Order Code RL32048
Iran: U.S. Concerns and
Policy Responses
Updated July 31, 2008
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Summary
The Bush Administration characterizes Iran as a “profound threat to U.S.
national security interests,” a perception generated primarily by Iran’s nuclear
program but that also takes into account Iran’s military assistance to armed groups
in Iraq, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The threat
assessment of some other governments was lessened by the December 3, 2007 key
judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is
driving to develop an actual nuclear weapon, but Administration officials say that this
finding was not the main thrust of the NIE, which judged Iran to be continuing
uranium enrichment.
The Bush Administration approach to contain the potential threat posed by
Iran’s nuclear program is to strengthen international economic pressure on Iran while
also offering Iran potential cooperation should it comply with the international
demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium. This led the Administration to
approve the participation of a high-level State Department official at multilateral
nuclear talks with Iran on July 19, 2008. Three U.N. resolutions (1737, 1747, and
1803) impose sanctions that ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade
with Iran; freeze the assets of Iran’s nuclear and related entities and personalities;
prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran; ban or require reporting on
international travel by named Iranians; call for inspections of some Iranian sea and
airborne cargo shipments; and call for restrictions on dealings with some Iranian
banks. Separate U.S. efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade,
investment, and credits to Iran; and to convince foreign banks not to do business with
Iran, are beginning to injure Iran’s economy, by many accounts. The pressure appears
to be causing debate among Iranian leaders over whether to negotiate the sought
curbs on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the offered incentives.
To strengthen its diplomacy, the Administration has maintained a substantial
naval presence in the Persian Gulf, which U.S. commanders insist would prevent any
Iranian attempts to close the crucial Strait of Hormuz for any extended period. The
Administration strongly denies that it is planning to take military action against Iran,
but has refused to rule it out if no other efforts to curb Iran’s uranium enrichment
program succeed. An alternate question is how the Administration would react to any
Israeli attempt to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Others believe that only a change of
Iran’s regime would end the threat posed by Iran, although regime change is not
currently a prominent feature of Administration policy toward Iran. Bills under
consideration in the 110th Congress, including H.R. 1400, S. 970, S. 3227,
H.Con.Res. 362, and S.Res. 580 would mandate or recommend significant tightening
of U.S. sanctions on Iran.
For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, The Iran Sanctions Act
(ISA), and CRS Report RS22323, Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq, both by
Kenneth Katzman, and CRS Report RS21592, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent
Developments, by Sharon Squassoni. This report is updated regularly.
Contents
Political History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Regime Stability, Human Rights, and Recent Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Rebound of the Conservatives and the 2005 Election of
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Ahmadinejad’s Policies and Political Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
March 2008 Majles Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Human Rights Practices and the Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Prominent Dissidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Exile Groups: People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) . . . . 11
Other Armed Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The Son of the Former Shah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Other Activists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Iran’s Strategic Capabilities and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs . . . . . 13
Conventional Military/Revolutionary Guard/Qods Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Nuclear Program and Related Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Establishment of “P5+1” Contact Group/June 2006 Incentive
Package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Resolution 1696 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Resolution 1737 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Resolution 1747 and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Resolution 1803 and New Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Chemical Weapons, Biological Weapons, and Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Ballistic Missiles/Warheads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Relations with the Persian Gulf States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Iranian Policy in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Supporting Palestinian Militant Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Lebanese Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Central Asia and the Caspian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
U.S. Policy Responses, Options, and Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Overview of Bush Administration Iran Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Containment and Possible Military Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Iranian Retaliatory Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Containment and the Gulf Security Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Presidential Authorities and Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Regime Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
“Grand Bargain Concept” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Further International and Multilateral Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
European/Japanese/Other Foreign Country Policy on Sanctions and
Trade Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Foreign Banking and Financing Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
World Bank Loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
U.S. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Terrorism/Foreign Aid Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Proliferation Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Counter-Narcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
U.S. Trade Ban/Subsidiaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Subsidiaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Pending Comprehensive Sanctions Legislation: H.R. 1400, S. 970,
S. 3227, H.Con.Res. 362, and S.Res. 580 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Travel-Related Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Status of Some U.S.-Iran Assets Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
List of Figures
Figure 1. Structure of the Iranian Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Figure 2. Map of Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
List of Tables
Table 1. Major Factions and Personalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table 2. Factions in the Eighth Majles (Elected March 14 - April 25, 2008) . . . . 7
Table 3. Selected Economic Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 4. Human Rights Practices and Dissent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Table 5. Iran’s Conventional Military Arsenal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Table 6. Summary of Provisions of U.N. Resolutions on Iran Nuclear Program
(1737, 1747, and 1803) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Table 7. Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Table 8. Iran Democracy Promotion Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Table 9. Entities Sanctioned by U.N. Resolutions and Executive Order 13382 . 61
Iran: U.S. Concerns and
Policy Responses
Much of the debate over U.S. policy toward Iran has centered on the nature of
the current regime; some believe that Iran, a country of almost 70 million people, is
a threat to U.S. interests because hardliners in Iran’s regime dominate and set a policy
direction intended to challenge U.S. influence and allies in the region. President
Bush, in his January 29, 2002, State of the Union message, labeled Iran part of an
“axis of evil” along with Iraq and North Korea.
Political History
The United States was an ally of the late Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
(“the Shah”), who ruled from 1941 until his ouster in February 1979. The Shah
assumed the throne when Britain and Russia forced his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi
(Reza Shah), from power because of his perceived alignment with Germany in World
War II. Reza Shah had assumed power in 1921 when, as an officer in Iran’s only
military force, the Cossack Brigade (reflecting Russian influence in Iran in the early
20th century), he launched a coup against the government of the Qajar Dynasty. Reza
Shah was proclaimed Shah in 1925, founding the Pahlavi dynasty. The Qajars had
been in decline for many years before Reza Shah’s takeover. That dynasty’s
perceived manipulation by Britain and Russia had been one of the causes of the 1906
constitutionalist movement, which forced the Qajars to form Iran’s first Majles
(parliament) in August 1906 and promulgate a constitution (December 1906). Prior
to the Qajars, what is now Iran was the center of several Persian empires and
dynasties. Iran adopted Shiite Islam under the Safavid Dynasty (1500-1722), which
brought Iran out from a series of Turkic and Mongol conquests.
The Shah was anti-Communist, and the United States viewed his government
as a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf. In 1951,
under pressure from nationalists in the Majles (parliament) who gained strength in
the 1949 Majles elections, he appointed a popular nationalist parliamentarian, Dr.
Mohammad Mossadeq, as Prime Minister. Mossadeq was widely considered left-
leaning, and the United States was wary of his policies, which included his drive for
nationalization of the oil industry. Mossadeq’s followers began an uprising in August
1953 when the Shah tried to dismiss Mossadeq, and the Shah fled. The Shah was
restored in a successful CIA-supported uprising against Mossadeq.
The Shah tried to modernize Iran and orient it toward the West, but in so doing
he also tried to limit the influence of Iran’s Shiite clergy. He exiled Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini in 1964 because of Khomeini’s active opposition to the Shah,
opposition based on the Shah’s anti-clerical policies and what Khomeini alleged was
the Shah’s forfeiture of Iran’s sovereignty to his patron, the United States. Khomeini
CRS-2
fled to and taught in Najaf, Iraq, a major Shiite theological center that contains the
Shrine of Imam Ali, Shiism’s foremost figure. There, he was a peer of senior Iraqi
Shiite clerics and, with them, advocated direct clerical rule or velayat-e-faqih (rule
by a supreme Islamic jurisprudent). In 1978, three years after the March 6, 1975,
Algiers Accords between the Shah and Iraq’s Baathist leaders, which settled
territorial disputes and required each party to stop assisting each other’s
oppositionists, Iraq expelled Khomeini to France, from which he stoked the Islamic
revolution. Mass demonstrations and guerrilla activity by pro-Khomeini forces, allied
with a broad array of anti-Shah activists, caused the Shah’s government to collapse
in February 1979. Khomeini returned from France and, on February 11, 1979,
declared an Islamic Republic of Iran, as enshrined in the constitution that was
adopted in a public referendum in December 1979 (and amended in 1989). Khomeini
was strongly anti-West and particularly anti-U.S., and relations between the United
States and the Islamic Republic turned hostile even before the November 4, 1979,
seizure of the U.S. Embassy by pro-Khomeini radicals.
Regime Stability, Human Rights,
and Recent Elections
About a decade after founding the Islamic republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini died on June 3, 1989. The regime he established appears relatively stable,
despite internal schisms, occasional unrest in areas inhabited by minorities, and
substantial unpopularity among many intellectuals, students, labor groups, and
women. Upon his death, one of his disciples, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, a two term
president (1981-1989), was selected Supreme Leader by an “Assembly of Experts”
(an elected body).1 The fourth election for the Assembly of Experts, which is
empowered to oversee the work of the Supreme Leader and replace him if necessary,
as well as to amend the constitution, was held on December 15, 2006. After that
election, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, still a major figure having served two terms as
president himself (1989-1997), was elected deputy chief of the Assembly of Experts,
positioning him for elevation to leader following the August 2007 death of the
existing chief, Ayatollah Ali Meshkini. Rafsanjani was voted head of the Assembly
of Experts on September 4, 2007, defeating the harder line Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati.
Khamene’i has vast formal powers as Supreme Leader — he is Commander in
Chief of the armed forces, appoint commanders, and has a representative on the
highest national security body, the Supreme National Security Council, composed of
top military and civilian security officials. The Supreme Leader appoints half of the
twelve-member Council of Guardians;2 and the members of Iran’s Supreme Judicial
Council, but he does not appoint the cabinet, which is named by the President and
confirmed by the Majles (parliament). Headed by Jannati, the conservative-controlled
Council of Guardians reviews legislation to ensure it conforms to Islamic law, and
1 The Assembly also has the power to amend Iran’s constitution.
2 The Council of Guardians consists of six Islamic jurists and six secular lawyers. The six
Islamic jurists are appointed by the Supreme Leader. The six lawyers on the Council are
selected by the judiciary but confirmed by the Majles (parliament).
CRS-3
it screens election candidates. Khamene’i also has the power, under the constitution,
to remove the elected President if either the Supreme Judicial Council or the elected
Majles (parliament) say the President should be removed, with cause. The Supreme
Leader also appoints members of the 42-member Expediency Council, set up in 1988
to resolve legislative disagreements between the Majles (parliament) and the Council
of Guardians. Expediency Council members serve five-year terms. The Council,
appointed most recently in February 2007, is still headed by Rafsanjani; its executive
officer is former Revolutionary Guard commander-in-chief Mohsen Reza’i.
Table 1. Major Factions and Personalities
Conservatives
Supreme
Has all the formal powers but not the undisputed authority of his
Leader Ali
predecessor, founder of the revolution Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Khamene’i
Considered moderate-conservative despite frequent hardline rhetoric
including on Israel. Seeks to challenge U.S. hegemony and wants
Israel defeated but respects U.S. military power and fears military
confrontation with United States. Generally supports the business
community (bazaaris), and opposes state intervention in the economy.
Akbar
Key strategist of the regime, longtime advocate of “grand bargain” to
Hashemi-
resolve all outstanding issues with United States, although on Iran’s
Rafsanjani
terms. A mid-ranking cleric, now leads both Expediency Council and
Assembly of Experts. Heads moderate-conservative faction known as
Executives of Construction. Was Majles (parliament) speaker during
1981-89 and President 1989-1997. One of Iran’s richest men, family
owns large share of Iran’s total pistachio nut production.
President
Leads faction of younger, harder line conservatives associated with
Mahmoud
Revolutionary Guard, revolutionary institutions, and provincial
Ahmadinejad
governments, who comprise much of his cabinet. Generally supports
state control of the economy, subsidies, and social welfare programs
for lower classes. Particularly popular in rural areas. See box.
Majles Speaker
Overwhelming winner for Majles seat from Qom on March 14, 2008
Ali Larijani
and selected Majles Speaker on May 25 (237 out of 290 votes).
Former state broadcasting head (1994-2004) and Minister of Culture
and Islamic Guidance (1993) , was head of Supreme National Security
Council and chief nuclear negotiator from August 2005 until October
2007 resignation. Sought to avoid U.N. Security Council isolation.
Politically close to Khamene’i, he still serves on the Supreme National
Security Council.
Mohammad
Former Revolutionary Guard Air Force commander and police chief,
Baqer Qalibaf
but a moderate-conservative and likely challenger to Ahmadinejad in
2009 presidential election. Supporters won nine out of 15 seats on
Tehran city council in December 2006 elections, propelling him to
mayor of Tehran. With Larijani and former Revolutionary Guard
Commander-in-Chief Mohsen Reza’i, recruited moderate
conservatives for March 2008 Majles election.
CRS-4
Ayatollah
Founder of the hardline Haqqani school, and spiritual mentor of
Mohammad
Ahmadinejad. Fared poorly in December 2006 elections for 86-seat
Taqi Mesbah-
“Assembly of Experts” that can amend the constitution, oversee
Yazdi
Khamene’i’s performance, and determine his successor, but did win
a seat. An assertive defender of the powers of the Supreme Leader and
a proponent of an “Islamic state” rather than the current “Islamic
republic,” and advocates isolation from the West. Some believe
Mesbah-Yazdi harbors ambition to replace Khamene’i.
Mahmud
An Ayatollah, has headed the Supreme Judicial Council since 1999.
Hashemi
Ally of Khamene’i and Rafsanjani, has supported repeated
Shahrudi
crackdowns on independent media critical of the regime. But, has
cracked down on judicial corruption and on mistreatment of prisoners.
Politically close to Shiite Islamist parties in Iraq, he is hosting
Moqtada Al Sadr, the radical young Iraqi cleric who has been studying
Islamic theology in Qom since late 2007.
Militant
Longtime organization of hardline clerics headed by Ayatollah
Clerics
Mohammad Mahdavi-Kani. Not to be confused with an
Association
organization with almost the same name, below.
Reformists
Mohammad
Reformist president during 1997-2005. Elected May 1997, with 69%
Khatemi/
of the vote; re-elected June 2001with 77%. Rode wave of sentiment
Reformists
for easing social and political restrictions among students,
intellectuals, youths, and women that seeks reform but not outright
replacement of the Islamic republican regime. Khatemi supporters held
about 70% of the 290 seats in the 2000-2004 Majles. Now heads
International Center for Dialogue Among Civilizations and remains a
public figure in Iran. Visited U.S. in September 2006 to speak at
Harvard and the Washington National Cathedral on “dialogue of
civilizations.” Reformist Mostafa Moin finished fifth in the first round
of presidential elections on June 17, 2005. Reformists regrouped and
won four of fifteen Tehran city council seats in December 2006 local
elections.
S o c i e t y o f
Reformist grouping once led by Mehdi Karrubi. Karrubi formed a
Militant Clerics
separated “National Trust” grouping after his 2005 loss in the
presidential election.
Office of
Hardline reformists. Originally strong Khatemi supporters, but
Consolidation
turned against him for failing to challenge hardliners, particularly
Unity (Daftar
after July 1999 violent crackdown on student riots, in which four
Tahkim-e-
students were killed. Generally dispersed and repressed under
Vahdat)
conservative presidency of Ahmadinejad.
The Islamic
The most prominent and best organized pro-reform grouping. Its
Iran
leaders include Khatemi’s brother, Mohammad Reza Khatemi (a
Participation
deputy speaker in the 2000-2004 Majles) and Mohsen Mirdamadi.
Front (IIPF).
Mojahedin of
Composed mainly of left-leaning Iranian figures who support state
the Islamic
control of the economy, but want greater political pluralism and
Revolution
relaxation of rules on social behavior. Its leader is former Heavy
Organization
Industries Minister Behzad Nabavi.
(MIR)
CRS-5
The Rebound of the Conservatives and the 2005 Election of
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. After suffering several election defeats at the hands of
Mohammad Khatemi and the reformists during 1997-2000 — and losing the grip on
power they held while Khomeini was alive — the conservative camp gained strength
after the February 28, 2003, municipal elections, when reformists largely boycotted.
The conservatives gained additional strength from the February 20, 2004, Majles
elections, in which the Council of Guardians disqualified about 3,600 mostly
reformist candidates, including 87 members of the incumbent Majles, enabling the
conservatives to win about 155 out of the 290 seats on turnout of about 51%. The
Administration and the Senate (S.Res. 304, adopted by unanimous consent on
February 12, 2004) criticized the elections as unfair because of the screening.
As the reformist faction suffered setbacks, Rafsanjani and other conservatives
prepared for the June 2005 presidential elections.3 After the Council of Guardians
narrowed the field of candidates to 8 out of the 1,014 persons who filed,4 Rafsanjani
had several opponents more hardline than he is — three had ties to the Revolutionary
Guard: Ali Larijani (see Table 1); Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf (see Table 1); and
Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In the June 17, 2005 first round, turnout was
about 63% (29.4 million votes out of 46.7 million eligible voters). With 21% and
19.5%, respectively, Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad moved to a run-off. Ahmadinejad
won a landslide victory in the June 24 runoff, receiving 61.8% to Rafsanjani’s 35.7%.
Turnout was 47%, less than the first round. He took office on August 6, 2005.
Ahmadinejad’s Policies and Political Position. Since taking office,
Ahmadinejad has inflamed world opinion with several anti-Israel statements, the first
of which was stated at an October 26, 2005, Tehran conference entitled “A World
Without Zionism” that “Israel should be wiped off the map” and that “anybody who
recognizes Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nations’ fury.” A similar point
of contention was his insistence on the holding of a December 2006 conference in
Tehran questioning the Holocaust, a theme he has returned to several times since,
including at a September 2007 speech at Columbia University, a forum where he also
denied that Iran had any homosexuals. A U.N. Security Council statement and Senate
and House resolutions (H.Res. 523 and S.Res. 292), passed in their respective
chambers, condemned the statement. (On June 21, 2007, the House passed
H.Con.Res. 21, calling on the United Nations Security Council to charge
Ahmadinejad with violating the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide; the Convention includes “direct and public incitement”
to commit genocide as a punishable offense.)
Some Iranian leaders, both conservative and reformist, and portions of the
population, appear concerned that Ahmadinejad’s defiance of the international
community on the nuclear issue is isolating Iran. Several experts believe that
Supreme Leader Khamene’i, although publicly backing Iran’s “right” to develop
nuclear energy, wants to curb Ahmadinejad’s authority, in part to limit the potential
3 Rafsanjani was constitutionally permitted to run because a third term would not have been
consecutive with his previous two terms.
4 In the 2001 presidential election, the Council permitted 10 out of the 814 registered
candidates.
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for confrontation with the United States. The first decision that strengthened this
view was the October 2005 grant of new governmental supervisory powers to the
Expediency Council. In July 2006, Khamene’i created a ten-person advisory “Foreign
Policy Committee” consisting of former defense and foreign ministers. In January
2007, an Iranian newspaper owned by Khamene’i admonished Ahmadinejad to
remove himself from the nuclear issue. A shakeup in the nuclear negotiating team in
October 2007 represented a further indication of splits in the leadership on that issue,
especially because the former negotiator (now Majles Speaker), Ali Larijani,
continued to undertake official visits representing the Supreme Leader. In April 2008,
Ahmadinejad fired two cabinet ministers, including the Interior Minister Mustafa
Pour-Mohammadi who is close to Khamene’i. In a further sign of rift and of the
increasing damage to Iran’s economy that international sanctions are inflicting, the
Supreme Leader’s top foreign policy advisor, former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar
Velayati, said in July 2008 that Iran should consider Western offers to settle the
nuclear issue.
March 2008 Majles Elections. The December 15, 2006, municipal council
and Assembly of Experts elections led experts to believe that pro-Ahmadinejad
candidates would be on the defensive in the March 14, 2008, Majles elections. In the
municipal elections, his supporters won only 3 out of the 15 seats on the Tehran city
council, with similar results in other major cities. Ahmadinejad’s political standing
appeared further undermined by the June 2007 rationing of gasoline — a move
intended to curb consumption that forces Iran to import refined gasoline. The
rationing harmed poorer Iranians in the urban areas who sometimes use their cars as
unofficial taxis, although it did reduce dependence on imported gasoline (to about
25% from 40%). The Oil Minister resigned in August 2007, probably because of the
unpopularity of the program among some. In January 2008, the Supreme Leader
ordered Ahmadinejad to implement Majles legislation requiring the government to
give natural gas to remote villages hard hit by cold weather.
Ahmadinejad has tried to solidify his position with the lower classes and rural
votes by raising some wages and lowering interest rates for poorer borrowers,
cancelling some debts of farmers, and increasing social welfare payments and
subsidies. Some analysts believe these moves have backfired, to some extent, by
causing increased inflation, but rural Iranians see him as attentive to their economic
plight. Ahmadinejad apparently believes that his distributive policies can still be
supported by high oil prices. The relative health of Iran’s budget is helping Iran
minimize the effects of international sanctions resulting from Iran’s nuclear defiance,
although some business owners say the difficulty obtaining credit from foreign banks
is hurting their ability to operate.
Maneuvering increased in advance of the Majles elections and presidential
elections in March 2009, in which Ahmadinejad is expected to run for a second term.
About 7,600 persons filed to run for the 290 total seats, of which 30 are in Tehran.
Of these, about 2,000 mostly reformist candidates, including 103 Majles incumbents,
were disqualified by the Council of Guardians. The outcome is in the table below,
and the selection of Ali Larijani, leader of the “moderate-conservative” faction, as
Majles Speaker, suggests that Ahmadinejad will face a relatively critical Majles as
the March 2009 presidential election in Iran approaches. Ahmadinejad’s re-election
will likely hinge on whether the Supreme Leader supports or actively works against
CRS-7
him and whether his relative popularity in the rural areas holds. As an indication of
his relative unpopularity with well educated Iranians, students protested
Ahmadinejad during a speech at Tehran’s Amir Kabir University in November 2006.
Other student protests against him took place on October 8, 2007, and since.
Table 2. Factions in the Eighth Majles
(Elected March 14 - April 25, 2008)
Pro-Ahmadinejad Conservatives (United Front of Principalists)
117
Anti-Ahmadinejad Conservatives (Coalition of Principalists)
53
Reformists (39 seats in eighth Majles)
46
Independents
71
Seats annulled or voided
3
Ahmadinejad has not moved to correct economic structural imbalances, such as
the dependence on oil revenues, which account for about 20% of Iran’s gross
domestic product (GDP), and its extensive imports of refined gasoline. Major
economic sectors or markets are controlled by the quasi-statal “foundations”
(bonyads), run by powerful former officials, and there are special trading privileges
for them and the bazaar merchants, a key constituency for some conservatives. The
same privileges reportedly apply to businesses run by the Revolutionary Guard, as
discussed below.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
First non-cleric to be president of the Islamic republic since the assassination of then
president Mohammad Ali Rajai in August 1981. About 52, he campaigned as a “man of
the people,” the son of a blacksmith who lives in modest circumstances, who would
promote the interests of the poor and return government to the principles of the Islamic
revolution during the time of Ayatollah Khomeini. His official biography says he served
with the “special forces” of the Revolutionary Guard, and he served subsequently (late
1980s) as a deputy provincial governor. A part of the “Isargaran” faction composed of
former Guard and Basij (volunteer popular forces) leaders and other hardliners. U.S.
intelligence reportedly determined he was not, as was thought by some, one of the holders
of the 52 American hostages during November 1979-January 1981. Other accounts say
Ahmadinejad believes his mission is to prepare for the return of the 12th Imam - Imam
Mahdi – whose return from occultation would, according to Twelver Shiite doctrine, be
accompanied by the establishment of Islam as the global religion. Earned clerical
criticism in May 2008 for again invoking intervention by Imam Mahdi in present day
state affairs. In an October 2006 address, Ahmadinejad said, “I have a connection with
God.” For more information, see CRS Report RS22569, Iran: Profile of President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, by Hussein Hassan.
CRS-8
Table 3. Selected Economic Indicators
Economic Growth
4.3% (2007 est.)
Per Capita Income
$8,100/yr purchasing power parity
Proven Oil Reserves
135 billion barrels (highest after Russia and Canada)
Oil
4.1 million barrels per day (mbd)/ 2.4 mbd exports. Exports could shrink
Production/Exports
to zero by 2015-2020 due to accelerating domestic consumption.
Major Oil/Gas
China — 300,00 barrels per day (bpd); about 4% of China’s oil imports;
Customers
Japan — 600,000 bpd, about 12% of oil imports; other Asia (mainly
South Korea) — 450,000 bpd; Italy — 300,000 bpd; France — 210,000
bpd; Netherlands 40,000 bpd; other Europe — 200,000 bpd; India —
150,000 bpd (10% of its oil imports; Africa — 200,000 bpd. Turkey —
gas: 8.6 billion cubic meters/yr
Refined Gasoline
Imports were $5 billion value per year in 2006, but now about $4 billion
Import/ Suppliers
per year after rationing. 60% is supplied by European oil trader Vitol,
(other traders include Russia’s Lukoil). Direct suppliers include refineries
in: India, Kuwait, UAE, Turkey, Venezuela, Singapore, Netherlands,
China, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan. Iran planning at least eight new or
upgrade refinery projects to expand capacity to about 3 million barrels
per day from 1.5 mbd.
Major Export
Japan ($9.9 billion); China ($9.2 billion); Turkey ($5.1 billion); Italy
Markets (2006)
($4.45 billion); South Korea ($4 billion); Netherlands ($3.2 billion);
France ($2.7 billion); South Africa ($2.7 billion); Spain ($2.3 billion);
Greece ($2 billion)
Major Imports From
Germany ($5.6 billion); China ($5 billion); UAE ($4 billion); S. Korea
(2006)
($2.9 billion); France ($2.6 billion); Italy ($2.5 billion); Russia ($1.7
billion); India ($1.6 billion); Brazil ($1.3 billion); Japan ($1.3 billion).
Export Credit
Germany $715 million, down from $2 billion in 2005; France — $3.8
Guarantees (2006)
billion, down from $5.7 billion in 2005.
Major Non-Oil
Renault (France) and Mercedes (Germany)- automobile production in
Investments
Karaj, Iran — valued at $370 million; Renault (France), Peugeot (France)
and Volkswagen (Germany) — auto parts production; Turkey — Tehran
airport, hotels; China — shipbuilding on Qeshm Island, aluminum factory
in Shirvan, cement plant in Hamadan; UAE financing Esfahan Steel
Company; India — steel plant, petrochemical plant; S. Korea — steel
plant in Kerman Province; S. Korea and Germany — $1.7 billion to
expand Esfahan refinery.
Trade With U.S.
$320 million (trade is severely restricted by U.S. sanctions). Exports to
(2007)
U.S. — $173 million (large categories: pomegranate juice, caviar,
pistachio nuts, carpets, medicines, artwork). Imports from U.S. — $146
million (food, medicines, tobacco products, seeds).
Foreign Exchange
$40 billion+
External Debt
$19 billion (2005 est.)
Development
2003 (latest available): $136 million grant aid. Biggest donors: Germany
Assistance Received
($38 million); Japan ($17 million); France ($9 million).
Inflation
18%+ (2007), according to Iranian economists.
Unemployment Rate
11%+
Source: CIA World Factbook, various press, IMF, Iran Trade Planning Division (2006), press
CRS-9
Human Rights Practices and the Opposition
The regime appears to have a relatively firm grip on power, in part because
Iran’s leaders have vigorously suppressed any dissent. However, Iranian opinion is
hard to gauge and even seemingly low level unrest has the potential to spiral into a
potential threat to the regime if, for example, the regime is perceived as committing
fraud in an election. Successive U.S. administrations have not generally considered
Iran’s human rights practices as a strategic threat to U.S. interests, but the Bush
Administration has highlighted Iran’s human rights record in order to build
international consensus to pressure Iran. The State Department’s human rights report
for 2007, released March 11, 2008, said Iran’s already poor human rights record
“worsened” during the year – a formulation similar to that used in the report for
2006. The latest human rights report, and the 2007 State Department “religious
freedom” report (released September 14, 2007), cites Iran for widespread serious
abuses, including unjust executions, politically motivated abductions by security
forces, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and arrests of women’s rights activists.
Table 4. Human Rights Practices and Dissent5
Group/
Regime Practice/Recent Developments
Issue
Ethnic and
Persians are about 51% of the population, and Azeris (a Turkic people) are about
Religious
24%. Kurds are about 7% of the population, and about 3% are Arab. Of religions,
Breakdown
Shiite Muslims are about 90% of the Muslim population and Sunnis are about
10%. About 2% of the population is non-Muslim, including Christians,
Zoroastrians (an ancient religion in what is now Iran), Jewish, and Baha’i.
Private
Since 2000, judicial hardliners have closed hundreds of reformist newspapers,
Media
although many have tended to reopen under new names. During March 26 - March
2007, authorities banned more than 20 publications. Iran also has blocked hundreds
of pro-reform websites. During 2007, regime increased controls over use of the
internet because citizens have increasingly turned to that medium as a source for
news and political debate. In August 2007, the government closed a major
reformist daily newspaper, Shargh, which had previously been suspended
repeatedly. In February 2008, the regime closed the main women’s magazine,
Zanan (women in Farsi) for allegedly highlighting gender inequality in Islamic law.
Labor
Unions are technically not independent, but under a state-controlled “Workers’
Unions/
House” umbrella. However, some activists show independence and, in 2007, the
Students
regime arrested labor activists for teachers’ associations, bus drivers’unions, and
a bakery workers’ union. The regime reportedly also dissolved student unions and
replaced them with regime loyalists following student criticism of Ahmadinejad.
H.Con.Res. 203 condemns Iran’s July 2007 arrests of several union officers.
5 Sources: State Department reports on human rights and on religious freedom.
[http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78852.htm]; [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls
/irf/2005/51599.htm].
CRS-10
Group/
Regime Practice/Recent Developments
Issue
Women
Regime strictly enforcing requirement that women fully cover themselves in public,
generally with a garment called a chador, including through detentions. In March
2007, the regime arrested 31 women activists who were protesting the arrest in
2006 of several other women’s rights activists; all but 3 of the 31 were released by
March 9. In May 2006, the Majles passed a bill calling for increased public
awareness of Islamic dress, an apparent attempt to persuade women not to violate
the dress code or wear Western fashion. The bill did not contain a requirement that
members of Iran’s minority groups wear badges or distinctive clothing. In April
2006, Ahmadinejad directed that women be allowed to attend soccer matches, but
the Supreme Leader reversed that move. Women can vote and run in parliamentary
elections, but their candidacies for president have routinely been barred by the
Council of Guardians. Iranian women can drive, and many work outside the home,
including owning and running their own businesses. There are nine women in the
290-seat Majles, down from 13 in the previous Majles.
Religious
Each year since 1999, the State Department religious freedom report has named
Freedom
Iran as a “Country of Particular Concern” under the International Religious
Freedom Act, and continued deterioration in Iran’s practices on this issue was
noted in the International Religious Freedom report for 2007. (No sanctions have
been added because of this designation, on the grounds that Iran is already subject
to extensive U.S. sanctions.)
Baha’is
Iran repeatedly cited for repression of the Baha’i community, which Iran’s Shiite
Muslim clergy views as a heretical sect. In the 1990s, several Baha’is were
executed for apostasy (Bahman Samandari in 1992; Musa Talibi in 1996; and
Ruhollah Ruhani in 1998). Another, Dhabihullah Mahrami, was in custody since
1995 and died of unknown causes in prison in December 2005. In February 2000,
Iran’s Supreme Court set aside the death sentences against three other Baha’is. A
wave of Baha’i arrests occurred in May 2006 and two-thirds of university students
of the Baha’i faith were expelled from university in 2007. Several congressional
resolutions have condemned Iran’s treatment of the Baha’is, including in 1982,
1984, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, and 2006. In the 110th Congress,
H.Res. 1008 condemns Iran’s treatment of the Baha’is.
Jews
Along with Christians, a “recognized minority,” with one seat in the Majles, the
30,000-member Jewish community (the largest in the Middle East aside from
Israel) enjoys somewhat more freedoms than Jewish communities in several other
Muslim states. However, in practice the freedom of Iranian Jews to practice their
religion is limited, and Iranian Jews remain reluctant to speak out for fear of
reprisals. During 1993-1998, Iran executed five Jews allegedly spying for Israel.
In June 1999, Iran arrested 13 Jews (mostly teachers, shopkeepers, and butchers)
from the Shiraz area that it said were part of an “espionage ring” for Israel. After
an April-June 2000 trial, ten of the Jews and two Muslims accomplices were
convicted (July 1, 2000), receiving sentences ranging from 4 to 13 years. An
appeals panel reduced the sentences, and all were released by April 2003.
Sunnis
The State Department reports note other discrimination against Sufis and Sunni
Muslims, although abuses against Sunnis could reflect that minority ethnicities,
including Kurds, are mostly Sunnis. In addition, the regime repressed 2006 unrest
among the minority Azeri population, as well as Arabs in the southern province of
Khuzestan.
Human
The June 4, 2008 (latest annual), State Department “Trafficking in Persons” report
Trafficking
continues to place Iran in Tier 3 (worst level) for failing to take action to prevent
trafficking in persons. Girls purportedly are trafficked for sexual exploitation
within Iran and from Iran to Turkey, Pakistan, and the Gulf states.
CRS-11
Prominent Dissidents. The regime is highly concerned about dissidents who
previously held senior regime positions. These dissidents are popular inside Iran, but
their ascendancy, were it to occur, might not fundamentally alter Tehran’s foreign or
defense policies. One such figure, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, was released in
January 2003 from several years of house arrest, but he remains under close watch.
He had been Khomeini’s designated successor until 1989, when Khomeini dismissed
him for allegedly protecting intellectuals and other opponents of clerical rule.
Another senior cleric who takes similar positions, Ayatollah Mohammad Kazemeni
Boroujerdi, was arrested on October 8, 2006. Closely monitored dissidents with
similar views include theoretician Abd al-Karim Soroush, former Interior Minister
Abdollah Nuri, and former hostage-holder Abbas Abdi, who had been arrested in
2002 for publishing an opinion poll purporting to show that the Iranian public favors
restoring relations with the United States.
Other, less prominent dissidents have sought to challenge or expose the regime’s
practices from inside Iran. Journalist Akbar Ganji conducted hunger strikes to protest
regime oppression; he was released on schedule on March 18, 2006 after sentencing
in 2001 to six years in prison for alleging high-level involvement in a series of
murders of Iranian dissident intellectuals that the regime had blamed on “rogue
agents” in the security apparatus. The Bush Administration issued a statement calling
for his release on July 12, 2005. Canadian journalist (of Iranian origin) Zahra Kazemi
died in detention in 2003, allegedly of beating. She had been detained in July 2003
for filming outside Tehran’s Evin prison. An intelligence agent who allegedly
conducted the beating was acquitted on July 25, 2004, prompting accusations that the
investigation and trial were unfair. The prosecutor in her case, Saeed Mortazavi,
allegedly responsible for numerous human rights abuses, was Iran’s representative
to the inaugural meeting of the U.N. Human Rights Council.
Exile Groups: People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). Of
the groups seeking to replace the regime outright, one of the best known is the
People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI).6 Secular and left-leaning, it was
formed in the 1960s to try to overthrow the Shah of Iran and advocated Marxism
blended with Islamic tenets. It allied with pro-Khomeini forces during the Islamic
revolution and supported the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in
Tehran but was later driven into exile. Even though it is an opponent of Tehran, since
the late 1980s the State Department has refused contact with the PMOI and its
umbrella organization, the National Council of Resistance (NCR). The State
Department designated the PMOI as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in October
19977 and the NCR was named as an alias of the PMOI in the October 1999 re-
designation. The FTO designation was prompted by PMOI attacks in Iran that
sometimes kill or injure civilians — although the group does not appear to purposely
target civilians. In August 14, 2003, the State Department designated the NCR offices
in the United States an alias of the PMOI, and NCR and Justice Department
authorities closed down those offices.
6 Other names by which this group is known is the Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MEK
or MKO) and the National Council of Resistance (NCR).
7 The designation was made under the authority of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132).
CRS-12
The State Department report on international terrorism for 2007 asserts that the
organization — and not just a radical element of the organization as the group asserts
— was responsible for the alleged killing of seven American defense advisers to the
former Shah in 1975-1976. The State Department report again notes the group’s
promotion of women in its ranks and again emphasizes the group’s “cult-like”
character, including indoctrination of its members and separation of family members,
including children, from its activists.
The group’s alliance with Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 1980s and 1990s
contributed to the U.S. shunning of the organization. U.S. forces attacked PMOI
military installations in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom and negotiated a
ceasefire with PMOI military elements in Iraq, requiring the approximately 3,350
PMOI fighters to remain confined to their Ashraf camp near the border with Iran. Its
weaponry is in storage, guarded by U.S. and U.S.-allied personnel. Another 350
PMOI fighters have taken advantage of an arrangement between Iran and the ICRC
for them to return home if they disavow further PMOI activities. Another 200 are in
the process of leaving Ashraf if a host country could be found.
Press reports say that some Administration officials want the group removed
from the FTO list and want a U.S. alliance with it against the Tehran regime.8 In
November 2002, a letter signed by about 150 House Members was released, asking
the President to remove the PMOI from the FTO list.9 Those advocating that policy
take heart from the U.S. decision in July 2004 to grant the Ashraf detainees
“protected persons” status under the 4th Geneva Convention, meaning they will not
be extradited to Tehran or forcibly expelled as long as U.S. forces remain in Iraq. At
the same time, some Iraqi leaders from pro-Iranian factions, including Prime Minister
Nuri al-Maliki, have said that the group would be expelled.
At the same time, opinion in Europe appears to be changing on the group. In
June 2003, France arrested about 170 PMOI members, including its co-leader
Maryam Rajavi (wife of PMOI founder Masoud Rajavi, whereabouts unknown). She
was released and remains based in France, and is occasionally received by European
parliamentarians and other politicians. In December 2006, a European Union (EU)
court struck down EU’s freezing of the PMOI’s assets in Europe. In May 2008, a
British court determined that the group should no longer be considered a terrorist
organization.
Other Armed Groups. Some armed groups are operating in Iran’s border
areas, and are generally composed of ethnic or religious minorities. One such group
is Jundullah, composed of Sunni Muslims from the Baluchistan region bordering
Pakistan. An armed Kurdish group operating out of Iraq is the Free Life Party, known
by its acronym PJAK. Another militant group, the “Ahwazi Arabs,” operates in the
largely Arab inhabited areas of southwest Iran, bordering Iraq.
8 Cloud, David. “U.S., Iran Hit Bumpy Terrain on Road to Rapprochement.” Wall Street
Journal, May 12, 2003.
9 “Removal of Iran Group From Terror List Sought.” Washington Post, November 23, 2002.
CRS-13
The Son of the Former Shah. Some Iranian exiles, as well as some elites
still in Iran, want to replace the regime with a constitutional monarchy led by Reza
Pahlavi, the U.S.-based son of the late former Shah and a U.S.-trained combat pilot.
However, he does not appear to have large-scale support inside Iran. In January 2001,
the Shah’s son, who is about 50 years old, ended a long period of inactivity by giving
a speech in Washington, DC, calling for unity in the opposition and the institution
of a constitutional monarchy and democracy in Iran. He has since broadcast messages
into Iran from Iranian exile-run stations in California.10 His political adviser is MIT-
educated Shariar Ahy. No U.S. assistance has been provided to exile-run stations.
The conference report on the FY2006 regular foreign aid appropriations, P.L. 109-
102, stated the sense of Congress that the Administration consider such financial
support.
Other Activists. Numerous Iranians-Americans in the United States want to
see a change of regime in Tehran. Many of them are based in California, where there
is a large Iranian-American community, and there are about 25 small-scale radio or
television stations that broadcast into Iran. Some well-known U.S.-based activists
include The Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation; and the Iran Human Rights
Documentation Center (IHDC). The center is run by persons mostly of Iranian origin
and affiliated with Yale University’s Griffin Center for Health and Human Rights.
It is documenting abuses in Iran, using contacts with Iranians in Iran. Another exile
is Amir Abbas Fakravar, a leader of the student dissidents who emerged in the July
1999 anti-regime student riots. A former medical student, he served time in Iranian
prisons.
Some organizations, such as The National Iranian American Council (NIAC),
are not necessarily seeking influence inside Iran. The mission of NIAC, composed
largely of Iranian-Americans, is to promote discussion of U.S. policy, and the group
has advocated possible engagement with Iran.
Iran’s Strategic Capabilities and
Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
The Administration’s “National Security Strategy” document released March
16, 2006 — which continues to represent a prevailing and perhaps even growing
Administration view — says the United States “may face no greater challenge from
a single country than from Iran.” The perception is based largely on Iran’s growing
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and its ability to exert influence in
the region counter to U.S. objectives.11 Iran’s national security goals are to protect
itself from foreign, primarily U.S., interference or attack, and to be able to protect
and defend the Shiite Islamic world that Iran sees as oppressed by the more numerous
and dominant Sunnis. Iran’s advanced and other conventional weaponry is deemed
10 Kampeas, Ron. “Iran’s Crown Prince Plots Nonviolent Insurrection from Suburban
Washington.” Associated Press, August 26, 2002.
11 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/].
CRS-14
to pose a less significant threat than its WMD, but Iran’s forces could still, in some
cases, threaten U.S. forces and allies in the Gulf region, as discussed later.
Conventional Military/Revolutionary Guard/Qods Force
Iran’s armed forces are extensive but widely considered relatively combat
ineffective against a well-trained, sophisticated military such as that of the United
States. Iran’s forces are believed to be sufficiently effective to deter or fend off
conventional threats from Iran’s weaker neighbors such as post-war Iraq,
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Afghanistan but are largely lacking in logistical
ability to project power much beyond Iran’s borders or to confront militarily capable
neighbors such as Turkey and Pakistan. Iran’s armed forces have few formal
relationships with foreign militaries, but Iran and India have a “strategic dialogue”
and some Iranian naval officers reportedly are being trained in India. Iran and Turkey
have agreed in principle (April 2008) to jointly fight terrorism along their joint
border. Most other military relationships between Iran and other countries, such as
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, North Korea, and a few others generally center on Iranian
arms purchases or upgrades.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),12 which also controls the Basij
(mobilization) volunteer militia that enforces adherence to Islamic customs, is
generally loyal to the hardliners politically and is clearly more politically influential
than is Iran’s regular military, which is larger but was held over from the Shah’s era.
The two forces, the Guard and the regular military, technically report to a Joint
Headquarters. As further evidence of the Guard’s pre-eminence, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen said on November 29, 2007 that the
IRGC Navy now has responsibility to patrol the entire Persian Gulf, and that the
regular Navy is patrolling the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman.
In IRGC leadership developments, on September 2, 2007, Khamene’i replaced
Rahim Safavi with Mohammad Ali Jafari as Commander In Chief of the Guard;
Jafari is considered a hardliner against political dissent, but he is believed politically
aligned with Rafsanjani and former Guard chief Mohsen Reza’i, rather than with
Ahmadinejad. In December 2007, Jafari briefly took direct control of the Basij,
which operates from thousands of positions in Iran’s institutions, and indicated he
would increase its role in monitoring and suppressing dissent. Later, the Basij
command was given to senior Guard leader Mohammad Baqr Zolqadr, who had been
serving as deputy Interior Minister, although command reshuffles in July 2008
furthered the view that the Basij is playing a more active role in uncovering suspected
plotting by Iran’s minorities and other groups. More information on Iran’s military
and how it might perform in combat against the United States is discussed under
“military options” later in this paper.
The Guard has a unit, the Qods (Jerusalem) Force, that operates outside Iran to
assist pro-Iranian movements with weapons, training, and finances. The Guard is also
increasingly involved in Iran’s economy, acting through a network of contracting
12 For a more extensive discussion of the IRGC, see Katzman, Kenneth. “The Warriors of
Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard,” Westview Press, 1993.
CRS-15
businesses it has set up, most notably Ghorb (also called Khatem ol-Anbiya, Persian
for “Seal of the Prophet”). Active duty IRGC senior commanders reportedly serve on
Ghorb’s board of directors. For the role of the Guard/Qods Force in external
activities, see below under “Foreign Policy and Terrorism.”
In the 110th Congress, a provision of H.R. 1400 (passed by the House on
September 25), S. 970, and the FY2008 defense authorization bill (P.L. 110-181,
Senate amendment adopted September 6, 2007 by vote of 76-22) calls for the
Revolutionary Guard to be designated a foreign terrorist organization, or FTO. On
October 25, 2007, the Administration took a somewhat lesser step by naming the
Guard, the Ministry of Defense, and several of the Guard’s commanders and
construction firms, as well as several Iranian banks, as proliferation entities under
Executive Order 13382. The Qods Force of the Guard, along with Bank Saderat, was
named as a “specially designated global terrorist entity” under Executive Order
13224. Both orders freeze the U.S.-based assets and prevent U.S. transactions with
the named entities, but these entities are believed to have virtually no U.S.-based
assets that could be frozen - the main penalties of Executive Order 13382 and 13324.
The U.S. action might have substantial effect on the Guard and its business entities
if U.S. partner countries and others adopt similar sanctions.
CRS-16
Table 5. Iran’s Conventional Military Arsenal
Defense
Surface-
Military
Combat
Budget
Tanks
Air
Ships
Personnel
Aircraft
(billions
Missiles
U.S. $)
545,000
1,693
150
280
200
6.6
(regular
(incl. 480 I-Hawk
(incl. 25 MiG-
(incl. 10
military and
T-72)
plus some
29 and 30 Su-
Chinese-made
Revolutionary
Stinger
24)
Hudong, 40
Guard Corps
Boghammer, 3
(IRGC)). IRGC
frigates) Also
is about one-
has 3 Kilo
third of total
subs
force.
“Qods Forces” of IRGC. Approximately 10,000 - 15,000 total in the Qods Force, which
promotes Iran’s regional and global objectives through advisory support to pro-Iranian
factions in Lebanon, Iraq, Persian Gulf states, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Also operates
worldwide intelligence network to give Iran possible terrorist option and to assist in
procurement of WMD-related technology.
Ship-launched cruise missiles. Iran is able to arm its patrol boats with Chinese-made C-802
cruise missiles. Iran also has Chinese-supplied HY-2 Seerseekers emplaced along Iran’s
coast.
Midget Subs. Iran is said to possess several, possibly purchased assembled or in kit form
from North Korea. Iran claimed on Nov. 29, 2007 to have produced a new small sub
equipped with sonar-evading technology.
Anti-aircraft missile systems. Russia has sold and now delivered to Iran (January 2007) 30
anti-aircraft missile systems (Tor M1), worth over $1 billion. In September 2006, Ukraine
agreed to sell Iran the Kolchuga radar system that can improve Iran’s detection of combat
aircraft. In December 2007, Russia agreed to sell the even more capable S-300 air defense
system, purportedly modeled after the U.S. Patriot system, which U.S. officials say would
greatly enhance Iran’s air defense capability. It is due for delivery in September 2008.
Nuclear Program and Related Sanctions
Since early 2007, Iran and the international community have verged on a crisis
over Iran’s nuclear program as many governments asserted their belief that Iran is
attempting to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. U.S. policy, as stated repeatedly
by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and other senior officials is that a nuclear
Iran is unacceptable and that U.S. policy is to prevent that outcome. Still, debate
persists over Iran’s nuclear intentions as well as its capabilities, not to mention how
best to ensure that Iran’s program is for peaceful purposes only.
International scrutiny of Iran’s nuclear program intensified after 2002, when Iran
confirmed PMOI allegations that it was building two facilities that could potentially
CRS-17
be used to produce fissile material useful for a nuclear weapon: a uranium enrichment
facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak,13 considered ideal for
the production of plutonium. It was revealed in 2003 that the founder of Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan, sold Iran nuclear technology
and designs.14 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), despite intensified
inspections of Iran’s facilities since late 2002, has said it cannot verify that Iran’s
current program is purely peaceful, and several of its reports (January 31, 2006,
February 27, 2006, and May 26, 2008) say it found documents that show a possible
involvement of Iran’s military in procuring technology for Iran’s program. The May
26, 2008, IAEA report, as have some of its previous reports, refer to a “Green Salt”
project of testing of relevant high explosives and of missile re-entry vehicles. A
National Intelligence Estimate (unclassified key judgments), released December 3,
2007,15 cast doubt on the most alarming interpretations of Iran’s program (as well as
on that of a previous NIE issued in May 2005), saying that Iran had — but in late
2003 halted — a covert nuclear weapons program as a result of increased
international scrutiny and pressure.
Iranian leaders continue to assert that Iran’s nuclear program is for electricity
generation. Iran says its oil resources are finite and that enriching uranium to make
nuclear fuel is allowed under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,16 to which
Iran is a party. An analysis was published by the National Academy of Sciences
challenging the U.S. view that Iran is petroleum rich and therefore has no need for
a nuclear power program. According to the analysis, the relative lack of investment
is causing a rapid decline in Iranian oil exports to the point where Iran might have
negligible exports of oil by 2015.17 U.S. officials say that Iran’s vast gas resources
make a nuclear energy program unnecessary.
Despite Iran’s professions that WMD is inconsistent with its ideology, the NIE
says it is likely that Iran will eventually try to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran’s
factions appear to agree on the utility of a nuclear weapons capability as a means of
ending its perceived historic vulnerability to U.S. domination and a symbol of Iran
as a major nation. Others believe Iran sees nuclear weapons as instruments to
dominate the Persian Gulf, and these experts believe an Iranian nuclear weapon
would dramatically shift the balance of power in the Gulf/Middle East in Iran’s favor.
There are also fears Iran might transfer WMD to extremist groups or countries.
13 In November 2006, the IAEA, at U.S. urging, declined to provide technical assistance to
the Arak facility on the grounds that it was likely for proliferation purposes.
14 Lancaster, John and Kamran Khan. “Pakistanis Say Nuclear Scientists Aided Iran.”
Washington Post, January 24, 2004.
15 Text at [http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf]
16 For Iran’s arguments about its program, see Iranian paid advertisement “An Unnecessary
Crisis — Setting the Record Straight About Iran’s Nuclear Program,” in the New York
Times, November 18, 2005. P. A11.
17 Stern, Roger. “The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National Security,”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
December 26, 2006.
CRS-18
Even though many countries are suspicious of Iran’s nuclear goals, there is still
major disagreement over the urgency of the issue. The Administration’s key concern
is that Iran is expanding its ability to produce enriched uranium. The NIE assessed
that Iran will likely be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched
uranium for a nuclear weapon some time during 2010-2015. IAEA Director El
Baradei said on April 18, 2008, that Iran is now running about 3,400 centrifuges,
considered a threshold number that could allow Iran to enrich enough uranium for a
nuclear weapon. Ahmadinejad said in July 2008 that Iran has at least 5,000
centrifuges running. But, IAEA reports have said Iran had enriched uranium to only
about 4% (90% is needed for a weapon), and that Iran still faces significant
bottlenecks in enrichment. The February 22, 2008, IAEA report added, and press
photos of an Ahmadinejad visit to Natanz in April 2008 show, that Iran is also testing
a new generation of centrifuge design (“IR-2”). The IAEA report added that Iran had
not addressed U.S. allegations that it had, prior to 2003, a nuclear weapons effort, but
Iran reportedly agreed in April 2008 to address IAEA concerns on this issue. The
May 26, 2008, IAEA report indicates Iran’s responses have not cleared up
outstanding questions on these issues. The report was viewed as highly critical of
Iran’s cooperation and raised major questions about its intentions.
The Administration is somewhat less concerned with Russia’s work, under a
January 1995 contract, on an $800 million nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Russia
insisted that Iran sign an agreement under which Russia would provide reprocess the
plant’s spent nuclear material; that agreement was signed on February 28, 2005. The
plant was expected to become operational in 2007, but Russia had insisted (including
during President Putin’s visit to Iran in October 2007) that Iran first comply with the
U.N. resolutions discussed below. In December 2007, perhaps to signal disagreement
with further pressure on Iran, Russia began fueling the reactor. Iran has received
virtually all the fuel that is needed, but the plant is not operational yet. Iran says the
fuel it is producing will be used for a second reactor planned for the Darkhovin area.
As part of Russia’s work with Iran, Russia has trained about 1,500 Iranian nuclear
engineers.
Diplomatic Efforts in 2003 and 2004/Paris Agreement. In 2003, France,
Britain, and Germany (the “EU-3”) opened a separate diplomatic track to curb Iran’s
program. On October 21, 2003, Iran pledged, in return for peaceful nuclear
technology, to (1) fully disclose its past nuclear activities, (2) to sign and ratify the
“Additional Protocol” to the NPT (allowing for enhanced inspections), and (3) to
suspend uranium enrichment activities. Iran signed the Additional Protocol on
December 18, 2003, although the Majles has not ratified it. Iran abrogated the
agreement after the IAEA reports of November 10, 2003, and February 24, 2004,
stated that Iran had violated its NPT reporting obligations over an 18-year period.
(The NIE released on December 3, 2007 appears to indicate that it was in conjunction
with this October 2003 agreement with the EU-3 that Iran might have halted its
covert nuclear weapons work.)
In the face of the U.S. threat to push for Security Council action, the EU-3 and
Iran reached a more specific November 14, 2004, “Paris Agreement,” committing
Iran to suspend uranium enrichment (which it did as of November 22, 2004) in
CRS-19
exchange for renewed trade talks and other aid.18 EU-3 — Iran negotiations on a
permanent nuclear pact began on December 13, 2004, and related talks on a trade and
cooperation accord (TCA) began in January 2005. On March 11, 2005, the Bush
Administration announced it would support the talks, but not join them, by dropping
U.S. objections to Iran’s application to the World Trade Organization (which it did
in May 2005) and to consider sales of U.S. civilian aircraft parts to Iran.
Reference to the Security Council. The Paris Agreement broke down just
after Ahmadinejad’s election, when Iran rejected as insufficient an EU-3 offer to
assist Iran with peaceful uses of nuclear energy and provide limited security
guarantees in exchange for Iran’s (1) permanently ending uranium enrichment; (2)
dismantling the Arak heavy water reactor;19 (3) agreement to no-notice nuclear
inspections; and (4) a pledge not to leave the NPT (which has a legal exit clause). On
August 8, 2005, Iran broke the IAEA seals on its uranium “conversion” (one step
before enrichment) facility at Esfahan and began conversion. On September 24, 2005,
the IAEA Board voted to declare Iran in non-compliance with the NPT and to refer
the issue to the Security Council,20 but no time frame was set for the referral. Iran did
not cease uranium conversion. The Administration supported a November 2005
Russian proposal to Iran to establish a facility in Russia at which Iranian uranium
would be enriched, thereby enabling Iran to claim it had retained its right to enrich.
Iran did not accept the proposal. In January 2006, Iran resumed enrichment activities,
and on February 4, 2006, the IAEA board voted 27-321 to report Iran to the U.N.
Security Council. On March 29, 2006, the Council agreed on a Council presidency
“statement” setting a 30-day time limit (April 28, 2006) for Iran to cease
enrichment.22
Establishment of “P5+1” Contact Group/June 2006 Incentive
Package. Because of opposition from Russia and China to immediately punishing
Iran, as well as to build support for possible international or multilateral sanctions,
the Administration offered on May 31, 2006, to join the nuclear talks with Iran if Iran
first suspends its uranium enrichment. Such talks would center on a package of
incentives and possible sanctions that were agreed to on June 1, 2006, by a newly
formed group of negotiating nations, the so-called “Permanent Five Plus 1” (P5+1:
United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany). EU representative
18 For text of the agreement, see [http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/eu_iran
14112004.shtml].
19 In November 2006, the IAEA, at U.S. urging, declined to provide technical assistance to
the Arak facility on the grounds that it was likely for proliferation purposes.
20 Voting in favor: United States, Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Argentina,
Belgium, Ghana, Ecuador, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia,
Japan, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, India. Against: Venezuela. Abstaining: Pakistan,
Algeria, Yemen, Brazil, China, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia,
and Vietnam.
21 Voting no: Cuba, Syria, Venezuela. Abstaining: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya, South
Africa.
22 See [http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/290/88/PDF/N0629088.pdf?Open
Element].
CRS-20
Javier Solana formally presented the offer to Iran on June 6, 2006. (The incentive
package is formally outlined in Annex I to U.N. Resolution 1747, see below.)
Incentives
! Negotiations on an EU-Iran trade agreements and acceptance of Iran
into the World Trade Organization.
! Easing of U.S. sanctions to permit sales to Iran of commercial
aircraft or aircraft parts.
! Sale to Iran of a light-water nuclear reactor and guarantees of nuclear
fuel (including a five year buffer stock of fuel), and possible sales of
light-water research reactors for medicine and agriculture
applications.
! An “energy partnership” between Iran and the EU, including help for
Iran to modernize its oil and gas sector and to build export pipelines.
! Support for a regional security forum for the Persian Gulf, and
support for the objective of a WMD free zone for the Middle East.
! The possibility of eventually allowing Iran to resume uranium
enrichment if it complies with all outstanding IAEA requirements
and can prove that its nuclear program is purely for peaceful
purposes.
Reported Sanctions23
! Denial of visas for Iranians involved in Iran’s nuclear program and
for high-ranking Iranian officials.
! A freeze of assets of Iranian officials and institutions; a freeze of
Iran’s assets abroad; and a ban on some financial transactions.
! A ban on sales of advanced technology and of arms to Iran; and a
ban on sales to Iran of gasoline and other refined oil products.
! An end to support for Iran’s application to the WTO.
Resolution 1696. Iran did not immediately give a formal response to the
incentive offer. On July 31, 2006, the Security Council voted 14-1 (Qatar voting no)
for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696, giving Iran until August 31, 2006, to
fulfill the longstanding IAEA nuclear demands (enrichment suspension, etc).
Purportedly in deference to Russia and China, it was passed under Article 40 of the
U.N. Charter, which makes compliance mandatory, but not under Article 41, which
23 One source purports to have obtained the contents of the package from ABC News:
[http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN060609.htm]
CRS-21
refers to economic sanctions, or Article 42, which would authorize military action.
It called on U.N. member states not to sell Iran WMD-useful technology.
On August 22, 2006, Iran submitted a formal response to the June 6 offer by the
six powers. The text of Iran’s response was not disclosed, but it reportedly did not
offer to suspend uranium enrichment, instead proposing negotiations on a broader
roadmap of engagement with the West — and sought provision of guarantees that the
United States would not seek regime change.
Resolution 1737. With the backing of the P5+1, chief EU negotiator Javier
Solana negotiated with Iran to try arrange a temporary enrichment suspension. A
round of talks, in Berlin, concluded on September 28, 2006, without agreement. After
almost four months of negotiations, the Security Council agreed to U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1737. It was passed unanimously on December 23, 2006, under
Chapter 7, Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. It prohibits sale to Iran — or financing of
such sale — of technology that could contribute to Iran’s uranium enrichment or
heavy-water reprocessing activities. It also required U.N. member states to freeze the
financial assets of 10 named Iranian nuclear and missile firms and 12 persons related
to those programs. See Table 8.
The Resolution did not mandate the banning of travel by these personalities, but
called on member states not to admit them. It also provided an exemption, sought by
Russia, for the Bushehr reactor. The EU foreign ministers agreed on February 12,
2007, to freeze the assets of the named entities and to impose broader restrictions on
entities that might later be identified as assisting Iran’s WMD program and to prevent
the training of Iranians in Europe that might contribute to Iran’s programs.
Resolution 1747 and Results. Resolution 1737 demanded enrichment
suspension by February 21, 2007. An IAEA report sent to Board member countries
that day said Iran continued its enrichment activities. In London on March 8, 2007,
the P5+1 began formal discussions on a new Chapter 7 Security Council resolution
that would presumably impose additional sanctions on Iran, quickly reaching
agreement. On March 24, 2007, Resolution 1747 was adopted unanimously, which:
! added 10 military/WMD-related entities; 3 Revolutionary Guard
entities; 8 persons, and 7 Revolutionary Guard commanders listed
in Table 8. Bank Sepah is among the entities sanctioned.
! banned arms transfers by Iran, a provision targeted at Iran’s alleged
arms supplies to Lebanese Hezbollah and to Shiite militias in Iraq.
! required all countries to report to the United Nations when the
sanctioned Iranian persons travel to their territories.
! called for (but did not require) countries to avoid selling arms or
dual use items to Iran and to avoid any new lending or grants to Iran.
Resolution 1747 demanded Iran suspend enrichment by May 24, 2007. The
IAEA report of May 23, 2007 stated that Iran did not comply, but the pressure of the
Resolutions appeared to be altering Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking. In August 2007,
CRS-22
Iran agreed to sign with the IAEA an agreement to clear up outstanding questions on
Iran’s past nuclear activities by the end of 2007, although the agreement was
criticized by the United States as not central to preventing Iran from achieving a
nuclear capability. On that basis, the P5+1 grouping — along with the EU itself —
agreed to a joint statement on September 28, 2007 (reiterated in November 2007), in
which all the undersigned, including Russia and China, said they would negotiate
another sanctions resolution if there is no progress reported by the IAEA in
implementing the August 2007 agreement or in separate continued negotiations with
EU representative Javier Solana. The IAEA report was circulated on November 15,
2007, saying that Iran had provided additional information on its past programs. On
his separate diplomatic track, Solana characterized a November 30, 2007, meeting
with new Iranian negotiator Sayid Jallili as “disappointing,” suggesting no progress.
Resolution 1803 and New Incentives. After several months of
negotiations, Resolution 1803 was adopted by a vote of 14-0 (Indonesia abstaining)
on March 3, 2008. It: (1) bans sales of dual use items to Iran; (2) authorizes, but does
not require, inspections of cargo (carried by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of
Iran Shipping Line) suspected of shipping WMD-related goods; (3) imposes a firm
travel ban on five Iranians named in Annex II to the Resolution and requires reports
on international travel by 13 individuals named in Annex I; (4) calls for, but does not
require, countries to prohibit financial transactions with Iran’s Bank Melli and Bank
Saderat; and (5) adds 12 entities to those sanctioned under Resolution 1737
(requiring asset freezes of these entities). However, the provisions do not materially
affect civilian trade or investment. The Administration nonetheless hailed the
Resolution as demonstrating that the international community remained unified in
insisting Iran curb its nuclear program.
Resolution 1803 also stated that “China, France, Germany, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further
concrete measures on exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear
issue through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals.” Appearing to
want to preserve a unified front, while still skeptical that new incentives would cause
Iran to curb its nuclear program, the Bush Administration agreed to reviving and
possibly expanding the June 2006 incentive package to induce Iranian cooperation,
discussed above. The P5+1 met on April 16, 2008, in Shanghai, China but it was not
until a meeting in London on May 2, 2008, that the powers agreed on a “refreshed”
package of incentives to augment those in the June 2006 package. According to press
reports (the exact offer was not made public), the powers included new language,
beyond that in the June 2006 proposal, offering political cooperation with Iran, and
enhanced incentives on energy cooperation.
EU envoy Solana presented the package (which included a signature by
Secretary of State Rice) on June 14, 2008, but Iran was non-committal. For its part,
Iran issued a letter on May 13, 2008, to U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon
reiterating elements of its August 2006 response to the June 2006 offer. The main
elements of Iran’s offer included cooperation on resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute;
countering drug trafficking in the region; combating terrorism; trade and investment;
and energy cooperation, including an international consortium to produce nuclear
fuel.
CRS-23
The latest phase of diplomacy began on June 23, 2008, when the EU, acting
under Resolution 1803, froze the assets of Bank Melli and several IRGC entities and
commanders. Perhaps sensing that the United States is succeeding in increasing
financial and diplomatic pressure on Iran, Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki indicated
on July 2, 2008, that Iran might be ready to negotiate on the revived June 2008
incentive package. One idea is a six week “freeze for freeze” in which the P5+1
would freeze further sanctions efforts and Iran would freeze any further expansion
of uranium enrichment (though not suspend outright). This signal from Iran seemed
to represent the first recent sign that the U.S.-led strategy might be affecting Iranian
decision-making. To try to take advantage of what seemed to be divisions within Iran
on whether to negotiate a settlement, the Administration decided to send
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns to join Solana and the
other P5+1 representatives at a meeting in Geneva on July 19, 2008 to receive Iran’s
response to the “freeze for freeze” idea. Again, Iran did not supply a direct answer,
instead focusing on elements of a final nuclear settlement. The P5+1 said it would
allow Tehran another two weeks (by August 2) to formally respond to the idea which,
if accepted, would pave the way for talks in earnest on the incentive package, if Iran
suspends uranium enrichment. Secretary of State Rice said that if Iran is not
responsive to the offers, a new sanctions resolution would be negotiated.
The potential for additional sanctions is further discussed in the section on
multilateral and international sanctions later.
Table 6. Summary of Provisions of U.N. Resolutions on Iran
Nuclear Program (1737, 1747, and 1803)
Require Iran to suspend uranium enrichment
Prohibit transfer to Iran of nuclear, missile, and dual use items to Iran, except for use
in light water reactors
Prohibit Iran from exporting arms or WMD-useful technology
Freeze the assets of 40 named Iranian persons and entities, including Bank Sepah, and
several Iranian front companies
Require that countries exercise restraint with respect to travel of 35 named Iranians
and ban the travel of 5 others
Calls on states not to export arms to Iran or support new business with Iran
Calls for vigilance with respect to the foreign activities of all Iranian banks, particularly
Bank Melli and Bank Saderat
Calls on countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of
Iran Shipping Lines if there are indications they carry cargo banned for carriage to Iran.
CRS-24
Chemical Weapons, Biological Weapons, and Missiles
Official U.S. reports and testimony continue to state that Iran is seeking a self-
sufficient chemical weapons (CW) infrastructure, and that it “may have already”
stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and nerve agents — and the bombs and shells to
deliver them. This raises questions about Iran’s compliance with its obligations under
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which Iran signed on January 13, 1993,
and ratified on June 8, 1997. These officials and reports also say that Iran “probably
maintain[s] an offensive [biological weapons] BW program ... and probably has the
capability to produce at least small quantities of BW agents.”
Ballistic Missiles/Warheads. Largely with foreign help, Iran is becoming
self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles and, by U.S. accounts, already
has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Tehran appears to
view its ballistic missiles as an integral part of its strategy to deter or retaliate against
forces in the region, including U.S. forces. To reinforce that point, during July 9 and
10, 2008, Iran conducted several highly publicized test launches of a variant of the
Shahab missile that Iran says has a 1,250 mile range, putting most key U.S. allies in
the region at risk. Other missiles were tested on those days as well, although some
analyses suggested Iran might have falsified photos and other accounts of exactly
how many missiles were tested and their capabilities.
However, Iran’s technical capabilities are a matter of some debate among
experts. The Bush Administration is seeking to establish sites in Europe, including
Poland and the Czech Republic, to counter Iranian ballistic missiles, although Russia
has opposed these locations as indications that the missile defense plans are a cover
for systems directed against Russia. At the G-8 summit in June 2007, Russian
President Vladimir Putin presented an alternative proposal to cooperate with the
missile defense against Iran by allowing use of a radar facility in Azerbaijan that
Russia leases. The Czech Republic has accepted the deployments. Prime Minister of
Poland, Donald Tusk, has been negotiating conditions in exchange for the
deployments — for example U.S. funding of other Polish military modernizations.
CRS-25
Table 7. Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal
Shahab - 3
800 mile range. Two of first three tests (July 1998, July 2000, and
September 2000) reportedly inconclusive or unsuccessful. Apparently
successful tests in June 2003; Iran subsequently called missile
operational (capable of hitting Israel). Despite claims, some U.S. experts
say the missile not completely reliable, and Iran tested a purportedly
more accurate version on August 12, 2004. Iran called the test
successful, although some observers said Iran detonated it in mid-flight.
On May 31, 2005, Iran announced it had tested a solid-fuel version.
“Shahab - 4”
1,200 mile range. In October 2004, Iran announced it had extended range
of the Shahab-3 to 1,200 miles, and it added in early November 2004
that it is capable of “mass producing” this “Shahab-4.” Agence France
Presse report (February 6, 2006) said test in January 2006 was
successful. Related missiles claimed produced by Iran - both of about
1,200 mile range, include the “Ashoura” (claimed in November 2007)
and the “Ghadr” (displayed at military parade in September 2007. If
Iran’s claims are accurate, large portions of the Near East and
Southeastern Europe would be in range, including U.S. bases in Turkey.
On March 31, 2006, Iran claimed to have tested a missile, possibly a
Shahab-4, with separately targeted warheads.
BM-25
1,500 mile range. On April 27, 2006, Israel’s military intelligence chief
said that Iran had received a shipment of North Korean-supplied BM-25
missiles. Missile said to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The
Washington Times appeared to corroborate this reporting in a July 6,
2006, story, which asserted that the North Korean-supplied missile is
based on a Soviet-era “SS-N-6” missile.
ICBM
U.S. officials believe Iran might be capable of developing an
intercontinental ballistic missile (3,000 mile range) by 2015.24 In
February 2008 Iran claimed to have launched a probe into space,
suggesting its missile technology might be improving to the point where
an Iranian ICBM is an increasingly realistic possibility.
Other
On September 6, 2002, Iran said it successfully tested a 200 mile range
Missiles
“Fateh 110” missile (solid propellent), and Iran said in late September
2002 that it had begun production.25 Iran also possesses a few hundred
short-range ballistic missiles, including the Shahab-1 (Scud-b), the
Shahab-2 (Scud-C), and the Tondar-69 (CSS-8).
Warheads
Wall Street Journal report of September 14, 2005, said that U.S.
intelligence believes Iran is working to adapt the Shahab-3 to deliver a
nuclear warhead. Subsequent press reports say that U.S. intelligence
captured an Iranian computer in mid-2004 showing plans to construct a
nuclear warhead for the Shahab.26 The IAEA is seeking additional
information from Iran.
24 “Greater U.S. Concern About Iran Missile Capability.” Reuters, March 11, 2002.
25 “Iran: New Missile on the Assembly Line.” New York Times, September 26, 2002.
26 Broad, William and David Sanger. “Relying On Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran’s
Nuclear Aims.” New York Times, November 13, 2005.
CRS-26
Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist Groups
Iran’s foreign policy is a product of the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution,
blended with long-standing national interests, and is intended largely to overturn the
“status quo” in the Middle East that Iran believes favors the United States, Israel, and
Sunni Muslim regimes. The State Department report on international terrorism for
2007, released April 30, 2008, again stated (as it has for more than a decade) that Iran
“remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism” in 2007, and it again attributed
the terrorist activity primarily to the Revolutionary Guard [presumably the Qods
Force]. The report focused particular attention on Iran’s lethal support to Shiite
militias in Iraq as well as on shipments to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.27
Relations with the Persian Gulf States.28 The Persian Gulf states are
highly concerned about the growing strategic influence of Iran but they do not openly
support U.S. conflict with Iran that might cause Iran to retaliate against Gulf state
targets. During the 1980s and early 1990s, Iran, through the Qods Force and the
MOIS, sponsored Shiite Muslim extremist groups opposed to the Sunni Muslim-led
monarchy states of the 6-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC; Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates). However, Iran’s
efforts to “export” its Islamic revolution were unsuccessful and caused the Gulf states
to ally closely with the United States. During Khatemi’s presidency, Iran reduced
support for Gulf Shiite dissident movements there. In part to counter Iran’s perceived
growing influence in the Gulf, in December 2006 the summit of the GCC leaders
announced that the GCC states might jointly study their own development of
“peaceful nuclear technology.” On the other hand, seeking to avoid further tensions
with Iran, the GCC leaders invited Ahmadinejad to speak at the December 2-3, 2007
summit of the GCC leaders in Doha, Qatar - the first time an Iranian president has
been invited since the GCC was formed in 1981. His speech reiterated a consistent
Iranian theme that the Gulf countries, including Iran, should set up their own security
structure without the help of “outside powers.”
! Saudi Arabia. Many observers closely watch the relationship
between Iran and Saudi Arabia because of Saudi alarm over the
emergence of a pro-Iranian government in Iraq and Iran’s
ascendancy in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia sees itself as leader of the
Sunni Muslim world and views Shiite Muslims as heretical and
disloyal internally. Saudi leaders are concerned that Iran’s nuclear
program will further strengthen Iran strategically but the Saudis also
worry about the potential for Iranian reaction against the Kingdom
should the United States take military action to stop Iran’s program.
The Saudis, who do not want a repeat of Iran’s sponsorship of
disruptive and sometimes violent demonstrations at annual Hajj
pilgrimages in Mecca in the 1980s and 1990s — or an increase in
27 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism 2007. Released April 30, 2008.
[http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103711.htm].
28 See CRS Report RL31533, The Persian Gulf States: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2006, by
Kenneth Katzman.
CRS-27
Iranian support for Saudi Shiite dissidents — are receptive to easing
tensions with Iran, particularly, and they hosted Ahmadinejad in the
Kingdom in March 2007 and again for the Hajj in December 2007.
The Saudis continue to blame a pro-Iranian movement in the
Kingdom, Saudi Hezbollah, for the June 25, 1996, Khobar Towers
housing complex bombing, which killed 19 U.S. airmen.29 After
restoring relations in December 1991 (after a four-year break),
Saudi-Iran ties progressed to high-level contacts during Khatemi’s
presidency, including Khatemi visits in 1999 and 2002.
! United Arab Emirates (UAE) concerns about Iran’s intentions have
not completely recovered from the April 1992 Iranian expulsion of
UAE security forces from the Persian Gulf island of Abu Musa,
which it and the UAE shared under a 1971 bilateral agreement. (In
1971, Iran, then ruled by the U.S.-backed Shah, seized two other
islands, Greater and Lesser Tunb, from the emirate of Ras
al-Khaymah, as well as part of Abu Musa from the emirate of
Sharjah.) The UAE (particularly the federation capital, Abu Dhabi,
which takes a harder line than Dubai, which has a large Persian-
speaking community and business ties to Iran) wants to refer the
dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but Iran insists on
resolving the issue bilaterally. The UAE has not pressed the issue
vigorously in recent years, although it insists the islands dispute be
kept on the agenda of the U.N. Security Council (which it has been
since December 1971). The United States, which is concerned about
Iran’s military control over the islands, supports UAE proposals but
takes no formal position on sovereignty. As an indicator of the
degree to which the issue is fading, the UAE received Ahmadinejad
in May 2007, the highest level Iranian visit to UAE since the 1979
revolution in Iran; during the visit, Ahmadinejad led an anti-U.S.
rally of a reported several hundred Iranian-origin residents of Dubai
at a soccer stadium there.
! Qatar is wary that Iran might seek to encroach on its large North
Field (natural gas), which it shares with Iran (called South Pars on
Iran’s side) and through which Qatar earns large revenues for natural
gas exports. Qatar’s fears were heightened on April 26, 2004, when
Iran’s deputy Oil Minister said that Qatar is probably producing
more gas than “her right share” from the field and that Iran “will not
allow” its wealth to be used by others. These concerns might have
prompted Qatar to invite Ahmadinejad to the December 2007 GCC
summit in Qatar.
29 Walsh, Elsa. “Annals of Politics: Louis Freeh’s Last Case.” The New Yorker, May 14,
2001. The June 21, 2001, federal grand jury indictments of 14 suspects (13 Saudis and a
Lebanese citizen) in the Khobar bombing indicate that Iranian agents may have been
involved, but no indictments of any Iranians were announced. In June 2002, Saudi Arabia
reportedly sentenced some of the eleven Saudi suspects held there. The 9/11 Commission
final report asserts that Al Qaeda might have had some as yet undetermined involvement in
the Khobar Towers attacks.
CRS-28
! In 1981 and again in 1996, Bahrain publicly accused Iran of
supporting Bahraini Shiite dissidents (the Islamic Front for the
Liberation of Bahrain, Bahrain-Hezbollah, and other Bahraini
dissident groups) in efforts to overthrow the ruling Al Khalifa
family. Bahrain is about 60% Shiite, but its government is
dominated by the Sunni Muslim Al Khalifa family. Bahraini fears
that Iran would try to interfere in Bahrain’s November 25, 2006,
parliamentary elections by providing support to Shiite candidates did
not materialize, although the main Shiite opposition coalition won
18 out of the 40 seats of the elected body. Tensions flared in July
2007 when an Iranian newspaper claimed Bahrain is part of Iran —
that question was the subject of the 1970 U.N.-run referendum in
which Bahrainis opted for independence. Still, Bahrain has sought
not to antagonize Iran and has apparently allowed Iran’s banks to
establish a presence in Bahrain’s vibrant banking sector. On March
12, 2008, the Treasury Department sanctioned the Bahrain-based
Future Bank under Executive order 13382 that sanctions
proliferation entities. Future Bank purportedly is controlled by Bank
Melli.
Iranian Policy in Iraq. The U.S. military ousting of Saddam Hussein
benefitted Iran strategically,30 and U.S.-Iran differences in Iraq have widened to the
point where Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen warned
in late April 2008 that there is Defense Department planning for possible military
action against Iran’s “increasingly lethal and malign influence in Iran” – referring to
its assistance to Shiite militias in Iraq. The State Department terrorism report for
2007, released April 30, 2008, reinforced the consistent statements of U.S. officials
(including the September 10-11, 2007 and April 8-9, 2008, testimony of U.S.
commander in Iraq General David Petraeus) that Iran’s Qods Force is providing arms
(including highly lethal “explosively forced projectiles,” EFPs, that have killed about
nearly 200 U.S. soldiers in Iraq), training guidance, and financing to “special groups”
of Shiite militias involved in sectarian violence and anti-U.S. activities. The New
York Times reported on May 5, 2008, that Lebanese Hizballah militants, who are
Arabs, are providing some of the training to the Iraq militants at training camps near
Tehran.
Some U.S. officials now indicate that the United States and Iran are now
engaged in a “proxy war” inside Iraq. In June 2008, Maliki visited Iran again, this
time reportedly to reassure Iran that a proposed U.S.-Iraq defense pact would not be
directed against Iran. Iran reportedly is trying to subvert the agreement, and Supreme
Leader Khamene’i told Maliki during his visit that the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq
is the main obstacle to Iraq’s development.
30 This issue is covered in greater depth in CRS Report RS22323, Iran’s Influence in Iraq,
by Kenneth Katzman.
CRS-29
General Petraeus’ April 2008 testimony was delivered amidst an upsurge of
intra-Shiite factional fighting and rocketing of U.S. installations in Baghdad by pro-
Sadr militiamen. The fighting wound down with a tense March 30, 2008, ceasefire,
but skirmishing continued in Sadr City between U.S. forces and pro-Sadr gunmen,
as did rocket attacks on the fortified International Zone where the U.S. Embassy is
located. Fighting has continued to diminish as the Sadr faction (in May 2008)
reached agreement with the Maliki government not to resist the entry of Iraqi troops
into Sadr City. Iran also has signed a number of agreements with Iraq on
transportation, energy cooperation, free flow of Shiite pilgrims, border security,
intelligence sharing, and other cooperation; several more agreements, including a $1
billion credit line for Iranian exports to Iraq, were signed during Ahmadinejad’s
March 2-3, 2008, visit to Iraq; implementing agreements were signed in April 2008.
The “Iraq Study Group” (Recommendations 9, 10, and 11) in its December 2006
report, recommended U.S. dialogue with Iran but President Bush initially appeared
to reject that idea. The Administration might have later judged that its 2007 “troop
surge” and other military moves in the Gulf (extra aircraft carrier deployments)
strengthened the U.S. position, and the Administration supported a March 10, 2007,
regional conference in Iraq attended by Iran and Syria. Both Iranian and U.S. officials
called the conference constructive, but both denied that substantive bilateral talks
took place at the margins of the conference. Further regional talks on Iraq
(“Expanded Neighbors of Iraq” process) were held in Egypt during May 3-4, 2007,
but Secretary of State Rice did not hold substantive bilateral discussions with her
counterpart, Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki. Nor did they directly talk
at the November 2, 2007 ministerial on Iraq held in Istanbul or at the April 22, 2008,
Expanded Neighbors meeting in Kuwait. Another meeting attended by Iran and the
United States, to review the Iraq Compact, was held in Sweden on May 29, 2008.
The Administration has held potentially more significant bilateral talks with Iran
on the Iraq issue. The first such meeting, in Baghdad, was on May 28, 2007; the two
sides met at the home of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who opened the meeting.
According to Ambassador Crocker (the Iranian side was represented by the Iranian
Ambassador to Iraq), the two sides agreed on broad principles for Iraq’s political
evolution and stability, but the United States would judge the dialogue by the
indications, discussed above, of Iranian cooperation in stopping military supply of
Shiite militias. Another round of talks was held on July 24, 2007; it reportedly
included mutual accusations but resulted in an agreement to establish a working
group to discuss ways to stabilize Iraq. This working group met for the first time on
August 6, 2007. Because of signs that Iran had slowed weapons flows into Iraq,
another round of talks was tentatively scheduled for December 18, 2007, but Iran
repeatedly postponed the talks because of differences over the agenda and the level
of talks (Iran wants them to be at the ambassador level). Ostensibly because of the
continued U.S. combat against the Mahdi forces in Sadr City that Iran said is causing
the deaths of innocent civilians, on May 5, 2008, Iran indefinitely suspended this
dialogue. The suspension came several days after an Iraqi parliamentary delegation
visited Iran to challenge Iran’s aid to the Shiite militants.
A provision of the FY2008 defense authorization bill (P.L. 110-181) requires
a report to Congress on Iran’s interference in Iraq, but it does not authorize or
recommend use of U.S. force to stop these actions. On January 9, 2008, the Treasury
Department took action against suspected Iranian and pro-Iranian operatives in Iraq
CRS-30
by designating four individuals and one organization as a threat to stability in Iraq
under the July 17, 2007 Executive Order 13438, which freezes the assets and bans
transactions with named individuals. The named entities, which includes a senior
Qods Forces leader, are in the tables on sanctioned entities.
Supporting Palestinian Militant Groups. Iran’s support for Palestinian
militant groups has long concerned U.S. Administrations, particularly since doing so
gives Tehran an opportunity to try to obstruct Israeli-Palestinian peace prospects.
Ahmadinejad’s various statements on Israel were discussed above, although other
Iranian leaders have made similar statements in the past. In the 1990s, Khamene’i
called Israel a “cancerous tumor” and made other statements suggesting that he seeks
Israel’s destruction. In December 2001, Rafsanjani said that it would take only one
Iranian nuclear bomb to destroy Israel, whereas a similar strike against Iran by Israel
would have far less impact because Iran’s population is large. Iran has sometimes
openly incited anti-Israel violence, including hosting conferences of anti-peace
process organizations (April 24, 2001, and June 2-3, 2002). During his presidency,
Khatemi generally refrained from inflammatory statements against Israel, and he
conversed with Israel’s president at the 2005 funeral of Pope John Paul II. The
Iranian Foreign Ministry, considered a bastion of moderates, has repeatedly stated
that Iran’s official position is that it would not seek to block any final Israeli-
Palestinian settlement but that the peace process is too weighted toward Israel to
result in a fair settlement for Palestinians.
The State Department report on terrorism for 2007 (mentioned above) again
accuses Iran of providing “extensive” funding, weapons, and training to Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, and the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). All are named as
foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) by the State Department for their use of
violence to undermine the Arab-Israeli peace process. Some saw Iran’s regional
policy further strengthened by Hamas’s victory in the January 25, 2006, Palestinian
legislative elections, and even more so by Hamas’s June 2007 armed takeover of the
Gaza Strip, from which it continues to periodically launch rockets on some Israeli
towns. The Hamas gains potentially position it to block moves toward peace, and
Hamas continues to oppose a two-state solution with Israel and to occasionally fire
rockets from Gaza into Israel. However, Hamas activists downplay Iranian influence,
asserting that Iran is mostly Shiite, while Hamas members are Sunni Muslims.31
Hamas was reputed to receive about 10% of its budget in the early 1990s from Iran,
although since then Hamas has cultivated funding from wealthy Persian Gulf donors
and supporters in Europe and elsewhere.
Iran again demonstrated its hard line on the peace process when it criticized the
participation of Iran’s ally, Syria, at the major U.S.-sponsored Middle East peace
meeting in Annapolis, Maryland on November 27, 2007. The meeting, in part,
represented a U.S. attempt to isolate Iran and other hardline opponents of an Israeli-
Palestinian peace agreement.
31 CNN “Late Edition” interview with Hamas co-founder Mahmoud Zahar, January 29,
2006.
CRS-31
Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran has maintained a close relationship with
Hezbollah since the group was formed in 1982 by Lebanese Shiite clerics who were
sympathetic to Iran’s Islamic revolution and belonged to the Lebanese Da’wa Party.
Hezbollah was responsible for several acts of anti-U.S. and anti-Israel terrorism in
the 1980s and 1990s.32 Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon
contributed to an Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, but, despite United Nations
certification of Israel’s withdrawal, Hezbollah maintained military forces along the
border. Hezbollah continued to remain armed and outside Lebanese government
control, despite U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559 (September 2, 2004) that
required its dismantlement. In refusing to disarm, Hezbollah says it was resisting
Israeli occupation of small tracts of Lebanese territory (Shib’a Farms).
Neither Israel nor the United States opposed Hezbollah’s progressively
increased participation in peaceful Lebanese politics. In March 2005, President Bush
indicated that the United States might accept Hezbollah as a legitimate political force
in Lebanon if it disarms. In the Lebanese parliamentary elections of May — June
2005, Hezbollah expanded its presence in the parliament to 14 out of the 128-seat
body, and it gained two cabinet seats. As a matter of policy, the United States does
not meet with any Hezbollah members, even those in the parliament or cabinet.
Hezbollah is a designated FTO, but that designation bars financial transactions by the
group and does not specifically ban meeting with members of the group.
Whether or not Iran instigated Lebanese Hezbollah to provoke the July August
2006 crisis, Iran has long been its major arms supplier. Hezbollah fired Iranian-
supplied rockets on Israel’s northern towns during the fighting. As part of a package
of aid to Hezbollah said to exceed $100 million per year, reported Iranian shipments
to Hezbollah over the past five years have included the “Fajr” (dawn) and Khaybar
series of rockets that were fired at the Israeli city of Haifa (30 miles from the border),
and over 10,000 Katyusha rockets that were fired at cities within 20 miles of the
Lebanese border.33 Iran also supplied Hezbollah with an unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV), the Mirsad, that Hezbollah briefly flew over the Israel-Lebanon border on
November 7, 2004, and April 11, 2005; at least three were shot down by Israel during
the conflict. On July 14, 2006, Hezbollah apparently hit an Israeli warship with a C-
802 sea-skimming missile probably provided by Iran. (See above for information on
Iran’s acquisition of that weapon from China.) Iran also purportedly provided advice
during the conflict; about 50 Revolutionary Guards Qods Force personnel were in
Lebanon (down from about 2,000 when Hezbollah was formed, according to a
Washington Post report of April 13, 2005) when the conflict began; that number
32 Hezbollah is believed responsible for the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine
barracks in Beirut, as well as attacks on U.S. Embassy Beirut facilities in April 1983 and
September 1984, and for the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in June 1985 in which Navy diver
Robert Stetham was killed. Hezbollah is also believed to have committed the March 17,
1992, bombing of Israel’s embassy in that city, which killed 29 people. Its last known
terrorist attack outside Lebanon was the July 18, 1994, bombing of a Jewish community
center in Buenos Aires, which killed 85. On October 31, 2006, Argentine prosecutors asked
a federal judge to seek the arrest of Rafsanjani, former Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian,
former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and four other Iranian officials for this attack.
33 “Israel’s Peres Says Iran Arming Hizbollah.” Reuters, February 4, 2002.
CRS-32
might have increased during the conflict to help Hezbollah operate the Iranian-
supplied weaponry.
Even though Hezbollah reduced its overt military presence in southern Lebanon
in accordance with the conflict-related U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 (July
31, 2006), Hezbollah was perceived as a victor in the war for holding out against
heavy Israeli air-strikes and some ground action. The outcome boosted Hezbollah’s
leverage to demand an equal say over who becomes president of Lebanon and a share
of cabinet seats that would enable it to veto cabinet decisions. Iran supported
Hezbollah’s demands and provided it with leverage by resupplying it with rockets,
reportedly increasing its stockpile to 27,000 rockets, more than double what
Hezbollah had at the start of the 2006 war.34 Among the deliveries are 500 Iranian-
made “Zelzal” (Earthquake) missiles with a range of 186 miles, enough to reach Tel
Aviv from south Lebanon. Iran also has made at least $150 million available for
Hezbollah to distribute to Lebanese citizens (mostly Shiite supporters of Hezbollah)
whose homes were damaged in the Israeli military campaign.35
Perhaps emboldened by the supplies, Hezbollah, perhaps for the first time, used
its military wing for internal Lebanese political purposes. In mid May 2008,
Hezbollah fighters took over large parts of Beirut in response to an attempt by the
U.S. and Saudi-backed Lebanese government to curb Hezbollah’s media and
commercial operations. The success of its fighters contributed to a Qatar-brokered
settlement on May 21, 2008, in which the government rescinded its actions against
Hezbollah and agreed to give Hezbollah enough seats in a new cabinet to be able to
veto government decisions. Hezbollah agreed to the compromise candidate of
Lebanese Army commander Michel Suleiman to become the new president; he has
been sworn in. The new cabinet, in which Hezbollah has one cabinet seat but its
allies have seven others, giving Hezbollah its long-sought veto power, was appointed
in June 2008.
Prior to the 2006 conflict, in the 109th Congress, two resolutions (H.Res. 101
and S.Res. 82) passed their respective chambers. They urged the EU to classify
Hezbollah as a terrorist organization; S.Res. 82 called on Hezbollah to disband its
militia as called for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559 (September 2, 2004).
Central Asia and the Caspian. Iran’s policy in Central Asia has thus far
emphasized Iran’s rights to Caspian Sea resources, particularly against Azerbaijan.
That country’s population, like Iran’s, is mostly Shiite Muslim, but its leadership is
secular. In addition, Azerbaijan is ethnically Turkic, and Iran fears that Azerbaijan
nationalists might stoke separatism among Iran’s large Azeri Turkic population,
which demonstrated some unrest in 2006. These factors could explain why Iran has
generally tilted toward Armenia, which is Christian, even though it has been at odds
with Azerbaijan over territory and control of ethnic Armenians. In July 2001, Iranian
warships and combat aircraft threatened a British Petroleum (BP) ship on contract to
34 Rotella, Sebastian. “In Lebanon, Hezbollah Arms Stockpile Bigger, Deadlier.” Los
Angeles Times, May 4, 2008.
35 Shadid, Anthony. “Armed With Iran’s Millions, Fighters Turn to Rebuilding.”
Washington Post, August 16, 2006.
CRS-33
Azerbaijan out of an area of the Caspian that Iran considers its own. The United
States called that action provocative, and it is engaged in border security and defense
cooperation with Azerbaijan directed against Iran (and Russia). The United States
successfully backed construction of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, intended in
part to provide alternatives to Iranian oil. Along with India and Pakistan, Iran has
been given observer status at the Central Asian security grouping called the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), which contains Russia, China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. In April 2008, Iran applied for full
membership in the organization, which opposes a long-term U.S. presence in Central
Asia.
Afghanistan.36 Iran is trying to restore some of its traditional sway in eastern,
central, and northern Afghanistan where Persian-speaking Afghans predominate. Iran
long opposed the regime of the Taliban in Afghanistan on the grounds that it
oppressed Shiite Muslim and other Persian-speaking minorities. Iran nearly launched
a military attack against the Taliban in September 1998 after Taliban fighters
captured and killed nine Iranian diplomats based in northern Afghanistan, and Iran
provided military aid to the Northern Alliance factions. During the major combat
phase of the post-September 11 U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, Iran offered search and
rescue of any downed service-persons and the trans-shipment to Afghanistan of
humanitarian assistance. In March 2002, Iran expelled Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a pro-
Taliban Afghan faction leader. Iran froze Hikmatyar’s assets in Iran (January 2005).
After the Taliban’s fall, Iran aided minority factions still referred to as the
“Northern Alliance” that were prominent in the post-Taliban governing coalition.
After 2004, Iran’s influence waned somewhat as Northern Alliance figures were
marginalized in Afghan politics. To compensate, Iran has funded projects in
Afghanistan that total about $500 million since 2001 (close to a pledged amount in
international donors conferences), mostly in neighboring Herat. Iranian-funded Shiite
theological seminaries are being built in Kabul and elsewhere, perhaps an indication
of Iran’s continuing efforts to support Afghanistan’s Shiite (Hazara) minority, and
Iran has funded several media outlets in Afghanistan catering to Shiites.
There are indications that Iran will work even with Sunni radical movements if
doing so provides Iran with leverage against the United States. The State Department
terrorism report for 2007 accuses the Qods Force of supplying various munitions,
including 107mm rockets, to Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan. These
militants are fighting the United States and NATO forces there. On April 17, 2007,
U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan captured a shipment of Iranian weapons that
purportedly was bound for Taliban fighters. On June 6, 2007 and again on September
6, 2007, NATO officers said they directly intercepted Iranian shipments of heavy
arms, C4 explosives, and advanced roadside bombs (explosively forced projectiles,
or EFPs, such as those found in Iraq) to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. Then U.S.
commander of international forces in Afghanistan Gen. Dan McNeil said at the time
that the intercepted shipments were large enough that the Iranian government would
have to have known about them.
36 See CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,
by Kenneth Katzman.
CRS-34
Al Qaeda. Iran is not a natural ally of Al Qaeda, largely because Al Qaeda is
an orthodox Sunni Muslim organization. However, Iran might see possibilities for
tactical alliance with Al Qaeda, and U.S. officials have said since January 2002 that
Iran has not brought to justice senior Al Qaeda operatives (spokesman Sulayman Abu
Ghaith, top operative Sayf Al Adl, and Osama bin Laden’s son, Saad37) who are
believed to be in Iran,38 meaning they might be at relative liberty within Iran. U.S.
officials blamed these figures for the May 12, 2003, bombings in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia against four expatriate housing complexes on these operatives, saying they
have been able to contact associates outside Iran.39 In testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on March 29, 2007, then Undersecretary of State
Nicholas Burns accused Iran of violating U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1267
and 1373, which require sharing information on Al Qaeda, as part of the emerging
broader U.S. strategy of pressuring Iran militarily, politically, and economically.
Iran asserted on July 23, 2003, that it had “in custody” senior Al Qaeda figures.
However, if that is not their status, the explanation could be that hardliners in Iran
might want to use Al Qaeda activists as leverage against the United States and its
allies. Some say Iran might want to exchange them for a U.S. hand-over of People’s
Mojahedin activists under U.S. control in Iraq. Possibly attempting to show that it is
an adversary and not an ally of Al Qaeda, on July 16, 2005, Iran’s Intelligence
Minister said that 200 Al Qaeda members are in Iranian jails and that Iran had broken
up an Al Qaeda cell planning attacks on Iranian students.40
The 9/11 Commission report said several of the September 11 hijackers and
other plotters, possibly with official help, might have transited Iran, but the report
does not assert that the Iranian government cooperated with or knew about the plot.
Another bin Laden ally, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, killed by U.S. forces in Iraq on June
7, 2006, reportedly transited Iran after the September 11 attacks and took root in Iraq,
becoming a major insurgent leader there.
Latin America. A growing concern has been Iran’s developing relations with
countries and leaders in Latin America considered adversaries of the United States,
particularly Cuba and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. Chavez has visited Iran on several
occasions, offering Iran additional gasoline during Iran’s fuel shortages in 2007 as
well as joint oil and gas projects. The two countries have established direct air links.
In February 2006, Secretary Rice referred to Venezuela and Cuba as “sidekicks” of
Iran because of their votes in the IAEA against referring Iran to the Security Council.
On October 30, 2007, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff said that
Iran’s relationship with Venezuela is an emerging threat because it represents a
“marriage” of Iran’s extremist ideology with “those who have anti-American views.”
The State Department terrorism report for 2006 said that Cuba maintains “close
37 Gertz, Bill. “Al Qaeda Terrorists Being Held by Iran.” Washington Times, July 24, 2003.
38 Keto, Alex. “White House Reiterates Iran Is Harboring Al Qaeda.” Dow Jones Newswires,
May 19, 2003.
39 Gertz, Bill. “CIA Points to Continuing Iran Tie to Al Qaeda.” Washington Times, July 23,
2004.
40 “Tehran Pledges to Crack Down on Militants.” Associated Press, July 18, 2005.
CRS-35
relationships with other state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran.” In October 2007,
Uruguayan parliamentary investigators said they blocked an attempt by the
government to buy arms from Iran, using a diversion through Venezuela.41
U.S. Policy Responses, Options, and Legislation
The February 11, 1979 fall of the Shah of Iran, a key U.S. ally, opened a long
rift in U.S.-Iranian relations. On November 4, 1979, radical “students” seized the
U.S. Embassy in Tehran and held its diplomats hostage until minutes after President
Reagan’s inauguration on January 20, 1981. The United States broke relations with
Iran on April 7, 1980 (just after the failed U.S. military attempt to rescue the
hostages) and the two countries have had only limited official contact since.42 The
United States tilted toward Iraq in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, including U.S.
diplomatic attempts to block conventional arms sales to Iran, providing battlefield
intelligence to Iraq43 and, during 1987-1988, direct skirmishes with Iranian naval
elements in the course of U.S. efforts to protect international oil shipments in the
Gulf from Iranian attacks. In one battle on April 18, 1988, Iran lost about a quarter
of its larger naval ships in a one-day engagement with the U.S. Navy, including one
frigate sunk and another badly damaged. Iran strongly disputed the U.S. assertion that
the July 3, 1988, U.S. shoot-down of Iran Air Flight 655 by the U.S.S. Vincennes over
the Persian Gulf (bound for Dubai, UAE) was an accident.
In his January 1989 inaugural speech, President George H.W. Bush laid the
groundwork for a rapprochement, saying that, in relations with Iran, “goodwill begets
goodwill,” implying better relations if Iran helped obtain the release of U.S. hostages
held by Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran reportedly did assist in obtaining their releases,
which was completed in December 1991, but no thaw followed, possibly because
Iran continued to back groups opposed to the U.S.-sponsored Middle East peace
process, a major U.S. priority.
Upon taking office in 1993, the Clinton Administration moved to further isolate
Iran as part of a strategy of “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq. In 1995 and 1996,
the Clinton Administration and Congress added sanctions on Iran in response to
growing concerns about Iran’s weapons of mass destruction, its support for terrorist
groups, and its efforts to subvert the Arab-Israeli peace process. The election of
Khatemi in May 1997 precipitated a U.S. shift toward engagement; the Clinton
Administration offered Iran official dialogue, with no substantive preconditions. In
January 1998, Khatemi publicly agreed to “people-to-people” U.S.-Iran exchanges
as part of his push for “dialogue of civilizations, but he ruled out direct talks. In a
41 Arostegui, Martin. “Uruguay Caught Buying Iran Arms.” Washington Times, October 12,
2007.
42 An exception was the abortive 1985-1986 clandestine arms supply relationship with Iran
in exchange for some American hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon (the so-called
“Iran-Contra Affair”).
43 Sciolino, Elaine. The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein’s Quest for Power and the Gulf
Crisis. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1991. p. 168.
CRS-36
June 1998 speech, then Secretary of State Albright stepped up the U.S. outreach
effort by calling for mutual confidence building measures that could lead to a “road
map” for normalization of relations. Encouraged by the reformist victory in Iran’s
March 2000 parliamentary elections, Secretary Albright, in a March 17, 2000,
speech, acknowledged past U.S. meddling in Iran, announcing some minor easing of
the U.S. trade ban with Iran, and promised to try to resolve outstanding claims
disputes. In September 2000 U.N. “Millennium Summit” meetings, Albright and
President Clinton sent a positive signal to Iran by attending Khatemi’s speeches.
Overview of Bush Administration Iran Policy
Although some U.S. commentators, including former CENTCOM Commander
John Abizaid, believe that the United States “can live with” a nuclear Iran, it is U.S.
policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. The Bush
Administration has undertaken multi-faceted efforts to implement that policy, as well
as to limit Iran’s strategic capabilities more generally, through international
diplomacy and sanctions — both international sanctions as well as sanctions enforced
by its allies, outside Security Council mandate. At the same time, the Administration
has engaged in bilateral diplomacy with Iran on specific priority issues, such as
stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq, and backed European diplomacy with Iran on the
nuclear issue. As of July 2008, however, the Administration has appeared willing to
engage more directly in the diplomacy with Iran, by sending Undersecretary Burns
to the nuclear talks on July 19 and by considering opening a new interests section in
Iran (subject to Iranian concurrence) staffed by U.S. personnel in Tehran. The policy
framework is supported by maintenance of a large U.S. conventional military
capabilities in the Persian Gulf and through U.S. alliances with Iran’s neighbors.
At times, the Administration has considered or, to some extent, pursued harder
line options. Some Administration officials, reportedly led by Vice President Cheney,
believe that existing measures will not curb the threat posed by Iran and that policy
should focus on possible military confrontation with Iran or on U.S. efforts to change
Iran’s regime.44 Legislation pending in the 110th Congress, discussed below, indicates
congressional support for increasing U.S. sanctions and for steps to compel other
countries to adopt stricter sanctions against Iran or to curb their companies’ business
dealings with Iran. The FY2007 defense authorization law (P.L. 109-364) called for
a report by the Administration on all aspects of U.S. policy and objectives on Iran
(and required the DNI to prepare a national intelligence estimate on Iran, which was
released on December 3, 2007 as discussed above).
Containment and Possible Military Action
A key question in Congress and among U.S. allies and other countries has been
whether President Bush might use military action to delay or halt Iran’s nuclear
program, or to try to curb Iran’s efforts to arm and train Shiite militias in Iraq.
Although some Members publicly oppose most forms of military action against Iran,
others fear that diplomacy and sanctions might not succeed and that Iran’s nuclear
44 Cooper, Helene and David Sanger. “Strategy on Iran Stirs New Debate at White House.”
New York Times, June 16, 2007.
CRS-37
program should be stopped before Iran possesses a working nuclear device,
notwithstanding the consequences. In discussing possible military options against
Iran’s nuclear facilities, President Bush has repeatedly maintained that “all options
are on the table”45 — a position he has reiterated since the release of the NIE – even
though most observers see the NIE as lessening the chance of U.S. conflict with Iran.
At the same time, he said during his trip to Europe in June 2008 that he had left in
place for the next Administration the “multilateral [diplomatic] framework”
discussed above, suggesting that he does not favor military action against Iran before
leaving office. Comments in July 2008 by Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike
Mullen to the effect that the U.S. military “does not need a third war” in the region
also indicate little Administration appetite for abandoning the ongoing diplomacy and
preventively striking Iran. A U.S. ground invasion to remove Iran’s regime has not,
at any time, appeared to be under serious consideration; most experts believe U.S.
forces are spread too thin to undertake such action, including about 145,000 deployed
in Iraq, and that U.S. forces would be greeted with hostility.
Proponents of U.S. air and missile strikes against suspected nuclear sites argue
that military action could set back Iran’s nuclear program because there are only a
limited number of key targets, and these targets are known to U.S. planners and could
be struck, even those that are hardened or buried.46 On former Air Force planner
estimates that up to 400 targets would need to be struck, including at least 75 that
would require penetrating munitions, while others discuss potentially a few thousand
targets whose destruction would cripple Iran’s economic and military infrastructure.
It could also be argued that the United States would need to reduce Iran’s potential
for military or unconventional retaliation by striking not only nuclear facilities but
also Iran’s conventional military, particularly its small ships and coastal missiles.
Still others argue that there are military options available that do not involve air
or missile strikes. Some say that a naval embargo or related embargo is possible that
could pressure Iran into reconsidering its stand on the nuclear issue. Such action is
“demanded” in H.Con.Res. 362. Others say that the imposition of a “no-fly zone”
over Iran might also serve that purpose. Either action could still be considered acts
of war that Iran might challenge, and which could escalate into military hostilities.
Most U.S. allies in Europe, not to mention Russia, China, and some U.S.
experts, have expressed opposition to any military action. Some question whether the
United States is aware of or militarily able to reach all relevant sites; other opponents
believe any benefits would be minor, or only temporary, and that the costs of a strike
are too high. Some believe that a U.S. strike would cause the Iranian public to rally
around Iran’s regime, setting back U.S. efforts to promote change within Iran. On the
other hand, regarding international support, in August 2007 French President Nicolas
Sarkozy indicated that such a strike might be undertaken by the United States if Iran
does not curb its nuclear program, although he said the effects of such a strike would
be a “disaster.”
45 Fletcher, Michael and Keith Richburg. “Bush Tries to Allay E.U. Worry Over Iran.”
Washington Post, February 23, 2005.
46 For an extended discussion of U.S. air strike options on Iran, see Rogers, Paul. Iran:
Consequences Of a War. Oxford Research Group, February 2006.
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Expressing particular fear that Iran might achieve a nuclear weapons capability,
Israeli officials have repeatedly refused to rule out the possibility that Israel might
strike Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Discussion of this possibility increased after the
NIE was released, because Israel fears it has greatly dampened the international
appetite to forcefully curb Iran’s nuclear abilities. Speculation about this possibility
increased even further on June 7, 2008, when Israeli deputy prime minister Shaul
Mofaz said that an attack on Iran is becoming “unavoidable” because it continues to
refuse to curb its nuclear program. Speculation increased further in mid-June 2008
when Israeli officials confirmed reports that Israel had practiced a long range strike
such as that which would be required to hit Iranian nuclear sites. Although Israeli
strategists say this might be a viable option, several experts doubt that Israel has the
capability to make such action sufficiently effective to justify the risks. U.S. military
leaders are said by observers to oppose an Israeli strike because such would
inevitably draw the United States into a conflict with Iran yet without the degree of
planning, preparation, or capability that would make a similar U.S. action a success.
Iranian Retaliatory Scenarios.47 Some officials and experts warn that a U.S.
military strike on Iran could provoke unconventional retaliation, using the equipment
discussed in the section on “conventional military capabilities,” that could be difficult
to counter. At the very least, such conflict is likely to raise world oil prices
significantly out of fear of an extended supply disruption. Others say such action
would cause Iran to withdraw from the NPT and refuse any IAEA inspections. Other
possibilities include firing missiles at Israel – and Iran’s July 2008 missile tests could
have been intended to demonstrate this retaliatory capability – or directing Lebanese
Hezbollah or Hamas to fire rockets at Israel.
Iran has acquired a structure and doctrine for unconventional warfare that partly
compensates for its conventional weakness. Former CENTCOM commander Gen.
John Abizaid said in March 2006 that the Revolutionary Guard Navy, through its
basing and force structure, is designed to give Iran a capability to “internationalize”
a crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. In his confirmation hearings on January 30, 2007,
Abizaid’s replacement, Admiral William Fallon, said that “Based on my read of their
military hardware acquisitions and development of tactics ... [the Iranians] are
posturing themselves with the capability to attempt to deny us the ability to operate
in [the Strait of Hormuz].” During a visit to the Gulf, Vice President Cheney warned
Iran on May 11, 2007, not to try to restrict sea traffic, saying “[The United States]
will keep the sea lanes open.” In July 2008 Iran again claimed it could close the Strait
in a crisis but CENTCOM Commander Admiral Kevin Cosgriff, backed by Joint
Chiefs Chairman Mullen, said U.S. forces could quickly reopen the waterway.
Iran has nonetheless tried to demonstrate that it is a capable force in the Gulf.
It has conducted at least five major military exercises since August 2006, including
exercises simultaneous with U.S. exercises in the Gulf in March 2007. In early 2007,
Iranian ships were widening their patrols, coming ever closer to key Iraqi oil
platforms in the Gulf. Several weeks after that report, Iran seized 15 British sailors
47 See also, Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The Last Resort: Consequences of
Preventive Military Action Against Iran, by Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt. June
2008.
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that Iran said were patrolling in Iran’s waters, although Britain says they were in Iraqi
waters performing coalition-related searches. They were held until April 5, 2007. On
January 6, 2008, the U.S. Navy reported a confrontation in which five IRGC Navy
small boats approached three U.S. Navy ships to the point where they manned battle
stations. The IRGC boats veered off before any shots were fired, but the Bush
Administration called it a “provocative act” and filed a formal protest with Tehran,
which claims the United States overblew the incident. The IRGC could have been
testing U.S. rules of engagement following months of U.S. criticism and the
proliferation designations of the IRGC and its subunits. Another incident occurred
in April 2008 when a ship under U.S. contract fired a shot to warn off Iranian boats
in the Gulf.
If there were a conflict in the Gulf, some fear that Iran might try to use suicide
boat attacks or to lay mines in the Strait. In April 2006, Iran conducted naval
maneuvers, including test firings of what Iran claims are underwater torpedos that
can avoid detection, presumably for use against U.S. ships in the Gulf, and a surface-
to-sea radar-evading missile launched from helicopters or combat aircraft. U.S.
military officials said the claims might be an exaggeration. The Gulf states fear that
Iran will fire coastal-based cruise missiles at their oil loading or other installations
across the Gulf, as happened during the later stages of the Iran-Iraq war.
Containment and the Gulf Security Dialogue. Whether or not a strike on
Iran is planned, the Administration believes that U.S. conventional military
capabilities and regional alliances strengthen overall efforts to contain Iran
strategically. An assertive military containment component of policy was signaled in
the January 10, 2007, Iraq “troop surge” statement by President Bush, in which he
confirmed in that speech that the United States was sending a second U.S. aircraft
carrier group into the Gulf,48 and he announced the extended deployment of Patriot
anti-missile batteries in the Gulf, reportedly in Kuwait and Qatar, as well as increased
intelligence sharing with the Gulf states. Secretary of Defense Gates said at the time
that he saw the U.S. buildup as a means of building leverage against Iran that could
be useful in bolstering U.S. diplomacy. He and other top U.S. military leaders have
repeatedly denied that the military moves are a prelude or part of planning for any
U.S. military attack on Iran. Nonetheless, some experts express concern about
potential U.S. action against Iran at times, such as in late April 2007, when the
United States announces new aircraft carrier task forces in the Gulf. The April 2008
deployment of a second carrier group to the Gulf was, according to Secretary Gates,
a “reminder” to Iran of U.S. capabilities in the Gulf.
The U.S. Gulf deployments build on a containment strategy inaugurated in mid-
2006 by the State Department, primarily the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
(“Pol-Mil”). The State Department effort represented an effort to revive some of the
U.S.-Gulf state defense cooperation that had begun during the Clinton Administration
but had since languished as the United States focused on the post-September 11 wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq. In a December 8, 2007 speech in Bahrain, Secretary Gates
48 Shanker, Thom. “U.S. and Britain to Add Ships to Persian Gulf in Signal to Iran,” New
York Times, December 21, 2006.
CRS-40
said the “Gulf Security Dialogue,” which is now in its third round of talks, has six
key pillars, some of which go beyond Iran containment:
! Defense cooperation (with the Gulf states).
! Developing a shared assessment and agenda on Iraq.
! Regional stability, especially with respect to Iran.
! Energy infrastructure security.
! Counter-proliferation
! Counter-terrorism
One goal of the initiative is on boosting Gulf state capabilities fueled
speculation about major new weapons sales to the GCC states. The emphasis of the
sales is to improve Gulf state missile defense capabilities, for example by sales of the
upgraded Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3),49 as well as to improve border and
maritime security equipment through sales of combat littoral ships, radar systems,
and communications gear. The initial sales, including PAC-3 related sales to UAE
and Kuwait, and Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) to Saudi Arabia and UAE
were notified to Congress in December 2007 and January 2008.
Presidential Authorities and Legislation. A decision to take military
action might raise the question of presidential authorities and congressional
consultation, and some in Congress have begun to express concern that the
Administration might be preparing for military action against Iran, despite
Administration denials to that effect. In the 109th Congress, H.Con.Res. 391,
introduced on April 26, 2006, called on the President to not initiate military action
against Iran without first obtaining authorization from Congress. A similar bill,
H.Con.Res. 33, has been introduced in the 110th Congress. Other bills requiring
specific congressional authorization for use of force against Iran (or prohibiting U.S.
funds for that purpose) include S.Res. 356, H.J.Res. 14, H.R. 3119, S.Con.Res. 13,
S. 759, and H.R. 770. An amendment to H.R. 1585, the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2008, was defeated 136 to 288. A provision that sought to
bar the Administration from taking military action against Iran without congressional
authorization was taken out of an early draft of an FY2007 supplemental
appropriation (H.R. 1591) to fund additional costs for Iraq and Afghanistan combat
(which was vetoed on May 1, 2007). Other provisions, including requiring briefings
to Congress about military contingency planning related to Iran’s nuclear program,
is in the House-passed FY2009 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5658).
49 “New Persian Gulf Security Effort Expected to Fuel Arms Sales in FY-07.” Inside the
Pentagon, November 9, 2006.
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Regime Change
A major feature of policy for part of 2006 — promotion of “regime change” —
has appeared to since recede. Senior U.S. officials now say that the democracy
promotion programs discussed below are intended to promote political evolution in
Iran and lead to changes in regime behavior, not outright replacement. Still, several
high-ranking U.S. officials, purportedly including Vice President Cheney, believe
that only an outright change of regime would permanently reduce the threat posed by
Iran. A few accounts, even as recently as June 2008 (“Preparing the Battlefield,”
Seymour Hersh, the New Yorker, July 7 and 14, 2008) say that President Bush has
authorized U.S. covert operations to destabilize the regime,50 involving assistance to
some of the ethnic-based armed groups discussed above. CRS has no way to confirm
assertions in the Hersh article that up to $400 million was appropriated for such
operations, or that any aid was given to any of the groups mentioned in it.
There has been some support in the United States for regime change since the
1979 Islamic revolution; the United States provided some funding to anti-regime
groups, mainly pro-monarchists, during the 1980s.51 The Administration’s attraction
to this option became apparent after the September 11, 2001, attacks, when President
Bush’s described Iran as part of an “axis of evil” in his January 2002 State of the
Union message. President Bush’s second inaugural address (January 20, 2005) and
his State of the Union messages of February 2, 2005, and January 31, 2006,
suggested a clear preference for a change of regime by stating, in the latter speech,
that “... our nation hopes one day to be the closest of friends with a free and
democratic Iran.” Indications of affinity for this option include increased public
criticism of the regime’s human rights record — for example supporting General
Assembly resolutions condemning Iran’s human rights record — as well as the
funding of Iranian pro-democracy activists.
The State Department is the implementer of these programs. In 2006, the
Administration began increasing the presence of Persian-speaking U.S. diplomats in
U.S. diplomatic missions around Iran, in part to help identify and facilitate Iranian
participate in U.S. democracy-promotion programs. The Iran unit at the U.S.
consulate in Dubai has been enlarged significantly, and new “Iran-watcher” positions
have been added to U.S. diplomatic facilities in Baku, Azerbaijan; Istanbul, Turkey;
Frankfurt, Germany; London; and Ashkabad, Turkmenistan, all of which have large
expatriate Iranian populations and/or proximity to Iran.52 An enlarged (six-person)
“Office of Iran Affairs” has been formed at State Department, and it is reportedly
50 Ross, Brian and Richard Esposito. Bush Authorizes New Covert Action Against Iran.
[http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/05/bush_authorizes.html].
51 CRS conversations with U.S. officials responsible for Iran policy. 1980-1990. After a
period of suspension of such assistance, in 1995, the Clinton Administration accepted a
House-Senate conference agreement to include $18-$20 million in funding authority for
covert operations against Iran in the FY1996 Intelligence Authorization Act (H.R. 1655, P.L.
104-93), according to a Washington Post report of December 22, 1995. The Clinton
Administration reportedly focused the covert aid on changing the regime’s behavior, rather
than its overthrow.
52 Stockman, Farah. “‘Long Struggle’ With Iran Seen Ahead.” Boston Globe, March 9, 2006.
CRS-42
engaging in contacts with U.S.-based exile groups such as those discussed earlier.53
The State Department has used funds provided in recent appropriations to support
pro-democracy programs run by 26 organizations based in the United States in
Europe. The Department refuses to name grantees for security reasons. Part of the
program is to promote people-to-people exchanges which might help alter the image
of the United States in Iran; to date the State Department has sponsored exchanges
with about 150 Iranian academics, professionals, athletes, artists, and medical
professionals. The Department has also formed a Persian-language website. Iran
asserts that funding democracy promotion represents a violation of the 1981 “Algiers
Accords” that settled the Iran hostage crisis and provide for non-interference in each
others’ internal affairs.
Funding. As shown below, prior to FY2008, a total of $42.2 million has been
appropriated for Iran democracy promotion ($15.2 million through DRL and $27
million through the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs). Of that, as of October 2007,
$35.65 million has been obligated, and $9.109 million disbursed.
53 Weisman, Steven. “U.S. Program Is Directed At Altering Iran’s Politics.” New York
Times, April 15, 2006.
CRS-43
Table 8. Iran Democracy Promotion Funding
FY2004
Foreign operations appropriation (P.L. 108-199) earmarked $1.5 million for
“educational, humanitarian and non-governmental organizations and individuals inside
Iran to support the advancement of democracy and human rights in Iran.” The State
Department Bureau of Democracy and Labor (DRL)54 gave $1 million to the IHDC
organization, mentioned earlier; $500,000 to National Endowment for Democracy
(NED).
FY2005
$3 million from FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) for democracy
promotion. Priority areas were political party development, media development, labor
rights, civil society promotion, and human rights.
FY2006
$11.15 for democracy promotion from regular FY2006 foreign aid appropriation (P.L.
regular
109-102). $4.15 million administered by DRL and $7 million for the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs.
FY2006
Total of $66.1 million (of $75 million requested) from FY2006 supplemental (P.L.
supp.
109-234): $20 million for democracy programs ($5 million above request); $5 million
for public diplomacy directed at the Iranian population (amount requested); $5 million
for cultural exchanges (amount requested); and $36.1 million for Voice of America-
TV and “Radio Farda” broadcasting ($13.9 million less than request). Of all FY2006
funds, the State Department said on June 4, 2007 that $16.05 million was obligated for
democracy promotion programs, as was $1.77 million for public diplomacy and $2.22
million for cultural exchanges (bringing Iranian professionals and language teachers
to the United States). Broadcasting funds provided through the Broadcasting Board
of Governors; began under Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), in partnership
with the VOA, in October 1998.55 Farda (“Tomorrow” in Farsi) received $14.7
million of FY2006 funds; now broadcasts 24 hours/day. VOA Persian services (radio
and TV) combined cost about $10 million per year. VOA-TV began on July 3, 2003,
and now is broadcasting to Iran 12 hours a day.
FY2007
FY2007 continuing resolution provided $6.55 million for Iran (and Syria) to be
administered through DRL. No funds were requested.
FY2008
$60 million (of $75 million requested) is contained in Consolidated Appropriation
(H.R. 2764, P.L. 110-161), of which $21.8 million is ESF for pro-democracy
programs, including non-violent efforts to oppose Iran’s meddling in other countries.
Appropriation also fully funds additional $33.6 million requested for Iran
broadcasting: $20 million for VOA Persian service; and $8.1 million for Radio Farda;
and $5.5 million for exchanges with Iran.
FY2009
Request is for $65 million in ESF “to support the aspirations of the Iranian people
for a democratic and open society by promoting civil society, civic participation,
media freedom, and freedom of information.” S. 3288 (FY09 foreign operations
appropriation) provides $20 million for democracy promotion in Iran to counter
Iranian influence in Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza.
54 The State Department has determined that, because Iran is ineligible for U.S. aid, Iran
democracy promotion funds cannot be channeled through the Middle East Partnership
Initiative, because those are Economic Support Funds, ESF, and cannot be used in Iran.
55 The service began when Congress funded it at $4 million in the FY1998
Commerce/State/Justice appropriation (P.L. 105-119). It was to be called Radio Free Iran
but was never formally given that name by RFE/RL.
CRS-44
Many question the prospects of U.S.-led Iran regime change through democracy
promotion or other means, short of all-out-U.S. military invasion, because of the
weakness of opposition groups. Providing overt or covert support to anti-regime
organizations, in the view of many experts, would not make them materially more
viable or attractive to Iranians. The regime purportedly also conducts extensive
regime surveillance of democracy activists or other internal dissidents. Iran has been
arresting civil society activists by alleging they are accepting the U.S. democracy
promotion funds, while others have refused to participate in U.S.-funded programs,
fearing arrest. The highest profile such arrest came in May 2007, when Iranian-
American scholar Haleh Esfandiari, of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington,
DC, who had been under house arrest and unable to leave Iran since late December
2006, was sent to Evin prison. Three other Iranian Americans were arrested and
accused by the Intelligence Ministry of actions contrary to national security in May
2007: U.S. funded broadcast (Radio Farda) journalist Parnaz Azima (who was not
in jail but was not allowed to leave Iran); Kian Tajbacksh of the Open Society
Institute funded by George Soros; and businessman and peace activist Ali Shakeri.
All were released by October 2007. Others argue that reformist groups such as
students, women, labor leaders, intellectuals, and others might be able to galvanize
regime change unexpectedly despite the repression; all of these groups have
conducted various small protests during the past few years. Several congressional
resolutions called on Iran to release Esfandiari (S.Res.214, agreed to by the Senate
on May 24; H.Res. 430, passed by the House on June 5; and S.Res. 199).
Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293). Legislation in the 109th
Congress exemplified the preference of some Members for regime change in Iran by
authorizing funding for democracy promotion, among other provisions. In the 109th
Congress, H.R. 282 passed the House on April 26, 2006, by a vote of 397-21. A
companion, S. 333, was introduced in the Senate. The Administration supported the
democracy-promotion sections of these bills, while opposing provisions on economic
sanctions, as discussed below in the section on the Iran Sanctions Act. Major
provisions of the bills were included in H.R. 6198, which was introduced on
September 27, 2006, passed by both chambers, and signed September 30, 2006 (P.L.
109-293). Entitled the Iran Freedom Support Act, it authorizes funds (no specific
dollar amount) for Iran democracy promotion and modifies the Iran Sanctions Act.
Engagement
As of July 2008, the Administration appears to be placing increased emphasis
on direct diplomacy on the nuclear and other issues. Some view the participation of
Undersecretary Burns at the July 19, 2008 Geneva meeting as a dropping of the
Administration precondition against meeting with Iran until it suspends uranium
enrichment, although the Administration characterized the decision as a show of
support for the P5+1 process. The Administration has also acknowledged considering
setting up an interests section, staffed by U.S. personnel, in Tehran, which would
mostly process Iranian visas and help facilitate U.S.-Iran people-to-people contacts.
Iranian leaders, including Ahmadinejad, have said they might accept the interests
section, although movement appears to have stalled as Iran has not accepted a
suspension of uranium enrichment.
CRS-45
Even prior to the 2008 shift, the Bush Administration had directly engaged Iran
on specific issues (Afghanistan and Iraq), viewing such dialogue as helpful to the
stabilization missions in those countries, but has refused an unconditional dialogue
on all issues. The United States had a dialogue with Iran on Iraq and Afghanistan
from late 2001 until May 2003, when the United States broke off the talks following
the May 12, 2003, terrorist bombing in Riyadh. At that time, the United States and
Iran publicly acknowledged that they were conducting direct talks in Geneva on those
two issues,56 the first confirmed direct dialogue between the two countries since the
1979 revolution. The United States briefly resumed some contacts with Iran in
December 2003 to coordinate U.S. aid to victims of the December 2003 earthquake
in Bam, Iran, including a reported offer to send a high-level delegation to Iran.
However, Iran rebuffed that offer. Recent meetings on Iraq were discussed above.
Regarding a broader dialogue with Iran on nuclear and other issues, since 2006
– and prior to the July 2008 decision to have Undersecretary Burns attend the July
19 nuclear issues meeting – the Administration has maintained it would join
multilateral nuclear talks, or even potentially engage in direct bilateral talks, if Iran
first suspends uranium enrichment. Some believe the Administration position was
based on a view that offering to participate in a nuclear dialogue with Iran would
later increase international support for sanctions and other pressure mechanisms by
demonstrating the willingness of the Administration to resolve the issue
diplomatically. Others believe that this precondition lessened the likelihood of a
positive response by Iran and should be clearly dropped. In a related form of the
option of dropping that precondition, former senior U.S. diplomat Thomas Pickering
and other experts said in April 2008 that U.S. and Iranian former officials and
academics have been meeting to discuss formulas under which Iran might continue
to enriched uranium to non bomb-grade levels under monitoring to be determined.
As part of the U.S. declared openness to talk with Iran if it complies on nuclear
issues, the Administration indicated that it considers Iran a great nation and respects
its history; such themes have been prominent in speeches by President Bush such as
at the Merchant Marine Academy on June 19, 2006, and his September 18, 2006,
speech to the U.N. General Assembly. Secretary of State Rice said in late January
2008 that the United States does not consider Iran a “permanent enemy.” An
amendment by Senator Biden (adopted June 2006) to the FY2007 defense
authorization bill (P.L. 109-364) supported the Administration’s offer to join nuclear
talks with Iran.
“Grand Bargain Concept”. U.S. officials have not, to date, offered an
unconditional, direct U.S.-Iran bilateral dialogue on all issues of U.S. concern:
nuclear issues, Iranian support of militant movements, involvement in Iraq, and
related issues. Some view this as a “missed opportunity,” saying that U.S. officials
rebuffed a reported overture from Iran just before the May 12, 2003, Riyadh bombing
to negotiate all outstanding U.S.-Iran issues as part of a so-called “grand bargain”
that has been discussed by outside experts and reported in various press articles. The
Washington Post reported on February 14, 2007 (“2003 Memo Says Iranian Leaders
Backed Talks”), that the Swiss Ambassador to Iran in 2003, Tim Guldimann, had
56 Wright, Robin. “U.S. In ‘Useful’ Talks With Iran.” Los Angeles Times, May 13, 2003.
CRS-46
informed U.S. officials of a comprehensive Iranian proposal for talks with the United
States. However, State Department officials and some European diplomats based in
Tehran at that time question whether that proposal represented an authoritative
communication from the Iranian government. Some believe that the NIE gives the
United States another opportunity to explore the grand bargain possibility, in part
because alternatives to pressure Iran have become more difficult. Others might argue
that the reported offer was unrealistic because an agreement would have required Iran
to abandon key tenets of its Islamic revolution, including support for Hezbollah and
acceptance of Israel’s right to exist.
There are some indications that Iran might be receptive to restoring relations
with the United States. On January 3, 2008, Supreme Leader Khamene’i said he
would support resumed relations with the United States at the right time and under
the right circumstances, but not at the present because the United States would use
relations to insert spies into Iran.
Further International and Multilateral Sanctions
If Iran does not accept the incentive package by August 2, 2008, the
Administration says it will return to consideration of new international and
multilateral sanctions. The following represent sanctions that the Security Council
might impose in future U.N. resolutions, along with some discussion of key positions
expressed by some Security Council or other nations on those ideas. Administration
officials say these or other additional sanctions might also be considered by a
“coalition” of countries, outside Security Council authorization — a possibility that
reportedly was discussed at a meeting of Security Council permanent members at the
U.S. State Department on September 21, 2007.57 On the other hand, even among U.S.
allies, Germany opposed sanctions outside Council action on the grounds that doing
so would undermine the Security Council process.58 Among the further U.N. or
multilateral sanctions widely discussed are the following:
! Mandating Reductions in Diplomatic Exchanges with Iran or
Prohibiting Travel by Iranian Officials. As noted above, Resolution
1803 imposes, rather than calls for, a ban on travel by some named
Iranian officials. A further option is to limit sports or cultural
exchanges with Iran, such as Iran’s participation in the World Cup
soccer tournament or the Olympics. However, many experts oppose
using sporting events to accomplish political goals.
! Banning or Inspecting International Flights to and from Iran. Bans
on flights to and from Libya were imposed on that country in
response to the finding that its agents were responsible for the
December 21, 1988, bombing of Pan Am 103 (now lifted). There are
no indications that a passenger aircraft flight ban is under
57 Wright, Robin. “U.S., Europeans Planning Own Iran Sanctions.” Washington Post,
September 22, 2007.
58 Berlin Says U.S. and France Guilty of Hypocrisy. Spiegel Online, September 24, 2007.
[http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,507443,00.html]
CRS-47
consideration at the U.N. Security Council, although, as noted
above, inspections of Iranian international cargo flights and shipping
is authorized in Resolution 1803.
! A Ban on Exports to Iran of Refined Oil Products or of Other
Products. Even before the NIE was released, members of the U.N.
Security Council did not appear ready to include this sanction in a
new Security Council resolution. Some countries that supply
gasoline to Iran, such as those listed in the economic table above
(see Table 3), might oppose this sanction. A gas exports ban would
almost certainly hurt Iran’s economy because Iran does not refine
enough gasoline to meet demand and must import gasoline, although
some experts believe Iran would be able to circumvent this sanction
by offering premium prices to suppliers. A bill, H.R. 2880, would
apply the Iran Sanctions Act (see below) to entities that sell gasoline
to Iran. H.Con.Res. 362 and S.Res. 580 call for that sanction.
! Financial and Trade Sanctions, Such as a Freeze on Iran’s
Financial Assets Abroad or Limiting Lending to Iran by Banks or
International Financial Institutions. Resolution 1737 and 1747
freeze the assets only of specific Iranian entities and individuals
named in those resolutions. As noted, Resolution 1803 authorizes
countries to curtail banking relationships with Iran’s Bank Melli and
Bank Saderat. A future resolution could, as has been discussed
between the United States, Europe, Russia, and China, mandate an
end to processing any Iranian bank transactions. Fearing that
possibility, Iran reportedly moved $75 billion held in European
banks out of those accounts in May 2008. Another option is to
mandate reduction of official credit guarantees, and British Prime
Minister Brown indicated British support for this idea on November
12, 2007. In response to U.S. urging, U.S. allies and their banks are
already reducing export credit guarantees and financing for Iran, as
discussed below.
! Banning Worldwide Investment in Iran’s Energy Sector. This option
would represent an internationalization of the U.S. “Iran Sanctions
Act,” which is discussed below and extensively in CRS Report
RS20871. In his November 12, 2007 comments, Brown expressed
support for a worldwide financing of energy projects in Iran as a
means of cutting off energy development in Iran, although others
believe that taking this step could cause worldwide energy prices to
rise further.
! Imposing a Worldwide Ban on Sales of Arms to Iran. Resolution
1747 called for — but did not require — U.N. member states to
exercise restraint in selling arms to Iran. A future resolution might
mandate such an arms sales ban. Another option under discussion is
to eliminate the Resolution 1737 exemption from sanctions for the
Bushehr nuclear reactor project, although Russian support for such
a move is in doubt.
CRS-48
! Imposing an International Ban on Purchases of Iranian Oil or Other
Trade. This is widely considered the most sweeping of sanctions that
might be imposed, and would be unlikely to be considered in the
Security Council unless Iran was found actively developing an actual
nuclear weapon. Virtually all U.S. allies conduct extensive trade
with Iran, and would oppose sanctions on trade in civilian goods
with Iran. A ban on oil purchases from Iran is unlikely to be imposed
because world oil prices remain over $120 per barrel and could go
far higher if such sanctions were imposed on Iran.
European/Japanese/Other Foreign Country Policy on Sanctions
and Trade Agreements. Although the United States and its allies are now mostly
aligned on Iran policy, some philosophical differences remain. Most U.S. allies still
favor engagement and incentives — not just economic or political punishments —
as tools to change Iran’s behavior. During 1992-1997, when the United States was
tightening its own sanctions against Iran, the European Union (EU) countries
maintained a policy of “critical dialogue” with Iran, and the EU and Japan refused
to join the 1995 U.S. trade and investment ban on Iran. The European dialogue with
Iran was suspended in April 1997 in response to the German terrorism trial
(“Mykonos trial”) that found high-level Iranian involvement in assassinating Iranian
dissidents in Germany, but resumed in May 1998 after Khatemi became president.
With Iran still defiant on nuclear issues, the European countries and Japan are
no longer negotiating new trade agreements and other economic interaction with Iran.
In December 2002, as part of its engagement strategy, the EU (European
Commission) first began negotiations with Iran on a “Trade and Cooperation
Agreement” (TCA) that would lower the tariffs or increase quotas for Iranian exports
to the EU countries. However, revelations about Iran’s undeclared nuclear activity
caused a suspension of the talks in July 2003. The TCA talks resumed in January
2005 in concert with the “Paris Agreement,” but were suspended after the breakdown
of the Paris Agreement. During the active period of such talks, there were working
group discussions focused not only on the TCA terms and proliferation issues but
also on Iran’s human rights record, Iran’s efforts to derail the Middle East peace
process, Iranian-sponsored terrorism, counter-narcotics, refugees, migration issues,
and the Iranian opposition PMOI. In addition, several EU countries report that
civilian trade with Iran is down because Iran’s defiance on the nuclear issue is
introducing more perceived risk to trading with Iran.
Similarly, there is insufficient international support to grant Iran membership
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) until there is progress on the nuclear issue.
Iran first attempted to apply to join the WTO in July 1996. On 22 occasions after
that, representatives of the Clinton and then the Bush Administration blocked Iran
from applying (applications must be by consensus of the 148 members). As discussed
above, as part of an effort to assist the EU-3 nuclear talks with Iran, the
Administration announced on March 11, 2005, that it would drop opposition to Iran’s
applying for WTO membership. At a WTO meeting in May 2005, no opposition to
Iran’s application was registered, and Iran formally began accession talks.
CRS-49
Foreign Banking and Financing Limitations. U.S. officials, including
Undersecretary of State Burns and Undersecretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey, say
that they are having substantial success in separate unilateral efforts (“targeted
financial measures”) to persuade European governments and companies to stop
financing commerce with Iran. Then Under Secretary of State Burns and Under
Secretary of the Treasury Levey testified on March 21, 2007, that “many leading
foreign banks ... [have concluded] that they simply did not wish to be a banker for a
regime that deliberately conceals the nature of its illicit business.” Treasury and State
Departments officials, as recently as April 17, 2008, testimony before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, say they have persuaded at least 40 banks not to provide
financing for exports to Iran or to process dollar transactions for Iranian banks.
Among those that have pulled out of Iran are UBS and Credit Suisse (Switzerland),
HSBC (Britain), Germany’s Commerzbank A.G and Deutsche Bank AG.
In an attempt to prevent Iran’s use of non-European banks to circumvent these
pullouts, U.S. pressure has reportedly convinced Kuwaiti banks to stop transactions
with Iranian accounts,59 and South Korean banks are considering doing the same. The
restrictions on financing are, according to Iranian and outside observers, making it
more difficult to fund energy industry and other projects in Iran, and particularly
hurting small Iranian businesses who have to pay new fees and premiums in order to
collect on accounts earned by outside trade. The results are due also to U.S.
presentations of the financial risk posed by providing credit to Iran. Thus far, the
Treasury Department has not gone so far as to sanction any bank for dealing with Iran
by designating it a “money laundering entity” under Section 311 of the USA Patriot
Act, although some say that step has been threatened at times. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2006 raised the financial risk
rating for Iran.
Some of these moves by European banks have come about by U.S. pressure. In
2004, the Treasury Department fined UBS $100 million for the unauthorized
movement of U.S. dollars to Iran and other sanctioned countries, and on December
20, 2005, the Treasury Department fined Dutch bank ABN Amro $80 million for
failing to fully report the processing of financial transactions involving Iran’s Bank
Melli (and another bank partially owned by Libya). On September 8, 2006, the
Treasury Department said it would bar U.S. banks from handling any indirect
transactions (“U-turn transactions, meaning transactions with non-Iranian foreign
banks that are handling transactions on behalf of an Iranian bank) with Iran’s Bank
Saderat (see above), which the Administration accuses of providing funds to
Hezbollah.60 Bank Sepah is subject to asset freezes and transactions limitations as a
result of their naming as sanctionable entities under Resolution 1737 and 1747. The
Treasury Department reportedly is considering similar sanctions against Bank
Markazi (Central Bank) which, according to a February 25, 2008, Wall Street Journal
story, is helping other Iranian banks circumvent the U.S. and U.N. banking pressure.
59 Mufson, Steven and Robin Wright. “Iran Adapts to Economic Pressure.” Washington
Post, October 29, 2007.
60 Kessler, Glenn. “U.S. Moves to Isolate Iranian Banks.” Washington Post, September 9,
2006.
CRS-50
However, the European countries reportedly oppose such a sanction as an extreme
step with potential humanitarian consequences.
As another sign of success for the U.S. campaign, some EU countries say they
have reduced credit guarantee exposure to Iran since Resolution 1737 was passed in
December 2006. The table at the beginning of this paper lists some countries that
have dramatically cut back credit guarantees for Iran. Previously, the EU countries
and their banks have maintained that financing for purely civilian goods is not
banned by any U.N. resolution and that exporters of such goods should not be
penalized. In the 1990s, European and Japanese creditors — over U.S. objections —
rescheduled about $16 billion in Iranian debt. These countries (governments and
private creditors) rescheduled the debt bilaterally, in spite of Paris Club rules that call
for multilateral rescheduling. Iran’s improved external debt led most European export
credit agencies to restore insurance cover for exports to Iran. In July 2002, Iran
tapped international capital markets for the first time since the Islamic revolution,
selling $500 million in bonds to European banks.
World Bank Loans. The EU and Japan appear to have made new
international lending to Iran contingent on Iran’s response to international nuclear
demands. This represents a narrowing of past differences between the United States
and its allies on this issue. Acting under provisions of successive foreign aid laws,
in 1993 the United States voted its 16.5% share of the World Bank against loans to
Iran of $460 million for electricity, health, and irrigation projects, but the loans were
approved. To block that lending, the FY1994-FY1996 foreign aid appropriations
(P.L. 103-87, P.L. 103-306, and P.L. 104-107) cut the amount appropriated for the
U.S. contribution to the Bank by the amount of those loans. The legislation
contributed to a temporary halt in new Bank lending to Iran. During 1999-2005,
Iran’s moderating image had led the World Bank to consider new loans over U.S.
opposition. In May 2000, the United States’ allies outvoted the United States to
approve $232 million in loans for health and sewage projects. During April 2003-
May 2005, a total of $725 million in loans were approved for environmental
management, housing reform, water and sanitation projects, and land management
projects, in addition to $400 million in loans for earthquake relief. (A provision of
H.R. 1400 and S. 970, introduced in the 110th Congress, would impose a new
restriction on U.S. contributions to the World Bank in proportion to the Bank’s
lending to Iran.)
U.S. Sanctions
Any international or multilateral sanctions would add to the wide range of U.S.
sanctions in place since the November 4, 1979, seizure of the U.S. hostages in
Tehran.61 Some experts believe that, even before U.S. allies have begun to impose
some sanctions on Iran, U.S. sanctions alone were slowing Iran’s economy, forcing
it to curb spending on weapons purchases.62 However, a report on U.S. sanctions by
the Government Accountability Office (GAO), published December 2007 (GAO-08-
61 On November 14, 1979, President Carter declared a national emergency with respect to
Iran, renewed every year since 1979.
62 “The Fight Over Letting Foreigners Into Iran’s Oilfields.” The Economist, July 14, 2001.
CRS-51
58: Iran Sanctions: Impact in Furthering U.S. Objectives Is Unclear and Should Be
Reviewed ) found that the extent of the impact on Iran is “difficult to determine.” The
GAO studied said that, despite the U.S. sanctions, Iran’s global trade has continued
to expand from 1987 (when sanctions first began to be imposed) to 2006, and that
Iran had signed $20 billion in energy investment deals with foreign firms, although
these agreements might not ultimately be carried out, as discussed below.
Terrorism/Foreign Aid Sanctions. In January 1984, following the October
1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon (believed perpetrated by
Hezbollah) Iran was added to the “terrorism list.” The list was established by Section
6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, sanctioning countries determined to
have provided repeated support for acts of international terrorism.
! The terrorism list designation restricts sales of U.S. dual use items
(Export Administration Act, as continued by executive order), and,
under other laws, bans direct U.S. financial assistance (Foreign
Assistance Act, FAA) and arms sales (Arms Export Control Act),
and requires the United States to vote to oppose multilateral lending
to the designated countries (Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, P.L. 104-132). Waivers are provided under
these laws, but successive foreign aid appropriations laws since the
late 1980s ban direct assistance to Iran (loans, credits, insurance,
Eximbank credits) without providing for a waiver.
! Section 307 of the FAA (added in 1985) names Iran as unable to
benefit from U.S. contributions to international organizations, and
require proportionate cuts if these institutions work in Iran. No
waiver is provided for.
! Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the
President is required to withhold U.S. foreign assistance to any
country that provides to a terrorism list country foreign assistance or
arms. Waivers are provided.
! U.S. sanctions laws do not bar disaster aid and the United States
donated $125,000, through relief agencies, to help victims of two
earthquakes in Iran (February and May 1997), and another $350,000
worth of aid to the victims of a June 22, 2002 earthquake. (The
World Bank provided some earthquake related lending as well.) The
United States provided $5.7 million in assistance (out of total
governmental pledges of about $32 million, of which $17 million
have been remitted) to the victims of the December 2003 earthquake
in Bam, Iran, which killed as many as 40,000 people and destroyed
90% of Bam’s buildings. The United States flew in 68,000
kilograms of supplies to Bam with U.S. military aircraft.
Proliferation Sanctions. Iran is prevented from receiving advanced
technology from the United States under relevant and Iran-specific anti-proliferation
CRS-52
laws.63 The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 102-484) requires denial of
license applications for exports to Iran of dual use items, and imposes sanctions on
foreign countries that transfer to Iran “destabilizing numbers and types of
conventional weapons,” as well as WMD technology. The Iran Nonproliferation Act
(P.L. 106-178, now called the Iran-Syria Non-Proliferation Act, or ISNA) authorizes
sanctions on foreign entities that assist Iran’s WMD programs. It bans U.S.
extraordinary payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency in connection
with the international space station unless the President can certify that the agency
or entities under its control had not transferred any WMD or missile technology to
Iran within the year prior. 64
Reflecting a Bush Administration decision to impose sanctions for violations,
the Bush Administration has sanctioned numerous entities as discussed below. These
entities were sanctioned under the INA, the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of
1992 (P.L. 102-484), and another law, the Chemical and Biological Warfare
Elimination Act of 1991, for sales to Iran. Those entities are listed in Table 8.
As with previous years’ appropriations, the FY2007 foreign aid appropriation
(H.R. 5522, P.L. 110-5) punishes the Russian Federation for assisting Iran by
withholding 60% of any U.S. assistance to the Russian Federation unless it
terminates technical assistance to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missiles programs. A
similar provision is contained in the FY2008 foreign aid bill (H.R. 2764, included in
the omnibus appropriation). A provision of H.R. 1400 and of S. 970 would restrict
nuclear cooperation with Russia, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, if it
continues to assist Iran’s nuclear or advanced conventional weapons capabilities.
(The two bills refer to different sections of the Atomic Energy Act, however.)
Executive Order 13382, allows the President to block the assets of proliferators
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters under the authority
granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and Section
301 of Title 3, United States Code. Iranian entities designated under E.O. 13382 are
listed in Table 9 at the end of this paper. As noted above, the Revolutionary Guard,
several Guard officers, several Iranian banks, and other entities were designated
under this Order on October 21, 2007; and several additional entities were designated
on July 8, 2008.
Counter-Narcotics. In February 1987, Iran was first designated as a state that
failed to cooperate with U.S. anti-drug efforts or take adequate steps to control
narcotics production or trafficking. U.S. and U.N. Drug Control Program (UNDCP)
assessments of drug production in Iran prompted the Clinton Administration, on
63 Such laws include the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Energy Policy Act of 2005
(P.L. 109-58).
64 The provision contains certain exceptions to ensure the safety of astronauts, but it
nonetheless threatened to limit U.S. access to the international space station after April
2006, when Russia started charging the United States for transportation on its Soyuz
spacecraft. Legislation in the 109th Congress (S. 1713, P.L. 109-112) amended the provision
in order to facilitate continued U.S. access and extended INA sanctions provisions to Syria.
CRS-53
December 7, 1998, to remove Iran from the U.S. list of major drug producing
countries. This exempts Iran from the annual certification process that kept drug-
related U.S. sanctions in place on Iran. According to several governments, over the
past few years Iran has augmented security on its border with Afghanistan in part to
prevent the flow of narcotics from that country into Iran. Britain has sold Iran some
night vision equipment and body armor for the counter-narcotics fight. Iran also
reportedly is supporting the international counter-narcotics effort in Afghanistan by
providing aid to Afghan farmers to grow crops other than poppy.
U.S. Trade Ban/Subsidiaries. On May 6, 1995, President Clinton issued
Executive Order 12959 banning U.S. trade and investment in Iran.65 This followed
an earlier March 1995 executive order barring U.S. investment in Iran’s energy
sector. The trade ban was partly intended to blunt criticism that U.S. trade with Iran
made U.S. appeals for multilateral containment of Iran less credible. Each March
since 1995, the U.S. Administration has renewed a declaration of a state of
emergency that triggered the investment ban. Some modifications to the trade ban
since 1999 account for the trade that does exist between the United States and Iran.
(H.R. 1400 and S. 970, see below, would reimpose many of the restrictions.)
The following conditions and modifications, as administered by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department, apply:
! Some goods related to the safe operation of civilian aircraft may be
licensed for export to Iran, and as recently as September 2006, the
Bush Administration, in the interests of safe operations of civilian
aircraft, permitted a sale by General Electric of Airbus engine spare
parts to be installed on several Iran Air passenger aircraft (by
European airline contractors). H.R. 1400 would ban such sales of
spare parts.
! OFAC regulations do not permit U.S. firms to negotiate investment
deals with Iran or to trade Iranian oil overseas.
! Since April 1999, commercial sales of food and medical products to
Iran have been allowed, on a case-by-case basis and subject to
OFAC licensing. According to OFAC in April 2007, licenses for
exports of medicines to treat HIV and leukemia are routinely
expedited for sale to Iran, and license applications are viewed
favorably for business school exchanges, earthquake safety seminars,
plant and animal conservation, and medical training in Iran. Private
letters of credit can be used to finance approved transactions, but no
U.S. government credit guarantees are available, and U.S. exporters
are not permitted to deal directly with Iranian banks. The FY2001
agriculture appropriations law (P.L. 106-387) contained a provision
banning the use of official credit guarantees for food and medical
65 An August 1997 amendment to the trade ban (Executive Order 13059) prevented U.S.
companies from knowingly exporting goods to a third country for incorporation into
products destined for Iran.
CRS-54
sales to Iran and other countries on the U.S. terrorism list, except
Cuba, although allowing for a presidential waiver to permit such
credit guarantees. Neither the Clinton Administration nor the Bush
Administration provided the credit guarantees. H.R. 1400 and S. 970
do not contain provisions limiting such exports to Iran.
! In April 2000, the trade ban was further eased to allow U.S.
importation of Iranian nuts, dried fruits, carpets, and caviar. The
United States was the largest market for Iranian carpets before the
1979 revolution, but U.S. anti-dumping tariffs imposed on Iranian
products in 1986 dampened of many Iranian products. The tariff on
Iranian carpets is now about 3% - 6%, and the duty on Iranian caviar
is about 15%. In December 2004, U.S. sanctions were further
modified to allow Americans to freely engage in ordinary publishing
activities with entities in Iran (and Cuba and Sudan). As of mid-
2007, the product most imported from Iran by U.S. importers is
pomegranate juice concentrate. H.R. 1400 and S. 970 would re-
impose the ban on importation of such goods.
! The trade ban permits U.S. companies to apply for licenses to
conduct “swaps” of Caspian Sea oil with Iran, but, as part of a U.S.
policy to route Central Asian energy around Iran (and Russia), a
Mobil Corporation application to do so was denied in April 1999.
! In May 2002 Moody’s stopped its credit ratings service for Iran’s
government bonds on the grounds that performing this service might
violate the U.S. trade ban.
Subsidiaries. The trade ban does not bar subsidiaries of U.S. firms from
dealing with Iran, as long as the subsidiary has no operational relationship to the
parent company. Some U.S. companies have come under scrutiny for dealings by
their subsidiaries with Iran. H.R. 1400, S. 970, S. 3227, and a version marked up by
the Senate Banking Committee — as well as the House-passed H.R. 957 — would
apply sanctions to the parent companies of U.S. subsidiaries if those subsidiaries are
directed or formed to trade with Iran. Among subsidiaries of U.S. firms that trade
with Iran are:
! On January 11, 2005, Iran said it had let a contract to the U.S.
company Halliburton, and an Iranian company, Oriental Kish, to
drill for gas in Phases 9 and 10 of South Pars. Halliburton reportedly
provided $30 million to $35 million worth of services per year
through Oriental Kish, leaving unclear whether Halliburton would
be considered in violation of the U.S. trade and investment ban or
the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA),66 because the dealings apparently
involved a subsidiary of Halliburton (Cayman Islands-registered
Halliburton Products and Service, Ltd, based in Dubai). On April 10,
2007, Halliburton announced that its subsidiaries had, as promised
66 “Iran Says Halliburton Won Drilling Contract.” Washington Times, January 11, 2005.
CRS-55
in January 2005, completed all contractual commitments with Iran
and that it is no longer operating there, but Halliburton has said it is
setting up a headquarters in Dubai to pursue additional business in
the region.
! General Electric (GE) announced in February 2005 that it would
seek no new business in Iran, and it reportedly is expected to wind
down the already agreed contracts by July 2008. GE was selling Iran
equipment and services for hydroelectric, oil and gas services, and
medical diagnostic projects through Italian, Canadian, and French
subsidiaries. The trade ban appears to bar any Iranian company from
buying a foreign company that has U.S. units.
! Subsidiaries of several other U.S. energy equipment firms are
apparently still in the Iranian market. These include Foster Wheeler,
Dresser Rand, Schlumberger, Natco Group, and Overseas
Shipholding Group. 67
! An Irish subsidiary of the Coca Cola company provides syrup for the
U.S.-brand soft drink to an Iranian distributor, Khoshgovar. Local
versions of both Coke and of Pepsi (with Iranian-made syrups) are
also marketed in Iran by distributors who licensed the recipes for
those soft drinks before the Islamic revolution and before the trade
ban was imposed on Iran.
The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). The Iran Sanctions Act penalizes foreign (or
U.S.) investment of more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector.68 In the
109th Congress, broad ISA-amendment bills were H.R. 282, which was passed by the
House on April 26, 2006; a Senate companion measure, S. 333; and H.R. 6198, the
latter of which was passed and then signed on September 30, 2006 (P.L. 109-293).
This “Iran Freedom Support Act,” discussed above, extends ISA until December 31,
2011, and drops Libya from the law, and is now called the Iran Sanctions Act. It
codified existing Iran sanctions, makes exports to Iran of WMD or advanced
conventional weapons technology sanctionable, and recommends (but does not
mandate) a 180-day time limit for the Administration to determine whether a project
violates ISA. It did not change the menu of available sanctions. As noted above, it
also authorized additional funding for promoting democracy in Iran. (See CRS
Report RS20871, The Iran Sanctions Act, by Kenneth Katzman.)
No projects have actually been sanctioned under ISA, and numerous investment
agreements with Iran since its enactment have helped Iran slow deterioration of its
energy export sector. However, some European companies are reportedly hesitating
on potential new energy investments in Iran, and there is uncertainty about whether
67 Prada, Paulo, and Betsy McKay. Trading Outcry Intensifies. Wall Street Journal, March
27, 2007; Brush, Michael. Are You Investing in Terrorism? MSN Money, July 9, 2007.
68 Originally called the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, or ILSA; P.L. 104-172, August 5, 1996.
It was renewed by P.L. 107-24, August 3, 2001; renewed again for two months by P.L. 109-
267; and renewed and amended by P.L. 109-293.
CRS-56
large agreements of investments by Asian companies will be implemented. Iran did
not extend a June 2008 deadline for Royal Dutch Shell and partner Repsol (Spain)
to finalize a deal to develop phases 13 and 14 of the large South Pars gas field; the
companies announced in May 2008 they would not pursue that deal but might bid on
other phases of South Pars. Total SA of France announced a similar move in July
2008 regarding developing liquified natural gas capabilities from South Pars. The
moves were possibly because of U.S. pressure on foreign firms not to do business
with Iran, and the implicit threat to impose ISA sanctions. In 2007, in part to express
displeasure on the nuclear issue, Japan’s Inpex to cut its $2 billion investment to
develop Iran’s large (26 billion barrels) onshore Azadegan oil field to a stake of only
about 10% in that project. An agreement on that project was signed in April 2007.
Total SA said in July 2008 that it would not go forward with a planned LNG project
linked to South Pars.
One major project that Iran believes would help its gas export sector
considerably is a proposed gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan, to India, on
which Iran and Pakistan said in November 2007 that they had reached final
agreement. A long delayed formal signing reportedly was to happen in late February
2008, but has not taken place to date, although Ahmadinejad’s visit to India in late
April 2008 has reportedly revived Indian discussions on the deal and could pave the
way for a final agreement among the three countries. Another major deal was
considered a blow to European solidarity – the agreement in March 2008 by
Switzerland’s EGL utility to buy 194 trillion cubic feet per year of Iranian gas for 25
years, through a Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to be built by 2010, a deal valued at
least $15 billion. The United States said it was launching a “legal review” of the deal
and criticized it as sending the “wrong message” to Iran, but the deal appears to
involve only purchase of Iranian gas, not development, and so many would consider
it unlikely to constitute a violation of ISA. It is also not clear whether or not Iran’s
reported investment to build five refineries in various Asian countries would
constituted sanctionable investment under ISA. H.R. 2880, as noted above, would
apply ISA to sales of gasoline to Iran.
Other recently announced preliminary agreements might test Administration
application of ISA. Many of these deals are included in a chart in the December 2007
GAO study referenced above. In July 2007, there was an agreement for the export of
Iranian gas to Europe through the Iran-Turkey gas pipeline (a project not sanctioned
under ISA), which includes Turkish development of phases 22, 23, and 24 of the
large South Pars gas field. In early October 2007, government-owned GAIL (India)
agreed to set up a $2.3 billion petrochemicals plant in Iran, which would presumably
use natural gas and oil products to manufacture rubber, plastics, or related chemicals.
On December 9, 2007 China’s Sinopec finalized a 2004 deal to develop Yadavaran
oil field and on December 26, 2007, Malaysia’s SKS Ventures finalized a $16 billion,
25-year deal to develop on shore and off shore gas fields. In July 2008, Russia’s
Gazprom said it would sign a memorandum of understanding with Iran on future
energy projects.
H.R. 1400, passed by the House on September 25, 2007, would remove the
Administration’s ability to waive application of sanctions under ISA. A companion
Senate measure, S. 970, does not contain a similar provision. The Administration
opposes that provision on the grounds that requiring sanctions on allied companies
CRS-57
would divide the United States and its allies on Iran policy. However, H.R. 1400 does
not impose on the Administration a time limit to determine whether a project is
sanctionable. H.R. 1400, S. 970, S. 3227, the Senate Banking Committee bill, and
another bill, H.R. 957 (the latter passed the House on July 31, 2007) would clarify
the definitions of sanctionable entities to include official credit guarantee agencies,
such as France’s COFACE and Germany’s Hermes, and both bills would also clearly
apply ISA sanctions to pipeline and liquified natural gas (LNG) projects. H.R. 1400
would require the president to select a ban procurement from a sanctioned entity as
one of the two sanctions to impose.
Divestment. A growing trend not only in Congress but in several states is to
require or call for or require divestment of shares of firms that have invested in Iran’s
energy sector (at the same levels considered sanctionable under the Iran Sanctions
Act).69 Pending legislation, H.R. 1400 (see below), does not require divestment, but
requires a presidential report on firms that have invested in Iran’s energy sector.
Another bill, H.R. 1357, would require government pension funds to divest of shares
in firms that have made ISA-sanctionable investments in Iran’s energy sector and bar
government and private pension funds from future investments in such firms. Two
other bills, H.R. 2347 (passed by the House on July 31, 2007) and S. 1430, would
protect mutual fund and other investment companies from shareholder action for any
losses that would occur from divesting in firms that have investing in Iran’s energy
sector.
Pending Comprehensive Sanctions Legislation: H.R. 1400, S. 970,
S. 3227, H.Con.Res. 362, and S.Res. 580. Legislation pending in the 110th
Congress — primarily the Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007, H.R. 1400 and S.
970, and variants such as S. 3227 and a version marked up by the Senate Banking
Committee – would attempt to compel foreign adoption of tighter sanctions against
Iran. Their provisions on the Iran Sanctions Act were noted above. In addition, these
bills would broaden the types of foreign entities (to include official credit guarantee
agencies, for example) that could be sanctioned by the United States for dealings
with Iran. H.R. 1400, passed by the House on September 25, 2007 by a vote of 397-
16, would remove presidential waiver authority to avoid sanctioning such companies.
The bills would mandate cuts in U.S. contributions to the World Bank for lending to
Iran and preventing Russia from obtaining a nuclear agreement with the United States
if it continues supplying nuclear technology to Iran. Other provisions of both would
rescind the easing of the U.S. trade ban with Iran.
H.Con.Res. 362 expresses the sense of Congress for imposition of strong
additional sanctions, including sanctioning Iran’s Central Bank, imposing sanctions
under the Iran Sanctions Act, banning gasoline exports to Iran, and strict inspections
for all cargo entering Iran. S.Res. 580 does not call for a ban on gasoline exports to
Iran or for a comprehensive inspections regime.
Travel-Related Guidance. Use of U.S. passports for travel to Iran is
permitted. Iranians entering the United States are required to be fingerprinted, and
69 For information on the steps taken by individual states, see National Conference of State
Legislatures. State Divestment Legislation.
CRS-58
Iran has imposed reciprocal requirements. In May 2007 the State Department
increased its warnings about U.S. travel to Iran, based largely on the arrests of the
dual Iranian-American nationals discussed earlier.
Status of Some U.S.-Iran Assets Disputes. A U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal
at the Hague continues to arbitrate cases resulting from the 1980 break in relations
and freezing of some of Iran’s assets. Major cases yet to be decided center on
hundreds of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases between the United States and the
Shah’s regime, which Iran claims it paid for but were unfulfilled. About $400 million
in proceeds from the resale of that equipment was placed in a DOD FMS account,
and about $22 million in Iranian diplomatic property remains blocked, although U.S.
funds have been disbursed — credited against the DOD FMS account — to pay
judgments against Iran for past acts of terrorism against Americans. Other disputes
include the mistaken U.S. shoot-down on July 3, 1988, of an Iranian Airbus
passenger jet (Iran Air flight 655), for which the United States, in accordance with
an ICJ judgment, paid Iran $61.8 million in compensation ($300,000 per wage
earning victim, $150,000 per non-wage earner) for the 248 Iranians killed. The
United States has not compensated Iran for the airplane itself. As it has in past similar
cases, the Administration has opposed a terrorism lawsuit against Iran by victims of
the U.S. Embassy Tehran seizure on the grounds of diplomatic obligation.70
Conclusion
Mistrust between the United States and Iran’s Islamic regime has run deep for
over two decades. Many experts say that all factions in Iran are united on major
national security issues and that U.S.-Iran relations might not improve unless or until
the Islamic regime is removed or moderates substantially, even if a nuclear deal is
reached and implemented. The Administration and many experts believe that Iran has
become emboldened by the installation of pro-Iranian regimes in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and the new strength of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and that Iran now seeks
to press its advantage to strengthen regional Shiite movements and possibly drive the
United States out of the Gulf. Others reach an opposite conclusion, stating that Iran
now feels more encircled than ever by pro-U.S. regimes and U.S. forces guided by
a policy of pre-emption, and Iran is redoubling its efforts to develop WMD and other
capabilities to deter the United States. Some say that, despite Ahmadinejad’s
presidency, the United States and Iran have a common interest in stability in the
Persian Gulf and South Asia regions in the aftermath of the defeat of the Taliban and
the regime of Saddam Hussein and that major diplomatic overtures to Iran should be
explored.
70 See CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorism States by Victims of Terrorism, by
Jennifer K. Elsea.
CRS-59
Figure 1. Structure of the Iranian Government
CRS-60
Figure 2. Map of Iran
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS (April 2005).
CRS-61
Table 9. Entities Sanctioned by U.N. Resolutions and
Executive Order 13382
(Persons listed are identified by the positions they held when designated.)
Entities Named for Sanctions Under Resolution 1737
Atomic Energy Organization
Mesbah Energy Company (Arak
Kalaye Electric
of Iran (AEIO)
supplier)
(Natanz supplier)
Pars Trash Company
Farayand Technique
Defense Industries
(centrifuge program)
(centrifuge program)
Organization (DIO)
7th of Tir
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
Shahid Bagheri
(DIO subordinate)
(SHIG) — missile program
Industrial Group
(SBIG)
missile program
Fajr Industrial Group
Mohammad Qanadi, AEIO Vice
Behman Asgarpour
(missile program)
President
(Arak manager)
Dawood Agha Jani
Ehsan Monajemi
Jafar Mohammadi
(Natanz official)
(Natanz construction manager)
(adviser to AEIO)
Ali Hajinia Leilabadi
Lt. Gen. Mohammad Mehdi Nejad
Gen Hosein Salimi
(director of Mesbah Energy)
Nouri
(Commander, IRGC
(Malak Ashtar University of
Air Force)
Defence Technology rector)
Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi
Reza Gholi Esmaeli
Bahmanyar Morteza
(head of Aerospace
(AIO official)
Bahmanyar
Industries Org., AIO)
(AIO official)
Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim
Safavi
(Commander in Chief,
IRGC)
Entities Added by Resolution 1747
Ammunition and Metallurgy
Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and
Kavoshyar Company
Industries Group
Production Center and Esfahan
(subsidiary of AEIO)
(controls 7th of Tir)
Nuclear Technology Center
Parchin Chemical Industries
Karaj Nuclear Research Center
Novin Energy
(branch of DIO)
Company
Cruise Missile Industry
Bank Sepah
Sanam Industrial Group
Group
(funds AIO and subordinate
(subordinate to AIO)
entities)
Ya Mahdi Industries Group
Qods Aeronautics Industries
Pars Aviation Services
(produces UAV’s, para-gliders for
Company
IRGC asymmetric warfare)
(maintains IRGC Air
Force equipment)
Sho’a Aviation
Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani
Mohasen Fakrizadeh-
(produces IRGC light aircraft
(senior defense scientist)
Mahabai
for asymmetric warfare)
(defense scientist)
Seyed Jaber Safdari
Amir Rahimi
Mohsen Hojati
(Natanz manager)
(head of Esfahan nuclear facilities)
(head of Fajr Industrial
Group)
CRS-62
Mehrdada Akhlaghi
Naser Maleki
Ahmad Derakshandeh
Ketabachi (head of SBIG)
(head of SHIG)
(head of Bank Sepah)
Brig. Gen. Morteza Reza’i
Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadiyan
Brig. Gen. Mohammad
(Deputy commander-in-chief,
(chief of IRGC Joint Staff)
Reza Zahedi
IRGC)
(IRGC ground forces
commander)
Rear Admiral Morteza Safari
Brig. Gen. Mohammad Hejazi
Brig. Gen. Qasem
(commander, IRGC Navy)
(Basij commander)
Soleimani
(Qods Force
commander)
Gen. Mohammad Baqr
Zolqadr
(IRGC officer serving as
deputy Interior Minister
Entities Added by Resolution 1803
Thirteen Iranians named in
Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co.
Barzaganin Tejaral
Annex 1 to Resolution 1803;
(centrifuge production)
Tavanmad Saccal
all reputedly involved in
various aspects of nuclear
program
Electro Sanam Co.
Ettehad Technical Group
Industrial Factories of
(AIO front co.)
Precision
Jabber Ibn Hayan
Joza Industrial Co.
Khorasan Metallurgy
Industries
Niru Battery Manufacturing
Pshgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries
Safety Equipment
Co.
Procurement
(Makes batteries for Iranian
(AIO front, involved in
military and missile systems)
missiles)
Tamas Co.
(involved in uranium
enrichment)
Entities Designated Under U.S. Executive Order 13382
(many designations coincident with designations under U.N. resolutions)
Entity
Date Named
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (Iran)
June 2005, Sept. 07
Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (Iran)
June 2005
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
June 2005
Novin Energy Company (Iran)
January 2006
Mesbah Energy Company (Iran)
January 2006
Four Chinese entities: Beijing Alite Technologies, LIMMT
June 2006
Economic and Trading Company, China Great Wall Industry Corp,
and China National Precision Machinery Import/Export Corp.
Sanam Industrial Group (Iran)
July 2006
Ya Mahdi Industries Group (Iran)
July 2006
Bank Sepah (Iran)
January 2007
Defense Industries Organization (Iran)
March 2007
Pars Trash (Iran, nuclear program)
June 2007
CRS-63
Farayand Technique (Iran, nuclear program)
June 2007
Fajr Industries Group (Iran, missile program)
June 2007
Mizan Machine Manufacturing Group (Iran, missile prog.)
June 2007
Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) (Iran)
Sept. 2007
Korea Mining and Development Corp. (N. Korea)
Sept. 2007
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
October 21, 2007
Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics
October 21, 2007
Bank Melli (Iran’s largest bank, widely used by the Guard); Bank
October 21, 2007
Melli Iran Zao (Moscow); Melli Bank PC (U.K.)
Bank Kargoshaee
October 21, 2007
Arian Bank (joint venture between Melli and Bank Saderat). Based
October 21, 2007
in Afghanistan
Bank Mellat (provides banking services to Iran’s nuclear sector);
October 21, 2007
Mellat Bank SB CJSC (Armenia). Reportedly has $1.4 billion in
assets in UAE
Persia International Bank PLC (U.K.)
October 21, 2007
Khatam ol Anbiya Gharargah Sazendegi Nooh (Revolutionary Guard
October 21, 2007
construction, contracting arm, with $7 billion in oil, gas deals
Oriental Oil Kish (Iranian oil exploration firm)
October 21, 2007
Ghorb Karbala; Ghorb Nooh (synonymous with Khatam ol Anbiya)
October 21, 2007
Sepasad Engineering Company (Guard construction affiliate)
October 21, 2007
Omran Sahel (Guard construction affiliate)
October 21, 2007
Sahel Consultant Engineering (Guard construction affiliate)
October 21, 2007
Hara Company
October 21, 2007
Gharargahe Sazandegi Ghaem
October 21, 2007
Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar (AIO, Iran missile official, see
October 21, 2007
above under Resolution 1737)
Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi (AIO head, Iran missile program)
October 21, 2007
Reza Gholi Esmaeli (AIO, see under Resolution 1737)
October 21, 2007
Morteza Reza’i (deputy commander, IRGC) See also Resolution
October 21, 2007
1747
Mohammad Hejazi (Basij commander). Also, Resolution 1747
October 21, 2007
Ali Akbar Ahmadian (Chief of IRGC Joint Staff). Resolution 1747
October 21, 2007
Hosein Salimi (IRGC Air Force commander). Resolution 1737
October 21, 2007
Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force commander). Resolution 1747
October 21, 2007
Future Bank (Bahrain-based but allegedly controlled by Bank Melli)
March 12, 2008
Yahya Rahim Safavi (former IRGC Commander in Chief
July 8, 2008
Mohsen Fakrizadeh-Mahabadi (senior Defense Ministry scientist)
July 8, 2008
Dawood Agha-Jani (head of Natanz enrichment site)
July 8, 2008
Mohsen Hojati (head of Fajr Industries, involved in missile program)
July 2008
CRS-64
Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (heads Shahid Bakeri Industrial
July 8, 2008
Group)
Naser Maliki (heads Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group)
July 8, 2008
Tamas Company (involved in uranium enrichment)
July 8, 2008
Shahid Sattari Industries (makes equipment for Shahid Bakeri)
July 8, 2008
7th of Tir (involved in developing centrifuge technology)
July 8, 2008
Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (partner of 7th of Tir)
July 8, 2008
Parchin Chemical Industries (deals in chemicals used in ballistic
July 8, 2008
missile programs)
Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13224 (Terrorism Entities)
Qods Force
October 21, 2007
Bank Saderat (allegedly used to funnel Iranian money to Hezbollah,
October 21, 2007
Hamas, PIJ, and other Iranian supported terrorist groups)
Entities Sanctioned Under the Iran Non-Proliferation Act and other U.S. Proliferation
Laws
Norinco (China). For alleged missile technology sale to Iran.
May 2003
Taiwan Foreign Trade General Corporation (Taiwan)
July 4, 2003
Tula Instrument Design Bureau (Russia). For alleged sales of laser-
September 17, 2003
guided artillery shells to Iran.
13 entities sanctioned including companies from Russia, China,
April 7, 2004
Belarus, Macedonia, North Korea, UAE, and Taiwan.
14 entities from China, North Korea, Belarus, India (two nuclear
September 29, 2004
scientists, Dr. Surendar and Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad), Russia, Spain, and
Ukraine.
14 entities, mostly from China, for alleged supplying of Iran’s missile
December 2004 and
program. Many, such as North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong and
January 2005
China’s Norinco and Great Wall Industry Corp, have been sanctioned
several times previously. Newly sanctioned entities included North
Korea’s Paeksan Associated Corporation, and Taiwan’s Ecoma
Enterprise Co.
9 entities, including those from China (Norinco yet again), India (two
December 26, 2005
chemical companies), and Austria. Sanctions against Dr. Surendar of
India (see September 29, 2004) were ended, presumably because of
information exonerating him.
7 entities. Two Indian chemical companies (Balaji Amines and Prachi
August 4, 2006
Poly Products); two Russian firms (Rosobornexport and aircraft
manufacturer Sukhoi); two North Korean entities (Korean Mining and
Industrial Development, and Korea Pugang Trading); and one Cuban
entity (Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology).
9 entities. Rosobornesksport, Tula Design, and Komna Design Office
January 2007
of Machine Building, and Alexei Safonov (Russia); Zibo Chemical,
China National Aerotechnology, and China National Electrical (China).
Korean Mining and Industrial Development (North Korea) for WMD
or advanced weapons sales to Iran (and Syria).
CRS-65
14 entities, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Some were penalized for
April 23, 2007
transactions with Syria. Among the new entities sanctioned for assisting
Iran were Shanghai Non-Ferrous Metals Pudong Development Trade
Company (China); Iran’s Defense Industries Organization; Sokkia
Company (Singapore); Challenger Corporation (Malaysia); Target
Airfreight (Malaysia); Aerospace Logistics Services (Mexico); and Arif
Durrani (Pakistani national).
Entities Designated as Threats to Iraqi Stability under Executive Order 13438
Ahmad Forouzandeh. Commander of the Qods Force Ramazan
January 9, 2008
Headquarters, accused of fomenting sectarian violence in Iraq and of
organizing training in Iran for Iraqi Shiite militia fighters
Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani. Iran based leader of network that funnels
January 9, 2008
Iranian arms to Shiite militias in Iraq.
Isma’il al-Lami (Abu Dura). Shiite militia leader, breakaway from Sadr
January 9, 2008
Mahdi Army, alleged to have committed mass kidnapings and planned
assassination attempts against Iraqi Sunni politicians
Mishan al-Jabburi. Financier of Sunni insurgents, owner of pro-
January 9, 2008
insurgent Al-Zawra television, now banned
Al Zawra Television Station
January 9, 2008