Order Code RL34505
National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates,
Execution to Date, and Considerations
for Congress
Updated July 28, 2008
Catherine Dale
Specialist in International Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates,
Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress
Summary
There is a growing, still highly inchoate, debate among practitioners and
scholars, including participants from across the political spectrum, concerning the
need to reform the U.S. government’s national security system. Reform proponents
argue that much of the current architecture was designed to meet the global security
challenges of the post-World War II context, and may not be appropriate for
addressing 21st-century challenges. That architecture includes the organizations,
structures, and processes that govern decision-making, budgeting, planning and
execution, and congressional oversight of national security activities. Strategic
guidance documents, including formal strategies and other forms of guidance, are a
key element of that system. The current debates are timely because a new
administration may begin issuing strategic documents early in its tenure in office.
National security strategy can theoretically serve several distinct purposes:
! By offering prioritized objectives and indicating which elements of
national power (“ways and means”) are to be used to meet them, it
can provide guidance to departments and agencies to use in their
internal processes for budgeting, planning and executing, and
organizing, training, and equipping personnel.
! By clearly linking goals and the approaches designed to meet them,
national security strategy can provide the executive branch a key tool
for justifying requested resources to Congress.
! By laying out a detailed strategic vision, it can help inform public
audiences both at home and abroad about U.S. government intent.
Some critics charge that executive branch processes for developing strategy are
flawed because, for example, they fail to establish priorities, consider fiscal
constraints, or assign responsibilities to specific agencies. Some note that the
issuance of strategic guidance does not always fully comply with legislative
mandates, while others note that the mandates themselves could be improved — for
example, by better synchronizing requirements for related documents.
Congress can continue to shape the role that strategy documents play in the
national security system through legislative requirements regarding the types of
strategic documents required, their primary and contributing authors, their contents,
their relationships with other strategic documents, their deadlines for delivery, and
their form of delivery (classified or unclassified).
This report reviews current legislative mandates for security strategic
documents, assesses the recent history of execution, describes strategic documents
in related fields for comparison, presents considerations that may be useful in
assessing current requirements and execution, and notes several current proposals for
changes to legislative requirements. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Key National Security Strategic Documents: Mandates and Execution . . . . . . . . 3
National Security Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
National Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Other Strategic Guidance: Mandates and Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Strategic Guidance: Considerations for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Synchronization of Timelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Clear Relationships Among Strategic Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Prioritization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Roles and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Fiscal Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Competition of Ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Intended Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Timeframe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Strategic Guidance: Recent Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Quadrennial National Security Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
National Security Planning Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Staffing Strategic Guidance Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

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National Security Strategy: Legislative
Mandates, Execution to Date, and
Considerations for Congress
Introduction
There is a growing, still highly inchoate debate among practitioners and
scholars, including participants from across the political spectrum, concerning the
need to reform the U.S. government’s national security system.1 Reform proponents
argue that much of the current architecture was designed to meet the global security
challenges of the post-World War II context, and may not be appropriate for
addressing 21st-century challenges.2 That architecture includes the organizations,
structures, and processes that govern decision making, budgeting, planning and
execution, and congressional oversight of national security activities.3 National
security strategic guidance documents, including formal strategies and other forms
of guidance, are a key element of that system.
In general, a strategy articulates prioritized “ends” and then links “means”
(resources) and “ways” (approaches) in a plan of action to achieve those ends in a
given context.4 A strategy may be narrowly targeted, designed to achieve one
specific goal, such as a strategy for a marketing campaign for a single new product,
or it may address a broad field including multiple, prioritized objectives and
initiatives, such as a company’s overall strategy to succeed in the marketplace.5 At
1 For an overview of the current national security reform debates, see CRS Report RL34455,
Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency
Reform Debates, by Catherine Dale, Nina Serafino, and Pat Towell.
2 The cornerstone of the current system is still the National Security Act of 1947 and its
subsequent amendments. That legislation laid the foundations of a new national security
regime, including the creation of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Department of Defense, a separate Department of the Air Force, and a
permanent Joint Chiefs of Staff. See National Security Act of 1947, P.L. 80-235.
3 There is no single, shared understanding of the concept of “national security” — some
observers include homeland security, while others focus exclusively on challenges abroad.
Some observers include economic, energy, and/or environmental security, while others
prefer a narrower definition.
4 For an overview of the elements of strategy, see John M. Collins, Military Strategy:
Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives, Potomac Books, Inc: Dulles, VA, 2001.
5 The October 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security defines “strategy” only in the
more limited sense, focused on a single goal, as “an integrated approach to achieve a policy
that takes into account underlying assumptions, context, tradeoffs, and necessary resources.”
(continued...)

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its best, strategy is iterative — that is, there are feedback loops in place to help
update the strategy based on the changing outside environment and on lessons
learned as the strategy is implemented.
National security strategy for the U.S. government can theoretically serve
several distinct purposes:
! By offering prioritized objectives and indicating which elements of
national power (“ways and means”) are to be used to meet them, it
can provide guidance to departments and agencies to use in their
internal processes for budgeting, planning and executing, and
organizing, training, and equipping personnel.
! By clearly linking goals and the approaches designed to meet them,
national security strategy can provide the executive branch a key tool
for justifying requested resources to Congress.
! By laying out a detailed strategic vision, it can help inform public
audiences both at home and abroad about U.S. government intent.
Some critics charge that executive branch processes for developing strategy are
flawed because, for example, they fail to establish priorities, consider fiscal
constraints, or assign responsibilities to specific agencies. Some note that the
issuance of strategic guidance does not always fully comply with legislative
mandates, while others note that the mandates themselves could be improved — for
example, by better synchronizing requirements for related documents.
Congress can continue to shape the role that strategy documents play in the
national security system through legislative requirements regarding the types of
strategic documents required, their primary and contributing authors, their contents,
their relationships with other strategic documents, their deadlines for delivery, and
their form of delivery (classified or unclassified). The current debates include several
proposals for changes to existing legislative requirements for strategy documents.
These debates are timely because a new administration is likely to begin issuing
strategic documents early in its tenure in office.
This report reviews the current legislative mandates for key security strategic
documents, assesses the recent history of execution, describes strategic documents
in related fields for comparison, presents a series of considerations that may be useful
in assessing current requirements and execution, and notes several major proposals
for change.
5 (...continued)
See Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, October 2007,
chart on page 44. Strategy-making is more challenging when it must balance and prioritize
multiple goals.

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Key National Security Strategic Documents:
Mandates and Execution
From the traditional defense perspective, the core national security strategic
documents today are the national security strategy, the national defense strategy
together with the Quadrennial Defense Review report, and the national military
strategy. The military strategy written by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
describes how the military will operationalize the defense strategy written by the
Secretary of Defense, which in turn covers those aspects of the security strategy for
which the Department of Defense is responsible. All of the strategies are mandated
by law, and their contents are prescribed in some detail. To date, execution has not
always precisely matched the letter of the law. This section describes their respective
mandates and recent implementation.
National Security Strategy
National security strategies are issued by the President and pertain to the U.S.
government as a whole. The current mandate for the President to deliver to Congress
a comprehensive, annual “national security strategy report” derives from the National
Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986.6
The legislation requires that a strategy report be submitted to Congress annually,
on the date the President submits the budget for the following fiscal year. In addition
to the regular report for that year, a newly elected President is required to submit a
strategy report not less than 150 days after taking office. Each report is to be
submitted in both classified and unclassified format.
According to the legislation, each report must address five points:
! “The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States
that are vital to the national security of the United States.
! “The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense
capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to
implement the national security strategy of the United States.
! “The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political,
economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the
6 National Security Act of 1947, P.L. 80-235, §108, and Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, P.L. 99-433, §603. Before that legislation, there was
no such comprehensive legislative mandate, although a variety of national strategies were
developed over time. One of the most notable was NSC-68, “United States Objectives and
Programs for National Security,” a (now-declassified) top secret document produced by
President Truman’s National Security Council on April 14, 1950. NSC-68 described in
detail the (Cold War) strategic context, noted the intentions and capabilities of both the
United States and the Soviet Union, and presented possible courses of action together with
assessments.

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United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the
goals and objectives referred to in paragraph.
! “The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out
the national security strategy of the United States, including an
evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of
the national power of the United States to support the
implementation of the national security strategy.
! “Such other information as may be necessary to help inform
Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the
United States.”7
In practice, since the Goldwater-Nichols Act, administrations have submitted
national security strategies fairly regularly although not always precisely on schedule.
The Reagan Administration submitted two (1987, 1988); the first Bush
Administration submitted three (1990, 1991, and 1993); and the Clinton
Administration submitted seven (1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000).
The current Bush Administration has twice submitted a document entitled
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, in September 2002 and
March 2006. The 2002 Strategy described the global strategic context, named broad
goals (“political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and
respect for human dignity”), and described eight broad areas of effort designed to
meet those goals. For each area, the Strategy listed subset initiatives but did not
describe how they are to be achieved and did not assign responsibility for achieving
them to specific agencies. Neither the eight major areas, nor the subsets within any
area, were prioritized.8
The 2006 Strategy maintained the same basic format, though it added an
additional area of effort (“challenges and opportunities of globalization”) for a total
of nine, and it included, in each area, a discussion of “successes” since 2002.9
By law, the next national security strategy is due from the current
Administration in early 2009, to be followed, 150 days after the Inauguration, by a
new national security strategy from the newly elected Administration.
7 National Security Act of 1947, P.L. 80-235, §108, and Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, P.L. 99-433, §603.
8 To illustrate the Strategy’s broad level of discourse, one area of effort, “work with others
to defuse regional conflicts,” included as a subset the statement, “Coordination with
European allies and international institutions is essential for constructive conflict mediation
and successful peace operations.” The document did not note which U.S. government
agencies should lead or participate in the coordination; on what matters they ought to
coordinate; or how important coordination with partners is, compared with unilateral
initiatives to “defuse regional conflicts.” See President George W. Bush, The National
Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002.
9 President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States, March
2006.

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National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review
National defense strategies and reports of the quadrennial defense review
process are Department of Defense (DOD) documents, intended to elaborate on
DOD’s support to the broader national security strategy.
Existing legislation requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct a quadrennial
defense review (QDR) and to submit a report on the QDR to Congress every four
years.10 The original QDR requirement, for a one-time review, was introduced by the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY1997.11 The permanent
requirement to conduct a QDR was introduced by the NDAA for FY2000, which
amended Title 10 of U.S. Code to that effect.12 The requirement for a national
defense strategy is derived from this legislation, which mandates that the QDR
include “a comprehensive discussion of the national defense strategy of the United
States.”
The QDR is to be conducted during the first year of every Administration
(“during a year following a year evenly divisible by four”). The QDR report is to be
submitted to Congress the following year, not later than the President submits the
budget for the next fiscal year. The Secretary of Defense is to conduct the review “in
consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” and the review is to look
out 20 years into the future. The legislation does not specify the classification level
for the report.
The QDR report is intended to be “nested” in — a subordinate part of — the
broader national strategic framework. As the legislation states, it will “delineate a
national defense strategy consistent with the most recent national security strategy.”13
Legislation describes in detail 15 items that the QDR report to Congress must
contain, including overall national defense strategy, national interests, threats,
assumptions, and requirements:
! “The results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of
the national defense strategy of the United States and the force
structure best suited to implement that strategy at a low-to-moderate
level of risk.
10 The QDR itself is a review process, while the QDR report is a written product produced
by that process.
11 NDAA for FY1997, September 23, 1996, P.L. 104-201, §923. The requirement was based
on the recommendations of the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions, which was
constituted pursuant to the NDAA for FY1994, November 30, 1993, P.L. 103-160.
12 Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 2, §118. The NDAA for FY 2000, October
5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, Division A, Title IX, §901, amended Title 10 to include §118.
Subsequent legislation amended parts of the mandate, see NDAA for FY2002, December
28, 2001, P.L. 107-107, §921; and Bob Stump NDAA for FY2003, December 2, 2002, P.L.
107-314, §922 and 923.
13 Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 2, §118 (b) (1).

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! “The assumed or defined national security interests of the United
States that inform the national defense strategy defined in the
review.
! “The threats to the assumed or defined national security interests of
the United States that were examined for the purposes of the review
and the scenarios developed in the examination of those threats.
! “The assumptions used in the review, including assumptions relating
to (A) the status of readiness of United States forces; (B) the
cooperation of allies, mission-sharing and additional benefits to and
burdens on United States forces resulting from coalition operations;
(C) warning times; (D) levels of engagement in operations other than
war and smaller-scale contingencies and withdrawal from such
operations and contingencies; and (E) the intensity, duration, and
military and political end-states of conflicts and smaller-scale
contingencies.
! “The effect on the force structure and on readiness for high-intensity
combat of preparations for and participation in operations other than
war and smaller-scale contingencies.
! “The manpower and sustainment policies required under the national
defense strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting longer
than 120 days.
! “The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the
national defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and
equipment necessary to assure that the reserve components can
capably discharge those roles and missions.
! “The appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces (commonly
referred to as the tooth-to-tail ratio) under the national defense
strategy, including, in particular, the appropriate number and size of
headquarters units and Defense Agencies for that purpose.
! “The strategic and tactical air-lift, sea-lift, and ground transportation
capabilities required to support the national defense strategy.
! “The forward presence, pre-positioning, and other anticipatory
deployments necessary under the national defense strategy for
conflict deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated
conflicts.
! “The extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more
theaters under the national defense strategy in the event of conflict
in such theaters.
! “The advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a
result of the national defense strategy.

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! “The effect on force structure of the use by the armed forces of
technologies anticipated to be available for the ensuing 20 years.
! “The national defense mission of the Coast Guard.
! “Any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate.”14
To date, three QDRs have been conducted — in 1997 on the basis of the
one-time legislative requirement (see above), and in 2001 and 2006 on the basis of
the permanent mandate.15 All three QDR reports were submitted to Congress on
time.16
The first two QDR reports included a defense strategy, as mandated by
legislation. Section III of the 1997 QDR Report was entitled “Defense Strategy,” and
it began with a summary of national security strategy, including national interests.
That summary was based on the (recent) February 1996 White House document A
National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.
Section II of the 2001 QDR Report was entitled “Defense Strategy.” At the time
the review was conducted and the Report written, the most recent national security
strategy dated from December 2000 — A National Security Strategy for a Global
Age, written by the Clinton Administration. The 2001 QDR Report described broad
national objectives — “peace, freedom and prosperity” — but did not refer
specifically to national strategy.17
In a departure from past practice, DOD issued the March 2005 National Defense
Strategy (NDS) separately from and prior to its partner QDR Report, which was
issued in February 2006. The NDS repeatedly cited the most recent national security
strategy at the time, from September 2002. The 2005 NDS was notable for
introducing a new, quadripartite categorization of global security challenges:
“traditional,” “irregular,” “catastrophic,” or “disruptive.”
14 Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 2, §118 (d).
15 Substantively, the requirements for the 1997 QDR were quite similar to the current
requirements, including 13 of the 15 current items; the items not included were U.S. national
security interests, and the defense mission of the U.S. Coast Guard. A key precursor to the
QDRs was the DOD “Bottom-Up Review,” launched in early 1993 by newly confirmed
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and directed by Acting Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
for Policy Frank Wisner. See Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Washington,
D.C., October 1993.
16 The 1997 QDR report, of May 1997, was submitted on time; the FY1997 NDAA required
the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress the QDR report by May 15, 1997; see
§923(d). The 2001 QDR report was submitted early. The 2006 QDR report was submitted
on time, at the time of the February 2006 budget submission.
17 The defense strategy discussion in the 2001 QDR Report introduced the quadripartite
“assure, dissuade, deter, defeat” description of defense policy goals. These refer to
“assuring allies and friends; dissuading future military competition; deterring threats and
coercion against U.S. interests; and if deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.”

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The 2006 QDR Report emphasized its direct link with the 2005 NDS. It stated,
“The foundation of this QDR is the National Defense Strategy, published in March
2005,”18 and it echoed the four global security challenges introduced by the NDS.
The 2006 Report also established four “focus areas”: “defeating terrorist
networks,” “defending the homeland in depth,” “shaping the choices of countries at
strategic crossroads,” and “preventing hostile states and non-state actors from
acquiring or using WMD.” These four areas were not assigned relative priority, but
they were labeled “priority” areas in comparison with other possible issues. The
Report described each area and the capabilities it required; provided a “refined”
version of the force planning construct (the guidance used for sizing and shaping the
force); discussed 10 portfolios of capabilities, including implied tasks; and addressed
three sets of institutional and organizational concerns — the defense enterprise, DOD
personnel, and coordination with other agencies and with international partners.
The law requires that the next QDR be conducted in 2009, and that a QDR
report be submitted to the Congress by early February 2010. Following the “separate
document” model established by the most recent QDR Report and NDS, in July 2008,
DOD finalized a separate 2008 National Defense Strategy and provided it to some
audiences in limited distribution, pending a public release. The 2008 NDS reportedly
calls for enhancing investment to meet “irregular” challenges — terminology
borrowed from the 2005 NDS — while assuming some risk in conventional arenas.
The new NDS also reportedly adopts an expansive definition of potential security
challenges to include space and cyber threats, natural disasters, pandemic diseases,
and competition for resources.19
National Military Strategy
The current mandate for a national military strategy is provided by Title 10, U.S.
Code, as amended by the NDAA for FY2004.20 This legislation permanently
mandates a biennial review of national military strategy, by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and unified commanders. A written report based on that review is to be submitted
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives
by February 15 of even-numbered years. The report is required to be consistent with
national security strategy and the most recent QDR. The legislation does not specify
classification level.
Legislation prescribes specific contents for the national military strategy report,
including the strategy itself, the strategic environment, threats, military objectives,
means for meeting those objectives, and required resources:
18 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2006.
19 Jason Sherman, “New Strategy Calls for Increasing Investment in Irregular Capabilities,”
Inside Defense, July 28, 2008, and discussions with DOD officials, 2008.
20 Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 5, §153, as amended by the NDAA for
FY2004, November 24, 2003, P.L. 108-136, §903.

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! “Delineation of a national military strategy.
! “A description of the strategic environment and the opportunities
and challenges that affect United States national interests and United
States national security.
! “A description of the regional threats to United States national
interests and United States national security.
! “A description of the international threats posed by terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction, and asymmetric challenges to United
States national security.
! “Identification of United States national military objectives and the
relationship of those objectives to the strategic environment,
regional, and international threats.
! “Identification of the strategy, underlying concepts, and component
elements that contribute to the achievement of United States national
military objectives.
! “Assessment of the capabilities and adequacy of United States forces
(including both active and reserve components) to successfully
execute the national military strategy.
! “Assessment of the capabilities, adequacy, and interoperability of
regional allies of the United States and or other friendly nations to
support United States forces in combat operations and other
operations for extended periods of time.”21
The first report issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the basis
of this legislation was the 2004 National Military Strategy of the United States of
America: A Strategy for Today, a Vision for Tomorrow. The document stated its
purpose and its relationships to other strategic guidance: “The National Military
Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and
implements the National Defense Strategy (NDS). It described the Armed Forces’
plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides the vision for
ensuring they remain decisive in the future.”22
Although the 2004 NMS was issued prior to the March 2005 NDS, the NMS was
clearly informed by early NDS work, because the NMS cites key concepts from the
21 Title 10, U.S. Code, §153 (d) (2).
22 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States
of America, “A Strategy for Today, a Vision for Tomorrow,” 2004, p. 1.

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2005 National Defense Strategy, including the four strategic challenges —
traditional, irregular, catastrophic, disruptive.23
Subsequent national military strategy reports were due to the Armed Services
Committees in February 2006 and February 2008.
The absence, until as late as 2003, of a codified permanent national military
strategy requirement, may seem surprising, but the general need for military strategy
was recognized in both law and practice much earlier.24 Prior to the 1986
Goldwater-Nichols Act, Title 10 U.S. Code described the duties of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff as including “prepar[ing] strategic plans and provid[ing] the strategic
direction of the armed forces.”25 The Goldwater-Nichols Act amended Title 10 to
include a new Section 153, which assigns responsibility to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff for “assisting the President and Secretary of Defense in providing for
the strategic direction of the armed forces,” as well as “preparing strategic plans,
including plans which conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of
Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be
effective.”26
National military strategies have also been required in the past on a limited
basis. The NDAA for FY1991 required the submission of a military strategy report
to Congress during fiscal years 1992, 1993, and 1994.27 In contrast to the current
mandate, the responsible party was the Secretary of Defense, while the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to “participate fully” in the development of the report.
The report was to be submitted in both classified and unclassified formats; to cover
a period of at least 10 years; to be fiscally constrained; and to address a series of
specified topics including threats, military plans for meeting them, risks, missions for
various components, and acquisition priorities.
While no explicit legislative mandate was in effect at the time, in both 1995 and
1997, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a national military strategy.
Both documents clearly stated their “supporting” relationships to higher-level
strategic documents. The 1997 National Military Strategy stated that it was based
on the May 1997 A National Security Strategy for a New Century and the 1997 QDR
Report. The 1995 National Military Strategy explained that the 1994 National
23 See ibid., p. 4.
24 Before the FY2004 NDAA introduced the permanent national military strategy
requirement, the FY2000 NDAA amended Title 10 to permanently require an annual report
from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff providing the Chairman’s “assessment of the
nature and magnitude of the strategic and military risks associated with executing the
missions called for under the current National Military Strategy.” The legislation capitalizes
“National Military Strategy,” underscoring the assumption of the existence of a document
not required by law at that time. See NDAA for FY2000, P.L. 106-65, §1033, which
amended Title 10 §153 to include a new subheading (c), later changed to subheading (b).
25 Title 10, U.S. Code, §141(c).
26 Title 10, U.S. Code, §153 (a) (1) and (2).
27 NDAA for FY1991, November 5, 1990, P.L. 101-510, §1032.

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Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement had described the relevant
national security objectives and “provided the Armed Forces the guidance to shape
our military strategy.” Both military strategy documents addressed the strategic
environment, national military objectives, military tasks to meet those objectives, and
capabilities and forces required to accomplish those tasks.28
Other Strategic Guidance: Mandates and Execution
The security/defense/military pillar of national security strategic guidance is
only part of a veritable wealth of national strategic documents broadly related to
security concerns. Some but not all of those documents are congressionally
mandated.29 As a rule, most formal strategies are unclassified, and they require or
imply participation from more than one department or agency. Their scope ranges
from multi-faceted concerns, such as national security and intelligence, to specific
topics, such as national security personnel development. Typically, written strategies
state their relationships to other strategic guidance documents.
In the constellation of strategies, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
(NSCT) is one of those whose relationships with other strategies are most clearly
defined. The NSCT was first issued by President Bush in February 2003, and was
then updated in March 2006. As the 2003 NSCT explained, it was a subordinate
document to the 2002 National Security Strategy, addressing one of the security
strategy’s eight major areas, counter-terrorism. The division of labor between the
NSCT and the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the NSCT added, was that
the homeland strategy addressed “preventing terrorist attacks within the United
28 See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy: A Strategy of
Flexible and Selective Engagement, February 1995; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, National Military Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now — A Military Strategy for
a New Era, 1997.
29 To help illustrate the depth and variety of legislative mandates for strategy, the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (December 17, 2004, P.L. 108-
458) alone includes the following requirements for strategies: from the Secretary of
Homeland Security, a National Strategy for Transportation Security (§4001); from the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, a strategy for improving the conduct of analysis
by the CIA, and a strategy for improving human intelligence and other capabilities (§1011);
from the Director of the National Counter-Terrorism Center, a “strategy for combining
terrorist travel intelligence, operations and law enforcement into a cohesive effort to
intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility
domestically and internationally” (§7201); from the President, a strategy for addressing and
eliminating terrorist sanctuaries, including, as subsets, a strategy for U.S. engagement with
Pakistan, a strategy for U.S. collaboration with the Government of Saudi Arabia, a strategy
to “help win the struggle of ideas in the Islamic world,” a strategy to expand outreach to
foreign Muslim audiences through broadcast media, and a strategy to promote free universal
basic education in the countries of the Middle East” (§7120); also from the President, a five-
year strategy for Afghanistan (§7104). The Secretary of State was also advised to “make
every effort” to develop a comprehensive strategy for public diplomacy (§7109).

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States,” while the NSCT was responsible for “identifying and defusing threats before
they reach our borders.”30
The two sets of strategies most similar to the security/defense/military pillar of
strategies are those concerning homeland security and intelligence. They are all
roughly analogous because each is associated with a primary agency of responsibility,
each requires execution by multiple agencies, and each has a very broad substantive
scope.
Homeland Security
Homeland security strategic guidance, like the homeland security architecture
in general, was created in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.31
Shortly after 9/11, President Bush created the Office of Homeland Security at the
White House and tasked it, as its first responsibility, to produce a national strategy
for homeland security. That strategy, issued in July 2002, addressed broad strategic
objectives and threats, and proposed specific initiatives to meet those threats in six
“critical mission areas.”32
The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security suggests, but does not
conclusively state, a conceptual dividing line between “homeland” and “national”
security responsibilities. For example, the Strategy’s first stated objective is to
“prevent terrorist attacks within the United States.” Some observers might argue that
this indicates that the boundaries of “homeland security” responsibility are the
nation’s borders; other observers might contend that preventing terrorist attacks at
home requires actions abroad.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which codified the organization and
responsibilities of the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and created the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), did not establish a formal requirement for a homeland
security strategy.33 It required the HSC to provide policy oversight and engage in
assessment, but not to craft strategy per se.34
30 See President George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, September 2002, Chapter III: “Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism
and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends.” See also President George W.
Bush, National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, February 2003; and President George W.
Bush, National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, September 2006.
31 In the wake of 9/11, President Bush, with Executive Order 13228, of October 8, 2001,
established the Homeland Security Council (HSC). Its organization and operations were
specified by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 1, of October 29, 2001.
32 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002.
33 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, November 25, 2002, P.L. 107-296.
34 It requires the HSC to “assess the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States
in the interest of homeland security and to make resulting recommendations to the President;
[and to] oversee and review homeland security policies of the Federal Government and to
make resulting recommendations to the President.” Ibid., §904.

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In October 2007, the Homeland Security Council issued an updated National
Strategy for Homeland Security, which addressed the same broad areas as its 2002
predecessor — national objectives, threats, and initiatives.35 The Strategy noted that
it “complements” other major strategic documents, including the March 2006
National Security Strategy and the September 2006 National Strategy to Combat
Terrorism, without spelling out the relationships among the three strategies as clearly
as the 2003 NSCT did.36
In 2007, Congress established a new requirement for the Secretary of Homeland
Security to conduct a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), on the model
of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) at the Department of Defense.37 The
legislation requires that the QHSR be conducted every four years, beginning in
FY2009, and that a report based on the review be submitted to Congress by
December 31 of the year in which the review is conducted.38
According to the legislation, the Secretary of Homeland Security is to conduct
the QHSR in conjunction with the heads of other Federal agencies, including the
Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Agriculture, and the Director of National Intelligence; key officials of the Department
of Homeland Security; and other relevant governmental and nongovernmental
entities, including state, local, and tribal government officials, Members of Congress,
private sector representatives, academics, and other policy experts.39
The report based on the QHSR is to be unclassified. The Department of
Homeland Security is further instructed to make the report publicly available on its
website.40
Concerning the relationship between the QHSR and the National Strategy for
Homeland Security, which might be considered analogous to the relationship
between the QDR and the National Security Strategy, the legislation may be
somewhat confusing to some. The legislation requires that the QHSR be consistent
35 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, October 2007.
36 The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security also makes reference to a large
number of single-topic strategies, including the National Strategy to Combat Terrorist
Travel, the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the National Strategy for Aviation
Security, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives, the National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, and the National Strategy for the Development of Security
Professionals.
37 See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, August 3,
2007, P.L. 110-53, §2401, which amended the Homeland Security Act of 2002, November
25, 2002, P.L. 107-296, adding §707 mandating a quadrennial homeland security review.
38 Technically this language concerning the submission date is unclear, because the fiscal
year spans more than one calendar year. See amended Homeland Security Act, P.L. 107-
296, §707 (a) (1), and (c) (1).
39 See amended Homeland Security Act, P.L. 107-296, §707, (a) (3) (A, B, and C).
40 See amended Homeland Security Act, P.L. 107-296, §707, (c) (3).

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with the National Strategy for Homeland Security.41 At the same time, the QHSR
should “…update, as appropriate, the national homeland security strategy.”42
Updating a strategy while remaining consistent with it may sound like an unusual
mandate, but the problem may only be semantic. The intent of the legislation seems
to be that the QHSR should examine and update the full array of strategic approaches
in a manner broadly consistent with the President’s most recently published
Strategy.43 (Conceivably, the subsequent iteration of the published Strategy might
reflect conclusions of the most recent QHSR.)
The legislation does not specifically require the QHSR to be consistent with the
current National Security Strategy, but the requirement for consistency with
“appropriate national and Department strategies” might be understood to include the
NSS.
The QHSR legislation, like that governing the Quadrennial Defense Review, is
quite specific concerning the focus of the review and the contents of the report to be
submitted to Congress. The QHSR report is to include a description of threats to
national homeland security interests; the national homeland security strategy,
including a prioritized list of the critical homeland security missions; a description
of required interagency cooperation measures and current preparedness of federal
assets; an assessment of DHS organizations, systems, and infrastructure to support
the strategy; a discussion of the status of cooperation among federal, state, local, and
tribal governments; and an explanation of assumptions used in the review.44
Intelligence
The national intelligence architecture was overhauled in the wake of 9/11,
through legislation and presidential directives including four executive orders issued
in August 200445 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004.46 These changes were informed in part by the recommendations provided in
July 2004 by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(“the 9/11 Commission”), a congressionally mandated, independent, bipartisan
41 See amended Homeland Security Act, P.L. 107-296, §707, (b) (1).
42 Ibid.
43 The security/defense/military pillar of strategic guidance has a semantic advantage in that
DOD’s QDR and its embedded national defense strategy support a national security strategy
issued by the White House.
44 See amended Homeland Security Act, P.L. 107-296, §707, (c) (2) (A through I).
45 The four include “Establishing the President’s Board on Safeguarding Americans’ Civil
Liberties,” “Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans,”
“National Counterterrorism Center,” and “Strengthened Management of the Intelligence
Community,” available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/orders/].
46 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, December 17, 2004 (P.L. 108-
458).

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panel.47 The guidance did not include a specific formal requirement for “intelligence
strategy.”
The intelligence community itself, now led by the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), has initiated two forms of intelligence strategic guidance. In
October 2005, DNI issued The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of
America: Transformation through Integration and Innovation. In a May 2006 update
to Congress on implementation of the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act, the DNI
described issuance of the 2005 Strategy as a facet of his responsibility, required by
the 2004 Act, to “serve as head of the intelligence community.”48
The 2005 Strategy names 15 strategic objectives, divided between “strategic
objectives” and “enterprise objectives,” each with subset objectives. In each area, the
Strategy tasks specific offices to craft plans to meet the various subset objectives.
The Strategy notes that it derives its objectives from the President’s National
Security Strategy.49
That Strategy, in turn, drew on a roughly simultaneous quadrennial intelligence
community review (QICR). The 2005 National Intelligence Strategy noted that it
prescribed “enterprise-wide objectives derived from the Quadrennial Intelligence
Community Review.”50 The QICR is a review process analogous to DOD’s
quadrennial defense review. To date, two QICRs have been completed — in 2001
and 2005 — and each resulted in a classified written report.
While no legislation was enacted as a result, there were some congressional
efforts in 2005 to establish a requirement for both a “quadrennial intelligence review”
and a national intelligence strategy. In its Report on the Intelligence Authorization
Act for FY2006, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
recommended that by the end of FY2008 the DNI develop a process for a
“quadrennial intelligence review” — a “formalized, periodic, and structured review”
based on the model of the Defense Department QDR.51
47 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report, July 2004, available at [http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm].
48 See “Report on the Progress of the Director of National Intelligence in Implementing the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,” May 2006, and Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, December 17, 2004, P.L. 108-458, §1095.
49 Director of National Intelligence, The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States
of America: Transformation through Integration and Innovation, October 2005.
50 Director of National Intelligence, The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States
of America: Transformation through Integration and Innovation, October 2005. In a June
2006 speech to the Intelligence and National Security Alliance, DNI Ambassador
Negroponte mentioned the QICR and its contents twice, as providing vision for the
intelligence community’s way forward. See Remarks by the Director of National
Intelligence Ambassador John D. Negroponte, “Transforming Intelligence — a Focus on
Analysis,” Intelligence and National Security Alliance, June 7, 2006, available at
[http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20060607_speech.htm].
51 See H.Rept. 109-101, Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2006, June 2, 2005, to
(continued...)

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The committee further proposed that this review “identify the breadth and depth
of the threats, [and] the capabilities existing and needed to combat those threats, and
better identify the alignment of resources, authorities, and personnel needed to
support those required capabilities.” This review would be used, in turn, to help DNI
“develop and periodically adjust a national intelligence strategy.” That strategy
“would inform the types of information needed to support national priorities and
objectives,” which in turn would facilitate determination “about which intelligence
discipline, or disciplines, can best provide the required information.” Those
decisions, in turn, would inform guidance regarding capabilities development, and
allocation of funding among intelligence disciplines.52
Strategic Guidance: Considerations for Congress
Over time, there has been no shortage of debate and commentary about the role
of “strategy” in the national security system, including both legislative requirements
and execution by the executive branch. This section highlights issues that have been
raised in these debates. These considerations may prove useful to Congress for
evaluating current performance and proposals for change.
Frequency
Historically, the timelines for submission of strategic documents to Congress
have not always been met, even when deadlines are quite specifically articulated in
law. A recent example is the submission by the current Bush Administration of only
two national security strategies, rather than meeting the annual submission
requirement in the 1947 National Security Act as amended by Goldwater-Nichols.
Some observers have suggested that in today’s globalized age, any written
document is by definition too static — that agencies need more frequently updated
guidance, and that both Congress and the public can gain a more accurate
understanding of current Administration intent from public statements and
congressional testimony.
Other observers have suggested that while official written strategy has a useful
role to play, an annual requirement for national security strategy may be too frequent.
Some suggest that the broad contours of the global security environment do not
change rapidly enough to warrant a complete overhaul of the nation’s basic security
outlook every year. In this view, responses to specific changes in the global
environment might be captured, instead, in more specific policies or approaches.53
51 (...continued)
accompany H.R. 2475.
52 Ibid.
53 Army War College strategist Don Snider has recommended a biennial national security
strategy. See Don Snider, “The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision,”
Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, second edition, March 15, 1995, available
(continued...)

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Synchronization of Timelines
In theory, agency-based and specific-issue strategies would derive guidance
from, and chronologically follow, recent national security strategy — for example,
national security strategy would be followed by national defense strategy, which in
turn would be followed by national military strategy. In recent practice, the timeline
has not quite worked that way. The 2001 QDR Report (with its embedded national
defense strategy) was issued in September 2001, before the current Bush
Administration issued its first National Security Strategy (September 2002). The
first National Military Strategy did not follow until 2004, and it almost immediately
preceded the next National Defense Strategy, issued in March 2005, a year ahead of
its “accompanying” QDR Report (February 2006), and just ahead of a new National
Security Strategy (March 2006).
In the defense arena, current requirements for submission timelines are fairly
well-suited for logical, sequential development of these “nested” strategies. The
QDR report and its accompanying defense strategy are due to Congress by the date
the President submits the budget for the next fiscal year, at the beginning of an
Administration’s second calendar year in office.54 The national security strategy for
that year is due to Congress on the same day. In theory, the QDR report and defense
strategy could draw on the previous year’s national security strategy, required “150
days” after an Administration takes office, and perhaps on the concurrent
development process for the second-year national security strategy.
The national military strategy, in turn, is required to be submitted to Congress
by February 15 of even-numbered years — that is, just several days after the
submission of the national security strategy — and either several days, or two years
and several days, after the submission of the QDR report and defense strategy. By
these timelines, development of the military strategy could draw on the defense
strategy from two or four years earlier, and perhaps on the concurrent defense
strategy development process.
53 (...continued)
at [http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/]. The “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” project at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies has recommended replacing the legislative
requirement for an annual national security strategy with one for a quadrennial guidance
document (see “Proposals,” below), Center for Strategic and International Studies, Clark A.
Murdock and Michele A. Flournoy, Lead Investigators, “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S.
Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report,” July 2005.
54 This timeline marks a change from the original permanent QDR mandate, which required
submission of the QDR report “not later than September 30 of the year in which the review
is conducted,” Title 10 U.S. Code §118(d) as amended by the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2000, P.L. 106-65 §901. The Bob Stump National Defense
Authorization Act of 2003, P.L. 107-314 §922, amended Title 10 U.S. Code §118(d) to
require a QDR report submission date of “not later than the date on which the President
submits the budget for the next fiscal year.”

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Clear Relationships Among Strategic Documents
Some observers have suggested that the distinctions among the mandates of
national security strategic documents, and particularly those for the defense and
military strategies, are not completely clear. All three strategic documents —
security, defense, and military — are mandated to provide objectives and strategies
to meet identified security challenges or opportunities, and to describe the
capabilities required to meet those objectives. The security strategy includes all
elements of national power — and all relevant agencies, civilian and military — and
is thus an umbrella for the DOD-centric defense and military strategies.
The intended relationship between the defense and military strategies is less
clear. The 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) stated that it “implements the
National Defense Strategy” (NDS). The NMS added that it “derives objectives,
missions and capability requirements from an analysis of the [National Security
Strategy], the NDS, and the security environment.”55 Its own contribution, in turn,
is providing “a set of interrelated military objectives and joint operating concepts”
that help Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders identify required capabilities.
It is not completely clear conceptually what further refinement or additions defense
objectives might require to become military objectives that senior leaders can use to
identify requirements.
Prioritization
Prioritization of objectives and activities by leadership at one level can help
leaders at the next subordinate level more appropriately shape their own strategies
and target their efforts and resources. The national security strategy could provide
such guidance to DOD and its QDR and defense strategy, and those DOD efforts
could provide corresponding guidance to the Joint Staff for its military strategy.
As a rule, current strategic documents do not prioritize the objectives or
missions they prescribe, nor are they required to do so by law.56 The most recent
national security strategies include eight or nine focus areas, but all of the areas are
implicitly equal in weight. The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report
names four focus areas, all implicitly of equal importance. Such guidance could
theoretically be used by subordinate agencies or offices to justify budgeting to
achieve a very wide spectrum of capabilities.
Roles and Responsibilities
Strategy at the national level generally addresses areas of effort that may require
participation by multiple departments and agencies. In many cases, there might be
55 See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United
States of America, “A Strategy for Today, a Vision for Tomorrow,” 2004, p. 2.
56 One exception is the new legislative mandate for the quadrennial homeland security
review, described above, whose report must include “a prioritized list of critical homeland
security missions.”

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multiple agencies that could conceivably accomplish the mission, such as
strengthening international partnerships. For such a mission, possible instruments
could include military exercises led by the Department of Defense, development
assistance programs led by the Agency for International Development, and
participation in multi-lateral organizations led by the Department of State, among
others. Yet recent national strategies have rarely assigned responsibility for specific
tasks to specific agencies.
By assigning responsibility for various missions, national strategy might serve
as a tool for leadership to indicate the most appropriate arm of national power to
bring to bear in each case — because the “messenger” may be as important as the
“message.” Using strategic documents to assign responsibilities might also help
agencies best focus their efforts, and might help conserve resources by preventing
duplication of effort.
Fiscal Constraints
The national security strategy, the national defense strategy and QDR, and the
national military strategy are not required by legislation to be fiscally constrained.57
At the Department of Defense, processes have long been in place, under the broad
heading “planning, programming, budgeting and execution cycle (PPBE),” to use
strategy to inform budget decisions. The PPBE cycle includes the development of
classified internal strategic guidance documents that assign responsibilities and set
priorities, which are used in turn to inform programming and budgeting.58 There is
no close analog for translating strategy into budget at the national level.
Competition of Ideas
In general, strategy development can benefit greatly from a healthy and robust
competition of ideas. The best-known historical example may be President
Eisenhower’s top secret “Project Solarium,” established shortly after Stalin’s death
in 1953, to reassess U.S. “containment” policy toward the Soviet Union. The
57 One historical exception was the early 1990s temporary national military strategy
requirement, see National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, November 5,
1990, P.L. 101-510, §1032. That legislation required that the Secretary of Defense’s
national military strategy report to Congress include the Secretary’s recommendations “for
a national military strategy that is both coherent and fiscally constrained” §1032(a)(2)(B).
The Secretary was to base his recommendation on a “strategic military plan” by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). In that plan, the CJCS was to lay out the best
plan possible for each of “three alternative sets of assumptions about future world conditions
and defense funding levels,” in which each set presumed a defense budget decline by a
specified amount, over a specified time period. See §1032(b)(1); and (e)(2), (f)(2), and
(g)(2).
58 PPBE was formerly known as the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).
For a description of these components, see Department of Defense Directive 7045.14, May
22, 1984, “The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System,” available at
[http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/704514p.pdf]. The names and formats of the
guidance documents produced, and of the bodies constituted within DOD to implement the
cycle, have varied over time.

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methodology included the formation of three teams of seasoned experts and
practitioners, both military and civilian. Each team was assigned a strategy to
elaborate and defend. After working for six weeks at the National War College, the
teams presented the strongest cases they could muster at a session with the President
Eisenhower, attended by the rest of the National Security Council, senior military
leaders, and others.59
More recently, Congress, when mandating the first quadrennial defense review,
also required the Secretary of Defense to establish a “nonpartisan, independent panel”
— the National Defense Panel — to assess the review process itself.60 Observers
note that the legislative mandate, and public voice including congressional testimony,
gave the panel an opportunity to shape the review process and its outcomes. The
2006 QDR process was also assisted by the work of an independent panel of defense
experts and retired flag officers, although they did not have a legislative mandate, and
their assessments were not made publicly available.
No legislative requirement is in place for the use of a “competitive” mechanism
to aid the development of national security strategy.
Intended Audience
Strategies required in unclassified form may be nominally intended to inform
multiple audiences simultaneously: the executive branch, Congress, the American
people, and foreign audiences.
In practice, some observers note, national strategies have typically emphasized
the “public diplomacy” function over the mandate to provide guidance within the
executive branch. As one observer noted, strategies such as the national security
strategy and national defense strategy are “heavy on themes and messages and light
on detail.”61 Referring to the requirement for a national security strategy, the
“Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” project based at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) argued that “… each Administration from President
Reagan on has chosen to treat this statute primarily as a requirement to publicly
explain and sell its polices rather than an opportunity to undertake a rigorous internal
strategic planning process. The result has consistently been a glossy document that
59 On Project Solarium and lessons that might be drawn from it, see Michele A. Flournoy
and Shawn W. Brimley, “Strategic Planning for National Security: A New Project
Solarium,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 41, 2nd Quarter 2006.
60 See NDAA for FY1997, September 23, 1996, P.L. 104-201, §924 (c) (1 and 2). The Panel
was also required to conduct an alternative force structure assessment, ibid., (c) (3), and (d).
61 See LTC Nathan Freier, “The Strategy Deficit,” Strategic Studies Institute, March 20,
2008, available at [http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB863.pdf].
LTC Freier adds, “None [of the strategies] can purport to involve the detailed articulation
of achievable, minimum essential ends, the balanced adjudication of ways and means, and
a thorough analysis of the risks associated with action and/or inaction.”

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serves a public affairs function, but does little to guide U.S. national security
policymaking and resource allocation.”62
It is possible that there are irreconcilable tensions, in terms of classification
level, between the need to provided detailed guidance to subordinates who will
implement it, and the need to explain — and sell — a strategic vision to broader,
potentially skeptical, public audiences. At the Department of Defense, for example,
the usual practice is to complement the public, unclassified QDR report and military
strategy with internal classified guidance documents that assign specific tasks to
offices of primary responsibility.63
Timeframe
As a rule, current security strategies are “present-tense” documents — they
describe security challenges and opportunities in the present tense, rather than
specifically addressing how those security conditions might be expected to evolve
over time. A key exception is the QDR, which is congressionally mandated to
anticipate conditions and requirements 20 years into the future.64
Some observers stress that a deliberate, longer-term outlook can play an
important role by informing preparations that require time, like developing and
building sophisticated platforms, or recruiting, educating, and training specialized
forces or categories of civilian personnel.
Strategic Guidance: Recent Proposals
A number of observers have suggested updating or amending current legislative
requirements to address some of the concerns noted above. This section describes
several of the most concrete proposals to date.
62 Clark A. Murdock and Michele A. Flournoy, Lead Investigators, “Beyond Goldwater-
Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2005, p. 28.
63 The names, formats, and timelines for delivery of these internal classified guidance
documents have evolved over time. For example, the 2006 QDR process directly informed
Strategic Planning Guidance and Joint Planning Guidance. Subsequently, as part of a
comprehensive effort to rationalize and synchronize internal strategic documents, DOD
established Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and Guidance for the Development
of the Force.
64 Two earlier products by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010,
issued in 1996, and Joint Vision 2020, issued in 2000, were intended to provide “conceptual
templates” for developing the force and its capabilities, and each looked out to its target year
“and beyond.” See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, July 2006,
available at [http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/history/jv2010.pdf], and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, May 2000, available at [http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/
jvpub2.htm].

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Quadrennial National Security Review
One proposal is that Congress mandate a “quadrennial national security review”
(QNSR), as an interagency-level analogue to DOD’s quadrennial defense review.
This proposal, in its current form, was put forward by the CSIS “Beyond
Goldwater-Nichols” project and was later echoed by other commentators.65
The “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” project recommended that Congress amend
legislation to replace the current requirement for a national security strategy with a
requirement for the more rigorous QNSR.66 The QNSR, like the QDR, would be a
review process. As articulated by the “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” project, it would
be led by a senior official designated by the President, and it would involve
participation from all departments and agencies concerned with at least some national
security issues. It would include “an assessment of the future security environment
and the development of national security objectives.” It would produce a strategy for
achieving those objectives, including “identifying the capabilities required to
implement the strategy and delineating agency roles and responsibilities.”
The proposal to create a quadrennial national security review is quite different
from the similar-sounding proposal put forward by the Commission on Smart Power,
also based at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, to establish a
requirement for a “quadrennial smart power review.”67 The “smart power” review,
also modeled on the QDR, would address the uses of all “the civilian tools of
65 See Clark A. Murdock and Michele A. Flournoy, Lead Investigators, Beyond Goldwater-
Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2005, p. 28. A similar proposal for a
Quadrennial Security Review (QSR) was put forward earlier, by the Commission on Roles
and Missions (CORM), whose work was mandated by the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1994, November 30, 1994, P.L. 103-160, in Title XIV, “National
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,Ӥ1401-1411. The QSR, which
would be a “comprehensive strategy and force review at the start of each Administration,”
and “an interagency activity directed by the National Security Council,” resembles the later
QNSR in proposed form. But the substantive focus of the QSR sounds more defense-centric
than that of the QNSR. The CORM noted, for example, that the QSR would “... address
international political and economic trends, changes in threats and military technology,
evolving opportunities for using military force to shape the security environment, resources
available for defense, possible adjustments to existing national security policy or strategy,
and a diverse set of military force and program options.” See John P. White, Chairman,
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Directions for Defense, May 24,
1995, 4-8, 4-9, and 4-10.
66 Murdock and Flournoy, p. 29.
67 See Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., co-chairs, “A Smarter, More Secure
America,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2007, p. 67. The
concept of “smart power” refers to an integration of traditional hard power (the use of
military and economic carrots and sticks to achieve desired ends) with soft power (“the
ability to attract people to our side without coercion”).

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national power.” The proposed “national security” review, by discussing both
military and civilian tools, would be broader in scope.68
National Security Planning Guidance
A second major proposal is that Congress enact legislation to require the
President to issue classified “national security planning guidance.” The proposal was
first put forward by the “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” project and was echoed in the
2006 QDR Report.69 The guidance would be classified, intended to convey intent and
direction to subordinate organizations. The guidance would set priorities, and state
national security objectives and the approaches and capabilities required to achieve
them. It would assign responsibility for specific tasks to specific agencies. It could
conceivably also provide specific fiscal guidance. The planning guidance would
follow from the national security strategy — or the quadrennial national security
review. “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” recommended that the guidance be issued in
the first year of each new administration, and updated biannually after that.
Staffing Strategic Guidance Activities
Some proponents of amending or expanding strategic guidance requirements
have observed that adequate personnel currently may not be available to manage and
integrate complex, multi-agency reviews or planning processes. One logical locus
for such staffing support is the National Security Council (NSC) staff, whose
positions give them access to high-level debates, and a systemic-level view above
and outside the various equities of individual departments. They are relatively well-
placed to help challenge assumptions and to identify gaps. However, as a rule, the
daily work of NSC staff has a short-term focus, on crises and other “real-time”
requirements.
Therefore, some observers have suggested that should additional strategic
guidance requirements be established, expanding the NSC staff, or re-designating the
portfolios of some of its personnel, might have to be considered. Two practitioner-
observers have gone further, recommending the creation and staffing of a permanent
new Interagency Planning and Policy Directorate within the NSC staff, led by a
Deputy National Security Advisor for Interagency Planning and Policy, who would
be dual-hatted as Deputy Director for National Security at the Office of Management
and Budget in order to ensure close linkage between planning and budgeting. The
68 The fact that the Smart Power Commission proposes that the “smart power review”
include only “civilian tools” is somewhat confusing, given that by their own definition,
“smart power” refers to the integration of soft power with traditional “hard power” —
including the use of the military.
69 See Clark A. Murdock and Michele A. Flournoy, Lead Investigators, Beyond Goldwater-
Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2005, p. 29, and Secretary of Defense,
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. 85.

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authors further recommend that the Directorate be subject to congressional oversight,
and that the leadership position be subject to Senate confirmation.70
70 Lt Col Sami Said, USAF, and Lt Col Cameron Hold, USAF, “A Time for Action: The
Case for Interagency Deliberate Planning,” John F. Kennedy School of Government,
National Security Program, May 7, 2008.

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