. Foreign Military Capacity Building
Section 1206 Authority188
DOD Role and Responsibility
In the FY2006-FY2008 annual DOD authorization bills, Congress provided
DOD with authority to train and equip foreign military forces to perform
counterterrorism, as well as military and stability operations. This “Section 1206”
authority, as it is known, enables DOD to use DOD funds to conduct or support train
and equip programs such as those usually provided under State Department security
assistance authorities and budgets. As with State Department security assistance
programs, activities carried out under Section 1206 authority are administered by the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
During the first two years of Section 1206 funding, DOD appeared to exercise
a strong lead in planning and carrying out activities. The State Department has
played a larger part since DOD and State Department guidance was issued in 2007.189
According to DOD officials, for the most recent (FY2008) planning cycle, which
began in August 2007, the programs have been coordinated through a joint State
Department-DOD review. U.S. embassies and Combatant Commands can offer
proposals to each other for concurrence, after which the proposals are disseminated
to appropriate offices in DOD and the State Department, including the legal
offices.190 State Department and DOD officials vet the proposed recipients for
human rights violations. Proposals selected as priority activities are sent to the
appropriate congressional committees for reprogramming approval at least 15 days
before beginning an activity.191
Origins and Evolution
In 2005, as part of its FY2006 budget submission, DOD requested this train and
equip authority to enhance its ability to meet urgent needs and respond to emerging
threats, particularly emerging terrorist threats. Most of the funding thus far has been
used for counterterrorism programs. First established in through the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163), this authority was
amended and extended in 2007. It is now in effect through the end of FY2008.
188 Prepared by Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs. See CRS
Report RS22855, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006: A
Fact Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military
Forces, by Nina M. Serafino, for additional information.
189 Author’s interviews with DOD officials, December 2007.
190 Author’s interviews with DOD officials, December 2007.
191 Section 1206 authority requires a 15-day advance notification to the congressional
defense, foreign affairs, and appropriations committees before initiating each program, with
information on the selected countries, budgets, timelines, sources of funding, and planned
expenditures of funds.

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The FY2006 NDAA Section 1206 provided the President with authority to
direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support programs to build the capacity
of foreign military forces to perform counterterrorism operations or to participate in
or support military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces participate.
Section 1206 authorized the provision of training, supplies, and equipment for those
programs. The Secretary of Defense could transfer monies from the defensewide
operations and maintenance account to fund the programs. The Secretaries of State
and Defense were required to jointly formulate any program, and the Secretary of
Defense to coordinate with the Secretary of State in their implementation. Congress
set the original funding limit, for FY2006, at $200 million, although only about half
of this was actually obligated. Congress also set strict conditions for these programs.
Section 1206 required that these programs observe and respect human rights,
fundamental freedoms, and the “legitimate civilian authority” within a country.
Section 1206 could not be used to provide any type of assistance otherwise prohibited
by any provision of law, nor to provide assistance to any country otherwise prohibited
from receiving such assistance under any other provision of law.192
Through the John Warner NDAA for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364), Congress
amended the FY2006 Section 1206 provisions to extend the authority through
FY2008, raise the funding limit to $300 million, and permit the Secretary of Defense
to draw from all DOD operations and maintenance accounts to fund the program.
Congress also changed the manner in which programs are initiated. Although the
original FY2006 Section 1206 provisions required a presidential decision to initiate
a program, the FY2007 legislation permitted the Secretary of Defense, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State, to authorize the training. Congress also added
a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to notify Congress when a decision was
reached to initiate a program.
Congress denied a May 2007 DOD request to expand and make permanent
Section 1206 authority.193 In this request, DOD asked for authority to train and equip
not only foreign military forces, but also foreign security forces. The request
proposed raising the limit on annual spending to $750 million. It also proposed
192 Section 1206 of P.L. 109-193 also required the President to submit a report, due January
6, 2007, that would assess U.S. laws governing capacity-building programs for foreign
governments and train and equip programs for foreign military forces, and recommending
changes to those laws, as well as to the organization and procedures of the DOD and the
State Department. The report was also to include a statement of the resources and funding
mechanisms required to ensure adequate funding for such programs. Section 1206(f) 2006
NDAA Report, op. cit..
193 The HASC Report 110-146 on the FY2008 NDAA, op. cit., stated that in “the last two
years, Congress has clearly and strongly discouraged further legislative proposals to expand
or make permanent DOD’s ‘train and equip’ authorities” absent a required report [the
Section 1206(f) FY2006 NDAA Report, op. cit.] and “an established track record of
success.” (p. 401.) The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) report accompanying
its version of the bill noted that SASC was restricting FY2008 funding for Section 1206
activities to the previously authorized $300 million, rather than the $500 million requested
by the Administration. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Forces, National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Report to accompany S. 1547, 110th Cong.,
1st sess., S.Rept.110-077, p. 317.

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authority to waive any restrictions applicable to assistance for military and security
forces. DOD funds could be used not only by DOD, but also could be transferred to
the Department of State or any other federal agency to conduct or support activities.
In its action on FY2007 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 110-28), Congress
declined to provide Administration’s request for $300 million in additional funding
for Section 1206 programs in FY2008.
In its FY2009 budget request of February 4, 2008, DOD asked for $500 million
for Section 1206 capacity-building purposes. Three days later, as part of its proposed
NDAA for FY2009, DOD submitted the Building Global Partnerships Act to make
permanent Section 1206 by codifying it at Title 10 U.S. Code, Chapter 20.194 This
proposal is similar to DOD’s May 2007 request. DOD again requested a permanent
annual authorization of up to $750 million to build foreign national military and other
forces. As in the 2007 proposal, these other forces would include “gendarmerie,
constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland
defense, coat guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces....” In a slight
difference from current practice, DOD and the State Department (not the secretaries
of Defense and State) would jointly formulate programs, and the Secretaries of
Defense and State would jointly coordinate implementation. The February 2008
proposal differed from the earlier request in that it would not in itself waive
restrictions elsewhere in law, but would grant waiver authority to the President and
the Secretary of State.
Activities
In FY2006, DOD used Section 1206 authority to carry out nine projects to
improve counterterrorism capabilities in 11 countries. DOD obligated a little over
$100 million for those programs. In FY2007, DOD used Section 1206 authority to
carry out programs in over a score of countries or groups of countries. These
programs cost almost $280 million. Most provided equipment, with associated
training. Most equipment and virtually all training to date has been provided by
contractors, according to DOD officials.195
In FY2006, DOD assisted Chad and Nigeria in developing an information-
sharing system to disrupt and attack terrorist networks in the trans-Saharan region.
Nigeria also received assistance, along with Sao Tome and Principe, to establish a
regional maritime awareness capability. Other countries that received assistance to
build maritime capabilities were Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Dominican Republic, and
Panama. Section 1206 provided funds to enhance the Lebanese Armed Forces’
ability to control Lebanon, to enable the Yemeni Armed Forces to prevent cross-
border arms trafficking and suppress terrorist activity, and to enhance Pakistan’s
ability to control its borders and to train and equip Pakistani Marines.
194 Provisions regarding the extension, expansion, and codification of Section 1206 authority
are contained in Section 1301 of the Administration’s proposed FY2009 NDAA, available
at [http:\\www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc]; last accessed July 22, 2008.
195 Author’s e-mail correspondence with DOD official, May 20, 2008.

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In FY2007, new programs included a 15-country African Maritime Security
program, as well as maritime programs in Djibouti, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the
Philippines, and a multinational maritime program involving various Caribbean
Basin countries. Bahrain received assistance to help develop a coastal patrol boat
capability.
New FY2007 programs also were carried out to enhance intelligence capabilities
in eight African countries, and to build counterterrorism and stability operations
capabilities in Albania, Georgia, Kazakstan, Macedonia, and Ukraine. Yemen
received funds for a new program to enhance border security. Mexico received a
small amount of counterterrorism assistance. Section 1206 funds were used to
support the East Africa Regional Security Initiative, as well as multinational civil-
military operations training conducted under the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism
Partnership.
Obligations for FY2008 Section 1206 projects are underway. Obligations for
projects in Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Georgia, Lebanon, and the Philippines totaled some
$24.8 million as of May 20, 2008.
Issues
Section 1206 funding has been one of the most controversial DOD foreign
assistance-type programs. The December 2006 Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(SFRC) report “Embassies as the Command Post in the Anti-Terror Campaign”
rejected this grant of special authority to DOD and recommended that the Secretary
of State “insist that all security assistance, including Section 1206 funding, be
included under his/her authority....”196 Based on visits to embassies in 2006, SFRC
staff found that plans for Section 1206 programs “were not receiving the same
embassy input as bilateral programs,” and that, in some cases, the embassies were not
even being informed of plans for Section 1206 activities until well into or after the
selection process. In addition, the report stated that, for the most part (except in the
cases of Lebanon and Pakistan), Section 1206 activities do not address emergency
situations and could be handled, as are other security assistance programs, through
the normal budget process.197
Some sources indicate that there have been some improvements in planning and
coordination since the SFRC report was issued. A 2007 GAO report echoed the
SFRC finding of a lack of coordination in formulating FY2006 proposals. The GAO
stated, however, that the “combatant commands and embassies we contacted reported
better coordination in the formulation of fiscal year 2007 proposals,” which they
attributed to “having more time to develop proposals and more explicit guidance
196 2006 SFRC Report, op. cit., p 3.
197 “Rather, it [Section 1206 funding] is seen as a new source of money for long-desired
components in a military relationship. Old wish lists were dusted off and used to justify
submitting a request for Section 1206 funding. Military officials in the embassies involved
see the programs as a ‘preventive’ effort, an investment in bilateral and intra-regional
cooperation.” 2006 SFRC Report, op. cit., p. 12.

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from State and DOD.”198 A 2008 DOD document describes DOD and State
Department coordination on Section 1206 programs as “rapidly becoming the gold
standard for interagency cooperation to meet emerging threats and opportunities
because of the revolutionary way it is managed.”199
Some analysts have questioned the utility of placing Section 1206 programs
under DOD when the program relies heavily on private contractors. The new
interagency process has expedited the project selection process, which may increase
the possibilities for using U.S. military personnel for some Section 1206 training.
FY2006 and FY2007 Section 1206 activities were selected toward the very end of the
fiscal years, leaving just enough time to obligate the funds through contracts with
private companies. These companies could then implement the project in the
following fiscal year. Scheduling assignments for U.S. military troops requires that
activities be approved well before the end of the fiscal year, according to one DOD
official, as military personnel must complete activities in the fiscal year or years for
which funds are allocated.200 The FY2008 selection process is well underway.
Provisions in the House and Senate versions of the FY2009 NDAA, which would
permit the use of appropriated funds over multiples years, would also facilitate
Section 1206 training by U.S. military personnel.
The question of whether State Department leadership on foreign policy is
challenged by DOD Section 1206 authority remains open for some analysts.
According to a December 2007 report by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), “the decision to provide the Department of Defense with its own
security assistance pipeline carries policy risks....” The report instead recommended
building “a larger State Department budget with increased and more flexible
counterterrorism funding.”201 CSIS did support, however, the DOD proposal to
extend Section 1206 training to foreign security forces.
198 GAO Section 1206 letter, op. cit., p. 3.
199 Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, op. cit., p. 103.
200 Author’s telephone conversation with a DOD official, July 2007.
201 CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007, op. cit., pp. 9-10. The report recognizes the
difficulties in establishing flexible funding mechanisms. “In principle, there is no reason
that the administration could not propose — and Congress fund — a contingency fund
within the FMF account to respond rapidly to unforeseen contingencies by training security
forces in counter-terrorism and stability operations. In practice, however, Congressional
resistance to funding such State Department ‘slush funds,’ and the comparative ease of
getting resources for DOD, creates a temptation to re-jigger authorities rather than budgets.”
p. 11.

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Appendix I. Global Peace Operations Initiative Train
and Equip Program202
DOD Role and Responsibilities
The State Department launched its Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)
in mid-2004 to train and equip foreign military and security forces to participate in
international peacekeeping operations. Officials in the Department of Defense
(DOD) Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) played a
major role in promoting the initiative, working with the State Department on the
proposal. GPOI’s primary purpose is to provide 75,000 soldiers from developing
nations with training in peacekeeping skills by the end of the decade. An ancillary
purpose is to stimulate a broad international effort to foster an international
deployment and logistics support system to transport and maintain them. GPOI also
provides some assistance to the Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units
(COESPU).
Overall responsibility for GPOI rests with the State Department’s Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs. The Bureau’s Office of Policy, Plans, and Analysis
(PM/PPA) works closely with the DOD to plan and implement GPOI through the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the military Combatant
Commands. In Africa, training is largely carried out by private sector personnel
employed under a State Department contract, but elsewhere, U.S. military personnel
provide most of the training. The State Department’s Africa Bureau continues to
play the major role in developing and overseeing the implementation of programs in
Africa. DOD provides a military officer to serve as Deputy Director of COESPU.
Origins and Evolution
GPOI was established to significantly expand and improve the State
Department’s special peacekeeping train and equip program in Africa. From 1996
through 2004, the United States provided field and staff training in peacekeeping
skills and techniques, and related non-lethal equipment, to potential African
peacekeepers, first through the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and then
through its successor program, the African Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance (ACOTA). GPOI was designed as a worldwide program, with a
continuing emphasis on Africa through ACOTA.
The impetus behind GPOI (and its predecessor Africa programs) was the widely
perceived need to improve international capabilities to control devastating conflicts.
Leaders of the Group of 8 (G8) major industrial countries endorsed the GPOI goal
to create 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010 in the June 2004 summit meeting at Sea
Island, Georgia. In his September 21, 2004, address to the opening meeting of the
59th session of the U.N. General Assembly, President George W. Bush stated that the
202 Prepared by Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs. For more
information on this initiative, see CRS Report RL32773, The Global Peace Operations
Initiative: Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.

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world “must create permanent capabilities to respond to future crises.” He pointed,
in particular, to a need for “more effective means to stabilize regions in turmoil, and
to halt religious violence and ethnic cleansing.” The Clinton Administration was
prompted to create the ACRI program by a similar perception.
In mid-2005, the State Department initiated the “Beyond Africa” GPOI
component, providing training and related equipment to militaries in Central
America, Europe, and Asia. As of the end of 2007, GPOI had funded the training of
some 40,000 potential peacekeepers around the world. The overwhelming majority,
some 96%, were from 20 countries and one regional organization in sub-Saharan
Africa. The remainder came from 21 countries, primarily in Asia, the Pacific Islands,
and Central America.
The State Department funds GPOI as a line item in its Peacekeeping (PKO)
account.203 Initial plans called for a five-year budget (FY2005-FY2009) of $660
million. Funding from FY2005-FY2008 totals $374.5 million. If Congress provides
the full FY2009 request, FY2005-FY2009 funding will total $487.7 million.
Table I1. GPOI Funding, by Fiscal Year, FY2005-FY2009
(current U.S. $ millions)
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
(actual)
(actual)
(actual)
(actual)
(request)
Total
96.7
100.4
81.0
96.4
110.2
484.7
Source: Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, June 16, 2008.
Issues
Although its purposes are generally supported, GPOI’s implementation has been
problematic and has drawn criticism from some Members of Congress. In the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181), Congress
called for a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that would address
continuing concerns. These are (1) the extent to which contributing and participating
countries maintain records and databases, (2) the quality and sustainability of the
training of individuals and units, (3) the extent to which those trained are equipped
and remain equipped to deploy in peace operations, (4) the capacity of participating
countries to mobilize those trained, (5) the extent to which trained individuals are
deployed, and (6) the extent to which contractors are used and the quality of their
203 For the program’s first year, about 80% of GPOI funding was provided through the
Defense budget. A small amount of GPOI funding provides a U.S. contribution to the Italian
government’s multinational Center of Excellence for Stability Police (COESPU), which
trains gendarmes (i.e., police with military skills). Through FY2008, the COESPU
contribution was funded by the PKO account. Of the FY2009 request, $106.2 million would
be funded by the PKO account and $4.0 million, for COESPU, would be funded by the State
Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account.

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work. The report, released in June 2008, judged that the State Department and DOD
“have made some progress in achieving GPOI goals in three principal areas: training
and equipping peacekeepers, providing equipment and transportation for deployed
missions, and building peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, but challenges remain
in meeting these goals.”204 It then recommended that the State Department (1)
“improve oversight of nonlethal equipment delivery to partner countries,” (2)
“develop methods to assess the overall outcomes of the training program,” (3)
“ensure that trainees are properly screened for human rights violations,” and (4) in
consultation with DOD, “assess the estimated resources and time frames needed to
complete activities to help achieve the G8 goals for developing African countries’
capabilities to maintain peacekeeping operations on their own.”205
204 U.S. General Accounting Office, Thousands Trained but United States is Unlikely to
Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements are Needed, GAO/08-754, June
2008 p. 2.
205 Ibid., p. 5.

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Appendix J. The Department of Defense in Nonproliferation:
The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program206
DOD Role and Responsibilities
DOD is one of the three principal U.S. agencies that carries out threat reduction
and nonproliferation programs. DOD is responsible for the central program that
secures and eliminates weapons: the multiple-part Cooperative Threat Reduction
program (CTR). The State Department is responsible for the program that provides
research grants to former Soviet scientists and engineers in an effort to keep them
from selling their knowledge to other nations. The Department of Energy (DOE) is
responsible for developing projects to improve accounting and security at research
facilities that house nuclear materials.
Origins
Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program in November 1991. A failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the
subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union had raised concerns about the safety
and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. Congress responded by transferring $400
million in FY1992 DOD funds to assist with the safe and secure transportation,
storage, and dismantlement of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons.207 Congress
appropriated an additional $300 to $500 million per year for DOD’s CTR program
between FY1993 and FY2007. The total budget for U.S. nonproliferation and threat
reduction programs in the former Soviet Union, which includes programs in DOE
and the State Department, has grown to around $1 billion per year.208
For several years in the early 1990s, virtually all the funding for U.S. threat
reduction and nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet Union came from the
DOD budget.209 Contractors working for DOD implemented most of the projects and
206 Prepared by Amy F. Woolf, Specialist in National Defense.
207 This program was authorized through an amendment to the implementing legislation for
the Conventional Armed Forces In Europe (CFE) Treaty (P.L. 102-228). The Amendment,
sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, established the Soviet Nuclear Threat
Reduction Act of 1991 (105 Stat. 1693).
208 For a detailed description of the full range of programs, see CRS Report RL31957,
Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet
Union, by Amy F. Woolf.
209 Congress also established the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Fund (NDF) in 1992, in part to ensure that the State Department would play a role in
providing nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet Union. (The fund was established
by Section 504 of the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasia Democracies and Open
Markets Support Act of 1992, P.L. 102-511, better known by its short title, the FREEDOM
Support Act.) However, the budget for NDF has remained relatively small (around $15-$30
million per year) and, unlike CTR, which has funded long-running, ongoing programs, NDF
it has served more to provide emergency funding and assistance when nonproliferation
(continued...)

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received most of the funding. Other agencies, including DOE and State Department,
participated in some of the CTR programs, particularly when their experts were
needed to design a project, but DOD served as the executive agent for the funding,
with contracts let through the DOD contracting process.
The State Department played the lead role in negotiating the umbrella
agreements between the United States and former Soviet states that were needed
before the United States could fund programs in these states. Further, after passage
of the FREEDOM Support Act in 1992 (P.L. 102-511), the State Department
Coordinator for assistance to the former Soviet Union was supposed to help
coordinate planning for CTR projects across the several agencies. For several years,
a deputies committee consisting of participants from DOD, DOE, the State
Department, and the National Security Council (NSC) met periodically (sometimes
as often as once a month) to discuss priorities for U.S. threat reduction assistance, to
identify possible projects that might receive funding from the program, and to
coordinate efforts by the agencies to support these programs. The frequency of these
meetings declined, however, by the middle of the decade, as the process became
more routine and many ongoing projects were well-established within the budget
process.210
The organizational structure and funding profile for U.S. nonproliferation and
threat reduction assistance changed in FY1996, when financial and administrative
responsibility for some of the programs and projects moved to DOE and the State
Department. Specifically, the State Department took over responsibility for the
Science and Technology centers in Moscow and Kiev, which provided research
grants to former Soviet scientists and engineers in an effort to keep them from selling
their knowledge to other nations. DOE took over responsibility for the Materials
Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program, which was developing
projects to improve accounting and security at research facilities that housed nuclear
materials. This division of labor allowed each agency to take responsibility for those
programs that best reflected its expertise: DOD maintained control of programs that
sought to secure and eliminate weapons, DOE took control of those that sought to
secure nuclear materials that were not in weapons, and State took over those that
worked directly with nuclear specialists in the FSU.
DOD and DOE both supported this change in funding and administration. For
DOD, the change reduced tensions in both Congress and DOD about the use of DOD
funds for foreign aid or foreign assistance programs, leaving DOD with responsibility
for the core CTR weapons elimination efforts. For DOE, the change allowed the
agency to expand the contacts it had established between its own labs and scientists
and those in the former Soviet Union, and to move quickly on its priorities without
the need to go through cumbersome DOD contracting procedures. On the other hand,
209 (...continued)
challenges emerge.
210 According to one source, the exchanges at these meetings were often “heated” as the
participants sought to set priorities among projects that would receive U.S. funding. See,
for example, Jason D. Ellis and Todd Perry, “Nunn-Lugar’s Unfinished Agenda,” Arms
Control Today, October 1997.

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some in State and the NSC argued against this division. Some in the State
Department questioned whether funding for the Science Centers would come at the
expense of other State Department priorities. Some in the NSC argued that the
division would undermine efforts to maintain central control over the priorities and
funding. The division of programs proved to be a financial boon to the whole threat
reduction and nonproliferation effort, with funding increasing to around $1 billion
per year across the three agencies by the end of the decade. Much of this increase
was due to the expansion of DOE’s programs, both at materials facilities and at
storage facilities for nuclear warheads.
An Evolving Program
Initially, many in Congress saw U.S. assistance under the Nunn-Lugar
amendment as an emergency response to impending chaos in the former Soviet
Union. Even after the sense of immediate crisis passed in 1992 and 1993, many
analysts and Members of Congress remained concerned about the potential for
diversion or a loss of control of nuclear and other weapons. Russia’s economy was
extremely weak, and press accounts reported that nuclear materials from Russia were
appearing on the black market in Western Europe. Consequently, many began to
view CTR as a part of a long-term threat reduction and nonproliferation effort.
Former Secretary of Defense William Perry referred to CTR as “defense by other
means,”211 as the program helped eliminate Soviet weapons that had threatened the
United States and contain weapons and materials that could pose new threats in the
hands of other nations.
In response to this relatively narrow mission, the initial Nunn-Lugar legislation
was tightly focused on the transport, storage, and destruction of weapons of mass
destruction. For example, the United States has provided extensive assistance with
destruction and dismantlement projects. These were designed to help with the
elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and their delivery vehicles.
These projects helped Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan remove warheads,
deactivate missiles, and eliminate launch facilities for nuclear weapons covered by
the START I Treaty. Chain of custody projects were designed to enhance the safety,
security, and control over nuclear weapons and fissile materials. These projects
provided Russia with bullet-proof Kevlar blankets, secure canisters, and safer rail
cars to transport warheads from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to storage and
dismantlement facilities in Russia. The CTR program also funded several projects
at storage facilities for nuclear weapons and materials, to improve security and
accounting systems and to provide storage space, at a new facility at Mayak, for
plutonium removed from nuclear warheads when they are dismantled.
Demilitarization projects encouraged Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to convert
military efforts to peaceful purposes.
The focus of CTR funding has changed over the years. Much of the work on
strategic offensive arms reductions has been completed, and the United States has
allocated a growing proportion of the funding to projects that focus on securing and
211 See U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction, April 1995, Washington
D.C., p. 1.

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eliminating chemical and biological weapons and securing storage sites that house
nuclear warheads removed from deployed weapons systems. The DOE programs that
seek to improve security and accounting for nuclear materials and some nuclear
warheads have also expanded and accelerated. Further, Russia has received most of
the funding in recent years, as the participants have completed most projects in the
other nations. In recent years, the United States has also increased funding for
projects that seek to secure borders and track materials, in an effort to keep weapons
of mass destruction away from terrorists. This has included some border security and
export control programs funded through the State Department.
This shift in funding has occurred, in part, because many observers began to
view U.S. assistance to the former Soviet states as a part of the effort to keep
weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists. In 1996, experts testified to
Congress that Russian nuclear and chemical facilities, with their crumbling security
and lack of accounting procedures, could provide a source for terrorists seeking
nuclear or chemical materials. In response, Congress expanded the programs that
provided security at facilities with nuclear materials and suggested that more
attention be paid to security at facilities with materials that could be used in chemical
or biological weapons. Since September 11, 2001, virtually all analysts who follow
U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance have made the link between the
possible quest for weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and the potential for
thwarting them by helping Russia protect its weapons, materials, and knowledge.212
In early 2003, the Administration stated that it had “expanded the strategic focus of
the CTR program” to support the war on terrorism.213 In its budgets presented from
FY2004 through FY2007, it increased funding for several export and border control
programs in DOD, State, and DOE; for the State Department programs designed to
stem the leaking of knowledge out of the former Soviet Union; and for a DOD effort
to find and recover radiological sources — a type of military device that could
provide terrorists with nuclear materials for use in a dirty bomb. All of these
initiatives focus more on stemming proliferation than on eliminating nuclear weapons
in the former Soviet states. However, the Bush Administration has not completely
altered the focus of CTR; in February 2005, at a summit meeting in Bratislava,
Slovakia, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed to accelerate some of the efforts to secure
Soviet-era nuclear weapons.214 This agreement has led to increased funding for both
DOD and DOE efforts to secure nuclear warheads.
212 Senator Sam Nunn has stated that “preventing the spread and use of nuclear biological,
and chemical weapons and materials should be the central organizing principle on security
for the 21st century.” Remarks by Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman, Nuclear
Threat Initiative. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. International
Nonproliferation Conference. November 14, 2002.
213 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former
Soviet Union Threat Reduction Appropriation, February 2003, p. 1.
214 The While House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement by President Bush and
President Putin on Nuclear Security Cooperation,” press release, February 24, 2005,
accessible through [http://www/whitehouse.gov/news]; last accessed July 22, 2008.

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Issues
Many analysts who follow the nonproliferation programs continue to express
concerns about the lack of coordination among DOD, DOE, and the State
Department in setting priorities and allocating funding. Many have suggested that
the White House create a position of nonproliferation czar so that there would be a
single individual in the government with the responsibility for setting priorities and
coordinating implementation of all threat reduction and nonproliferation programs.
Congress has addressed a number of issues over the years as it has reviewed
CTR projects and authorized funding for continuing programs. Some of these have
focused on specific programs, such as the development of a chemical weapons
destruction facility at Shchuch’ye, Russia, one of that country’s seven chemical
weapons storage sites. Questions about the goals of this effort and Russia’s
contribution to it led Congress to withhold funding in FY2000 and to restrict it in
other years. Congress has also addressed questions about the role that CTR plays in
advancing U.S. national security objectives. Some have argued that the United States
should increase funding to secure weapons and materials in Russia at a more rapid
pace, while others have argued that this funding can actually undermine U.S. security
if it frees up funds for Russia to add to its defense budget and weapons acquisition
efforts. There have also been some disputes, over the years, about whether certain
programs should be funded through DOE or through DOD, although those disputes
have waned as the two agencies have worked together to share lessons learned and
best practices.
Some Members of Congress, particularly in the House, have questioned whether
funds should be allocated to the CTR program from the DOD budget as the programs
shift away from efforts to eliminate Soviet-era nuclear weapons and toward efforts
to secure borders and prevent the loss of WMD materials and knowledge. This
controversy has been evident in recent years, as both the President and the Senate
have supported efforts to allow the CTR program to allocate a portion of its funds to
programs outside the former Soviet Union. For example, in 2003, the Bush
Administration requested the authorization to spend up to $50 million in CTR funds
outside the former Soviet Union in the FY2004 Defense Authorization Bill. The
Senate offered its unqualified support for this measure. The House, in contrast,
argued that these types of programs would be better managed by the State
Department than the Defense Department. It authorized the transfer of up to $78
million in CTR funds to the State Department Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Fund for use in threat reduction efforts outside the former Soviet Union. The
Conference Committee, in its report on the FY2004 Defense Authorization Bill
(P.L.108-136), approved the President’s request. However, in deference to the House
concerns, the committee language indicates that this funding should be used only for
short-term projects; it also states that the President should determine whether DOD
is the agency that is most capable of implementing the planned project. The
conferees stated that they would expect the President to assign the project to the most
appropriate agency. The United States has exercised the option of spending CTR
funding outside the former Soviet Union only once, in mid-2004, when DOD
provided assistance to Albania for the elimination of chemical weapons, but DOD
has, in subsequent years, retained the authority to obligate funds outside of the former
Soviet Union.

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Appendix K. DOD in Iraq and Afghanistan
Economic Reconstruction and State-Building215
DOD Roles and Responsibilities
In Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD has assumed economic reconstruction and state-
building responsibilities not usually associated with its military obligations. Civilian
agencies — in particular, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) — have more traditionally taken the lead in
providing such assistance. The State Department plays a key role in overseeing
democratization programs in developing and crisis countries. State also has had the
lead in setting the broad direction of U.S. policy toward these countries. USAID, the
agency with the greatest expertise and experience in international development,
historically has taken the lead in designing and implementing programs intended to
stimulate economic growth and encourage the expansion of democracy. However,
in Afghanistan, and particularly in Iraq, the civilian agencies have found themselves
at times subordinate to DOD in fulfilling these roles. DOD has the lead role in
economic reconstruction of the national infrastructure in Iraq. In Iraq and
Afghanistan, DOD also provides assistance for local-level economic reconstruction
and state-building through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).
Evolution of DOD’s Role in Iraq
A January 20, 2003, presidential directive that established the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) in DOD formally put that
Department in charge of post-invasion planning and assistance in Iraq. The Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA), established by the President in May 2003 to replace
ORHA, was also a DOD entity, its Administrator, Paul Bremer, reporting to the
Secretary of Defense. The CPA made all decisions regarding the political and
economic aftermath of the invasion and determined the direction of U.S. assistance.
The first U.S. foreign assistance efforts to address Iraq’s economic, political,
and social needs were appropriated through the Office of the President under a new
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), which was established by the FY2003
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act in March 2003 (P.L. 108-11). Early
assistance programs were largely managed by USAID and the Department of State.
Of the $2.5 billion in reconstruction funding provided under that Act, DOD was
made responsible for 21%, largely to implement oil and electric power infrastructure
programs. In the November 2003 FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act (P.L. 108-106), Congress approved a large replenishment of the IRRF ($18.4
billion), of which DOD ultimately was responsible for 75%, or about $13.4 billion.
While roughly $4 billion of that sum went to DOD for security-related programs, half
of the entire appropriation ($9.2 billion) was placed by the President in DOD hands
to implement non-security-related activities.
215 Prepared by Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Affairs.

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Economic Reconstruction and Assistance in Iraq. Most of the DOD
economic reconstruction programs involved the design and construction of large-
scale economic infrastructure — roads and bridges, oil and pipeline facilities,
electrical power plants, railroad and telecommunications networks, water and
sanitation plants, and the like. Instead of choosing the Army Corps of Engineers
(which did not believe it had sufficient capacity to oversee or staff such a large effort)
or USAID (which the CPA believed lacked the organizational capacity), the CPA
decided to contract out management and oversight responsibilities for each
construction sector’s projects to private contracting firms. The CPA established a
Program Management Office (PMO) to oversee the managers of these programs. In
mid-2004, following the dissolution of the CPA, the President, issuing National
Security Policy Directive (NSPD) 36,216 transformed the PMO into the Project and
Contracting Office (PCO), a temporary Army organization. Although the State
Department was now in charge of Iraq policy, and a new State-run Iraq
Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) was established to set overall priorities
and requirements for most aid programs, the PCO continued to be responsible to
DOD as well as State. On December 4, 2005, the PCO merged with the Army Corps
of Engineers/Gulf Region Division (ACE-GRD), and the ACE/GRD was formally
identified as the successor organization to the PCO in May 2007.217
Although its role in economic assistance in Iraq has been generally limited to
infrastructure construction, in the latter half of 2006, DOD, without State or USAID
participation, began to develop a program intended to create employment
opportunities for Iraqi citizens and stimulate the economy by rehabilitating some of
the roughly 200 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that composed a large part of the
Iraqi economy prior to the U.S. occupation. Despite State Department skepticism,
the Administration requested $100 million to fund this endeavor under the Iraq
Freedom Fund DOD appropriations account in the FY2007 emergency supplemental
(P.L. 110-28). Congress approved $50 million. Although press reports suggested
that results were disappointing, another $100 million was requested for this endeavor
for the FY2008 Global War on Terrorism supplemental appropriation and $50
million in the FY2009 annual appropriations request.218
216 White House, National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) 36, “United States
Governmental Operations in Iraq,” May 11, 2004.
217 SIGIR, Fact Sheet on the Roles and Responsibilities of U.S. Government Organizations
Conducting IRRF-funded Reconstruction Activities, 07-008, July 26, 2007.
218 In addition to opposition on free market grounds, skeptics questioned the extent to which
violence would be reduced as a result of expanded employment and suggested that the SOEs
might become targets for insurgents, and that investments in the SOEs might provide
opportunities for corruption and political manipulation. Barney Gimbel, “Mission
Impossible,” Fortune, September 17, 2007; “U.S. Falters in Bid to Boost Iraqi Business,”
Washington Post, August 24, 2007. As of spring 2008, about 29 factories have been
restarted, but only 10,000 jobs have reportedly been created versus the original DOD
employment goal of 150,000 by September 2008.

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Issues. Press and expert accounts suggest that the State Department’s views
and extensive pre-war research on post-war Iraq planning were ignored by DOD.219
Many observers believe that the first year of the reconstruction program, during
which DOD was largely in charge of policy and program development, was marked
by ineptness.220 According to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
(SIGIR), under the CPA, large Iraqi-owned financial resources that might have been
turned to valuable use went unaccounted for. In many cases, audits have found that
infrastructure programs under CPA/DOD/Army Corps of Engineers management
were not appropriately monitored and that a number of programs were poorly
constructed and funds were wasted.221 The post-occupation division of labor between
the Army and State Department in the PMO and IRMO may have ensured a
continued lack of coordination between assistance entities.
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the CERP has provided DOD-appropriated funds
to U.S. military commanders on the ground with which to conduct reconstruction
activities, mostly in rural areas. At the time it was launched, there was limited or no
civilian presence to conduct development programs. The CERP’s purpose has been
to facilitate the stabilization of an area in the wake of a military operation by gaining
the support of local populations. In both countries, the CERP supports a wide range
of activities, from school construction to rehabilitation of electrical and water supply
to condolence payments. The program is highly flexible and is not weighed down
by the bureaucratic encumbrances of other assistance programs. Major subordinate
commanders have authority to approve grants up to $500,000. Grants provided have
been credited with helping the military better exercise its security missions, while at
the same time meeting immediate neighborhood development needs. Roughly $2.7
billion in CERP funding has been made available in Iraq.
Authorities. In June 2003, the CPA authorized the operation of the CERP in
Iraq, at first using Iraqi resources. In the November 2003, FY2004 emergency
supplemental appropriations act, funds were appropriated for the CERP in Iraq and
establishment of a similar program was authorized for Afghanistan. Subsequent
appropriations and defense authorization bills continued to authorize and appropriate
funds for the CERP for both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Issues. The CERP is a flexible tool meant originally to address security
concerns. Therefore, it often was used on an ad hoc basis by military commanders
to meet immediate short-term stabilization needs. It has been criticized for not being
219 There are many sources for this criticism. For example, interviews with experts and
officials conducted for the PBS Frontline report “Truth, War, and Consequences,”
accessible through [http://www.pbs.org], last accessed July 22, 2008, and interviews
conducted by the United States Institute of Peace under its Iraq Experience Project.
220 See, for example, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s
Green Zone, Knopf, 2006.
221 See, for example, SIGIR, Audit of Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries
through the National Budget Process, Audit 05-004, January 30, 2005, and other SIGIR
audits, [http://www.sigir.mil]; last accessed July 22, 2008.

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part of a larger development strategy and not being synchronized with civilian
assistance program plans. More recently, CERP projects in Iraq are larger than
previously — on average $140,000/project versus $67,000/project in FY2004 — and
are the main source of U.S. infrastructure assistance in areas such as water and
sanitation, and road construction. According to the SIGIR, in many cases, it is being
used to perform tasks that should be taken on by local and provincial governments,
and, by doing so, it undermines the capacity-building purpose of PRTs.222
Provincial Reconstuction Teams (PRTs)
Although there are multiple models of PRTs in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the
basic premise for all is the integration of civilian and military organization personnel
in order to meet stability objectives in a defined region. The military in both cases
provides protection to civilian officials, allowing civilian specialists a degree of
outreach to the provincial and local governments that otherwise would be impossible.
Civilian employees provide expertise on reconstruction and facilitate political
solutions to local problems that the military is less able to do well.
Afghanistan PRTs. The PRTs in Afghanistan have three goals: (1)
stability/security, (2) extending the reach of the central government and strengthening
local government, and (3) reconstruction. Of the 26 PRTS in Afghanistan, 12 are
U.S.-run and 14 are run by other coalition partner countries.223 They vary in size and
makeup of personnel. The initial guidance for U.S.-run Afghanistan PRTs, agreed
to by senior civilian and military leaders and approved by the U.S. Deputies
Committee of the National Security Council in June 2003, assigned DOD
responsibility for improving security in areas of operation, logistical support, and
force protection for all PRT members. The Department of State was made
responsible for political oversight, coordination, and reporting. USAID was
appointed the lead agency for reconstruction. However, in certain parts of the
country, the military element in Afghanistan PRTs appears to have taken a more
forward role in reconstruction efforts than is the case with PRTs in Iraq. According
to an interagency assessment of the Afghanistan PRTs, despite the guidance
providing leadership to civilians on governance and reconstruction, “PRT culture,
people, and resources were predominantly military.”224 Especially where PRTs were
co-located with combat units, on occasion the commander would reportedly take on
a political as well as military role.
222 SIGIR, Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in
Iraq, 07-015, October 18, 2007, p. 23-34. Hereafter referred to as SIGIR, Review of PRT
Effectiveness.
223 Bruce Rogers, Jim Hope and Robert Kemp, PRTs in Afghanistan: A Report from the
Inside, Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2008, p. 32.
224 Department of State, USAID, Department of Defense, Provincial Reconstruction Teams
in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment, June 2006.

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Iraq PRTs. There are currently 14 PRTs (3 of which are led by other coalition
countries) and 13 ePRTs (embedded PRTs) in Iraq.225 The U.S.-led PRTs are made
up of between 35 and 100 members, including representatives from the Embassy, the
Project Contract Office (Army Corps of Engineers), USAID, military, and other
agency staff. PRTs have been co-located on existing U.S. military bases. The
ePRTs, in which civilian teams are embedded in Brigade Combat Teams, are smaller.
Most are concentrated in Baghdad or Anbar Province, where significant military
action is taking place. Although the PRTs appear to focus efforts on expanding U.S.
assistance outreach to the provinces and strengthening local government, the ePRTs
envision that, as U.S. and Iraqi military forces secure an area, ePRT staff will work
with local Iraqis to further stabilize the area by drawing on all available spigots of
U.S. and Iraqi government funding to create jobs and meet other basic needs.226
DOD’s role in the PRTs, therefore, is chiefly to provide security and logistical
support. DOD, however, was originally reluctant to divert the necessary manpower
from other responsibilities. PRTs in Iraq were authorized by Cable 4045 (October
2005), issued jointly by the U.S. Embassy-Iraq and by the U.S.-led military coalition
Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I), under which the U.S. Embassy was called upon
to support the establishment of PRTs at State Department sites and MNF-1 was
called upon to support them at military sites.227 As the PRTs were being established,
the division of responsibilities and obligations between DOS and DOD were not well
defined. As a result, according to the SIGIR, “lines of authority and coordination
between the U.S. Embassy and military components were never spelled out and
agreed upon, and the operational support mechanisms the PRTs are dependent upon
at military bases — i.e. facilities, life support, communications, management
services, and supplies — were not settled upon.”228 DOD agreed to provide
protection to the PRTs in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that took effect in
February 2007 and finalized operational requirements and responsibilities.229
A key determinant of PRT success in the first year was the presence of a brigade
commander who supported the PRT mission. Such was the case in Mosul, according
to the SIGIR, whereas in Anbar, a lack of support signaled civilian difficulty
obtaining transportation and other resources, and civilian exclusion from meetings
with government officials. According to the SIGIR, in some PRTs, there was
occasionally a difference in views regarding the use of reconstruction assistance, with
225 There are also four Provincial Support Teams (PSTs), much smaller in size than PRTs
and aimed at providing advice to provincial officials. These are being meshed with existing
PRTs or transformed into PRTs. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2008.
226 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Status of the Provincial
Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, SIGIR-06-034, October 29, 2006 (hereafter referred
to as Status of the PRT Iraq Program); Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team
Program Expansion in Iraq, SIGIR-07-014, July 25, 2007; and SIGIR Review of PRT
Effectiveness, op. cit.
227 Reference to Cable 4045 is in SIGIR, Review of PRT Effectiveness, op. cit., p. 5.
228 SIGIR, Status of the PRT Iraq Program, op. cit., p. 8.
229 SIGIR, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq, SIGIR-
07-014, July 25, 2007, p. 15.

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commanders expressing “frustration” over PRT failure to create employment by
funding state-owned enterprises (see above).
The February 2007 MOA helped resolve a number of coordination concerns, but
the role of DOD in providing assistance has continued to be greater than intended,
in part because of shortfalls in civilian staffing at the PRTs. Until civilians with
specialist skills in local governance and agriculture, for example, could be provided
by the Department of State, over 100 DOD-supplied personnel were made available
on a temporary basis.230
Issues. Many refer to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and
Afghanistan as a model for DOD-civilian cooperation in foreign aid. However, it
appears that DOD maintains a preponderant weight in PRT decision making as the
sole supplier of security, which allows civilians to undertake project site visits and
meetings with local leaders, and as a significant supplier of assistance through the
well-funded CERP program. The interagency assessment found that, in Afghanistan,
subordination of PRTs to combat units threatened to dilute a core focus of the PRT
— to strengthen the government of Afghanistan’s capacity to address issues
underlying instability and support for the insurgency. In Iraq, according to the
SIGIR, there are reports that CERP use undermines civilian efforts to strengthen local
government. Absent a clear set of objectives and performance measures fashioned
for each individual PRT, as the SIGIR has repeatedly proposed, the coordinated
efforts of disparate agencies composing the PRTs in Iraq are likely to be dependent
on the personalities of team members and the level of teamwork they are able to
cobble together.
230 “Pentagon Agrees to Help Fill State Department’s Iraq Reconstruction Jobs on
Temporary Basis,” New York Times, February 20, 2007.

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Appendix L. Foreign Security Assistance Initiatives
for Afghanistan and Iraq231
DOD Roles and Responsibilities
In Afghanistan and Iraq today, based on decisions by the Administration and
authorities granted by Congress, DOD plays the lead U.S. government role in
providing training assistance to Iraqi and Afghan security forces, including police and
other civilian forces, as well as military forces. Both the extent of DOD’s role, and
funding appropriated for these purposes, have grown over time.
Congress has also provided DOD with several categories of funding and
authorities to allow international partners to contribute to the coalition efforts in Iraq
and Afghanistan — including both providing some partners with resources directly
to enable their participation, and reimbursing other partners for support provided.
DOD takes the lead in implementing these activities.
Origins and Evolution
Train and Equip. Several key foreign security assistance programs, including
Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training,
managed by the Department of State and implemented by DOD, provided some
forms of “train and equip” assistance to foreign partners.
The driving reasons for assigning DOD the lead role in training and equipping
Iraqi and Afghan security forces were apparently the sheer size and scope of the tasks
at hand, the presence of capable if not specialized DOD personnel on-site, and the
urgency that left no time to deliberately develop capabilities in other U.S.
government agencies. DOD did not seek expanded train and equip authority until the
Administration judged that other approaches were not working.232
The legislation authorizing DOD to provide “train and equip” support and
appropriating funds for that purpose is both specific and limited. The legislation is
enacted on an annual basis, and it refers strictly to Iraq and Afghanistan. Specific
requests for resources and authorities were initiated by the executive branch, based
on input from practitioners in the field.
The legislation requires “the concurrence of the Secretary of State.”233 That
language is generally understood, by staff at both agencies, to mean that initiatives
cannot proceed without State Department approval. Coordination mechanisms for
231 Prepared by Catherine Marie Dale, Specialist in International Security.
232 A similar dynamic characterizes the development of the CERP, discussed in a separate
section, proposed by the military command in Iraq only after the magnitude of requirements
on the ground, and inability of civilian U.S. government agencies to address them in a timely
fashion, became apparent.
233 See FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-106, Section 1107,
and subsequent legislation.

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seeking that approval — from the Secretary or her designated representative — are
reportedly in place and actively utilized.234
Initially, train and equip authority was granted for support to “the New Iraqi
Army and the Afghan National Army.”235 Subsequent legislation expanded the focus
to include the “military and security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan,” which could
include police and other civilian services.236 The scope of the assistance initially
included “assistance, including equipment, supplies, services, training and
funding.”237 Later, the scope was broadened to also include “facility and
infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction.”238
Funds appropriated for train and equip missions in Iraq and Afghanistan have
grown substantially over time, from $150 million in the FY2004 Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-106, of November 6, 2003, to $9.7
billion ($5.9 billion for Afghanistan and $3.8 billion for Iraq) in the FY2007 U.S.
Troop Readiness, Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Act, P.L. 110-28, of May 25,
2007.
Iraq. Security forces training efforts in Iraq were initially spearheaded by the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, which
served from its appointment in May 2003 until June 28, 2004, as the legal executive
authority of Iraq. DOD, as CPA’s higher headquarters, had overall responsibility for
the effort. The military command in Iraq during the formal occupation, the
Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), reported to its own higher headquarters,
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), but served in direct support to CPA.
The scope of the challenge has been extensive because none of Iraq’s pre-war
security forces or structures were left intact or available for duty after major combat
operations ceased. Iraq pre-war planning erroneously assumed that at the end of
“major combat,” Iraqi police would be available, as needed, to help provide security
for the Iraqi people.239 Instead, in the immediate aftermath of major combat,
coalition forces found that civilian law enforcement bodies had disappeared.
Meanwhile, U.S. military pre-war planning had also assumed that Iraqi military
units would be available for recall and reassignment after the war, as needed.
Military plans counted on the “capitulation” of Iraqi forces and included options for
234 Interviews with State Department officials, Washington DC, November 2007.
235 See FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-106, Section 1107.
236 See FY2005 Ronald W. Reagan NDAA, P.L. 108-375, Section 1202, and subsequent
legislation.
237 See FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-106, Section 1107.
238 See FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 235-
237.
239 This assumption was explicitly stated at the February 2003, post-war planning “rock
drill” held by the new Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
(ORHA), at National Defense University.

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using some of those forces to guard borders or perform other tasks.240 Instead, on
May 23, 2003, the CPA issued Order Number 2, dissolving all Iraqi military services,
including the Army. That decision foreclosed the option of unit recall to support
security or reconstruction activities, or to serve as building blocks for a post-Saddam
force.241
In August 2003, CPA directed the creation of the New Iraqi Army, under the
authority of the CPA Administrator or “a civilian member of the CPA reporting
directly to the Administrator.”242 Iraqi police training, too, was initially a CPA
function, under the leadership of former New York Police Commissioner Bernard
Kerik, who reported to the CPA Administrator. He was supported by a skeleton staff
in Baghdad and by resources from the State Department’s Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). That arrangement quickly proved
insufficient to the task at hand.
In early September 2003, at the recommendation of military commanders and
with strong support from DOD, CPA launched the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC),
a “security and emergency service agency for Iraq,” for which the CPA Administrator
delegated responsibility to the senior military commander on the ground.243 The
ICDC was essentially a military initiative, designed to leverage the coalition’s most
copious resource — the “boots on the ground” of CJTF-7 — to recruit and train Iraqi
units to temporarily fill the security vacuum.
By early 2004, it was apparent to senior U.S. civilian and military leaders on the
ground in Iraq that the sheer magnitude of the task demanded significantly greater
resources. Moreover, under the system of divided responsibilities, there was a lack
of consistency across Iraq in the creation of each force, and in strategic-level
coordination among the forces. Accordingly, on May 11, 2004, President Bush
issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36, which, among other
matters, assigned the mission of organizing, training, and equipping all Iraqi security
forces (ISF) to CENTCOM.244 This mission included both directing all U.S. efforts
240 Information from CFLCC and V Corps planners, 2002 and 2003. See also Michael R.
Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story and the Invasion and
Occupation of Iraq, New York: Vintage Books, 2006.
241 CPA Order 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” available at [http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Entities_with_Annex_A.pdf]; last
accessed July 22, 2008. Note that the date of the Order is given incorrectly on the CPA
website table of contents, but is correctly printed on the Order itself.
242 See CPA Order 22, “Creation of a New Iraqi Army,” 18 August 2003, available at
[http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030818_CPAORD_22_Creation_of_a_New
_Iraqi_Army.pdf]; last accessed July 22, 2008.
243 See CPA Order 28, “Establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps,” September 3, 2003,
available at [http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030903_CPAORD_28_Est_of_
the_Iraqi_Civil_Defense_Corps.pdf]; last accessed July 22, 2008.
244 See White House, National Security Presidential Directive 36, “United States
Government Operations in Iraq,” May 11, 2004, available at Federation of American
Scientists website, [http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd051104.pdf], last accessed July
(continued...)

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and coordinating all supporting international efforts. It explicitly included Iraq’s
civilian police, as well as its military forces.245 CENTCOM, in turn, created the
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), a new three-star
headquarters that would fall under the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), to bring
together all Iraqi security forces training under a single lead in Iraq.246
Since December 2004, the MNSTC-I Commander has been dual-hatted as the
Commander of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I). With participation by 15
NATO members, including the United States, and one non-NATO country, NTM-I
provides training, both inside and outside Iraq, to Iraqi forces; assistance with
equipping; and technical assistance.247
On October 1, 2005, MNSTC-I was given the additional responsibility of
mentoring and helping build capacity in the Ministries of Defense and Interior.
Afghanistan. The organization and focus of train and equip efforts in
Afghanistan, too, has evolved over time. Regime removal left both a domestic
security vacuum and a complete lack of truly national structures to support national-
level governance. The December 2001 Bonn Agreement recognized the need to help
the new Afghan authorities “in the establishment and training of new Afghan security
and armed forces.”248 Several months later, at a conference in Geneva on
Afghanistan security, contributing states agreed to support the rebuilding of Afghan
security forces and organized their efforts into five “pillars” — including the Afghan
National Army under U.S. lead, and the police sector under German lead. In 2002,
the United States created the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A),
as part of the military command structure in Afghanistan, with the mandate to train
the Afghan army. Germany assumed the lead for its pillar — the police training
effort. It soon became apparent, however, that pressing security needs called for
greater resources than Germany alone could provide. In 2003, to improve the effort,
244 (...continued)
22, 2008.
245 See NSPD-36, op. cit.
246 In May 2004, CJTF-7 split into a higher, four-star headquarters, MNF-I, and a lower,
three-star headquarters, MNC-I, (see above).
247 See [http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Missions/NTM-I/NTM-I.htm]; last accessed July
22, 2008. Countries participating include 15 NATO members (Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovenia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States), as well as Ukraine. Key
current foci include gendarmerie-type training and helping build an Iraqi non-commissioned
officer corps.
248 Representatives of major Afghan factions participating in the U.N. Talks on Afghanistan,
held in Bonn, Germany, after the October 2001 U.S.-led multilateral coalition intervention,
signed the Bonn Agreement setting forth the terms of a transitional government and
authorizing an international peacekeeping force in Kabul. Agreement on Provisional
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government
Institutions, Annex I, para.2, available at [http://www.afghangovernment.com/Afghan
AgreementBonn.htm]; last accessed July 22, 2008.

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the State Department’s INL, with contractor support, began training serving
policemen and new recruits.249
In 2005, based on input from relevant agencies, the Administration decided to
shift U.S. responsibility for police training in Afghanistan to DOD. The OMC-A was
renamed the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan, still part of the military
command structure in Afghanistan, and it assumed U.S. responsibility for training the
entire Afghan security sector, including the Afghan National Police. Responsibility
for policy guidance on police training remained with the U.S. Chief of Mission250 and
State’s INL retained contract management authority.251
In April 2006, the modalities for cooperation between State and Defense
Department representatives on the ground changed, when the U.S. military command
structure in Afghanistan was adjusted.252 At that time, OSC-A was redesignated the
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and assigned
directly to U.S. Central Command, rather than to a military command in
Afghanistan.253 The U.S. embassy in Kabul provided CSTC-A with policy guidance.
Coalition Partner Assistance. Since 9/11, Congress has provided DOD
with several categories of funding and authorities in order to enable international
partners to contribute, in various ways, to the coalition efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The primary impetus for seeking these authorities has been military
exigency to support coalition operations: the need for the unique access that some
states, by virtue of geography, can provide; the desire for additional troop strength
to support the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan; and the need for some unique
capabilities, such as language skills and cultural familiarity, and other niche
capabilities, such as Estonia’s specialization in explosive ordnance disposal. Some
observers stress that a policy imperative — to build coalition forces with as many
249 See Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, by the
Inspectors General of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, November
2006, available at [http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/76103.pdf]; last accessed
July 22, 2008.
250 The U.S. Chief of Mission is the U.S. Ambassador, or in that official’s absence, the
highest ranking official in the U.S. embassy.
251 Ibid.
252 Early in 2007, the three-star-led Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan was
deactivated.
253 The mandate of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan is “to plan,
program and implement structural, organizational, institutional and management reforms of
the Afghanistan National Security Forces required to defeat the insurgency, provide internal
security, extend and enforce the rule of law, set conditions for economic development and
gain the trust and confidence of the citizens of Afghanistan.” CSTC-A remains part of a
broader international effort. It works in concert with the German Police Project Office and
the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan on police training, and with the
Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams from the NATO-led International Security Assistance
Force on Army training. See the CSTC-A website at [http://www.cstc-a.com]; last accessed
July 22, 2008.

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participants as possible in order to shore up the legitimacy of coalition efforts — has
also played a key role.254
This section addresses two categories, commonly known as “coalition support”
and “lift and sustain.” “Coalition support” provides funds to DOD to reimburse
international partners for their support. “Lift and sustain” allows DOD to provide
resources to international partners, without which they would be unable to participate
in the coalition effort.
The legislation supporting these efforts is enacted annually. Since late 2003,
coalition support legislation has required the “concurrence of the Secretary of
State.”255 As it is for train and equip, this requirement is understood to mean formal
agreement, and inter-agency mechanisms are in place to support coordination.256
“Lift and sustain” legislation does not include such a requirement.
Substantively, the earliest coalition support legislation designated as recipients
only Pakistan and Jordan, but more recent legislation has added “... and other key
cooperating nations.”257 All of the legislation provides for reimbursing those states
for logistical and military support to U.S. military operations.258 The lift and sustain
legislation allows DOD to provide “supplies, services, transportation (including
airlift and sealift), and other logistical support to coalition forces supporting military
and stability operations in Iraq.”259
Congress has appropriated over $1 billion annually for coalition support
efforts.260 Congress supports “lift and sustain” in turn, by providing that DOD may
254 In the case of Iraq, the decision not to pursue a second UN Security Council Resolution
explicitly sanctioning military action may have sharpened interest, in some quarters, in
seeking additional international legitimacy through robust coalition participation. See
United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1441 (2002), November 8, 2002. In it,
the Council “decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations,”
decides to afford Iraq “a final opportunity to comply,” and recalls “that the Council has
repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued
violations,” but stops short of authorizing military action.
255 See FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-106, Title I, Chapter
1 (117 Stat. 1210) and subsequent legislation.
256 Interviews with State Department officials, Washington, D.C., November 2007.
257 See first the FY2002 Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. 107-117, Section 304, January
10, 2002, and then the addition of “key cooperating nations” in the Emergency Wartime
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003, P.L. 108-11, Section 1310.
258 See Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003, P.L. 108-11, Section
1310, and subsequent legislation.
259 See FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-106, Section 1106,
and subsequent legislation.
260 Up to $1.4 billion in the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L.
108-11, April 16, 2003; up to $1.15 billion in the FY2004 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-106, November 6, 2003 ... and then up to $900 million in the
(continued...)

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use funds available for operation and maintenance for lift and sustain efforts.261 In
practice, coalition support has directly supported major border operations by the
government of Pakistan, along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, as well as Jordanian
efforts along the Jordan-Iraq border.262 The assistance has also reportedly supported
some states in the region that do not wish their involvement in the coalition efforts
to be known. Lift and sustain, in turn, has allowed Poland to bring its forces to Iraq,
sustain them throughout their deployment, and lead the Multi-National Division
Center South.263 Lift and sustain has also supported Georgia’s deployment to Iraq of
a full brigade of 2,000 soldiers, who are currently manning checkpoints between al
Kut and the Iraq-Iran border.
Issues
DOD’s role in coalition partner assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan has been
relatively uncontroversial. It is possible that DOD’s coordination role with
international partners in these cases could set precedents for future security
partnerships more broadly. It may be more likely, however, that DOD’s coalition
partner assistance role in these two cases will serve as a precedent only for possible
future coalition military operations — not for the routine conduct of security
assistance or security cooperation.
DOD’s role in train and equip assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan has sparked
much more debate — within DOD, among U.S. government agencies, and in the
broader policy community. Most observers expect that in the future, U.S. efforts to
help build the capacity and improve the capabilities of the security forces of various
partner states are likely to grow, even if nation-building-style missions on the scale
of Iraq are not very likely.264 There is much less agreement among agencies and
observers about who ought to bear what share of the burden.
Some argue that the Department of State, and in particular INL, should be much
better resourced, in terms of personnel and funding, to meet possible future demands.
Current resources simply do not allow INL to tackle training missions on the scale
of the recent Iraq or Afghanistan experiences. Building up a greater capacity in the
260 (...continued)
FY2007 Defense Appropriations Act P.L. 109-289, September 30, 2006; up to $200 million
in the FY2007 U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, P.L. 110-28, Title I, Chapter 3, May 25, 2007.
261 See FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-106, Section 1106,
and subsequent legislation.
262 See Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) justifications for war funding
requests, for example [http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_
supplemental/FY2007_Emergency_Supplemental_Request_for_the_GWOT/pdfs/
operation/21_DSCA_Supp_OP-5.pdf]; last accessed July 22, 2008.
263 Ibid.
264 This expectation is reflected prominently in both DOD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review and in the 2006 National Security Strategy.

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State Department would allow it to assume a greater share of the responsibility in a
similar future contingency.
Others argue that DOD needs to increase its own training capacity — even if
DOD will remain in a supporting role for future training missions. Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates identified “the standing up and mentoring of indigenous army
and police” as “a key mission for the military as a whole.”265 Some DOD officials
and outside defense experts have argued that the training mission is so important that
DOD should establish and maintain dedicated training units, to capitalize on recent
operational experiences.266
These two approaches (i.e., increasing training capacity at the Department of
State and at DOD) are not mutually exclusive. Both might be considered appropriate
by analysts who expect a larger overall future requirement for U.S. train and equip
assistance.
265 U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, the
“Landon Lecture” delivered at Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, November 26,
2007. Accessed through [http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches]; last accessed July 22,
2008.
266 See for example John Nagl, “Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for a Permanent
Army Advisor Corps,” Center for a New American Security, June 2007, available at
[http://www.newamericansecurity.org/publications/Nagl_AdvisoryCorp_June07.pdf]; last
accessed July 22, 2008.

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